Aristotle and Civil Society Theory

Paper for:
WIMPS presentation
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
1:00 2:30
Walker II Building conference room, #201-B
IUPUI

By: Marty Sulek

Ph.D. Candidate
Indiana University Center On Philanthropy

Phone: (765) 468-4909

Cell: (765) 546-0859
E-mail: msulek@iupui.edu

Box 236
103B North Main St.
Farmland, IN 47340

Marty Sulek is currently a Ph.D. candidate in philanthropic studies, with a minor in philosophy. He was
born and raised in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, and earned his B.A. with an honours certificate in political
science and philosophy at Mount Allison University in New Brunswick. Before coming to the Center On
Philanthropy to pursue graduate studies, he worked for several years as a non-profit development
professional. Martys primary academic interest is in political philosophy, both ancient and modern, for
the light it sheds on contemporary understanding of civil society and philanthropy. The working title of
his dissertation is: Gifts of Fire Promethean Imagery and Philosophical Philanthropy in Plato, Bacon and
Nietzsche.

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Aristotle and Civil Society Theory
Aristotles Life
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) is one of the most famous philosophers of antiquity, and a founding
figure of Western philosophy. A student of Plato and a teacher of Alexander the Great,
Aristotle founded the Lyceum, one of the earliest and most influential philosophical schools of
the ancient world. By some accounts, he also invented political science as a distinct academic
discipline (Strauss, 1978, pg. 21). There is a rich biographical tradition on Aristotle in ancient
sources, of which Dring (1957) provides a useful scholarly inventory. One of the most
extensive extant ancient accounts is provided by Diogenes Laertius (DL) in the fifth book of his
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, written sometime in the 2nd century AD. In the introduction
to his translation of Aristotles Politics, Lord (1984) also provides a speculative biography,
extrapolated from the biographical record, that traces the philosophers likely, though for
political reasons never explicitly stated, political activities.

Aristotle was born in 384 in Stageiria, a Greek colony on the Chalcidice peninsula, on the Gulf of
Strymon, in the northern Aegean Sea. He remained a citizen of Stageiria his entire life, despite
living elsewhere for most of it. Later in life, he performed great services for his home polis,
including drafting its written code of laws. His mother, Phaestis, originally hailed from Chalcis,
on the island of Euboea, and his father, Nicomachus, was an Asclepiad, retained as court
physician by King Amyntas II of Macedon. Aristotle thus received his early education in an
aristocratic setting at the Macedonian royal court. His mother died when he was still very
young, and his father died when he was ten. Thereafter, he was brought up under the
guardianship of Proxenus, the husband of his sister, Arimneste.

At the age of 17, Aristotle moved to Athens to pursue his advanced education. He may have
initially enrolled in Isocrates oratorical school, as evinced by his keen interest in deliberative
and forensic rhetoric and logic. The fact that Plato was away in Sicily in 367 would support this
thesis. In any event, Aristotle likely enrolled at Platos Academy fairly soon after his arrival in
Athens. It is commonly held that he studied there continuously until Platos death in May of
347; DL, on the other hand, cites sources contending he seceded from the Academy while Plato
was still alive. Chroust (1967) offers a plausible scenario in which Aristotle likely left Athens in
the autumn of 348, due to anti-Macedonian sentiment among the Athenians arising from
events of the Olynthian War earlier that year. Around the same time, Aristotle successfully
petitioned the king of Macedon, Phillip II, to restore Stageiria, which the Macedonian army had
destroyed during that conflict. In any event, Plato was succeeded as head of the Academy by
his nephew, Speusippus, which may or may not have contributed to Aristotles move to Asia
Minor shortly thereafter.

At the invitation of Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneaus, Aristotle and another fellow alumnus of
the Academy, Xenocrates, relocated to Assos; a polis located in the Troad, the peninsula
situated along the southeast shore of the strategic Dardanelles Straight. Hermias had studied
at the Academy in his youth, where he first met Aristotle. He went on to found a respectable

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sized kingdom encompassing the regions of Aeolis, the Troad and Mysia, which he carved from
out the border regions of the then decaying Persian Empire. Under the patronage of Hermias,
two other Academy alumni Erastus and Coriscus had established a school in Assos. Hermias
would thus appear to have been assembling a circle of prominent Platonic philosophers,
possibly to act as advisors, emulating a long Greek tradition of political leaders employing wise
counsel: from Agamemnon with Nestor and Odysseus, to Pericles with Anaxagoras and
Protagoras.

