CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) vs. RICHARD BRODETT

AND JORGE JOSEPH, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011.

FACTS:

On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa charged
Richard Brodett and Joseph Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b) of
RA 9165 after being caught selling and trading 9.8388 grams of methamphetamine HCL
on September 19, 2008. Likewise, on April 16, 2009, Brodett was charged for violating
Sec. 11 of RA 9165 for possession of various drugs in an incident on the previously
noted date.

On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which is
a 2004 Honda Accord car registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused
to return as it was used in the commission of the crime and which was supported by the
OCP, stating that such vehicle be kept during the duration of the trial to allow the
prosecution and defense to exhaust its evidentiary value.

On November 4, 2009, the RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S. Brodett after it
was duly photographed. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration, such being denied.
PDEA then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was also
denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.

ISSUE/S:

Can the car owned by an innocent third party not liable for the unlawful act be returned
to its owner although such car was used in the commission of a crime?

RULING:

The Court ruled that a property not found to be used in an unlawful act and taken as
evidence can be returned to its rightful owner but only when the case is finally
terminated. The Court further states that the order to release the car was premature and
in contravention of Section 20, Par. 3of RA 9165 which states that property or income in
custodia legis cannot be disposed, alienated or transferred during the pendency of the
case. Court resolves that all RTCs comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release
articles, drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before rendition of
judgment, even if owned by innocent third party. Respondents having been acquitted
of the crime charged the Court will not annul the orders of the RTC nor reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

MICHAEL PADUA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168546, July 23,
2008.

FACTS:

Michael Padua, 17 years old, was charged with the crime in violation of Sec. 5 Art II of
RA No 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".
Padua, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A.

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Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops. Padua initially pleaded "not guilty", however Padua's counsel
manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea
of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70 of RA
9165. Without any objection from the prosecution, Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded
guilty. Subsequently, Padua filed a Petition for Probation, alleging that he is a minor
who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No 968.
Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.
However, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act
No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted
by the Probation Law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Michael Padua can avail of probation being a minor under the Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law?

RULING:

No. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in
statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Court further emphasized that the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide
stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or
pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.

GARCIA, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995.

FACTS:

Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event (aconfrontation in the private

respondents office where the later allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in
a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality,") and sought moral damages, attorney's fees
and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610, 000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
andpenalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes."

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Petitioner argues, as her "main and principal issue" that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those
involved in the communication.

In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation
must be alleged in the Information; otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200.

Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication, not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly
taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

(2) Whether the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged

inthe Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute aviolation of
R.A. 4200.Whether R.A. 4200 penalizes only the taping of a "private
communication and not a "private conversation"

RULING:

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Section I. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken wordby using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for

any person, not authorized by all the parties to any privatecommunication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify
as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violationof the statute

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The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to
a third person should be professed."

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of

R.A. 4200 does not include
"privateconversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word"communication" to
a point of absurdity.

The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning "to share or
to impart."In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" These definitions arebroad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressivecommunications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally - charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN DERILO, ISIDRO BALDIMO y

QUILLO, alias "Sido", LUCAS DOOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE
ISIDORO BALDIMINO y QUILLO, G.R. No. 117818 April 18, 1997

FACTS:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doos, Alejandro Cofuentes and one
John Doe were charged with the crime of murder committed by a band before the First
Branch of the former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar.

Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought
within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on appellant pleaded not
guilty. However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on
August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte, manifested to the court a quo that he
wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty.
Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.
A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test appellant's voluntariness
and comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty. Satisfied with the
answers of appellant, the trial court convicted him of the crime of murder defined and punished
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the plea of guilty of the respondent constitutes admission of the crime and its
surrounding circumstances that would warrant the imposition of death penalty?

RULING:

The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission
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of the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant
and the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea
of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence
whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation.

It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being
taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of
the act charged as the criminal offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have
been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of
proof. The Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing
the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not
only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the
accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his
plea.

JOEMAR ORTEGA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151085, August 20,
2008.

