Scribner - 1988 - Investigation of The Collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza

INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLAPSE OF
L'AMBIANCE PLAZA
By Charles F. Scribner,1 Member, ASCE, and Charles G. Culver,2
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Universidad Politecnica De Valencia on 06/09/15. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
Fellow, ASCE
ABSTRACT: Results from an investigation of the collapse of the L'Am-

biance Plaza building on April 23, 1987, are presented. The building was
being constructed using the lift-slab method; collapse occurred during
construction. The investigation included examination of debris at the
site of the collapse, review of eyewitness accounts of the collapse,
review of project documentation, laboratory and field tests, and analy-
ses of the structure. Several potential failure mechanisms are investi-
gated. The most probable cause of the collapse is determined to be loss
of support at a lifting jack in the west tower during placement of a group
of three floor slabs. The loss of support was likely due to excessive
deformation of a shearhead lifting angle, which caused a lifting nut to
slip off its lifting angle. This failure mechanism was duplicated in
laboratory experiments. As loads were redistributed after the initial
failure, the remaining jack rod lifting nuts along column line E support-
ing the package of floor slabs slipped off their lifting angles and the slabs
failed in flexure and shear. These slabs fell causing the slabs below them
to fail.
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 1:30 P.M. on April 23, 1987, the L'Ambiance Plaza, an

apartment building under construction in Bridgeport, Connecticut, col-
lapsed, killing 28 construction workers. This was the largest loss of life in
a construction accident in the United States since 51 workmen were killed
in the collapse of a reinforced-concrete cooling tower under construction
at Willow Island, West Virginia, in 1978 (Lew et al. 1979). A photograph of
the structure taken approximately two hours after the collapse is shown in
Fig. 1.
Representatives of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) arrived on the building site shortly after the collapse occurred.
O S H A requested that the National Bureau of Standards' (NBS) Center for
Building Technology conduct an investigation to determine the most
probable cause of the collapse. Engineers from N B S arrived on the site and
began their investigation on April 24, 1987. In addition to information
collected during examination of the debris, the N B S team, in carrying out
its investigation, used:
1. Descriptions of the collapse given by survivors and eyewitnesses.

Res. Struct. Engr., Structures Div., Ctr. for Bldg. Tech., Nat. Bureau of
Standards, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.
2
Chf., Structures Div., Ctr. for Bldg. Tech., Nat. Bureau of Standards, Gaith-
ersburg, MD 20899.
Note. Discussion open until October 1, 1988. To extend the closing date one
month, a written request must be filed with the ASCE Manager of Journals. The
manuscript for this paper was submitted for review and possible publication on
December 21, 1987. This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of Constructed
Facilities, Vol. 2, No. 2, May, 1988. ASCE, ISSN0887-3828/88/0002-0058/$1.00 +
$.15 per page. Paper No. 22453.
58
J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 1. L'Ambiance Plaza Immediately after Collapse
2. Project documentation, including design specifications, plans, shop

drawings, construction records, testing laboratory reports, and project
correspondence.
3. Laboratory tests of samples of construction materials removed from
the collapsed structure and critical subassemblies.
4. Data obtained from an investigation of the foundations at the site after
the collapse.
5. Analytical studies, including computer analyses.
This paper summarizes the results of the investigation by NBS. Com-

plete details of all aspects of this investigation are available in a National
Bureau of Standards report (Culver et al. 1987).
DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURE
L'Ambiance Plaza was to have been a 16-story structure consisting of 13

stories of apartments and 3 levels of parking. The structure consisted of
two rectangular towers, each 112 ft (34 m) by 62 ft (19 m) in plan,
designated in this report as the east and west towers. A five-story parking
garage planned for construction adjacent to the two towers had not been
erected and was not involved in the collapse. A plan view of the main
building is shown in Fig. 2.
Steel columns (W and HP shapes) supported the floor slabs. The floor
slabs in each tower were erected independently and were connected by
59

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60

Slabs in temporary position m i Slabs in permanent position
FIG. 3. Sequence of Erection of Columns and Floor Slabs
cast-in-place reinforced-concrete pour strips at each floor level after the

floor slabs had been secured in their final positions.
The building was being constructed using the lift-slab method. Columns
were erected and slabs were lifted in stages. The sequence of lifting floor
slabs and extending columns is shown schematically in Fig. 3. As this
figure illustrates, up to three slabs were lifted at one time in a "package."
With the exception of the first and last packages of two floor slabs in each
tower, all packages consisted of three floor slabs.
The floor and roof slabs were two-way, unbonded post-tensioned flat
plates cast one on top of the other at ground level. Normal-weight concrete
was used throughout the structure. The location of the post-tensioning
tendons is shown schematically in Fig. 4. The tendons in the north-south
direction were approximately uniformly spaced. In the east-west direction,
the tendons were banded along the column lines. The tendons along
column line E in the west tower were splayed as shown in Fig. 4. The
centroids of the banded tendons did not coincide with the column
centerlines. Slabs contained a nominal amount of bonded reinforcement in
the vicinity of the columns and shearwalls.
After being post-tensioned, the slabs were erected using a lifting system
consisting of hydraulic jacks, threaded jack rods and attachments, and
welded steel collars called shearheads placed in the concrete floor slab at
each column. The elements of the lifting system are shown in Fig. 5. A
hydraulic jack was mounted on the top of each column. Each jack
consisted of an upper and lower crossarm separated by a hydraulic
cylinder. The lower crossarm sat directly on the column top. The upper
61

62

!
O
<5
o
o
u.
03
(A
a.
I
Take-up nut
Upper crossarm
Hydraulic jack
1/2" stroke limit
Nut drive arm

