GALLO SPECIAL PROCEEDING

By: Pablo Jan Marc A. Filio IV

INTRODUCTION

NATCHER V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 133000 OCTOBER 2, 2001

Buena, J:

Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel
of land in Manila. Upon the death of Garciana, Garciano together with the six children entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate. Under the agreement, Graciano shall receive
8/14 share while each of the six children shall receive 1/14 share. The heirs executed and forged
an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights. They
subdivided among themselves the parcel of land.
Graciano donated to his children a portion of share in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos name. The land
was further subdivided into separate lot. Graciano sold the 1st lot to a third person but retained
ownership over the 2nd lot to Natcher and a title was issued under her name.
Graciano died leaving his 6 children and Nather as heirs. A civil case was filed before
RTC of Manila by the 6 six children alleging that Natcher acquired the 2nd lot through fraud,
forgery, and misrepresentation by making it appear that Graciano exceuted a Deed of Sale in her
favour. They allege that their legitimes have been impaired.
On the other hand, Petitioner Natcher alleged that she was legally married to Graciano in
Mrach 20, 1980 and she is likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter.
The RTC Ruling deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor
of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. No evidence that a
separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property between them. Therefore, it can be construed as an
advance inheritance to Patricia because the sale is void and the donation is void.
The CA ruled that a probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make just and legal
distribution of the estate by trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/ annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for
settlement of estate of a deceased person.

Issue:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by
the decedent to any of the heirs?

Held: NO. CA decision AFFIRMED.

Ratio:

Civil Action Special Proceeding

A formal demand of right in a court of justice
in the manner prescribed by the court of the
law
A method of applying legal remedies according
to definite established rules
An application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
No formal pleadings are required unless the
statue expressly provides
The remedy is granted upon an application or
motion

In an American Jurisprudence
Special proceedings are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decendent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court, matters which involve ssettlement and
distributions of the estate of the decendent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to
advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
The RTC is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of Natcher in the case for reconveyance and annulment
of the title with damages. The RTC of Manila was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario
to his wife. The present issue is a mere question of procedure which may be waived. No waiver
was done by the six children nor did they assail the authority of the trial court.
The RTC that acts in its general jurisdiction to rule on this specific issue of advancement
made by decendent to the petitioner, a probabte court may not decide a question of title of
ownership with the following exceptions:
a. Probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership if the interested
parties are all heirs
b. Question is one of collation or advance ment.
c. Parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
the third parties are not impaired the remedy is granted generally upon application or
motion.
Here, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action which are matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding that requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction.

PACIFIC BANKING CORP vs CA G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

Mendoza, J:

Facts:
This is a consolidated cases.

Case Number One

Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank
of the Philippines and, was placed under liquidation and a liquidator was appointed. The Central
Bank filed a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation." The RTC ruled in favor the petition and then the creditors filed their claims with
the court.
On the other hand, Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union), filed a
complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary
increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its
members as employees of the union. The RTC ordered payment of the principal claims of the
Union. The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order but was
denied. The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit
Record on Appeal. The respondent judge disallowed Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the
ground that it was late because it was filed more than 15 days after receipt of the decision.
The liqudator filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus CA. CA held in
favor of the liquidator. The case of the Union that the proceeding before the RTC was a
special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of
the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time.

Case Number Two

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondent, filed claims for the payment of
investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18
before the RTC. Respondent judge directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents as
preferred creditors. The Liquidator moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration
The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders.As in the case of the Union,
however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had
been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. The judge directed the
execution of his order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
The Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered is 15 days
Since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice
of appeal was filed late.
The Liquidator filed a petition before Supreme Court. Liquidator contends that the
Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special
Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is
30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

Issue:
Whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action?

Held:
The petition for liquidation is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING.

Ratio:
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
1. Action defined. Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which
the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.

2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. Every other remedy, including one to

establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.

Ordinary Civil Action Special Proceedings

The act by which one sues another in a court of
justice for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A formal demand of a right by one against
another.
Proper remedy of a party litigant that seeks to
recover property from another.
The act by which one seeks to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
A petition for a declaration of a status, right or
fact.
Proper remedy of a party whose purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an
insane.

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding

and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right
nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for
injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its
creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment
of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.
Since a petition for liquidation is in the nature of a special proceeding, the period of appeal is 30
days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a
record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal.

In CASE#2 (Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having
been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the
result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required
under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple
appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a
decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record
on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final.

In CASE#1 (union), CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition
and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of
the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for
extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal.
Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's
motion for extension to file a record on appeal.

CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition and its decision should be affirmed.

Note:
Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for
interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of
the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus
charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in
the order of payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased
persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with
the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and
the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights
and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for
liquidation of an insolvent corporation.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 163604 MAY 6, 2005

Carpio-Morales, J:

Facts:
Apolinaria Jomoc filed a petition to declare a presumprive death of her husband
Clemente Jomoc for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage.
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article
provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of a spouse for the purpose of remarriage is
a special proceeding?

