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Electrical Design
Handbook
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 3
2 General Guidelines on Design and Utilisation of Electrical Equipment ___________ 4
2.1 Standard Voltages and Currents________________________________________ 4
2.1.1 Main Definitions from IEC Standards ____________________________________________4
2.1.2 Standard Voltage Ratings ______________________________________________________5
2.1.2.1 Low AC Voltage (100 V- 1,000 V) ____________________________________________5
2.1.2.2 Middle AC Voltage (1 kV- 35 kV) ____________________________________________5
2.1.2.3 High and Super High AC Voltage (above 35 kV)_________________________________5
2.1.3 Standard Test Voltages________________________________________________________6
2.1.4 Standard Current Ratings ______________________________________________________6
2.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) ___________________________________ 7
2.2.1 Mitigation of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Effects on Facility Equipment __________7
2.2.2 Project EMC Requirements ____________________________________________________8
2.2.2.1 Required Procedures _______________________________________________________8
2.2.2.2 Exclusions _______________________________________________________________8
2.2.2.3 Personnel and Equipment Exposure ___________________________________________8
2.2.3 EMI/EMC Contractual Requirements for ITER Suppliers_____________________________9
2.3 Specific Requirements and Recommendation for Design and Testing of Components 10
2.3.1 Cables ____________________________________________________________________10
2.3.2 Other Electrical Equipment ___________________________________________________10
2.A Attachment: List of IEC Standards_____________________________________ 11
3 General Guidelines on Grounding ________________________________________ 12
3.1 Basic Approaches __________________________________________________ 12
3.1.1 Tree-shaped configuration ____________________________________________________12
3.1.2 Grounding Circuit Monitoring _________________________________________________13
3.1.3 Integrated Plant Ground Grid __________________________________________________13
3.1.4 Personnel Protection_________________________________________________________13
3.2 Grounding of Machine Components ____________________________________ 13
3.2.1 Magnet System _____________________________________________________________14
3.2.1.1 Coils/Coil Terminals ______________________________________________________14
3.2.1.1 TF Coil Cases____________________________________________________________14
3.2.1.2 PF Coil Structures ________________________________________________________14
3.2.1.3 CS Structure_____________________________________________________________14
3.2.2 Thermal Shields ____________________________________________________________14
3.2.3 In -Vessel Components_______________________________________________________15
3.2.3 NB Injector and RF Generators ________________________________________________15
3.2.4 Power Supply Components in Tokamak Proximity _________________________________15
3.2.5 Diagnostic and Instrumentation ________________________________________________16
3.3 Grounding of Power Equipment _______________________________________ 16
3.3.1 Coil and H&CD System Power Supplies _________________________________________16
3.3.2 Steady-State Electrical Power Network __________________________________________17
3.3.3 Other Equipment and Structures________________________________________________17
3.3.3.1 Buildings _______________________________________________________________17
3.3.3.2 Outdoor Equipment _______________________________________________________18
3.3.3.3 Indoor Equipment ________________________________________________________18
3.3.3.4 Tunnels and Cable Trays ___________________________________________________18
3.4 Ground Insulation Tests _____________________________________________ 19
3.A Attachment: List of Papers on Grounding________________________________ 20
1 Introduction
This document provides general guidelines regarding the design and the grounding of the
electrical equipment to be used in ITER plant systems. It is addressed to designers and users
of electrical components in non-electrical plant systems, rather than to the designers of the
power supply systems. The latter should follow in their work many other, specific, standards,
instructions and industrial practices that are beyond the scope of this handbook. Furthermore,
specific aspects with regard to electrical components that are safety classified from the
nuclear point of view are not covered.
All electrical components utilised in the ITER plant systems shall be designed, manufactured
and tested in compliance with the latest issues of the standards published by the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The IEC is the authoritative worldwide body
responsible for developing consensus on global standards in the electrotechnical field. The
list of the IEC standards, most relevant for the design of the plant system electrical
components, is given in Attachment to section 1 of this document. Some quotations from
these standards are given in section 1 as general guidelines for design of the electrical
components. A full list of the IEC standards as well as the information about updated and
new publications can be found on the IEC site: www.iec.ch/
The highest voltage for equipment is the maximum value of the highest system
voltage (see above) for which the equipment may be used.