(In raised position)
Holding nut
Lower crossarm
Lifting rod
1-3/4" dia.
Acme thread
Column
Rod coupler
Extension rod
Sleeve
Lifting angle
Shearhead
Lifting nut
FIG. 5. Elements of Lifting System
arm supported two jack rods, which were attached to the shearhead and
supported the floor slab.
Two sizes of jacks were used. All jacks shared similar essential features
and modes of operation. The nominal load capacity of a small jack was 150
kips (667 kN). At the four columns with the heaviest sections in each tower
(B9, BIO, D9, and D10 in the east tower and columns E3, E3.8, G3, and G4
in the west tower), "super jacks," with a capacity of 300 kips (1,334 kN),
were used. Separate control consoles and engine-driven power units
supplied hydraulic pressure to the jacks in each tower. All jacks connected
to a given console operated at the same line pressure.
The jacks lifted the floors in 1/2-in. (12.7-mm) increments, or lifting
cycles. A system of electrical interlocks prevented the floor slabs from
being raised more than 1/2 in. differentially between any two jacks. Floors
were typically lifted at rates of approximately 5 ft (1.52 m) per hour.
Once the slabs had been raised to approximately the desired elevation
for "parking" (mechanical attachment to the columns), the jacks at each
column could be controlled individually to raise or lower the slab to the
63

FIG. 6. Detail of Slab-to-Column Connection
desired elevation. The floor slabs were supported at the columns by steel
wedges placed between the lower face of the shearheads and blocks
welded to the flanges of the columns. A typical connection of a slab to a
column is shown in Fig. 6.
Slabs could be parked either temporarily or permanently. If the slab was
to be parked temporarily, wedges would be held in position only by tack
welds and friction. If the slab was to be parked permanently, the wedges
were fully welded around their perimeter, the top flanges of the shearhead
channels were welded to the seal blocks, and concrete was placed in the
cavity between the shearhead and the column.
STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION AT TIME OF COLLAPSE
Several types of construction work were in progress in the building on

the day of the collapse. Plumbers, electricians, and carpenters were
installing nonstructural items in both towers. Masons were placing con-
crete in shearwaU forms, in the cavities between the columns and floor
slabs in each tower, and in pour strips connecting the floors of the east and
west towers at level 2.
Floor slabs were being lifted and attached to columns with wedges in
both the east and west towers on April 23d. During that morning the fourth
stage of erection of the east tower had been completed and workmen were
welding wedges permanently in place when the collapse occurred.
The group of slabs for floors 9, 10, and 11 of the west tower had been
raised to its temporary position in the fourth stage of lifting at approxi-
64

WEST TOWER EAST TOWER
U ROOF
LEGEND:
Jl, J l Pour strips In place
Slab-Column Joint Configuration in " ' | [ e between towers
Wedges tack-welded 1 only

TT Shear wall
Wedges permanently welded
Shear walls and pour strip
Wedges permanently welded; cast on day of collapse
= * * = Seal blocks welded and column
II pockets filled
FIG. 7. Status of Construction at Time of CollapseSouth Elevation
mately 11:30 A.M. At the time of the collapse, approximately 1:30 P.M.,
workmen were installing wedges to hold slabs 9, 10, and 11 in position
temporarily. Wedges had been installed along column lines G and H and
ironworkers were installing wedges at column E4.8. A schematic represen-
tation of the state of construction at the time of the collapse is shown in
Fig. 7.
DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLAPSE
Forty-five individuals who were on the site or nearby provided descrip-
tions of the collapse. Fourteen of these individuals were in the structure
when the collapse began. Three other individuals who did not witness the
collapse provided general information about construction procedures used
at the job site.
Witnesses did not see the building moving prior to the collapse. None of
the workmen in the building reported any swaying or unusual motion of the
building. Almost all witnesses first noticed the start of the collapse because
of a loud snap or bang, which some likened to the slamming of a hinged
tailgate of a dump truck or the sound of a piece of metal snapping under
pressure. In general, all witnesses agreed that the collapse was extremely
rapid, with most estimating its duration at between two and ten seconds.
Most of the witnesses indicated the collapse started in the west tower.
All workmen who believed they saw the failure begin said the failure
65

appeared to start high in the structure in the west tower. An ironworker
installing wedges at column E4.8 underneath slabs 9, 10, and 11 stated that
at the start of the collapse he heard a loud noise, which he believed came
from within 25 ft (7.6 m) of where he was working, either directly above
him or toward the center of the slab in the vicinity of column E3.8. He then
noticed the floor slab directly over his head "was cracking just like ice
breaking." The floor slabs above him then fell. He was carried down with
the collapsing structure and later rescued.
Descriptions of the collapse given by three witnesses who were south of
the building were essentially similar. All three heard one or more loud
noises and then saw the west tower beginning to collapse. They indicated
the west tower then fell slightly eastward into the east tower, causing the
top floors of the east tower to fall onto the floors below. The east tower
then listed slightly eastward and collapsed completely.
DESCRIPTION OF INVESTIGATION
Photographs were taken and videotape records were made immediately
following the collapse and as debris was removed from the site over the
following week. Sketches were made of the pattern of deformation of the
columns and the orientation of the collapsed floor slabs. Samples of the
construction materials tested at the National Bureau of Standards in-
cluded: (1) Concrete core samples from floor slabs and shear walls; (2)
portions of structural steel columns, weldments, and attachments; (3)
samples of post-tensioning strand; (4) one large and one small hydraulic
jack and jack rods, nuts, and other fittings; and (5) several shearheads and
wedges.
The NBS staff also examined project documentation including: (1) The
daily construction logs; (2) testing laboratory reports; (3) project corre-
spondence; and (4) design and construction drawings, project specifi-
cations, and architectural, structural, and mechanical-electrical drawings.
Wind-speed data and temperature records were obtained from the weather
station at the Bridgeport airport.
The in situ condition of the foundations and the backfill behind a
basement wall on the north side of the building were examined after the
majority of the debris had been removed from the building site. Elevations
at the column locations were measured to determine whether the footings
had settled. The material below the bottom of the foundations was
explored by core borings, test pits, and in situ tests where feasible. The
core borings penetrated the slab on grade, column footings, underlying soil
and/or fractured rock, and the underlying bedrock. Standard penetration
tests and pressuremeter tests were run at selected locations. Routine
classification tests and direct shear tests on reconstituted soil samples were
run in the laboratory. The objective of this investigation was to determine
whether the conditions of the footings or the backfill behind the basement
wall could have contributed to the collapse.
LABORATORY TESTS
Tests performed in the laboratory included standard tests to evaluate
properties of the construction materials and tests of components and
assemblies of the lifting system. Standard tests included compression and
66

