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No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation The criminal and civil actions for damages in cases written
of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought defamation shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the court of first instance of the province or city-
offended party. (As amended by R.A. 1289, approved June 15, 1955, 1. Where the libelous article is printed and first published; or
R.A. 4363, approved June 19, 1965). 2. Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public For the purpose of determining the meaning of any
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance v. Reyes,12 to wit:
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn.,
341), the court had the following to say on this point: "In
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two
concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 8 construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
The last two elements have been duly established by the which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2)
prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to whole."
someone other than the person against whom it has been
written.9 Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states that the same Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in
was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao
complained of has communicated it to a third English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts
10
person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule
subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself. as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago
dito."14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory;
and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution
need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious
(malice in law).15 A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such
a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioners good intention and justifiable G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal
inference of malice. JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
The MeTC refused quashal. (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig Criminal Case No. 82366.
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Petitioner also sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings Ruling:
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail petition in S.C.A. 2803
and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
remained unresolved. 82366.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
motion.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape
RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed
No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
proved unavailing. escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
Hence, this petition. contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments
of convictions.
Issue/s:
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the its Consequences on Persons and
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Property are Material Only to Determine
Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and the Penalty
jurisprudence.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers
penalizing quasi-offenses. (See Article 365)
the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence
sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a
to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
to that of a fugitive without standing.
or foresight, the imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 punish the intentional criminal act.
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses
set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case
Reckless Imprudence Bars
No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 more consequences.
starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of
a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because
a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts,
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and Hence, SC hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should
consistently answered in the affirmative. proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to shall be filed in the same first level court.
which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and The ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied
both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting
acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This Branch 157. Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. petitioner is Dismissed.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
SC GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,