EMIRATE V MENESE
her to pack her things and to leave
PETITIONERS: Emirate Security and
Maintenance, Inc.
Roberto A. Yan
RESPONDENT: Glenda M. Menese
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 182848
PROMUL. DATE: October 5, 2011
PONENTE: Brion, J.
FACTS
GLENDA M. MENESE On June 5, 2001, filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal; illegal reduction
of salaries and allowances; separation pay; refund of
contribution to cash bond; overtime, holiday, rest day
and premium pay; damages; and attorneys fees
PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS:
o On April 1, 1999 the agency engaged her
services as payroll and billing clerk. She was
assigned to the agencys security detachment
at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
o Monthly salary P9,200. Allowance
P2,500, a total of P11,700.
o May 2001 allowance was reduced to
P1,500, and P100 was deducted from her
salary every month as her contribution to a
cash bond which lasted throughout her
employment.
o Required to work 7d/week, from 8AM-5PM.
Required to report for work on holidays,
except on New Years Day and Christmas.
o May 4, 2001 - she started getting pressures
from the agency for her to resign from her
position because it had been committed to a
certain Amy Claro, a protge of Mrs. Violeta G.
Dapula (Dapula) the new chief of the Security
Division of the University of the Philippines
(UP) Manila and PGH.
o Menese raised the matter with Yan who told
her that the agency was in the process of
establishing goodwill with Dapula, so it had to
sacrifice her position to accommodate
Dapulas request to hire Claro.
o Menese claimed that she was told not to
worry because if she was still interested in
working with the agency, she could still be
retained as a lady guard with a salary
equivalent to the minimum wage. She would
then be detailed to another detachment
because Dapula did not like to see her
around anymore. If the offer was acceptable
to her, she should report to the agencys
personnel officer for the issuance of the
necessary duty detail order. Menese thought
about the offer and soon realized that she
was actually being demoted in rank and
salary. She eventually decided to decline the
offer. She continued reporting to the PGH
detachment and performed her usual
functions as if nothing happened.
o Menese alleged that at this juncture, Claro
reported at the agencys PGH detachment
and performed the functions she was doing.
She bewailed that thereafter she continuously
received harassment calls and letters. She
was also publicly humiliated and badly
treated at the detachment. The agency,
through Security Officer Alton Acab,
prohibited her from using the office computer.
o May 18, 2001 Jose Dante Chan (PGH
detachment commander), arrogantly told her
to leave PGH.
o May 25, 2001 Chan shouted at her and told
immediately, and not to return to the
detachment anymore; otherwise, she would
be physically driven out of the office.
o The petitioners allegedly withheld her salary
for May 16-31, 2001.
RESPONDENTS DEFENSE:
o May 8, 2001 - Dapula informed the agency in
writing, through Yan, that she had been
receiving numerous complaints from security
guards and other agency employees about
Meneses unprofessional conduct.
o She told the petitioners that she was not
tolerating Meneses negative work attitude
despite the fact that she is the wife of Special
Police Major Divino Menese who is a
member of the UP Manila police force, and
that as a matter of policy and out of
delicadeza, she does not condone nepotism
in her division.
o On the basis of Dapulas letter, Yan sent
Menese a memorandum dated May 16, 2001,
instructing her to report to the agencys head
office and, there and then, discussed with her
Dapulas letter. Yan informed Menese that
upon Dapulas request, she would be
transferred to another assignment which
would not involve any demotion in rank or
diminution in her salary and other benefits.
o Although Menese said that she would think
about the matter, the petitioners were
surprised to receive summons from the labor
arbiter regarding the complaint.
LABOR ARBITER
o Mar. 14, 2002 LA Jovencio LL Mayor, Jr.
DECLARED MENESE TO HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.
o He found the petitioners wanting in good faith
in transferring Menese to another detachment
as she would be suffering a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay.
NLRC
o GRANTING THE APPEAL AND REVERSING
THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION. It ruled
that Menese was not constructively
dismissed but was merely transferred to
another detachment. It opined that the
transfer was a valid exercise of the
petitioners management prerogative.
o However, it ruled that despite Meneses
refusal to accept the transfer, she cannot be
made liable for abandonment as her refusal
was based on her honest belief that she was
being constructively dismissed.
o However, it ruled that despite Meneses
refusal to accept the transfer, she cannot be
made liable for abandonment as her refusal
was based on her honest belief that she was
being constructively dismissed.
o The NLRC ordered Menese, at her option, to
immediately report to the agencys head office
and the agency to accept her back to work. It
absolved Yan from liability, and deleted the
award of backwages, overtime pay and
damages.
COURT OF APPEALS
o GRANTED THE PETITION, on its decision
dtd Feb. 28, 2008.
 o It set aside the assailed resolutions of the
NLRC and reinstated the March 14, 2002
decision of the labor arbiter.
o As the labor arbiter did, the CA found Menese
to have been constructively, and therefore
illegally, dismissed. It noted that the
memoranda on Meneses transfer were
prompted by Daculas letter, dated May 8,
2001, to Yan, which contained allegations on
Meneses supposed unprofessional conduct
and involvement in nepotism. It further noted
that when Yan asked Dapula in writing to
provide the agency with documents/evidence
that would support her allegations, she failed
to do so. The CA thus concluded that the
reasons for Meneses transfer did not exist or
that no substantial evidence was presented in
that regard.
o The CA sustained all the other findings of the
labor arbiter. On the whole, it ruled that the
NLRC misappreciated the evidence in the
case. The petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion in its resolution of May 14, 2008.