splitting tensile tests of the concrete cores; tensile and hardness tests and
metallographic, fracture, and chemical analyses of samples of the steel
columns and weldments; and tensile tests of the post-tensioning strand,
jack rods, and attachments. Critical subassemblies, including the shear-
head-to-column connection and the lifting assembly (jack, jack rods and
attachments, and shearhead), were tested to determine their behavior and
capacity.
Concrete Specimens
The strength of concrete was determined from 3-3/4-in. diameter cores
cut from floor slabs and shear walls following the collapse. Forty-three
core samples were taken. Eight core samples were instrumented with a
compressometer to measure axial deformations and elastic moduli of the
cylinders as they were tested. Five cores were tested in diametric
compression to determine splitting tensile strength of the concrete. The
strength of the concrete throughout the structure was also evaluated
approximately using a rebound hammer.
Average compressive strength was 5,420 psi (37.4 MPa) for cores taken
from slabs and 4,570 psi (31.5 MPa) for cores taken from shearwalls. The
average splitting tensile strength of all cores was 565 psi (3.90 MPa). No
concrete was found that had a strength less than the 4,000 psi (27.6 MPa)
specified on the plans. Results of tests using the rebound hammer indicated
the quality of the concrete was relatively uniform throughout the structure.
No evidence was found to indicate that any concrete had been damaged by
cold weather.
Steel Specimens
Coupons taken from three column segments were tested to evaluate the
mechanical properties of steel in the columns. Specimens were tested to
failure in tension according to American Society of Testing Materials
(ASTM) procedures. The static yield stress, ultimate tensile strength,
elastic modulus, and percentage of elongation were calculated for each
coupon.
Project specifications required that steel in the columns conform to the
requirements for either ASTM A36 or A572, Grade 50 structural steel,
depending on the location of the column in the structure. All mechanical
and chemical properties measured satisfied the appropriate requirements.
The average static yield stress of coupons cut from the specimens of A36
steel was 38.4 ksi (265 MPa). The average ultimate tensile strength of those
coupons was 67.9 ksi (468 MPa) and the average value of the elastic
modulus was 29.8 X 103 ksi (205,000 MPa). The average static yield stress
and ultimate tensile strength of coupons cut from the sample of A572
Grade 50 steel were 52.9 ksi (365 MPa) and 79.3 ksi (547 MPa). The average
value for the elastic modulus of that steel was 29.2 x 103 ksi (201,000 MPa).
Weldments
Fifteen coupons of weldments were machined in accordance with ASTM
E8-85b from field splices in three column segments. A group of unma-
chined coupons was also prepared from these column segments. Speci-
mens were tested to failure in tension and their ultimate tensile strengths
were recorded.
67

Only 1 of the 15 machined coupon specimens failed in the base metal.
The other 14 coupons failed in the weld metal. All splices of columns were
designed to be complete penetration welds. Porosity and incomplete
penetration were seen in the fracture surfaces of three specimens. In these
specimens, the incomplete portion of the weld comprised between 15 and

60% of the cross-sectional area of the specimens, an amount greater than
that considered acceptable by the American Welding Society specification
("Structural welding" 1983). The tensile strengths for these welds were
less than the strengths expected for the weld metal (near 75 ksi). The
ultimate tensile strength of 10 of the 15 coupons was less than the minimum
ultimate tensile strength specified for ASTM A572, Grade 50 steel. Results
of tests of the three unmachined coupons were consistent with those
obtained from the machined coupons.
Post-Tensioning Strand
Four specimens of both unused and used 1/2-in. (12.7-mm), Grade 270,
seven-wire, Low-Lax post-tensioning strands were tested. Yield strengths
of all eight specimens exceeded the strength specified by ASTM A416. The
average breaking strength for the eight specimens of strand was less than
1% less than the specified minimum. Only one of the specimens of unused
strand had a breaking strength above the specified minimum strength. AH
four of the specimens of used strand had strengths in excess of the
specified minimum.
Jack Rods
Jack rods used with the small jacks were tested to determine their tensile
strength and pattern of fracture. Four segments of 1-3/4-in. (44.5-mm)
diameter jack rods were loaded monotonically to failure in tension. The
average failure load was 185.5 kips (825 kN), a value 2.5 times the rated
load of 75 kips (334 kN). Elongations of approximately 8% in a 40-in.
(1,000-mm) gage length were recorded. The fracture surfaces indicated a
ductile failure, and one of the specimens necked down near the center of
the rod.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSES
Structural analyses were performed to determine forces present in