FACTS:

Petitioner, then about 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, then about eight (8)
years of age. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends
of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB
caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA,
then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda
Ortega, mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital
to attend to her other son who was sick. During the first night at petitioner's residence,
petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her
daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped
AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's
residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort
room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her
vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her
parents, otherwise, he would spank her. AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner
went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-
powered television. At that time, Luzviminda
wasconversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called
AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room
which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled
AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty,
and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA. AAA described
petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She,
likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis. This last incident
was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their
kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA
both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner
holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop;
the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother,
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MMM. MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas, the
Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that
she was molested. Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM
went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health
Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report showing that there were abrasions
on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette. She
also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and
that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days.
Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the
confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality. Subsequently, an amicable
settlement was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an
organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. As such, petitioner
stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went
home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of
petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this
instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which
assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only
filed the two (2) instant cases.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as found by both the RTC and the CA.

(2) 2. Whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case,
considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely
13years old.

RULING:

1. In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA.
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor.
If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted
solely on that basis. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility,
and found no ill motive for her to charge
petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as themalefactor.
Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he
saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitionerasserts
that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such
assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject
their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of
a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage theirdaughter's
psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.2. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and
explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.

A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years
but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and
be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
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with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada who is being prosecuted for under RA 7080 otherwise known
as An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the
Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions
are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses
which are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the
facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law
using the facial challenge.

RULING:

The terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the
lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-form
vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinar
y intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may
not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, over breadth
doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to
be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for
facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a

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malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it
among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court
holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

ROMARICO MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 183891, OCTOBER 19, 2011

FACTS:

Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a

special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance
of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is
criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted
in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty
how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).The Court sentenced Mendoza to
an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the court the Court
transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and
RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

ISSUE/S:

Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the
President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict?

RULING:

The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate
but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is
clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall
submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) AND EFREN L. ALAS,
G.R. NOS. 147706-07, FEBRUARY 16, 2005.

FACTS:

Two separate opinions for violation of Section 3 (e) of A 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November
17, 1999 against Efren l. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas in his capacity as President and Chief
Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay

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Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the
government.

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a Motion to Quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a
private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall
under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

- Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private

persons are charged with them in the commission of the offenses.
- The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings bank is a
subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government
owned corporation, the same is not created by special law.
- Said entity is formed was primarily for business.

The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition
arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government owned or controlled corporation
as the term defined under Section 2 (13) of the Administrative Code of 1987. RA 8294
(Act defining jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan did not make a distinction as to the manner
of creation of the government owned or controlled corporation for their officers to fall
under its jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or

managers of government owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under corporation Code for the purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act?

RULING:

More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while
the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who were themselves officers of
PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354,
otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of among others, to
encourage and promote the virtue of theft and the habit of savings among the general
public, especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the country xxx and to
facilitate postal service by receiving collections and making payments, including
postal money orders.

It is a basic principle in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.

Constitution: The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court known as

Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices such other offense committed by public officers and
employees, including government owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law.

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM and MR. DAVID LIM ,
vs. IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE B.

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MARCOS, ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ and
CYNTHIA L. COMANDAO, G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) dismissed its regular

and permanent employees, respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and
Comandao on March 15, 2004 and Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis on March 31, 2004, together
with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand.
PCMC, however, claimed that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver,
and Quitclaim.

Aggrieved by PCMCs decision to terminate their employment, respondents filed

separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing
Corporation, Mr. Patricio Lim and Mr. David Lim. These cases were later consolidated.
Respondents questioned the validity of the companys retrenchment program. On
August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA). rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. The LA found no flaw in respondents termination as they voluntarily
opted to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then
regularized, terminated from employment and were paid separation benefits. In view
of respondents belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such action is a
mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect more money, taking
advantage of the 2006 Supreme Court decision.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA

decision. In addition to the LA ratiocination, the NLRC emphasized the application of
the principle of laches for respondents inaction for an unreasonable period.

Respondents elevated the matter to the CA which reversed the earlier decisions of the
LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was
instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four
years.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the principle of laches apply in this instant case?

RULING:

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has been repeatedly held by the Court that:

x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. InZabat Jr. v.
Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of
procedure. We said therein:
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As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive
rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments
based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore
cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law."