ISSUE: WON Mense was illegally dismissed
RULING
o We deny the petition for lack of merit. The
evidence of Meneses unwarranted,
unjustified and, in her own language,
unceremonious dismissal is so glaring that to
ignore it is to commit, as the NLRC did, grave
abuse of discretion.
o We note as a starting point that at the time
material to the case, Menese ceased to be
the agencys payroll and billing clerk at its
PGH detachment. The position was taken
away from her as she had been transferred to
the agencys main office on Ortigas Avenue,
Mandaluyong City, upon the request of
Dapula, the new chief of the UP-PGH
Security Division. The transfer was to be
carried out through a memorandum dated
May 16, 2001 issued by Yan; a second
memorandum dated May 22, 2001 issued by
Personnel Officer Edwin J. Yabes, reminding
Menese of Yans instruction for her to report to
the main office; and a third memorandum
dated May 28, 2001, also issued by Yabes
informing Menese that it was her second
notice to assume her work detail at the main
office. Yabes instructed her to report for work
on May 30, 2001.
o On a superficial consideration, the petitioners
position looks unassailable as indeed an
employer can regulate, generally without
restraint and according to its own discretion
and judgment, every aspect of its business,
including work assignments and transfer of
employees, subject only to limitations
imposed by law. This submission, however,
glossed over or suppressed a crucial factor in
the present labor controversy. We refer to
Dapulas letter to Yan in early May 2001,
asking for Meneses transfer allegedly due to
numerous complaints from security guards
and co-workers regarding her
unprofessionalism and because of nepotism;
Menese is the wife of a member of the UP
Manila police force.
o Had Yan inquired into Dapulas claim of
Meneses alleged unprofessionalism, ideally
through an administrative investigation, he
could have been provided with a genuine
reason assuming proof of Dapulas
accusation existed for Meneses transfer or
even for her dismissal, if warranted. That the
agency did not get into the bottom of Dapulas
letter before it implemented Meneses transfer
is indicative of the sheer absence of an
objective justification for the transfer. The
most that the agency did was to write Dapula
a letter, through Yan, asking her to provide
documents/evidence in support of her
request for Meneses transfer. Significantly,
Yans request came after the labor arbiters
summons to Yan regarding Meneses
complaint. Dapula never responded to Yans
letter and neither did she provide the
evidence needed for the agencys defense in
the complaint.
o As Menese noted, the petitioners did not
submit as annex to the petition Yans letter to
Dapula, and the reason appears to be
obvious they were trying to avoid calling
attention to the absence of proof of Meneses
alleged unprofessionalism and her
involvement in nepotism. Evidently, the basis
for Dapulas request did not exist. We thus
find credible Meneses contention that her
transfer was a ploy to remove her from the
PGH detachment to accommodate the entry
of Dapulas protge. In short, the agency
wanted to create a vacancy for Claro, the
protge. Confronted with this clear intent of the
petitioners, we cannot see how Meneses
transfer could be considered a valid exercise
of management prerogative. As Menese
rightly put it, her transfer was arbitrarily done,
motivated no less by ill will and bad faith.
o We cannot blame Menese for refusing Yans
offer to be transferred. Not only was the
transfer arbitrary and done in bad faith, it
would also result, as Menese feared, in a
demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
Although Yan informed Menese that based on
the request of the client, she will be
transferred to another assignment which
however will not involve any demotion in rank
nor diminution in her salaries and other
benefits, the offer was such as to invite
reluctance and suspicion as it was couched
in a very general manner. We find credible
Meneses submission on this point, i.e., that
under the offered transfer: (1) she would hold
the position of lady guard and (2) she would
be paid in accordance with the statutory
minimum wage, or from P11,720.00 to
P7,500.00.
o In these lights, Meneses transfer constituted
a constructive dismissal as it had no
justifiable basis and entailed a demotion in
rank and a diminution in pay for her. For a
transfer not to be considered a constructive
dismissal, the employer must be able to show
that the transfer is for a valid reason, entails
no diminution in the terms and conditions of
employment, and must be unreasonably
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If
the employer fails to meet these standards,
the employees transfer shall amount, at the
very least, to constructive dismissal.
o Yan had been aware all the time of the utter
lack of a valid reason for Meneses transfer.
He had been aware all the time that Dapulas
charges against Menese the ostensible
reason for the transfer were nonexistent as
 Dapula failed to substantiate the charges. He
was very much a part of the flagrant and
duplicitous move to get rid of Menese to give
way to Claro, Dapulas protge.
o Based on the facts, Yan is as guilty as the
agency in causing the transfer that was
undertaken in bad faith and in a wanton and
oppressive manner. Thus, he should be
solidarily liable with the agency for Meneses
monetary awards.
o While the labor arbiter declared that Meneses
claim for overtime pay is unrebutted and,
indeed, nowhere in the petitioners position
paper did they controvert Meneses claim, we
hold that the claim must still be substantiated.