various parts of the structure under a variety of loading conditions that
might have been encountered at the time the collapse occurred and to
evaluate the likelihood of various modes of failure. The analyses included:
(1) Estimation of reactions at all column locations under a variety of
conditions that could have existed at the time of the collapse; (2) analysis
of stability of individual columns; (3) analysis of lateral stability; (4)
calculation of the capacity of the floor slabs in shear and flexure; (5)
analysis of possible vertical or lateral deformations of the structure due to
foundation conditions; and (6) analysis of the structure under the wind
loads that existed at the time of the collapse.
Floor Slabs
A two-dimensional finite element computer model was used to analyze
the floor slabs. Columns were modeled as point supports at the column
centers. The effects of post-tensioning were included in the model as
68

* kips SLAB: Unit weight -145 lbs/ft 3

Total weight-601.2 kips
E o -2.88x103ksi
FIG. 8. Support Reactions for Single Slab in West Tower
compressive stress in the plane of the slab and secondary moments

induced by the drape of the post-tensioning cables.
The majority of the analyses dealt with the west tower. Support
reactions and rotations at each column location and stresses and displace-
ments throughout the slab were determined for the slab subjected to its
own dead weight. The reactions and stresses resulting from loss of support
at various columns and support reactions due to raising the slab at one
location were also determined.
The support reactions for a single slab in the west tower in the "as-cast"
position are shown in Fig. 8. These reactions can be multiplied by three to
obtain the reactions for a package of three slabs. The reactions near the
center of the tower, where super jacks were used (columns E3, E3.8, G3,
and G4), were higher than the reactions around the perimeter. Note,
however, that the reactions at columns E2, G2, E4.8, and G5 are also
relatively large, with the reaction at E4.8 being the largest in the west
tower. The reactions at the majority of columns due to the dead load of
three slabs were below the capacity of the jacks used at those columns. For
column E4.8, however, the three-slab load was equal to the nominal
capacity of the jack used at that column. Loads on the lifting jacks in the
east tower were also calculated. For the east tower, the largest reactions
occur at columns B9, BIO, D9, and D10, where super jacks were used.
The computer model was also used to calculate column reactions
resulting from loss of support of the floor slab at selected column locations.
Such loss of support could have resulted from failure of a jack rod, failure
of a shearhead, failure of a weld block or loss of a wedge. Loss of support
at column E4.8 caused a large change in reactions at other supports, with
considerable increases in reactions at the surrounding columns, C4.8,
E3.8, G5, C.5, and E.5. The reaction at column E3.8 increased 48% when
the support at E4.8 was removed.
69

The support reactions resulting from raising the slab at a single column
location were also calculated. This analysis was designed to determine the
changes in support reactions that could result from raising the slab at a
single column location, as was commonly done during placement of
wedges at a column. Raising of the slab at column E4.8 by one full stroke
of the jack (1/2 in. or 12.7 mm) was considered. This analysis showed that
the force applied by the jack at column E4.8 would have to be increased
from 151.8 kips (675 kN) to 201.1 kips (894 kN) to raise the slab one-half
inch at column E4.8.
Instability of Individual Columns

Instability of the columns in the west tower was examined to determine
whether this could have caused collapse of the building. The length of each
column was assumed to be 30 ft 5 in. (9.3 m), the maximum unbraced
length in the west tower at the time of the collapse. The effective length
factor was conservatively assumed to be K = 1. The analysis showed that
all columns were stable for these conditions. Buckling loads were between
2.2 and 7 times as large as the actual loads on the columns.
Lateral Instability
The possibility of sidesway buckling of the west tower was also
considered. Several analyses were performed. Inelastic stability in the
east-west direction was determined by a two-dimensional, inelastic analy-
sis of each column line. Columns were modeled as line elements. The shear
walls in place at the time of the collapse were assumed to provide lateral
restraint. The concrete slabs were assumed to be rigid in their plane and
pin-connected to the columns. Rotational restraint of the columns by
temporary slab-to-column connections was neglected. The safety factor
against lateral buckling of the west tower for this case was calculated to be
1.07.
Other analyses indicated, however, that neglecting rotational restraint
due to placement of the wedges on the column flanges was a conservative
assumption. An analysis was conducted with temporary slab-to-column
connections being modeled as linear elastic-plastic rotational restraints
whose characteristics were based on the actual dimensions of the connec-
tion. This model indicated the sidesway buckling capacity-to-load ratio for
east-west motion of the west tower was approximately 5.6.
A 12-ton (107-kN) hydraulic jack was being used on the day of the
collapse to plumb the west tower. Results of a lateral load analysis
indicated that it was unlikely that the lateral force or displacement due to
this jack could have initiated the collapse of the west tower.
Shear Capacity of Slabs

The capacity of the slab to resist punching shear failure at the column
locations was computed according to procedures recommended by the
American Concrete Institute (ACI) ("Building code" 1983). Computed
ratios of capacity to load were between 4.0 and 23.1. On the basis of these
calculations, it was considered unlikely that the collapse of the structure
could have been due to failure of the slabs in shear.
70

