PS 284 Paper (Final) - Cortez

PS 284
Seminar: International Organizations

Dr. Sylvano D. Mahiwo
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Intergovernmentalism

Creating Regional Cooperative Architecture in Asia
Danilo S. Cortez, Jr.
This seminar paper titled “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Intergovernmentalism creating Regional Cooperative Architecture in Asia”
emphasizes the significant features of intergovermentalism in the context of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) contributing to the evolution of a new
regional cooperative framework in Asian region, and Eurasia as well. Firstly, this
paper discusses the historical developments that led to the establishment of the
SCO. It also underscores the significant features of intergovermentalism in the
context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Highlighting
intergovernmentalism as the theoretical basis of this academic study further
characterizes the nature, goals, structure, operations and other features of SCO.
Moreover, this study examines policies, activities and interstate affairs, both
internal and external spectrum by mainly focusing on the politico-security issues
and cooperation initiatives of the member-states of SCO vis-à-vis global politics
and other perplexing contemporary challenges and developments in the
international arena. Lastly, the paper explores new directions and prospective
interfacing mechanisms towards greater Asian/Eurasian regional cooperation
and integration by relating Philippines and ASEAN to Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
INTRODUCTION
There is a clear trend in the 21st century for regional organizations to flourish, to
become more multi-functional and to devote themselves in addressing the challenges of
globalizing world, as well as other transnational issues of security and developments.
Given this backdrop, this article focuses on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
being a regional organization geopolitically positioned in Eurasia. In general, it seeks to
study the relevance and responsiveness of the SCO as a model (icon) and/or inspiration
for regional integration and international cooperation. It is interesting, though, to begin by
narrating the historical development of the SCO. This will allow us to know more about this
1| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Intergovernmentalism
Creating Regional Cooperative Architecture in
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organization and to examine issues/concerns that triggered the formation of this regional
organization.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a permanent intergovernmental
international organization. The creation of which was proclaimed on 15 June 2001 in
Shanghai (China) by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of
Uzbekistan. Its prototype is the Shanghai Five Mechanism.
For centuries, Central Asia has been the contested frontier of world empires.
Mongol, Chinese, Russian, and British empire-builders have all at various points contested
to influence or establish outright political control over the region. In the 20th century, both
Soviet and PRC regimes established firm control over their slices of the region. These new
empires drew political boundaries, stamped out much of local culture, and tried to integrate
Central Asian people into the culture of these new empires. While Central Asia was the
frontier of two of the biggest world powers of the 20th century, strong-armed Communist
rule on both sides assured that it was anything but contested (Security Council Simulation
at Yale).
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 threatened to change that. New Central Asian
states emerged almost overnight from defunct Soviet Republics. The potential for these
newly independent states to destabilize the region immediately became of great concern
to China. Thus, the Chinese acted quickly to negotiate a series of border agreements with
four of these new states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan) in November 1992
(Weitz: 104).
On 26 April 1996, the Shanghai Five grouping was originally formed when the
heads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China at the summit talks in
Shanghai signed the Agreement on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions. This
gathering was later named as the first summit meeting of “Shanghai Five” as the
predecessor of the SCO. On 24 April 1997, the heads of the Shanghai Five signed the
Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Regions in the

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second summit occurred in Moscow, Russia. Subsequently, the Shanghai group
conducted their annual summits held in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in 1998, in Bishkek
(Kyrgyzstan) in 1999, and in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2000.
As the Shanghai Five continued to meet and reach formal agreements through the
end of the 1990s, the Five decided to further institutionalize their interactions. On 15 June
2001, the heads of state for the Shanghai Five again met in Shanghai to sign the
Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the
Shanghai convention on fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. At this same
meeting, Uzbekistan, which had previously attended some Shanghai Five meetings as an
observer, was admitted into the SCO as a full member. Praising the role played thus far by
the Shanghai Five mechanism and aiming to transform it to a higher level of cooperation,
hence, at this meeting the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was
formally declared.
Later, in July 2001, Russia and the PRC, the organization’s two leading nations,
signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, bilaterally.
The first meeting of heads of government of SCO member-states happened in
Alma-Ate on 14 September 2001. They signed the Memorandum among the
Governments of SCO Member States on Main Objectives and Directions of Regional
Economic Cooperation and also announced the creation of a mechanism of regular
meetings of heads of governments within the framework of SCO.
On 7 June 2002, at the second meeting of heads of SCO member-states which
took place in St. Peterburg, Russia. Parties signed the Charter of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which expounded on the organization’s purposes, principles, structures and
form of operation, and established it officially from the point of view of international law.
Additionally, they also initialed the Agreement on Regional Antiterrorist Structure
(RATS) and the Declaration of Heads of SCO member-states. The SCO’s Charter came
into force starting 19 September 2003.

