Spinozas Liberalism

While Spinozas political philosophy is often described as liberal, it is not always clear what this

label means or whether it is warranted. Commentators who refer to Spinoza as liberal generally

do not intend to claim that he upholds the collection of views now identified as political

liberalism. This would be anachronistic, since this way of classifying political theories did not

emerge until the nineteenth-century (Merquior 2), and plainly false, since no seventeenth-century

philosopher defended what have become minimal requirements for liberalism today, such as

universal suffrage. Rather, calling Spinoza liberal implies that he belongs to a historical tradition

of political philosophers, who formulated and defended claims, which later became identified as

central to political liberalism. This explains why the question of Spinozas liberalism is

important: it asks us to clarify the relationship between Spinozas political philosophy and one of

the most important political developments of our time.

Given what it means to call Spinoza a liberal, it follows that whether and how Spinoza

qualifies as liberal depends on how one understands liberalism today, which is a contested issue.

It also follows that Spinoza may be liberal in one sense and illiberal in another, for he could

uphold some commitments which are important to the development of liberalism while rejecting

others. Consequently, we should not expect the question of Spinozas liberalism to admit a

single, univocal answer. Rather, specifying how Spinoza is or is not liberal means articulating the

complex ways that Spinozas politics anticipates and suggests, but also resists and excludes the

variety of claims associatedrightly or wronglywith liberalism. This paper aims, first, to

provide an overview of the ways that Spinozas philosophy has been explicitly connected to

liberalism. Due to considerations of length, the paper does not consider how we ought to

understand liberalism and, consequently, does not take a stand on whether the various

interpretations of Spinozas liberalism properly conceive of liberalism. The paper aims, second,
to move the debate forward by pointing out an important and overlooked way that Spinoza resists

a view commonly associated with liberalism. In doing so, I do not intend to cast doubt on the

value or historical significance of Spinozas politics, since it merits interest not only for

anticipating liberalism, but also for calling into question and offering alternatives to liberalism.

I. The Main Debate: Valuing Freedom

Liberalism is most commonly characterized as asserting the political value of individual

liberty (Gaus and Courtland), a commitment which became increasingly important during the

early modern period.i In this vein, Spinoza is most frequently described as a liberal because his

politics emphasizes the value of freedom by arguing that states should protect freedom of thought

and speech (Smith, Jewish Identity 23; Feuer 65, 83; West 290; Strauss 16; Steinberg, Curious

Defense 210, 230).

If no man, then, can give up his freedom to judge and think as he pleases, and

everyone is by absolute natural right the master of his own thoughts, it follows

that utter failure will attend any attempt in a commonwealth to force men to

speak only as prescribed by the sovereign despite their different and opposing

opinions. Therefore the most tyrannical government will be one where the

individual is denied the freedom to express and to communicate to others what he

thinks. (TTP 20, 567)ii

Spinozas argument here is based on two of his most famous political claims. The first is that

the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom (TTP 20, 567). What Spinoza means by this is

that people agree to the covenant for the sake of promoting their freedom. It follows that, if the

government were to restrict peoples freedom excessively, then it would lose the support of the

people, from whom it derives its power. On this basis, the passage above concludes that the state

lacks the power to deny freedom of thought and speech. The second claim is that political right is

determined by power: the right of the individual is coextensive with its determinate power
(TTP 16, 527). This implies that the state lacks not only the power to control thought and speech,

but also the right to do so.

On the other hand, it is not clear how deep Spinozas commitment to individual liberty

runs. Spinoza recognizes few constraints on the sovereign power, which suggests that there are

few obstacles to authoritarian states restricting individual freedom. The basis for this concern is

Spinozas account of the social contract, which holds that people transfer all their rights to the

sovereign.iii

The sovereign power is bound by no law, and all must obey it in all matters; for

this is what all must have covenanted tacitly or expressly when they transferred

to it all their power of self-defense, that is, all their right. If they intended that

there should be anything reserved to themselves, they should have taken the

precaution at the same time to make secure provision to uphold it. Since they did

not do so, and could not have done so without the division and consequent

destruction of the state, they thereby submitted themselves absolutely to the will

of the sovereign. (TTP 16, 530)

Of course, Spinoza does not take this to imply that sovereigns will exercise their power to

undermine freedom; in fact, he does not think that sovereigns can restrict freedom of speech and

thought without bringing about their downfall. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether

Spinoza is right about this and, consequently, the extent to which his state actually promotes

freedom.

