A historical perspective and comparative study

of the standards IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E

BY RAVEL F. AMMERMAN, P.K. SEN, & JOHN P. NELSON

HE EXPOSURE TO

T hazards associated with

electrical arcing phe-
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nomena when working

on energized equipment is a topic of
significant interest to industrial plant
personnel. This article provides an
overview of the current arc-flash stan-
dards, focusing on the methods used
to calculate incident energy levels in a
system. A thorough sensitivity analy-
sis of the arc-flash hazard incident
energy calculations currently adopted
by the IEEE 1584 standard leads to
some possible conservative simplifica-
tion of the equations. These simple
equations could be used for a quick
first-cut assessment of the incident
energy levels present in a system. A
case study using data from a typical
petrochemical application provides a
comparison of the National Fire

42
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MIAS.2009.932345 CREATAS

1077-2618/09/$25.002009 IEEE
Protection Association (NFPA) 70E OSHA initially used the National
and IEEE 1584 arc-flash incident Electrical Code (NEC) as a basis for
energy equations and the results ob- OSHA INITIALLY electrical regulations. Because the NEC
tained using the proposed simplified largely does not address employee
calculations. USED THE safety, it became apparent that a new
Awareness of the various hazards standard was needed. As a result, on 7
caused by an arc flash has increased NATIONAL January 1976, a new NFPA electrical
significantly over the past two deca- standards development committee was
des. The regulations, standards, re- ELECTRICAL formed. This group was given the task
search, and application guidelines of assisting OSHA in preparing stan-
focus on reducing the exposure of CODE (NEC) AS dards specifically addressing electrical
personnel to burn injuries associated A BASIS FOR safety. The Committee on Electrical
with arc-flash events in low-voltage Safety Requirements for Employee
(LV) and medium-voltage (MV) appli- ELECTRICAL Workplaces published the first edition
cations. Currently, the NFPA 70E of NFPA 70E in 1979. The initial
Standard for Electrical Safety in the REGULATIONS. edition covered installation safety
Workplace [1] and the IEEE 1584 requirements. Three subsequent edi-
Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard tions over the next decade added sec-
Calculations [2], [3] have the same tions on safety-related work practices
goal, protecting individuals who must work on or near and safety-related maintenance requirements. OSHA used
energized electrical equipment. However, the philosophi- this work to create many of its regulations applying to
cal approaches used by these two groups to estimate the electrical safety.
arc-flash hazards are different. For many who are required Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Sub-
to apply and follow the standards, the arc-hazard calcula- part S, addresses electrical safety requirements that are nec-
tions and the interpretations, at times, can be confusing, essary for the practical safeguarding of employees in their
particularly when there are discrepancies among the meth- workplaces [4]. It was not until 1991 that OSHA added
ods being used. It has been widely accepted in the power words acknowledging arc flash as an electrical hazard. The
industry that there is a need to perform additional research fifth edition of the NFPA 70E, published in 1995, became
and refine the arc-flash calculation methods to more effec- the first standard specifically addressing the arc-flash haz-
tively manage the hazard. ard. This printing included requirements for protective
This article focuses primarily on the arc-flash incident clothing and defined a flash-protection boundary. The next
energy calculations currently being used. Following a two revisions focused on detailed arc-flash hazard analysis,