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In a meeting of heads of governments of SCO member-states on 23 September
2003 in Beijing (China), they approved the Programme of Multilateral Trade and economic
Cooperation among SCO member-states as well as adopted the organization’s first budget
for 2004. The Programme clearly determined the main objectives and task of economic
cooperation with the SCO framework, and set a direction for the free movements of goods,
capital, services and technology inside the region during the next twenty-year period.
Besides the Heads of State Council and the Heads of Government Council, the
SCO also set up mechanisms for regular meetings on the level of speakers of parliament,
national security councils, ministries of foreign affairs (MFA Council), ministries of defense,
law enforcement agencies, ministers of economy, transportation, emergency relief, culture,
education and healthcare, heads of border agencies, prosecutor general, supreme courts
and courts of arbitration, and national coordinators (CNC).
The headquarters of the SCO Secretariat in Beijing (China) and the SCO RATS in
Tashkent (Uzbekistan) opened in January 2004.
Since the establishment of the SCO with its original six members (See Illustration
1), no new member-states have been admitted to the organization. Provisions have,
however, been made for states to have “observer” status. Mongolia was made the first
official observer state in June 2004, and India, Iran, and Pakistan were all given observer
status the following year, in the summit in Astana (Kazakhstan). Rather significantly, the
United States‟ application for SCO observer status was rejected in 2005.
Illustration 1

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Member-states of the SCO
Considering its recent security activities, there are studies which critically examine if
SCO is developing into a ‘NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] of the East’ as it was
regularly described after the anti-Western flavor of the 2005 Astana Summit. In the last
couple of years, the SCO indisputably made huge steps in intensified security cooperation,
operational (military exercises), as well as political (policy concepts). A number of events
and agreements in 2006 and 2007 indicate a cautious development of the SCO towards a
full-grown security organization (de Haas: 17).
Currently, The SCO member-states occupy a territory of around 30,189,000 square
kilometers (SCO countries [full members and observers] comprise a hefty 25% of Earth's
land area), which makes up three fifths of the Eurasia continent (See Illustration 2), and
have a combined population of 1.526 billion (SCO member-states only), which makes up a
quarter of the Planet’s population (CIA World Factbook). Furthermore, The SCO covers
one of the largest geographical areas of any regional organization, from Kaliningrad to
Vladivostok and from the White Sea to the South China Sea. If its observer states are
added, it reaches to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East as well. Its members and
observers collectively possess 17.5 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves, 47–50 per
cent of known natural gas reserves and some 45 percent of the world’s population (US
Department of Energy).
Illustration 2

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Map of member and observer states of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
Fundamentally, SCO members often refer to the underlying values of the

organization as the “Shanghai Spirit.” According to the Article 2 of the Charter of the SCO,
member-states of the SCO must adhere to the following principles:
 Mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and
inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs,
non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral
military superiority in adjacent areas;
 Equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual
understanding and respect for opinions of each of them;
 Gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;
 Peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;
 SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;
 Prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;
 Implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other
documents adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.
Above anything else, the concept of intergovernmentalism actively operates in the
state of affairs and process of regional integration of this organization. As to general
characteristic of this institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a permanent

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intergovernmental international organization. It is therefore apparent that the SCO adopts
intergovernmentalism as an alternative method of decision-making in the regional
organization, instead of supranationalism.
In its basic form, intergovernmentalism explains interstate cooperation and
especially regional integration as a function of the alignment of state interests and
preferences couple with power. That is, contrary to the expectations of neofunctionalism,
integration and cooperation are actually caused by rational self-interested states
bargaining with one another (Moravcsik, 1993). Additionally, any increase in power at
supranational level resulted from a direct decision by governments of member-states,
thus, power in international/regional organizations is possessed by the member-sates and
decisions are made by unanimity (agreements).
In the context of SCO, the organization firmly stands in support of national
sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. In line with its
guiding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states, the SCO is
structured so that the organization can do nothing without the express permission of its
member-states.
Structurally, the SCO was designed essentially as an intergovernmental network
led by annual summits and by regular meetings of the heads of government, foreign
ministers and other high officials of the member states. The SCO Charter, adopted in June
2002, lists several basic principles of international law as the foundations for the
organization, including the sovereign equality of states and the rejection of hegemony and
coercion in international affairs. It includes a statement that the SCO is ‘not directed
against other States and international organizations (SCO Charter).
Liberal democratic principles such as human rights or self-determination, which rest
at the core of organizations like NATO, are completely absent from the SCO‟s charter.
This makes the SCO attractive to its members, all of which have been criticized by the
international community for human rights violations (Bailes, Dunay, Guang, and Troitskiy,
2007: 7).

