NOTES ON PROPERTY
At best it may
Prince Jan Ronald D. Wacnang
Saint Louis University School of Law
15 June 2017
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON PROPERTY
(expanded from Notes on Property, 13 June 2017)
Art. II, Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Peace and order will entail, as a consequence, the
protection of life, liberty, and property. (5 Record 11)
The general welfare or the common good is the
primary consideration in the exercise of the police
power of the State. (id.)
Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of
the government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated. (Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, 229
SCRA 554 [1994])
Art. II, Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice
in all phases of national development.
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those
with [fewer] privileges in life should have more
privileges in law. (Philippine Airlines v. Santos, 218
SCRA 415 [1993])
[However,] social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners, who under
our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. The social justice consecrated in our
Constitution was not intended to take away the rights
from a person and give them to another who is not
entitled thereto. (Caleon v. Agus Development
Corporation, 207 SCRA 748 [1992])
The policy on social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged.
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone
the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative
of every humane society but only when the recipient
is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
Social justice cannot be permitted to be the refuge of
scoundrels any more than can equity be an
impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those
who invoke social justice may do so only if their
hands are clean and their motives are blameless and
not simply because they happen to be poor. This great
policy of Constitution is not meant for the protection
of those who have proved they are not worthy of it,
like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor
with the blemishes of their own character. (PLDT v.
NLRC, 164 SCRA 671 [1988])
xxx
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority
565 SCRA 379 (2008)
Re: Social Justice as applied to Property
FACTS: On 26 March 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued
expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. In the same Decree, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the
Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss Project with the former to
take possession, contol (sic) and disposition of the
expropriated properties with the power of
demolition. During the Census survey of the area, the
structure built by Caridad Magkalas (petitioner) was
assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of
the area, the NHA determined that the area where
petitioners structure is located should be classified
as an area center (open space). The Area Center was
determined in compliance with the requirement to
reserve 30% open space in all types of residential
development.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed an appeal from the
decision of NHA to designate the area where the she
has the said structure, as an Area Center. But the
appeal was denied. The NHA informed plaintiff that
per Development Program of Bagong Barrio, she was
being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132.
The General Law on Property Rights
2
On 23 August 1985, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the NHA with the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City after the NHA sent a
letter to the petitioner earlier in the month of
August 1985 directing the petitioner to vacate
the premises and dismantle her structure. The
trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint
on 10 March 1999.
In this petition to the Supreme Court, petitioner
invokes the Social Justice Clause of the
Constitution, asserting that a poor and
unlettered urban dweller like her has a right to
her property and to a decent living. Thus, her
relocation and the demolition of her house would
violate of her right embodied under Article XIII,
Secs. 9 & 10 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Would the relocation and the demolition
of petitioners house violate the Social Justice
Clause of the Constitution in relation with Article
XIII, Secs. 9 & 10?
RULING: No, petitioner cannot find solace in
those Constitutional provisions. Social Justice, as
the term suggests, should be used only to correct
an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel
observed, social justice must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the
State of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest
good to the greatest number. (Calalang v.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726 [1940])
Moreover, jurisprudence stresses the need to
dispense justice with an even hand in every case:
[The] Court has stressed more than once
that social justice or any justice for that
matter is for the deserving, whether he
be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case
of reasonable doubt, we are called upon
to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends
its sympathy and compassion. But never
is it justified to give preference to the
poor simply because they are poor, or to
reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served for
poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law. (Gelos v. Court of
Appeals, 208 SCRA 608 [1992])
Hence, there is a need to weigh and balance the
rights and welfare of both contending parties in
every case in accordance with the applicable law,
regardless of their situation in life.
In the instant case, the relocation of petitioner
and the demolition of her structure were in
accordance with the mandate of P.D. No. 1315
which was enacted primarily to address the
housing problems of the country and to adopt an
effective strategy for dealing with slums, squatter
areas and other blighted communities in urban
areas.
For sure, the NHAs order of relocating petitioner
to her assigned lot and demolishing her property
on account of her refusal to vacate was
consistent with the laws fundamental objective
of promoting social justice in the manner the will
inure to the common good. The petitioner cannot
disregard the lawful action of the NHA which was
merely implementing P.D. No. 1315. It is also
worth noting that petitioners continued refusal
to leave the subject property has hindered the
development of the entire area. Indeed,
The General Law on Property Rights
3

