Origen and Allegory | Introduction to History and Spirit: The

Understanding of Scripture According to Origen | Henri de Lubac

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Dom Capelle was recently obliged to devote a scholarly article to proving that Saint Ambrose
did not take Melchizedek to be the eternal Father. [1] What a lengthy book would be required
if we wished to establish with equal care, by the minute examination of so many misquoted
texts and by the production of so many others that are usually misunderstood, that Origen was
not the mad "allegorist" he is so often thought to be! The error is so deep-rooted, it has so
many authorities for it, it concurs, we must admit, with so many of our prejudices, that even
today we find good historians reviving it without a closer look. Even those who every now
and then rise to combat it make concession to it again in spite of themselves. Such was the
case in the nineteenth century with Bishop Freppel, who thought he was being generous to
Origen in saying that "even with regard to the books of the Old Testament, his preferences do
not go so far as to exclude systematically" all literal exegesis. [2] Closer to our own time, this
was also the case with Abb Jules Martin, even though he was working on texts. [3] Ren
Cadiou himself, in the course of an excellent chapter on Origenian symbolism, writes: "The
Alexandrians easily sacrificed history in their desire to impose symbolism, even though
Christian revelation is, in the first place, a historical event." [4] Nevertheless, as paradoxical
as this might appear to a modern mind, was not one of the motives for this symbolism, in the
Christian thinking of the first centuries, precisely to assure history a meaning that pagan
antiquity had denied it? And did not Origen, perhaps better than any other, comment on this
verse from the Letter to the Hebrews that, in its uniqueness, so well confirms the value of the
"historical event" in which we believe: "[Christ] has appeared once for all at the end of the
age to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself "? [5]

The word allegory is automatically associated with Origenian exegesis. This is certainly not
wrong, if we do not intend to express the whole of his exegesis by that word, and neither are
all the objections summed up in that word inapplicable. But still, it is necessary to have a
good understanding of it. It is a vague word with a variety of meanings. [6] Many have too
much disdain for it to waste their time being precise about the characteristics of the thing it
designates, or that they think it designates in Origen's case, so that, by its very inconsistency,
the idea they form of it eludes any orderly discussion. When they speak, in fact, of an "excess
of symbolism" or "exaggerated allegory", what exactly do they mean by these expressions? Is
it merely a question, for example, of a "lack of sobriety" or of too rich a profusion of symbols,
so that the error would be "rather in the application than in the substance of things" ? [7] Or,
on the other hand, is it a question of some corrosive principle that sound exegesis is obliged to
reject? It has been my desire to try to clear up a question that has become so obscure by, first
of all, forcing, so to speak, the accepted judgments to be more explicit. I have sought, not to
"defend" Origen, but simply to know what in fact he thought and said.

Several friends had undertaken to translate the Homilies on the Hexapla from Rufinus'
version. These translations naturally appeared some time later in the Sources chrtiennes
series, and I was asked to write an introduction. That was the occasion for this study. Since
the Homilies on the Hexapla are, from one end to the other, little more than one vast
repertoire of "allegorical" interpretations, the subject was inescapable. The very strangeness
of it was stimulating to me. But it was quickly apparent to me that in order to discuss this
subject to any advantage, it was necessary to consider it at the same time within the
framework of Origen's entire work. As E. Klostermann wrote quite recently, [8]
commentaries and homilies cannot be dissociated in this work on the pretext that they
correspond to two distinct genres: just as the homilies are filled with details that attest to a
concern for scientific order, the commentaries are full of spiritual preoccupations. As for the
other works, such as the Peri Archn or Contra Celsum, their contribution is equally essential.
But as I looked in those works for the necessary information, the subject I had at first
envisioned assumed a broader scope in my eyes. It was no longer a matter of measuring, in
any given exegesis, the part allotted to the "letter" or to history. It was no longer even a matter
solely of exegesis. It was a whole manner of thinking, a whole world view that loomed before
me. A whole interpretation of Christianity of which Origen, furthermore, despite many of his
personal and at times questionable traits, was less the author than the witness. Even more,
through this "spiritual understanding" of Scripture, it was Christianity itself that appeared to
me, as if acquiring a reflective self-awareness. This is the phenomenon, one of the most
characteristic of the early Christian period, that, in the final analysis, I sought to grasp.

Similar essays have become increasingly frequent in recent years, some simply historical and
others with a doctrinal purpose. Theologians and exegetes are examining the subject
thoroughly, each according to his discipline. Everywhere, in every sense, they are speaking of
the "spiritual sense". Discussions have taken place that were not at all unproductive. New
points of view have evolved. Traditional truths have been elucidated more clearly. My task is
easier because of this. The time is not ripe, however, for a complete synthesis. Rather than
consider the question in all its breadth, which would have required a rather adventurous foray
into the biblical field, I have therefore stayed with my original plan. Origen remains at the
center of my perspective. It is he whom we are examining; it is within his axis that we place
ourselves. A mere chapter--though one of unparalleled importance, it is true--of that history of
spiritual exegesis that might itself be an important chapter in the history of theology.

My purpose is thus historical--and I intend my method to be so as well. Let me repeat, I am

seeking to discover what Origen thought by finding out, without any preconceived decision,
what it was he said, through as extensive a reading and as literal an exegesis as possible. To
the best of my ability, I am employing with regard to him that "basic objectivity that consists
in seeing him accurately within the framework of problems contemporaneous to him and in
understanding his doctrine according to the questions to which it was actually responding".
This is precisely what seems to me to be lacking in some earlier works, and it is this above all
that I have sought to provide. But such a concern carries us far. It forces us to react against
that kind of unjust objectivity of those who can see only the outside and the fixed endings of a
work that has become distant. It also leads us very quickly to go beyond too extrinsic a
method, one by which we could at best obtain only an almost insignificant exactitude--a
betrayal worse than many misinterpretations. Many interpretations have in fact been made of
Origenian texts. But what is perhaps more regrettable is that this immense question of the
spiritual understanding of Scripture, as ancient Christian tradition envisaged it, has so often
been reduced to the narrow proportions of a debate over the number and value of certain
"spiritual meanings" hidden like riddles in certain corners of the Bible; just as it is also
regrettable that, of the whole profound doctrine elaborated by Origen on this subject, so often
only the "excesses" or the "subtleties" of his "allegories" are retained.

It is possible, without taking particular precautions, to make a "historical contribution" to the

history of a rite or an institution, indeed, with a few reservations, to that of an idea or a
dogma. It is enough to apply the customary rules. But when a spiritual synthesis, lived and
reflected within a great intellect, is at issue, what gross or subtle distortions occur in
reconstructions produced by an "objective" and "strictly historical" method! This is said, not
at all to make excuses for the weaknesses of the method, but to establish its inevitable
insufficiency. To reach the heart of a vigorous thought, nothing is as inadequate as a certain
pretension to pure objectivity. If we want to have any chance of understanding it, even as a
mere historian, it is necessary, whether we like it or not, to explain to ourselves what we read;
it is necessary to translate, to interpret. That cannot be done without risk, but this risk must be
run. Truly illuminating analysis is neither a photograph nor a material summary. It must bring
out the essence, which is nearly always implicit. It must lay open hidden categories, determine
lines of force. It must penetrate beneath the particularities of time and place to what is eternal.
This is, without doubt, a task that is always incomplete, an interpretation necessarily partial.
Every epoch, every historian, returning to the great works of the past, illuminates one aspect
of them while leaving others in shadow. In that sense, too, subjectivity is unavoidable. Yet the
work is indispensable, all the more indispensable as the thought being studied is more actually
thought. Thought is not rediscovered in the same way as a fact is reconstructed. Whether it be
from today, yesterday, or long ago, whether it offers greater or fewer difficulties of approach
to be overcome by the resources of historical science and its auxiliaries, it has an interior that
historicism is obliged to disregard. [9]