Insulation co-ordination:
the selection of the dielectric strength of equipment in relation to the voltages which
can appear on the system for which the equipment is intended and taking into account
the service environment and the characteristics of the available protective devices.
The lower values in the first column are voltages to neutral and the higher values are voltages
between phases. When one value only is indicated, it refers to a 3-wire system and specifies
the voltage between phases.
The voltages in excess of 230/400 V are intended exclusively for heavy industrial
applications and large commercial premises.
Standard current ratings in amperes have been fixed by the IEC as follows:
The potential for EMC problems exists because the facility will contain large quantities of
high power electrical and RF generation equipment that will be used in conjunction with
sensitive diagnostic and control equipment.
This section provides guidelines, and procedures that can be used to minimise the possibility
of EMC problems occurring in the ITER facility.
Compliance with the radiated EMI limits given in CISPR-11, and possibly conducted EMI
limits imposed by the electrical utility supplying ITER, are mandatory. All other EMC
requirements are self-imposed by the ITER project with the aim of mitigating potentially
serious operational problems.
If the emission limit for all facility equipment is set below the susceptibility limit for all
facility equipment then EMC is assured. Unfortunately EMI/EMC limits for much of the
equipment to be used in the ITER facility are unknown, installation specific, and/or
interactive with the operation of the full system. Because this is a universal problem the IEC
has established generic EMC guidelines, and EMI emission/immunity standards for industrial
equipment that can be used to help avoid EMC problems.
Properly installed equipment that is certified to comply with IEC EMC standards will most
likely not have EMC problems. The IEC standards relating to EMC are listed in the
introduction to this section. Some additional explanations are given below.
The IEC has published generic immunity and emission standards for industrial equipment.
These are: IEC 1000-6-2, Generic Immunity Standards for Industrial Equipment, and IEC
1000-6-4, Generic Emission Standards for Industrial Equipment. Control and
measurement equipment are covered with additional immunity standards given in IEC 801- 2,
3, and 4 which are Electrostatic Discharge, Radiated Electromagnetic Field, and
Electrical Fast Transient immunity requirements respectively. Many types of common
industrial equipment may carry certifications of compliance with these standards.
Much of ITER equipment will be unique and specialised in nature. It is unlikely that this type
of equipment will carry certifications of compliance to IEC EMC standards and requiring
these certifications would add unnecessary expense and complication to ITER procurements.
On the other hand, uniquely designed equipment, especially equipment that operates at very
high power levels, can have high risks of causing facility EMC problems. The following
paragraphs will outline procedures ITER will impose to minimise the risk of EMC problems.
All equipment not conforming to the IEC standards and not mentioned in section 2.2.2.2
(Exclusions), shall have an EMC risk assessment done by ITER personnel on an individual
basis. This assessment and the disposition thereof shall be kept on file by the ITER relevant
engineering staff.
Equipment deemed to be at risk of causing EMC problems shall have a more detailed
assessment done by the engineering staff. This assessment may involve analysis and/or
measurement of equipment EMI/EMC by ITER or their design. Subject equipment may be
accepted as is or shielding, filtering, and/or physical isolation may be required, as deemed
appropriate.
Equipment known to have high risks of causing EMC problems shall require preventative
measures to be taken in the design phase. High risk equipment includes, but is not limited to:
RF generators, thyristor phase controllers, and high power switching devices.
To the extent possible all equipment installations shall follow the procedures given in IEC
1000-5-1 which is entitled Installation and Mitigation Guidelines for EMC of industrial
equipment.
2.2.2.2 Exclusions
Equipment excluded from this EMC requirements/procedures shall be: any non-electrical
equipment, infrastructure equipment (e.g., lighting, low voltage distribution, etc.) temporary
equipment, portable equipment, or equipment not used during normal ITER operation (e.g.,
emergency generators, off-line uninterruptable power supply (UPS), etc.).
