Francisco vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

Petitioner: Teresita C. Francisco

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals; and Conchita Evangelista and her husband Simeon Evangelista;
Araceli F. Marilla and her husband Freddy Marilla; Antonio V. Francisco; and Eusebio Francisco
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage, filed a
suit for damages and for annulment of the general power of Attorney authorizing Conchita Evangelista, the
daughter of Eusebio by his first marriage, to administer the properties of Eusebio, namely: the house and
lot, the sari-sari store and the apartments. The subject properties are alleged to be acquired during their
conjugal partnership. Petitioner also alleged the physical incapability of Eusebio to manage their properties.
The trial court renedered judgment in favor of private respondents due to the failure of petitioner to
establish proof that the subject properties where acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the Court of Appeals affirms the
decision of the trial court.

Respondents contend that the subject properties were not acquired during the second conjugal
properties since the properties are the legitime of Eusebio. Petitioner avers that the application of Article
116 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar because the Article 254 of the same code expressly
repeals Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Court Article 245 of the Family Code which expressly repealed Articles 158 and
160 has a retroactive effect?

Held: No.
The court ruled that the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in
force. Thus, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. To invoke this presumption, the petitioner carries the burden of proof to establish that the subject
properties are acquired during the second conjugal partnership, by which petitioner failed. Hence, the
subject property is proved to belong exclusively to Eusebio Francisco. Further, the alleged physical
incapability of Eusebio was proved to the contrary. Thus, the petition was denied with cost to the petitioner.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Line vs. Hon. Ludivico Arciaga

148 SCRA 438

Facts:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson as paying passenger on board a bus belonging to the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines (PRBL) sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus crashed
against an acacia tree in Balaoan, La Union. Thereafter, he filed a complaint for contractual tort. In their
answer, PRBL interposed the defense that the collision was due to fortuitous event.
 The case was set for trial but the case was dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff. He then
filed a motion for relief on the grounds of equity. He averred that his ride on the way had engine trouble.
Judge Arciaga granted the motion filed by Singson.

Issue: Whether or not the case filed by Taurino Singson be dismissed?

Held: Yes.
There is no reason to grant a petition for relief. Since, Singson and his lawyer let 61 days lapse
before filing their petition for relief. It must be filed within 60 days. Otherwise, judgment shall become final
and executory. Equity aids the vigilant not those who slumber on their rights.

Manuel vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:
Eduardo Manuel was first married to Rubylus Gana on July 18, 1975, who was charged with estafa
and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him since his last visit. Manuel met Tina Gandelera
who was then 21 years old. After 3 months they got married in Baguio without Tina knowing the subsequent
marriage of Manuel. After 3 months of marriage Tina learned about the first marriage, she then filed a
criminal case of bigamy against Manuel. Manuel in his defense claimed that he declared himself single in
the marriage contract because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did
not know that he need to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
The trial court sentenced him 6 years and 10 months imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 for moral
damages. Manuel appealed before the CA contending his good faith with no malicious intent to hurt Tina.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications.

Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that petitioners wife cannot be declared or presumed
dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code and no judicial declaration of presumptive death provided in Article
41 of the Family Code.

Held: Petition is denied.

The petitioner is held to have acted with malice in marrying Tina. Ignorantia Legis non excusat.
Where the spouse is absent for requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage
after securing judgment of declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid conviction of
bigamy. Judgment is proof of good faith and so in the case, the absent spouse reappears, the present
spouse may not be held for bigamy. The court ruled that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after marriage were willful, deliberate and with malice, thus causing injury to the latter.
The court awards moral damages to the innocent wife.

Mansion Biscuit Corp vs CA

G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995

FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered
numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of the
goods on November 12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp.,
four postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer biscuits. Four other postdated
checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in
December of the same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When the first four
checks were deposited, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty
Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to replace the checks with good cash or good checks. Ty
Teck Suan failed to heed said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of
Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash advance by Suan and the amount paid was applied as
payment for the first postdated check. Hong sent Suan a formal demand letter requesting the latter to make
good the value of the remaining dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof. Thereafter, the
second batch of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but were all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit
Corporation filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law).

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks were issued merely to
guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the complaint.

