1.

TOBIAS VS ABALOS FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong because Article
VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.

ISSUE:
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A.
No.7675.

HELD:
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
ldistrict for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of it conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover,
a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein.
2. LIDASAN VS COM ON FACTS:
ELEC Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as
unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another
province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. This question was initially
presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA
4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.

ISSUE:
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.

HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities
in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur makes the title
misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns andprovinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790
3. ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
4. MABANAG VS VITO
5. MORALES VS SUBIDO
6. ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were
approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments,
thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses
certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon
 became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because
it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the
Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their
signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the
authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof
of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House
shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the
absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court
may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal
discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature,
the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not
become a law.
7. GARCIA VS WEST COAST
8. TOLENTINO VS SEC OF
FIN
9. CIR VS TAX APPEALS
10. CASCO PH VS GIMENEZ FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It
sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the
Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds
upon the ground that Petitioners separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA
2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin established
by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for
the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.

ISSUE:
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.

HELD:
The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the
finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and
Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde
which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin.
The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported
by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea and
formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee
11. ICHONG VS SARMIENTO FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of
RA1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds:
a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of
their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the
constitutional requirement that a bills title must reflect the subject matter
of the same because regulate does not really mean nationalize and
prohibit 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws
 ISSUE:
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional.

HELD:
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been
pointed out is the constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only
one subject as expressed in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the
public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law.
Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the
responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the
judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of
the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this.
12. PANGANIBAN VS SHELL FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint for the collection of sales taxes from
Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the
same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing
from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property
sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant,
RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is
unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1) amendment
of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and
makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.

HELD:
RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by
its title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary
usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill
must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly
construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to
its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity.
In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional
requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its
title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be
able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of that particular law.
13. PEOPLE VS BUENVIAJE FACTS:
Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the
violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself
as a doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured
a certificate to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head
and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic
has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of
doctor should be understood t orefer to doctor of medicine and not to
doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act3111 is unconstitutional as it
does not express its subject.

ISSUE:
W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under
Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code.

HELD:
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of
sections to be amended) is sufficient and it need not include the subject
matter of each section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of
 medicine. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The
constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally
construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede
the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be
resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. A bill shall embrace
only one subject, expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legislation by
apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of the law
14. ALALAYAN VS NPC FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
Act No. 121. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in
any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of
the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of
not more than 12%annually of its investments plus 2-month operating
expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so
that the provisions of the act could be given effect.

ISSUE:
W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider
because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill,
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title.

HELD:
Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is
sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in
this case Commonwealth Act 121).Constitutional provision is satisfied if title
is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means
necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be a complete index
of the contents of the act.
15. CORDERO VS FACTS:
CABATUANDO Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented
by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in
Republic Act No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act
No. 1199. Section19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy
disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also
provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the
Tenancy Mediation Commission.

ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of
the constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill.

HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is
complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions
relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
16. AYSON VS PROV. OF FACTS:
RIZAL The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13,
section2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry
 known as fishing, with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before
engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from
the shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a
license issued by this municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50
annually, payable every three months. The authority for the enactment of
the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.

HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17,
section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and
that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill because the
Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative
Code of 1917 has for its title, An Act amending the Administrative Code. It
does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law, which provided
that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill, because
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code
enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the
Reorganization Act
17. MNL TRADING VS REYES FACTS:
Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to
pay some of the instalments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel
mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the
sheriff of the City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and
liquidated damages to Respondents indebtedness, the latter owed the
company a balance of P275.47 with interest. The company instituted an
action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. He
pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its
chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery of the
unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122.

ISSUE:
W/N Act No. 4122, entitled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting
between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and
fifty-five thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred
and fifty-four-A, is valid.

HELD:
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act
No.4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in
connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were
payable in instalments. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the
effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified
code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
further stated. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to
resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a
clear conflict between it and the Constitution
18. PEOPLE VS FERRER FACTS:
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive
associations and punishes any person who knowingly, wilfully and by
overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the CPP
 or any other organization subversive in nature. Tayag filed a motion
challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations.
The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were dismissed, to
which the Government appealed.

ISSUE:
W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles.

HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in
clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the
statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the
legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements
19. DEL ROSARIO VS FACTS:
CARBONEL Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act
purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act
allegedly fails to include the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. The statute plainly reads: An Act
Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by
Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines
Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional
Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of
Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for
the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for
Other Purposes.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject.

HELD:
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary
because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on
both Houses Nos. 2and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both
Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the
Constitutional Convention called for therein is to propose amendments to
the Constitution of the Philippines, which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of
both Resolutions. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison detre is to revise
the present Constitution. It is not required that the title of the bill be an
index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is
enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all
the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. All the
details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by
its title
20. PEOPLE VS MASA FACTS:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation
of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant
moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act,
which was an Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use,
and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in
compliance with the provisions of this Act, did not include weapons other
than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that
no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

ISSUES:
 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule.
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.