Held:
No, the declaration of presumptive death of a spouse for the purpose of remarriage is a special
proceeding.

Ratio:
As a general rule, petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding. Under Section 3(c) of the same rule special proceeding is
defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The
inatant petition is indeed not an ordinary civil action. It only seeks for a declaration by the trial
court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it
involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
However, under Article 41 of the Family Code, for the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Therefore in the given case, it is a summary proceeding

NON-PROBATE MODE OF SETTLEMENT

CEASE VS CA G.R. No. L-33172 OCTOBER 18, 1979

Guerrero, J:
Facts:

Forrest Cease and five (5) other American citizens formed Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company.Eventually, the shares of the other original incorporators were bought out by Cease with his children.
The companys charter lapsed in June 1958. Forrest Cease died in August 1959.
There was nomention whether there were steps to liquidate the company. Some of his
children wanted an actualdivision while others wanted a reincorporation. Two of his children,
Benjamin and Florence, initiatedSpecial Proceeding No. 3893 with CFI Tayabas asking that the
Tiaong Milling and PlantationCorporation be declared identical to Forrest Cease and that its
properties be divided among hischildren as intestate heirs. Defendants opposed the same but the
CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the CFIs
decision but the same was dismissed for beingpremature. The case was elevated to the SC which
remanded it to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower courts decision that
thesubject properties owned by the corporation are also properties of the estate of Forrest Cease?

Held:
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the lower courts decision that
thesubject properties owned by the corporation are also properties of the estate of Forrest Cease.

Ratio:
The trial court indeed found strong support, one that is based on a well-
entrenchedprinciple of law which is the theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong
Milling as onepersonality", or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the
deceased ForrestL. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties
of Forrest L. Cease andshould be divided equally, share and share alike among his six children,
... ", the trial court aptly applied the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the
legal fiction of distinct andseparate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the
individual member one and thesame. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge
narrated the undisputed factualpremise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens, friends or third-
parties inrelation to another, in the course of its existence, it developed into a close family
corporation. TheBoard of Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which
Forrest L. Cease alwaysretained the majority stocks and hence the control and management of its
affairs. It must be notedthat as his children increase or become of age, he continued distributing
his shares among themadding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only 190 were left to
his name.Definitely, only the members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The corporation 'never' had any account with any banking institution or if any account was carried ina
bank on its behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. There is truth in plaintiff's
allegationthat the corporation is only a business conduit of his father and an extension of his
personality, they are one and the same thing. Thus, the assets of the corporation are also the estate of Forrest L.
Cease,the father of the parties herein who are all legitimate children of full
blood. A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of disregardin
g orpiercing the veil of corporate fiction.GENERAL RULE: a corporation is vested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from thepersons composing it as well as any other legal entity to which
it may be related. By virtue of thisattribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer
for acts or liabilities of its stockholdersor those of the legal entities to which it may be connected,
and vice versa. This separate and distinctpersonality is, however, merely a fiction created by law
for convenience and to promote the ends of justiceEXCEPTIONS: Such rule may not be used or
invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation or which
could not have been intended by law to which it owes its being. This isparticularly true where the
fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,defend crime, confuse
legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumventthe law This is
likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or businessconduit
for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate. In any of these cases, thenotion of
corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be treated merely as an
association of persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the
one being merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the other. An indubitable
deduction from the findings of the trial court cannot but lead to the conclusion thatthe business of
the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal venture of Forrest L. Cease. Thereis not even a shadow of a
showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own. Their participation as
nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitousdole out of his own
shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.If the Court sustained the theory of
petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction orabuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in deciding the civil case as a case for partition,Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company would
have been able to extend its corporate existence beyond the period of its charter which lapsed in
June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, CeasePlantation Company, Inc. as Trustee which
would be against the law, and as Trustee shall have beenable to use the assets and properties for
the benefit of the petitioners, to the great prejudice anddefraudation. of private respondents.
Hence, it becomes necessary and imperative to pierce thatcorporate veil.The judgment appealed from
is AFFIRMED

PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. L-81147 JUNE 20, 1989

Gancayco, J.:

Facts:
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away
without a will and survived by petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira who is his legitimate spouse of
ten months and his respondent sister Rita Pereira Nagac.
Rita Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira because Rita Nagac and
Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased, the deceased left no will,
there are no creditors of the deceased, the deceased left several properties, and the spouse of the
deceased had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary
forms part of the estate of the deceased.
 Victoria contended that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
RTC appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate and appointed
Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate

Issue:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without
leaving any debts?

Held:
No, judicial administration proceeding is not necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts.

