White

Paper

Cyber Warfare - The GeoSpatial Approach

An Esri UK White Paper

Executive Summary
Information has always been the lifeblood of warfare. The
fundamental advantage of knowing more about yourself, your
environment and your adversary, than they do, is a constant.
However, recent experience highlights that this is a challenge with which UK
forces continue to struggle as the volume, velocity and variety of information
increases against an imperative to act more quickly and with more precision,
usually with diminishing resources.

1. Cyber Warfare is something which defence has always undertaken but it is a

concept that must now be considered and addressed within the defence and
government networks, across the electromagnetic spectrum, global media
and cyber holistically. Cyber warfare could be as defined as influencing target
audiences by optimising and controlling information flows whilst denying
the adversaries the ability to do the same. This document therefore seeks to
bring greater clarity and understanding of what cyber warfare includes and
what it can achieve.
2. In dealing with cyber there are three domains all of which have a geospatial
component:
a. The cognitive domain is the sphere in which human decision-making
occurs - effect is created by altering the way in which information is
perceived.
b. The virtual domain is the sphere in which intangible activity occurs, it
can be used to influence the cognitive domain by denying, altering or
manipulating information.
c. The physical domain is the sphere in which physical activity occurs
everything happens somewhere. Human geography can sit both within
this domain as well as within the other domains.
3. Offensive and/or defensive intelligence led operations activity can take
place in any of these domains in order to achieve effect and key to being
more effective in influencing the cognitive domain will require a better
understanding of human geography. Activity within the virtual domain
has increased significantly this has resulted in both greater opportunity
and increased vulnerability and therefore conducting cyber intelligence
activities within the virtual domain offers the potential for: asymmetric attack;
greater effect at less cost; more precise effects (but there is still scope for
considerable collateral damage) and better alignment with non-military
organisations. Activities in the physical domain are the traditional preserve
of military forces. However, the nature of the physical effects that may be
required is likely to change as there is the need to create effect, kinetic and
non-kinetic, within the expanded virtual domain.
4. Using cyber strategically is about exerting influence to change peoples
behaviours and attitudes and information they can be exposed to is a key
tool in achieving this with the speed, ubiquity and pervasiveness of the
worldwide media presenting a highly effective mechanism to get information
to a range of target audiences. However, these same mechanisms also result
in a risk that UKs own tactical mistakes could have significant detrimental
strategic effect. Achieving influence via this mechanism requires a better
understanding of human geography which includes geospatial information

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 2

 and intelligence, therefore needing to become more proficient at operating
in the cognitive domain. There is also a need to understand the information
that is critical to the prosecution of operations, which is not the same as
needing to know all the information about operations.
5. Defence intelligence activity must be shaped, planned and executed in
alignment with the strategic narrative as there is a need to turn the strategic
corporal to advantage and empower personnel at all levels to interact with
the outside world, thus delivering stronger and more coherent influence.
Consequently decision making must be rapid enough to plan and authorise
engagement with the media at a tempo which can counter adversaries and
therefore staff will need the appropriate capabilities e.g. capability, training
and bandwidth in order to engage rapidly via a variety of traditional and
contemporary channels, direct from the battlespace.
6. In delivering increased precision there is the requirement to synchronise
activity across the levers of power; the Confused, Congested, Cluttered and
Contested future operating environment and the increasing accuracy offered
by weapons technology, all demand greater precision in time and space.
This precision is required in the cognitive, virtual and physical domains. To
enable this there is a need to have: greater understanding of human terrain/
geography; greater understanding of the information flows through the
virtual domain; more granular and accurate intelligence information and
better meshing so that the J2/3/5 functions deliver synergistic effect. The
employment of a capability such as a geographical information system
(GIS) helps join up the dots across all staff branches. This results in a Full
Spectrum Targeting cycle with greater processing effort and less combat
engagement activity in order to achieve exponential effect. The challenge
is to conduct this processing as quickly as possible in order to support
an overall increased tempo of warfare and also to support time sensitive
targeting.
7. Successful cyber warfare is founded on the basic principles of information
assurance (IA), information management (IM) and information exploitation
(IX): IA means relying on the availability and integrity of information; IM
means knowing what information is held and the ability find it in a timely
fashion when needed and IX means exploiting information and presenting
it in a form which can then be used in direct support of operational activity.
Critical information also needs the disciplines of IA, IM and IX to produce
relevant actionable intelligence. Taking a data centric approach migrating
through an information approach to one of knowledge based is supported
using geospatial information/intelligence. The four core capabilities of cyber
warfare are intelligence, battlespace management, command and control
and full spectrum targeting defended by force protection and supported by
sustainment and service continuity. All these capabilities, but in particular
the core four, must be properly managed and integrated in order to deliver
improved effect.
8. This model of cyber warfare is akin to the Mission Thread construct which
enables better delineation of responsibilities and capability management in
the delivery of the core capabilities. Fundamental to this model is location
everything happens somewhere and therefore geography underpins cyber
warfare. This document set out to expand the concept of cyber warfare.
It is such a broad topic that it defies a neat and succinct definition but
more important perhaps, is how it needs to evolve in order to address the
emerging issues.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 3