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summary of the history of arc-flash hazard research and a providing more specifications regarding the arc-flash pro-
brief review of the calculations, a sensitivity analysis is tection boundaries and incident energy calculations. NFPA
performed, which leads to a potential simplification of the 70E-2004 includes sample calculations of flash protection
incident energy calculations presented in the standards. It boundaries in Annex D. It is important to note, as quoted
should be emphasized that the sensitivity analysis and the on page 70E-98 of the standard: This annex is not a part of
recommendations suggested in this article are based exclu- the requirements of this NFPA document but is included
sively on existing test data collected and made available in for informational purposes only [1].
IEEE 1584 and the equations presented as a part of the In addition to the NFPA 70E standard and the OSHA
NFPA 70E-2004 and IEEE 1584-2002 standards. Finally, Title 29 (CFR), in 2002, the NEC started requiring the
calculations are provided to compare the incident energy use of labels warning workers about potential arc-flash
equations and to validate the proposed simplified hazards. This same year an IEEE working group com-
approach for estimating energy levels. A number of graphs pleted the publication of the standard IEEE 1584-2002:
and charts are added to enhance the understanding and Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. The
possibly simplify the future application guidelines. new standard presented models for estimating incident
energy levels based on a large amount of test data. As seen
Evolution of Arc-Flash Standards from this brief summary, until recently, the arc-flash haz-
ard has not been widely acknowledged. Extensive research
Historical Perspective of the Development and testing performed of late has led to a better under-
of Arc-Flash Regulations and Standards standing of the arc-flash hazard. The next section high-
On 29 December 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health lights, chronologically, some of the most significant
Act was signed into law. The general duty clause mandates contributions to the body of knowledge pertaining to arc-
that each employer shall furnish to each of his employees, ing phenomena and the associated hazards.
employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause Significant Milestones in Arc-Flash Research
death or serious physical harm to his employees [4]. The 1) Lee: In 1982, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electri-
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), cal Arc Blast Burns [5] was published. This article
given the responsibility of providing for worker safety, ini- is considered by many to be one of the most impor-
tiated the development of Federal regulations, including tant research contributions on arcing phenomena in
those that targeted identifying the electrical hazards and open air. This article was significant in that it
43
implementing safe work practices. quantified the potential burn hazards and educated
 personnel about the safety implications. Lee estab- very relevant article in 1987, Pressures Developed
lished the curable burn threshold for the human from Arcs [6]. The pressure effects of an arc inci-
body as 1.2 cal=cm2 . Lee also published a second dent are quantified in this publication.
2) Doughty et al. [7]: Testing
Update on Protective Clothing
and Equipment for Electric Arc
1800 Exposure [7], published in
Electric Arc
Research 1997, details the incident
energy levels associated with
Developments LV arc-flash events and was the
Leading to Regulations and Standards first to describe how an event
1970 Addressing the Arc-Flash Hazard is intensified when the arc ini-
tiates within electrical equip-
National Electrical Code ment enclosures.
OSH Act
Used for the Basis of 3) Doughty et al. [8]: Predicting
29 December 1970
OHSA Regulations
Incident Energy to Better Man-
NFPA 70E age the Electric Arc Hazard on
Committee NEC Does Not Address 600 V Power Distribution Sys-
Formed to Assist OSHA Worker Safety tems [8] was published in
1976 New Standard Needed 2000. This article semiempiri-
cally quantified the incident
NFPA 70E
energy calculations for LV sys-
Edition 1
Part I tems and is the source of the in-
cident energy calculations used
1980 in the NFPA 70E standard.
NFPA 70E Arc-Flash 4) Jones et al.: In 2000, Staged
Edition 2 Research Tests to Increase Awareness of
Part II Added Arc-Flash Hazards in Electrical
Equipment [9] was also pub-
NFPA 70E lished. Experimental investiga-
Ralph Lee
Edition 3 tions, using mannequins, were
Arc-Blast Burns
Part III Added
conducted to improve the un-
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derstanding of how humans can

NFPA 70E Ralph Lee be adversely affected by arc-
Edition 4 Pressure from Arc
Minor Revisions
flash incidents.
Blasts
5) IEEE Standard 1584: The first
1990 edition of IEEE Guide for Per-
OSHA forming Arc-Flash Hazard Calcu-
Subpart S lations [2] was issued in 2002.
Arc-Flash Added This standard used extensive
Testing Update on
test data to develop empirical
NFPA 70E equations derived from statisti-
Protective Clothing and
Edition 5 Equipment for Electric Arc cal analysis. Tests data were
Arc-Flash Added Exposure made available from various
2000
sources and are included as an
Predicting Incident Energy to appendix to the standard. An
Better Manage the Electric article written by Gammon and
NFPA 70E Arc Hazard on 600-V Power
Matthews, IEEE 1584-2002,
Edition 6 Distribution Systems
Arc-Flash
Incident Energy Factors and Sim-
Requirements NEC Requires Arc-
ple 480-V Incident Energy Equa-
Expanded Stokes and Sweeting tions [10], includes a thorough
Flash Hazard Warning
Electric Arcing Burns statistical analysis and summary
IEEE 1584-2002 of the IEEE 1584 test data.
NFPA 70E IEEE 1584-2004a Effects of Insulating 6) Stokes and Sweeting: Electric Arc-
Edition 7-2004 Guide for Performing Barriers in Arc-Flash ing Burn Hazards [11], pub-
Arc-Flash Calculations Testing lished in 2006, provides a critical
2006 evaluation of the testing method-
Collaborative Effort
ology, in particular, the electrode
Development of Definitive Industry Standard orientation used to assess the
arc-flash hazard for the IEEE
1 1584 standard development. In
44
Historical development of arc-flash standards. addition, this article included an
 extensive list of literature on n System conditions
electric arcs. The authors suggest n available short-circuit current
that this body of knowledge has IN 2006, THE IEEE n X/R ratio
largely been overlooked in the n prefault voltages
development of the current IEEE AND NFPA n loading.
1584 standard. Several discussion n Protective devices (timecurrent
articles were published which AGREED TO characteristic)
provided additional analysis of n the first upstream device
the issues being debated. Clo-
COLLABORATE n the second upstream device.
sure to Discussions of Electric ON A JOINT n System grounding
Arcing Burn Hazards [12] pub- n Electrical electrodes and potential
lished by Stokes and Sweeting RESEARCH arc lengths
further documented their concerns. n spacing between phases
7) Wilkins et al.: Effect of Insulat- INITIATIVE TO n spacing between phases and
ing Barriers in Arc-Flash Test- ground
ing [13] was published in INCREASE THE n orientation
2008. The authors of this article n insulated versus noninsulated.
used vertical conductors termi- UNDERSTANDING n Size and shape of enclosures
nated in insulating barriers for n Atmospheric conditions
their testing methodology. The
OF ARC-FLASH n ambient temperature
nature of the arc is very similar PHENOMENA. n barometric pressure
to what is observed when the n humidity.
electrodes are oriented horizon- n Arc conditions
tally, thus reinforcing the work n randomness of the arc
of Stokes and Sweeting. Lang presented additional n interruption of the arc
information regarding the evaluation of alternate n arc plasma characteristics
test configurations in February 2007 at the 14th n other unidentified factors.
Annual IEEE/IAS Electrical Safety Workshop held n Dissipation of energy
in Calgary, Alberta, Canada [14]. n heat
n latent heat of vaporization
Future Development of Arc-Flash Standards n light
In 2006, the IEEE and NFPA agreed to collaborate on a n sound