Design and layout of the P&SS PS and its grounding scheme shall limit the exposure of
sensitive electronic equipment to static and variable magnetic fields to a peak of about
10 mT. Exceptions can be made for equipment specifically designed and certified to function
in higher fields.
Equipment located close to the cryostat, e.g. discharge circuits for TF coil quench protection,
may be exposed to pulsed magnetic fields up to 30 mT.
Equipment emission shall be in accordance with the IEC standard 1000 on electromagnetic
compatibility:
Equipment specifications for ITER procurements may include specified EMC standards from
the IEC or other agencies as deemed appropriate. In addition to specified requirements the
following general requirements are mandatory.
A supplier of equipment shall certify that each piece of equipment supplied either:
Is certified to comply with EMI emission and susceptibility limits as set forth in IEC
1000-6-2 and IEC 1000-6-4, or in the case of control or measurement equipment IEC
801- 2, 3, and 4.
Is not certified to comply with EMI emission and susceptibility limits as set forth in IEC
1000-6-2 and IEC 1000-6-4 or IEC 801- 2, 3, and 4.
Suppliers of equipment not certified to comply with EMI emission and susceptibility limits,
shall assist ITER to determine EMI emission and immunity levels of their equipment and/or
allow ITER to measure EMI emission and susceptibility levels before installation of
equipment into the ITER facility. Measurement methods shall be those set forth in IEC
1000-4.
Equipment suppliers shall certify that they have used standard industry practices to minimise
generation of EMI and susceptibility to EMI.
2.3.1 Cables
All power, measurement, control and auxiliary cables shall be made of copper. Cable
insulation shall meet the following requirements:
insulation material XLPE preferred, PVC not accepted;
external sheath zero halogen material
max. permissible conductor temperature - continuous 90C;
- under short circuit conditions 250C;
acid gas content zero halogen, according to IEC-754;
fire retardancy according to IEC-332.
The most relevant IEC standards with recommendation for design and tests of components
for switching and conversion of electric power are given in the Attachment to section 2.
All components for outdoor installation should be designed and tested in line with IEC
recommendations for the level 3 (heavy) air pollution, according to IEC-71-2, as assumed in
the Site Design Assumptions (see PDS, Section III.A.6).
Enclosures for electrical equipment shall be in accord with IEC-529: Degrees of protection
provided by enclosures.
The ITER grounding circuits will be realised, to the most possible extend, in a tree-shaped
configuration to meet the single-point-grounding concept. This is primarily applicable to the
tokamak and surrounding area, where the level of stray magnetic fields is substantial. A
single grounding path normally shall be provided in this area (called "loop exclusion zone")
for each electrical circuit and structural or other metallic item. Parallel grounding paths
creating low-resistance loops for induced currents have to be avoided.
Some double and multiple ground connections may be accepted with analysis provided on a
case-by-case basis. The main criteria are to maintain adequate conditions for the insulation
testing and fault detection and to limit eddy current losses in the cold structures,
electromagnetic shielding effects and induced error fields.
The first and major exception from the single-point-grounding scheme is due to the multiple
parallel low-impedance connections between the vacuum vessel (VV) and the cryostat wall
through all ports, mechanical supports and blanket cooling pipes. The machine design makes
them unavoidable. These connections play a negligible role on plasma breakdown, on
vertical stabilisation and on error fields.
The central point of the ITER grounding tree is a cluster formed by the interconnected
conductive structures of the vacuum vessel and of the cryostat, together with a massive
busbar beneath the cryostat, which is solidly connected with the cryostat through negligibly-
low-impedance conductors. It is called the "ITER machine ground" and is intimately
connected through the steel embedded in the concrete to the Integrated Plant Ground Grid
(IPGG, see 3.1.3). The busbar under the cryostat is used for the grounding of the
components/structures in the "loop exclusion zone", which do not have direct contact with
the vacuum vessel or the cryostat. The dimensions of this loop exclusion zone have not
been evaluated. Analysis is needed to define it..
A ground monitoring system (GMS) shall verify the integrity of the connections to the
ground tree and shall detect closed loops through grounding conductors, e.g. caused by
accidental contact between two grounded metallic masses, in the tree-shaped grounding
configuration. The GMS will work continuously during shut-down intervals and between
pulses.