In the present case, such historicism would be doubly deceptive. For we are not at all
concerned with the work of one solitary thinker or with a problem that in no way affects us.
This work fits into a tradition that touches us ourselves. This problem--in assuredly very
different forms according to the century--has commanded the attention of all Christian
generations. In the final analysis, all have to resolve it in the same light. If, therefore, our
historical effort must not deviate into historicism, neither must our parallel effort at
objectivity deviate into objectivism. Living the same faith as Origen, members of the same
Church, afloat, so to speak, in the same stream of tradition, it would be pointless for us to
wish to behave like outside observers in everything concerning him--or concerning anyone
else in the long chain of witnesses that goes back to the apostles of Jesus. It would prohibit us
a second time from understanding him. It would deprive us of any valid principle of
discernment with which to judge him. The methodological principle put forward by Mhler
for the history of the Church is, a fortiori, true for the history of Christian thought: "We must
live the Christianity of the history to be described, and this Christianity must live in us, for
Christianity is above all a living thing, and the history of the Church is a living development."
[10]

Finally, let me add that, with texts that very often disconcert us, an extra effort becomes
necessary in order to reproduce within ourselves the movement of the spirit that once made
them come alive. An intentional sympathy, methodical docility--which are not grounds for
concluding that I am presenting Origenian exegesis as a model to be followed in every
respect. I am far from doing that. My endeavor would be misconstrued if ascribed to even a
limited or amended "anti-scientific reaction", which I am told "is prevalent currently in
spiritualist circles". I know, of course, that there is blind criticism and false science. Authentic
science itself is not everything, especially when its object is books containing the Word of
God. It is nevertheless invaluable, and I would consider harmful to the highest degree anyone
in the least inclined to contest its domain or scorn its results. I am furthermore convinced that
if it is necessary to note an insufficiency here in what concerns Origen, it is much less one of
spirit than one of technique. On the other hand, I find the distance to be as great as anyone
else does, that distance which separates us irremediably from this Alexandrian of the third
century and from his intellectual universe. The river does not flow back to its source. No more
than life itself does thought retrace its steps. Even if it wished to do so, no miracle would
allow such a dream to be realized. Yet perhaps after the long course it has just run through the
parched lands of rationalism and positivism, it will find itself more likely to be understood
and even taken in today--many signs seem to attest to this--in order to bring to life in us what
is expressed of the eternal in these forms now dead. The wells once dug by Origen have long
been covered over with sand. But the same deep layer of water is still there, which he can help
us find once again in order to quench the same thirst. [11]

ENDNOTES:

1 Dom B. Capelle, "Notes de thologie ambrosienne, 1: La Personne de Meichisdech", in

Recherches de thologie ancienne et mdivale, 1931: 183-89.
[2] Charles Freppel, Cours d'eloquence sacre 10:140.

[3] Martin, "La Critique biblique chez Origne", Annales de philosophie chrtienne
151:241ff.

[4] Ren Cadiou, La Jeunesse d'Origne (1936), p. 54.

[5] Heb 9:26. Verse cited in PA 2, 3, 5 (p. 120). Cf. CC 4, 12 (p. 282). "It will be noted",
writes Father Danilou, Origne, p. 280, "that in that long succession of centuries
(inaugurated by Origen), the one during which Christ became incarnate has a unique
importance that has no more been exhausted by the centuries-old vastness of Origen than the
unique place on earth, the site of Christ's Incarnation, has been exhausted by the discovery of
stellar vastness."

[6] See "Typologie et allegorisme", RSR 34 (1947).

[7] Bainvel, De Scriptura sacra (1910), p. 199.

[8] E. Klostermann, "Formen der exegetischen Arbeiten des Origenes", Theologische

Literatur-zeitung, October 1947, cols. 203-8.

[9] I do not think it possible to respond lightly to the reproach addressed by Karl Barth to
those who profess respect for history: "This famous respect for history," he wrote, "which,
despite the beauty of the expression, simply means that one is renouncing all serious and
respectful understanding and explanation."

[10] J.-A. Mhler, first preface to L'Unit dans l'glise. Cf. the commentary that Father de
Grandmaison gives for this passage, RSR 9 (1919): 314.
[11] I am grateful to Father Chifflot, director of ditions du Cerf, for permitting me to use for
this work my introductions to Homlies d'Origne, which appeared in the Sources chrtiennes
series.