HELD:
The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject to these two criminal
cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22
because one important element of the offense is missing: that the check is made or drawn and issued to
apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee the fulfillment of an agreement
to deliver biscuits by complaint when accused Suan would place orders. Accused are hereby declared not
guilty of the offense charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANICETO BULAGAO, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT

Facts:
The Regional Trial Court imposed upon accused-appelant of death for each count of rape. The Court
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Repuiblic Act No. 9346. Which
prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of moral damages and civil
indemnity to be increased each from fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.

In the case at bar, both Information charges a crime of rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A when committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This
crime was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have occurred on June
17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether the presence of aggravating circumstance of the case show highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender? In the case of (2) counts of rape and suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

Held:
 The petition was denied. Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape
and sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for
each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications.

Ancheta vs. Ancheta

G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and
had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their
conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the
petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before
the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the
ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro
Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son
at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just
over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties
void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She
alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the
case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now
comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?

HELD: NO.
The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section
6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says
the Court. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment
against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge
the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage
as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. Petition is GRANTED.
Aranes v. Occiano
380 SCRA 402

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law for
solemnizing the marriage between her and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license.
Because their marriage was nulled, her right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and her entitlement
for a pension was not granted. Judge Occiano averred that before starting the ceremony, he examined the
documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess a marriage
license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent
reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to
him, but they never did.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and
outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the
petitioner because he officiated the marriage outside his jurisdiction and knowing that the documents
submitted to him lacked marriage license.

San Luis v San Luis

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974,
Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for
inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court

ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988;
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration?

Held:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of
the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge
Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido;
Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario;
Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did
not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and
did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions
to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It
was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated
by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to
avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal
solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid?

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was
really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge
to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already
started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On
the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and
claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering
that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and
wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18
yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got
married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order
to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Nicdao Cario vs Yee Cario

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost
10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans
filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received
a total of P21,000. Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and
the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the
deceased. In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao?

Held: No.
The court held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships. Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her
marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said
death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one
of them.
 As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did
not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-
half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the
disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without
the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party
who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial
decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise
the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.

AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010

Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a
beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito
Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioners family was apprehensive because of the nature of the
respondents work and that she came from a broken family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001,
Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner
alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household
chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an
affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad
fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda
refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house,
discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that
she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her.
She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their
former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the
hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties.
On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex
parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified true copy of
their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that
respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set
aside the Regional Trial Courts decision on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to
establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondents psychological incapacity?

Held: No.
The petitioners testimony established difficulty, refusal, and neglect. However, it did not reveal
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patacs
psychological report only enumerated the respondents behavioral defects but failed to prove the gravity or
seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing
psychological incapacity: (1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2) The
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In Marcos
v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion under
Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was
flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or straightjacket.

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the
time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to
be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he
became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their
assets without Victorias consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilios refusal to reform. In the
prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him.
Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting
of newspaper articles of Emilios relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of
drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilios
evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then
declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victorias marriage to Emilio and
awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was
denied.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the case
where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing?
Held:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment. Under
the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground
of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing
that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the
court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the
latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a
counsel to inform the trial court of his clients confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-
appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy,
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.

Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo

A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004

Complainant: Florence Teves Macarrubo, the minors Juris Alexis T. Macarrubo and Gabriel Enrico T.
Macarrubo as represented by their mother/guardian, Florence T. Macarrubo
Respondent: Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo

Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that
respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen
Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by
Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office, and the second on
December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent
admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing
complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void.

Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T.
Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular
support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions.

Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that complainant
was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will
to a sham wedding to protect her and her familys reputation since she was then three-months pregnant.
He submitted in evidence that in the civil case Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves, it declared
his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial courts findings on the basis of his
evidence which was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed a sham and make believe one,
vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal
impediment and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the additional defenses that the
judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present administrative
case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her
letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital relations,
respondent invoked the final and executory August 21, 1998 in the case Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen
C. Esparza, declaring his first marriage void on the ground of his wifes psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct?

Held:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband
and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998
that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent
with the good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his
own admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day,
respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus, respondent
Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.

