You are in for a difficult bar exam
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus
Poli Law Rev Essay
1. Ampatuan v. De Lima
A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the
power to prosecute . The right to prosecute vested on prosecutors
gives them the discretion on what and whom to charge. Consistent
with the separation of powers, the court does not want to interfere
with the executive in the exercise of this right to prosecute, in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, to determine probable cause
and to establish sufficient evidence.
2. Look at authority reclamation of regional centers Republic
v. Bayao re: DAR employees ejected
3. Powers of congress as a Board of Canvassers Pimentel v.
COMELEC
Omnibus election Code
SEC. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy is any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or
by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appearance of the election returns.
RA7166: Certificates of canvas
SEC. 37. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy. The following shall be proper issues that may
be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers;
2) The canvassed election returns/certificates of canvass are
incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns/certificates or in the other authentic copies thereof as
Election Code;
3) The election returns/certificates of canvass were prepared
under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
4) When substitute or fraudulent election return/certificates
of canvass were canvassed, the results of which materially
affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.
SEC. 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and
Municipal Offices. Pre-proclamation cases involving
provincial, city and municipal officer shall be allowed and shall
be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof.
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission
shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of
the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers
concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party.
However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that
the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an
order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate
order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari.
SEC. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission. However, matters raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of
canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board
of canvassers only.
SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the elections for president,
vice-president, senator, and member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed
on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates
of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in
Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
Any objection on the election returns before the city or
municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates
of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district
board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically
noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
Election of President and Vice President: The Commission en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of
Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en
banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of
the certificate of canvass for president and vice-president and
senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it
by the local board of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each
certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked
by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and
transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them;
(2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the
candidates for president and vice-president or senator, as the
case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and
figures; (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificates of canvass or in any of its supporting
documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by
precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words
and figures in the certificate; and (4) there exists no
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures
in the certificate of canvass against the aggregate number of
votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered by
the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies
of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for
the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be
incomplete the Senate President or the Chairman of the
Commission, as the case may be shall require the board of
canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery the
election returns from polling places that were not included in
the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said
election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within
two (2) days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting
statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct bears
erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity
of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result
of the election, upon request of the presidential, vice-
presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party,
Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be,
shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice-President or senator, count
the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns
submitted to it.
In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or
alteration as mentioned above, the procedure on pre-
proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as
provided in Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20.
 Any person who presents in evidence a simulated copy of an
election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes, or
a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or
statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a
simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense and
shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg.
881. (Emphasis supplied.)
4. Cases:
a. Consolidated cases involving pork barrel Belgica v.
Executive Sec on valid delegation of powers (2 tests) completeness
and sufficient standard
b. Angara v. Tanada
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters[14]
raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty
and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.[16] As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,[17] the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many
cases,[18] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of
principles and state policies. The counterpart of this article in
the 1935 Constitution[21] is called the basic political creed of
the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato,[24] the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory
policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal
right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be
unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged
or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts
into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to
special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments -- the legislative and executive departments --
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.
c. EDCA case Saguisag
The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the
President is empowered to enter into executive agreements
on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such
agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such
and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely
involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of the
MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the
Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in
by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25.
Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need
not be transmitted to the Sena
6. Creation of ICC up to what extent can you give in to the
prerogative of the president (ex: Trump withdrawing from existing
treaties)
7. Attrition on law on public officers ABAKADA partylist v.
Purisima; Bureau of Customs Employees v. Teves;
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,
that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives
and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain
to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards
to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has
recognized the following as sufficient standards: public
interest, justice and equity, public convenience and resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others,
welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare.33 In this that its members and other BOC employees are in great
case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created
for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From
then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence,
the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law
R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A.
No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation
of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly
filed the present petition before this Court against
respondents.
BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the
constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct
danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the
required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of
their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and
their respective families prejudice.
Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not
violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure
of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the
guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is
not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and
its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the
dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of
the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an
employee may only be separated from the service upon
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The
OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality.
In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the
principle of separation of powers. However, the
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335
was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court
also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No.
9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the
rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process?
HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.
REMEDIAL LAW: actions; parties
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted,
that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its
members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are
actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this
doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari
potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers
admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation
of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies like the Board in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs
apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in
Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR or
 BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant
factors that may affect the level of collection.
