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The Gallipoli campaign of April 1915 to January became embroiled in this infamous campaign.
1916, from the perspective of the Allied Powers, I dont know whats to be done.this isnt war,
was a failure in that few, if any, of the military wailed the War Secretary, Lord Kitchener.2 Four months
objectives set were achieved; that it cost the after the outbreak of hostilities, the British Army was at
lives of over 50,000 Allied soldiers, and resulted stalemate with the German Army in the trenches of the
in the evacuation of all Allied troops. Western Front that ran from the North Sea to the Swiss
It was a military failure for a number of reasons: border. British military tactics had become redundant. The
weak command and leadership; ill-defined British military command believed that the vital ground
goals and poor planning; insufficient resources - and key to success lay in the Western Front and that any
especially equipment and logistics; inexperienced action that reduced the pressure or gave the impression of
troops; strength of the opposition - and Allied reduction from this theatre would lead to German success
overconfidence. By analysing the causes of failure, we - thus the stalemate remained. However, an ambitious
are able in turn to identify lessons to learn for the future. young politician was able to proffer an alternative to the
Three lessons are of particular prominence, both for their slaughter of the Western Front. Winston Churchill was
repetition throughout military history but so too for the First Lord of the Admiralty. He demanded a plan from
Support troops from the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade wait behind Quinn's
Post, Gallipoli, after it was retaken on 29 May 1915. IWM (HU 50622). importance that they played during the campaign and the Royal Navy that sought to attack Germany through
the legacy that they left: the necessity to learn and the back door.3 The opportunistic plan sought to send
the impact this had on subsequent operations; a naval force through the straits of the Dardanelles to
the need for Joint or combined operations1, attack Constantinople4 , the capital of Turkey (and the
and the influence on the outcome of a campaign that Ottoman Empire), Germanys principal ally. By harassing 1
ADP Ops Ch 4.
can be directly apportioned to command and leadership, Turkeys capital Germany would be obliged to send troops 2
Quoted in Gray of
especially by senior commanders. to support her ally, troops that would otherwise have Fallodon, Twenty-Five
Years, vol.I, pp.71-2
been destined for the Western Front to face the Allies.
3
Paxman, Jeremy, Great
Context Additionally, were Constantinople to fall, Turkey and the Britain's Great War,
Why Gallipoli? It is necessary and appropriate at this point Ottoman Empire would be knocked out of the war. This Penguin UK, 2013
to provide the context for how and why the Allied Powers would then allow Britain and France to open up a supply 4
Modern day Istanbul
114 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 115
narrow strip of water that runs for 40 miles on route to any comprehensive joint or combined planning occurred the defenders to keep Allied forces hemmed in at the found that their rifles jammed from exposure to seawater 10
The affectionate name
given to the landing
Constantinople. This critical entry point was guarded by ahead of beginning the operation, other than to say that landing sites from a superior tactical position; under such and sand. This compares differently to the Normandy site where ANZAC
Turkish forts, but risk, when considered and calculated the Royal Navy would clear the straights and then the circumstances success would be difficult to achieve. There Landings nearly 30 years later; no plastic bag to cover forces landed
5
Ibid, p.101 correctly, is part of military operations. Conversely, Army would land at Gallipoli. are arguably some minor examples that illustrate that the the weapon from such menaces; no build up training 11
Paxman, p.102
116 BAR HISTORY The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 BAR The British Army Review 165: Winter 2016 117
and rehearsals over months with lessons analysed after Ambulance unit remained on the dockside in England.12 Strength of the opposition: Whilst Allied much as the fighting ability of the New Model Army,
each exercise utilising air, land and maritime components. Manpower, artillery and ammunition were also lacking. overconfidence has been discussed, acknowledgement but the quality of those leading it from the old Army
There were examples of positive performance by the Allied Hamilton had requested another 95,000 troops on 17 of the enemy must be given. The various battles and of yester-year. His concerns were confirmed by the
forces, in particular the ANZAC Divisions, achieved limited August to resuscitate the campaign and attempt to skirmishes throughout the land campaign provide ample Germans. One German officer noted that No energetic
success and this has since become an integral part of the break the stalemate, yet this was only met with 25,000 examples of bravery on both sides. Casualty rates were attacks on the enemys part has taken place.the
history and ethos of both nations militaries. However, such reinforcements due to the decision by the Dardanelles comparably high - approximately 250,000 each. enemy is advancing timidly.21 An operation that had
examples are in the minority for a force that was ultimately Committee on 20 August to support a planned French After the landings and despite taking initial objectives at been thoroughly planned, commanded and led by
found wanting, in part, due to inexperience. offensive in the autumn in France. Any ship-to-shore both Helles and Anzac Cove, the Allies failed to exploit capable leaders may have resulted differently. In a
supply and naval fire support became diminished with the situation. With momentum having been lost, the twist of irony, Kitchener cabled Hamilton instructing
Insufficient resources: If the Allied troops the torpedoing of HMS Goliath on 13 May.14 For much Turks were able to reinforce15 and swiftly the depressing him to sack Stopford, as this is a young mans war
inexperience was a cause of failure, so too was of the land campaign, most of the Allied warships were attritional nature of trench warfare once again formed. we must have commanding officers that will take full
insufficient resources - especially equipment and logistics. therefore kept at Imbros, but this protection arguably One other factor is worth noting: the Turks were well led; advantage of opportunities22 Ironic given Kitchener
12
Ibid p.107
The high temperatures and desperate conditions meant came at a cost of limited supply to the land forces. General Otto Liman von Sanders had been head of the had selected Stopford precisely because he did not
13
Cameron, David., that many had exhausted their supply of water and the Perhaps greater investment in the campaign, combined Military Mission sent to Turkey as advisors.16 So too, many wish to deprive French of more current and competent
Gallipoli, Big Sky
Publishing, 2011, p.147 chaotic planning of the landing sites compounded the planning, resources and commitment in troop numbers, of the senior officers in the Fifth Army were also German; commanders on the Western Front. Hammersley had to
14
Burt, Raymond A. lack of an established supply chain from landing point to would have gone some way to setting the conditions for that is not to suggest Turkish leadership was lacking17, be evacuated, not due to a nervous background, but
British battleships, fighting echelons. Other critical equipment was lacking; success. Likewise, the issue of resourcing illustrates the but the two combined well to provide an effective because of a blood clot in his leg. It is noteworthy that
1889-1904, Naval Inst
Pr, 1988, pp.158-159 for example much of the equipment of the 34th Field need to accord any priority the right priority. command and control of the defences; this was arguably when General George S Patton wrote his dissertation
the difference between success and failure. This therefore on the Gallipoli campaign some twenty years later, the
links to the discussion of the final and pre-eminent cause thrust of his argument and focus of criticism was at the
The scene at Suvla Point ('A' West Beach) prior to the evacuation. of failure. British commanders. It was not the Turkish Army which
Note the 'beetles' in the harbour constructed by 5th Anglesey
Company, Royal Engineers, December 1915. IWM (Q 13660).