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While other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, have also stressed
noninterference in a country’s internal affairs, some fear the SCO is becoming the chief
advocate of what has been called “Eurasian Neo-Authoritarianism.” SCO members
interpret “noninterference” as immunizing them against foreign criticism of human rights
abuses within their borders. SCO members have also singled out the Internet as a security
threat and advocated its censorship (Ibid, Weitz, 109-110). The elements present in the
United Nations Charter that the SCO Charter most conspicuously omits are respect for
human rights and the self-determination of peoples. All these features can be explained
first of all as signals of reassurance being exchanged among the SCO’s members: China
and Russia grant the formal equality of the smaller ones and commit themselves, at least
on paper, not to intervene in their internal affairs without invitation. The omission of any
reference to rights of non-state actors completes the assurance of support for
authoritarian, centralizing regimes that was given already in 2001 by the organization’s
dedication to countering the ‘three evils’ of ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ (Bailes,
Baranovsky, Dunay, 2007).
In addition, SCO proclaimed its main goals as follows: (1)Strengthening mutual
confidence and good-neighborly relations among member countries; (2)Promoting their
effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as
well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other
fields; and (3)Making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in
the region, to move towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational
political and economic international order.
At this stage, the main conclusion to be drawn is that the SCO is not an
‘unprincipled’ organization in the strict sense, but one that has chosen to define its
members’ shared concepts of multilateral interaction in terms that consciously and
significantly deviate from the principles of almost all other extant regional groups, notably
on the point of disregard for human rights (Ibid).

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STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF SCO
In line with its guiding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member
states, the SCO is structured so that the organization can do nothing without the express
permission of its member-states (See Illustration 3). While individual states do invariably
exercise a great deal of influence over international organizations like the UN, supreme
power over the SCO actually rests with the heads of state of the member states.
Moreover, the three levels of command underneath the Council of Heads of State are
made up of officials representing the governments of member states: the Council of Heads
of Government, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council of National Coordinators,
respectively (Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale).
The Council of Heads of State is the top decision-making body in the SCO. This
council meets at the SCO summits, which are held each year in one of the member states'
capital cities. The current Council of Heads of State consists of:
 Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Kyrgyzstan)  Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan)

 Hu Jintao (People's Republic of China)  Dmitry Medvedev (Russia)
 Islom Karimov (Uzbekistan)  Emomalii Rahmon (Tajikistan)
The Council of Heads of Government is the second-highest council in the

organization. This council also holds annual summits, at which time members discuss
issues of multilateral cooperation. The council also approves the organization's budget.
The Council of Foreign Ministers also hold regular meetings, where they discuss
the current international situation and the SCO's interaction with other international
organizations.
As the name suggests, the Council of National Coordinators coordinates the
multilateral cooperation of member states within the framework of the SCO's charter.
Illustration 3

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The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Source: “The Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00027.html
The Secretariat of the SCO is the primary executive body of the organization. It
serves to implement organizational decisions and decrees; drafts proposed documents
(such as declarations and agendas); function as a document depository for the
organization; arranges specific activities within the SCO framework; and promotes and
disseminates information about the SCO. It is located in Beijing. The current SCO
Secretary-General is Bolat Nurgaliyev of Kazakhstan.
The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, is a permanent organ of the SCO which serves to promote cooperation of
member states against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. The Head
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of RATS is elected to a three-year term. Each member state also sends a permanent
representative to RATS.
The official decision-making process laid out in Article 16 of the SCO Charter also
maximizes the rights of member-states to take whatever action they choose to take.
Officially, decisions are taken purely on consensus without vote. If there is a proposal for a
“project of cooperation” in which one or several member-states do not want to take a part,
states in favor of the proposal can enter into the project and cannot prevent other member-
states from joining in at a later time (SCO Charter).
The two working bodies of the SCO that are not composed primarily of government
officials of the member-states are the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure
(RATS). The SCO Secretariat is located in Beijing and is very similar to the Secretariat of
any other international organization: It is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
organization and it is made up of a Secretary-General and staff who are acting as
international officials reporting only to the SCO and no individual country (SCO Secretariat
in Brief, SCO website). Institutionally distinct from the Secretariat, RATS exists to help
facilitate cooperation among SCO member-states in combating “terrorism, separatism, and
extremism” (Ibid, Bailes, Dunay, Guang, and Troitskiy, 2007: 48-49).
POLICIES, ACTIVITIES, AND INTERSTATE AFFAIRS
Proceeding from the “Spirit of Shanghai”, the SCO pursues its Internal Policy
based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal rights, consultations, respect
for the diversity of cultures and aspiration towards common development. On the other
hand, SCO conducts its External Policy in accordance with principles of non-alignment,
non-targeting anyone and openness (Brief Introduction, SCO Website).Hitherto, because
the SCO is so directly dependent on its member-states for direction, understanding the

