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21 (2002) 435457

www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase

application to Argentina

Nada Choueiri

International Monetary Fund, Washington DC 20431, USA

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of contagious currency crises where crises are transmitted

across countries through a risk premium effect on government bonds. Three types of equilibria

can occur in the model: a no-collapse equilibrium in which a crisis is never transmitted from

abroad, a collapse equilibrium in which a crisis is inevitably contagious, and a fundamentals

equilibrium in which a crisis is contagious when domestic fundamentals are weak enough.

The model is calibrated to the March 1995 Argentine crisis that followed on the heels of the

December 1994 Mexican peso crisis. The results imply that the occurrence of the 1995 Argen-

tine crisis reveals a combination of risk aversion of investors and weak credibility in the

currency board arrangement. The Argentine crisis however could only be attributed to a

tequila effect alone (contagion from the Mexican crisis without any role for weak domestic

fundamentals) if investors were excessively risk averse. 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All

rights reserved.

1. Introduction

On 20 December 1994, Mexico was forced into a 15% devaluation of the Mexican

peso followed by the adoption of a floating exchange rate, after a speculative attack

reduced its stock of foreign exchange reserves to US$ 6 billion, down from US$29

billion in February of that year. Soon afterwards, financial problems occurred in

Argentina, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, as investors were reluctant to renew their

loans to these two countries. Argentina lost 41% of its reserves and 18% of its bank

Tel.: +1-202-623-4450; fax: +1-202-589-4450.

E-mail address: nchoueiri@imf.org (N. Choueiri).

0261-5606/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 5 6 0 6 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 0 8 - 6

436 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

deposits in the first quarter of 1995, while Brazils foreign exchange reserves

declined by 20%. Similar events took place in the summer of 1997 after Thailand

stopped defending the bahts fixed US dollar value on 2 July: a wave of speculative

attacks rocked South East Asian countries, leading to widespread depreciations that

reduced the values of these countries currencies by 3050% as of December 1997,

in comparison with the beginning of the year1.

The attacks in both episodes often seemed justified by fundamental problems in

the countries concerned. For example, a large number of financial institutions in

South East Asia were grappling with substantial amounts of unhedged foreign debt

and nonperforming assets. But there were cases in which these currency attacks

seemed unwarranted by the underlying fundamentals, as was the case in the run on

the Hong Kong dollar in October 19972. In both instances of widespread financial

turmoil, the temporal correlation of crises remains particularly striking. This phenom-

enon that devaluation in a country can be the precursor and even one of the

causes of financial troubles in other countries has been dubbed contagion.

Prior to the 1990s, currency crises did not seem to spread across countries with

the virulence and speed observed recently. It is therefore not surprising that in the

1980s the finance literature, while focusing on contagion in bank runs3, had little to

say about contagious speculative attacks on currencies. In the 1990s, however, the

literature took a step in the latter direction when the interest of researchers focused

on the comovement of asset prices and capital flows across emerging financial mar-

kets4. This comovement was generally interpreted as supporting evidence for the

presence of contagion in asset flows across countries. Calvo and Reinhart (1996),

for example, argue that the significant correlation in bond and equity returns they

found across emerging markets is indicative of such contagion. Valdes (1996), after

accounting for fundamental factors, is still able to identify excess comovement in

country credit ratings and secondary market debt prices, hence ascertaining the con-

tagion hypothesis.

The focus on contagion in the context of currency crises alone occurred mainly

in the past few years, inspired not only by the collapse of the ERM in 1992 but

mostly by the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994 and by the Asian crises in

1

The Asian crises intensified in 1998, and the turmoil in Asia even reached Latin American markets.

Brazil seems to have been most affected. First a period of financial distress in October 1997 (in which

stock market prices fell by 15%) forced the central bank of Brazil to double short-run borrowing rates

to 46% in order to defend its currency, the real. Although these rates declined later, the crisis further

intensified in the summer of 1998, following the Russian debt default, and culminated in the decision to

float the real on 13 January 1999. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 1999 documents in detail

the financial market events of the second half of 1998.

2

This run took place although the size of foreign exchange reserves in Hong Kong around US$88

billion at the time was four times the size of its money stock narrowly defined (M1). It forced the

monetary authority to raise interest rates to 300% to fend off speculators.

3

Theoretical models explaining bank runs can be found in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Chari

and Jagannathan (1988), for example. Several empirical papers (such as Gorton, 1988) examined historical

episodes to identify the reasons behind bank panics.

4

See Calvo and Reinhart (1996) for a discussion of this branch of the literature.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 437

199798. There are, however, only a limited number of empirical studies that investi-

gate the reasons why crises seem to be linked across countries5. Eichengreen et al.

(1996) address this question using a sample of 20 industrialized countries over a 30-

year period. They find a significant positive correlation in the incidence of crises

across countries, after accounting for domestic economic and political factors. Look-

ing at emerging markets, Sachs et al. (1996) examine the countries that suffered

from financial problems in the wake of the Mexican crisis. They find that lending

booms, real appreciation and low reserve levels were common priors across the coun-

tries that had severe crises at the time, hence explaining their extreme susceptibility

to the tequila effect. Contagion in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis therefore

seemed to have led to the worst turmoil in economies characterized by weak underly-

ing fundamentals. Using a different approach, Schmukler and Frankel (1996) perform

tests on country funds data and find significant adverse short-run spillover effects

from the Mexican crisis to both Latin America and Asia.

Overall, the empirical literature clearly cannot refute the hypothesis of contagion

effects in specific episodes of currency crises. The theoretical literature, however,

proposes few analyses of such effects. The existing theories generally link contagion

either to (bilateral or third-party) trade channels, or to liquidity effects. Gerlach and

Smets (1995), for example, model the role of trade channels as central to the trans-

mission of crises. They show how a devaluation in a given country can lead to

adverse monetary shocks and reserve losses in another country because of the

inflationary effect of a rise in the latters import prices. (A rise in import prices leads

to an increase in the general price level, which reduces money demand and leads to

reserve losses in a fixed exchange rate system.) Alternatively, the devaluation can

cause a crisis in the second country by leading to a current account deficit as the

second countrys exports are priced out of the first market. The trade channel, how-

ever, cannot account for the observation of contagion effects across countries that

do not have strong trade linkages with one another (or with the same third party).