What has changed and what is
Cyber Warfare?
Cyber Warfare is something
which defence has always
undertaken. It is not a
separate branch of warfare
which has clearly defined
physical domains, but rather
a concept that must now be
considered and addressed
within the defence and
government networks, across
the electromagnetic spectrum,
global media and cyber
holistically.
What has changed? In many respects, nothing. Information has always been
the lifeblood of warfare - the fundamental advantage of knowing more about
yourself, your environment and your adversary than they do is a constant.
However, recent experience highlights that this is a challenge with which UK
forces continue to struggle as the volume, velocity (receiving information far
quicker) and variety of information increases against an imperative to act more
quickly and with more precision, usually with diminishing resources. The world
around us is becoming more complex, requiring us to operate in environments
where there may be no clearly defined adversary, but rather complex collections
of target audiences over which we must seek to exert influence by our words and
deeds. To succeed in this environment we must understand the thoughts, beliefs
and likely behaviours of all those within the battlespace to conduct operations in
order that we can influence them in accordance with our strategic objectives.
Cyber Warfare is something which defence has always undertaken. It is not a
separate branch of warfare which has clearly defined physical domains, but
rather a concept that must now be considered and addressed within the defence
and government networks, across the electromagnetic spectrum, global media
and cyber holistically. It is a key enabler of warfare as a whole, and thus a
discipline in its own right. Cyber warfare or cyber security could be as defined as
influencing target audiences by optimising and controlling information flows
whilst denying the adversaries the ability to do the same. However, this is a
very broad definition and this document therefore seeks to bring greater clarity
and understanding of what cyber warfare includes and what it can achieve. So,
what has changed? There are a number of trends which highlight where defence
needs to do better if it is to succeed in the future 2020 contingency basis
operating environment:
UK defence is getting smaller Information is a force-multiplier. Defence
forces are continuing to shrink in capability, in terms of both people and
platforms. The overall mass is reducing and so if there is a requirement to
maintain the same momentum the same effect then there is a need to
increase speed. There are many recent historical examples of smaller forces
achieving disproportionate results where their agility has enabled them to
respond quicker, understand the situation ahead of the enemy, adapt rapidly
to the unforeseen and, ultimately, make better decisions ahead of their
adversary. There is therefore a need to become more agile, make quicker
decisions and thus operate at a faster tempo than an adversary.
Defence is engaged in a battle of narratives. Everything that defence says
and does is exposed to instantaneous global scrutiny and the information
environment is thus as much a part of the strategic environment as the
terrain or weather. Influencing an adversary, their supporters and, indeed,
the UK national audience, are key factors in any military campaign and it is
particularly challenging when UK adversaries are unfettered by the moral,
legal, hierarchical and reputational constraints under which the UK must
operate. Communication and information activities must therefore be fully
integrated with military activities to the point that must be an acceptance
Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 4