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joint research initiative to increase the understanding of n pressure wave.
arc-flash phenomena. This effort also plans to include n Other miscellaneous factors.
working with the international community for global Reviewing this long list of variables, it is obvious that
adoption of such a standard. It is the hope that the part- determining the precise arc-flash incident energy to which
nership between these two organizations will lead to a a worker may be exposed is extremely difficult, if not
definitive industry standard regarding arc-hazard analy- impossible. Only an estimate of a workers potential inci-
sis and mitigation. Figure 1 summarizes some of the dent energy exposure can be established. Consequently, it
more significant events in the development of arc-flash is wise to have the calculations be on the conservative or
hazard standards and regulations, provided for future safer side when protecting personnel.
reference only.
NFPA 70E
Arc-Flash Incident Energy Calculations The sixth edition of NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical
One of the most important and essential elements of an Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces [15], includes a
arc-flash hazard analysis is the estimation of the incident set of equations used to calculate the available incident
energy. These calculations help predict the amount of energy for LV systems (600 V and below). The seventh
energy available during an arc-flash event. Incident energy edition, NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for Electrical Safety in
is typically expressed in J=cm2 or cal=cm2. The calcula- the Workplace, moved the incident energy calculations to
tions detailed by NFPA 70E-2004 and IEEE 1584-2002 Annex D. The IEEE 1584-2002 methods for computing
are used to establish the flash protection boundary, i.e., incident energy are also included in the annex. The calcula-
the distance from an arc source that would cause the onset tions are used to establish the personal protective equipment
of a second-degree burn. The energy required to produce a (PPE) required for a worker. The incident energy calcula-
curable, second-degree burn on unprotected skin has been tions, based on fault current, working distance, and protec-
established as 5.0 J=cm2 (or 1.2 cal=cm2 . tive equipment clearing times are as follows:

Factors Influencing Incident Energy Levels

EMA 5, 271 D1:9593
A
To help the reader fully comprehend the complexity of
these types of calculations, a comprehensive list of the fac- 3 tA 0:0016 F2  0:0076 F 0:8938, (1)
tors influencing the incident energy is provided below.
EMB 1038:7 D1:4738
B
This has been known and well recognized by researchers
2
3 tB 0:0093 F  0:3453 F 5:9675, (2) 45
over the years.
 where EMA , maximum open air incident energy (cal=cm2 ); Incident Energy Calculations
EMB , maximum 20 in cubic box incident energy (cal=cm2 );
DA and DB , distance from arc electrodes (in) (for distances 18 lg (En ) K1 K2 1:081 lg (Ia ) 0:0011 G (6)
in and greater); tA and tB , arc duration (s); F, short-circuit lg (En )
current (kA) (for the range of 1650 kA). En 10 , (7)