Valdes (1996) provides an alternative framework, in which investors liquidity needs

lead to contagion effects. According to his model, a crisis in a given country will

drive investors to sell off another countrys assets in order to raise funds, either

because these funds are needed today or because cash needs are expected to

materialize in the future. His model, however, only explains the trigger effect of a

crisis, namely the sell-off of assets in other countries. There is no analysis of how

this initial effect leads to a full-fledged crisis6. Adopting a more general approach,

Masson (1998) presents a balance of payments model in which a crisis could occur

because of either adverse changes in domestic or external fundamentals or because

of contagion effects. Massons model, however, captures the latter factor by a posi-

5

A concise survey of this literature can be found in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).

6

A different liquidity story is given by Calvo (1998): highly-leveraged informed investors facing

capital losses in the wake of a crisis could be forced into selling holdings in other markets; this could

trigger a global sell-out as uninformed investors follow suit thinking that the informed are acting upon

some adverse news about these other markets. Note that this scenario also entails some form of herding

on behalf of the uninformed inasmuch as they are replicating the informed investors decisions.

438 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

tive shock to the exogenous probability of devaluation in a foreign country, and the

transmission channel to the domestic economy operates through the bilateral real

exchange rate. Therefore, as in Gerlach and Smets (1995), contagion in his model

effectively operates through a fundamental economic link between the two countries.

This paper takes seriously an alternative explanation for contagion and analyzes

its implications on the incidence of currency crises. Contagion is introduced in the

model through a risk premium channel: a currency crisis in a given country affects

another country by causing a rise in the risk premium on bonds issued by the latter

country. This transmission mechanism can be due to the herding behavior of inves-

tors, rather than to fundamental factors such as trade channels or liquidity needs7.

Herding behavior is not necessarily an ad-hoc assumption: it can be justified by the

globalization of capital markets in the 1990s, coupled with the presence of imperfect

information. Indeed, as shown by Calvo and Mendoza (1997), by raising the number

of investment opportunities and/or exerting pressures on managerial performances,

globalization reduces the incentive to incur the cost of gathering country-specific

information and induces conformity in investment decisions across fund managers.

Both factors lead to herding behavior8.

Contagion in this paper develops as follows. Consider an international investor

who diversifies risks by holding assets in several emerging markets, choosing the

composition of her portfolio in accordance with the maximization of a mean-variance

expected utility function. A crisis in a given country inevitably motivates the investor

to reduce her exposure to the country in trouble. In a world of uncertainty, this will

trigger a portfolio reallocation whereby the investor will withdraw from other mar-

kets as well. In particular, assets denominated in currencies that are expected to

covary positively with the currency in trouble will become undesirable, and this

translates into a rise in the risk premium component of returns on these assets. A

contagion effect is hence triggered. Unless the return on such assets rises to compen-

sate for the increase in perceived risk, a decrease in the demand for these assets

occurs, and hence the possibility of a currency crisis in their country of origin arises.

The present paper embeds the contagion mechanism above in a model of speculat-

ive attacks a la Krugman, developed by Flood and Marion (1998). An exchange rate

crisis is assumed to have recently occurred in a foreign country and the contagious

effects on the domestic economy are felt through an increase in the risk premium

on domestic bonds. The model can theoretically yield three types of equilibria that

7

As pointed out by an anonymous referee, a rise in the risk premium can alternatively be due to a

flight to quality not necessarily driven by herding behavior but by a revision of preferences in the light

of added uncertainty created by the crisis in the original country. Indeed, in BIS (1999), evidence is given

for a rise in the risk premium on emerging market debt (mainly in Eastern Europe and Latin America)

in the wake of the Russian devaluation and default of 1998, and it is argued that this reflects in great

part an increase in the perception of risk in other emerging market economies () [as investors were

reminded of] the inherent riskiness of investments in these economies.

8

In this paper herding refers to a situation in which rational investors choose to react to a rumor,

regarding () a countrys asset return characteristics, as defined by Calvo and Mendoza (1997). It could

also reflect a situation in which investors replicate the investment decisions of informed market parti-

cipants but for the wrong reasons, as explained in 7.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 439

low uncertainty, the economy settles at a no-collapse equilibrium where a crisis in

a foreign country does not lead to a crisis at home. Alternatively, the economy could

be driven to a collapse equilibrium-characterized by an inevitable speculative attack

on the fixed exchange rate system-in case investors face a large degree of uncertainty

and are risk averse. For an intermediate range of uncertainty and risk aversion, the

economy would settle at a fundamentals equilibrium, in which a crisis abroad

causes a speculative attack at home only when domestic fundamentals are precari-

ous9.

When calibrated to the Argentine and Mexican economies in 1995, the solution

to the model is characterized by multiple equilibria of the type described above.

Given actual observations on the variances and covariances of the two countries

exchange rates over the 19701995 period, it appears that the turmoil in Argentina

in 1995 can be attributed to contagion effects resulting from the Mexican peso col-

lapse of December 1994 if investors degree of risk aversion is sufficiently high.

The next section presents the model and sketches the analytical solution. Section

3 applies the model to Argentina, Section 4 concludes, and the Appendices detail

the steps followed to derive the risk premium and solve the model.

2. The model

This section presents a two-country model, where both the home country and the

foreign country follow a fixed exchange rate system. (For ease of exposition, the

foreign country variables will be indicated by the superscript f.) A currency crisis

occurs in the foreign country, however, leading to the adoption of a floating rate

system there. Taking the equilibrium in the foreign economy as exogenously determ-

ined, this section will trace the repercussions of the foreign crisis on the domestic

economy.

The model extends the framework developed by Flood and Marion (1998) to a

two-country set-up10. The key modification is in allowing the risk premium on dom-

estic bonds to capture contagion effects coming from the crisis that just occurred in

the foreign country. In addition, a stochastic process for the exchange rate of the

foreign currency is an inherent part of the model, capturing the floating rate system

established following the crisis in the foreign economy11. The model also includes

9

The model therefore implies that preserving an exchange rate peg through tight economic policy is

possible when there are foreign crises, but only if uncertainty is not too high and investors are not

extremely risk averse.

10

Flood and Marion (1998) present a Krugman-type speculative attack model in which a countrys

fixed exchange rate is abandoned either because of problems in economic fundamentals or because of a

large shift in private sector expectations.