As a backdrop to all this, society
is producing and exploiting
information in ways undreamed
of five years ago and the
pace of innovation continues
unabated. These technologies
are rapidly finding their way into
the military domain and thus
the variety, velocity and volume
of information is increasing
exponentially with both our
equipment and processes
struggling to keep up. Key to
all of the above is geography
a common thread that ties all
the various factors, influencers
and events etc in time and
space. Everything happens
somewhere.
that the cyber battle is no longer necessarily subordinate to the application
of force. Defence must use cyber as a weapon in itself and consider
strategic communications and information operations at the heart of
warfighting efforts.
Defence forces are being asked to deliver greater precision. Political
imperatives resulting from an increasingly Contested, Congested, Confused
and Cluttered environment are demanding greater precision in both time
and space. Whilst developments in intelligence collection, including open
source and social media and analysis as well as weapon technology offer the
ability to achieve this, it results in a more involved targeting process which
must support the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic activities. Witness
the power of social media reporting and the need to be able to publically
rebut/confirm the information almost immediately. All this requires defence
to deal with more information more quickly and efficiently than it has done
in the past. Defence must deliver effect with greater precision in both time
and space.
Defence has become critically dependent on information. Commercial
technology is now commonplace across the military spectrum. Defence relies
on this technology in nearly everything that it does both within the business
and operational space, yet has invested little in mitigation or revisionary
methods of operation in the event of denial of service. Information and
therefore cyber is perhaps already the Centre of Gravity and therefore
needs to be defended as it is an obvious and attractive target for any
adversary. The current era sees a shift in potential targets and attack vectors
from military equipment and personnel to military and national infrastructures
such as transportation, communications, banking, logistics, markets and
healthcare. An adversary will seek to attack these areas to destabilise social
infrastructures to create disruption, discord, unrest and perhaps ultimately
to change or influence perceptions eg Eastern Ukraine. Defence needs to
better understand the information critical to the prosecution of its operations
and be wary of not letting the need for information to become its CoG
due to perhaps a mistaken belief that information superiority can only be
achieved by knowing everything about everything. Defence must protect its
information and networks more effectively.
Threats to the UKs security have changed in nature. Disease, epidemics,
natural disasters, chronic economic decline, demographic pressures, climate
change, scarce resources, government weakness, corruption and loss of
identity and nationhood continue to dominate news headlines and are the
key drivers which compromise a states security, economy, governance and
the rule of law leading to failed or failing states. The UK Government has
clearly set out its policy that the ungoverned spaces resulting from failed or
failing states lead to safe havens and fertile recruiting grounds for extremists
who, given time and freedom of action, will threaten the security and stability
of the UK. National policy therefore remains interventionist, but with an
emphasis on the stabilisation of complex situations as part of an Integrated
or Comprehensive Approach rather than the simple projection of military
power. Defence must get better at integrating actions with diplomatic
activities, other Government Departments and Non-Governmental
Organisations.
Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 5
 Cyberspace .
In order to understand how cyber might be used more effectively in a military
context, it is helpful to have a conceptual framework to explain how information
flows and how it is used this is known as cyberspace. Physical events
happen in the real world, these are then captured or reported on in some way
and transmitted as information before reaching peoples minds where that
information is processed to produce actionable intelligence amongst other
things. These three stages equate to three domains:

The cognitive domain is the sphere in which human decision-making

occurs. Here, new information is set against previously assimilated
knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense in order to gain
understanding and make appropriate decisions. Effect is created here by
altering the way in which information is perceived
.
The virtual domain is the sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such
as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information eg the internet
is part of the virtual domain. Essentially, this is how people and entities
communicate. This domain can be used to influence the cognitive domain by
denying, altering or manipulating information as it passes through the virtual
domain.

The physical domain is the sphere in which physical activity occurs

everything happens somewhere. Activity in this domain may create effect
purely through physical attrition or perhaps be used to degrade the physical
equipment which supports the virtual domain. However, physical actions eg
use of posture, presence or poise may also and can have a direct impact on
the cognitive domain. Further human geography can sit both within this
domain as well as within the other domains

Within the three domains there are specific layers of activity which can be
identified and mapped. The physical domain made up of the sea, land and air
environments, including weather and space, together with the physical networks
which transmit the data. Within the virtual domain are the various layers and
repositories of information the internet is a good example of this where
information exists in a virtual form which is completely disassociated from the
network and physical topology. The virtual domain also includes persona which
can also be mapped. For example, an individual may have a number of email
accounts, a Facebook and a Twitter account; collectively these form their virtual
persona and, in theory, all relate to the same individual. However, persona can
Figure 1 - Visualising the Information Domain
be hijacked or impersonated relatively easily which provides a vector to influence
information as it flows through the virtual domain and also identifies that this
must be a key area to be protected. Finally, people and the social groups which
they move in form the cognitive layer. This domain can also be mapped as the
others using a combination of tools such as IBM i2 ANB and Esris GIS.