While living as a guest of Hermias, Aristotle married his hosts adopted daughter or niece,
Pythias, who is also described as his concubine by some of DLs sources. She bore Aristotle a
daughter whom they also named Pythias. During that time, Aristotle conducted research on
botany and zoology on the nearby island of Lesbos along with his pupil, Theophrastus, who was
also an alumnus of the Academy. After Hermias was captured while attempting to put down a
rebellion, and was tortured and killed in 342/1 by the forces of the Persian King Artaxerxes III,
Aristotle fled to Mytilene on Lesbos. The following year, he was invited by Philip II to tutor his
son, Alexander III, then age 13, who would go on to become Alexander the Great. At age 16,
Alexander was appointed regent of Macedon while his father was away conducting a military
campaign against Byzantium. Aristotle, released from his teaching obligations, retired to
Stageiria.

After the death of Phillip in 336 and Alexanders ascension to the Macedonian throne, Aristotle
returned to Athens and founded his own school the following year. It was named the Lyceum
after the precinct it occupied, which was dedicated to Apollo Lyseius and the Muses, located
northeast of Athens, just beyond the city walls. There, Aristotle rented some buildings,
including a gymnasium, and equipped the new school with a large library and natural history
museum, toward which Alexander reputedly contributed 800 talents (the modern equivalent of
approximately $240 million US). Aristotle presented his lectures on the walkways [perpatos]
that ran through the Lyceums tree-lined groves, which led to its members being called
Peripatetics.

During Aristotles second stay in Athens, his first wife died. He lived thereafter with Herpylis of
Stageiria, who bore him a son, Nicomachus, after whom his most definitive ethical treatise,
Nicomachean Ethics, is named. Aristotle continued teaching at the Lyceum until Alexanders
death in 323, after which Athens led an unsuccessful Greek revolt against Macedonian rule,
known as the Lamian War. During the war, which lasted a year, the Athenians proceeded to
persecute anyone connected with Macedonian rule. Aristotle, a close associate of the
Macedonian court and a critic of democracy, was, like Socrates before him, prosecuted for
impiety; in this case, in connection with a poem he had composed years before honouring
Hermias. Remarking that he would not allow Athens to sin twice against philosophy,
(Marcianus, Vita Aristotelis 41) he instead withdrew to his mothers familys estate at Chalcis,
where he died a year later of an intestinal disorder (although some of DLs sources claim he
drank poison). Upon Aristotles death, he was succeeded as head of the Lyceum and the
Peripatetic school of philosophy by his old pupil and friend, Theophrastus.

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Aristotles Writings
After Aristotles death, the manuscript originals of his treatises and other unpublished works
were bequeathed to Theophrastus and remained at the Lyceum as his property. Both Strabo
(Geography 13.1.54) and Plutarch (Sulla 26) record that Theophrastus willed his library, or that
portion of which included his and Aristotles writings, to a certain Neleus, who transported it to
Scepsis in Asia Minor. There it was hidden in a cellar by Neleus heirs, where it lay neglected
and forgotten until the beginning of the 1st century BCE, when it was discovered and purchased
by Apellicon, a rich book collector and Aristotle enthusiast. He brought it back to Athens and
attempted to repair the damaged manuscripts by filling the gaps in the texts, but only
succeeded in producing an edition full of errors.

After the Roman conquest of Athens in 86 BCE, Apellicons collection was acquired by Sulla, the
Roman statesman and general, who brought it to Rome, where it eventually came into the
hands of Andronicus of Rhodes. Andronicus edited and, around 30 AD, published the definitive
ancient editions of the works of both Aristotle and Theophrastus, along with extensive
commentary on the authorial authenticity of each work. This edition is the source from which
all surviving manuscripts of Aristotle ultimately derive. The definitive modern edition of
Aristotles works in Greek was published between 1831 and 1837 by August Immanuel Bekker,
from which the standard page references to his works are derived.