petitioner cannot invoke the social justice clause

at the expense of the common welfare. Hence, private property may be validly taken
where it is offensive to the public welfare, like a
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, building on the verge of collapse, which may be
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor demolished under the police power in the
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the interest of public safety. It may also be
laws. expropriated, after payment of just
compensation, so it may be devoted to some
A flexible definition of due process is that it is
public use; or it may be distrained and levied
the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
upon in the case of tax delinquency of its owner.
(Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme
Court, pp. 32-33)
However, there would be unlawful deprivation if
ones property is destroyed by the authorities
Due process is a guaranty against arbitrariness
even if it is not noxious or intended for a noxious
on the part of the government, whether
purpose, or is taken from him without just
committed by the legislature, the executive, or
compensation or is regulated in such an arbitrary
the judiciary. If the law itself unreasonably
manner as to deprive him of its lawful enjoyment
deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property,
and use. (Cruz & Cruz, supra at p. 208) Hence, the
he is denied the protection of due process. If the
Supreme Court in People v. Fajardo (104 Phil.
enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an
443) as confiscatory a municipal ordinance
unreasonable requirement, due process is
prohibiting the construction on residential land
likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of
of any building that might obstruct the view of
such rights, be it in the Constitution itself or
the public plaza from the highway.
merely a statute, its unjustified withholding
would also be a violation of due process. Any
Vested Right; What is NOT property
government act that militates against the
ordinary norms of justice or fair play is
The concept of vested right is a consequence
considered an infraction of the great guaranty of
of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
due process; and this is true whether the denial
expresses a present fixed interest which in right
involves violation merely of the procedure
reason and natural justice is protected against
prescribed by the law or affects the very validity
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
of the law itself. (Cruz & Cruz, supra. at pp. 205-
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand
206)
but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested. Rights
Deprivation
are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
To deprive is to take away forcibly, to prevent
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
from possessing, enjoying or using something.
irrefutable. (Alcantara v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
(People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 [1996])
[2005]) While one may be deprived of his vested
Deprivation of life, liberty, or property per se is
right, he may lose the same if there is due
not necessarily unconstitutional. What is
process and such deprivation is founded on law
prohibited is deprivation without due process of
and jurisprudence. (Quiao v. Quiao, 675 SCRA
the law.
642 [2012])
The General Law on Property Rights
4
One cannot have a vested right to a public
office, as this is not regarded as property. If
created by statute, it may be abolished by the
legislature at any time, even if the term of the
incumbent therein has not expired. And the same
observation may be made of the salary attached
to it, which may be reduced or even completely
withdrawn without violation of due process
(Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660) although this will cause prejudice to the
office-holder. The only exception is where the
salary has already been earned, in which case it
cannot be reduced or withdrawn by a retroactive
law as the said salary has already accrued as a
property right. (Mississippi v. Miller, 276 U.S.
174)
It has also been held that mere privileges, such as
a license to operate a cockpit (Pedro v. Provincial
Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 [1931]) or a liquor
store (Board v. Barrio, 24 N.Y. 659), are not
property rights revocable at will.
Likewise, one does not have a vested property
right in the continued operation of a law, which
may be repealed or amended at will by the
legislature, or in the maintenance of a judicial
doctrine, which may be modified or reversed in
the discretion of the Supreme Court. Such
changes may be validly made regardless of
adverse consequences upon any person who may
have previously acted thereunder. (Cruz & Cruz,
supra. at p. 212)
xxx
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority
Supra.
Re: Vested right
FACTS: (See digest under notes on Art. II, Sec. 10,
p. 1) Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a
vested right over the property subject of this case
on the ground that she had been in possession of
it for forty (40) years already.
ISSUE: Did petitioner acquired vested right over
the property?
RULING: No, petitioners contentions must
necessarily fail. The NHAs authority to order the
relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her
property is mandated by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1315. Under this Decree, the entire
Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as
a blighted area and was thereby declared
expropriated. The properties covered under P.D.
No. 1315 included petitioners property. The
NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for
the national government, was empowered to
take possession, control and disposition of the
expropriated properties with the power of
demolition of their improvements.
Inasmuch as petitioners property was located in
the area identified as an open space by the NHA,
her continued refusal to vacate has rendered
illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could
lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that
petitioner had already acquired a vested right
over the subject property when the NHA
recognized her as the censused owner by
assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-
0063).
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete
and unconditional and no obstacle exists to its
exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and
not dependent upon any contingency. To be
vested, a right must have become a title legal or
The General Law on Property Rights
5

equitable to the present or future enjoyment of

property.

Contrary to petitioners position, the issuance of

a tag number in her favor did not grant her
irrefutable rights to the subject property. The
tagging of structures in the Bagong Barrio area
was conducted merely to determine the qualified
beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the
area. It did not necessarily signify an assurance
that the tagged structure would be awarded to its
occupant as there were locational and physical
considerations that must be taken into account,
as in fact, the area where petitioners property
was located had been classified as Area Center
(open space). The assignment of a tag number
was a mere expectant or contingent right and
could not have ripened into a vested right in
favor of petitioner. Her possession and
occupancy of the said property could not be
characterized as fixed and absolute. As such,
petitioner cannot claim that she was deprived of
her vested right when the NHA ordered her
relocation to another area.

--- end of notes for 15 June 2017 ---