Berlin has also called into question whether Spinozas politics protects individual liberty

from a different direction. Berlin criticizes political philosophies that are based on positive

conceptions of freedom, among which he includes Spinozas (151). Whereas negative freedom

consists in an absence of obstacles or impediments to action, positive freedom consists in

realizing some capacity or acting in some way. Berlin criticizes positive conceptions on the

grounds that they open up the possibility of states imposing some particular conception of the
good life in a way that restricts individual liberty, while insidiously disguising such restrictions as

promoting liberty.

Berlin is correct that Spinozas politics defends a positive conception of freedom. While

there has been some controversy over how to understand Spinozas conception of political

freedom (Steinberg Civil Liberation), recent scholars have shown that Spinozas politics aims to

promote the freedom described in the Ethics: metaphysical self-determination, more specifically,

acting from ones essential power, her conatus or striving to persevere in existence and increase

her power (Steinberg Civil Liberation; Kisner 216). This explains why Spinoza holds that the

states aim of promoting freedom requires it to help people develop, first, their powertheir

mental and physical facultiesand, second, what most increases their power: their rationality,

to keep men within the bounds of reason, as far as possible (TTP 16, 531). Thus, political

freedom, for Spinoza, involves exercising a capacity, acting from ones own power.

However, it is less clear whether this definition of freedom empowers Spinozas state to

impose a particular conception of the good life. In this vein, West replies to Berlin, first, that

Spinoza conceives of our individual essences as our conatus, which varies according to the

individual. It follows, according to West, that there is not a single good way of living for all

individuals, which the state could impose on subjects (292), a conclusion which is also endorsed

by Smith (Book of Life 149). While it is true for Spinoza that we benefit from different things

and, consequently, can lead different kinds of good lives, Steinberg points out that the most

important goods for Spinozas ethics do not vary by individual (Curious Defense 215-6). All

humans benefit from virtue and the intellectual love of God (5p32c). Furthermore, human beings

share a rational nature, in virtue of which we benefit from the rationality of others (4p45-7).

Consequently, it is unclear whether Spinoza is sufficiently pluralist about the good life to rule out

the justification for the state imposing such a conception.

West offers a second reasons for thinking that Spinozas conception of freedom rules out

the possibility of the state imposing what it deems a free or rational way of life: Spinoza identifies
freedom with rationality, which cannot be coercively inculcated (294). While it is true that the

state cannot force people to be rational, it can nevertheless promote their rationality, for instance,

by minimizing the influence of irrational superstitious religious authorities and encouraging

democratic participation in the state and civic life. In this vein, Kisner defends a republican

reading of Spinozas politics as upholding democratic participation on the grounds that it

promotes our virtue (217-8). Rosenthal also argues that Spinozas politics pursues the republican

aim of instilling citizens with virtue, specifically the virtue of toleration (Tolerance).

Consequently, Wests view is indirectly supported by those who take a critical stance toward such

republican readings (Smith, Jewish Identity 164; Prokovniak 209, 216).

Others have argued that Spinozas politics is liberal on the basis of his universal religion

(TTP 14, 515-9). Spinoza holds that the sovereign has the authority to regulate religion and,

furthermore, recommends that the sovereign legislate a universal religion.iv Since the universal

religion directs people away from superstition and helps them to develop their moral capacities, it

appears to help people develop their rationality. On this basis, Slyomovics argues that Spinozas

commitment to the universal religion indicates his commitment to the value of promoting

peoples rationality and, consequently, their freedom, since people attain freedom by becoming

rational. Slyomovics concludes that this commits Spinoza to liberalism. While Levene and

Hunter do not mention liberalism, they also conclude on the same grounds that the universal

religion contributes to individual liberation.