11

Equivalently, the foreign country could be following some form of flexible exchange rate system all

along, and the foreign crisis could be captured by an unplanned large devaluation shock [a positive shock

to eft in Eq. (6)]

440 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

a process for the GDP ratio of foreign debt in circulation as the size of such debt

affects the portfolio allocation of international investors and hence has a bearing on

the risk premium component of the rate paid on domestic government debt.

The basis of the model is a simplified stochastic version of the domestic money

market equilibrium condition:

mtpt ait det, a 0,d 0; (1)

12

where mt is the logarithm of the money base normalized by domestic output , pt

the logarithm of the price level, and it is the interest rate. The domestic economy is

subject to real productivity shocks et that affect money demand: a negative pro-

ductivity shock is captured by e 0 and causes a decline in money demand. The

central bank does not hold government bonds; all public debt is in the hands of the

private sector. This implies that monetization of fiscal deficits cannot take place,

which eliminates a traditional channel through which misaligned fundamentals cause

balance of payments crises a la Krugman13. Large deficits leading to the accumulation

of public debt would still create fundamental problems to the economy as they would

translate into an increase in interest rates that jeopardizes the exchange rate system.

This is made clear in the next key equation of the model, the interest parity condition:

it i Et(st+1st) z[btVart(st+1) bft Covt(st+1,sft+1)], (2)

where bt is the ratio of total public debt to GDP in the domestic economy, and bft

is the foreign economy counterpart. According to Eq. (2), the domestic interest rate

it has to exceed the constant exogenous safe rate of return on US bonds i by an

amount that compensates for two factors: the expected rate of depreciation of the

domestic currency and the risk incurred by holding domestic bonds. The expected

rate of depreciation is measured by Et(st 1st), where st is the logarithm of the

exchange rate expressed in domestic currency units per dollar. The risk premium

itself has two components and can be derived from a two-period utility-maximization

problem of an investor allocating her wealth across holdings of a safe bond such as

US treasury bills and bonds of two other countries14. The first component captures

the adverse effect of an increase in the GDP ratio of government debt bt. The higher

the expected volatility of the future domestic exchange rate, Vart(st 1), the greater

is the degree of uncertainty facing investors and therefore the greater is the risk

resulting from an expansion in public debt15. The second component of the risk

12

In other words, mt ln(Mt / Yt). It is therefore assumed that the income elasticity of money demand

is unity.

13

See Krugman (1979).

14

The derivation is explained in Appendix A.

15

The role of the volatility of financial variables in the occurrence of crises is not implausible. Indeed,

using simple calculations, Calvo (1995b) shows that the probability of a crisis rises with the volatility of

real M2.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 441

premium captures the possibility of contagion effects resulting from a crisis in the

foreign country. Recall that, as explained in the introduction, imperfect information

leads agents to make investment decisions based on rumors whose veracity would

be too costly to ascertain. In this model, the existence of negative rumors circulating

about the domestic currency peg (after the foreign crisis takes place) is captured by

investors ex-ante belief that the exchange rates of the two currencies covary posi-

tively. Given this positive covariance, once a crisis happens in the foreign country,

it will raise expectations about an increase in the value of the exchange rate in

other words an abandonment of the peg at home as well. Formally, herding

behavior in the wake of the foreign crisis is captured by a positive value of

Covt(st 1,sft 1) in Eq. (2), which translates into an increase in the risk premium on

domestic assets16. The higher the GDP ratio of foreign debt in circulation bft, the

larger is the premium required on domestic bond holdings. Indeed, an increase in

bft can be associated with a greater risk of collapse of the peg in the foreign country,

or also with a larger depreciation of the short-run equilibrium value of the post-crisis

floating exchange rate of its currency; this in turn increases the risk of a currency

collapse at home, given the positive covariance of the two countries exchange rates.

The term z0 captures the degree of risk aversion of investors, with a value of zero

indicating risk neutrality.

Domestic prices are set one period ahead. This rule allows deviation from PPP in

order to capture the real appreciation usually observed in a fixed exchange rate sys-

tem when pressures of a crisis arise:

pt Et1st. (3)

17

Domestic and foreign public debt and the post-collapse equilibrium foreign

exchange rate follow the stochastic processes specified below:

bt m rbt1 get, g 0 (4)

b k lb

f

t

f

t1 he , h 0

f

t (5)

sft sft1 cetf det, c, d 0. (6)

The model allows for two real disturbances, one affecting the domestic economy

(et) and the other affecting the foreign economy (eft) . These two shocks are assumed

to be white noise and independently distributed. In Eq. (6), the post-collapse floating

exchange rate that results in the foreign country depends not only on that countrys

own shock but on that of the domestic economy as well, because of the herding

16

Besides herding, hedging and other trading strategies could also account for this comovement. As

the same referee mentioned in 7 pointed out, and as Calvo (1998) argues, cross-market hedging is thought

to be mostly responsible for the effect of the 1998 Russian crisis on Brazil, for example. Kaminsky and

Reinhart (1998) discuss at length the role of trading strategies in yielding financial market contagion.

17

As in Flood and Marion (1998), it is assumed that there is a bond-financed fiscal deficit, but that

government spending is also partly covered by tax levies, which increase as government bond issues

increase so as to satisfy transversality conditions.

442 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

behavior of investors18. As indicated in Eqs. (1) and (4), the real shock in the home

country affects both money demand and fiscal accounts. A negative productivity

shock, for example (captured by a positive value of et), would both reduce money

demand as well as raise the amount of domestic public debt issued (in order to cover

the budget deficit increase). An alternative interpretation for the disturbance e can

be based on policy factors. A positive value of e could capture an expansionary shift

in fiscal policy, for example. Such a policy change would first increase the budget

deficit finance and hence raise b. In fragile economies prone to money finance (a

common characteristic of countries that adopt a fixed exchange rate system to control

inflation) this shift in fiscal policy would also cause the public to reduce its money

holdings, expecting that the exchange rate peg could not be sustained for long.

An explicit policy rule implemented by the government in the home country is

needed to close the model. It will be assumed that the monetary authority defends

the value of the peg as long as its reserves exceed a strictly positive threshold r. In

other words, as long as reserves are greater than r, monetary policy is completely

passive and accommodates any shifts in money demand so as to preserve the fixed

exchange rate regime. If reserves fall below that threshold, however, the government

would be ready to relinquish the peg as interest rates would have reached extremely

high levels by then, hence choking economic activity19. Furthermore, it is assumed

that following a successful attack, the monetary authority will float the currency.