Ratio:
As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator. The exception is
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. The court ruled that this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
a. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the
heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where
such property is in the hands of one heir.
b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment
wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective
could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration.
c. to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings

PORTUGAL V. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN G.R. NO. 155555 AUGUST 16, 2005

Carpio-Morales, J:

Facts:
Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.) contracted two marriages. The first marriage is with Paz
Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (April 1950), the
herein respondent. The second marriage is with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a
boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (Sept. 1949), the petitioners herein.
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights executed by
Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father, a parcel of land in Caloocan was
issued a TCT in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985. In 1988, Leonila executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person, adjudicating to herself
the Caloocan parcel of land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name Leonila
Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against Leonila for
cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila is
not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan
parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in
their (petitioners) name.
A Pre-Trial Order was issued, citing the following issues to be resolved, to wit:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.
(Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioners status
and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court.
Citing the case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the Supreme Court in this case
ruled that the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a
special proceeding, not an ordinary civil action. Thus, the court, not being a probate court, is
without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein.
On appeal to CA, the petitioners cite the case of Carino vs. Carino. In this case, the SC
ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court held that in
Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two marriages, whereas in the instant case,
the main issue is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TCs dismissal
of the case.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should institute a special proceeding to determine their status as
heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name?

Held:
 No, the petitioners should not to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as
heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name

Ratio:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under
the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate
court, no doubt has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
However, the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is in the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical. It is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to
still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to
wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal,
is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is
the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.

AVELINO V. COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 115181 MARCH 31, 2000

Quisimbing, J:

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr.
Private respondent Angelina Avelina is the wife of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr. The
other private respondents are Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all
surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon is an American who is
the second wife. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
Petitioner Ma. Socorro filed to be appointed the administrator of the estate. On the other
hand, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed. Respondent
judged favor the private respondents. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the action for judicial partition of the estate is proper in the case at bar?

Held:
Yes, the action for judicial partition of the estate is proper in the case at bar.

Ratio:
Under Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 74 of Rules of Court, when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial
administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. A complete
inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate
has no debts. Therefore, CA did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition.

INITIATION OF PROBATE PROCEEDING

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA VS. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, ET AL,

GR NO. 154322 AUGUST 22, 2006

Corona, J:

Facts:
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six
children: petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now
deceased), HilariaFiguracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and
Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children.
When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 in the name
of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento and (2) Lot 705 in the name
of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento. Leandro had inherited both lots from his
deceased parents nad issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento and new TCT No. 101331 was
issued to Lazaro Adviento who married to Rosenda Sagueped as owner of the 162 sq. m. The
other part of the land is still owned by Leandro Figuracion who was married to
Carolina Adviento as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name of Leandro in
Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
 A complaint of partition happened between the petitioner and her sister respondent Mary.
The dispute between petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla and her sister, respondent Mary over
the eastern half of Lot 707.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento. When Adviento died, his two
daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his
daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of
petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died
single and without any issue. However, before her half-sisters death, respondent Carolina
adjudicated unto herself the entie lot of 707 through an affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. Then, she sold the entire Lot 707 to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two
immediately had a new TCT under their name in the names (Felipa and Hilaria) for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed
for ten years. Returning in 1981, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-
portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.
Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and
respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City, for partition, annulment
of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents over Lot 2299
and 705. She also filed for the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot
707.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo
settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that
an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
The RTC rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed
of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties
of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for
by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the
properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being
premature. However, it upholded the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of
sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied,
respondents elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334,
entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla

Issue:
Whether or not there is a need of prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate before the
properties can be partitioned or distributed?

Held:
Yes, there is a need of prior prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate before the
properties can be partitioned or distributed.
With respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of
Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale in favor
of Felipa and HilariaFiguracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al.
v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.

Ratio:
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth
in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the
moment of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of
Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299.
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section
2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.
In the given case, the petitioner did not dispute that there are certain expenses including
those related to her fathers final illness and burial which are not yet properly settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In estate settlement
proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate
must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties
may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.

ABOLARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 129163 APRIL 22, 2003

Panganiban, J:

Facts:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo
Baloyo, (4) Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now
dead.
The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and
[respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein
[respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with
the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without
issue.
Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacions father, Juan Arbolario, consorted
with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the
[petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion
Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as Arbolarios). It is significant to note, at
this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners] were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his
sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document acknowledged before Notary
Public Deogracias Riego.
In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda,
Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared
themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces,
Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half.
And as far as Julian Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned, records could only show
that he was married to a certain Margarita Palma; and that he died, presumably after 1951
without any issue.
Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed
parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or
ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving
daughters of her (Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to
share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2). This forthwith brought about the
cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in their names and
conformably with the aforesaid distribution.
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against Spouses Rosalita
Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid
lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late
Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the
disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 -- before Civil Case No. 367 was heard and tried on the
merits -- Voltaire M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala, Exaltacion Arbolario,
Carlos Arbolario (Arbolarios, collectively) and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez
Salhay (the same defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil Case No. 385 [f]or Cancellation
of Title with Damages, against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 367. The Arbolarios, joined by the
Salhays, contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the
Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The
Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister,
Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the
aforesaid lot

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate children?
2. Whether or not there is evidence of purchase?
3. Whether or not the petitioner has right over the partition?

Held:
1. No, the petitioners are not legitimate children.
 2. No, there is no evidence of purchase.
3. No, the petitioner has no right over the partition.

