CHAPTER 5 CASES
KMU vs Garcia
FACTS:
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing,
among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for
provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the
authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded
fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of
the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit
of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a
fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and
minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having
to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;
Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the
existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No.
202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common
carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
PASEI vs Torres
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA
took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul
the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or
in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to
the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office
of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders
and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions
of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is
constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is
the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar
as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases
of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to
make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Santiago vs Comelec
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for
three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and
III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an
enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated
without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in
the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if
Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation
US vs Ang Tang Ho
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to
this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand,
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done
on the 6thof August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act
prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner
in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which
may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.
Ynot vs IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot
ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as
to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who
are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
DAR vs Sutton
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and
calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian reform program at the time, they made a voluntary offer
to sell their holding to DAR to avail of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included farms used for raising livestock under
its coverage. In light of the Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a formal request to withdraw
their VOS as their land was outside the coverage of CARL. The DAR ignored their request.
In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that only lands used for raising livestock,
poultry and swine are outside the coverage of CARL. And in 1995, the DAR ordered a part of
the Suttons landholdings to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the assailed AO
HELD: Unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e.,the power to make
rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a
practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of
public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and
effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review They may be properly challenged
before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
To be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law
andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge
the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in
the form of industrial fixed assets.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not
agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in
issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some
unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to
avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance
of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their
landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in
Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner
DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have
just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of
the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It
must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for
non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of
business interest in the case of respondents.
Sol. Gen vs MMA
Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority
Facts:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,
West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of
motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the
confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by
the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became
final and executor.
Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired,
wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the
confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers.
 On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that
the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and
that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.
Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are
valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the
national legislature?
Held:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of
the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and
Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing
the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating
drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was
applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites
should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public
policy.
In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not
pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow
either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to
impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of
a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).
They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
BOIE-Takeda vs Dela Serna Full Text!!!
Untied BFHA vs BF Homes
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND
GUARANTY CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
BF HOMES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts:
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all
homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner- developer of the
subdivision.
Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under
Atty. Orendain for 10 years.
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the
rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners'
associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the
Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single,
representative homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program
that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. Subsequently,
this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was amended.
Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), 6 and recognized as the sole representative of all
the homeowners' association inside the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration
and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space respectively.
The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent
BFHI's board of directors was appointed. 9
Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a
letter to the different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic
requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security
of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of
squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the
committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver.
The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the
clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding or preventing the execution and sale of
properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement or petitioner
with the BFHI.
Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. 14
The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for
preliminary injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with
the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary
restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo. 15
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition. Motion
for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. Hence this petition.
Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided for in
sec1(b) rule II of HIGCs rules of procedure.
Ruling:
HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Originally, administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-
A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was given the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide homeowners disputes arising out of the following
intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and among members of the association; 2.Between
any and/or all of them and the association of which they are member; and 3.In so far as it
concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state.
When HIGC adopted its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners disputes, it
added the phrase between the association and the state/general public or other
entity.
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised
rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential
Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC
cannot legally do . The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated
legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or
the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute." 26 If a discrepancy occurs between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with
the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers
should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.
Lupangco vs CA
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot
ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as
to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who
are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
People vs Que Po Lay
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank
Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect
because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed
to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930
do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
 public concern is to be given substance and validity.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
effect. requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said TAADA VS. TUVERA
contents and its penalties.
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
Tanada vs Tuvera
FACTS:
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or immediately upon their approval.
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. ISSUES:

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable. The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
HELD: mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
 further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not ISSUE/S
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows HELD
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication 1. YES.
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
People vs Macaren amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute
PEOPLE v MACEREN

79 SCRA 450
Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
AQUINO; October 18, 1977 not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the
old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished.
FACTS

- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance"
in fishing.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G.
1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds
it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform
to the standards that the law prescribes

- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was
alleged that they engaged in electro fishing.

- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower
court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court
US vs Panlilio possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.
The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as penalties.
The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to implement the law.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set
aside the Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an
action before the RTC to nullify the circular.
RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced
new offenses not included in the statute.
o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each
violation, there is a possibility that the P50,000 maximum penalty might
be exceeded.
o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses and
a range of P5,000-10k/cylinder for third offenses. For retails outlets, the
max penalty is 20k.
o Aside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the
recommendation the closure of the business to the proper LGU.
Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is empowered by the
ff. provisions to penalize the acts it enumerated in the circular:

o BP Blg. 33, as amended:

SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions
for violation thereof. The Bureau of Energy Utilization
shall issue such rules and regulations as are necessary to
carry into effect the provisions of this Act, subject to the
approval of the Minister of Energy, after consultation with
the affected industry sectors. Said rules and regulations shall
take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to

impose in an administrative proceeding, after due notice and
hearing, upon any person who violates any provision of such
rules and regulations, a fine of not more than ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the license or
permit of a hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or
retail outlet: Provided, That hearing in any administrative
proceedings may be waived by respondent. Provided,
Further, That during the pendency of such administrative
People vs Santos Full Text !!!! proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business operations
of such hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer
or retail outlet operator when the suspension is consistent
with public interest.
xxxx
SEC vs LPG Refillers The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be
without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action as the case
FACTS: may warrant.

BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, o 23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998):
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as
 Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
DOE, in coordination with the Board, the DENR, DFA,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department
of Health (DOH), DOF, DTI, National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate
and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations
within sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act.
o 5(g) and 21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):
(g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system
of providing incentives and penalties, for the judicious and
efficient use of energy in all energy-consuming sectors of the
economy;
o The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount
within the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent as to the
max penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount
to violation of the statutory maximum limit.
o The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis
does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33
prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal
measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as
well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public
interest.

xxx

Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and

monies collected or which the otherwise come into the
possession of the Department and its bureaus from fees,
surcharges, fines, and penalties which the Department and its
bureaus may impose and collect under this Act

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the Circular is valid/legal. YES.

For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must
concur:
o the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by
the delegating statute itself; and
o the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself
As for the first requirement:
o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said
criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no
weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no
authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial
number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on
cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and
unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes
contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious
practices of LPG dealers.
As for the second requirement:
o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as penalties.