defeated the British - it was von Sanders, Kemal, Pasha,
Weak command and leadership: The Allied and Major Wilmer who defeated Hamilton, Stopford
forces were poorly led at Gallipoli. That is not the say and Hammersely.Had the two sets of commanders Perrett, Bryan (2004),
15
assault asleep.19 These were not the most qualified men that poor leadership had a detrimental impact on the 18
Paxman, p.105
- both physically and mentally, to command a complex campaign from the Allies perspective, but that it was 19
Ibid p.106
amphibious operation in a mechanised total war20 on of pre-eminence. It affected not only the planning of 20
As in the Clausewitzian
foreign soil. the operation, but also the execution. Perhaps, given sense of total war
from On War (Date);
Perhaps a more battle-hardened force would have the significant literature on leadership24, one should Clausewitz, Carl Von
had greater success, but any frontal assault against be unsurprised with this deduction. However, what is 21
Ibid p.108
an entrenched enemy defending their home soil was of significance is the extent to which this factor was of 22
Paxman p.105
likely to prove difficult. The critical issue was lack of importance in this campaign. Similar historical examples
23
Ibid p.106
leadership. When investigating the reasons for failure would include Balaklava, Islandlawana, and Spion Kop.
by 11th Division, Hamilton concluded that a lack of But, in a modern mechanized total war, the outcome Northouse, Peter G.,
24
impact on the development of amphibious operational Command and leadership: Thirdly and finally,
planning. The campaign has since been studied by military Gallipoli shows how command and leadership are such
planners prior to operations such as the Normandy important factors on the outcome of what is, at core,
Landings and Falklands War.29 The campaign became the a most human endeavour. Those selected for higher
focus of amphibious warfare study during the inter-war command were unfit for the demands placed upon
period with previous perceptions that opposed landings them. The link between command and leadership and
could not exist being overcome during WWII, in part due the performance of the Allies at Gallipoli is clear; other
to the application of the lessons learned from Gallipoli.30 factors have been shown to be of importance, but
Gallipoli therefore shows the importance and need to learn none with such reverberations on military capability
and the direct impact this had on future military success. and performance. To conclude, despite varying
interpretations, many would argue that Gallipoli was a
Joint or Combined Operations: Secondly, the military failure. The causes of failure were varied and
29
Holmes, Richard, ed.,
Gallipoli campaign illustrates the necessity for combined lay between the individuals charged with planning The Oxford companion
or joint operations. Gallipoli should have represented the and executing the operation through to the lack to military history.
Oxford, New York, NY:
combination of naval and land forces in a coordinated of investment of the campaign, and of course the Oxford University Press,
2001, p.343
and planned operation; had this been the case then the enemy always has a vote. The lessons identified are
fiasco that proceeded may have been avoided. Instead it significant; the future will indicate whether or not they Hart, Peter, Gallipoli,
30
An Alternative To Failure?
Was it all bad news; was there any success to be transports, 44 supply ships and 148 sailing vessels at a
gained from Gallipoli? Historians are divided over their cost of eight Allied submarines.28 Yet despite this tactical
conclusions of the campaign. Some would argue that it success, the Allied attempt at securing a passage through
25
Carlyon, 2001, p.518 was a defeat for the Allies, whilst others would suggest the Dardanelles proved unsuccessful; so too the aim of a
26
Haythornwaite, 2004,
the overall result was a stalemate.25 Others go further successful invasion at Gallipoli.
p.40 suggesting it was a disaster for the Allies.26 In raw
27
Grey, Jeffrey, A military numbers, the campaign was as destructive for the Turks Lessons Learnt
history of Australia,
Cambridge University as it was the Allies; arguably the Allies were in a better What then can be learnt? Many lessons can be
Press, 1999 position to sustain the losses than the dwindling Ottoman drawn, but three in particular are identified due to the
28
USN, Captain John Empire.27 One area of success was British and French importance they played on the outcome of the campaign
FO'connell, and
John F. O'Connell, submarine operations in the Sea of Murmara. This forced and legacy on future military thinking.
Submarine Operational
Effectiveness in the
the Ottoman Empire to abandon the sea as a transport
20th Century: Part One route. British and French submarines were able to sink Necessity to learn: Paradoxically, one of the key
(1900-1939), iUniverse,
2010.p.78 one battleship, one destroyer, five gunboats, 11 troop lessons is that the Gallipoli campaign had a significant