Viewing cyberspace in this way within a geospatial context allows consideration

of which domain it is most appropriate to create effect both in terms of the
operational intelligence imperatives but also, critically, the overall strategic
narrative, context and effect

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 6

Operating Across Cyberspace

Consider an example where the desired effect is to prevent an opposing

commander from initiating an attack. In the physical domain, this might be
achieved by fires (artillery) activity which destroys or degrades the adversarys
C infrastructure. Within the virtual domain, a cyber-attack could deny, alter or
delay information as it is exchanged, thus either removing the commanders
key indicators and warnings or disrupting the C information flow. Finally,
placing a warship a few miles off the coast, or placing a squadron of attack
aircraft in a neighbouring country, would be a direct influence on the cognitive
domain and may persuade an adversary not to take any action. Three different
methodologies have been employed, but all lead to the same effect. It will
also be vital to evaluate other factors such as necessity, humanity, distinction
and proportionality as part of an integrated intelligence process which ensures
alignment with the overall strategy. Ultimately, a carefully synchronised
combination of all three activities might be the most effective course of action
and using geospatial information to help portray and determine likely options
and outcomes.

Operating in the Cognitive Domain

The ultimate aim is normally to exert influence in the cognitive domain ie to

achieve a change in the behaviour and attitude of a potential adversary. To
successfully orchestrate activities in the virtual and physical domains in order
to achieve this, then there is a need to fully understand the human terrain/
geography the social, political and economic organisation, beliefs and values
and forms of interaction of a population. This requires a shift in emphasis/
priorities of the intelligence cycle to understand the people first in order
to shape which courses of action might be viable in the virtual and physical
domains.

Operating in the Virtual Domain

Intelligence has always operated in all three domains, however, the level of
activity that goes on within the virtual domain has now increased significantly.
Communications between entities in the battlespace used to involve for
example, point to point radio networks so the virtual domain was limited to the
electromagnetic transmission between them. Today entities communicate using
email and chat rooms which route traffic via satellites and network operating
centres around the world. This results in multiple opportunities to disrupt or deny
information flows or perhaps modify persona. The global information revolution
is resulting in growing opportunities for both state and non-state actors to
access cyber technologies and thus act freely in the virtual domain. Thus, the
almost guaranteed integrity and availability of the virtual domain which has been
enjoyed in the past is unlikely to continue with future conflicts.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 7

However, just as intelligence has expanded into the virtual domain, so to
have adversaries. They take full advantage of the reach, speed and anonymity
offered by the virtual domain but they are often, but not always, dependent
on insecure commercial technology and so their vulnerability in this domain is
considerable. Nevertheless adversaries are becoming increasingly sophisticated
in their use of technology. Offensive activities within the virtual domain can
be rapid, initiated without warning and utilise any number of attack vectors
eg persona, networks, databases, email, chat, webpages, social media and
electromagnetic transmissions it therefore offers intelligence the opportunity
to develop asymmetric actions against an adversary ranging from ethereal
non-state actors to nation states.

Intelligence led operations within the virtual domain can also be more cost-
effective than their physical alternatives. They are certainly not without cost
significant investment is required to obtain effective capabilities that can
act within the virtual domain. However, returning to the example above and
considering the resources required to disrupt C capabilities across a wider
region, it is clear that the attack vectors using the virtual domain will require far
less resource than either the capital cost of procuring multiple warships/planes
or the costs of providing platforms and munitions capable of conducting fires.
Whilst some degree of credible force will always be needed, in a resource
constrained era together with use of precision strike to minimise collateral
damage, cyber has the potential to offer greater effect for less cost especially via
the investment in the provision of geospatial information/intelligence.

It was outlined in the introduction that the future operating environment will be
increasingly Contested, Congested, Confused and Cluttered. Whilst this will also
extend into the virtual domain, achieving greater precision of effect with less
physical collateral damage is inherently easier than operations in the physical
domain. This mechanism of achieving effect via intelligence operations is
therefore better aligned with the National Security Strategys increased focus on
Soft Power, and is also more able to support activities as part of the Integrated/
Comprehensive Approach as fires are often seen to be, at best, unpalatable and,
at worst, can be counterproductive in achieving the overall political end-state.
However, there is significant potential for collateral damage and unintended
second order effects within the virtual domain. For example, cyber activities to
disrupt power infrastructures could also affect hospitals or schools in the local
area. Thus, the potential for collateral damage as a result of virtual activities will
need to be evaluated equally as rigorously as for physical fires and hence why the
use of the geographic approach helps overcome such issues.