IEEE 1584 where En , normalized incident energy ( J=cm2 ); K1 ,

The IEEE 1584-2002 standard was developed using test
data compiled from several laboratories. The calculations,
which were derived statistically, are used to predict the inci-
dent energy an employee could experience when working
on energized equipment. These equations also help estab-
lish the boundary distances for workers not wearing the
proper PPE. This article does not address the charts and
simplified equations that were developed for Class L and
RK1 LV fuses or for the materials presented that deal with
certain types of LV circuit breakers.
This article focuses specifically on the incident energy equa-
tions that are described later. Compared with the NFPA 70E
calculations, the IEEE 1584 equations are more complicated,
involving an increased number of variables. It is also apparent
that the IEEE 1584 calculations accommodate a wider range
of voltage and bolted fault current levels. The equations for
the incident energy calculations are summarized as follows:
Arcing Current Calculations
n System voltage less than 1,000 V:
lg (Ia ) K 0:662 lg(Ibf ) 0:0966 V
0:000526 G 0:5588 V lg (Ibf )
 0:00304 G lg (Ibf ): (3)
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0.792 for open configurations and 0.555 for box con-
figurations; K2 , 0 for ungrounded and high-resistance
grounded systems and 0.113 for grounded systems; G,
gap between conductors (mm) (Table 1).
E Cf En (t=0:2) (610x =Dx ), (8)
where E, incident energy (cal=cm2 ); Cf , calculation factor
1.0 for voltages above 1 kV and 1.5 for voltages below
1 kV; En , normalized incident energy ( J=cm2 ); t, arcing
time (s); D, distance from the possible arc point to the per-
son (mm); x, distance exponent (Table 1).
Lee Method
For cases outside the ranges established for use in both the
NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584 standards, the Lee method is to
be used. The Lee model is presented below:

E 5:12 3 105 V Ibf (t D2 ), (9)
where E, incident energy (cal=cm2 ); V, system voltage
(kV); t, arcing time (s); Ibf , bolted 3/ fault current (kA);
D, distance from the possible arc point to the person (mm).
Figure 2 provides a comparison between the NFPA
70E and IEEE 1584 standards. This side-by-side appraisal

of the standards includes a summary of variables needed to

n System voltage more than 1,000 V: calculate the incident energy and the conditions for which
the calculations are applicable.
lg (Ia ) 0:00402 0:983 lg (Ibf ), (4)
Ia 10 lg (Ia )
, Sensitivity Analysis of IEEE 1584 Incident
(5)
Energy Calculations
where Ia , arcing current (kA); K, 0.153 for open configura- Many companies follow the IEEE 1584 methodology when
tions and 0.097 for box configurations; Ibf , bolted 3/ fault calculating incident energy levels, because it was developed
current [symmetrical rms (kA)]; V, system voltage (kV); G, using a large number of test data and encompasses a wider
gap between conductors (mm) (Table 1); lg, log with a base 10. range of voltage and current. This method is believed by
many to provide more accurate
results. On the other hand, the
TABLE 1. FACTORS FOR EQUIPMENT AND VOLTAGE CLASSES.
increased complexity of the re-
System Voltage Typical Gap Between Distance quired calculations suggests that a
(kV) Equipment Type Conductors (mm) Exponent (x) computer program should be used
0.2081 Open air 1040 2.000 to manage the equations effec-
tively. The IEEE 1584-2002 stan-
Switchgear 32 1.473 dard comes equipped with a set of
MCC and panels 25 1.641 spreadsheet calculators to assist
with an arc-flash study. These cal-
Cable 13 2.000
culators are not always easy to fol-
>15 Open air 102 2.000 low and at times can be confusing.
Switchgear 13102 0.973
Some companies rely heavily on
commercial software packages to
Cable 13 2.000 help estimate incident energy
>515 Open air 13153 2.000 levels within their facility.
In an effort to provide a clear
Switchgear 153 0.973 understanding of the IEEE 1584
Cable 13 2.000 incident energy calculations, the
46
sensitivity of the equations to the
 NFPA 70E - 2004 IEEE 1584 - 2002
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations

System Application Limits

Parameter NFPA 70E-2004 IEEE 1584-2002

Working Distance 457 mm (18 in) or more 457 mm (18 in) or more
Type of Installation Open Air or Cubic Box Open Air, Cubic Box and Cable Bus
Voltage Level 208600 V 208 V15 kV
Range of Current 1650 kA 0.7106 kA
Time of Arc Exposure Unlimited Unlimited

Incident Energy Equations (Incident Energy in cal/cm2)

System Voltage Under 1,000 V

Maximum open-air incident energy (cal/cm2) lg Ia = K + 0.662 lg (I bf) + 0.0966 V + 0.000526 G

2
+ 0.5588 V (lg (Ibf)) 0.00304 G (lg (Ibf))
E = 5271 D 1.9593 t [0.0016 Ibf 0.0076 Ibf + 0.8938]