Yasin vs. Sharia Court

FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the
petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding
the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof
which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of
her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of
her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule
103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners
maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and
comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: No.
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's
surname to her maiden firstname. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the
marriage ties or vinculum
no longer exists as in the case of death of thehusband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the
widow or divorceeneed not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order torevert to her
maiden name as the use of her former husband's name isoptional and not obligatory for her. When
petitioner married her husband, shedid not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she
required tosecure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after themarriage, as no law
requires it. The use of the husband's surname during themarriage, after annulment of the marriage and
after the death of the husbandis permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.The court
finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed bypetitioner before the respondent court a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is
already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce fromher in accordance with Muslim
laws.

Chan-Tan vs. Chan

G.R. No. 167139 February 25, 2010

Facts:
On June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons
Justin (born in Canada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993). Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner,
then filed a case of annulment under FC 36 (psychological incapacity) against Jesse Tan. The parties,
thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement. Thus, on July 31, 2003: trial court issued a partial judgment
of approval of the said compromise agreement.

Sometime in March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under the Family
Code, Article 36, on the ground of psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated
the compromise agreement it previously approved in said decision. Petitioner then cancelled the offer to
purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2 property, and authorized Megaworld Corp. to
offer it to other interested buyers. It also appeared that the petitioner left the country with the children.
Respondent then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the main custody of the children claiming that petitioner
brought the kids out of the country w/o his knowledge; that said petitioner failed to settle the balance for the
Megaworld property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to
turn over to him documents and titles in his name. The court awarded respondent custody of the children
and ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in his name, and allowed respondent
to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.
June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denied due
process, was notable to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said that she
was forced out of the country due to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for
an increase in the respondent's monthly support obligation.
However, on October 12, 2004, the court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it
was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The court also declared petitioner in contempt of court for
non-compliance with the July 31, 2003 partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution and also denied
the prayer for an increase in monthly support obligation, since petitioner was able to enroll the children
to another school by herself without respondent's knowledge.
On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the
October 12, 2004 resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that
withdrawing from the case would be in the best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from
all prior orders, and leave the parties at a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the parties to
their conditions prior the filings.
On December 28, 2004 the court denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March
30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory upon lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period and on February 15, 2005 the court again denied another motion for reconsideration of
the December 28, 2004 decision and issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and May 17, 2004
decisions.

Issue: Whether or not the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory
despite allegations of denial of due process?

Held:
Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the 15-day reglementary period.
The alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner resulting in loss of petitioner's right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular. Petitioner cannot claim she
was denied due process, since records showed that she was very active in court. She also cannot claim
negligence on the part of her counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying that
said counsel made attempts to call the petitioner and failed.

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION

G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956

Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wife for legal separation on the ground of
adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a
monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport. The husband
opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife had abandoned the
children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition granting custody of the children to the wife
and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her children.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the husbands request that evidence be allowed
to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows: ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed?

Held: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their
grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another,
and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this
practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other
provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes
to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.

In the case at bar, the court cannot ignore the claim of adultery by the husband in the face of
express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the
authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the custody of the wife,
and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the petition and in the
affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode. Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be
allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully
exercised.

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it
does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the
cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and
convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which
is best for their custody.

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
vs. Daisy R. Yahon
G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014

Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, petitioner.

Daisy R. Yahon, respondent.

Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts:
Petitioner, Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) filed a petition for review
which seeks to nullify and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial
court granting temporary and permanent protection order with financial spousal support to respondent
Daisy R. Yahon.

Respondent Yahon filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under RA 9262 against her
husband S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired on
January 2006. Respondent and Sgt. Yahon were married but did not have any children, but respondent has
a daughter with her previous live-in partner. Upon trial for the protection order, preponderance of evidence;
oral and documentary showed that Sgt. Yahon had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional
and economic abuse and violence upon the respondent and at some instance Sgt. Yahon threatened her
and her daughters life at gun point. The trial court issued a temporary protection order with financial
spousal support to the respondent. However, Sgt. Yahon violated the TPO and did not provide for financial
support.