Aristotles writings fall into two broad categories: published works [ekdedomnoi lgoi] almost
none of which have survived, and lecture notes [akroatiko lgoi] derived from the manuscripts
willed to Theophrastus. DL, writing in the 2nd century AD, identifies 156 titles attributed to
Aristotle totaling 445,270 lines. Unfortunately, only a small fraction, currently comprising 48
titles, have survived to the modern period, including some likely pseudonymous works. Of the
surviving manuscripts, only Athenian Constitution, discovered in 1890 on two Egyptian papyri, is
thought to derive from his published works. Almost all of Aristotles extant works, then, are
notes and treatises not originally intended for publication. These surviving works may be
arranged into five categories, according to the subjects they address: logic, metaphysics,
natural science, ethics/politics, and rhetoric/poetry. This article is, of course, primarily
concerned with his works on ethics and politics, the most important of which are Nicomachean
Ethics, Politics, and the Athenian Constitution.

Aristotle on Civil Society

Before examining how Aristotles ideas relate to civil society, it is useful to first review what,
exactly, is meant by civil society in modern parlance. Contemporary conceptions of civil
society may be arranged into three distinct, but mutually supportive, categories encompassing:
associational life, the public sphere, and the good society (Edwards, pg. 91). Associational life
theories, primarily found in the social sciences, define civil society as a function of the various
organisations that constitute the voluntary, non-profit sector. Public sphere theories, by
comparison, view civil society as the site of public debate including independent media, civic
forums, or even just plain talk among citizens where consensus is forged through open-ended
discussion of issues of public concern. Good society theories, finally, view civil society as a

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normative concept describing the type of society in which people would (or should) ideally like
to live as free and reasonable citizens.

Aristotle addresses all three modern conceptions of civil society in his extant works:
associational life is primarily dealt with in Politics and Athenian Constitution (AC), the public
sphere as an arena of debate in Rhetoric, and the ideal of the good society in Politics.
Aristotles Politics actually forms the second part of a single treatise, of which Nicomachean
Ethics (NE) is the first. In NE, Aristotle examines what he considers the highest good of human
life: namely, the happiness attained through striving for excellence [aret]. Politics, on the
other hand, primarily examines which political regimes are most conducive to their citizens
pursuit of excellence. Aristotle defines aret as the attainment of a virtuous mean between
two extremes of bad behaviour (1106b). The pre-eminent classical virtue of courage [andreio]
is thus defined as the mean situated between the extremes of fearfulness or lack of confidence,
and excessive fearlessness or rashness. Failure to attain this virtuous mean can thus lead to the
vices of either cowardice or foolhardiness.

Aristotle, along with many other Greek thinkers, posits free will as a precondition of virtue. In
contrast to modern notions, though, he defines voluntary action [hekousios praxeis] both in
terms of the absence of coercion, as well as full knowledge of ones actions (1110a); for it
would be absurd to refer to an action as voluntary, he goes on to argue, when it results in
consequences unintended by the acting agent (1111a). Aristotle describes seven major and six
minor virtues in NE, the major ones being: courage [andreio] (1115a), moderation
[sphrosun] (1117b), generosity [eleutheriots] (1119b), magnificence [megaloprepeia]
(1122a), magnanimity [megalopsuchia] (1123b), and justice [dik] (1129a), plus a range of
intellectual virtues (1138b-1152b) corresponding to the classical virtue of wisdom [sophia].

Aristotles taxonomy of arte contrasts in interesting ways from earlier Homeric conceptions,
where it is primarily associated with personal talents. In the Iliad, likely written in the first half
of the 8th century BCE, aret is defined in terms of courage (11.760, 11.90, 13.275, 14.117,
22.268), strength (8.535, 22.242), speed (20.411), talents generally (15.642), and horsemanship
(23.571). The virtue of gods (9.498) and the speed and mettle of horses (23.276 & 23.374) are
also mentioned. In the Odyssey, likely written in the latter half of the 8th century, aret is also
employed to describe courage (12.211), including how Odysseus vies in courage with his father
(24.515), but it also encompasses a much wider array of virtuous behaviours. It describes the
qualities of wily Odysseus (4.725, 4.815, 18.205), his faithful wife, heedful Penelope (2.205,
18.251, 19.124, 24.193 & 196), and the foremost among her haughty suitors (4.629, 21.187),
their talent for war craft in particular (22.244). Aret is used a number of times in an abstract
sense, with no reference to any particular person or quality (8.237, 8.240, 8.244, 8.329, 8.329,
14.402, 17.322). It is also used in a rather novel fashion, finally, to describe success (13.198)
and the good leadership under which a people prosper (19.114).