In Global Incorporated v. Commissioner
Atienza, a claim for overtime pay will not be
granted for want of factual and legal basis. In
this respect, the records indicate that the
labor arbiter granted Meneses claim for
holiday pay, rest day and premium pay on the
basis of payrolls. There is no such proof in
support of Meneses claim for overtime pay
other than her contention that she worked
from 8:00 a.m. up to 5:00 p.m. She presented
no evidence to show that she was working
during the entire one hour meal break. We
thus find the NLRCs deletion of the overtime
pay award in order.
o Also, the NLRC noted that the award of
P2,600.00 for the refund of the cash bond
deposit is overstated and should be adjusted
to P600.00 only, as indicated by the payrolls.
We likewise find the adjustment in order.
o All told, except for the above clarifications on
the overtime pay award and the refund of the
cash bond deposit, we reiterate and so
declare the petition to be devoid of merit.
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, except
for the overtime pay award and the refund of
deposit for the cash bond, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the following
modifications:
1) The deletion of the overtime pay
award; and
2) Adjustment of the refund of the cash or
surety bond deposit award from
P2,500.00 to P600.00.
PECKSON V ROBINSONS
PETITIONER: Jenny F. Peckson
RESPONDENTS: Robinsons Supermarket
Corporation
Jody Gadia
Roena Sarte
Ruby Alex
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 198534
PROMUL. DATE: July 3, 2013
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
FACTS
JENNY F. PECKSON first joined RSC as a Sales
Clerk on Nov. 23, 1987
o Oct. 26, 2006 - she was holding the position
of Category Buyer when respondent Roena
Sarte (Sarte), RSCs Assistant Vice-President
for Merchandising, reassigned her to the
position of Provincial Coordinator, effective
November 1, 2006.
o Claiming that her new assignment was a
demotion because it was non-supervisory
and clerical in nature, the petitioner refused
to turn over her responsibilities to the new
Category Buyer, or to accept her new
responsibilities as Provincial Coordinator.
Jody Gadia (Gadia) and Ruby Alex (Alex)
were impleaded because they were corporate
officers of the RSC.
o November 13, 2006 RSC, through Sarte,
demanded an explanation from her within 48
hours for her refusal to accept her new
assignment despite written and verbal
demands. Sarte cited a company rule,
Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action No.
4.07, which provided that [d]isobedience,
refusal or failure to do assigned task or to
obey superiors/officials orders/instructions,
or to follow established procedures or
practices without valid reason would be
meted the penalty of suspension. The
petitioner ignored the 48-hour deadline to
explain imposed by Sarte.
o November 23, 2006 - Sarte issued her
another memorandum, reiterating her
demand to explain in writing within 48 hours
why she persistently refused to assume her
new position, and warning her that this could
be her final chance to present her side or be
deemed to have waived her right to be heard.
o November 27, 2006 one-paragraph reply.
The petitioner stated that she could not
accept the position of Provincial Coordinator
since she saw it as a demotion. As it turned
out, however, on November 9, 2006, the
petitioner had already filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal against RSC, Sarte,
Gadia and Alex (respondents).
o November 30, 2006 - Sarte issued an
instruction to the petitioner to report to RSCs
Metroeast Depot to help prepare all shipping
manifests for Cagayan de Oro and Bacolod,
but as witnessed by RSC employees Raquel
Torrechua and Alex, she did not obey as
instructed.
o Dec. 8, 2006 - Sarte issued a similar
instruction, citing the need for certain tasks
from the petitioner in preparation for the
coming Christmas holidays, but the petitioner
again refused to heed.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
o the petitioner argued before the LA that the
true organizational chart of the RSC showed
that the position of Category Buyer was one
level above that of the Provincial Coordinator,
and that moreover, the job description of a
Provincial Coordinator was largely clerical
and did not require her to analyze stock
levels and order points, or source new local
and international suppliers, or monitor stock
level per store and recommend items for
replenishment, or negotiate better items and
discounts from suppliers, duties which only a
Category Buyer could perform.
o She also claimed that she was instructed to
file a courtesy resignation in exchange for a
separation pay of one-half salary per year of
service.
RESPONDENTS DENIAL IN THEIR POSITION
PAPER
o denied the correctness of the organizational
chart presented by the petitioner.
o They maintained that her transfer was not a
demotion since the Provincial Coordinator
occupied a Level 5 position like the
Category Buyer, with the same work
conditions, salary and benefits.
o The respondents also raised the petitioners
record of habitual tardiness as far back as
1999, as well as poor performance rating in
2005.
o In addition to her performance rating of 2.8
out of 4.0 in 2005 equivalent to below
expectation, the petitioner was found to be
tardy in June and July 2005, 13 times, and for
the entire 2005, 57 times; that she was
suspended twice in 2006 for 20 instances of
tardiness and absences from July to
September 2006 alone. We also note that the
petitioner was suspended for seven (7) days
in September and October 2005 for
deliberately violating a company policy after
she was seen having lunch with a company
supplier.
LABOR ARBITER
o In dismissing the petitioners complaint, the
LA in its Decision dated May 30, 2007 ruled
that job reassignment or classification is a
strict prerogative of the employer, and that
the petitioner cannot refuse her transfer from
Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator
since both positions commanded the same
salary structure, high degree of responsibility
and impeccable honesty and integrity.
o Moreover, the LA ruled that her persistent
refusal to accept her new position amounted
to insubordination, entitling the RSC to
dismiss her from employment.