Herein petitioner AFPFC filed before the trial court a Manifesto and Motion to lift the TPO.
Petitioner informed the trial court that S/Sgt. Yahons check had been processed and is ready for payment
but the check has not been claimed by respondent. The court of appeals denied the petition for certiorari
and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the trial court. Thus, herein petitioner contends before the
court of last resort that it cannot comply with the trial courts directive for the automatic deduction of 50%
from the retirement benefits and pension of S/Sgt. Yahon to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes with Section 31 of PD 1638 stating that the benefits authorized under this decree, except as
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
with a similar provision found in RA 8291 otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner military institution be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as
spousal support in compliance with a protection order pursuant to RA 9262?

Held:
Yes.
The court ruled that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the latter enactment must
prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. It held that Section 8(g) of RA 9262, being the
later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above stated that
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary.
As for the contention of the petitioner that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of
S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, the court
sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the amount of Php. 10, 500 payable to the BML
Trading and Supply. The court ruled that under Section 8(g) of RA 9262 used the general term employer,
which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons employer. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or
government.
The court further ruled that Section 8(g) of RA 9262 providing for spousal and child support is a
support enforcement legislation. Hence, the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Thus, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is affirmed and upheld.

NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No.114791 May 29, 1997

Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their
wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet
ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but
only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has been
erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial
court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages.
In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding,
however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two
months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.

Issue: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages?

Held: Yes.
The contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the
wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon
is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case
against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that
the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and
remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding
the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and
humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under
Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included
in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was
shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy)
is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

Luis Wong vs Court of Appeals

351 SCRA 100

Luis Wong is a collector of Limtong Press, Inc., a company which prints calendars. Wong was
assigned to collect check payments from LPI clients. One time, six of LPIs clients were not able to give the
check payments to Wong. Wong then made arrangements with LPI so that for the meantime, Wong can
use his personal checks to guarantee the calendar orders of the LPIs clients. LPI however has a policy of
not accepting personal checks of its agents. LPI instead proposed that the personal checks should be used
to cover Wongs debt with LPI which arose from unremitted checks by Wong in the past. Wong agreed. So
he issued 6 checks dated December 30, 1985.

Before the maturity of the checks, Wong persuaded LPI not to deposit the checks because he said
hell be replacing them within 30 days. LPI complied however Wong reneged on the payment. On June 5,
1986 or 157 days from date of issue, LPI presented the check to RCBC but the checks were dishonored
(account closed). On June 20, 1986, LPI sent Wong a notice of dishonor. Wong failed to make good the
amount of the checks within five banking days from his receipt of the notice. LPI then sued Wong for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Among others, Wong argued that hes not guilty of the crime of charged because one of the
elements of the crime is missing, that is, prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds against
the drawer. According to Wong, this element is lost by reason of the belated deposit of the checks by LPI
which was 157 days after the checks were issued; that he is not expected to keep his bank account active
beyond the 90-day period 90 days being the period required for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of fund to arise.

Issue: Whether or not Wong is guilty of the crime charged?

Held:
Yes.
Wong is guilty of violating BP 22. The elements of violation of BP 22 pertinent to this case are:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
 Under the second element, the presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency arises if the check is
presented within 90 days from the date of issue of the check. This presumption is lost, as in the case at bar,
by failure of LPI to present it within 90 days. But this does not mean that the second element was not
attendant with respect to Wong. The presumption is lost but lack of knowledge can still be proven, LPI did
not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of Wong that he would issue new checks. Upon his
failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, Wong
was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days
thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that Wong had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds
in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks.

The Supreme Court also noted that under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check must
be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from
liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check
becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days. LPI deposited the checks 157 days after the
date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale.

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

Petitioner: Teresita C. Francisco

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals; and Conchita Evangelista and her husband Simeon Evangelista;
Araceli F. Marilla and her husband Freddy Marilla; Antonio V. Francisco; and Eusebio Francisco
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second marriage, filed a
suit for damages and for annulment of the general power of Attorney authorizing Conchita Evangelista, the
daughter of Eusebio by his first marriage, to administer the properties of Eusebio, namely: the house and
lot, the sari-sari store and the apartments. The subject properties are alleged to be acquired during their
conjugal partnership. Petitioner also alleged the physical incapability of Eusebio to manage their properties.
The trial court renedered judgment in favor of private respondents due to the failure of petitioner to
establish proof that the subject properties where acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the Court of Appeals affirms the
decision of the trial court.