Ratio:
First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was
intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit
has been written over to make it look like a 0. Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners
should show a chronological progression in the heirs years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and
Eduardo in 1947.Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her name written
after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official
translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since
respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the
whole document.
Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios marriage
to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they
were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already
conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other
generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they
were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that
they were half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and
nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or
illegitimate siblings. We quote the appellate court:
x x x. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan
Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the
foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan Arbolario.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New
Civil Code); and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the
dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to
prove his or her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the x x x
Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted subsequent marriage, who must show
proof of their legitimacy. But this, they have miserably failed to do.[14]
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. It
stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.[16] Petitioners, however, failed
to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and
Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CAs factual findings cannot be set aside,
because they are supported by the evidence on record.[17] As held by the appellate court, without
proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even
where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage
subsists, and either spouses cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between
husband and wife
 2. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as
petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale when they argued thus: As to the
spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not present any written contract to
support their claim to having purchased a portion of Lot 323 where their house stands. Rosalita
R. Salhay on the witness stand testified under oath that she has no contract of sale in her favor
because it was her mother, Rosela Rodriguez who had purchased the land, but she was not able
to produce any evidence of such sale in favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid
land taxes for the land. Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in
toto. The CA, on the other hand, categorically ruled that no clear and reliable evidence had been
introduced to prove such bare [allegation] that a portion of the disputed lot had ever been
purchased by the Salhays. Besides, no favorable supporting evidence was cited by petitioners in
their Memorandum. Thus, we find no reason to overturn the CAs factual finding on this point.

3. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the

individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and
a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference. Petitioners in this case
were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they were
legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the
determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate
of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in
special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession.

AZUELA VS CA G.R. NO. 122880 APRIL 12, 2006

Tinga, J:

Facts:
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on April 10, 1984 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate
the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on June 10, 1981. Petitioner is the
son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the
vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate
petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner
himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed
that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart
Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented
herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Oppositor Geralda
Castillo argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law.After due
trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. The Order was
appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased
mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not it can be probated?

Held:
No, it cannot be probated.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. It held
that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause
to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on
the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of
which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to.

AZUELA VS CA G.R. NO. 122880 APRIL 12, 2006

Tinga, J:

Facts:
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on April 10, 1984 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate
the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on June 10, 1981. Petitioner is the
son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the
vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate
petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner
himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed
that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart
Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented
herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Oppositor Geralda
Castillo argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law.After due
trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. The Order was
appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased
mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not it can be probated?
Held:
No, it cannot be probated.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. It held
that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause
to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on
the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of
which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to.

ALABAN V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.NO. 156021 SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

Tinga, J:

Facts:
Respondent Fransisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Soledad Prrovido Elevencionado. The reposndent condtended that he was
the heir of the decendent and the executor of the will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will
and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
After four months, petitioner filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceeding.
The petitioner claimed that they are the intestate heirs of the descendent. They contended that
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees,
defective publication, and lack of notice of the others heirs. The will could not have been
probated because the signature was forged, the will was not executed in accordance with the law,
the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause, the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity to execute and publish a will, the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure, the descendent had no intention to make will at the time of affixing of her
signature, and she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will
properties which no longer belonged to her.
RTC denied the motion and ruled that the petitioner were notified by the publication and
the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for outright dismissal of the case.
CA dismissed the petition of the petitioner and ruled that there is no showing that the petitioner
failed to availed of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief of
judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.

Issue:
Whether or not the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to mentioned
the petitioner as parties?

Held:
No, the allowance of the will to probate should not be annulled for failure to mentioned the
petitioner as parties.
Ratio:
Probate of a will is considered action in rem. Under the Rules of Court, any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Petitioner became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing.
The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new trial. The ruling became final
executor because the motion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of the decision four
months after they could have filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their
motion to reopen.
Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive
requisites. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose to have the final and
executor judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. The two grounds are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of denial of due process. An action to annul a final
judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.
Extrinsic fraud is present when a party having a trial or from representing his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. The will states that the respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
descendent this he has no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or
personally notify them.

FLEUMER V. HIX G.R. NO. L-32636 MARCH 17, 1930

Malcolm, J:

Facts:
The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the
latters will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the
petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, as found in West Virginia Code
and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance
however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of
such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.

Held:
Yes, it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law i n
West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.
Ratio:
The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of
the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the
law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as
provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the
laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court
therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West
Virginia must be proved.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR

PIJUAN VS. VDA. DE GURREA GR NO. L-21917 NOVEMBER 29, 1966

Concepcion, CJ:

Facts:
In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain,
where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro,
to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children.
Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental. Manuela came to the Philippines, but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to
his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son Teodoro in Bacolod City.
Mrs. Gurrea instituted against Carlos Gurrea before Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in
favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said court issued an order granting Mrs.
Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which, on May 17, 1961, was reduced by
the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in
which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and Teodoro.
Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was appointed special administrator of
the estate without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her
son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.
Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion alleging that the
aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon the death
of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it
pending the final determination of the case. This motion having been denied in an order dated
February 2, 1963, Mrs. Gurrea moved for a reconsideration. She also moved for her appointment
as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. The lower court denied the motion of Mrs. Gurrea
for her appointment as administratrix, in view of the provision of the will of the deceased
designating another person as executor thereof.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Manuela Ruiz is entitled for share of the estate of Carlos Guerra?
2. Whether or not Manuela Ruiz should be appointed as admintratrix of the estate of Carlos
Guerra?