Operating in the Physical Domain

Ultimately, there is likely to be the requirement to create effect in the physical
domain. This is what military forces have always done typically to achieve either
physical attrition or counter command activity. However, the expanded virtual
domain and a greater understanding of the cognitive domain means that activity
in the physical domain will also need to change. The complexities of the virtual
domain offer physical opportunities to create effect network components,
transmission paths, and communication infrastructure which will have impact in
the virtual domain. Similarly, a greater understanding of how this might achieve
influence in the cognitive domain is likely to result in a number of non-traditional
physical targets which may need to be targeted more precisely both in time and
in space. This is where the power of geospatial information/intelligence utilising
for example open source (OSCINT) can have dramatic effect
Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 8
Using Cyber Strategically
Ultimately, as part of the contribution towards a political end-state, military
activity aims to achieve a change in behaviours and attitudes of one or more
target audiences ie a shift within the cognitive domain. These changes
are achieved by exerting influence on individuals that make up the target
audiences. The information that these individuals are exposed to is as a result of
a communication campaign through words, images and actions and is therefore
critical in an attempt to achieve influence.

This, in itself, is nothing new information and indeed misinformation

has always been used to exert influence. However, what has changed is
the evolution of an almost instantaneous worldwide media operating in a
globalised, interconnected world where target audiences are no longer defined
along geographic or even political boundaries. This results in a plethora of
uncontrollable communications channels which have the capacity to exert
considerable influence over both an adversary and wider target audiences such
as the broader Diasporas, NGOs, OGDs and civilian populations. An adversary
and their supporters are quick to exploit these channels and are often first to
enter the information space as procedural and organisational constraints leave
defence struggling to keep up. Information has become a strategic instrument
in its own right which can span from Main Building to the forefront of the
battlefield via middle England in an instant. It is an aspect of warfare which
is now so ubiquitous and of such import, that it must be integral to strategy,
planning and execution.

The tools to enable this are already in place. MoD Joint Action doctrine
provides a framework to integrate intelligence activities using Full Spectrum
Targeting as the means to decide which activities are most appropriate in
achieving our desired objectives; this is the key mechanism which allows the
bringing of information to the centre of intelligence led operations. Further,
within the development of intelligence led operations, geospatial information/
intelligence is rapidly becoming a foundation capability, a joint enabler upon
which other intelligence disciplines can overlay their information to synergistic
effect.

Delivering Increased Precision

The Requirement for Increased Precision

Precision can be defined as the ability to deliver the desired effect (in space and
time) with the minimum of assets while, at the same time, minimising collateral
damage. It will be essential to the successful conduct of operations in the future
2020 contingency operating environment for a number of reasons:

Precision across the Levers of Power. The levers of power must be coherent
within the strategic narrative in order to maximise their effect. In being
coherent, effects must be synchronised across all lines of activity this is, in
essence, the Integrated/Comprehensive Approach and demands precision in
time and space, which geospatial information/intelligence provides, in order
to be effective.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 9

 Precision in the Future Contingency based Operating Environment. In many
respects, traditional confrontational and attritional warfare is simple. The
future operating environment adds significantly greater complexity to the
planning and conduct of operations, exacerbated by intense global media
scrutiny that amplifies the impact of military activity both good and bad.
This Confused, Cluttered, Congested and Contested global stage demands
precise effects across the full spectrum of military, diplomatic and economic
activities against a backdrop of political zero-tolerance for any collateral
damage.

Realising the Precision offered by future Weapons. Weapons systems are

becoming ever more accurate and therefore have the potential to deliver
precise effect. If we are to be able to capitalise on these technologies, the full
spectrum targeting process, and the information and intelligence on which
it relies must therefore be of requisite, if not greater, accuracy in terms of
relevance, timeliness and precision.

Managing the increasing Volume, Velocity and Variety of information

to deliver increased Precision. The impact of 5th Generation Warfare
typified by a focus on the destruction of opponents through the domination
and disruption of cyber networks that control and manage a nations
infrastructure, manifests itself in several ways. The proliferation of diverse
information requirements, the sheer volume of that information and the
necessary speed at which it must be processed to produce intelligence
in order to make it of use to the Commander and his staff, is extremely
challenging. Improving our ability to retrieve/discover, filter, and process
information and intelligence within the complex operating environment will
enable us to operate with greater precision.