Similar systems have been implemented at the TFTR, DIII-D and RFX, all based on the use
of two Rogowski coils surrounding a tested conductor. One of the coils (a probe signal
sender) is connected to an ac power source, the other coil (a receiver) is connected to a
detector of fault signals. These signals are generated by the second coil when a closed loop,
occasionally created, links it with the first Rogowski coil.
All site, switchyard, building and equipment grounding grids/systems will be connected
together to form an integrated plant ground grid (IPGG). Equipment exterior and metal
structures will be connected by grounding conductors to the IPGG.
The ground grid will be embedded within the perimeter of the ITER plant including both
pulsed and steady-state HV substations. The IPGG will also include grounding electrodes
(vertically buried rods) at the perimeters of the HV substations or/and the ITER plant, the
steel reinforcement bars in the concrete of the building basements and perimeter ground
conductors buried around buildings.
More details on the arrangement of the IPGG are given in DDD4.3, section 1.1.7.
Combined protection of the personnel shall be provided against the electrical hazards in
accordance with common industrial rules and regulations, including practical experience
gained on existing tokamaks. The currently employed ITER concept is based on a number of
designated areas supplied with protective interlocks. Electrically interlocked boundaries
exclude personnel from areas containing potential hazardous conditions or connected with
areas containing hazardous sources. Electrical safety measures will be integrated with those
for nuclear, chemical and others.
This section deals with an outline description of the means for grounding of the machine
components within or in the proximity of the cryostat. A more detailed description should be
given in the corresponding DDDs.
The TF, CS, PF and correction coils shall be grounded in such a way:
to balance the voltage-to-ground at each coil terminal to 1/2 of the voltage across the
coil in normal conditions);
to limit ground fault currents;
to provide fault current detection.
The coils and their power supplies will be grounded through the same grounding circuits. A
soft grounding via high impedance (1-2 k) resistors is provided for all the coils.
Two series-connected resistors are connected in parallel to each coil/group of coils (e.g. in
the TF system) having a pair of current leads available outside the cryostat. Within each
subsystem, the midpoints of these terminal resistors is connected to the Neutral, which is a
common busbar connected to the ITER machine ground, through one grounding resistor
(GR). Its resistance is about 1 k to limit the fault current to ground and the related arc
energy in the case of a single failure in the coil or its power supply ground insulation. The
leakage current to ground will be measured and used for ground fault detection.
The TF coil cases are grounded through the 9 low resistance (about 0.5 m) feeder conduits
(stainless steel pipes) connected to the cryostat. They also have connections with the cryostat
through the structure cooling pipes, which resistance is about 20 m. Together with the 9
electrical connections (by pairs) at the inner parts of the TF cases these cooling pipes create
low-impedance loops. This is an exception from the single-point tree-shaped grounding
scheme, but it was found acceptable based on eddy current and error field study for all
assumed conditions.
The PF coil structures (clamps and cover plates) are grounded through the TF coil cases.
Each set of cover plates is connected to one PF coil clamp, which is connected to the nearest
TF coil case grounded through the TF feeder conduit. Each PF coil break box is insulated
from the clamps and cover plates and is grounded separately through its own PF feeder
conduit.
3.2.1.3 CS Structure
The CS structure split along its axis into 6 modules is grounded through the 6 cooling pipes.
The thermal shield contains three major portions: (1) vacuum vessel thermal shield, located
between the vacuum vessel and TF coils, (2) cryostat thermal shield, located between the
cryostat wall and magnet system, and (3) transition thermal shields, covering the ports, port
extensions and water cooling pipes, etc.
Structurally, the vacuum vessel thermal shield is designed as a self-standing toroidal shell,
surrounding the vacuum vessel. The entire shell is supported against the TF coil cases to
ensure its proper position and shape in the narrow gap between the TF cases and vacuum
vessel.
Electrically, the vacuum vessel thermal shield has 36 toroidal and 2 poloidal insulating
breaks, and it is insulated from the TF cases and the vacuum vessel. Each sector of the
vacuum vessel thermal shield has its own grounding path through a current limiting resistor
with provisions for insulation monitoring.