A possible difficulty for this line of argument is that Spinozas universal religion is not

entirely rational. Slyomovics points out that the universal religion is based on more rational

textual interpretation (511) and that it directs us to act in accordance with moral teachings (501),

such as treating others with benevolence, which Spinoza regards as rational. Nevertheless,

Spinoza does not regard the main beliefs of this religion, the seven dogmas of the universal

religion, as consistent with reason: for instance, the first dogma asserts that God is supremely

just and merciful (TTP 14, 517), which contradicts Spinozas claim that God is impersonal
(1app). Furthermore, Spinoza denies that the universal religion requires knowledge: the universal

religion requires not so much true dogmas as pious dogmas, that is, such as move the heart to

obedience, even if many of those beliefs contain not a shadow of truth (TTP 14, 516). It follows

that the universal religion does not require reason, since Spinoza defines reason as having

knowledge, what Spinoza calls adequate ideas (2p40s2). Of course, Spinoza holds that these

irrational dogmas promote rationality in the sense of directing us to more rational action, such as

benevolence. Nevertheless, since Spinoza identifies rationality with having adequate ideas,

actions arising from these false and inadequate ideas would not count as strictly rational, though

they would be consistent with reason and could help us to develop more rational ideas.

II. Two Other Liberal Commitments

The foregoing discussion has focused on whether Spinozas politics is liberal in the sense

of promoting freedom. This is a somewhat trivial claim by todays standards, since no plausible

political theory would deny the value of freedom. The rest of this paper considers reasons for

thinking that Spinoza upholds more contentious claims associated with contemporary liberalism.

The first revolves around the previously mentioned debate about whether Spinozas state aims to

promote a single conception of the good life. Mara claims that it does not, thereby siding with

West and Smith, against Kisner, Rosenthal and Steinberg. Mara argues that this commitment

alone is sufficient to qualify Spinoza as a liberal, independent of what it says about Spinozas

view on the value of freedom. Maras reasoning here supposes that liberalism aims for political

conditions that help people to promote their own conception of the good, rather than imposing a

particular conception of the good, derived from a rational analysis of human nature and

perfection. In fact, Mara suggests that liberalism is skeptical about the possibility that different

ways of life can be evaluated and compared on a rational basis (129). Mara points out that

Spinoza opposes liberalism on this point to some extent since his political recommendations are

based on an analysis of what best promotes our nature or conatus (131). Nevertheless, Mara
argues that Spinoza regards political efforts to help us perfect our nature by becoming more

rational and virtuous as ineffective; rather politics can only hope to curb and redirect our passions

(142-3).

Second, Smith has argued that Spinozas state is liberal in the sense that it creates a new

kind of liberal citizen (Jewish Identity 20). Smith is interested in the question of why Spinoza

denigrates Judaism in the TTP. Rejecting the notion that Spinozas criticism of Judaism was

based on self-hatred, Smith counters that Spinozas criticism aims to divest Jews of an identity

based on their distinctive culture and religion. Smith concludes that Spinoza intended to create a

secular Jewish identity based on participation in civil life. This qualifies Spinoza as a liberal on

the assumption that liberalism conceives of subjects as defined foremost by their rights and

responsibilities as citizens, rather than their cultural and religious identities.

A possible difficulty with this view is that Spinoza does not clearly conceive of citizens

or the state as secular. As we have seen, Spinoza advocates that the state endorse a universal

religion, which suggests that peoples religious identities are important to their identities as

citizens. Furthermore, the universal religion is based to some extent on Christianity, for its

seventh dogma asks us to believe that God forgives sins, which Spinoza describes as knowing

Christ according to the spirit (TTP 14, 518). Of course, Smith is correct that the universal

religion is more ecumenical, since it is supposed to be based on principles accepted by all

Christians regardless of their sect. It follows that the universal religion discourages individuals

from focusing on their distinctive religious identities, which is an important step toward a secular

civic identity. Nevertheless, since Spinoza understands the general populace as necessarily

committed to irrational religious dogma, it is unclear whether he could admit the possibility of a

populace united by a truly secular civic identity.

III. The Fundamental Liberal Principle: A Spinozistic Illiberalism

 This section considers whether Spinozas politics upholds a view sometimes associated

with liberalism, what Gaus and Cortland call the fundamental liberal principle (hence forth FLP).v

It holds that freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would

limit freedom, especially through coercive means. In other words, the FLP regards liberty as

having presumptive value, such that any restriction on freedom requires justification. Mill

expresses the principle when he writes: the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are

against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition. The a priori assumption is in

favour of freedom (262).

At first glance, one would expect Spinoza to endorse the FLP because it asserts the value

of freedom and Spinoza regards freedom as extremely valuable. Since freedom amounts to acting

from ones essential power, increasing ones freedom also increases her virtue, which Spinoza

identifies with power (4def8). Consequently, freedom is valuable in the same way as virtue,

which is why Spinozas ethics exhorts us to become free.vi However, the FLP asserts that

freedom has not ethical value, but rather a very particular sort of political value: it is presumed to

be valuable when determining the appropriate constitution of the state and the exercise of its

power. Thus, the FLP is best understood as a thesis about how freedom functions in political

arguments and theories. It is surprising, then, that while Spinoza places such a high premium on

the value of freedom, his political arguments refrain from presuming its value, or so I will argue.