1,000 V < System Voltage < 15 kV

Maximum 20 cubic box incident energy (cal/cm2)
E = 1038.7 D 1.4738 t
[0.0093
where D is in inches
lg (Ia) = 0.00402 + 0.983 lg (Ibf)
2 Ia =10 lg(Ia)
I bf 0.3453 Ibf + 5.9675]
lg (En) = K1 + K2 + 1.081 lg (Ia) + 0.0011 G
En = 10 lg(En) Normalized incident energy (J/cm2)
E = Cf En (t / 0.2) (610x/ Dx )
Required Variables and Constants

Constants

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K: 0.153 for open configurations
0.097 for box configurations
K1: 0.792 for open configurations (no enclosure)
0.555 for box configurations (enclosed equipment)
K2: 0 for ungrounded and high-resistance grounded systems
NFPA IEEE
Required Variable 0.113 for grounded systems
70E 1584
C f: calculation factor
V: System Voltage (kV) 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV
Ibf: Fault Current (kA) 1.5 for voltages below 1 kV
t: Arcing Time (sec)
Distance Factors and Typical Conductor Gaps
D: Working Distance (mm)
Open/Enclosed Equipment Typical Gap
System Between
Equipment Distance
G: Conductor Gap (mm) Voltage Conductors
Type Factor
K: Grounded, Ungrounded, (kV) (mm)
and High-Resistance Open Air 1040 2.000
Grounded Systems Switchgear 32 1.473
Cf: Calculation Factor 0.2081 MCC and
25 1.641
x: Distance Factor Panels
Cable 13 2.000
Open Air 102 2.000
>15 Switchgear 13102 0.973
Cable 13 2.000
Open Air 13153 2.000
> 515 Switchgear 153 0.973
Cable 13 2.000
Lee Method: E = 5.12 105V Ibf (t / D 2)
Used to predict the open-air incident energy levels in cases where working voltages or conductor gaps
fall outside of the range of the NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584 Standards

2
47
Summary of incident energy calculations.
 assorted variables was investigated. This
is to be emphasized; no effort has been
made in this article to validate the equa-
tions presented in the IEEE Standard
1584. The approach is demonstrated on
the equations derived for LV and MV
systems. A discussion of three cases fol-
lows: 1) system voltages 480 V and
below, 2) system voltages below 600 V,
and 3) system voltages over 1,000 V.
These voltage values were selected so
that some comparison could be made
with the experimental results provided
in the IEEE Standard 1584.
System Voltages 480 V and Below
Equations (3) and (5) were evaluated
for different conductor gap distances
on a 480-V system with a box configu-
ration as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 reveals that a worst case
relationship between the arcing current and the bolted
Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current
(480 V, Box Configuration)
70
G = 10 mm
60
Arcing Fault Current (kA)
fault current, for voltages less than
480 V, in closed configurations, could
ONE OF THE MOST be approximated by the simplified
IMPORTANT AND equation of a straight line given by (as
shown in Figure 3)
ESSENTIAL
Ia 0:6 Ibf : (10)
ELEMENTS OF AN
Using information extracted from
ARC-FLASH the IEEE 1584 test results database,
arcing current and three-phase bolted
HAZARD fault current data corresponding to
ANALYSIS IS THE voltages less than 480 V are plotted
(scatter plot) in Figure 4.
ESTIMATION OF A line representing (10) is super-
imposed over the IEEE 1584 test
THE INCIDENT data. Test points on the scatter plot
are grouped into three shaded areas as
ENERGY. identified. Group 3 is of particular
interest because of the wide variation
in arcing current levels observed for
fault currents more than 100 kA. This is attributed to
the test procedure, which investigated a broad range of
conductor gap distances varying from 7 to 32 mm. Fig-
ure 3 reveals that the incident energy equation models
the increasing influence of conductor gap distance at
higher fault current levels. The simplified approach does
G = 25 mm G = 40 mm
not account for this because only the worst case was con-
sidered, i.e., a conductor gap of 10 mm. Nevertheless, all

50
of the data points fall beneath this line, confirming that
la = 0.6 lbf this simple linear equation could be used as a worst case
approximation of the relationship between the arcing
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40
current and bolted fault current, for voltages less than
30
480 V, in closed configurations. It will be interesting to
20 see whether this simplification could be proven by addi-
tional testing.
10 Next, the sensitivity of the normalized incident energy
0
to the conductor gap distance was evaluated using (6) and
0 20 40 60 80 100 (7). Results for ungrounded or high-resistance grounded
Bolted Fault Current (kA) systems are shown in Figure 5. Ungrounded systems are
3 featured in this study because our investigation con-
Sensitivity to gap between conductors: 480 V and below. firmed other literature, which states that typically an

Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current

IEEE 1584 Test Data Under 480 V Normalized Incident Versus Arcing Current
Sample Size: 48 (480 V, Ungrounded)
60 30
Normalized Energy (J/cm2)