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interest of the individual SCO members is especially essential to understanding the
organization as a whole. This has brought vastly differing perspectives and expectations,
as by-product of different national interests of member-states and observer states of the
SCO.
China
China has consistently been a driving force behind the development of the
SCO. The idea of the “Shanghai Sprit” and many of the other underlying ideas embodied
in the core documents of the SCO came from Chinese president Jiang Zemin. Since the
SCO’s founding, the Chinese have pushed for better institutionalization of the SCO and
given substantial support for many SCO projects. China’s active support of a multilateral
organization like the SCO contradicts the generally bilateral nature of Chinese foreign
policy (Ibid, Bailes, Dunay, Guang, and Troitskiy, 2007: 48-49). While there has been
much speculation about the interests China is pursuing through the SCO, three general
Chinese objectives are put forward by most analysts: 1.) Ensuring the security of sensitive
multiethnic border regions; 2.) Building a regional economic and military sphere of
influence; and 3.) Countering U.S. and Western influence in the Central Asian region and
in the rest of the world (Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale).
Russia
While China is strengthening its influence around the world, Russia is struggling to
maintain its status as a major player in the current geopolitical framework. No longer able
to challenge the U.S. in its own right, Russia would much prefer a multipolar world to one
in which the United States is the sole dominating force (Ibid, Security Council Simulation at
Yale). Russia also views the SCO as having a key role to play in its diplomatic

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relationships with its neighbors. First and foremost, the SCO helps Russia regulate the
uneasy mix of cooperation, competition, and power balance that has characterized its
relations with China. The SCO also functions as another link tying Russia with the former-
Soviet Central Asian nations. Russia already plays a commanding role in institutions, such
as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic
Community (EURASEC), of which the Central Asian states are members. The SCO simply
adds to Russia‟s portfolio of forums it can use to exercise soft power leverage over these
states and alleviate regional tensions. (Ibid, Bailes, Dunay, Guang, and Troitskiy, 2007:
14).
Central Asian States

The foreign policy of the Central Asian member-states of the SCO (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) consists largely of playing Russia, China, and the
United States off of one-another. All of these states share the Soviet legacy with Russia,
meaning that they have everything in common from Russian as a lingua franca to the
kleptocracy and authoritarian governments. Despite the close relationship that the Central
Asian states have with Russia, Central Asian states are sure to keep Russia at an arm’s
length, particularly in light of its very aggressive dealings with its other neighbors. (Ibid, 14)
The SCO is very much a piece of this strategic balancing act, promoting peaceful
and stable relations between Russia and China, providing a forum to discuss regional
issues, and giving Central Asian states an institutional connection to larger, wealthier
allies. (Ibid, Weitz: 113)
Observer States
Observer status confers the right to be represented at all higher-level meetings of
the SCO. The current list of Observer States (Mongolia, India, Iran, Pakistan) represents a
wide range of interests, but they are all interested in the opening up of trade across

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Central Asia and joint approaches to trans-Asian energy delivery and infrastructure.
Currently, it does not appear that the full members will allow any observers to become full
members in the immediate future (of all the observer states, Iran is pushing the most to
obtain full membership), and it is likely that some observer states would be nervous about
getting too close to the SCO. Nonetheless, the potential benefits (economic and other) that
could come from being in the SCO are such that observer states are monitoring the
situation closely.
Security Cooperation
Although it does not have the conventional warfare capabilities of a collective

security apparatus like NATO, the SCO has held increasingly large and ambitious joint
military exercises since the SCO‟s founding. This has been one of the most highly
publicized aspects of the organization around the world and certainly indicates that SCO
nations are become closer allies. It is not entirely clear, however, what this means about
the direction of the organization. On the one hand, China would almost certainly support
an expanded collective security apparatus under the SCO. Considering Russia’s
aforementioned control of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, though, it may not
see the need to create an SCO security apparatus in which it will have to share the
commanding role with China. Joint military exercises have taken place between the SCO
and the CSTO, most recently the “Peaceful Mission Rubezh-2007,” which could be a
model for a future larger security apparatus. (Xinhua.net)
Grigory Logninov claimed in April 2006 that the SCO has no plans to become a
military bloc; nonetheless he argued that the increased threats of "terrorism, extremism
and separatism" make necessary a full-scale involvement of armed forces. There have
been a number of SCO joint military exercises. The first of these was held in 2003, with
the first phase taking place in Kazakhstan and the second in China.