It follows that Spinoza does not accept the FLP, and thus, that liberty plays a different role in his

politics than in liberalism, as it is often conceived.

The remainder of this section considers and rejects two reasons why one might think that

Spinoza accepts the FLP. The main reason is Spinozas commitment to a social contract theory.

Social contract theories aim to justify political authority, such as a sovereign power or laws by

considering the political conditions to which people would consent in a hypothetical state of

nature. These theories usually hold that political authority requires this sort of justification

because it restricts our freedom, specifically a natural or pre-political freedom to govern oneself
independently of anothers authority. This implies that restrictions on freedom require

justification, which is equivalent to the FLP.vii While this reasoning explains why most social

contract theories imply the FLP, it does not hold in the case of Spinoza because, as I will show,

he does not believe that the covenant restricts our freedom. Consequently, his move to justify the

sovereign power does not imply that restrictions on our freedom must also be justified, nor that

freedom has presumptive value.

To understand why Spinoza does not see the covenant as restricting freedom, it is helpful

to consider a few claims from Pettit. Pettit distinguishes republican conceptions of freedom from

another, which he identifies as liberal (9-10).viii According to Pettit, the liberal conceives of

freedom as an absence of interference from othersa state where one is able to choose ones

actions without impediments or coercionwhereas republicans conceive freedom as an absence

of domination by others, not being subject to the will or power of others. Pettit argues that

republican conceptions of freedom do not regard our freedom as inconsistent with the presence of

laws and a sovereign power to enforce them; in other words, republican conceptions of freedom

imply the consistency of liberty and law (35). For the interference imposed by law may be

consistent with our freedom, according to the republican account, if the laws do not imply

domination. In particular, laws are consistent with and even conducive to freedom when they are

an expression of the peoples will.ix Pettit contrasts this to the liberal conception, which regards

the existence of laws as necessarily restricting our freedom because they impede certain courses

of action.x

While Spinozas conception of freedom may not entirely fit Pettits description of

republican freedom, Spinoza accepts the republican notion that freedom involves an absence of

domination rather than interference, as is evident in his distinction between a citizen and a slave.

If the purpose of the action is not to the advantage of the doer but of him who

commands, then the doer is a slave, and does not serve his own interest. But in a

sovereign state where the welfare of the whole people, not the ruler, is the
 supreme law, he who obeys the sovereign power in all things should be called a

subject, not a slave who does not serve his own interest. And so that

commonwealth whose laws are based on sound reason is the most free, for there

everybody can be free as he wills, that is, he can live whole-heartedly under the

guidance of reason. (TTP 16, 531)

In other words, whether we are free or slaves is determined not by whether we are subject to laws,

but rather by whether the laws serve our interests. It follows that freedom requires an absence of

not interference, but rather domination, the sort of interference that reflects the interests of

another, rather than our own. This passage also shows that Spinoza accepts what Pettit argues is

the consequence of this view: the consistency of liberty and law. For the passage claims that laws

can promote our freedom when they protect our interests; in fact, we are most free under laws

based on sound reason, a point echoed in the Ethics: the man who is guided by reason is more

free in a state where he lives under a system of law than in solitude where he obeys only himself

(4p73).

Because Spinoza sees the sovereign and laws as consistent with freedom, he does not

regard the covenant to institute these powers as infringing on our freedom. This conclusion is

supported by Spinozas distinctive conception of the covenant. On a common view, upheld by

Hobbes and Locke, the covenant requires individuals to transfer certain natural rights to the

sovereign in the sense of giving them up or surrendering them. For instance, Hobbes holds that

the covenant requires surrendering our right to follow our own judgments when it disagrees with

the sovereign (112).xi Spinoza, however, conceives the transfer of rights to the sovereign in a

different way, as pooling them into a central power, over which we all have some say.