As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the
veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in
the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom
for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of
the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is.
The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now
reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.
Pichay v. PCGG; power of president to reorganize (Zamora)
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the
Executive Department under E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive
Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292
sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora 5 the Court
affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive
department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of
E.O. 292, thus:
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the
executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations
Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for
his office. 19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer
any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
a. Banda v. Ermita -
The present controversy arose from a Petition forCertiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a
class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-
employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former
President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of
Executive Order No. 285which provided, among others, the creation
of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and
the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA).
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby
created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the
Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing
jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable
forms of national, provincial, city and municipal governments,
including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General
Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information
materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including
government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but
not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and
related management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the
implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in
accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No.
285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from
the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by
the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in
the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive
powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No.
285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates
petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether the E.O no. 378 is Constitutional.
HELD: Yes. It is constitutional
POLITICAL LAW: reorganization
In the present case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices,the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the
interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within
the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to
the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment
that this Court could only but accept.
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals 527 SCRA 746which involved a
structural and functional reorganization of the Department of Health
under an executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power
of the President to reorganize agencies under the executive
department by executive or administrative order is constitutionally
and statutorily recognized. We held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President
may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization
of government entities under the Executive Department. This is also
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No.
292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.:
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President
consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under
it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in
Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies
under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under
the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and
control of the President, those under the administrative supervision
of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and
program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order
creating them under any specific department.
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is
likewise recognized in general appropriations laws.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional
power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any
legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an
exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently
affirmed by this Court.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the
scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary,
but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the power of control may
justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office.
Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987
is one such law.
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an
exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the
aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President,
"in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a
matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization
of such an office through executive or administrative order is also
recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987.
MCQ
1. Obligation treaty as source
2. Conventions
a. Rights of a child
3. Jurisdiction between ICC and ICJ
What is the International Court of Justice?
The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was
established by the United Nations Charter, signed in 1945 at San
Francisco (United States), and began work in 1946 in the Peace
Palace, The Hague (Netherlands).
The Court, which is composed of 15 judges, has a dual role: in
accordance with international law, settling legal disputes between
States submitted to it by them and giving advisory opinions on legal
matters referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and
specialized agencies.
The official languages of the Court are English and French.
What differentiates the International Court of Justice from the
International Criminal Court and the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals?
The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to try individuals
accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. As it is not a
criminal court, it does not have a prosecutor able to initiate
proceedings.
This task is the preserve of national courts, the ad hoc criminal
tribunals established by the United Nations (such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) or in co-operation
with it (such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone)), and also of the
International Criminal Court, set up under the Rome Statute.
4. ICJ Advisory Opinion In re Reparations can UN represent
injured parties? (yes); before, exclusive jurisdiction of ICJ is states;
now can represent organizations
5. Frivaldo v. COMELEC effect of Repatriation
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon
and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only
to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law
era.
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of
valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to
drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
6. Maquiling case
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation.
7. Qua Ching Gan v. Deportation board power of immigration
to issue warrants of arrest
Immigration cannot issue warrant of arrest, but may arrest.
Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed
pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
8. Maritime Zones definitions
9. International Criminal Law ad hoc courts, like Nuremburg
As the guardian of international humanitarian law, the ICRC also
supports efforts to end impunity through the development of
international criminal justice, be it by encouraging States to
implement the required legislation so that the fight against impunity
for international crimes can be fought at the domestic level, as well as
supporting the trend towards the internationalization of individual
responsibility for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Having primary jurisdiction would have meant that the ICC would
have the power to deal with any case, even if the national authorities
were already trying to do so.
This was the system used for the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (1945) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (1946), as well as for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
in the 1990s.
10. Petition for naturalization Republic v. Batugas GR 183110,
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship
through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000").
A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15
of CA 473, which provides that:
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine
citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to
submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that
the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the
Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition
Qualifications for natural citizen alien must prove he has lucrative
profession or sufficient means of employment.
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization
under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino
citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine
citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and
seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of be coming a
Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA
473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she
is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand
in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
11. Eminent Domain
12. Grace Poe; DOJ Secretary v. Pinessi (?) case recognition by
Bureau of Immigration can be subject of judicial inquiry
13. Amendment process how may Constitution be revised or
amended?