Delivering Increased Precision

The drivers outlined above indicate that increased precision will be required in
all three domains of cyberspace and for which geography provides the glue:

Precision in the Cognitive Domain is primarily achieved through a full

understanding of the Human Terrain. The complex interactions between all
the actors affected must be clearly understood. Information and intelligence
led operations and activities in the Cognitive Domain can have an extremely
damaging effect if imprecisely targeted, and the tactical, operational and
strategic aspects of the impact of any intended activity must be analysed
and considered. A full and nuanced understanding is therefore vital in
order to deliver clinical precision. Precise planning and execution based
on this expanded understanding of the human terrain has the potential
to manipulate an adversarys understanding, altering their perceptions of
their support base and reinforcing the freedom of action through ensuring
enduring support. Synchronising these activities properly can deliver
significant positive strategic effect - potentially greater than that which might
be realised from kinetic attack. Conversely, incoherent activities have the
potential to be counter-productive and extremely damaging
.
Precision in the Virtual Domain starts with a thorough understanding of the
entirety of the virtual terrain the networks, information topologies and
persona mappings utilised by all the actors involved. Assessing an adversarys

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 10

 Information Needs Analysis (their information flow requirements) will reveal
opportunities to attack within the virtual domain through a combination of
offensive activities that should include cyber.

Precision in the Physical Domain also starts with a thorough understanding

of the geospatial environments backed up by accurate intelligence
information of appropriate granularity. This must be complemented by
a Battlespace Management mechanism which also has the capacity to
operate, when appropriate, at a high level of accuracy. Precision in time is
achieved through this enhanced Shared Situational Awareness supported
by an Intelligence cycle that is appropriately and chronologically meshed
with the Battlespace Management, command and control and full spectrum
targeting cycles.

The implication of delivering increased precision in all three domains is a

change in the historical ratio of targeting to fires. Traditionally, a relatively
small amount of targeting effort supported a significant amount of military
effect which was primarily fires in the physical domain. In order to deliver
the increased precision required in all three domains, we are likely to see an
increase in the amount of targeting activity required, albeit within shorter
timescales, to support a reduced amount of military activity with less emphasis
on the physical domain.

Enabling Cyber Warfare

Having examined the scope of what cyber warfare has the potential to achieve,
how might this be enabled? The conceptual model for joint operations via joint
action demonstrates that effects are enabled by the core capabilities of C,
Battlespace Management, full spectrum targeting and intelligence, especially
geospatial intelligence all defended by force protection. Subsequent analysis
looking at agility, tempo, strategic effect and precision all highlight that effective
integrate these capabilities is critical to improving effect. It can therefore be
deduced that the four capabilities form the core of cyber warfare.

However, in turn these capabilities are dependent on three critical supporting

activities which deserve specific attention. Information Assurance, Information
Management and Information Exploitation are foundation activities which
support all aspects of cyber warfare, some of which will be geo-enabled, others
will not be. These terms are:

Information Assurance Secure and ensure the Information. This is

the bedrock on which cyber warfare depends. Not being able to rely on
information being there when needed, or its provenance cannot be trusted,
leads to failure. This area encompasses activities such as computer network
defence, user authentication, continuity planning and physical security. IA
also encompasses service management and risk management - protecting
information is important, but a balance has to be struck between protecting it
and constraining its use. Information Assurance is achieved by a combination
of training, processes and technology.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 11

 Information Management Organise the information. Information is useless
if it cannot be found or, even worse, if its existence is not known this
alludes to perhaps the issue of discovery and searching for information. The
electronic storage of documents means that everybody has a responsibility
to ensure that the right information is stored in the right place with the
relevant metadata, the use of a geodatawarehouse is a key component in this
storage and retrieval issue. However, whilst Information Management tools
can help in dealing with the increasing volumes of information, this activity
must be enforced by a combination of training and discipline focused on IM
for operations. Information Management is achieved by a combination of
training, discipline, leadership, careful planning, processes and tools
.
Information Exploitation Turn Information into actionable Intelligence.
Information without context is data; context and assessment derives
intelligence. At JFIG for example, most analysts are conducting information
exploitation and generate Intelligence on a continual basis. This might
involve complex applications help analyse a plethora of data sources, or
it might be as simple as generating a graph from a table of information.
Information exploitation is therefore something which is performed at various
levels using a disparate variety of tools that range from the simple to the
complex and geographical information systems (GIS) are a core component.
In many cases this therefore requires career specialists in order to be able
to both understand the context and process the information successfully.
The particular slant or type of intelligence required will vary and successful
information exploitation is therefore output driven ie the method of
exploitation must be derived from the nature of intelligence that is required.
Information Exploitation is achieved by a combination of correctly trained
specialists, training for all personnel within the force, processes and tools -
all driven by strong leadership and the culture of mission command.