They [parties to the covenant] therefore arranged that the unrestricted right

naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership,

and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of

the individual, but by the power and will of all together. (TTP 16, 528).
Thus, Spinoza does not conceive the transfer of rights to the sovereign as giving them up, since

we become part of the sovereign power and retain common ownership of our combined rights.xii

Spinoza is explicit on this point when he claims that the covenant forms a community without

any infringement of natural right (530).xiii Consequently, while Spinoza sometimes describes the

transfer of right with the Latin cedere as giving them up or surrendering them (4p37s2; TTP 16,

530), he should be understood as speaking loosely, since he does not believe that the covenant

requires people to part with their natural rights.xiv

This conception of the covenant is most evident in Spinozas defense of democracy. One

of Spinozas most perplexing claims about democracy is that it is the most natural form of state

(TTP 16, 531). Spinoza means by this is that all states begin as democracies. In fact, Spinoza

defines democracy as the power formed through the covenant: such a communitys right [the

community created by the covenant] is called a democracy, which can be defined as the united

body of men which corporately possess sovereign right over everything within its power (TTP

16, 530). Thus, there is an analytic connection between the covenant and democracy, such that

covenants necessarily produce democracies, which only subsequently change into other regimes.

The basis for this connection is the notion that the covenant requires subjects to transfer rights in

the sense of pooling them for collective use, rather than giving them up. For this entails that the

covenant creates a situation where all individuals participate in their governance, which is a

democracy: for in a democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so completely

that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he transfers it to the majority of the entire community of

which he is a part (TTP 16, 531).

One might respond by pointing out a second argument for claiming that social contract

theories imply a commitment to the FLP. This argument revolves around the notion that the

sovereign power derives legitimacy from the consent of the governed. This entails that political

authority can only be justified because it is freely chosen and, thus, because it is consistent with

our freedom. According to this view, freedom regulates the legitimate exercise of sovereign
power by restricting and constraining the kind of political authority that can be justified. In order

for freedom to play this role, it must have value prior to and independently of the state. The most

likely reason why freedom has this prior value, the argument concludes, is that freedom has

presumptive value.xv

Does this second argument show that Spinozas social contract theory implies a

commitment to the FLP? The answer might seem to be yes, since Spinoza accepts that freedom

regulates the legitimate exercise of state power. As we have seen, Spinozas argument for why

states should protect freedom of thought and speech implies that people agree to the covenant for

the sake of promoting their freedom, such that the state loses power if it excessively restricts

freedom. According to this view, freedom regulates the states power in the sense that peoples

desire for freedom places limits on the states power. Since Spinoza holds that right is

coextensive with power, it follows that freedom also regulates the legitimate use of state power.

Nevertheless, this line of reasoning does not imply that freedom has presumptive value,

as the FLP asserts. Remember, the second argument asserts that freedom must have value prior

to and independently of the state in order for it to regulate and constrain the sovereign power.

According to foregoing discussion, however, Spinoza holds that freedom regulates state power

not because of its value, presumptive or otherwise, but rather because people value it so strongly

that excessive efforts to restrict freedom meet with opposition, which diminishes the states

power to restrict freedom. Thus, Spinozas reasoning for claiming that states are not justified in

excessively restricting freedom supposes only that people regard freedom as valuable, not that it

actually is valuable.

We should also consider a second reason to think that Spinoza upholds the FLP: his

defense of freedom of speech and thought, described in the first section above. Those who read

this defense as indicating a commitment to liberalism are likely motivated partly by its general

resemblance to Lockes defense of toleration, which is associated with liberalism. While Lockes

defense of toleration does imply the FLP, a close look reveals that Spinozas view does not. Its
worth examining this difference in detail because it shows how differently freedom functions in

Spinozas politics than in Lockes, a standard model of liberalism.

Locke offers many reasons for toleration, though the main argument from the Letter

concerning Toleration revolves around the notion that it would be irrational for the state to

attempt to control peoples religious beliefs through coercion, since such attempts are ineffective,

changing only the outward expression of belief, ones practices and professions of faith, not the

beliefs themselves (46). This argument for toleration resembles Spinozas because it concludes

that the state should not attempt to control belief on the grounds that it lacks the power to do so.

Furthermore, both arguments hold that the states lack of power to control belief creates a free

zone surrounding peoples beliefs, where they have the right to their beliefs without interference.