The cryostat thermal shield is split on separate panels and attached to a frame, which is
mounted on the interior of the cryostat wall. Each panel is supported on cryostat with the
help of Ti-alloy support, therefore having electrical contact with the cryostat. The panels are
insulated between each other in order to restrict the eddy currents.
Different transition thermal shields are made in different ways. In respect of grounding,
some portions are designed similar to the vacuum vessel thermal shield, and others are more
similar to the cryostat thermal shield.
All in-vessel components have low impedance grounding paths to the vacuum vessel, which
represents the machine ground. There are direct connections for divertor cassettes, for the
blanket modules and baffles.
The blanket modules and baffles are electrically separated from each other by open gaps.
Each NB H&CD Injector has a single grounding path routed through its metallic duct to the
cryostat vessel. There are no insulating breaks between the NB injector duct and vacuum
vessel, cryostat vessel and NB injector vessel. Practically all high potential parts of the NB
injector and its HV power supply are enclosed in thick walled vessels or ducts, and any high
voltage electric breakdowns are contained inside these volumes.
Similar grounding schemes are used for ECH and ICH equipment. The RF generators are
designed in so-called grounded grid configuration. All dc power supplies are insulated from
ground; the ground connection takes place at the load end.
This section applies to the TF fast discharge unit components and the water-cooled busbars
located in the gallery of the Tokamak Building.
All live, or current-carrying, parts of the power supply components are insulated from
ground, except for the resistors connected to the coil terminals and utilised for coil grounding
(see section 3.2.1).
Non-current-carrying parts, e.g. support structures and housings of the TF fast discharge units
components, cases and separators of the water cooled busbars etc., shall be grounded
according to the tree-shape-grounding scheme.
The diagnostic and instrumentation devices are normally supplied with fiber-optic
transmission lines to minimise problems caused by the electromagnetic interference. The use
of galvanic lines should be limited to only necessary cases.
For the galvanic transmission lines, the typical design solution is with the single grounding
point at the machine side. The main grounding point for these lines is the Vacuum Vessel
that represents the machine ground.
This section deals with the power equipment and structures located outside the loop exclusion
zone and, therefore, not subjected to the single-point-grounding approach.
The live, or current-carrying, parts of all other power supply components are insulated
from ground. This includes static converters (secondary windings of transformers, rectifiers
and inverters), busbars, switches etc, except for the ground switches specifically intended for
personnel safety. The grounded contacts of these switches are normally disconnected from
the live parts of equipment. The switches must be closed during shutdown/maintenance
periods to connect the power supply components and their loads to ground, thus, providing
safe access to the components by personnel.
The connection of the coil and H&CD power supply components to ground needed to avoid
floating potentials occurs at the load ends, namely on the coil terminals and NB injector and
RF generator grounded grids.
Non-current-carrying parts of the power supply components, with the exception of those
mentioned in section 3.2.5, are routinely connected to ground through low-impedance
conductors as described in section 3.3.3.
The main step-down transformers 220/11-11 kV have the primary windings firmly connected
to the ground grid through their neutrals. The secondary windings of these transformers with
a delta connection will be isolated from ground, as well as all other components of the middle
voltage (11 kV and 3.3 kV) distribution system, including transformers, diesel-generators,
distribution busbars, switchgear etc. This, of course, does not apply to the ground switches,
normally opened, which provide safe access to the electric components and circuits during
the shutdown period for maintenance. Therefore, the middle-voltage (11/3.3 kV) ac power
distribution is essentially a isolated neutral system according to IEC-50-601. That means
that the neutral point of the system is not intentionally connected to ground, except for high
impedance connections for protection or measurement purposes.
Contrary to that, the low voltage (400/230 V) distribution is essentially a solidly earthed
(neutral) system according to IEC-50-601. The 11 kV/400 V transformers in the Load
Centres have the grounded neutral on the secondary side. The low voltage cables are 3-
phase, 4-wire cables with the neutrals providing 400 V voltage to 3-phase loads and 230 V to
single-phase loads.