NLRC
o the NLRC in its Decision dated February 25,
2009 sustained the findings of the LA.
o It agreed that the lateral transfer of the
petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial
Coordinator was not a demotion amounting to
constructive dismissal, since both positions
belonged to Job Level 5 and between them
there is no significant disparity in terms of the
requirements of skill, experience and
aptitude.
o The NLRC then reiterated the settled rule that
management may transfer an employee from
 one office to another within the business
establishment, provided there is no demotion
in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and
other privileges, and the action is not
motivated by discrimination or bad faith or
effected as a form of punishment without
sufficient cause.

COURT OF APPEALS
o In its Decision dated June 8, 2011, the CA
found no basis to deviate from the oft-
repeated tenet that the findings of fact and
conclusions of the NLRC when supported by
substantial evidence are generally accorded
not only great weight and respect but even
finality, and are thus deemed binding.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners lateral transfer from

Category Buyer to Provincial Coordinator was a
demotion amounting to constructive dismissal

HELD:
o This Court has consistently refused to
interfere with the exercise by management of
its prerogative to regulate the employees
work assignments, the working methods and
the place and manner of work.
o As a privilege inherent in the employers
right to control and manage its enterprise
effectively, its freedom to conduct its
business operations to achieve its
purpose cannot be denied. We agree with
the appellate court that the respondents are
justified in moving the petitioner to another
equivalent position, which presumably would
be less affected by her habitual tardiness or
inconsistent attendance than if she continued
as a Category Buyer, a frontline position in
the day-to-day business operations of a
supermarket such as Robinsons.
o If the transfer of an employee is not
unreasonable, or inconvenient, or
prejudicial to him, and it does not involve
a demotion in rank or a diminution of his
salaries, benefits and other privileges, the
employee may not complain that it
amounts to a constructive dismissal.
o Interestingly, although the petitioner claims
that she was constructively dismissed, yet
until the unfavorable decision of the LA on
May 30, 2007, for 7 months she continued to
collect her salary while also adamantly
refusing to heed the order of Sarte to report
to the Metroeast Depot. It was only on June
22, 2007, after the LAs decision, that she
filed her forced resignation. Her deliberate
and unjustified refusal to assume her new
assignment is a form of neglect of duty, and
according to the LA, an act of
insubordination. We saw how the company
sought every chance to hear her out on her
grievances and how she ignored the
memoranda of Sarte asking her to explain
her refusal to accept her transfer. All that the
petitioner could say was that it was a
demotion and that her floating status
embarrassed her before the suppliers and
her co-employees.

ORCHARD GOLF V FRANCISCO
PETITIONERS: The Orchard Golf & Country
Club, Inc.,
Exequiel D. Robles
Carlo R.H. Magno
Conrado L. Benitez II
Vicente R. Santos
Henry Cua Loping
Mariza Santos-Tan
Tomas B. Clemente III
Francis C. Montallana
RESPONDENTS: Ernesto V. Yu
Manuel C. Yuhico
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 191033
PROMUL. DATE: January 11, 2016
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS
May 28, 2000 - Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went
to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round of
golf with another member of the club.
At the last minute, however, that other member
informed them that he could not play with them. Due
to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained
in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of
less than three players from teeing off on weekends
and public holidays before 1:00 p.m., [respondents]
requested management to look for another player to
join them.
Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third
player, [respondent] Yu tried to convince Francis
Montallana, Orchard's assistant golf director, to allow
them to play twosome, even if they had to tee off from
hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana
refused, stating that the flights which started from the
first nine holes might be disrupted.
[Respondent] Yu then shouted invectives at
Montallana, at which point he told [respondent]
Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway,
regardless of what management's reaction would be.
[Respondents] then teed off without permission from
Montallana.
They were thus able to play, although they did so
without securing a tee time control slip before teeing
off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a
result of [respondents] actions, Montallana filed a
report on the same day with the board of directors
(the board).
May 31, 2000 the board, through Clemente,
requested [respondents] to submit their written
comments on Montallanas incident report dated May
28, 2000. The report was submitted for the
consideration of the board.
June 29, 2000 - the board resolved to suspend
[respondents] from July 16 to October 15, 2000,
and served notice thereof on them.
July 11, 2000 - [respondents] filed separate petitions
for injunction with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction
with the Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), at that time the tribunal vested by
law with jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-
corporate controversies.
July 14, 2000 the SEC-SICD issued a TRO
effective for 20 days from issuance, restraining
and enjoining [petitioners], their agents or
representatives from implementing or executing
the suspension of [respondents].
August 2, 2000 - After hearing [respondents]
applications for preliminary injunction, the SEC-SICD
directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the individual [petitioners], their
agents and representatives from suspending
[respondents], upon the latter's posting of separate
bonds of P40,000. This [respondents] did on August
4, 2000.
August 7, 2000 - the SEC-SICD issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against [petitioners] directing
them to strictly observe the order dated August 2,
2000.
December 4, 2000 - [petitioner] Clemente informed
them through separate letters addressed to each
respondent, that the board was implementing their
suspensions.