Differential Foundation Settlements
The behavior of the foundations of the structure was estimated on the
basis of the soil properties and bedrock characteristics determined during
the NBS investigation of the conditions of the footings and fill used on the
north side of the retaining wall. It was estimated that differential foun-
dation settlements not exceeding 3/8 in. (10 mm) could have occurred
during construction, with approximately 90% of these settlements occur-
ring before any slab was fixed in its permanent position. The maximum
settlement that could have occurred after initial lifting of the slab was
estimated to have been 0.05 in. (1.3 mm) or less. It was considered unlikely
that settlements of the magnitude of those calculated could have caused
failure of the structure.
Lateral Earth Pressure
The lateral pressures exerted by the. backfill behind the basement wall
north of the building prior to the collapse were resisted in part by the floor
slabs at levels C and D. The forces acting on the slabs were determined on
the basis of soil properties obtained from the subsurface investigation.
These forces were transmitted by the slabs to the columns and shearwall,
which carried the forces to the foundations. The ultimate shear resistance
of the most critical shearwall was calculated to be 40% greater than forces
transmitted to it by horizontal soil pressure. In addition, sliding and/or
overturning of shearwall footings was determined to be unlikely. The
minimum reserve capacity against failure was approximately 2.7. Field
observations confirmed these calculations. Photographs showed that no
significant displacement of the wall had taken place immediately after the
collapse occurred. On the basis of these analyses, it was considered
unlikely that shearwall failure or excessive displacements caused by lateral
soil pressure against the basement wall contributed to collapse of the
building.
Wind Loading
The maximum wind loads acting on the structure at the time of collapse
were calculated using the procedure described in ANSI A58.1 and the
wind-speed data obtained from the National Weather Service station at the
Bridgeport airport. The lateral loads calculated were an order of magnitude
smaller than the calculated lateral capacity of the structure. It was
concluded that wind effects did not play any significant role in the collapse.
TESTS OF SUBASSEMBLIES
Tests were conducted to evaluate the performance and strength of two
subassemblies critical to the erection of floor slabs. The first subassembly
consisted of a shearhead, two wedges, and a section of column that
included weld blocks and seal blocks. This assembly made up the
temporary slab-to-column connection. Three tests of this assembly
showed that the connection could withstand all static vertical loads present
during normal construction operations.
The second subassembly consisted of a 150-kip (667-kN) lifting jack,
jack rods and attachments, and a shearhead of the type used at column
E4.8. This lifting assembly was tested to evaluate the behavior and
capacity of the mechanism used to lift the slabs into place. The test setup
71

150 kip lift slab jack
(inoperable)
-1"x5'x14"
steel plate
2-100 ton
hydraulic rams
Threaded rod
1"x9'x16'
steel plate
6x12 structural
tubing
2* steel plate
2*x2*bar
Mark P50
shearhead
Lifting nut
FIG. 9. Lifting Assembly Test Setup
is shown schematically in Fig. 9. The distance from the underside of the

hydraulic jack to the bottom of the shearhead corresponded to the distance
between the top of the column and the bottom of slabs 9, 10, and 11 in the
west tower at the time of the collapse. Five tests of the lifting assembly
were conducted. The major variable in the tests was the condition of
confinement of the shearheads.
The lifting jack supported the jack rods as had been done in the
structure. Load was applied by hydraulic rams positioned between the
base of the lifting jack and a spacer fabricated from structural tubing. The
shearheads were loaded uniformly around their top perimeter to simulate
approximately the conditions at a shearhead in the structure.
Bare shearheads (not confined by concrete) were used in three of these
tests. The shearhead used for the third test was stiffened by two steel bars
welded between the tops of the vertical legs of the lifting angles. This
72

FIG. 10. Deformed Shearhead Number 2 after Lifting Assembly Test
prevented lateral movement of the top of the lifting angles and the top
flanges of the shearhead arm channels. This condition represented an
effective upper bound of lateral restraint. In tests 4 and 5, shearheads were
confined by a concrete slab containing a nominal amount of mild steel
reinforcement. No post-tensioning was used in these specimens. Load was
transferred from the spacer to the concrete slab through wooden timbers
positioned around the perimeter of the shearhead opening. In four tests
transducers were used to measure the lateral displacement of the flanges of
the arm channels. The behavior of the lifting angle of the shearhead and the
lifting nut was recorded on videotape for all tests.
Load was applied slowly in 10-kip (44-kN) increments. In each test
deformation of the shearhead consisted of twisting of the lifting angles and
the arm channels as well as local deformations of the lifting angles near the!
point at which the lifting nuts applied loads. Deformation and yielding of
the lifting angles and arm channels of the shearhead were first observed
when the load on the system reached approximately 120 kips (534 kN).
When load was increased, additional yielding of the lifting angles and arm
channels of the shearheads allowed the ends of the jack rods to move
toward the center of the shearhead. The manner in which the shearheads
deformed is shown in Fig. 10. Lifting angles deformed in the manner seen
in this specimen were observed on several shearheads in the collapsed
structure.
Failure of the lifting assembly took place in one of two ways, each of
which occurred at the connection of the jack rod to the shearhead. The first
type of failure occurred when the lifting angle rotated sufficiently to allow
the lifting nut to overcome friction forces and slip out from under the lifting
angle. In the second type of failure, rotation of the lifting angle and arm
channel of the shearhead caused the jack rod to fracture due to combined
flexure and axial load. All failures occurred with very little warning and
were accompanied by a loud bang as energy was released rapidly and
73