In case the foreign country follows a fixed exchange rate system insulated from

all shocks, the variance of this rate and its covariance with the fixed home country

exchange rate is zero, and contagion is absent. The model becomes similar to the

framework analyzed by Flood and Marion (1998), in which crises can result because

of a shock to the domestic economy or because of weak domestic fundamentals;

alternatively, crises could also be due to a shift in investors expectations regarding

the future variance of the exchange rate20.

This paper examines the occurrence of a contagion-driven crisis at home after a

18

Just as the shadow value of the domestic exchange rate turns out to depend on both shocks in the

model solution [see Eq. (10) below], it is rational to assume the counterpart for the foreign floating

exchange rate so that shocks at home can potentially transmit abroad through the contagion channel

modeled in this paper.

19

The precise magnitude of the threshold r depends on government preferences regarding the trade-

off between recession or financial sector problems on the one hand and the value of preserving the fixed

exchange rate system on the other. Note that if access to foreign borrowing is available, net reserves

could presumably fall below zero.

20

Flood and Marion (1998) find that in the absence of real economic shocks a crisis could occur either

because of a large shift in investors expectations (triggered by a domestic economic shock not explicitly

accounted for) or because of weak fundamentals (which they capture by a large value of domestic debt

holdings relative to the worldwide stock of bonds). They distinguish a range of values of the fundamentals

for which there is a possibility for a self-fulfilling crisis to succeed: a shift in expectations can make

these fundamentals look precarious in an otherwise viable environment.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 443

currency crisis takes place in the foreign economy. First, the channel leading to a

crisis in such a case is now explained in the light of the model of subsection 2.1.

As mentioned earlier, contagion works itself into the domestic economy through an

increase in the risk premium on public bond holdings21. The collapse of the peg in

the foreign country has yielded a floating exchange rate with a stochastic process

described by Eq. (6). Herding behavior leads investors to expect a collapse at home

with positive probability, forming expectations about both (i) the variance of the

resulting exchange rate (Vt(st 1)); and (ii) its covariance with the foreign rate (

Cov(st 1,sft 1)). The greater the investors anticipated value of the covariance of

the two exchange rates (in other words the stronger the effect of herding behavior

of investors), the greater is the premium they require on their holdings of domestic

bonds and hence the greater the risk premium these bonds have to pay to encourage

investors to hold them. This feeds into the money market through the interest rate

and leads to reserve losses, causing a crisis when the lower bound on reserves r is

attained. Note that with this set-up the probability of a crisis occurring at home at

some undefined point in the future is equal to 1 when the shocks in the model are

not bounded. Hence the question this paper addresses is not whether the domestic

economy will ever experience a crisis. It is rather whether the domestic economy

will experience a crisis in the next period given the occurrence of a crisis in the

foreign country today and assuming no further change in domestic economic con-

ditions. Furthermore, the issue is whether there is a role for fundamentals in either

contributing to the occurrence of the crisis at home or preventing the collapse of

the peg.

The model is now solved analytically. While no closed form analytical solution

is possible, numerical solutions are calculated based on parameter estimates that

reproduce Argentinas economy in the 1990s. The purpose is to shed some light on

the financial turmoil that took place in Argentina in March 1995 and its linkages

with the 1994 Mexican crisis.

The solution procedure is analogous to the one formulated by Flood and Marion

(1998) and previously used in the context of monetary models of the type developed

in this paper22. The core of this procedure is to solve for the shadow value of the

domestic exchange rate, st, defined as the floating rate that would prevail if a success-

ful attack takes place. Naturally an attack takes place whenever it is worthwhile for

investors to make it happen. In other words, a necessary and sufficient condition for

an attack to occur is that st s where s is the fixed exchange rate. This proposition

21

Note that the risk premium could increase as a result of fundamental problems within the domestic

economy. The lack of fiscal discipline, for example, could lead to an increase in the stock of public bonds

in circulation (bt), which raises that premium. Hence both contagion effects and effects of domestic fiscal

expansion work through the same mechanism in this model. Note also that other types of domestic prob-

lems leading to a crisis could arise from the real sector disturbance e.

22

See, for example, Flood and Garber (1984) or Blanco and Garber (1986).

444 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

allows us to solve for st as a function of the other variables in the model. Once this

is done, one can determine the range of values of the parameters and fundamentals

for which an attack will take place.

By definition, st equilibrates the money market when reserves have reached their

lower bound r and the peg is abandoned. Therefore, substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) in

the equilibrium condition (1) gives the following equation that determines the value

of st:

rEt1st aiaEt(st+1st)az[btVart(st+1) bftCovt(st+1,sft+1)] (7)

det.

A couple of steps are needed in order to derive the value of st from (7). First,

Et1st can be written as:

Et1st (1pt1)s pt1Et1(st / st s), (8)

where pt1 is the period t1 probability that a collapse will occur in period t. Next,

a linearization of the second term in Eq. (8) yields:

pt1Et1(st / st s) ps pEt1(st / st s) spt1, (9)

where p is the average probability of an attack occurring in the next period, and s

is the average value of the expected exchange rate in the next period conditional on

an attack. To further aid in the solution, it is assumed that the post-attack variance

of the domestic exchange rate and its covariance with the foreign rate are constant.

Eqs. (8) and (9) can then be substituted in (7) to obtain an equation with one

unknown, the shadow value of the exchange rate st. A reasonable guess for the

solution form of the shadow exchange rate is:

st l0 l1bt1 l2bft1 l3eft l4et. (10)

Appendix B shows the details of the steps followed in order to solve for the constants

l0, l1, l2, l3, and l4 in eq. (10), given the processes of bt, bft and sft in (4)(6). To

simplify the analytical solution, the error terms et and eft are assumed to be identically

distributed according to a uniform density with support [w;w] , with E(et)

E(eft) 0. The values obtained for the li parameters are the following:

l0

1

p / 2 1 / 4 a

(1 a)(r ai ab1m ab2k

azmw2 b32

n1 2

b

n1 4

3azkw2 b3c b4d

n1

n1 3

3s

4

(11)

ps l3w

2

4

ar(z(b32 b42(n 1) / (n1))w2 / 3 b1)

l1 (12)

p / 2 1 / 4 a

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 445

l2 (13)

p / 2 1 / 4 a

l3 h[z(b3c b4d(n 1) / (n1))w2 / 3 b2] (14)

l4 l[z(b3 b4 (n 1) / (n1))w / 3 b1]d / a.