December 12, 2000 - [respondents] filed a petition for
indirect contempt against [petitioners] in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmarinas, Cavite
December 13, 2000 - the Dasmarinas, Cavite RTC,
Branch 90, through Judge Dolores [L.] Espaol,
directed the parties to maintain the last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of things,
effectively restoring the writ of preliminary
injunction, and also ordered [petitioners] to file
their answer to the petition.
CA REVERSED THE DASMARINAS, CAVITE RTC
IN THE DECISION DATED August 27, 2001.
o In view of the CAs decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62309, [petitioners] finally implemented
[respondents] suspension.
In the meantime, [respondents] filed a motion ad
cautelam dated August 30, 2001 in the RTC of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 21, praying for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writ of injunction to enjoin [petitioners] from
implementing the suspension orders.
Sept. 7, 2001 - the Imus, Cavite RTC issued a TRO.
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration on
September [11,] 2001.
Sept. 12, 2001 respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. CA denied the
MR.
More importantly, the substantive merits of the case
deserve Our utmost consideration.
In the present case, Yu acknowledged that there was
an offense committed. Similarly, Yuhico admitted that
he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Club's
"no twosome" policy as contained in the Club's
Membership Handbook and that they teed off without
the required tee time slip. Also, while Yu recognized
telling Montallana "kamote ka," Yuhico heard him also
say that he (Montallana) is "gago."
Respondents assert that the "no twosome" policy was
relaxed by the management when a member or
player would not be prejudiced or, in the words of Yu,
allowed when "maluwag." Yet a thorough reading of
the transcript of stenographic records (TSN)
disclosed that such claim is based not on concrete
examples. No specific instance as to when and under
what circumstance the supposed relaxation took
place was cited. Yuhico roughly recollected two
incidents but, assuming them to be true, these
happened only after May 28, 2000. Further, the tee
pass or control slip and the Club's Palmer Course
Card, which was identified by respondents' witness,
Pepito Dimabuyo, to prove that he and another
member were allowed to play twosome on June 13,
2004, a Sunday, indicated that they were allowed to
tee off only at 1:45 p.m. Lastly, granting, for the sake
of argument, that the "no twosome" policy had been
relaxed in the past, Montallana cannot be faulted in
exercising his prerogative to disallow respondents
from playing since they made no prior reservation and
that there were standing flights waiting for tee time.
Per Cipriano Santos' Report, May 28, 2000 was a
relatively busy day as it had 200 registered players to
accommodate as of 8:00 a.m.
It was averred that respondents teed off without the
required tee time slip based on the thinking that it was
no longer necessary since Santos, the Club's
Manager, allowed them by waving his hands when
Yuhico's caddie tried to pick up the slip in the
registration office. Such excuse is flimsy because it
ignored the reality that Santos, a mere subordinate of
Montallana who already earned the ire of Yu, was
practically more helpless to contain the stubborn
insistence of respondents.
Definitely, the contentions that respondents were not
stopped by the management when they teed off and
that they did not cause harm to other members
playing golf at the time for absence of any complaints
are completely immaterial to the fact that
transgressions to existing Club rules and regulations
were committed. It is highly probable that they were
tolerated so as to restore the peace and avoid further
confrontation and inconvenience to the parties
involved as well as to the Club members in general.
With regard to the purported damages they incurred,
respondents testified during the trial to support their
respective allegations. Yuhico stated that he
distanced himself from his usual group (the "Alabang
Boys") and that he became the butt of jokes of fellow
golfers. On the other hand, Yu represented that some
of his friends in the business like Freddy Lim, a
certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos started to evade
or refuse to have dealings with him after his
suspension. Apart from these self-serving
declarations, respondents presented neither
testimonial nor documentary evidence to bolster their
claims. Worse, Yu even admitted that Freddy Lim and
Atty. Benjie did not tell him that his suspension was
the reason why they did not want to transact with him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
Records reveal that respondents were given due
notice and opportunity to be heard before the Board
of Directors imposed the penalty of suspension as
Club members. Respondent Yu was served with the
May 31, 2000 letter signed by then Acting General
Manager Tomas B. Clemente III informing that he
violated the "no twosome" policy, teed off without the
required tee time slip, and uttered derogatory remarks
to Montallana in front of another member and the
caddies. In response, Yu's counsel asked for a copy
of Montallana's report and a formal hearing to
confront the complainant and all the witnesses.
Subsequently, on June 13, 2000, Yu, through
counsel, submitted his explanation that included an
admission of the "no twosome" policy. Finally, on
September 15, 2000, Yu was advised of the Board
resolution to give him another opportunity to present
his side in a meeting supposed to be held on
September 20, 2000. It appears, however, that Yu
refused to attend.
Likewise, respondent Yuhico was given by Clemente
a letter dated May 31, 2000 informing him of violating
the "no twosome" policy and teeing, off without the
required tee time slip. After receiving the same,
Yuhico called up Clemente to hear his side. Like Yu,
however, Yuhico later refused to attend a meeting
with the Board.
