KevinGao

kg349
NetworksHW2

1. a.
5,0 3,1

4,2 1,3
TheonlyNashEquilibriuminthismatrixisifAplaysUandifBplaysR,or(3,1).

b.
3,2 2,1

1,4 4,2
TheonlyNashEquilibriuminthismatrixisifAplaysUandifBplaysL,or(3,2).

c.
2,4 1,2

0,2 3,3
Therearetwopurestrategyequilibriainthismatrix:ifAplaysUandBplaysL,orifA
playsDandBplaysR.
Togetthemixedstrategyequilibrium,weneedtosolveforpandq,thetwoprobability
distributionvalues.
ForplayerA:
U(L)=U(R)U(L)=p(4)+(1p)2U(R)=p(2)+(1p)3
2p+2=2p+33p
3p=1,p=1/3

ForplayerB:
U(U)=U(D)U(U)=q(2)+(1q)1U(D)=q(0)+(1q)3
2q+1q=33q
4q=2,q=1/2

Sothemixedstrategyequilibriumforthismatrixis(p=1/3,q=1/2).







2.a.
1,0 2,1 0,2

2,1 4,0 1,1

0,2 3,3 0,1

PlayerAhasadominantstrategy,whichisthatnomatterwhatPlayerBdoes,PlayerAshould
alwayschoosemastheresponse.PlayerBdoesnthaveadominantstrategyPlayerBwill
wanttoshiftstrategiesdependingonwhatPlayerAdecidestodo.

b.TherearetwopurestrategyNashequilibriainthisplayoffifAchoosesmandB
choosesL,orifAchoosesmandBchoosesR.Thetwovaluesfortheequilibriaare(2,1)and
(1,1),respectively.

3.a.
1,0 5,1 3,2

0,3 4,0 2,1

2,2 6,1 0,3

NeitherplayerAnorplayerBhasadominantstrategy.Bothplayerscanshifttheirstrategy
basedonwhattheotherplayerchooses.

b.PlayerAshouldneverusestrategym,asthereisalwaysabetteralternativeresponse
foreachofPlayerBschoices.PlayerBshouldneverusestrategyM,becausePlayerBcan
alsogetmorepayoffbychoosinganotherstrategytorespondtoanyofPlayerAschoices.

c.Thereisonepurestrategyequilibriumonthematrix,whichisthatAchoosesuandB
choosesR,whichcorrespondsto(3,2).

4.a. ColonelB(attacker)
ColonelApassa passb
(defender)
PassA w,l l,w

PassB l,w w,l

b.Therearenopurestrategyequilibria.Eachcolonelwilldefinitelyshiftstrategiesifthey
knewtheothercolonelschoices.

c.Tofindthemixedstrategyequilibrium,wewouldneedtosetuptheprobability
distributionsforeachplayer.LetpbetheprobabilitythatAdefendsatPassA,andletqbethe
probabilitythatBattacksatpassA.
ForplayerA:
U(A)=U(B)U(A)=q*w+(1q)*lU(B)=q*l+(1q)*w
qw+lql=ql+wqw>2qw2ql=wl>q=1/2

ForplayerB:
U(a)=U(b)U(a)=p*l+(1p)*wU(b)=p*w+(1p)*l
pl+wpw=pw+lpl>2pl2pw=lw>p=1/2

TheMixedstrategyequilibriumforthepayoffmatrixis(p=1/2,q=1/2)

d.Intheend,wedidntneedtoworryaboutwhatthevaluesforwandlwere.The
reasonwhytheydontaffecttheprobabilitiespandqisbecausethepayoffsforeachplayeris
identical,andinallcases,eitherAwinsandBloses,orBlosesandAwins.Inotherwords,
eachplayerisindifferenttoeachchoicethattheypickforthegame.Thereisnodominant
strategy,asanychoicecanleadtoawinforeitherplayer.

5.a.N=800peopleequilibriumisachievedwhen:
6+x/100=2+y/100
600+x=200+y>y=400+x
400+x+x=800>2x=400,x=200,y=600
SotheNashEquilibriumoccursat(x=200,y=600)

b.NowthereisanewlineconnectingAtoBwithavalueof4hoursperperson.To
setupequilibrium,weanalyzewhichpathswillbetakeninthenewnetwork.Letzbethenumber
ofpeopletravellingthroughthemiddlerouteatequilibrium.
Because6+x/100>4,wecanassumethatnoonewillwanttotravelalongthetoproute.
Giventhis,wewriteanewsetofequations:
2+y/100=4
y/100=2,y=200
 Sothenashequilibriumoccursatx=0,y=200,andz=600


6.a.N=800peopleequilibriumisachievedwhen:
x/20+10=20+z/5=30+y/10
x/20=10+z/5>x=200+4z
z/5=10+y/10>y=2z100
200+4z+2z100+z=800
7z=700,z=100
20+20=30+y/10y=100
X=600
Sonashequilibriumisachievedwhenx=600,y=100,z=100


b.Weneedtobalanceoutthenetworkfirst.Ifwesetx=400andz=50,thenclearlythe
nextdriverwillbeindifferentastowhichpathhetakesalongthefirsttworoutesandtheCD
bridge.However,inthelongrun,alldriverswillwanttotaketheADCBpathsoastohitthe
minimumtimeneededtogetfromAtoB.Noonewillwanttogothroughthebottomroute
anymore,because30+y/10isnotasfastas30foranypositivevaluey.SoforABCD,the
amountofdriversthatwillchoosethispathafteralltheroutesarebalancedisw=350people.
Thenewnashequilibriumisachievedwhenx=400,z=50,andw=350,wherewisthe
numberofpeoplewantingtotakeADCB.

350peoplewilltaketheDCroadtoavoidlongerdrivetime,and750peoplewilltakethe
CBpathsoastoavoidtheDBroute,whichwouldalsoresultinlongerdrivetime.