2 2 2

(15)

Appendix B shows that there can be at most two different solutions for eqs. (11)

(15) above, yielding two possible equilibria for st given a specific parameter con-

figuration. While it was impossible to derive a closed form solution analytically, the

model was calibrated to reproduce the Argentine and Mexican economies, as speci-

fied below. Before turning to the corresponding results, it is useful to note that there

are three different types of equilibria that could occur; these will be referred to as

collapse, no-collapse, and fundamentals equilibria. A collapse equilibrium is

one in which the economy inevitably experiences a speculative attack as a result of

contagion. This is the case when the parameters of the model are such that l0 s.

A no-collapse equilibrium is the opposite case where contagion can never affect the

domestic economy and hence no attack occurs, and this corresponds to a parameter

configuration yielding l0 s and l1,l20. A fundamentals equilibrium corre-

sponds to a case where the probability of collapse is between 0 and 1, and is a

positive function of the level of domestic debt and real economic shocks. In such a

case, l0 s but l1 and l2 are significantly different from 0. In a fundamentals

equilibrium, the lower the level of initial debt, the lower the probability of a speculat-

ive attack triggered by contagion. In this case, fundamental factors play an important

role in deterring such attacks when they threaten to propagate across countries.

The model is now calibrated to reproduce the Argentine and Mexican economies

at the eve of the 1995 financial turmoil in Argentina. In April 1991, Argentina

implemented a currency board system under the auspices of the Convertibility Plan,

and since then the Argentine peso has been linked to the US dollar at the rate of

one peso to one dollar. Following the Mexican crisis of December 1994, however,

there were intense pressures on the Argentine peso. While the crisis in Argentina

was not mainly a balance of payments crisis in the traditional sense but a banking

crisis characterized by bank runs and bank closures, there was also speculation

against the peso as peso deposits were converted into dollars and the central bank

lost 41% of its foreign exchange reserves in the first quarter of 199523.

The present model can readily be applied to examine the role of the Mexican crisis

in triggering the attack against the peso in Argentina. Indeed, the built-in features of

the model agree with characteristics of the Argentine economy. For example, the

23

See Uribe (1996) and DAmato et al. (1997) for an account of the events in Argentina that surrounded

that period.

446 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

and the readiness of the Banco Central de Argentina to reduce reserve requirements

to make interbank credit more available during the 1995 crisis can be interpreted as

a policy approach that favors the alleviation of economic pressures over sticking

stringently to the rule. Moreover, simple money demand regressions on monthly data

for Argentina for the period 19911995 yielded an estimate of 1.09 for the income

elasticity of money demand, which broadly agrees with the unitary elasticity assumed

in the previous section.

To help in the calibration of the model, the indicators reported in Table 1 are

used. Table 2 summarizes the parameter values employed in the calibration24.

In Table 2, a very conservative threshold level of foreign exchange reserves R

was chosen, namely US$6 billion. Approximating the level of GDP to US$280

billion, this yields a value of 3.8 for r. Following Flood and Marion (1998), it was

assumed that the average probability of collapse p is 0.5 and that the interval width

of the distribution of the shocks was w 2. The semi-interest elasticity of money

demand was set to a 3.2, which agrees with several findings in the literature on

money demand in Argentina25. The parameters needed to characterize the AR pro-

cesses of the debt ratios in Argentina and Mexico, m, r, k and l, were estimated by

fitting AR processes to quarterly data on the ratio of public debt to GDP in the two

countries for the period 1970:4 to 1994:4.

In order to complete the calibration, values are needed for the following para-

meters: z (the risk aversion parameter), c and d (the parameters indicating the sensi-

Table 1

Selected economic indicators (in US$ and percentages, as indicated)

Total debt/GDP (1995) 31.9%.

Foreign reserves (1995:3) US$8.5 billion

Exchange rate (1991:4 onwards) 1 peso/US$

Total debt, average annual growth (19851995) 5.8%

Debt/GDP, annual average (19901995) 31%

Mexico Total debt/GDP (1994) 37%

USA 3-month TB interest rate (1994:12) 5.64%

Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank, February 1997) and International Financial Stat-

istics (IMF, 1998).

24

To check for the sensitivity of the results to the choice of these parameter values, other solutions

were computed with the following values: 4 and 3.5 for r; 0.06 and 0.05 for i; 2.5 for w; 3.5 for

a; 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4 for b0; 0.3 and 0.5 for bf0; 0.4 and 0.44 for m; 0.06 and 0.08 for k; 0.66 and 0.7 for

r; and 0.8 and 0.86 for l. While the proportions reported in Tables 3 and 4 changed, the relative ranking

of their magnitudes was invariant and hence the interpretation of the results still holds. It was interesting

to note that as the level of initial debt b0 decreases, the probability of settling at a no-collapse equilibrium

in Argentina increases.

25

Calvo (1996) and Calvo and Leiderman (1992) estimate different forms of money demand functions

for Argentina, and report the following values for a: 3.18, 3.2 and 4.13.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 447

Table 2

Baseline parameter values

r Log of R /Y 3.8

i US interest rate 0.0564

p Average probability of collapse 0.5

s Log of the fixed Argentine exchange rate 0

w Width of the uniform distribution of the shocks 2

a Semi-interest elasticity of money demand 3.2

b0 Period-zero debt to GDP ratio in Argentina 0.3

b0f Period-zero debt to GDP ratio in Mexico 0.4

m Drift parameter of the AR(1) process for bt 0.42

k Drift parameter of the AR(1) process for bft 0.07

r Auto-regressive parameters of the process for bt 0.68

l Auto-regressive parameters of the process for bft 0.83

Table 3

Classification of feasible equilibria: the case of Argentina and Mexico

(2) z1 4 32 47 12 5

(3) z3 9 33 47 6 4

(4) z5 8 30 54 5 3

(5) g h 0.1 4 1 85 1 9

(6) g h 0.5 0 61 0 39 0

(7) g h 0.9 0 100 0 0 0

Table 4

Classification of the feasible equilibria with restricted variance and covariance: the case of Argentina

and Mexico

collapse equilibrium no-collapse fundamentals equilibrium

equilibrium

z 1 0 100 0

z 2 0 100 0

z 3 0 33 67

z 4 86 0 14

z 5 100 0 0

448 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

tivity of Mexicos post-collapse floating exchange rate to real Mexican and Argentine