Held:
1. Yes, Manuela Ruiz is entitled for share of the estate of Carlos Guerra.
2. Yes, Manuela Ruiz should be appointed as admintratrix of the estate of Carlos Guerra.

Ratio:
1. Absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property, under the law
such property belongs to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs
presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea and also part of the share of the deceased in said
partnership. Thus, the provision of disinheriting her is nullified. It is clear that the
continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil
Case No. 5820, is fairly justified.
2. Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. "if no executor is named in the will or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate." However, in the case at bar, none of these were obtained. The
deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still
pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said
document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor is not claimed that he is incompetent
therefor. He expressly accepted the trust by applying for his appointment as executor and
upon his appointment as special administrator, he has assumed the duties thereof. It may
not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to appoint of a regular administrator or
administratrix, not to that of a special administrator. The order appointing the latter lies
within the discretion of the probate court and is not appealable.

LUZON SURETY VS. QUEBAR GR L-40517 31 JANUARY 1984

Makasiar, J:

Facts:
Luzon Surety issued 2 administrator's bond (P15,000.00 each), in behalf of Pastor T.
Quebrar, as administrator of the testate estates of A. B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa,.
For the first year, premiums and documentary stamps were paid. On June 6, 1957, the CFI of
Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of Quebrar. On May
8, 1962, Luzon Surety demanded the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps but the
Quebrar moved for the cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the
heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares". The CFI of Negros
Occidental ordered the bonds cancelled.
 On January 8, 1963, the Luzon Surety filed the case with the CFI of Manila. The
defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00 by way of amicable settlement which the Luzon Surety
refused. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defendants-appellants.
Defendants-appellants appealed to the CA. CA certified the herein case to the SC after finding
that this case involves only errors or questions of law.

Issue:
Whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year
that they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled?

Held:
Yes, administrator's bonds were still in force and effect from and after the year that they
were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled.

Ratio:
Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. Before an executor or
administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or administration
issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any
other person for him;
(b) (b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to
the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which
shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other
person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies,
and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the
court;
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one
(1) years, and at any other time when required by the court;
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.

The surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has
duties to do as such administrator/executor. Quebrar still had something to do as an
administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts.
Liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts
and expenses. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the
term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the
administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as
the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability
notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
The lower court was correct. The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as
part of the consideration, and not as a condition for the payment was not made a condition to the
attaching or continuing of the contract. The premium is the consideration for furnishing the
bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists for as long as the liability of the surety shall
exist.

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

G.R. NO. 183053 OCTOBER 10, 2012

Perez, J:

Facts:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on June 4, 1950. She was married to
Dr. Frederico Suntay with only one child Emilio Suntay I who died before the death of his
parents. Cristina left her spouse Dr. Federico Suntay (Frederico) and five grandchildren. Three
of the grand children are legitimate grandchildren including Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay
(respondent) and two illegitimate grandchildren including Emilio Suntay III (petitioner).
After the death of Cristina, respondent Isabel filed before RTC of Malolos a petition for
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Cristina. On the other hand, Federico
opposed Isabel and filed a motion to dismiss on the petition of Cristina on the ground that Isabel
had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina because Cristina is an illegitimate
grandchild of Cristina due to the declaration of the marriage of Isabels parents as null and void.
Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his behalf in the
event letters of administration issues to Federico. Furthermore, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention contending that he is better than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the descendent after the death of Cristina and Federico.
The trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of descendent
Cristinas intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. The Court decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate
to give weight to his interest in Federicos estate.

Issue:
Who is better qualified between Emilio III and Isabel to act as administrator of the
decedents estate?

Held:
Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

Ratio:
As a general rule, the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
 (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
The rule lists a sequence to be observed in an order of preference about the appointment
of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse,
the next of kin and the creditor in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of administrator over the estate
of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, in
the alternative, suffer the consequence of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and the most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. The rule speaks
of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate but an interest greater than other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled
does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as
one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right.
It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case.
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand,
and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents
were alive,
which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III
to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has
not looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the
estate. Respondent Isable points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not overlooked after the welfare of the subject estate and has
actually acted to damage and prejudice thereof.

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ VS. CA G.R.118671 JANUARY 29, 1996

Puno, J.

Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs:
a. Edmond Ruiz only son
b. Maria Pilar Ruiz adopted daughter
c. Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all
daughters of Ruiz
Testator Hilario Ruiz bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal, and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash
component of his estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz and respondents.
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will. After 4 years, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval
of the deceaseds will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to
deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. Edmond moved for the release of
P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7,722.00
Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court admitted the
will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the
filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion
for Release of Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due
to Edmonds lack of opposition. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but
only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances
for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their
share in the inheritance
CA sustained probate courts order.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
 1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren - NO
2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs -No
3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. No

Held:
1. No, the grant of allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the of the
testators grandchildren are not allowed.
2. No, the order of the release of the titles to certain heirs is not allowed.
3. No, the grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will is not
allowed.