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Economic and Socio-Cultural Cooperation
SCO members have also reached some agreements in areas not related to
security. In late 2005, member states agreed on mutual assistance to manage the
consequences of natural disasters and other emergencies. The various national
emergency management agencies of SCO members are now developing ways to enhance
this cooperation (Ibid, Weitz: 106). In addition, there have been some developments in the
form of general agreements favoring free trade, mutual investment, and other economic
cooperation.
A Framework Agreement to enhance economic cooperation was signed by the
SCO member states on 23 September 2003. At the same meeting the PRC's Premier,
Wen Jiabao, proposed a long-term objective to establish a free trade area in the SCO,
while other more immediate measures would be taken to improve the flow of goods in the
region. A follow up plan with 100 specific actions was signed one year later, on September
23, 2004. On 26 October 2005, the Moscow Summit of the SCO, the Secretary General of
the Organization said that the SCO will prioritize joint energy projects; such will include the
oil and gas sector, the exploration of new hydrocarbon reserves, and joint use of water
resources. The creation of an Inter-bank SCO Council was also agreed upon at that
summit in order to fund future joint projects. The first meeting of the SCO Interbank
Association was held in Beijing on 21-22 February 2006. On 30 November 2006, at The
SCO: Results and Perspectives, an international conference held in Almaty, the
representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia is developing plans
for an SCO "Energy Club". The need for this "club" was reiterated by Moscow at an SCO
summit in November 2007. Other SCO members, however, have not committed
themselves to the idea
Cultural cooperation also occurs in the SCO framework. Culture ministers of the
SCO met for the first time in Beijing on 12 April 2002, signing a joint statement for
continued cooperation. The third meeting of the Culture Ministers took place in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, on 27-28 April 2006.

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External Policy Coordination
As shown by declaration and actual policy, the SCO further aspires to coordinate
foreign policy and to become an actor on the international arena. According to the SCO
Charter, the aim is to search for common positions on foreign policy issues of common
interest, to maintain relations with other states and international organizations and to
cooperate for the prevention of international conflicts (Oldberg: 17)
In line with the ambition to establish itself as an international actor, the SCO in
2004-2005 established contacts with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
its EURASEC (Eurasian Economic Community) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty
Organization), with the ASEAN, the OSCE, and the EU. It also got observer status at the
UN. The SCO evinced a special interest in the developments in Afghanistan, e.g. by
creating a special contact group of Afghanistan, reportedly to supports its anti-drug efforts
and stabilize the socio-economic situation. In February 2006, it held the first meeting with
Afghan officials, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai met the SCO secretary-general at
the 2006 summit in Shanghai (Interview of SCPO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliev, SCO
Website)
However, with regard to domestic policy, there is an anti-Western and anti-US edge
to this proclaimed foreign policy. The United States have been denied observer status in
the organization (Maksutov, 2006). The Shanghai Five already upheld the Russian
position concerning the war in terrorism in Chechnya and China’s right to reunification with
Taiwan (Plater-Zyberk, 2007). As mentioned, the 2005 summit asked for a deadline for the
presence of the US-led coalition forces in Central Asia. The SCO contacts with
Afghanistan can be seen as reflecting an ambition to show an alternative to Western policy
there. Likewise, the military cooperation and antiterrorist exercises among the SCO states
serve to preclude such cooperation with the West. Concerning the Central Asian nuclear-
free zone mentioned above, it is noteworthy that the three Western nuclear powers did not