shocks respectively), d (the parameter controlling the reaction of money demand to

real economic shocks in Argentina) and g and h (the parameters indicating the effect

on public debt of real domestic shocks in Argentina and Mexico, respectively). The

parameter terms d, g and h capture the sensitivity of the economy to domestic shocks,

with higher values indicating greater effect of the latter shocks compared to foreign

shocks. Obtaining precise values for the five parameters above is virtually imposs-

ible; hence the model was simulated for all possible combinations of parameter

values drawn from the following sets: |d|, g, h[0.05,0.10,0.15,0.20,,0.95,1];

z[0.1,0.3,0.5,,4.7,4.9]; and c, d[ 0.01,0.04,0.07,,,0.97,1]. Solutions were

computed for each possible vector (d,g,h,z,c,d) drawn from the above sets and a tally

of the results is given in the first row of Table 326. The remaining rows of the table

[rows (2) to (7)] provide an idea of the sensitivity of the results to a change in the

degree of risk aversion z or in the degree of responsiveness of the economy to dom-

estic shocks, as captured by g and h. Solutions were computed by fixing one para-

meter value as indicated in the first column of the table and letting all other para-

meters vary across their respective ranges.

Table 3 shows that the solution to the model, when calibrated to the Argentine and

Mexican economies in 1995, is generally characterized by two possible equilibria: a

no-collapse equilibrium and a collapse equilibrium. Indeed, 50% of acceptable

solutions are associated with multiple equilibria of these two types. A large pro-

portion (28%) of the acceptable cases turn out to produce multiple equilibria of the

no-collapse and fundamentals types, however. In these cases a speculative attack

either never occurs or takes place only if domestic fundamentals are weak enough27.

Rows (2)(4) indicate that an increase in the degree of risk aversion is associated

with an increase in the risk of settling at a collapse equilibrium. It is also interesting

to note that a greater effect of domestic disturbances on the economy is unques-

tionably associated with a shift to a no-collapse equilibrium, as implied by rows

(5)(7) of Table 3. Indeed, an increase in g and h represents a greater relative effect

of domestic shocks and therefore greater isolation of the economy from outside dis-

turbances, and hence less susceptibility to contagion.

Given the existence of multiple equilibria for the Argentine economy in the after-

math of the Mexican crisis, would it be possible to determine the equilibrium at

26

The table entries refer to the percentage of acceptable solutions with characteristics corresponding

to the column headings. These characteristics are as follows: 2yc indicates solutions that correspond to

two collapse equilibria; 2nc indicates solutions that correspond to two no-collapse equilibria; 1nc1yc

indicates solutions that correspond to one collapse and one no-collapse equilibria; 1nc1fe indicates

solutions that correspond to one no-collapse and one fundamentals equilibria; and 1yc1fe indicates

solutions that correspond to one collapse and one fundamentals equilibria. The ratio of solutions corre-

sponding to two fundamentals equilibria was always negligible if not zero, so it is not reported here.

27

Note, however, that the model does not allow for a banking sector, hence the fundamentals considered

here are restricted to characteristics of the fiscal and monetary policies followed at the time. It would be

interesting to find out whether the likelihood of a fundamentals equilibrium would increase if the model

is modified to account for the existence of a banking sector, given the simultaneous banking crisis that

took place in Argentina at the time. This however is an extension beyond the scope of this paper.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 449

which the economy is expected to settle? In other words, is there a factor that

explains why the Argentine economy experienced a speculative attack in 1995

instead of moving to a no-collapse equilibrium28? It turns out that the equilibria

produced by the model can be distinguished by the associated variance of Argentinas

exchange rate and its covariance with the Mexican rate. Indeed, all no-collapse

equilibria corresponded to low variance and covariance values, to the order of 0.01,

whereas the other two types of equilibria generally corresponded to variances and

covariances at least ten times greater in magnitude. The interpretation of this obser-

vation is straightforward: in periods of low uncertainty, captured by relatively low

values of the exchange rates variance and covariance, the risk premium is not greatly

affected by the occurrence of a foreign crisis, and hence does not increase enough to

lead to strong pressures in domestic financial markets. In other words, no-collapse

equilibria are the product of low uncertainty, which minimizes herding behavior.

Hence, since a speculative attack occurred in Argentina in 1995, then it must be the

case that credibility in the currency board arrangement was weak, creating uncer-

tainty about the sustainability of the exchange rate peg.

At this point an important question arises: is weak credibility the main culprit for

the Argentine crisis? Werent there additional important factors at work that contrib-

uted to the turmoil? In order to examine this issue, a quantitative measure for the

uncertainty prevalent at the time is needed, to focus uniquely on the equilibria that

could arise in the case of lack of sufficient credibility. It seems plausible to derive

this value from the historical experience of Argentina with exchange rate volatility.

Argentine data indicates that the black market rate had a sample variance of 0.15

over the period 1970:1 to 1995:5; furthermore, the covariance of this rate with the

Mexican exchange rate over periods of relatively floating rates in Mexico ranges

from about 0.46 to 0.53, depending on the definition of these periods29. Accordingly,

28

Note that the financial turmoil in Argentina did not lead to an abandonment of the currency board

system then, and this system is still in place. Although this seems not to fit the criteria for a crisis as

specified in the model, it is important to recall that steps were implemented that succeeded at fending

off speculators. In contrast, the model of the preceding section assumes that no policy intervention takes

place to counteract speculative attacks. Hence, although the attack was not successful at bringing down

the peg, the Argentine episode can still qualify as a crisis given the observed speculation against the

currency and the reserve losses incurred by the central bank, and assuming a collapse could have occurred

had there been no central bank initiative to make credit more available to the banks while at the same

time issuing statements to restore credibility in the currency peg.

29

The variance of the Argentine pesos dollar exchange rate and its covariance with the Mexican pesos

dollar exchange rate are calculated based on the black market exchange rate of the Argentine peso (instead

of the official rate) because the variables of interest are the expected values of both statistics. During

various episodes in which the exchange rate in Argentina was officially fixed or pegged, the black market

exchange rate fluctuated, reflecting changes in market sentiment and sometimes also lack of credibility

of market participants in the exchange rate policies followed during these episodes. The time periods

corresponding to these episodes were therefore not excluded when calculating the variance and covariance.