Respondents were suspended in accordance with the
procedure set forth in the Club's By-laws. There is no
merit on their insistence that their suspension is
invalid on the ground that the affirmative vote of eight
(8) members is required to support a decision
suspending or expelling a Club member. Both the
provisions of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of
the Club expressly limit the number of directors to
seven (7); hence, the provision on suspension and
expulsion of a member which requires the affirmative
vote of eight (8) members is obviously a result of an
oversight. Former Senator Helena Z. Benitez, the
Honorary Chairperson named in the Membership
Handbook, could not be included as a regular Board
member since there was no evidence adduced by
respondents that she was elected as such pursuant
to the Corporation Code and the By-laws of the Club
or that she had the right and authority to attend and
vote in Board meetings. In addition, at the time the
Board resolved to suspend respondents, the
affirmative votes of only six (6) Board members
already sufficed. The testimony of Jesus A. Liganor,
who served as Assistant Corporate Secretary, that
Rodrigo Francisco had not attended a single Board
meeting since 1997 remains uncontroverted.49 The
Court agrees with petitioners that the Club should not
be powerless to discipline its members and be
helpless against acts inimical to its interest just
because one director had been suspended and
refused to take part in the management affairs.
Lastly, contrary to respondents' position, the
recommendation of the House Committee to suspend
a Club member is not a pre-requisite. Section 1,
Article XIV, not Section 2 (b), Article XI, of the By-
Laws governs as it outlines the procedure for the
suspension of a member. Even assuming that the
recommendation of the House Committee is
mandatory, respondents failed to prove, as a matter
of fact, that petitioners acted in bad faith in relying on
the subject provision, which employs the permissive
word "may" in reference to the power of the House
Committee to recommend anytime the suspension of
a Club member.
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 16,
2009 and January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 106918, which reconsidered and set
aside its Resolution dated January 15, 2009, granting
petitioners a fifteen-day period within which to file a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules, is
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. SEC Case Nos. 001-
01 and 002-01 filed and raffled before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondents are
ORDERED TO RETURN to petitioners the total
amount of P9,200,000.00 or P4,600,000.00 each,
within THIRTY (30) DAYS from the time this decision
becomes final and executory. Thereafter, said amount
shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum until fully paid.
POLLO V CONSTANTINO-DAVID
PETITIONER: Briccio Ricky Pollo
RESPONDENTS: Chairperson Karina Constantino-
David
Dir. IV Racquel De Guzman
Buensalida
Dir. IV Lydia A. Castillo
Dir. III Engelbert Anthony D. Unite
The Civil Service Commission
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 181881
PROMUL. DATE: Oct. 18, 2011
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J
FACTS:
January 3, 2007 - an unsigned letter-complaint addressed
to respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson
Karina Constantino-David which was marked Confidential
was received by the Integrated Records Management
Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. The aforesaid
letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter reads:
I would like to ask from you personally if it is just
alright for an employee of your agency to be a
lawyer of an accused gov't employee having a
pending case in the [CSC]. I honestly think this is
a violation of law and unfair to others and your
office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered
by one of your attorn[e]y in the [R]egion 4 office.
He is the chief of the ]Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na Division]. He have been helping many
who have pending cases in the [CSC].
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of
four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing
them to conduct an investigation and specifically
"to back up all the files in the computers found in
the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the
Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone
on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-
affidavit within five days from notice.
PETITIONERS COMMENT:
He denied that he is the person referred to in the
anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it,
because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for
people with cases in the CSC.
He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter
dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director
Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files
and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some
associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing,
copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his
constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.
He pointed out that though government property, the
temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under
a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee
who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its
use for personal purposes.
ISSUE: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the
computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and
was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
HELD:
o Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted
on petitioners computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the
CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there
is no such administrative policy, there is
no doubt in the mind of the Commission
that the search of Pollos computer has
successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches
in the workplace as enunciated in the
above-discussed American authorities. It
bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances
exempted from the warrant requirement.
At the inception of the search, a
complaint was received recounting that a
certain division chief in the CSCRO No.
IV was lawyering for parties having
pending cases with the said regional
office or in the Commission. The nature
of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC
employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of lawyering for
parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would
undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the
institutional integrity of the Commission
as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling
its mandate as an impartial and objective
dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative
tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so,
otherwise the general public would not
have any trust and confidence in it.
o Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only
to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date
that the complaint was received, a search was
forthwith conducted involving the computer
resources in the concerned regional office. That it
was the computers that were subjected to the
search was justified since these furnished the
easiest means for an employee to encode and
store documents. Indeed, the computers would be
a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating
evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be
destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated
drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose
the need to comply with the probable cause
requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of
the wok-related investigation.
o Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the
Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some
employees of the regional office, who happened to
be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the
respondent himself was duly notified, through text
messaging, of the search and the concomitant
retrieval of files from his computer.
o All in all, the Commission is convinced that the
warrantless search done on computer assigned to
Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with
unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the
work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible.
o Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional
right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication
and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees
in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities.
NORKIS V GNILO
PETITIONER: Norkis Trading Co.,
Inc. and/or
Manuel Gaspar E. Albos, Jr.,
RESPONDENT:Melvin Gnilo
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 159730
PROMUL. DATE: February 11, 2008
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J
FACTS:
MELVIN GNILO - was initially hired by Norkis Trading
Co., Inc. (petitioner Norkis) as Norkis Installment
Collector (NIC) in April 1988.
o Manuel Gaspar E. Albos, Jr. (petitioner Albos)
is the Senior Vice-President of petitioner
Norkis.
o Respondent held various positions in the
company until he was appointed as Credit
and Collection Manager of Magna Financial
Services Group, Inc.-Legaspi Branch,
petitioner Norkis sister company, in charge of
the areas of Albay and Catanduanes with
travel and transportation allowances and a
service car.