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pledge to respect it as they usually do in the United Nations, because the treaty text of the
states collective security treaty with Russia. This was seen as a loophole allowing Russia
to transport nuclear weapons across the countries (Reuter: Steen, dated 8 September
2006)
Further evidence of bias can be found in the SCO summit declaration of 2006,
which praised the increasing multipolarization in the world and the establishment of a new
international order. It held the United Nations to be the most authoritative international
organization and called for a Security Council reform with a more equitable distribution of
seats. The declaration also advocated a new global security architecture of mutual trust
and benefit, equality and respect base on international law, while “double standards” were
disregarded. This sounded very much like official Russian and Chinese criticism of
Western, especially US policy (Ibid, Oldberg: 18)
Some obstacles to the further development of the SCO
There are still obstacles to the further development of the SCO. Despite the SCO’s
uniting influence, questionable bilateral relations between a number of member states
stand as a stumbling block for the future of the organization. For all the excitement that
surrounds China’s growth and increasing power, even among SCO states there is still a
great deal of distrust felt towards China. Most significantly, perhaps is China’s relationship
with the two largest member-states of the SCO: Russia and India (Ibid, Security Council
Simulation at Yale). Additionally, despite widespread speculation surrounding the SCO,
the U.S. ultimately still has more comprehensive bilateral ties with Russia, China, India
than any of them have with each other (Pant: 52).
As to the opposing interests of participating states, although the SCO has
succeeded in finding some key areas for cooperation between its member states, there is
anything but uniformity of opinion on a wide spectrum of economic and security-related
issues. Among the two largest of these issues are the U.S. Military Presence in Central
Asia and Energy Cooperation (Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale).
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With regard to structural problems, as an organization, the SCO lies somewhere
between a loose forum and a structured alliance. Boasting itself as an ambitious
organization that seeks to be actively engaged in political, security, economic, and social
arenas, the progress it has made has varied widely across different issues. Much of this
problem can be attributed to fundamental issues in the structure of the SCO (Zhao, 2006:
115). This organizational problem is caused by political culture or by the attribute of
governments in SCO member-states. The point is that the SCO Secretariat exists, but it
decides nothing. It is not clear at all what it is engaged in. The real executive management
of the SCO is carried out by the Council of National Coordinators, in other words, by the
Foreign Affairs Ministries of SCO member countries. Juxtaposing with experiences of
United Nations and European Union, bureaucratic organization in order to function
efficiently, should present a bureaucratic unit that has decision-making capacity. The SCO
is not a unit of this kind. The SCO Secretariat does not have the opportunity to decide
anything without coordination with the Council of National Coordinators and the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs of each state, respectively.
Lacking a permanent inter-parliamentary body like NATO’s North Atlantic Council,
the SCO has difficulty in reconciling differences among members and enforcing the
implementation of agreements in a structured format. Although, there have been many
discussions and documents produced by the SCO regarding economic cooperation,
almost nothing has been implemented and very few programs even require the SCO's
existence to be implemented (Lukin, 2007: 144-145).
On the other hand, in the Asia-Pacific Security Survey 2008 Report, SCO was
recognized as an effective regional institution, both for building sense of community and
mechanism for practical cooperation (See Illustration 4), next to ASEAN and ASEAN-
centered institution - ASEAN-Plus-Three. It emerged as the Top 3 clear winner as builder
of a sense of community. SCO itself obtained the 3rd highest rating, followed by the
ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, United Nations, etc. On the dimension of Practical
Cooperation, the analysts also gave “effective” ratings to SCO. Thus, it appears that this

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organization has moved up in the esteem of security analysts between the 2007 and 2008
surveys, into the “generally effective” as a mechanism for practical cooperation. Indeed,
this suggests that after short years of existence since its creation,” SCO has gained
recognition from regional security analysts as an organization that can have a practical
effect – coordinating policies and actions by its members. Given this backdrop, the SCO
as a regional organization is on the right track (Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008).
Illustration 4
Effectiveness of Regional Institutions

Source: Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008, Report by Richard W.
Baker and Galen W. Fox. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2008.
p.28

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In the ultimate analysis, regionalism and community building in Eurasia through the
SCO while applying its own strategic approach to regional integration and/or alliance may
steer the organization and its community in the right direction. Accordingly, the important
concern is for the participating nation-states to live up to the agreements they made and to
advance the common aims and ambitions of the organization.
Relating Philippines and ASEAN to SCO: Options and Outlook
The strong ties between the Philippines and its Southeast Asian neighbors, form an
important staging ground for greater regional cooperation not only with Asian regional
powers like China, Japan, and Korea; but also with other regional organizations like
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as prospective add up to its relations with the world,
that is not only confined with western powers. Through multilateral fora and inter-regional
mechanisms, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the SCO may perhaps
endeavor to promote greater interaction among politico-security, economic and socio-
cultural spectrum. This will pave the way for closer connection with Asian neighbors and
countries in Eurasia towards strengthening and deepening strategic partnership on all
fronts. ASEAN and SCO, through frequent and growing interaction, will develop a solid
relationship that serves as constructive element in strengthening community-building in
Asian/Eurasian Region, moving ahead for peace, stability and prosperity in the continent.
ASEAN, in strong collaboration with SCO, can make a significant contribution to
international peace and stability by promoting confidence-building measures among
member states. Thus, may result to easing of tensions on the way to peaceful settlement
of disputes/conflict resolution, addressing the South China Sea issue and resolving other
border issues.
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Both sides may possibly strengthen cooperation towards Politico-Security
Synchronization through Defense Cooperation addressing security threats, especially non-
traditional security concerns such as: Terrorism and Transnational Crimes; Maritime
Security; Drug Trafficking; Arms Smuggling; Human Trafficking (children and women);
Addressing Environmental Degradation, Environmental Protection and Disaster
Management; Addressing Infectious Diseases (SARS, HIV-AIDS and Avian Influenza)
among others. This will include capacity-building measures to strengthen region’s capacity
to deal with these challenges. Along this line, ASEAN, through ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), is the only regional organization in Asia that provides a political forum where Asian
countries and the world powers can discuss and consider problems about security,
political issues and military concerns. With the active involvement of SCO, qualitative and
quantitative positive results will be achieved.
ASEAN’s alliance with emerging global powers and existing regional power will
reinforce economic cooperation (Narrowing the Development Gap). This will bring about
increase in foreign trade and investments, improve international tourism, establish energy
cooperation, agricultural cooperation as well. For the Philippines, such strong economic
strategic partnership will provide market for Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and
promote international mobility and Recognition of Filipino professionals, among others.
With the formation of a new regional and global partnership, people-to-people ties
will also improve, bringing the region closer together. ASEAN and SCO could work
together in building connections amongst the communities in the region, through
exchanges at various levels and in different fields, (i.e. Education Network and other
People-to-People Exchanges). Promoting greater socio-cultural awareness and
understanding, preserving rich and diverse heritage as part and parcel of creating a
harmonious regional community of nations where people can live in peace and prosperity.
In general, bilateral regional cooperation and integration can help maximize the
benefits of globalization, while reducing its risks. This serves as one component of a larger
political effort to deepen economic relations with neighboring countries. It will also create