However, these time periods were excluded in sensitivity tests reported in 30.

30

As a sensitivity check, two other sets of solutions were defined, based on lower bands for the variance

and covariance [first down to (0.06;0.12) and (0.26;0.42) respectively, and then down to (0.03;0.06) and

(0.11;0.18) respectively]. The second set of bands reflects the values of the variance and covariance over

the period 1970:1 to 1995:5 after excluding episodes in which Argentina had a fixed exchange rate or

450 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

it is assumed that the solutions producing a variance of the Argentine exchange rate

of 0.120.18 and a covariance of that rate with the Mexican rate of 0.420.58 are

the ones associated with significant uncertainty, and hence weak credibility. Table

4 presents a tally of this restricted set of solutions: these were computed for all

combinations of (d, g, h, c, d) drawn from the sets specified above, and for values

of z specified in the first column of the table.

Table 4 shows that weak credibility is not a sufficient condition for a crisis to

result in Argentina following a crisis in Mexico. The degree of risk aversion of

investors, z, has to be high enough to produce a collapse equilibrium. Indeed, if z

is close to 5, the majority of solutions fall in the category of collapse equilibria.

If, however, it is around 1 or 2, then the economy will rather move to a no-collapse

equilibrium30. Accordingly, in addition to economic uncertainty, a relatively high

degree of risk aversion of investors must have contributed to the Argentine crisis of

1995. Moreover, it is important to note that the role of fundamentals is not completely

ruled out in this setting since for an intermediate range of risk aversion these turn

out to be crucial in determining whether the crisis would take place or not. Hence,

if investors were not sufficiently risk averse then, the 1995 crisis must have been

driven by a combination of lack of credibility in the exchange rate system, risk

aversion of investors, and weak domestic economic fundamentals31.

4. Conclusion

across countries. Contagion here is the consequence of rational herding behavior of

investors who diversify risk by holding assets of several countries and form ex-ante

expectations about the comovement of exchange rates across these countries, poss-

ibly because of lack of accurate information. A crisis in one country leads to an

increase in the likelihood of a crisis in another country when investors expect a

positive covariance of the two countries exchange rates. This phenomenon of con-

tagion translates into an increase in the risk premium required to hold domestic

bonds. The resulting pressures of a crisis are transmitted to the money market through

the domestic interest rate. For a benchmark of parameter values, calibrated to repro-

duce the Argentine economy, the model yields multiple equilibria. The different

crawling peg system, as identified in Choueiri and Kaminsky (1999). The results showed that the lower

the band adopted, the greater the degree of risk aversion z needed to produce a collapse equilibrium.

In other words, the lower the degree of uncertainty (and hence the greater the confidence attached to the

peg) the higher the degree of risk aversion needed to produce a collapse equilibrium.

31

In this respect, it would be useful to derive a methodology that would allow estimation of the degree

of risk aversion z. Given the linearizations and other assumptions involved in solving the background

investor model to obtain the risk premium (see the Appendices) such an endeavor is not straightforward

and is beyond the scope of this paper. Calvo and Mendoza (1997) performed calculations leading to the

conclusion that the coefficient of risk aversion in their model is within the range (0;1). It is hard to map

this result into the present model to specify a plausible range of values for z because of the differences

between their model and the one presented in the Appendices.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 451

equilibria that the economy could settle at are associated with different levels of

uncertainty prevailing in the economy, as captured by investors expectations regard-

ing the comovement of the two countries exchange rates. In particular, the no-

collapse equilibrium corresponds to a relatively low degree of uncertainty. If, there-

fore, one believes that the currency board in Argentina was credible enough to reduce

exchange rate uncertainty to near-zero levels then the model implies that contagion

was not the main cause for the Argentine financial turmoil of 1995. However, if one

is to extrapolate from historical values of the exchange rate variance in Argentina

and its covariance with the Mexican rate over the non-fixed periods in 19701995,

then the model provides a rationale for the argument that contagion contributed to

the speculative attack, but only if investors are believed to be sufficiently risk averse.

It is important to note that the economic fundamentals accounted for in this paper,

namely the stock of public debt, do not seem to play a critical role in determining

whether or not the Argentine economy was driven to a crisis equilibrium. This is

not surprising because that aspect of the economy was not problematic at the time.

Argentinas financial sector fundamentals, however, had deteriorated in 1995. Hence,

a useful extension to this paper would be to model the banking sector explicitly in

order to account for a more comprehensive spectrum of fundamentals.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Graciela Kaminsky, Louis Maccini, and an anony-

mous referee for comments. This paper is based on the authors doctoral dissertation,

written at the Johns Hopkins University before joining the International Monetary

Fund. The views expressed therein are the authors and do not necessarily represent

those of the IMF.

A rationale for the risk premium adopted in eq. (3) in the text can be derived as

follows. Consider the two-period problem of an investor choosing to allocate a given

stock of wealth W0 across one-period holdings of home country bonds B, foreign

bonds Bf, and safe US Treasury bills B. All bonds are denominated in the currency

of the respective country of origin. The predetermined rates of interest these bonds

pay are i, if, and i, respectively. The dollar value of the domestic currency is X

and Xf is the dollar value of the foreign currency. The investor maximizes the mean-

variance utility function:

U0 E0(W1)gV

W1

W0

,

W0 B BX0 BfXf0.

452 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

The first-order conditions with respect to B and B can be combined to yield the

following form for the risk premium required on Argentine bonds:

X1

(1 i) (1 i)

X0

2g(1 i)

W02

BX0(1 i)V

X1

X0

BfX0f(1 (A1)

if)COV

X1 X1f

,

X0 X0f

.

The higher the expected variance of the future exchange rate or the higher the stock

of home country bonds in circulation, the higher is the risk premium. This is the

component of the premium compensating for own-country risk. The second compo-

nent of the premium compensates for contagion risk. Allowing for contagion in

this set-up is equivalent to assuming that the stochastic processes of the domestic

and foreign exchange rates are interdependent such that COV(X1 / X0,X1f / Xf0) 0.

Hence contagion works its way into the domestic economy by raising the premium

required on holding domestic bonds.