Conceptions of aret evolved considerably further by the 5th century BCE, reflecting significant
developments in Greek society as a whole. Protagoras, the greatest sophist and reputed
teacher of virtue in the classical age of Greece, defined aret primarily in terms of courage

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[andreio], wisdom [sophia], justice [dik], moderation [sphrosun], and piety [hosiots]
(Plato, Protagoras, 329c-e). Socrates presents a remarkably similar description of aret in his
enumeration of the virtues of the citizens of the perfectly just polis, although he drops piety
(Plato, Republic, Bk IV, 427e). Aristotle also excludes piety from his list of the virtues in NE, but
notably adds the qualities of generosity, magnificence and magnanimity. Generosity or
liberality [eleutheriots] is derived from the word for freedom [eleutheros], and is
etymologically related to eleutherios, meaning to speak or act like a free man. Magnificence
[megaloprepeia] is defined as generosity on a grand scale, and is derived from the word prep,
meaning to be conspicuously fitting. Magnanimity or great-souledness [megalopsuchia],
finally, is proper pursuit of the great honours associated with public service (cf. Plato, Republic,
Bk III, 402b). Among the minor virtues, Aristotle also includes a virtue concerned with small
honours (1125b) that bears the same relation to generosity that magnanimity bears to
magnificence.

The Greek conception of aret thus substantially evolved from the 8th to the 4th centuries BCE.
In the archaic period, it initially defined excellences such as courage, strength and skill, the
benefits of which are largely confined to the person possessing them. By the classical age,
though, its meaning had expanded to include public virtues, such as piety and justice, that
emphasised ones obligations to others, such as the gods and ones fellow man. This latter,
public-spirited conception of aret receives its most sophisticated expression by Aristotle, who
emphasizes the crucial importance of voluntary public service, both great and small, to the
formation of excellence in human character, and thereby to both the experience of pleasure
and the attainment of happiness. By dropping piety and adding generosity, in tandem with the
virtue concerned with small honours, Aristotles conception of aret also aptly reflects both the
secularising and democratising trends current in Greek society during the 5th and 4th centuries
BCE.

Politics [Politikn] contains Aristotles most definitive theoretical treatment of the concept of
civil society. In fact, the nature of civil society forms the very essence of the subject addressed
by the treatise, which opens with the introductory observation:
Every state [plin] is as we see a sort of partnership [koinnan], and every partnership is formed with a
view to some good [agathou] (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think is
good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, the partnership that is the most
supreme of all and includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods;
and this is the partnership entitled the state [polis], the political association [koinna he politik+. (1252a)

Aristotles conception of political association, or koinna he politik, is roughly synonymous

with the modern theoretical notion of civil society (Lord, 1963; Kumar, 1993). Aristotle is the
first political thinker to employ the term politikn koinnan in a technical sense, to describe a
particular socio-political phenomenon. Plato employs the phrase only once in his authentic
works (Alcibiades I, 125e), but with nothing approaching Aristotles theoretical intent or
precision; koinona is prominent, though, in the definition of politea formulated by Platonists in
the late 4th century BCE Academy (Plato, Definitions, 413e). As Aristotle conceives it, every
individual pursues what they consider good, and enters into partnerships with others they
believe to hold similar conceptions of the good in order to further that end. The political

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association, in turn, channels these collective pursuits to serve the common goal of attaining
the good society; in the same way that an architect directs the activities of various tradesmen in
order to construct a sound building, that being the supreme goal that determines their
activities.

Aristotle employs two interrelated methodologies in Politics to develop his theoretical

understanding of political association: analysing the composite whole by breaking it down into
uncompounded elements; and studying its origins and early development (1252a). The oldest
and most fundamental partnership in civil society is the union of male and female, brought
about by natural instinct for the continuance of the species. With the addition of children,
other family members, and servants or slaves, this union becomes a household [oika]. The
partnership of several households, in turn, forms a village [km], while the partnership of
several villages results in the city-state [plis]. Hence, Aristotle concludes, the polis exists by
nature, as it constitutes the end or purpose for which the other forms of partnership exist
(1252b). Elsewhere, he mentions several other forms of association prevalent in ancient Greek
society that contributed toward the feeling of friendship [phila] between members of the
political partnership [politikn koinnan] (1281a), including: clans [genn], brotherhoods
[phratrai], and clubs for sacrificial rights and social recreations [thysai ka diagga to syzn]
(1280b); tribes [phyls] and demes [dmoys] (1300a); and political clubs [etairin airontai]
(1305b).