G = 10 mm G = 25 mm G = 40 mm
Arcing Fault Current (kA)

50 25
la = 0.6 lbf
40 20
En = 0.43 la
3 15
30
2 10
20
1 5
10
0
0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0 20 40 60 80 100 Arcing Current (kA)
Bolted Fault Current (kA)
4 5
48
Scatter plot of IEEE 1584 LV test data: 480 V and below. Sensitivity to gap between conductors: 480 V and below.
ungrounded system results in the incident energy level Taking the worst case shown on the graph, as before, a
thats about 30% greater than that of a solidly grounded simplified expression for the incident energy is derived:
system [16]. Taking the worst case, as depicted on the
graph later, in a similar approach as before, a simplified En 0:43 Ia : (15)
equation for the incident energy is derived as follows:
Finally, using the procedure previously described, the
En 0:43 Ia : (11) incident energy calculation derived for this case is sum-
marized as
Last, the incident energy is calculated using (8). Con-
tinuing to simplify the equations using the worst case E 4:14 Ibf (t): (16)
approach, the working distance (D) is set to 457 mm
(18 in) and the value of 1.641 is selected for the distance System Voltage More Than 1,000 V
exponent (x) for G 25 mm. It should be noted that A similar approach was used to evaluate the incident
selecting the worst case condition for the distance expo- energy calculations for voltages more than 1,000 V
nent could be problematic. It has been shown that the using the IEEE 1584 equations listed as (4) and (5). Fig-
procedure adopted to calculate the incident energy using a ures 911 detail the data used to develop the simplified
distance exponent can give anomalous results [17], and it equations.
should be further investigated. Because this is a LV system Interpreting the information on the graphs gives the
being evaluated, 1.5 is used for the calculation factor (Cf ). equations that follow:
The incident energy calculation shown with the values
selected for the variables follows: Ia 0:95 Ibf , (17)
En 0:60 Ia : (18)
E 1:5 En (t=0:2) (610=457)1:641 : (12)
To conclude this process, the incident energy for an
Combining (10) to (12) results in a simplified form of ungrounded system is calculated using (8). The working
the incident energy equation:

E 3:11 (Ibf ) (t), (13) Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current

IEEE 1584 Test Data Under 1 kV
Sample Size: 166
where E, incident energy (cal=cm2 ); Ibf , bolted 3/ fault 80
current (kA); t, arcing time (s).
Arcing Fault Current (kA)

70

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60 la = 0.8 lbf
System Voltages 600 V and Below 3
A similar procedure was applied for different conductor 50
gap distances on a 600-V system with a box configuration. 40
Figures 68 summarize the information. As before, the 30
data are grouped into three distinct regions. A scatter plot 20 2
of the data confirms that as a worst case the relationship 10
1
between the arcing current and bolted fault current, for
0
voltages less than 1,000 V in a closed configurations, 0 20 40 60 80 100
could be approximated by the simplified equation Bolted Fault Current (kA)
7
Ia 0:8 Ibf : (14) Scatter plot of IEEE 1584 LV test data: 600 V and below.

Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current Normalized Incident Energy Versus Arcing Current
(600 V, Box Configuration) (600 V, Ungrounded)
90 40
80 G = 10 mm G = 25 mm G = 40 mm
Normalized Energy (J/cm2)
Arcing Fault Current (kA)

35 G = 10 mm G = 25 mm G = 40 mm
70
30
60 En = 0.43 la
la = 0.8 lbf 25
50
20
40
15
30
10
20
5
10
0 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bolted Fault Current (kA) Arcing Current (kA)
6 8
49
Sensitivity to gap between conductors: 600 V and below. Sensitivity to gap between conductors: 600 V and below.
 distance (D) is set to 457 mm (18 in), (0.1 s), then the expressions become
and the value of 2.000 is selected for as follows:
the distance exponent (x). Because ONE OF THE
the voltage of the system being eval- E 0:31 (Ibf ),
uated is greater than 1 kV, 1.0 is used DRAWBACKS OF (21)
for Cf . Equation (19) summarizes E 0:41 (Ibf ): (22)
USING THE NFPA
this approach:
70E APPROACH IS Figure 12 shows that all the avail-
E 1:0 En (t=0:2) (610=457)2:000 : able data points fall below the lines
(19) THE POTENTIAL TO representing the equations derived
for the 480- and 600-V cases, indi-
Combining (17)(19) results in a OVERPROTECT cating that the simplified approach
simplified form of the incident energy results in conservative estimates for
equation: THE WORKERS. the incident energy levels in a LV
system when compared with the
E 5:1 (Ibf ) (t): (20)
available test data.
As an additional means of verification, the simpli-
Verification of Results Derived for the LV Case fied version of the equations presented in this article
To check the validity of the simplified approach presented are compared with the results derived from the NFPA
in this article, average incident energies and bolted fault 70E and IEEE 1584 incident energy equations. NFPA
currents data from the IEEE 1584 test database are plot- 70E incident energy levels were derived using (2) and
ted for voltages under 1,000 V. The values selected corre- IEEE 1584 (3) and (5)(8) were used to calculate the
spond to arc durations of approximately six cycles (100 incident energy levels. Figure 13 provides a summary
ms). If the time in (13) and (16) is set equal to 100 ms of the calculations in a graphical form, confirming that

Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current Normalized Incident Energy Versus Arcing current
45 (Undergrounded)
60
40
G = 23 mm G = 53 mm
Arcing Fault Current (kA)

Normalized Energy (J/cm2)

35 50 G = 103 mm G = 153 mm
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30 la = 0.95 lbf 40
25 En = 0.6 la
20 30
15 20
10
10
5
0 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 20 40 60 80 100
Bolted Fault Current (kA) Arcing Current (kA)
9 11
System voltage more than 1 kV. Sensitivity to gap between conductors: More than 1 kV.

Arcing Versus Bolted Fault Current Incident Energy Versus Bolted Fault Current
IEEE 1584 Test Data Under 1 kV 40
Sample Size: 148 35
45
Incident Energy (cal/cm2)

E = 0.41 lbf
Arcing Fault Current (kA)

40 30 (600 V)
35
25
30 la = 0.95 lbf
25 20 E = 0.31 lbf
20 15 (480 V)
15 10
10
5 5
0 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 20 40 60 80 100
Bolted Fault Current (kA) Bolted Fault Current (kA)
10 12
50
Scatter plot of IEEE 1584 MV test data. Validation of simplified approach.
the simplified approach
gives conservative val- Incident Energy Versus Bolted Fault Current
ues in most cases. The IEEE 1584, NFPA 70E, and Simplified Method
NFPA hazard or risk cat- Calculation Comparison
egories are also shown on 35
the figure for reference. E = 0.41 lbf E = 0.31 lbf
30 Hazard Risk Category 4 (480 V)
(600 V)
Discussion of Results

Incident Energy (cal/cm2)

for the LV Case
25
As observed in the pre-
ceding analysis, the sim-
plified approach provides 20
conservative estimates of Hazard Risk Category 3
IEEE 1584
arcing fault current and 15
the incident energy lev-
els. Caution applying this 10
simplified approach is Hazard Risk Category 2
NFPA 70E
advised at bolted faults 5
below 20 kA, because arc Hazard Risk Catego
g ryy 1
Category
sustainability issues are
0
probable at these current 0 20 40 60 80 100
levels. Bolted Fault Current (kA)
Validation of the sim- 13
plified approach in this
section focused on the rela- Comparison of various results.
tionship observed between
incident energy and bolted fault current. It is well docu-
mented that the available fault current and timecurrent Incident Energy Versus Arc Duration
characteristics of the protective devices have the most (480 V Bus)
significant effect on arc-flash hazard incident energy levels.
Therefore, the next section, which features a case study, pro- 500
450 NFPA 70E
vides an analysis of the relationship between the incident

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Incident Energy (cal/cm2)

400 IEEE 1584

energy and the arc duration. Simplified (480 V)
350 Simplified (600 V)
Petrochemical System: A Case Study 300
Data from a typical petrochemical power distribution 250
network were used to perform an arc-flash comparative 200
study using one of the commercial software packages 150
available. Nominal voltages of 480 V, 4.16 kV, and 100
12 kV are present in the system, providing a good oppor- 50
tunity to compare both the LV and MV incident energy 0
calculations. Figure 14 shows some of the results of the 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
study. Recall that the NFPA 70E incident energy calcu- Arc Duration (Cycles)
lations are valid for voltage levels up to 600 V and for
bolted fault currents between 16 and 50 kA. Therefore, Incident Energy Versus Arc Duration
the Lee method was used to estimate the energy values (12 kV Bus)
for the 12-kV bus. A working distance of 18 in was used 1,000
for all the calculations. 900 NFPA 70E
Incident Energy (cal/cm2)