Ratio:
1. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate.
a. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend
it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity
b. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction
of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts
when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The
estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.
a. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.
b. At the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law
a. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated
 b. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner
before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for
release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order
of the said court.
c. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his father's will be included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
d. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall
proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.

3. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate
not willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.
a. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of
court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for
repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of
the real estate taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release of additional
funds for the same reasons he previously cited
a.It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting
of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favour
b. Petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year
rental income from the Valle Verde property.
c. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the
estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.

ANA LIM KALAW V. IAC G.R. NO. 74618 SEPTEMBER 2, 1991

Nocon, J:

Facts:
Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended
petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration before CFI Manila in Special Proceeding
naming Ana Lim Kalaw, Victoria Lim Kalaw, Pura Lim Kalaw, and Rosa Lim Kalaw as the
surviving heirs of Carlos Lim Kalaw.
The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special
administratrix. Later on, the Ana Lim Kalaw filed a preliminary inventory of all the properties
which came into her possession of the state of her father Carlos Lim Kalaw. The court also
appointed her as judicial administratrix.
 On the other hand, Jose Lim filed a motion to require the petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw to
have an accounting of her administration of said estate which was granted by Judge Ricardo
Diaz. However, the instruction was returned to the court after it was served personally to
petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw.
Thereafter, the private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw with her sisters Victoria and Pura
filed a motion to remove petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as adminstratrix of the estate of Carlos Lim
Kalaw and appoint the private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw instead due to the failure to render an
accounting of her administration for violation Section 8 of Rule 85 of Revised Rules of Court.
Ana Lim Kalaw likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion praying for
her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in rendering said accounting was due to the
fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned,
had then been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a
considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest
soon after his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to render
an accounting report.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw should be removed as admintratrix of the
estate of Carlos Lim Kalaw?
2. Whether or not petitioner Ana Lim Kalwa was deprived of due process of law?

Held:
1. Yes, Ana Lim Kalaw should be removed as admintratrix of the estate of Carlos Lim
Kalaw.
2. No, petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw was not deprived of due process of law.

Ratio:
1. Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. Every executor
or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year
from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the
court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims
against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he
shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is
wholly settled."
The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from
his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall." The only exception is
when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the
estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case
at bar. Furthermore, petitioner's excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding was pending
and was vacant most of the time deserves scant consideration since petitioner never attempted to
file with said court an accounting report of her administration despite the fact that at one time or
another. Judge Sundiam and Judge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their
incumbency. Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not
purge her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies
petitioner's removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her place as
mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her
failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to render an
accounting of her administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.

2. Petitioner's contention that her removal was without due process is certainly not borne
out by the records. There has been a hearing and several pleadings had been filed by the parties
on the issue before the order of removal was issued. Thus, the motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix was filed and a motion for hearing was set. Petitioner filed an opposition to the
motion for it. This was followed by a Rejoinder and Manifestation by private respondent. The
order for petitioner's removal was issued on January 4, 1985, or after almost a year from the time
the motion to remove her was filed. Not satisfied with this order, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 1985, to which motion private respondent filed an opposition on
January 25, 1985. Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the opposition on February 18, 1985. Respondent
Judge issued his order denying the motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1985. This recital of
events indubitably disproves petitioner's allegation that she was not afforded due process.

PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB G.R. NO. 156403 MARCH 21, 2005

Facts:
On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin
Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana,
Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang.
On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City
a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. The petition,
docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred
to as the intestate court. In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as
among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners'
judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 also of the CFI of Davao
City, Branch VI. On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustins
petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the
PNB and Arguna respectively. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions
prejudicial to them. The trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both
were valid with respect to the other parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals;
to the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the
foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court?

Held:
Yes, the court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
Ratio:
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners.
The element of delay in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking.
Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties.
There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified petitioners of the
contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although petitioners finally obtained knowledge of
the subject petitions filed by their father, and eventually challenged the July 18, 1973, October
19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from
the challenged decision of the appellate court when they (petitioners) actually learned of the
existence of said orders of the intestate court. Absent any indication of the point in time when
petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity
thereof certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches
against them.

RIOFERIO V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 129008 JANUARY 13, 2004

Tinga, J:

Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and
real properties in Angeles City, Dagupan City, and Kalookan City. He left a wife Ezperanza
Orfinada with seven children and a paramour Teodora Riofero with children Aldo. Private
respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio
and her children (executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and transfers involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P.
Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.

Issue:
Whether or the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case?