Respondents contend that the subject properties were not acquired during the second conjugal
properties since the properties are the legitime of Eusebio. Petitioner avers that the application of Article
116 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar because the Article 254 of the same code expressly
repeals Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Court Article 245 of the Family Code which expressly repealed Articles 158 and
160 has a retroactive effect?

Held:
No.
The court ruled that the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in
force. Thus, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. To invoke this presumption, the petitioner carries the burden of proof to establish that the subject
properties are acquired during the second conjugal partnership, by which petitioner failed. Hence, the
subject property is proved to belong exclusively to Eusebio Francisco. Further, the alleged physical
incapability of Eusebio was proved to the contrary. Thus, the petition was denied with cost to the petitioner.

Guillerma Tumlos vs. spouses Mario Fernandez and Lourdes Fernandez

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance
they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment building for the last
seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few
months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants.

She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-
vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an
amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10)
years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other
apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of cohabiting
with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez?

Held:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. Guillerma Tumlos failed to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of
the property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.

Uy vs. Chua
G. R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009

Joanie Surposa Uy, petitioner.

Jose Ngo Chua, respondent.

Ponente: Chico- Nazario, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Joanie S. Uy filed a petition for review assailing the resolution of RTC Branch 24 which
granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua which resulted to the dismissal of a special
proceeding for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent Chua.
Petitioner Uy filed two similar special proceedings for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation against respondent Chua. In the first special proceeding, petitioner and respondent entered into a
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and Jose Ngo Chua on the
other; herein respondent, as a gesture of good will and by way of a settling civil, monetary and similar
claims without liability, binds himself to pay two million pesos for each petitioner and her brother Allan; that
petitioner and her brother declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands
against Jose Ngo Chua or Catalino Ngo Chua nor their heirs, successors nor any and all corporations,
companies nor businesses of respondent; that respondent Chua waives all counterclaim or counter
demand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
The trial court approves the said agreement, judgment is rendered in accordance with the
provisions of the compromise agreement.
However, petitioner instituted before RTC branch 24 a similar special proceeding for the issuance
of a decree of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner alleged in her complaint that respondent had an illicit affair with
Irene Surposa, had two children (petitioner and her brother), respondent directed that petitioners birth
certificate be filled out for fathers name as Alfredo F. Surposa, respondent had consistently and regularly
gave financial support for petitioner before she got married, respondent also provided her employment.
Respondent denied the alleged illicit relationship and filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the decision of RTC Branch 9 to the first special proceeding had already been barred by res judicata.
The trial court gave due course to the demurrer.

Issue: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court bars petitioner from
instituting another special proceeding for a decree of illegitimate filiation?

Held:
The court ruled in the negative.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code prohibits any compromise for the civil status of persons, the validity
of a marriage or legal separation, any ground for legal separation, future support, the jurisdiction of courts,
and future legitime. The Compromise Agreement entered to and by the parties is covered in the prohibition.
The court further ruled that the compromise is against public policy rendering it void ab initio and cannot be
operative even by the parties alleged performance of their respective prestations. The trial courts have no
jurisdiction over the compromise agreement and it cannot legalize something that is prohibited as it
contravenes with public policy. Thus, the court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court for the
demurrer to evidence and remands the same court for further proceedings.

Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to Perico Jao. After such introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long
thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968, Arlene became
pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but when the child, Janice was born,
Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC
ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showed that Janice could not have
been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.

Issue: Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice?

Held: Yes.
The group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already
become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact
that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type
when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that
one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of
one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same
blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

Facts:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the
same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos house and Daisy
wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning, Daisys body was found tied to a
tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death. In the afternoon of July
11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the
victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely
during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy
disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At
the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from
Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing Blood Type
A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from
Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the
crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened
by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to
death by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence?

Held:
Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that
even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The Supreme Court also
elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary
value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or
her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime
is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body for the suspects
DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken
from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national
and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be
given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

Issue: Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away?

Held:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority
was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be
exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to
legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father
and the mother.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.
He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers middle
name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as
his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?

Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA
8557. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan

GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode
bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their two minor sons on the
ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling,
that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.

Held:
 Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has
cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of
habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs. The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.