HELD:
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the
one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills
to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and
existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of
Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained
operative because it was not in consistent with the Constitution, pursuant to
Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution.
21. BAGATSING VS REYES FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the
Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other
Purposes. Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the
Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the
Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec.
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated, and d)
the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and
charges on livestock and animal products.

ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.

HELD:
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the
presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the
general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general
whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax
Code controls.
22. LAGMAN VS CITY OF MNL FACTS:
Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for
the transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila
repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled An Ordinance
Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For
Other Purposes.

ISSUE:
W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.

HELD:
No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and
the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions
of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both
Commonwealth Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the
Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the
regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic
23. MANZANO VS VALERA FACTS:
A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who
initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. However, the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance
of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan, Municipal Trial, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and
 decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner
thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondents acceptance of the case
for the MTCs lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

ISSUE:
W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel.

HELD:
No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the
Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Although RA 7691 was
enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by
expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general
character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, which
is a law of special nature. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent
to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R.A.
7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed, amended
or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication
24. GARCIA VS PASCUAL ET FACTS:
AL Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligible, was appointed by the Justice
of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When
vouchers were submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them.
His reason was RA 1551has repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act. Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace
may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be
appointed by respective justices. RA 1551 however, which is claimed to
have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296provides that all employees whose salaries
are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by
the mayor.

ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551.

HELD:
The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the
Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle
of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general
law. Also, there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to
appoint the clerk of court, the power to appoint should not be considered
lodged in the said mayor. Lastly, the intent of the law in placing the
appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the
importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics
25. NPC VS PRESCRIBING FACTS:
JUDGE The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the
collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner
contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the
proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which
provides that disputes between agencies of the government including
GOCCs shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of
Justice. On the other hand respondent invokes P.D. 464 which governs the
appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by
provinces, cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of
the concerned municipal corporations.

ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action.

HELD:
 Yes. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or
agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property
taxes. Granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real
property taxes whereas P.D. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad
coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes, claims and
controversies between or among government agencies and
instrumentalities. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as
exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
calling for a contrary conclusion
26. LOPEZ JR. VS CIVIL FACTS:
SERVICE The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the
appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the
Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. However, the City
Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed
employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments
signed by the Vice Mayor. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion
that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council.

ISSUE:
W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and
BP 337empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of
the city.

HELD:
No. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law (RA 409) providing
specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila
prevails over a general law. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not
meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power. Also,
since repeals by implication are not favored, conflict between the statutes
should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals
the other
27. TAN LIAO VS AM PRES FACTS:
LINES This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of
P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff
due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the
transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from
the port of New York, USA to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more
than a year from the receipt of the goods, and thereby, claimed by the
defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription
given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

ISSUE:
W/N the action for damages had already prescribed, and thus, barred the
appellant to receive compensation for damages.

HELD:
Yes, it has already prescribed. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides
that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery
of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the Court held that the
prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. 190 as to goods transported
in foreign trade, the former being a special act while the latter is a law of
general application.
28. CIR VS CTA FACTS:
Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a
legislative franchise, pursuant to RA 808, which included a tax exemption
from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross
earnings and tax on its real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in
 the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining
that the franchise was in operative for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14
of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned
corporations. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise
unconstitutional while declaring petitioners assessment without effect
having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code.

ISSUE:
W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the
gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal
effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935
Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act.

HELD:
No. The legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is in the nature of a
private contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation
by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract
between the government and the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute
must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet
particular sets of conditions and circumstances.
29. BELLIS VS BELLIS FACTS:
Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3
illegimate children, all surnamed Bellis. After the execution of the
decedents will, which was executed in the Philippines where the properties
involved were situated, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7
equal portions for the benefit of the testators 7legitimate children. Herein
appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying on Art. 16of the
New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should
apply (Texas Law), which did not provide for legitimes, the CFI of Manila
denied such oppositions.

ISSUE:
Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and
testamentary succession.

HELD:
Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress
to make Art. 16, par. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in
testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this intent, Art.
1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of
the decedent. It is thus evident that Congress has not intended to extend
our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals.
30. PH TRUST CO VS FACTS:
MACUAN Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated.
Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian
of the person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in
a certain land with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property.
Subsequently, M. Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by
the Court, praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete
inventory of all the property belonging to his ward. A special guardian,
Philippine Trust Co., was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of the property herein involved.

ISSUE:
1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is
entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal.
2. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his
mentally incapacitated wifes property, her undivided half of the conjugal
property.

HELD:
1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership,
which still subsists, in the inventory of her property.
2. The defendant, being the guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the
inventory of the same, said half of the conjugal property. The Court relied on
1) the Code of Civil Procedure, which is general in character; and 2) the Civil
Code, which is more specific, referring to the management of the property
of a demented ward who is married. Thus, Civil Code takes precedence over
the Code of Civil Procedure.