See notes
14. What are the tests for amendment or revision
Santiago v. COMELEC review provisions of RA 6735
i. Indirect
ii. Direct
15. What is relative constitutionality (qualification standards
law, Central Bank employees case) and relativity of due process (can
exclude people because of greater national interest)?
The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.]
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed
by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the
light of changed conditions
16. Freedom of navigation
17. Russias acts of reclamation
18. PH with jurisdiction over criminal acts in embassy grounds
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides
that the premises of a diplomatic mission shall be inviolable, and may
not be entered by the police or by any other agent of the receiving
State, except with the consent of the Ambassador or the head of the
mission, it does not alter the fact, however, that such premises are
still part of Philippine territory. The concept of exterritoriality,
under which diplomatic premises are deemed to be part of the
sovereign territory of the sending State, has not been adopted in the
Vienna Convention. Hence, a crime committed on or within such
premises by a private person like Williams who enjoys no diplomatic
immunity falls within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
19. Liang v. ADB no immunity in cursing employees
20. Sps. Tecson v. Sec. of Public Work powers of the congress
in enacting laws; when is a law valid?
21. BT Talong case
22. Atong Paglaum case partylist nominee need not be part of
the disadvantaged sector
23. BANAT what are 4 parameters
24. Discipline of members of congress in the house of
representatives
25. Cudia case PMA relativity of due process
26. Bill of Rights look at plain view doctrine
See notes
27. Right to privacy in public places driving somewhere, hit
someone, can police use CCTV as evidence?
28. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay quasi-judicial powers of
the Mayor
Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal
constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a
nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. ary
We agree with petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i)
of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances
declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It
bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare
a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation.
It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is
a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things
must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however,
We still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order
the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power
and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to
issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor
is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive
official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an
effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444
(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing
to secure the necessary permits.
29. Qualifications to run for congress
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five
years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding
the day of the election.
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
30. Miranda rights; exclusion of evidence
Custodial evidence is excluded. However, the trial is not rendered
invalid
31. Election law jurisdiction of PET, HRET, SET
32. Public International Law those covered by the protection of
the Geneva Convention of 1949 offshoot World War II (wounded,
innocent, prisoners of war)
33. Does stare decisis apply as generally accepted principles of law
in IL? NO
34. What is relationship of ICC to domestic courts under Rome
Statute Ans: Complementary
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court currently
signed by 139 states is the treaty that created the International
Criminal Court (ICC). In effect, it established a new system linking the
national and international court systems to deal with the most
egregious crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
At the heart of that new system is the idea that, first and foremost,
the courts at the national level should deal with cases of serious
violations. And the ICC, according to the Rome Statute, is
complementary to those national jurisdictions.
This is where the word we now frequently use in reference to the
Rome Statute system comes from, complementarity.
There are at least four reasons for the complementary system:
1) It protects the accused if they have been prosecuted before
national courts.
2) It respects national sovereignty in the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction.
3) It might promote greater efficiency because the ICC cannot deal
with all cases of serious crimes.
4) It puts the onus on states to do their duty under international and
national law to investigate and prosecute alleged serious crimes (that
is, it is not just a matter of efficiency but a matter of law, policy, and
morality).
35. Maturity of action power of judicial review (memorize par. 2
of Sec. 1 of Art 8)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members.

36. Qualified political agency
37. Manila Bay case
38. Fruit of the poisonous tree
39. How do you prove existence of customary international law?
40. Commander in chief power of the president
41. Difference between interim and acting capacity
appointments
Yes provided the temporary appointments of cabinet members do
not exceed one (1) year.
The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature and the legislature may not interfere
with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of
an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress,
through a law cannot impose on the President the obligation of
automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter ego. He
must be of the Presidents confidence and provided that the
temporary appointment does not exceed one (1) year.
There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and
appointments in an acting capacity. While both are effective upon
acceptance, ad interim appointments are extended only during the
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended
any time that there is a vacancy.
Moreover, ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments
are not submitted to the Commission on appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily circumventing the need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
42. Francisco v. HOR on impeachment
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. Impeachment shall be
initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on
Justice of:
(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives; or
(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, or
(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment fifed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House,
Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. A verified
complaint for impeachment by a Member of the House or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof
shall be filed with the office of the Secretary General and immediately
referred to the Speaker.