TABLE 1. Summary of Lifting Assembly Test Results
Failure Load
Test Condition of
number shearhead . Kips kN Failure type and location
(D (2) (4) (5)
(3)
1 Unconfined 165 734 Bottom nut slipped off lifting
angle.
2 TJnconfined 196 872 Jack rod broke above lifting nut
due to flexure and axial load.
3 Unconfined, 227 1,010 Jack rod broke above lifting nut
stiffened due to flexure and axial load.
4 Confined 201 894 Bottom nut slipped off lifting
by angle, east side.
concrete
5 Confined 198 881 Bottom nut slipped off lifting
by angle, west side.
concrete
components of the subassembly slammed together. A summary of the

results of tests of lifting assemblies is given in Table 1.
The support conditions for the shearheads tested did not duplicate
exactly the support conditions of the shearheads in the actual structure,
but rather, defined the bounds of strength of the lifting assembly, within
the limits of the parameters of loading used in the tests. The capacity of
specimen 1 given in Table 1 represented a lower bound for capacity of the
lifting assembly, as the shearhead was essentially unconfined. The ca-
pacity of specimen 3 represented an upper bound of the capacity of the
lifting assembly, as lateral restraint provided by the bars welded to the
lifting angles was much stiffer than that which could be provided by
confinement by concrete. The specimens confined by concrete (4 and 5)
had capacities between these two extremes. The capacities of specimens 4
and 5 were considered good approximations of the capacities of the lifting
assemblies in the actual structure.
These tests indicated the flexural and torsional flexibility of the arm
channels and lifting angles was the primary factor influencing the strength
of the lifting assembly, regardless of the size of the jack used to lift the
shearhead. The shearheads used in these tests were designated as type
P50. Other tests performed during the investigation (Culver et al. 1987)
showed that lifting angles on shearheads designated as X51 (the type of
shearheads used with the super jack at column E3.8) performed in a
manner similar to the lifting angles on the P50 shearheads. On the basis of
these tests, the capacity of a lifting assembly could have been expected to
be at least 170 kips (756 kN) but not much larger than 200 kips (934 kN) in
the L'Ambiance Plaza structure.
COMPARISON OF RESULTS OF TESTS WITH PROJECT SPECIFICATIONS
No attempt was made to evaluate the design of the completed structure.

In general, construction materials were found to conform to specifications
established for the project. No concrete was found that did not meet
strength requirements set forth in project specifications. All structural steel
was found to be acceptable in both chemical composition and strength.
74

All samples of post-tensioning strands recovered from the collapsed
structure had yield and ultimate strengths that satisfied requirements for
the type of strand specified for use on the project. The yield strength of all
specimens of strand tested exceeded the design value specified.
Foundations
Most footings rested on a layer of disintegrated rock or local material
between 1 ft (0.3 m) and 2 ft (0.6 m) thick. This fill material was certified
by an independent testing laboratory to be capable of supporting 14,000 psf
(670 kPa). No evidence was found during the investigation to indicate that
the condition of the footings contributed to the collapse, or that the
footings would have settled excessively under design loadings.
Lateral Bracing
Shearwalls constructed as the slabs were lifted provided lateral support
after the concrete achieved a certain strength. The structural drawings
note that the shearwalls were required to "be cast so that no more than
three equivalent floors of height of lift slab structure shall be advanced
above cast top of shear wall." This requirement was not met at the time of
the collapse of the structure. On April 23,1987, the shearwalls on the south
side of the building between the ground level and level 1 were placed. The
erection of slabs had proceeded to five equivalent story heights (level 1 to
level 6) above the cast top of the shearwall at level 1. However, there is no
indication that this deviation from approved construction procedures
contributed to the collapse.
Weldments
Projects specifications required that all welds be visually inspected.
Types and locations of defects and work required and performed to correct
deficiencies were to be recorded. Fillet welds were to have been tested by
liquid penetrant inspection or magnetic particle inspection. Complete
penetration welds were to have been tested by radiographic inspection or
ultrasonic inspection, at the testing agency's option. Inspection require-
ments for field welds were the same as those for shop welds. Information
indicated the shop welds were visually inspected and the column splices
were ultrasonically inspected.
The results from tensile coupon tests and fractographic analyses raised
questions about the quality of some welds in the structure. Some welds did
not meet the requirements of the AWS Dl.1-83 ("Structural welding"
1983). It is not possible to determine the frequency at which this occurred
throughout the structure based on the limited amount of weldment testing
done during this investigation.
Details of Placement of Post-Tensioning Tendons
At several locations in the structure, details of placement of post-
tensioning tendons did not satisfy requirements established by the Ameri-
can Concrete Institute. In the vicinity of column E4.8, east-west tendons
are splayed in such a way that they are separated from the column by over
5 ft (1.52 m). This tendon layout does not satisfy the assumption that
banded tendons pass within the shear perimeter of the support. The
horizontal curvature of cables near column E4.8 is also questionable. ACI
Committee 423 ("Recommendations" 1983) specifically discourages the
75

use of horizontally curved, banded monostrand tendons unless special
reinforcement transverse to the axis of the tendons is provided. The
investigation did not indicate that any of these details contributed to
initiation of the collapse,'although their use is discouraged.
SCENARIO OF COLLAPSE
Based on the testimony of witnesses, observations of debris from the