Held:
Yes, the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case

Ratio:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision
of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle
that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if
administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would
care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the
meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
The rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the
estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being
when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

UNION BANK VS. EDMUND SANTIBANEZ GR NO. 149926 FEBRUARY 23, 2005

Callejo, Sr, J:

Facts:
The First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into
a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of 1 unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. Efraim and his son
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five
equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 .
The FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in the amount
of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and 1 unit Howard Rota-motor
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the loan.
Efraim died in 1981 and left a holographic will. The testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola executed a Joint Agreement.
They agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors, 2 Tractors for
Edmund and 1 Tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC
A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the Edmund failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, the petitioner UBP filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. So, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
 Respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer alleged that the loan documents did not
bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and
her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void. Hence, she was
not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
The RTC ruled that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. Furthermore, the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by Edmund and Florence was in effect a partition but was
null and void because it was not approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. It ruled further that petitioner failed to prove that
it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its
assets and liabilities. The court agreed to the respondents that the list of assets and liabilities of
the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents
account.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the joint agreement made by Efraim and Florence is valid even if there is
a pending probate proceeding in the court?
2. Whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding?
3. Whether or not the petitioner is the proper parties as successor-in-interest?

Held:
1. No, the joint agreement made by Efraim and Florence is not valid even if there is a
pending probate proceeding in the court.
2. No, the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding.
3. No, the petitioner is the proper parties as successor-in-interest.

Ratio
1. At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In
our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication
of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of a will. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic willwhich contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as
follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
 We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving
the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at
the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their
late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. It must be stressed that the
probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the
probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing
that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had
yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature
act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim
against the estate of the deceased.

2. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness
of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it
provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and
take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
First Countryside Credit Corp. The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that
they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
 counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-
maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.

3. The petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August
20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank
of the Philippines. However, the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in
the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc.
Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines.
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.

ALDAMIZ V. JUDGE OF CFI MINDORO

Moran, C.J:
Facts:
Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a Spaniard and member of
the commercial partnership Aldamiz y Rementeria. The other members were his brothers.
Santiago Rementeria died in Spain in 1937. Probate proceedings were instituted in the same year
in CFI of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino Aldamiz was
appointed administrator and was again represented by responded Atty. Juan Luna.
After ten years from the date of appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through
his attorney, Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for the years 1944, 1945, and 1946 and also a
project of partition with view of closing the proceedings. The court approved the accounts but
refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts including attorneys fees are paid.
In partition, it was expressly stated that attorneys fees, debts, and incidental expenses
would be proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings.
However, the court refused to sanction this clause of the project. Attorney Luna, to comply with
the wishes of the court, without filling a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and
without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and
professional standing so that the court may fix his compensation and the administrator may make
payment thereof.
It must be noted that Attorney Luna served as attorney for the administrator as legal
consultants to Santiago and his brothers and to Aldamiz y Rementeria. He did not charge them
professional services, thus showing disinterested and extreme liberality due to friendship and
other personal considerations toward his clients. When he wanted to close accounts of the estate,
he showed no interest in demanding for payment by preferring to leave the matter to the future
negotiation or understanding with interested parties. When the amount of his fees was fixed by
court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for substantial reduction, he answered that it was not he
who had fixed the amount but the court, and advised his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection to any reduction in amount
and to any extension of the time for praying what might be grnated by the court.
The court issued its order awarding respondent Attorney Luna in payment of his
professional services, an aggregate sum of P28,000. Petitioner was able to pay P5,000 only and
upon his failure to pay the balance after several demands made upon him by respondent attorney,
the latter filed an ex-parte motion for execution which was granted by respondent court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the court ruled in fixing the amount of attorneys fees and issuing a writ
of execution?
2. Whether or not the order of prosecution is proper in the case?

Held:
1. No, the court is not correct in fixing the amount of attorneys fees and issuing a writ of
execution.
2. No, the order of prosecution is not proper in the case.

Ratio:
1. The correct procedure for the collection of attorneys fees is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not
as an administrator should he fail to pay. If the judgment is rendered against the administrator
 and he pays, he may include the fees as paid in his account to the court. The attorney may
also instead bring such action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding asking that
the court, after notice all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to
pay it as an expense of administration.
No written petition for the payment of attorneys fees has ever been filed by the
respondent attorney and the interested parties had not been previously notified of hearing held in
court. Consequently, the order issued by the respondents feed and all subsequent orders
implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued excess of jurisdiction.

2. The order of execution is null and void because a writ of execution is not proper procedure
allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The
proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or sale of mortgaged of real
property of deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issue upon motion
of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in
the Philippines.
Execution may issue only where the devisees legatees of heirs have entered into
possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts
and expenses to be paid, in which case, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances
require.