The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten
(10) session days from receipt. It shall then be referred to the
Committee on Justice within three (3) session days thereafter.
RULE III
FINDING A PROBABLE CAUSE
A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS
Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance.
Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determine whether
the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If the committee
finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same
to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written
explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return
the same to the complainant(s) together with the committees
written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the
committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in farm.
Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in term, it shall
then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The
requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not
sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit
its report as provided hereunder.
Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. If the
committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it
shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the
resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written
notice that the respondent shall answer the complaint within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to
the complainant(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the
period to answer the complaint.
The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative
defenses. If the respondent fails or refuses to file an answer within
the reglementary period the respondent is deemed to have
interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days
from receipt of the answer, the complainant may life a reply, serving
a copy thereof to the respondent who may file a rejoinder within
three (3) days from receipt of the reply, serving a copy thereof to the
complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply, all the material
allegations in the answer are deemed controverted. Together with
their pleadings, the parties shall file their affidavits or counter-
affidavits, as the case may be, with their documentary evidence. Such
affidavits or counter-affidavits shall be subscribed before the
Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary General.
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, failure to file an answer will not
preclude the respondent from presenting evidence to support the
defenses.
When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished
with a copy of the verified complaint of a Member of the House or a
copy of the verified complaint of a private citizen together with the
resolution of endorsement thereof by a Member of the House of
Representatives and a written notice to answer. In this case,
reference to respondent in these Rules shall be understood as
respondents.
Section 6. Submission of Evidences and Memoranda. After receipt
of the pleadings, affidavits and counter-affidavits and relevant
documents provided for in Section 5, or the expiration of the time
within which they may be filed, the Committee shall determine
whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment.
If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the
Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report
required hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for
impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a hearing. The
Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of
examination and cross-examination. The Committee shall have the
power to issue compulsory processes for the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documents and other related evidence.
Hearings before the Committee shall be open to the public except
when the security of the State or public interest requires that the
hearings be held in executive session.
After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the
submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted
for resolution.
Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. The House
may, upon proper petition, provide adequate protection to a
complainant or witness if it is shown that the personal safety of the
complainant or witness is in jeopardy because of participating in the
impeachment proceeding.
Section 8. Report and Recommendation. The Committee on Justice
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit
its report to the House containing its findings and recommendations
within sixty (60) session days from the referral to it of the verified
complaint and/or resolution. Together with the report shall be a
formal resolution of the Committee regarding the deposition of the
complaint which shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten (10) session days from receipt thereof.
If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Members,
that a probable cause exists on the basis of the evidence adduced
before the Committee, it shall submit with its report a resolution
setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. Otherwise, the complaint
shall be dismissed subject to Section 11 of these Rules.
Section 9. Report to be Calendared. The Committee on Rules shall
calendar the report and the accompanying resolution of the
Committee on Justice regarding the disposition of the complaint in The contents of the verification shall be as follows:
accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives. The We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state:
House shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session days from That we are the complainants in the above-entitled
its submission by the Commission on Justice. complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said
B. HOUSE ACTION complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents
Section 10. Vote Required for Approval. A vote of at least one-third thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own
(1/3) of all the Members of the House is necessary for the approval of knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation of
the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the documents and other records pertinent thereto.
resolution is approved by the required vote it shall then be endorsed
to the Senate.
On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure approval by
the required vote, it shall result in the dismissal of the complaint for
impeachment.
Section 11. Where Dismissal Recommended. When the report of the
Committee on Justice dismisses the complaint, it shall submit to the
House a resolution for the dismissal of the verified complaint and/or
resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary to override such resolution,
in which case the Committee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the
Articles of Impeachment.
Section 12. Vote by Roll Call. The voting on a resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee on Justice or a contrary
resolution dismissing the Impeachment Complaint shall be by roll call,
and the Secretary General shall record the vote of each Member,
RULE IV
VERIFIED COMPLAINT/RESOLUTION
BY ONE-THIRD OF MEMBERS
Section 13. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate.
A verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified
complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same
manner as an approved bid of the House.
The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and
sworn to before the Secretary General by each of the Members
constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.