collapse, and review of possible failure mechanisms, the most probable
cause of the collapse of the L'Ambiance Plaza building was failure of the
lifting assembly to support the package of floor slabs 9, 10, and 11 along
column line E in the west tower, specifically at column E3.8 or E4.8.
At the time of the collapse temporary wedges were being installed under
floor slab 9 at column E4.8. It is probable that installation of these wedges
required some raising or lowering of the slab package at that column.
Columns E3, E3.8, G3, and G4 carried less load than did E4.8. The
nominal reaction at E4.8 due to slabs 9, 10, and 11 was 152 kips (676 kN),
which, during erection of the slabs, made it the most heavily loaded
column in the west tower.
It was determined that increasing the elevation of the slab package at
column E4.8 by one full jack stroke of 0.50 in. (12.7 mm) from its as-cast
position would require a jack load of 201 kips (894 kN). Employees of the
lifting subcontractor testified that the line pressure normally supplied by
the lifting system power unit ranged from 2,300 to 2,500 psi (15.9 to 17.2
MPa) while lifting a package of three slabs, and that the maximum line
pressure attainable was approximately 3,000 psi (20.7 MPa). This trans-
lates to a jack force normally between 137 and 149 kips (609 to 663 kN) and
a maximum available force of 179 kips (796 kN) for a small jack. The jack
at column E4.8 could not have developed the force required for an upward
adjustment of 0.50 in. (12.7 mm) from the as-cast position, even when
operating at the maximum line pressure.
The indentations of the top of column E4.8 suggest that one of the jack
rods lost its load, causing the jack to roll off the column top and chamfer
the edge of the web. As tests of the lifting assembly indicated, this could
have resulted either from fracture of a jack rod or from a lifting nut slipping
out from under a lifting angle. Lifting nut impact marks were found on each
side of the web of this column at approximately 52 in. (1.32 m) below the
top of the column, indicating that at this column the lifting nuts "kicked
out" from under the lifting angles of the shearhead at slab 9.
Whether loss of support of the slab at column E4.8 was the cause of the
collapse or simply one of its effects cannot be established with certainty.
At least one other sequence of events could have produced a similar result.
If an upward adjustment of the slab at E4.8 required a force larger than the
jack at column E4.8 could provide, it is possible the 300-kip (1,334-kN)
jack at column E3.8 could have been used to effect this adjustment.
Assuming an operating pressure of 2,500 psi (17.2 MPa), the jack at column
E3.8 could have developed a lifting force of approximately 298 kips (1,330
kN). A full-stroke upward displacement at column E3.8 would have
required a force of about 190 kips (845 kN), which the jack easily could
have produced. A jack force of 190 kips (845 kN) acting on the type X51
shearheads at column E3.8 would produce significant rotations of the
76

IJLXAJk
Q^-ir-
n ^
<t> Loss of support of slab at E3.8 or E4.8
Loss of support of slab and reduction of
- post-tensloning along column line E
Shearwall <^ Flexural failure of slab - negative moment
n\ \ Pour strip
<> Initiation of failure of roof and level 12
<> Initiation of failure of East tower
FIG. 11. Probable Sequence of Collapse
lifting angles, possibly leading to kick out of one or both of the lifting nuts.
Marks on the bottom surfaces of the lifting angles of the shearhead of slab
9 at column E3.8 showed that lifting nuts did slip off the lifting angles of the
shearheads at that location.
A yield line analysis showed that floor slabs would remain intact after
loss of support at either column E3.8 or E4.8. Therefore, loss of a jack at
either E3.8 or E4.8 would have led to failure of the lifting assembly at the
other column as loads were redistributed. An estimate of how the initial
failure propagated through the structure can be made based on eyewitness
accounts and observations of the debris. The probable sequence of
collapse is indicated in Fig. 11. After loss of support of slabs 9, 10, and 11
at column E3.8 and E4.8, whichever occurred first, it is likely that the
remaining jacks along column line E shed their load as one or more lifting
nuts kicked out when loads were redistributed. The loss of support of floor
slabs 9, 10, and 11 along column line E is in agreement with observed
marks on the stage IV column extensions and on the shearhead lifting
angles.
At approximately the same time, the slabs failed in flexure along the
length of the west tower just to the north of column line G. During this
initial phase of failure of slabs 9, 10, and 11, the two slabs at the top of the
building (12/roof) remained intact, as indicated by the curvature at the very
top of columns along column line C.
Along column lines G and H, slabs had been temporarily wedged and the
lifting nuts had been removed from the jack rods at the time of the collapse.
The shearheads in those two column lines scraped the columns very little
during the collapse and, with the exception of the shearheads in column
lines 1 and 6, the shearheads released cleanly and slid straight down.
Racking forces produced by movement of the slabs could have then caused
expulsion of wedges under floor slab 12 along column lines G and H.
Analysis indicated the slab would lift off one wedge at each column under
small lateral displacements.
The absence of scrapes and gouges on the column tops along these two
lines and the extensive damage to the tops of columns along column line C
77

suggest that failure of the upper two floor slabs (12/roof) initiated in the
south sector of the west tower. This failure sequence is consistent with
accounts given by several eyewitnesses.
The most probable cause of the initiation of the collapse of the east
tower is less clear. Four mechanisms appear possible. First, the pour strips
between the floor slabs of the two towers could have transmitted destruc-
tive forces from the west tower into the east tower. Counterclockwise
twisting of several of the columns in the lower levels of the east tower and
cracks in the shear wall on the south side of the east tower pointed to this
failure mode. Second, falling debris near the west end of column line D
could have damaged the tendon anchorages in the east tower floor slabs at
this location. With loss of anchorage of post-tensioning strands in one or
more floor slabs, the progression of failure could have been similar to that
described for column line E in the west tower. Third, forces exerted by
debris falling from the west tower could have caused lateral displacement
and instability of the east tower. Loss of wedges supporting the upper floor
slabs would follow. This loss of support could propagate through the floor
slabs in the east tower in a manner similar to that discussed for the slabs
at levels 9, 10, and 11 in the west tower. Fourth, debris from the west
tower could have struck the columns along column line 7, causing the east
tower to move laterally, thereby allowing temporarily welded wedges to
fall out and initiate collapse of the east tower.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are based on the laboratory and field tests,
computer analyses, witness interviews, and review of the project docu-
mentation:
1. The most probable cause of the collapse was failure of the lifting
system in the west tower during placement of a package of three floor
slabs. The failure most probably began at column E4.8 or column E3.8 as
excessive deformations of the lifting angles of the shearheads allowed the
jack rods to slip off the lifting angles in the shearheads supporting the
package of three slabs. This failure mechanism was duplicated in labora-
tory experiments. The failure propagated as the remaining jack rods along
column line E became overloaded and broke or slipped off the lifting angles
and the package of three slabs failed in flexure and shear. These slabs fell,
causing all slabs beneath them in the west tower to fail. The east tower
collapsed due to some combination of forces transmitted to it by the west
tower collapse, damage to the unbonded post-tensioning tendons caused
by falling debris from the west tower, or lateral instability caused by falling
debris from the west tower.
2. The quality of materials in the structure was generally in accordance
with the project plans and specifications and did not play a significant role
in initiating the collapse.
3. There were a number of deviations from the project plans and
specifications in the structure as built, but the investigation indicated these
deviations did not play a significant role in initiating the collapse.
4. The reserve capacity against lateral instability was small. It does not
appear, however, that lateral instability was the initial cause of the
78