A special audit team was conducted in respondents
office in Legaspi, Albay from March 13 to April 5,
2000 when it was found out that respondent
forwarded the monthly collection reports of the NICs
under his supervision without checking the veracity of
the same.
o It appeared that the monthly collection
highlights for the months of April to
September 1999 submitted by respondent to
the top management were all overstated
particularly the account handled by NIC
Dennis Cadag, who made it appear that the
collection efficiency was higher than it
actually was; and that the top management
was misled into believing that respondents
area of responsibility obtained a favorable
collection efficiency.
Respondent was then charged by petitioners'
Inquiry Assistance Panel (Panel) with negligence
of basic duties and responsibilities resulting in
loss of trust and confidence and laxity in
directing and supervising his own subordinates.
o During the investigation, respondent admitted
that he was negligent for failing to regularly
check the report of each NIC under his
supervision; that he only checked at random
the NIC's monthly collection highlight reports;
and that as a leader, he is responsible for the
actions of his subordinates. He however
denied being lax in supervising his
subordinates, as he imposed discipline on
them if the need arose.
May 30, 2000 Norkis issued a memorandum
placing respondent under 15 days suspension
without pay, travel and transportation allowance,
effective upon receipt thereof.
o Respondent filed a letter protesting his
suspension and seeking a review of the
penalty imposed.
June 30, 2000 another memo was issued to
respondent requiring him to report on July 5, 2000 to
the head office of petitioner Norkis in Mandaluyong
City for a re-training or a possible new assignment
without prejudice to his request for a reconsideration
or an appeal of his suspension.
July 27, 2000 - respondent requested petitioner Albos
that he be assigned as Sales Engineer or to any
position commensurate with his qualifications.
However, on July 28, 2000, respondent was formally
appointed as Marketing Assistant to petitioner Albos,
which position respondent subsequently assumed.
October 4, 2000, respondent filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal suspension,
constructive dismissal, non-payment of allowance,
vacation/sick leave, damages and attorney's fees
against petitioners.
LABOR ARBITER
o March 30, 2001, the LA rendered his decision
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
o The LA found that the position of Credit and
Collection Manager held by respondent
involved a high degree of responsibility
requiring trust and confidence; that his failure
to observe the required procedure in the
preparation of reports, which resulted in the
overstated collection reports continuously for
more than six months, was sufficient to
breach the trust and confidence of petitioners
and was a valid ground for termination; that
instead of terminating him, petitioners merely
imposed a 15-day suspension which was not
illegal; and that petitioners exercised their
inherent prerogative as an employer when
they appointed respondent as a Marketing
Assistant.
NLRC DECISION
o In a Resolution dated January 29, 2002, the
NLRC reversed the LA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
complainant's appeal is partly
GRANTED. The Labor Arbiter's
decision in the above-entitled case is
REVERSED. It is hereby declared
that complainant was constructively
dismissed from his employment.
Respondent Norkis Trading Co., Inc
is ordered to pay complainant the
amount of P411,796.00 as
backwages and separation pay, plus
ten percent (10%) thereof as
attorney's fees.
o the NLRC found that the 15-day suspension
cannot be considered harsh and
unconscionable as petitioners validly
exercised their management prerogative to
impose discipline on an erring employee for
negligence by submitting unreliable and
inaccurate reports for six consecutive months
to the top management who used the reports
in their planning and decision-making
activities, and thus caused damage or injury
one way or another to petitioners. It however
held that the transfer of respondent from the
position of Credit and Collection Manager to
Marketing Assistant resulted in his demotion
in rank from Manager to a mere rank and file
employee, which was tantamount to
constructive dismissal and therefore illegal.
o The NLRC ruled that respondent was
constructively dismissed and therefore he
was entitled to reinstatement and payment of
full backwages from the time he quit working
on October 19, 2000 due to his demotion up
to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, it found that the parties' relationship
was already strained on account of this case;
thus, it ordered the payment of respondents
separation pay equivalent to his one-month
salary for every year of service. It upheld the
LA's dismissal of respondent's prayer for
damages for failure to submit substantial
 evidence to support the same, but awarded
attorney's fees.
COURT OF APPEALS
o On June 20, 2003, the CA rendered its
assailed Decision denying the petition and
affirming the NLRC Resolutions.
ISSUE: whether respondent's transfer from the
position of Credit and Collection Manager to that of a
Marketing Assistant amounts to a constructive
dismissal.
HELD:
o Well-settled is the rule that it is the
prerogative of the employer to transfer and
reassign employees for valid reasons and
according to the requirement of its business.
[13] An owner of a business enterprise is
given considerable leeway in managing his
business. Our law recognizes certain rights,
collectively called management prerogative
as inherent in the management of business
enterprises. We have consistently recognized
and upheld the prerogative of management to
transfer an employee from one office to
another within the business establishment,
provided that there is no demotion in rank or
diminution of his salary, benefits and other
privileges[14] and the action is not motivated
by discrimination, made in bad faith, or
effected as a form of punishment or demotion
without sufficient cause.[15] This privilege is
inherent in the right of employers to control
and manage their enterprises effectively.[16]
o The right of employees to security of tenure
does not give them vested rights to their
positions to the extent of depriving
management of its prerogative to change
their assignments or to transfer them.