Using the calculations described in the arc-flash stan- 800 IEEE 1584
dards, the NFPA 70E approach typically produces more 700 Simplified (>1 kV)
conservative estimates (higher values) for the incident 600
energy in the cases explored for this study. One of the
500
drawbacks of using the NFPA 70E approach is the poten-
400
tial to overprotect the workers. Using a sensitivity analy-
300
sis, the alternative method proposed in this article
200
produces more conservative estimates of the potential
incident energy exposure than the IEEE 1584-2002 100
equations. This is to be expected as the method is based 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
on some simplifications of the IEEE 1584-2002 equa-
Arc Duration (Cycles)
tions. However, the estimates for incident energy
gleaned from the approximations are less conservative 14
51
than the NFPA 70E calculations. Comparison of incident energy calculations.
 Conclusions Acknowledgments
This article has reviewed the incident The authors wish to acknowledge the
energy equations used in the NFPA 70E THE Power Systems Energy Research Cen-
standard as well as the empirically based CALCULATIONS ter (PSerc) for helping to support this
equations of the IEEE 1584 document. A research. PSerc is an Industry Univer-
simplified quick assessment approach has ARE USED TO sity Cooperative Research Center (pre-
been proposed for performing incident viously a National Science Foundation
energy calculations. ESTABLISH THE Center).
The question is then, which
method should be used? This issue is PERSONAL References
complex, because research focused on [1] Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace,
modeling arc-flash events and predict- PROTECTIVE NFPA 70E-2004.
[2] IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
ing incident energy levels is still in its EQUIPMENT Calculations, IEEE 1584-2002.
infancy. As emphasized in this article, [3] IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
real arc-flash exposures are very diffi- REQUIRED FOR Calculations-Amendment 1, IEEE 1584a-2004.
[4] Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations
cult to predict because of their ran-
dom complex nature and the large A WORKER. (29 CFR). Part 1910: General Industry;
Safety Standards for Electrical Systems and
number of variables involved. Further Safety-Related Work Practices, Occupa-
complicating matters are the varied tional Safety and Health Administration
working conditions and actual equipment configurations (OSHA) Standards, Washington, DC.
encountered. [5] R. Lee, The other electrical hazard: Electrical arc blast burns, IEEE
Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. IA-18, no. 3, pp. 246251, May/June 1982.
The incident energy information derived from an arc- [6] R. Lee, Pressures developed from arcs, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl.,
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system, analyzing and accurately calculating the energy update on protective clothing and equipment for electric arc expo-
sure, in IEEE PCIC Conf. Rec., 1997, pp. 323336.
released during an arc-fault event is the cornerstone of an [8] R. L. Doughty, T. E. Neal, and H. L. Floyd, Predicting incident
arc-flash hazard analysis. NFPA 70E incident energy cal- energy to better manage the electric arc hazard on 600 V power
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F. Saunders, R. E. Downey, L. B. McClung, A. Smith, S. Jamil, and
three-phase, open-air systems, applicable for any voltage. V. J. Saporita, Staged tests to increase awareness of arc-flash hazards
In other words, both standards use Lees article [5] as the
IEEE INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS MAGAZINE
MAY j JUNE 2009
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in electrical equipment, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 36, no. 2,

theoretical basis for understanding the electrical arcing pp. 659667, Mar./Apr. 2000.
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air is not suitable for situations where the arc initiates ards, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 134141, Jan/
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arcing burn hazards, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 42, no. 1,
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models for incident energy calculations based on a signifi- [13] R. Wilkins, M. Lang, and M. Allison, Effect of insulating barriers
cant amount of test data. Test results obtained for the in arc flash testing, IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl., vol. 44, no. 5,
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for future arc flash models, Presented at the 14th Ann. IEEE IAS
different electrode orientations and the use of insulating Electrical Safety Workshop, ESW2007-14, Calgary, Alberta, Canada,
barriers have been investigated, and the results indicate 2007.
that a horizontal electrode configuration produces higher [15] Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
NFPA 70E-2000.
incident energy levels [11][14]. A number of specific [16] C. St. Pierre, Putting arc-flash calculations into perspective, Elec-
items were presented at the 2007 IEEE/IAS Electrical tric. Constr. Mainten., vol. 103, no. 6, pp. 4858, June 2004.
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In the meantime, the quick first-cut approach devel-
oped in this article represents an effective way to estimate Ravel F. Ammerman (rammerma@mines.edu) and P.K. Sen
the arc-flash hazard incident energy levels based on the are with the Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado.
current IEEE 1584 standard. Available fault current and John P. Nelson is with NEI Electric Power Engineering, Inc.,
the clearing time of the protective devices, as known, have in Arvada, Colorado. Ammerman is a Member of the IEEE.
the greatest impact on the potential arc-flash hazard. The Sen is a Senior Member of the IEEE. Nelson is a Fellow of
simplified versions of the IEEE 1584 incident energy the IEEE. This article first appeared as Arc Flash Hazard
equations, proposed in this article, emphasize these rela- Incident Energy Calculations, A Historical Perspective and
tionships. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that Comparative Study: IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E at the
52
consistent results are obtained using this method. 2007 Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference.