B.

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

1. BACANI vs NACOCO
100 PHIL 468
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1956novemberdecisions.php?id=386
FACTS: Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court
in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties,
National Coconut Corporation(NACOCO), requested said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied
with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their bills for the
payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani
and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the rate of P1 per page.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts
on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was expressed that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the
stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON NACOCO may be considered as included in the term Government of the
Republic of the Philippines for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees
HELD: No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status
of being part of the government because they do not come under the classification of municipal
or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose
of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United
States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and
4, Commonwealth Act No. 518 the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from
our government.
The term Government of the Republic of the Philippines used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms
through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities
have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters.
2. PVTA vs CIR
65 SCRA 416
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_32052_1975.html

FACTS:This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare.In 1966 private respondents filed a petition
seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioners failure to pay for said
compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.

Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

HELD: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the
government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people.
RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is
irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: The growing complexities of modern
society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental
agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It
does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct
respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear
the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to
be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents
to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such
an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent
Court must be sustained.
3. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
35 PHIL 728
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1916/dec1916/gr_l-9959_1916.html

FACTS:
About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the
Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3, 1863 in the
Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of respondent, the Philippine government
directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in
instalments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to recover said amount with interest
against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to whom the relief
was intended. Defendant contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court
erred in stating that the Philippine Islands hassubrogated the Spanish government in its rights.

ISSUE:
Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the respondent?

HELD:
The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation and
that respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States. It is said that there is total abrogation of the former political relations of the
inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the case are not political
in nature. The great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continue
in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler, as such, the government has the authority
to file a suit in behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae.
4. CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/sep1945/gr_l-5_1945.html

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by
General MacArthur that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and
jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission,
and in the laws they administered and enforced.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts during a de facto government are good and valid.
2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments and
judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation.
3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue
those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were reestablished in the Islands.

HELD:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International
Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the
enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the
right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a
conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either
change the existing laws or make new ones.
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has
been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an
invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts
done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done,
to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts
done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain
good.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a
political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur
on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the
governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not
have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to the
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes
of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands
during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the
Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it
was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes,
in violation of said principles of international law.
3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does
not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states
that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in
force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. And Taylor in this connection says: From a theoretical point of view it may be said
that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms
of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to
continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this
practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not
be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and
the government established by the occupant of transient character.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that
the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As
Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that
which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force,
and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and
content.
Anuncios
5. People vs Gozo
53 SCRA 476
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1973/oct1973/gr_36409_1973.html

FACTS:LoretaGozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation
which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without
acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then
charged by the City Engineers Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to
secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has
no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign
country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains
not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement).
Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.
6. LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1947/jan1947/gr_l-409_1947.html

FACTS:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered
to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He filed a petition for habeas corpus
contending that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was
suspended at that time and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:
WON the absolute allegiance of the citizens was suspended duringJapanese occupation (NO)

HELD:
A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. The
absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory, occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is NOT abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier.

Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was
suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government,
there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What
happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of
the Philippines. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because
it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
7. RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1946/aug1946/gr_l-533_1946.html

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on
December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor
Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo
Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents
be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground
that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.

ISSUES:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?

HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo
Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United
States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground
that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that National
Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. The petitioners are in error for courts
martial are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition
thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.