Managerial prerogatives, however, are
subject to limitations provided by law,
collective bargaining agreements, and
general principles of fair play and justice.[17]
o The employer bears the burden of showing
that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee;
and does not involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other
benefits.[18] Should the employer fail to
overcome this burden of proof, the
employees transfer shall be tantamount to
constructive dismissal.
o Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting
because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of
pay.[20] Likewise, constructive dismissal
exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer
becomes unbearable to the employee,
leaving him with no option but to forego his
continued employment.[21]
o
o A transfer is defined as a movement from one
position to another which is of equivalent
rank, level or salary, without break in service.
[22] Promotion, on the other hand, is the
advancement from one position to another
with an increase in duties and responsibilities
as authorized by law, and usually
accompanied by an increase in salary.[23]
Conversely, demotion involves a situation in
which an employee is relegated to a
subordinate or less important position
constituting a reduction to a lower grade or
rank, with a corresponding decrease in duties
and responsibilities, and usually
accompanied by a decrease in salary.[24]
o
o In this case, while the transfer of respondent
from Credit and Collection Manager to
Marketing Assistant did not result in the
reduction of his salary, there was a reduction
in his duties and responsibilities which
amounted to a demotion tantamount to a
constructive dismissal as correctly held by
the NLRC and the CA.
o
o A comparison in the nature of work of these
two positions shows a great difference. As
Credit and Collection Manager, respondent
was clothed with all the duties and
responsibilities of a managerial employee. He
could devise and implement action plans to
meet his objectives and exercise independent
judgment in resolving problem accounts. He
had power and control over NICs, Branch
Control Officers (BCOs) and Cashiers under
his supervision, and he provided them
training in the performance of their respective
works. Further, he had the authority to ensure
reserves in the NICs, BCOs and Cashiers in
case of expansion, reassignment and/or
termination. There is no doubt that said
position of Credit and Collection Manager
entails great duties and responsibilities and
involves discretionary powers. In fact, even in
petitioners pleadings, they repeatedly stated
that the position involved a high degree of
responsibility requiring trust and confidence
as it relates closely to the financial interest of
the company.
o
o On the other hand, the work of a Marketing
Assistant is clerical in nature, which does not
involve the exercise of any discretion. Such
job entails mere data gathering on vital
marketing informations relevant to petitioners'
motorcycles and making reports to his direct
supervisor. He is a mere staff member in the
office of the Senior Vice-President for
Marketing. While petitioners claim that the
position of a Marketing Assistant covers a
wide area as compared with the position of
Credit and Collection Manager, the latter is
reposed with managerial duties in overseeing
petitioners business in his assigned area,
unlike the former in which he merely collates
raw data. These two positions are not of the
same level of authority.
o There is constructive dismissal when an
employee's functions, which were originally
supervisory in nature, were reduced; and
such reduction is not grounded on valid
grounds such as genuine business necessity.
o Petitioners argue that it is patently inimical to
their interest if respondent would be
maintained in the position of Credit and
Collection Manager, as he was negligent in
the performance of his duties as such; that
the 1999 incident was not the first time that
 respondent forwarded to top management
overstated collection reports, since three of
the NICs under respondent's supervision
committed similar misrepresentations in
1997; and that it has been held that the mere
existence of a basis for believing that the
supervisor or other personnel occupying
positions of responsibility has breached the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his
employer is a sufficient ground for dismissal.
o o
o While petitioners have the prerogative to
transfer respondent to another position, such
transfer should be done without diminution of
rank and benefits which has been shown to
be present in respondent's case. He could
have been transferred to a job of managerial
position and not to that of a Marketing
Assistant. Moreover, petitioners failed to
substantiate their claim that respondent was
weak in the financial aspect of operation, but
he was good in marketing, as the
performance evaluation report relied upon by
petitioners would not suffice. On the other
hand, the evaluation report dated March 10,
1997 stated that respondent's track records in
sales and collection showed his potential for
advancement and could be the basis for his
promotion to Marketing Manager.
o o
o We note that the alleged overstated collection
reports of three NICs under respondent's
supervision submitted in 1997, were already
mentioned in the IAP report of the 1999
incident for which respondent was meted the
penalty of 15- day suspension without salary,
travel and transportation allowance; thus, the
same could no longer be used to justify his
transfer. Moreover, respondent's demotion,
which was a punitive action, was, in effect, a
second penalty for the same negligent act of
respondent.
o
Finally, we find no error committed by the
NLRC in awarding attorney's fees. In San
Miguel Corporation v. Aballa,[29] we held that
in actions for recovery of wages or where an
employee was forced to litigate and thus
incur expenses to protect his rights and
interests, a maximum of 10% of the total
monetary award by way of attorney's fees is
justifiable under Article 111 of the Labor
Code,[30] Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its
Implementing Rules;[31] and paragraph 7,
Article 2208 of the Civil Code.[32] The award
of attorney's fees is proper and there need
not be any showing that the employer acted
maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld
the wages. There need only be a showing
that the lawful wages were not paid
accordingly.[33]
o
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated June 20, 2003 and the
Resolution dated August 25, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.