Man is, by nature, a political animal, Aristotle asserts, and a man who is incapable of entering
into partnership [koinnen], or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part
of a state [plis], so that he must be either a lower animal or a god. (1253a) Aristotle derives
additional evidence for the intrinsically political nature of human beings from the fact that we
are the only animal to employ speech, or logos, which is designed to indicate the
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and wrong (Ibid). Besides
distinguishing humans from the other animals, then, speech also grants us our unique ability to
perceive and communicate what is good and bad, right and wrong, and the other moral
qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household [oikan] and a city-state
[plin]. (Ibid) Precisely because of the unique moral and political capacities of human nature,
it is particularly necessary to habituate people to virtue through participation in civil society.
For just as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when
sundered from law and justice. (Ibid) Civil society thus plays a crucial role in directing the
polis, as the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership *politiks
koinnas+. (1253b)

Every partnership is composed of two elements: that which commands, and that which obeys
(1254a). Aristotle considers slavery a natural condition of human existence, but condemns the
conventional practices of legal slavery (1255a). A conventional or legal slave is someone
enslaved by force, whether through capture in war or by defaulting on debts secured by their
personal freedom. A natural slave, on the other hand, is someone incapable of exercising
reason and foresight, usually due to excessive slavishness toward their passions. In modern
parlance, this might mean people incapable of acting in their best interest due to mental or

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physical defect, such as compulsive behaviours. A natural master, on the other hand, is
someone capable of acting not only in his own best interest, but also in the best interests of
those under his command. In this sense, then, there is a certain community of interest and
friendship [even] between slave and master in cases when they have been qualified by nature
for those positions, although when they do not hold them in that way but by law and by
constraint of force the opposite is the case (1255b).

Aristotle strongly advocates the institution of private property in Politics, and condemns the
communal ideals expressed in Platos political philosophy as unworkable. In Platos dialogue,
Republic [Politeia], Socrates argues that, in order for a polis to be perfectly just, all property
must be held in common, at least among the members of its ruling class. Aristotle challenges
this assertion, countering that it is better for possessions to be privately owned, but to make
them common property in use (1263a). In other words, it is preferable for property to be
privately held, but for its owners to make it available for public use, in accordance with the
precepts of public virtue. Aristotles justification for private property is primarily based upon
the pleasure that possession of things gives the possessor. Selfishness and covetousness are
justly condemned, he argues, but since the love of self and possessions is so deeply rooted in
human nature, it is better to moderate and harness this powerful instinct, rather than simply
trying to deny it. Furthermore, to bestow favours and assistance on friends or visitors or
comrades is a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private ownership of property.
(1263b) Not only does property give its possessor pleasure, then; it also forms a precondition
to the development of important forms of virtue. Aristotle concludes that, while legislation
proposing the abolishment of private property and the holding of all things in common has an
attractive appearance, and might be thought to be humane [philnthrpos]; in fact, the
precise opposite is the case (Ibid).

The key to knowing a polity, for Aristotle, is understanding the nature of its ruling class or
political regime. Following Plato, he categorises regimes according to the proportion of the
citizenry that compose the ruling class, and whether they rule corruptly or virtuously. A corrupt
regime rules in its own interest, to the detriment of those ruled, while a virtuous regime rules in
the best interests of the polis as a whole. Thus, when one man rules for his own benefit, it is
termed tyranny [tyranns], whereas when he rules for the benefit of the polis, it is termed
kingship [basilea]. Similarly, when a small group of individuals, usually composed of the
wealthy, rule for their own benefit, it is termed oligarchy [oligarcha]; whereas when a small
group, chosen for their political virtue, rule for the benefit of the polis, it is termed aristocracy
[aristokrata]. When the political class is composed of a majority of citizens who rule for the
benefit of the many, but to the detriment of a minority, finally, it is termed democracy
[demokrata]; while when the multitude govern, but with a view to the advantage of all, it is
called by the name common to all the forms of constitution, constitutional government
[politea] (1279a). Aristotles conception of constitutional government more closely
approximates mixed government, where all citizens have the right to participate in political
rule, but only a small minority of notables [gnrimn] possessed of both wealth and public
virtue choose to do so.