An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to

the complainants rights which should be brought within four years from the time of
their dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Respondents complaint filed
almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive
period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied
only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers
are protected under the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil
Code.

JAMAR KULAYAN, et. al. vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor
of Sulu, G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecti
ng a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee was then
formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The committee convened under the
leadership of respondent Abdusakur MAhail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency
in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for
the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act
(RA 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures
during manmade and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the
Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set
up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests,
and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et. al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra
vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers
and calling out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.

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ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling out powers of a President.

RULING:

It has already been establish that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is
the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as what became known as the calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII therof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, aiming the civilian
president the nations supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3,
when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial,
legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require
that the president must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine
military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of
the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise
by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., vs.

TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 199595, April 2, 2014

FACTS:
On May 19, 2004, respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs)
Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a
Land Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20970 T-22702 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.

TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and
successors-in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist
Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated on May 19, 1934 a 14,073-square meter parcel
of land (subject property) located at 21 Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City.

PWCTUIs corporate term expired in September 1979. Five years thereafter, using the
same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No. 122088 and forthwith
applied for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the
subject property. The application was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No.
20970 T-22702.
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TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUIs corporate term in 1979
effectively rescinded the donation. PWCTUI opposed the petition.

In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the RTC denied the Opposition of PWCTUI.
According to the trial court, when the corporate life of PWCTUI expired in 1979, the
property ceased to be used for the purpose for which it was intended, hence, it
automatically reverted to Yangco. As such, TRY Foundation, being composed of his
heirs, is considered "other person in interest" under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a
right to file a petition for the issuance of title over the property. The RTC granted TRY
Foundations petition by ordering the cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702
and the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY Foundation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case?

RULING:

The issues embroiled in revocation of donation are litigable in an ordinary civil

proceeding which demands stricter jurisdictional requirements than that imposed in a
land registration case.

Foremost of which is the requirement on the service of summons for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Without a valid service of
summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the
defendant voluntarily submits to it. Service of summons is a guarantee of ones right to
due process in that he is properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured
of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit.

In contrast, jurisdiction in a land registration cases being a proceeding in rem, is

acquired by constructive seizure of the land through publication, mailing and posting of
the notice of hearing Persons named in the application are not summoned but merely
notified of the date of initial hearing on the petition.

The payment of docket fees is another jurisdictional requirement for an action for
revocation which was absent in the suit filed by TRY Foundation. On the other hand,
Section 111 of P.D. No. 1529 merely requires the payment of filing fees and not docket
fees.

Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms
of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc.,
computed as to man hours used in handling of each case. Docket fees, on the other
hand, vest the trial court jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of action.

The absence of the above jurisdictional requirements for ordinary civil actions thus
prevented the RTC, acting as a land registration court, from acquiring the power to hear
and decide the underlying issue of revocation of donation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04).
Any determination made involving such issue had no force and effect; it cannot also
bind PWCTUI over whom the RTC acquired no jurisdiction for lack of service of
summons.

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"Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that
is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties."

Conclusion

All told, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the actual
subject matter contained in TRY Foundations petition for issuance of a new title. TRY
Foundation cannot use the summary proceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to
rescind a contract of donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil
proceedings. In the same vein, the RTC had no jurisdiction to declare the donation
annulled and as a result thereof, order the register of deeds to cancel PWCTUIs TCT
No. 20970 T-22702 and issue a new one in favor of TRY Foundation.

The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed the land
registration case or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil action and thereafter
ordered compliance with stricter jurisdictional requirements. Since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action for revocation of donation disguised as a land registration
case, the judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) is null and void. Being void, it cannot
be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. It can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. It may even be considered as a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever
and whenever it exhibits its head.

Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative to LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all
issuances made in connection with such review are likewise of no force and effect. A
void judgment cannot perpetuate even if affirmed on appeal by the highest court of the
land. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.

PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. Vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F. Castaeda

(Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.

On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located at
Bo. Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Paraaque townhouse unit). The Registry of
Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to "Evelyn P.
Castaeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age.

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn
on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-776, was raffled to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Makati RTC).