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opportunities to expand foreign relations through joint action to overcome institutional as
well as policy barriers to international trade/investments, security cooperation and people-
to-people interactions. Likewise, such arrangement will form cornerstones of larger
economic, as well as politico-security and socio-cultural efforts to increase regional
cooperation.
Applying the Metanation State Interface
Sylvano Mahiwo’s Metanation State Interface (Mahiwo, 2007) can be considered

as a germane reference point for the study of interaction and dynamics of relationship
among nation states and international regional organizations. The concept of Metanation
state relations posits the proposition that inter-nation state connections has been evolving
and shifting from the conventional mono-channel mode of exchanges and interchange to a
multi-strata, multi-channeled structure and mode of interflow not only between and among
nation states, but even regional and sub-regional organizations (see illustration 5).
Against this backdrop, international exchanges and interactions are traversing from
passive to a more active position (from limited and selective engagement to
comprehensive involvement) wherein multilateral and bilateral relations among nation
states/regional organizations proliferate in a multi-level avenue, in multi-actor involvement,
and in multi-dimensional dynamics. This process begins with economic interactions
moving towards political, security, social and cultural engagements. Hitherto, Metanation
State Concept still retains the nation state as the core and central foundation of
international relations from which most if not all interactions radiate, thus,
intergovernmentalism vigorously facilitates all interactions (Ibid).
Illustration 5
Metanation State Interface (Mahiwo)

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According to Mahiwo, bilateral and multilateral relations are analyzed, as they

emerge in multi-level venue, in multi-player participation and in multi-dimensional
dynamics (Ibid). Anent to this, scales/levels of Metanation State Interface in the context of
Philippines, ASEAN, BIMP-EAGA and SCO relationships are explored and analyzed. This
Metanation State Paradigm illustrates the levels and channels through which interface
occur between and among entities in regional and global interactions. In particular, the
cobweb of interactions between states and regions presents different interfacing
relationships between and among states and regional groupings in Asia/Eurasia, along
these lines:
(1) nation state to nation state strata of interaction

a) Bilateral Relations of the Philippines with China
b) Bilateral Relations of the Philippines with Russia
c) Bilateral Relations of the Philippines with other SCO member states
and observer, individually.
(2) nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

a) RP relations with SCO
b) Hybrid Relations between a Regional Organization and
a Great Power
 ASEAN relations with China
 ASEAN relations with Russia

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c) ASEAN relations with other SCO member states and observer,
individually.
(3) sub regional extra-nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines – East ASEAN
Growth Area or BIMP-EAGA relations with SCO
(4) extra-nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

(Inter-Regionalism)
ASEAN-SCO Relations
Indeed, in the imperfect Asian region, and Eurasia as well, a multi-phased approach
toward a Pan-Asia or Pan-Eurasia international cooperation is the right process. As
regards the future shape of international cooperation and eventual integration in Asia-
Pacific and Eurasia, it is probable to achieve consolidation and expansion of regional/sub-
regional groupings into a more cohesive arrangement. In this light, the establishment of
harmonized principles and foreign policies will pave the way for a greater regional politico-
security, economic, and socio-cultural connections to include broader areas of
international cooperation and integration (see table 1).

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The above table shows the prospective development stages of regional cooperation
and integration in Asia-Pacific and Eurasia. The future shape of international connections
posits the evolutionary process of a more cohesive regional arrangement. Specifically,
Stage 1 pointed out the 10 member-states of ASEAN, which is expected to happen in
immediate future (by 2015). Then, Stage 2 integrated the three major dialogue partners of
ASEAN namely China, Japan and Korea in the context of ASEAN+3. Thereafter, Stage 3
included other dialogue partners of ASEAN such as Russia, India, Australia, and New
Zealand. Finally, Stage 4 holistically integrated other nation-states in Asia and Eurasia,
namely: Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran, North Korea, and the Central Asian Countries