collapse. It is unlikely that the horizontal jack used to plumb the structure
initiated the collapse.
5. It is unlikely that lateral earth pressure acting against the basement
wall on the north side of the structure caused the building to collapse.
6. It is unlikely that differential foundation settlements caused the

building to collapse. Data from the subsurface explorations indicated
differential foundation settlements not exceeding 3/4 in. (19 mm) could
have occurred during construction. It is believed that the majority of any
settlements would have occurred early in the erection process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Staff of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration provided

support throughout the investigation. John Miles, Pat Clark, Ronald
Morin, John Stanton, Joseph Normand, Edward Eagan, William Freeman,
Romas Bossone, Thomas Guilmartin, and Kang Yi are gratefully acknowl-
edged.
The Department of Public Safety of the State of Connecticut, Lieutenant
Edmund Dunstone, and state of Connecticut Building Inspector Leo
Belval are acknowledged for their invaluable support.
Schupack, Suarez Engineers Inc.; Schnabel Engineering Associates;
Connecticut Test Borings, Inc.; the Neil S. Moreton Company; and J. E.
Barrett and Sons provided valuable field service and assistance.
Many members of the NBS staff worked on this investigation. The
efforts of R. D. Marshall, F. Y. Yokel, J. L. Gross, C. W. Yancey, and
E. M. Hendrickson, and NBS technicians are especially acknowledged.
APPENDIX I. REFERENCES
"Building code requirements for reinforced concrete." (1983). ACI Committee 318,
ACI318-83, American Concrete Institute, Detroit, Mich.
Culver, C. G., et al. (1987). "Investigation of L'Ambiance Plaza building collapse
in Bridgeport, Connecticut." NBSIR 87-3640, National Bureau of Standards,
Washington, D.C., Sep.
Lew, H. S., et al. (1979). "Investigation of construction failure of reinforced
concrete cooling tower at Willow Island, West Virginia." NBSIR 78-1578,
National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., Nov.
"Recommendations for concrete members prestressed with unbonded tendons."
(1983). ACI-ASCE Committee 423, ACI423.3R-83, American Concrete Institute,
Detroit, Mich., 16 pp.
"Structural welding code-Steel." (1983). ANSI/AWS Dl.1-83, American Welding
Society, Miami, Fla.
79

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Scribner - 1988 - Investigation of The Collapse of L'Ambiance Plaza

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INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLAPSE OF

ABSTRACT: Results from an investigation of the collapse of the L'Am-

At approximately 1:30 P.M. on April 23, 1987, the L'Ambiance Plaza, an

1. Descriptions of the collapse given by survivors and eyewitnesses.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 1. L'Ambiance Plaza Immediately after Collapse

2. Project documentation, including design specifications, plans, shop

This paper summarizes the results of the investigation by NBS. Com-

L'Ambiance Plaza was to have been a 16-story structure consisting of 13

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

,9,U .9.fr3 .9,11

i,Zt J . .9.t>3 X .B.i.1

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

Slabs in temporary position m i Slabs in permanent position

FIG. 3. Sequence of Erection of Columns and Floor Slabs

cast-in-place reinforced-concrete pour strips at each floor level after the

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

1/2" stroke limit

Nut drive arm

FIG. 5. Elements of Lifting System

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 6. Detail of Slab-to-Column Connection

STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION AT TIME OF COLLAPSE

Several types of construction work were in progress in the building on

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

Wedges tack-welded 1 only

FIG. 7. Status of Construction at Time of CollapseSouth Elevation

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

specimens, the incomplete portion of the weld comprised between 15 and

Structural analyses were performed to determine forces present in

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

* kips SLAB: Unit weight -145 lbs/ft 3

FIG. 8. Support Reactions for Single Slab in West Tower

compressive stress in the plane of the slab and secondary moments

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

Instability of Individual Columns

Shear Capacity of Slabs

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 9. Lifting Assembly Test Setup

is shown schematically in Fig. 9. The distance from the underside of the

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 10. Deformed Shearhead Number 2 after Lifting Assembly Test

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

components of the subassembly slammed together. A summary of the

COMPARISON OF RESULTS OF TESTS WITH PROJECT SPECIFICATIONS

No attempt was made to evaluate the design of the completed structure.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

Based on the testimony of witnesses, observations of debris from the

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

FIG. 11. Probable Sequence of Collapse

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

6. It is unlikely that differential foundation settlements caused the

Staff of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration provided

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 1988.2:58-79.

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