During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining
Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He
asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties
registered in her name.
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At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to
dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus
rendering Eijis application and motion moot. On the basis of said commitment, the
Makati RTC rendered the Order dated October 2, 1996, which was annotated on the title
of the Paraaque townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific
Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real
estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Paraaque townhouse unit covered
by TCT No. 99791.

At the time of the mortgage, Eijis appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns marriage, and had
ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the Paraaque
townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the
Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyns commitment
not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her name.

Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage
as a violation of the Makati RTCs October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the
annulment of REM against Evelyn and PAFIN at the Paraaque RTC.

The Paraaque RTC dismissed Eijis complaint for failure of the plaintiff to state a cause
of action against Evelyn and PAFIN. Eiji appealed the trial courts decision arguing that
the trial court erred in holding that his inability to own real estate property in the
Philippines deprives him of all interest in the mortgaged property, which was bought
with his money. The CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN, on
the basis of Evelyns commitment and its annotation on TCT No. 99791.

The parties to the annulled mortgage filed separate motions for reconsideration on
August 22, 2006, which were both denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in its
November 7, 2006 Resolution.

PAFIN filed this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Paraaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same
issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

2. Whether an undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in

open court and embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person relying thereon.

RULING:

Cojuangco v. Villegas states: "The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A
contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice."

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The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation
of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is
pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an
"insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By
insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the
Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Paraaque RTC to rule on the
ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the
REM. The Court disagrees. The RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on Eijis
incapacity to own real property. This defense does not negate Eijis right to rely on the
October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the
registered property, to the annotations entered on the title.

The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or

encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a
standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who
are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of
action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR vs. CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by

LUZ G. ANGELES, G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land

located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 150872. The subject parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA)
from 1979 up to 1993, as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador
(SALVADOR) alleged that she bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land
from GALIGA who represented that he was the owner, being one in possession.
Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said subject property from
November 1993 up to the present.

On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondent appellee ANGELES, sent a
letter to petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject
property, which was not heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-
appellee ANGELES, thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment
on October 12, 1994 with the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16,
docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.

The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein respondent-
appellee ANGELES, ordering petitioner-appellant to vacate and pay the former.

In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among others, that
DIAZ, who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from
respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant
SALVADOR's appeal was denied by the [Regional Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated
March 12, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR was denied in an
Order dated March 16, 2004.

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Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a Decision dated
September 16, 2005, said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration of said Decision was denied in a Resolution dated January 13, 2006.

ISSUE/S:

What is the effect Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof
of his authority to represent respondent-appellee ANGELES in filing the complaint?

RULING:

In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically stated that "if a complaint is
filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.

Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it
was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October 12,
1994, alleging therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no
copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding
the authority supposedly granted to him. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever
filed with the MeTC, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent-appellee ANGELES. The courts could not have delved into the very merits
of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction
cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.

SIXTO CHU vs. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, G. R. No. 184333, April 1,
2013

FACTS:

Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing

dump trucks and heavy equipments. Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment
equipments from respondent to be paid in 12 monthly installments through postdated
checks. However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were
dishonored by the bank either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient
funds," or "payment stopped."

On November 11, 1999, respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorneys fees and damages against the
petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the
subject heavy equipments.

On December 9, 1999, Sheriff proceeded at petitioners given address for the purpose of
serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond.
However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since
the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the
summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of
the petitioner.
Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, which prompted respondent to move
for the declaration of defendant in default. On January 12, 2000, the RTC issued an

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Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its
evidence ex parte.

On December 15, 2000, after respondent presented its evidence, the RTC rendered a
Decision against the petitioner. On July 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied
in the Resolution dated August 28, 2008.

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors assailing the
Decision dated July 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70666, and
the Resolution dated August 28, 2008 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in defiance of law and

jurisprudence in finding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant even when the substituted service of summons was improper.

2. Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in defiance of law and

jurisprudence in holding that herein petitioner should have set up a meritorious
defense even when the summons was improperly served.

RULING:

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when

summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that
substituted service may be resorted to.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating

that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be
shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that
such efforts have failed.

In the case at bar, clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the
summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. Thus, service on the
security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements
of substituted service.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a

rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment
rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and
void.

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