Despite this similarity, Spinozas argument for toleration is importantly different.xvi

While one could read Lockes argument as defending tolerance entirely on the grounds that it is

impossible to control peoples beliefs (Waldron), Creppell (221) shows that doing so overlooks

Lockes insistence on the inviolable relationship between the individual and God, which

guarantees the right to worship: the care of each Mans Salvation belongs only to himself (47);

Liberty of Conscience is every mans natural Right, equally belonging to Dissenters as to

themselves; and no body ought to be compelled in matters of Religion, either by Law or Force

(51). These remarks suggest that the argument proceeds as follows: God entrusts each person

with her own salvation by according her the power to choose her own beliefs. Consequently,

respecting Gods will requires us to respect the right to conscience, that is, to believe in

accordance with her own judgment. The state should only violate this right if there is good

reason to do so. Since the state is not capable of coercing belief, the argument concludes, it has

no such reason; it would be irrational to do so. The important point is that this argument is

based on the right to believe in accordance with ones conscience, which is justified by our

relationship with God and, consequently, exists prior to and independently of the state. In other

words, the argument is based on the claim that we have a natural right to conscience.
 In contrast, Spinozas argument that we have a right to freedom of thought and speech

does not appeal to a natural right to conscience or any other (see Steinberg Curious Defense

217-8). Rather, Spinoza defends the right to these freedoms on the grounds that states lack the

power to restrict them effectively. To be clear, I do not mean to deny that, for Spinoza, people

possess natural rights and that these rights include the right to free speech and thought. Rather, I

am arguing that the existence of these natural rights plays no role in Spinozas argument that we

have a political right to freedom of thought and speech. In other words, Spinozas argument does

not conclude that we have a political right to these freedoms on the grounds that they are

guaranteed or implied by a natural right.

Because of this important difference between the arguments, Lockes implies the FLP,

whereas Spinozas does not. Lockes argument concludes that the state should tolerate peoples

religious beliefs and practices on the grounds that they have a natural right to follow their

conscience, which the state cannot restrict without good reason. In this way, the argument

implies that the freedom to follow ones conscience has a value that cannot be restricted without

justification, in other words, presumptive value. Since Spinozas argument, in contrast, does not

appeal to a natural right as the grounds for toleration, it does not suppose that peoples freedom

can be restricted only with justification. In fact, Spinozas argument generally resists the notion

that political rights can be determined independently of considerations of power. For Spinoza,

our political rights are determined by the limits of the states powers, not by what would be right

or wrong, independently of such considerations. This way of thinking about rights closes off the

possibility of justifying political rights by appealing to rights that people possess independently of

the states power, that is, natural rights. Consequently, it also closes off the possibility that his

argument for a right to free thought and speech would be based on the notion that freedom has

value independently of the state, that is, presumptive value.

This discussion indicates an important strategic difference between Spinozas philosophy

and liberalism, at least, insofar as Locke characterizes liberalism generally. Because Locke
assumes that freedom is valuable, he is able to determine the legitimate exercise of state power by

analyzing justifiable restrictions of our freedom. Since Spinozas politics does not assume that

freedom is valuable, it argues for the protection of freedom only on the grounds that people

happen to value it. Consequently, while Spinoza may ultimately agree with liberals that states

should protect freedom, he arrives at this conclusion by a very different route.xvii

Acknowledgment

Thanks to Sam Rickless and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on previous drafts

of this paper.