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Aristotle places a low value on political innovation and a correspondingly high value on regime
stability. He warns against habitual recourse to civil war as a means of correcting political
imbalance, as through it the bonds of civil society *politikn koinnan+ are loosened. (1272b)
He devotes considerable analyses to the causes of the transformation of one type of regime
into another. Radical democracy, for instance, tends to degenerate into tyranny, given the
inherent political dynamic of demagogues among the masses. Aristotle advocates the creation
and maintenance of what he terms a middle class *msn+ (1295b) as an antidote to the
political instability that plagued the regimes of his day; a rather innovative idea in the context
of the political philosophy of his time. A middle class would, he thought, tend to balance the
conflicts that inexorably arise between aristocratic or oligarchic elites, and the larger, poorer
and less educated masses of the citizenry. Aristotles call for the creation of a middle class may
be seen to stem from reasoning similar to that he employs to describe the virtues, as a mean
between two extremes of behaviour. He also likely derived much inspiration for the idea of a
middle class from the ruling practices of Phillip II of Macedon (Lord, 1993, pg. 6).

Aristotle concludes Politics with an unfinished consideration of the constitution of the ideal
polis. He differs somewhat from Plato in his approach, striking more of a compromise between
the ideal and what is practically possible. He does closely follow Plato, though, in placing a
strong emphasis on the need for public education, given its importance to both the attainment
of virtue and political cohesion, for:
inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education [paidean] also must
necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence of this much be public [koinn], and
not on private lines, in the way in which at present each man superintends the education of his own
children, teaching them privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. (1337a)

Significantly, both Aristotle and Plato practiced what they preached in this regard, and created
the schools they called for in their political works. The Academy and the Lyceum were not
quite the public educational institutions they had in mind, though; rather, these schools were
constituted as private, religious societies, given the considerable political restraints they faced.

Athenian Constitution (AC) is one of the most important surviving accounts of the operations
of the Athenian polis, and contains valuable information on the legal status of its private
associations organized to serve public purposes. An entire class of legal action considered by
the public law courts, for instance, concerned friendly society business *eraniks] (LII.3); i.e.
the regulation of social, religious and beneficent associations. AC was originally one of 158
constitutional histories of various Greek polies assembled by Aristotle, likely in association with
students at the Lyceum. This collection also likely formed the third part of a work of which NE
and Politics are the first two, given the references to such a collection at the end of NE (1181b).

The high degree to which Aristotle derived his political theories, as expressed in Politics, from
empirical research is apparent from AC. It is also a valuable supplement to other ancient
political histories of early Athens; particularly that of Herodotus, with his overtly democratic
sympathies. In Aristotles view, Solons greatest political reform was not the introduction of
written laws, but rather the reform of debtor law to prohibit loans secured by the borrowers
personal freedom (VI.1). He also casts the tyrant Peisistratus in a much more favourable light:
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praising him personally as mild [praos], philanthropic [philnthrpos] and popular [thei]
(XVI.2&8); describing his rule as being much more moderate [metrs] and constitutional
[politiks] than tyrannical [tyrraniks] (XVI.2); and comparing his reign to the golden age of
Kronos (XVI.7).

Aristotles Modern Relevance

Aristotle may be seen to have exercised a decisive influence on modern political thinkers and
ideas across the political spectrum: from Lockes justification of private property as an aspect of
natural law, to Marxs critique of civil society as the site of class warfare, to Mills refined
version of utilitarianism, to Nietzsches fundamental distinction between master and slave
moralities. Despite the significance of his ideas to the development of modern political
thought, though, Aristotle is largely ignored by contemporary social science. Since at least the
late Renaissance, when Galileo famously chided his contemporaries for believing the testimony
of Aristotle more readily than the evidence of their own eyes, Aristotelian philosophy has been
indelibly linked with the dogmatic, pre-modern thinking that was superseded by the more
skeptical methodologies of empirical science. It didnt help matters that Aristotelian science
was pronounced the official dogma of the Catholic Church, after St. Thomas Aquinas successful
synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology in the 13th century. As has been
demonstrated above, though, Aristotle was eminently empirical, methodical and, yes, even
critical in his approach to political science.

Aristotles scientific method has often been criticised for employing teleological principles to
construct theories explaining natural phenomenon i.e. positing that telos, or the end or goal
of a thing, can explain its development. This approach has been rendered implausible since at
least Darwin, who definitively proved that nature is understandable as a blind and random
evolutionary process, utterly lacking any ultimate end or goal. However deficient teleological
principles may be in the natural sciences, though, it is not quite so clear how irrelevant they are
to the social sciences. To this day, civil society organizations are legally defined and organized
in terms of the ends they serve, as defined by their mission, which purportedly directs and
determines their activities. It would still seem to make some sense, then, to employ
teleological principles in the study of these organizations.