Note that in this set-up, the risk premium can increase either because of fears of

contagion, or because of fears of devaluation at home irrespective of what happens

in the foreign country (because, say, in the presence of large fiscal deficits and a

high debt-to-GDP ratio, investors fear that the government will try to inflate away

the debt). One could also modify the expression of the risk premium by introducing

a probability of default that affects the value of the stock of debt held by investors,

B, in such a way that an increase in the probability of default would constitute a third

reason for an increase in the risk premium. In this paper, however, the possibility of

default is assumed away in order not to introduce complexities in the model that are

superfluous to the study of contagion.

In order to transform the risk premium given by the right-hand side of eq. (A1)

into the form adopted in eq. (2) of the text, the following set of notations and assump-

tions are used:

i if ii (A2)

2g(1 i) 2

z (A3)

W0

Vt

Xt+1

Xt

Vt(st+1) (A4)

COVt

Xt+1 Xft+1

,

Xt Xtf

COVt(st+1,sft+1) (A5)

BtXt

bt (A6)

Wt

BtfXtf

bft. (A7)

Wt

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 453

A bar above a variable indicates a steady-state value. The dollar exchange rates of

the domestic and foreign currencies are given by S 1 / X and Sf 1 / Xf respect-

ively, and s and sf are the natural logarithms of S and Sf, respectively. In eqs. (A6)

and (A7), bt and bft capture the representative investors exposure to the debt of the

two countries, which will be proxied by the GDP ratios of domestic and foreign

bonds, respectively.

The solution for st is found using eqs. (4)(9). Assuming that the variance and

covariance terms in the premium are constant after the speculative attack, one can

stipulate a linear solution to the model of the following form:

st l0 l1bt1 l2bft1 l3eft l4et.

In order to solve for st, it is necessary first to determine pt1, Et1(st / st s) and

Et(st 1st). To aid in the determination of these three expressions, it is useful to

approximate the continuous uniform distribution of the error term et by a discrete

uniform distribution, while maintaining the assumption of a continuous uniform dis-

tribution for eft over the interval [w;w] . Hence, the density functions of et and eft

are given by g() and f() defined as follows32:

1 2 4 n3

for eg 0, w, w,, w, w

g(e) n n1 n1 n1

0 otherwise

1

for eff [w;w]

f(e ) 2w

f

.

0 otherwise

Given g() and f(), the probability at t1 of a crisis occurring in period t can be

solved as follows:

[Pr(etf

x

32

In the density g, n is restricted to the set of odd integers greater than 1.

454 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

1

n

g

Pr etf Jt1

l4

l3

x

x

1

n

g

Pr 1F Jt1

l4

l3

x

x

associated with the uniform density function f() of eft. Solving the above sum yields

the following

wl3s l0 l1bt1 l2bft1

pt1 . (B1)

2wl3

Second,

Et1

st

st

s l0l1bt1 l2bft1 Et1 l3etf

l4et

st

s .

But,

Et1 l3etf

l4et

st

s xg

l3etf

l4x

st

s and et x Pr(et x)

w

1 (l3etf l4x)f(ef)def s wl3l0l1bt1l2bft1

.

n 1F(Jt1(l4 / l3)x) 2

g

x (l4 / l3)x

Jb1

Hence,

Et1

st

st

s

l0 l1bt1 l2bft1 s wl3

2

. (B2)

rate that equilibrates the money market at t 1 after an attack occurs in period t.

Then Et(st 1st) b0 b1(m rbt1 et) b2(k lbft1 eft)l0l1bt1

l2bft1l3eftl4et. The b coefficients can be calculated by applying the method of

undetermined coefficients to the money market equilibrium condition in period

t 1. This yields the following values:

n1

m b32 b42

n1

b0 r a i b1m b2k zw2 / 3 (B3)

n1

k b 3c b 4d

n1

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 455

b1 (B4)

1 a(1r)

alz(b3c b4d(n 1) / (n1))w2 / 3

b2 (B5)

1 a(1l)

b3 h b2 z b3c b4d

n1 2

n1

w /3 (B6)

b 4 g b 1 z b 32 b 42

n1

n1 2 d

w /3 .

a

(B7)

Note that:

w2

Vart(st+1) b23Var(eft+1) b24Var(eft+1) b23 b24

3 n1 3

n 1 w2

(B8)

w2

Covt(st+1,st+1f) E[(b3eft+1 b4et+1)(ceft+1 det+1)] b3c (B9)

3

b4d

n 1 w2

n1 3

.

Substituting (B1)(B9) and eqs. (4), (5), (6), (8) and (9) in eq. (7), and using the

method of undetermined coefficients again gives the solution for the shadow rate

value as described in eqs. (10)(15) in subsection 2.3.

Note that (B4)(B7) imply that b3 solves the following second-order equation:

0 b23

3 (1 aar) n1

w2 (1 a)zg d(n 1) 1 3(1 aal)

d h(1 a)zw2

c

2

(B10)

b3

3(1 aal)

h(1 a)zw2

d

c .

a

Finding a closed-form solution to the model entails finding first the roots of (B10).

Each acceptable root33 will determine a solution for st that can be found by solving

eqs. (B3) to (B7) and text eqs. (11)(15) for the b and l coefficients using this value

of b3. Both roots are acceptable when the discriminant of eq. (B10) is strictly

positive. Assuming n, this discriminant is as follows:

3(1 aal)

h(1 a)zw2

c 2

4

d w2 (1 a)zg

a 3 (1 aar)

d

1 3(1 aal)

d h(1 a)zw2

c

2

.

33

The roots have to be real and positive to be acceptable from an economic point of view and be

consistent with the models assumptions.

456 N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457

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Sachs, J., Tornell, A., Velasco, A., 1996. Financial crises in emerging markets: the lessons from 1995.

Working Paper No. 5576. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Schmukler, S., Frankel, J., 1996. Crises, contagion, and country funds. Working Paper, University of

California-Berkely.

Uribe, M., 1996. The Tequila effect: theory and evidence from Argentina. Working Paper. Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC.

Valdes, R., 1996. Emerging markets contagion: evidence and theory. Working Paper, Massashussetts

Institute of Technology.

World Bank, 1997. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC.

N. Choueiri / Journal of International Money and Finance 21 (2002) 435457 457

Further Reading

Calvo, G., 1995a. Varieties of capital market crises. Working Paper No. 15, University of Maryland

Center for International Studies.

Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., 1996. The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments

Problems International Finance. Discussion Paper No 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,

Washington, DC

Krugman, P., 1996. Are currency crises self-fulfilling? Working Paper for the Macroeconomics Annual

Conference, National Bureau of Economic Research.

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