It can therefore be concluded that cyber warfare depends upon information

assurance, information management, information exploitation and service
continuity supporting command and control, battlespace management,
intelligence, full spectrum targeting, force protection and sustainment.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 12

Figure 2 - The Components of Cyber Warfare

The set of capabilities which are derived are in effect, a set of Mission Threads.
The relationship between these capabilities and military activities ie Joint Action
is shown in Figure 2 above. The arch construct shows that all mission threads
are dependent on IA, IM and IX but are also reliant upon each other in order to
maintain overall integrity remove one component and the arch collapses. This
concept, which is the subject of ongoing UK doctrinal development for Joint and
Coalition use, has been developed and proven on complex coalition operations
in Afghanistan. A key feature of mission threads is that they are championed
from within the J3/5 community supported by a technical lead within the J6
cadre and subject matter expertise from branch specialists such as J2 they thus
have operational provenance and are not a specific technical capability, service
or process.

The mission thread construct also enables more effective capability

management across all the Defence Lines of Development (DLODs) as
each thread can be broken down into a set of core operational services and
supporting enabling services which consists of a combination of people,
equipment, organisation and process elements. Thus, a clear link can be made
between capability and military effect.

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 13

Conclusions
This paper set out to expand the concept of cyber warfare and how geography and the geographic approach is
germane to the topic. The use of geography is both key to organising and structuring information as well as in its use
to help derive analysis within all three domains, underpinning situational awareness, developing options and driving
outcomes. Cyber warfare is a broad topic that defies a neat and succinct definition but more important perhaps, is
how it needs to evolve in order to address the emerging issues identified in the introduction. Therefore cyber warfare
is described in terms of what it is about and what it could achieve:

Cyber warfare is about ...
increasing our ability and
propensity to operate in the virtual
domain
enabling greater agility and tempo
operating effectively in the
strategic information environment
being more precise in space and
time
understanding and defending our
own information
... which leads to ...
actions which are more appropriate
to the future operating environment
(Congested, Cluttered, Confused and
Contested)
the ability to achieve more with less
alignment with the national security
strategy aspiration to use more soft
power
the potential to conduct asymmetric
warfare of own actions which are more
likely to be aligned with and part of an
Integrated Approach
more opportunities to create effect as
our adversaries become increasingly
dependent on the virtual domain
faster, more accurate decisions
a tempo of operations which overwhelms
the adversary, getting inside his OODA
loop
influence at the centre of intelligence
activities
intelligence activity which is coherent with
the strategic narrative
personnel at all levels who understand
the strategic narrative and thus shape
their actions accordingly
quicker and more effective interaction
with non-defence audiences in order to
achieve influence
less collateral damage
more effective fires
activity in the cognitive and virtual
domains which is more appropriate in the
future operating environment
better synchronisation of effects so
more effective
ability to exploit more accurate weapon
systems
freedom of action at all times
assured C
and requires
a better understanding of the cognitive domain
and the associated human terrain
a change in mindset to consider the virtual domain
as a primary area of warfare
full consideration of information activities as part
of the estimate and targeting process
appropriate tools and equipment to influence and
exploit the virtual domain
intelligence tools and analysis which reflect our
focus on the virtual and cognitive domains
utilising the geographic approach
Situational Tools which support geospatial and
non-geospatial representations
Decision Superiority
Information Superiority
A decision making process where BM, Int and C
are fully meshed and integrated
better understanding of the human terrain
a strategic narrative
consideration of the strategic narrative in all
aspects of planning
delegation of authority to engage with the media
to the lowest levels
appropriate tools to interact with the media and
target audiences
more intensive targeting cycle requiring more
accurate and timely intelligence
more timely and accurate BM and Int functions
which are properly meshed with the targeting
cycle (J2-3-5 integration)
better understanding of the human terrain (all
actors)
better understanding of the information flows
through the virtual domain (all actors)
assured communications channels
understanding of the vulnerability of operating in
the virtual domain
more robust procedures for ensuring persona are
valid
fallback equipment, networks and procedures

Cyber Warfare - The Geospatial Approach 14

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