Aristotle is also sometimes criticised for dwelling on the outdated notion of the polis in his
political writings, particularly when supra-political entities, such as kingdoms, empires and
federated leagues of polies, had existed for centuries prior, and were on the political
ascendancy in his day. These criticisms arent heard quite as much since civil society groups
overthrew the seemingly permanent regimes of the communist bloc, and the academic study of
civil society came back into vogue. As Aristotle himself points out, he purposely focused his
investigation on the polis because it is the smallest self-sufficient political unit capable of
realizing full human potential (1252b). As Aristotle himself might have remarked, all politics is
local; all else is ephemeral.

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Aristotles political thought is bound to sound heretical and even contradictory to modern ears.
He considers politics an outgrowth of human nature; whereas post-modern thinkers generally
follow Hegels view of society as an artificial construct, unfolding within the realm of history
and freedom, in counter-distinction to nature. Aristotle advocates the value of personal
freedom and the practice of civic virtue, but believes that inequality and slavery are a natural
aspect of the human condition. He calls for the creation and maintenance of a middle class to
help ensure political stability, but advocates disenfranchising the merchant and artisan classes
that could make the middle class a real economic possibility.

Despite the dissonance between modern ideals and Aristotles political thought, prominent
Neo-Aristotelian ethicists such as MacIntyre (1984) point to the continuing relevance of his
rational, secular analysis of moral issues, firmly rooted in the fundamentals of human nature
and experience, and advocate a return to an updated version of his virtue ethics. The particular
value of Aristotles ideas to contemporary political thought is the unique perspective he brings,
unclouded by modern normative assumptions that sometimes obfuscate human nature. The
proverbial Achilles heel of modern social science is that the observations it gathers and
interprets, in accordance with its empirical method and modern ideals, are generally limited to
a relatively narrow sample of contemporary behaviours, from which it then extrapolates to
construct theories with implicit claims to universality. This is an untenable epistemological
position for which Aristotles political philosophy holds the potential to act as a theoretical
corrective.

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Selected Translations of Aristotles Political Works:
Politics:
Rackham, H., trans. (1st publ. 1932): Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, (English with
accompanying Greek text)
Lord, Carnes, trans. (1984): Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press
Reeve, C.D.C., trans. (1998): Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co.
Jowett, Benjamin, trans.; Everson, Stephen, ed. (1988): Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press

Nicomachean Ethics:
Rackham, H., trans. (1st publ. 1934): Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, (English with
accompanying Greek text)
Irwin, Terence (1985): Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co.

Athenian Constitution:
H. Rackham, trans. (1st publ. 1935): Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press (English with
accompanying Greek text)

References and Further Readings

Bartlett, Robert C. (Mar., 1994): Aristotles Science of the Best Regime, The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1, 143-155
Chroust, Anton-Hermann (1967): Aristotle Leaves the Academy, Greece & Rome, 2nd Ser., Vol.
14, No. 1. (Apr., 1967), pp. 39-43
Coby, Patrick (Nov., 1988): Aristotles Three Cities and the Problem of Faction, The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 896-919
Dring, Ingemar (1957): Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Gteborg (distr.:
Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm)
Edwards, Michael (2004): Civil Society, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press
Kraut, Richard (2002): Aristotle Political Philosophy, New York: Oxford Univ. Press
Kumar, Krishan (Sep., 1993): An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, The British
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 375-395
Loos, Isaac (Nov., 1897): The Political Philosophy of Aristotle, Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 10, pp. 1-21
Lord, Carnes (1987 [1st publ. 1963+): Aristotle, In Strauss, L. & Cropsey, J., eds., The History of
Political Philosophy, Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. (1984): After Virtue: a study in moral theory (2nd ed.), Notre Dame: Univ.
of Notre Dame Press
Marcianus of Heraclea (1962): Vita Aristotelis Marciana, ed. Olof Gigon, Berlin: De Gruyter
Strauss, Leo (1978 [1st publ. 1964]): The City and Man, Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press
Tessitore, Aristide, ed. (2002): Aristotle and Modern Politics The Persistence of Political
Philosophy, Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press

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