Lagman vs. Ochoa full text ruling!
President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the
Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body
of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President
may create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed32 since
there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that
authorizes the President to create a truth commission.33 He adds
that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot
serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize,"
"transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as it
vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of
the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity
thereof.35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the
creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and
not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that
the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section
31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the
President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2)
is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the
Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the
internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of
functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.36 Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive
Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated
authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about
the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth
commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past
presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create
public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been
recognized.37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the
other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority
to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of
its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but
an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under
Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article
VII of the Constitution.39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power
to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure
that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his
department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly
the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of his officials.40 The power of the
control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends
further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to
discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication
and licensing purposes42 and in order to be informed on matters
which he is entitled to know.43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it
was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department in line with his
constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily
includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may
create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the
reported large scale graft and corruption in the government.45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation
of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as
expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section
31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following
functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers
to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These
point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of
an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of
the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in
the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an
"alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part
of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment
of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,46
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does
not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of
the power that which constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of
other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines
of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the
Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power
of control is entirely different from the power to create public
offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent
duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations,
and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to
Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several
cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster
on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the
creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power
in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws
in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark
case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative,
executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power"
is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as
well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative
charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for
the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it
was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that
all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be
revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano
Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.
There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is
not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of

Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office,
suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,
"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations,
there is no impropriety in the funding.