FE QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 124862 DECEMBER 22, 1998

Bellosillo, J:

Facts:
Petitioner Fe D. Quita and Arturo Padlan were both Filipinos when they were married in
the Philippines in May 1941. They got divorce in San Fransiscoon July 23, 1954. Both of them
remarried to another person. Fe D Quita remarried twice after the divorce to Arturo. Arturo
remarried Bladina Dandan. They were blessed with six children.
Arturo died and the trial court set to declared as to who will be the instate heirs. The trial
court invoking the ruling in Tenchavez vs Escano that ruled that the divorce acquired by the
petitioner is recognized in the Philippines.
On the other hand, the private respondent stressed that the citizenship of the petitioner
was relevenat in the light of ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtained divorce
are recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. The
petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. The petitioner also
stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the same tome she obtained the divorce. Thus, it implies that
she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
The trial court disregarded the contention of the respondent. The net hereditary estate was
ordered in favor of Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan
children moved for reconsideration. A partial reconsideration was granted declaring Padlan
children with exception of Alexis entitled to of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan
and the other half to Fe Quita. Priavte respondent Blandina Dandan was not declared an heir for
her marriage to Arturo was declared void ab initio since it was celebrated during the existence of
his previous marriage to the petitioner Fe Quita. Hence an appeal, the CA referred back the case
to the trial court to determine whether Fe Quita is entitled as beneficiary of Arturo.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the hearing must be referred back to the trial court to determine the lawful
heirs?
2. Whether or not the marriage of Blandina Dandan is void ab intio to Arturo?
3. Whether or not petitioner Fe Quita committed Forum Shopping?

Held:
1. Yes, the hearing must be referred back to the trial court to determine the lawful heirs.
2. No, Blandina Dandan marriage to Arturo is not void ab intio as a bigamous marriage.
3. No, petitioner Fe Quita did not commit Forum Shopping

Ratio:
1. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Indeed, there is no dispute exists either as to the right of the six Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who
is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. There is still a question regarding the right
of Fe Quita to be beneficiary. Fe Quita had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. The implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct
a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of
the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower
court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling
in Tenchavez v. Escao. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen
when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right
to inherit from Arturo. It must be noted that Fe Quita was an American Citizen since
1954 and it was the same year that the divorce was obtained. Indeed, the court of appeals
is correct to refer to the trial for further proceedings to determine the facts as to whether
the divorce was obtain after the America citizenship was given to Fe De Quita.

2. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void ab initio outrightly. The court must
proeed to trial to determine the facts of the case. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. Blandina Dandan and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of Fe Quita and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and
 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from
him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

3. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject
matter and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the
subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of
Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

EMILIO PACIOLES, JR. VS. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING

GR NO. 127920 AUGUST 9, 2005

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner,
against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision.
In March 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value
of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54
million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her petitioner husband Emilio B.
Pacioles, Jr. and their two minor children.
Petitioner Emilio Pacioles filed with the RTC a verified petition[ for the settlement of
Miguelitas estate:
(a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and
(b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
On the other hand, private respondent Miguela Chuatoco-Ching who is the mother of
Miguelita filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that
(a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and
(b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead and she also filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix.
Petitioner Emilio Pacioles moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the
respondents has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir and
that Emilio as the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
under the law.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake
whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.
In her omnibus motion, respondent Miguela nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as
special administrator.
The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner Emilio and Emmanuel as joint
regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their
oath and posting the requisite bond.
 However, no claims from the creditors were filed against the estate within the period set by
the Revised Rules of Court after the publication in Manila Today.
Thereafter, petitioner Emilio submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas
estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory. The intestate court declared petitioner and his
two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.
Then, petitioner Emilio filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among
others, that an Order be issued directing the:
1) payment of estate taxes;
2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and
3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of
the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether
the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.
Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner.
Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled. The intestate court allowed the payment of the
estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate, holding that it is indeed premature.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the intestate courts which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim
of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the
challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?

Held:
No, a trial court, acting as an intestate court, cannot hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate.

Ratio:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included
in the inventory.
 In the given case, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent Miguela adopts the
inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994.
She did not sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered
to be hers. Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate,
did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3)
months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge. He could have submitted an
inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers.
The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners
inventory. Respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what
properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to
secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse
claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate. Still respondents
claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners
inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in
the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the
properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action. petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of
course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

ESCHEAT

REPUBLIC VS. CA GR NO. 143483 JANUARY 31, 2002

Bellosillo, J:

Facts:
 Private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the
late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national for three decades. During Ms. Hankins'
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Amado Solano was
her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to
her needs. Ms. Hankins executed in her favor of Amado Solano two deeds of donation involving
two parcels of land covered by TCT of the Registry of Deeds however Amado Solano misplaced
the deeds of donation and cannot be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of
the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the RTC of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion
for intervention was filed by the spouse of the respondent Romeo Solano but was dismissed valid
claim or right to the properties in question.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of
donation she had been looking for for a long time. In view of this development, respondent
Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment
of the lower court's decision.
The Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register
of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitations.
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court
of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to
the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds
of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are barred by statute of limitations to cliam the
ownership by virtue of deed of donation after lapse of 5 years period of the finality of the escheat
proceeding?

Held:
Yes, the private respondents are barred by statute of limitations to claim the ownership by
virtue of deed of donation after lapse of 5 years period of the finality of the escheat proceeding.

Ratio:
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early
as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when
private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated
assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. With the lapse of
more than the 5-year period, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the
supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat
judgment which has long attained finality.
In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands
had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least
before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume
otherwise.