Notes
i
In other words, liberalism is characterized by a commitment to the liberty of individuals in the
state, rather than the liberty of the state.
ii
Quotations from Spinozas Ethics, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [TTP] and Tractatus
Politicus [TP] are taken from Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt, 4 vols (Heidelberg: Carl Winter,
1925). Translations generally follow Shirleys translation. Quotations are cited by chapter
number and page number in Shirleys translation. I adopt the following abbreviations for the
Ethics: the first numeral refers to parts; p means proposition; c means corollary; s means
scholium; app means appendix; e.g. 2p40s2 refers to Ethics, part II, proposition 40, second
scholium.
iii
Spinoza asserts his commitment to the social contract in the TTP: in order to achieve a secure
and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body, by forming a covenant (16, 528).
Spinoza later offers an example of such a covenant in the history of the Hebrew people under
Moses: it was necessary that every one of them should first surrender his natural right, and that
all should by common consent resolve to obey only what was revealed to them by God through
prophecy (559). In the Ethics, 4p37s2 also offers an account of the social contract. There is
some question about whether Spinozas commitment to the social contract tradition persisted in
the TP; for an overview of this question, see Steinberg Political Philosophy.
iv
Spinoza claims that the sovereign has absolute power to control religion: When I said that the
possessors of sovereign power have rights over everything, and that all laws are dependent on
their decree, I meant not only civil but religious law; for in the case of the latter too they must be
both interpreters and guardians (TTP 19, 557-8). This view is justified partly by Spinozas
interpretation of the Hebrew state, according to which the state ultimately collapsed because the
power of interpreting scripture was entrusted to a separate priestly caste, the Levites. Given the
pervasiveness of Lockean attitudes today, it is natural to blame the resulting problems on the fact
that the state intervened in religious matters by assigning the power to interpret scripture. We
must remember, however, that Spinoza understands religious power as, by its nature, political:
according to Spinoza, there is no religion in the state of nature; religion only acquires power, like
political entities, from contracts (TTP 16, 533-4). For Spinoza, the existence of an independent
religious authority is tantamount to an independent political authority, which essentially divides
the political power of the state. Thus, the mistake of the Hebrew state was not that it intervened
in religion, but rather that it gave up control of religion. The result was that the Levites used their
monopoly on scriptural interpretation as a way of increasing their own power in opposition to the
state. The resulting political struggle undermined the sanctity of religion in the eyes of the
people, which led to widespread disillusionment with the religious beliefs and practices that were
necessary to the maintenance of the state (TTP 17).
v
Gaus and Courtlands essay provides the most comprehensive effort to define liberalism in a
way that captures the essential commitments shared by the many varieties of liberalism.
vi
An anonymous referee has pointed out that freedom may even have an unconditional value for
Spinoza. For Spinoza, all things have valuein other words, are good or bad, virtuous or
vicious, perfect or imperfectaccording to how they promote our power. Since freedom
amounts to acting from ones power, it seems that everything of value contributes to our freedom,
which implies that the value of freedom can never be superseded. It is interesting that Spinoza
could uphold such a view, yet still reject the FLP.
vii
For example, Locke writes: The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power
on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of
nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but
that established, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or
restraint of any law, but what the legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it (17). This
passage distinguishes natural liberty, which arises only from governing oneself in accordance
with reason and is inconsistent with being under any external authority, from the liberty we
possess in a state, which is consistent with being subject to the authority of another, provided that
it arises from consent. This passage indicates that being subject to the authority of another and,
thus, restricting our natural freedom, can only be justified when the restriction arises from
consent. In this way, the passage indicates that restricting our freedom requires justification, in
other words, that freedom has presumptive value. This view on the value of freedom is a central
reason why Locke is commonly described as a member of the liberal tradition. For instance,
Grant portrays Lockes politics as a liberal on the grounds that it takes its bearings from the
thought that all men have an equal right to govern their actions as they see fit (1; see also
Seliger).
viii
This identification is somewhat problematic. Larmore questions whether we should regard
these conceptions of freedom as indicating a commitment to liberalism or republicanism (106-
12). He points out that Locke defends a republican conception of freedom, but incontestably
qualifies as a liberal (108). Taking a stronger stance, Ghosh denies that the distinction between
these two conceptions of freedom is evident in the historical literature.
ix
In Pettits words, laws do not infringe freedom so long as they respect peoples common
interests and ideas and conform to the image of an ideal law: so long as they are not the
instruments of any one individuals, or any one groups arbitrary will (36).
x
Consequently, philosophers working with this conception of freedom, such as Hobbes (79), are
inclined to regard all laws as necessarily restricting our freedom. For instance, Hobbes tends to
conceive of freedom as an absence of law: The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those
things, which in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath pretermitted (264).
xi
Lockes acceptance of this view is evident in his claim that men, when they enter into society,
give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature, (68). In fact, it
is precisely because Locke accepts this view that he is so concerned that subjects not transfer all
of their rights.
xii
In further support of this reading, Spinoza claims that the covenant requires subjects to transfer
rights not to an individual or a third party, as in Hobbes, but rather to the community, of which
we are a part: A community can be formed and a contract be always preserved in its entirety in
absolute good faith on these terms, that everyone transfers all the power that he possesses to the
community, which will therefore alone retain the sovereign natural right over everything, that is,
the supreme rule which everyone will have to obey either of free choice or through fear of the
ultimate penalty (TTP 16, 530).
xiii
This claim is echoed in Spinozas much cited remark that his covenant, unlike Hobbes,
preserves the natural right intact (letter 50).
xiv
Spinozas view on the transfer of rights in the covenant is explained partly by his distinctive
understanding of individuals. Spinoza holds that the essence of each thing is its conatus, a
striving to persevere in existence and increase its power. It follows that when different things act
together to preserve the group, the group has a power to preserve itself and, thus, a conatus, in
virtue of which it constitutes an individual. Consequently, collective entities such as sports teams
and corporations form individuals to the extent that their members work collectively for the
survival and power of the whole, in much the same way that the organs and limbs of a persons
bodies, all contribute to the conatus of the person and, thus, form one person. Spinozas
commitment to this conclusion is evident in his claim that people, who obey reasons commands
to act for their common good, form a single individual: Men can wish for nothing more excellent
for preserving their own being than that they should all be in such harmony in all respects that
their minds and bodies should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together
should endeavor as best they can to preserve their own being (4p18s). For the present purposes,
the important point is that this way of thinking about individuals entails that when people come
together to form a state, they form an individual with its own conatus. In doing so, they gain
some power in governing the collective power, of which they are a part. In this way, entering the
covenant actually increases our power, which explains Spinozas insistence that the covenant
preserves our natural right. My view here that the state counts as an individual is controversial,
as explained by Campos.
xv
Thus, the argument is weaker than the first, for it does not entail that freedom has presumptive
value. There may be other explanations for why freedom has prior value.
xvi
This line of argument is consistent with Rosenthal, who also defends that Spinozas defense of
toleration is different from a liberal defense (Republican Argument).
xvii
This discussion shows that Spinoza departs from liberalism in this way largely because of his
naturalistic view that normative political claims are derivable from a descriptive analysis of our
power.