3.3.3.1 Buildings
All building metallic structures, including steel reinforcement of concrete, metallic water-
pipes et and other metallic elements of the building services shall be connected to the IPGG.
Normally, it will be done through the perimeter ground loops: grounded busbars running
around the periphery of each building. Ground connections are arranged at uniform intervals
around the buildings, avoiding concentration at one side.
For steel-frame buildings, the perimeter ground loop is connected to each column located
along the perimeter.
If the building has more than one floor, each floor has its own ground busbar or terminals.
All floor ground busbars are connected by a set of vertical conductors to the main ground
busbar located at the first floor or basement, if it exists. Such a main ground busbar or
terminal is required by IEC-364-5-54 as the place for connection of:
grounding conductors;
protective conductors;
main equipotential bonding conductors;
functional grounding conductors, if required.
The main ground busbar is connected to the underground perimeter ground loops with several
conductors.
All exposed metal parts of switches, structures, transformer tanks, metallic walkways, fences,
switchboards, instrument-transformer secondary windings, etc., are adequately grounded to
ensure personnel protection. This means that each individual piece of equipment and each
structural column has reliable electrical connection to the IPGG.
Equipment for indoor installation are connected to ground terminals/busbars provided inside
the buildings on each floor. The minimum cross-sections and other properties of the
grounding conductors are defined in IEC-364-5-54.
A ground busbar is provided inside each electrical equipment cabinet. Equipment housing
electronic circuits is provided with an instrumentation ground bus to which all conversion
equipment internal instrumentation and control system analogue and digital signal grounds
are attached.
The tape shields and armours in power cables are grounded at both ends. (This is also
applicable to the cable running outdoors.) Control and instrumentation cable shields are
grounded at the transmitting end only.
All non-current carrying metallic parts in the tunnels must be connected to the IPGG through
grounding busbars or cables running along the tunnels.
Metallic cable trays are grounded. The tray sections have mutual connections along the tray.
Multiple grounding electrodes connect each tray with the ground grid.
Periodic tests of the ground insulation must be provided during maintenance periods to check
its integrity and strength. These tests will include HV tests and insulation resistance tests.
They shall be conducted in accordance with relevant IEC standard, in particular IEC-60 and
IEC-71 mentioned in section 2.1.3.
The electric loads, subject of the ground insulation tests, should be disconnected from their
power supplies.
The insulation tests on the coil will be conducted during the time when the coils are de-
energised. In the CS, PF and CC systems the coil can be isolated from the power supply
equipment by the disconnect switches in order to detach the resistance of the coil insulation
to be measured. In the TF magnet system the disconnectors are included behind the fast
discharge units and can isolate the coils only from the ac/dc converters. However, in both
cases the disconnectors are located far from the coil terminals and are connected with them
by the water-cooled busbars. Therefore, the leakage resistance to ground through the water
and metallic tubes of the water distribution system will shunt the resistance of the coil
insulation and make impossible to measure the insulation resistance.
The proposal b) is more promising and is now considered as the reference solution to be
implemented by WBS 6.5.
1. J.T. Scoville and P.I. Petersen. The Ground-Fault Detection System for DIII-D. Proc. of
the 12th Symposium on Fusion Engineering, Montrey, California, 1987, pp. 1532-1535.
2. K Arakawa et al., Design of JT-60 Grounding System, proc. of the 8th Symp. on Eng.
Problems of Fusion Research, 1979.
3. R Caldon et al., Parallel Path Earthing systems in Power Distribution Networks, Proc. of
ERA Technology Conference Earthing systems -Which Path to follow?, Manchester,
UK, July 1993, pp 3.4.1-3.4.10.
4. F. Bellina, N. Pomaro, F. Trevisan: "The Ground Loops Detection System in the RFX
Machine"; Fusion Technology, vol. 30, n 3, part 2B, Dec 1996, pp.1217-1221.
5. F Faulkner et al., TFTR Grounding System, IEEE paper,
6. C. Neumeyer, Review of TPX Magnet Grounding Considerations, report PPPL 47-
950731-PPPL
7. V. Kuchinski, IDoM N 41 RI 8 96-12-18, The ITER Ground-Fault Detection System.