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(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), thus, creating a Pan-Asia Pacific
Eurasian regional integration.
CONCLUSION
Pluralistic Phenomenon of Regional and International Organizations can possibly

lead to Continent-wide Asian Cooperation and Integration through Inter-Regionalism
between SCO and ASEAN. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has potentials for
active participation and facilitation for Greater Asian/Eurasian cooperation and
amalgamation creating a new regional cooperative architecture in Asia. Through
intergovernmentalism, relationship among nation-states will be effectively managed and
be more prepared for greater regional cooperation and integration. At this time, the
progression of regional integration is at a slow pace, albeit gradually moving towards the
achievement of a cohesive ASEAN Community; subsequently, of an East Asian
Community or a Pan-Asia Pacific Eurasian regional arrangement, in broader sense.
Nevertheless, much depends on the willingness of ASEAN to be the driver and
providing a neutral venue in the process of Asian Economic Cooperation towards eventual
integration. Likewise, SCO and ASEAN can make an important contribution to
international peace, stability and prosperity by promoting confidence-building measures
and mechanism for further cooperation at the bilateral, regional and international levels.
SCO and ASEAN should strengthen and deepen strategic partnership on all fronts with
focus on economic, political and security, social and cultural cooperation.
International synergy may serve as an avenue to achieve equilibrium in world order,
a rejoinder against hegemonic and predatory power in the international arena within there
is balance of power in the Asia-Pacific striking a balance vis-à-vis the role of the United
States, the “rising” China and India, and the “normalizing” Japan.
For the Philippines, in relating with prospective partners in international community,
it should acknowledge the role of multilateral and inter-regional organizations in promoting
common interest among different states. As a dynamic member of the ASEAN, Philippines

Asia
PS 284
should put premier importance to ASEAN Community in dealing with other nation states
(global powers) and regional organizations like the SCO, recognizing the enabling role of
regionalism to advance shared vision/aspirations of the ASEAN. Thus, more and more
Philippine foreign policy decisions must continuously be crafted in the context of the
ASEAN.
For developing countries like Philippines, international cooperation with other

regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can help motivate and
reinforce broader reform measures in domestic policy/program and contribute to a political
environment that is more conducive to mutual security, regional stability and shared
economic prosperity in the international community. Philippine Government should align its
economic and foreign policies with international framework of cooperation, thereby
creating an image of a conducive market for trade, tourism, investments, socio-cultural
harmony, peace, and stability.
Philippine Foreign policy in connection with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
should continue placing premium on cooperation and partnership towards progress and
development as an economic resiliency action amid global financial turmoil. This will pave
the way for the following: (1) more foreign investments in the Philippines; (2) more
Philippine exports to China, Russia, and other Central Asian States; (3) meeting the
energy requirements of the Philippines; (4) tourism market for the Philippines; (5) global
labor opportunities for prospective OFWs; and (5) mutual recognition of professionals and
regional mobility of natural persons, etc.
Moreover, SCO – principally China and Russia, is a promising partner of the
Philippines in combating security threats, especially non-traditional security issues.
Recognizing the fact that “Security is everybody’s business,” countries must work hand-in-
hand because nation states have only this common vision anyway – peaceful and secure
atmosphere contributing to economic prosperity.

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As a final note, Philippines must also take into account the emerging necessity to
establish new strategic partnerships, and should not only be confined in the umbrella of
western powers and their proxies in East Asian Region.
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id=96&LanguageID=2>. The principles are
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PS 284

Seminar: International Organizations

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Intergovernmentalism

Danilo S. Cortez, Jr.

This seminar paper titled “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

1| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

2| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

3| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

4| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Member-states of the SCO

5| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Map of member and observer states of the Shanghai Cooperation

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND VALUES

Fundamentally, SCO members often refer to the underlying values of the

6| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

7| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

8| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF SCO

 Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Kyrgyzstan)  Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan)

The Council of Heads of Government is the second-highest council in the

9| Page The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

10 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

POLICIES, ACTIVITIES, AND INTERSTATE AFFAIRS

11 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

12 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Central Asian States

13 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Although it does not have the conventional warfare capabilities of a collective

14 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

15 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

External Policy Coordination

16 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Some obstacles to the further development of the SCO

18 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Effectiveness of Regional Institutions

19 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Relating Philippines and ASEAN to SCO: Options and Outlook

21 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Applying the Metanation State Interface

Sylvano Mahiwo’s Metanation State Interface (Mahiwo, 2007) can be considered

Metanation State Interface (Mahiwo)

22 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

According to Mahiwo, bilateral and multilateral relations are analyzed, as they

(1) nation state to nation state strata of interaction

(2) nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

23 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

(3) sub regional extra-nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

(4) extra-nation state to extra-nation state strata of interaction

24 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

25 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Pluralistic Phenomenon of Regional and International Organizations can possibly

26 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

For developing countries like Philippines, international cooperation with other

27 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

28 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

29 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

30 | P a g e The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

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