Works Cited

Berlin, Isaiah. Two Concepts of Liberty. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1969.
Campos, Andre Santos. The Individuality of the State in Spinozas Political Philosophy. Archiv
fr Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (2010): 1-38.
Creppel, Ingrid. Locke on Toleration: The Transformation of Constraint. Political Theory 24.2
(1996): 200-40.
Feuer, Lewis Samuel. Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958.
Gaus, Gerald and Courtland, Shane D. Liberalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2011 Edition). Ed. Edward N.
Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liberalism/>.
Ghosh, Eric. From Republican to Liberal Liberty. History of Political Thought 29.1 (2008):
132-67.
Grant, Ruth W. John Lockes Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668. Ed. Edwin
Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994.
Hunter, Graeme. Radical Protestantism in Spinozas Thought. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.
Kisner, Matthew J. Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Larmore, Charles. Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom. Republicanism: History,
Theory and Practice. Ed. Daniel Weinstock, Christian Nadeau. Portland: Frank Cass,
2004. 96-119.
Levene, Nancy. Spinozas Revelation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Locke, John. A Letter concerning Toleration. Ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1983.
______. Second Treatise of Government. Ed. C. B. Macpherson. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1980.
Mara, Gerald M. Liberal Politics and Moral Excellence in Spinozas Political Philosophy.
Journal of the History of Philosophy 20.2 (1982): 129-50.
Merquior, J. G. Liberalism Old and New. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991.
Mill, John Stuart. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 21. Ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1963.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997.
Prokhovnik, Raia. Spinoza and Republicanism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Rosenthal, Michael. Spinozas Republican Argument for Toleration. Journal of Political
Philosophy 11.3 (2003): 320-37.
______. Tolerance as a Virtue in Spinozas Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4
(2001): 535-57.
Seliger, M. The Liberal Politics of John Locke. London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1968.
Slyomovics, Peter. Spinoza: Liberal Democratic Religion. Journal of the History of Philosophy
23.4 (1985): 499-513.
Smith, Steven. Spinozas Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003.
______. Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997.
Spinoza, Benedict. Spinoza: Complete Works. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Ed. Michael L. Morgan.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002.
Steinberg, Justin. Spinozas Curious Defense of Toleration. Spinozas Theological-Political
Treatise: A Critical Guide. Ed. Yitzhak Melamed, Michael Rosenthal. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 210-230.
______. Spinoza on Civil Liberation. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.1 (2009): 35-58.
______. Spinoza's Political Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009
Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/spinoza-political/>.
Strauss, Leo. Spinozas Critique of Religion. New York: Schocken Books, 1965.
Waldron, Jeremy. Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution. Justifying Toleration.
Ed. Susan Mendus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 61-88.
West, David. Spinoza on Positive Freedom. Political Studies 41 (1993): 284-96.