CANON 11

1. NG vs ALAR Case Digest

[Adm. Case No. 7252 (CBD 05-1434), November 22, 2006]

JOHNNY NG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the complainants in a labor case
filed with the Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. The case was filed when
employees of the Ng Company alleged that they did not receive their service
incentives because the Ng Company refused to pay because a strike was conducted
on company premises hampering entrance and exit into the area. It was later found
that the incentive pay had been paid. When the NLRC dismissed the appeal, Alar
filed an *MR with a Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), where Alar used scandalous,
offensive and menacing language to support the complaint. He called the Labor
Arbiter crossed-eyed in making his findings of fact and that the NLRC
commissioner acted with malice in ruling that the labor arbiter decided correctly. He
also alleged that NLRC retiring commissioners circumvent the law when the money
claims involved in the cases are large.

Because of this a disbarment case was filed against him saying that he violated
canons 8 and 11.

Alar argues that he did not violate them because:

1) NLRC is not a court contemplated by the rules; that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC
Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers
appearing before it and that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for
adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it.

2) NLRC commissioners are not judges; the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do
not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary.

3) The complaints in labor cases are bound to be heated and that they are entitled to
some anger. He counterclaimed that the lawyers of Ng are the ones in violation of
the CPR by filing multiple suits from the same cause of action and that they
deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case.
The commission on bar discipline found Alar guilty of violating the CPR.

ISSUE: Is a lawyers misbehavior before the NLRC susceptible of the provisions of

the Code of Professional Conduct?

HELD: Yes. The MRMI he filed contained insults attacking the NLRC, casting
doubt on its moral and intellectual integrity, implying that the NLRC can be bought.
He used improper and offensive language, which cannot be justified. Though a
lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it must always be dignified and
respectful. He deserves not only a warning but also a fine of P 5,0000. The counter-
complaint is dismissed because there was no position paper submitted to substantiate
the claims.

The assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges
or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary and that consequently, the Code of
Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the
Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the
law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.

Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession.

NOTE: (actual citation from the MRMI)

x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was

merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight
modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion, made by some
knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at
all connected with the NLRC First Division.

x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in
maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half month per year of
service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there another reason
known only to them?

x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First
Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of the
commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in
prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents failed to prove their claim of
losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability
to see these glaring facts.

x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of
service and all of it to the affected workers not to some people in the NLRC
in part.

x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of

employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the First Division do not
know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.

x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for

themselves the evidence before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and
on the word of their ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing
the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is
lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.

If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable
Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so and with malice thrown
in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how come their only
"penalty" is removing their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the
Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was no
strike. This is the only reason for the finding of "illegal strike". Without this
finding, they have no basis to remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.

x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management" and
its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But
Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed
his sights on the tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide
passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the
premises, are blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His
impaired vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.

Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas,

before, the established rule was, in cases of money claims the employer had the
burden of proof of payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a
better name we should call this new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But
only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and only when
 the money claims involved are substantial. When they are meager the ordinary
rules apply.

x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the
sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service incentive leave pay. This
finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter
Santos x x x .

The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress
and egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of Commissioner
Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x

2. FUDOT v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC.

(G.R. No. 175942, September 13, 2007)

FACTS: (Antecedent facts:) The case stemmed from the sale of several parcels of
land between Cattleya Land, Inc. and the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson.
Subsequently, the Deeds of Sale were registered with the Register of Deeds. The
Register of Deeds, Atty. De La Serna, refused to actually annotate the deed of sale
on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a
compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was
brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the
Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the
titles covering the same were still unaccounted for. Later, respondent Cattleya
learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner and issued a new title herein. The respondent filed its Complaint for
Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With
Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City whereby such court
rendered a decision in favor of respondent.

(Facts related to Legal Ethics:) Atty. De La Serna requested that Justice Tinga, the
ponente in the Fudot case, be inhibited because it was alleged that he received 10
million pesos from Chan in exchange for a favorable decision.

Atty. De La Serna relates that sometime in 2006, he was prevailed upon by former
BIR Commissioner Tomas Toledo to meet with Mr. Chan. In the meeting, Mr. Chan
informed him that he had already bought the interest of Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya)
over a property adjacent to the property subject of the case and that he was interested
in putting up a resort/hotel in the property. He wanted to purchase Carmelita Fudots
interest in the property as well to put an end to the litigation. They did not reach an
agreement on the purchase price.
De La Serna suggests that Tinga abandoned the doctrine in Lim v. Jorge to
accommodate Chan. He also said that Tinga prioritized the case and that Chan
already knew of the outcome of the case before the decision was promulgated. Chan
related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling the case,
and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. He denied having said to De La Serna
that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.

HELD: Yes. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the court by setting up

opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It is not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders but it also brings authority of the court and
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner impedes the due
administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the
presence of the court but tends to be little, degrade obstruct or embarrass the court
and justice. Improper conduct tending to directly or indirectly impede obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice is also indirect contempt.

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court and it is his duty to maintain
the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. While he is expected to bring forth
irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court it is important that this
criticism shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. His statements bear badges of falsehood because the version of the
witnesses disputes his statements. He maliciously made these declarations
irresponsibly. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga
degrade the dignity of the court and erode public confidence in it. He is hereby fined
P 3,000.00.

3. GUERRERO v. VILLAMOR (A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25,

1998)

FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint addressed to this Court through the Court

Administrator, dated March 8, 1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero charges Judge Adriano
Villamor of the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte,
Branch 16, with serious misconduct, ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for issuing an Order
dated December 11, 1987 declaring the complainant and one George Carlos guilty
of direct contempt.
In a separate verified complaint, involving exactly the same incident, George Carlos
also charges Judge Adriano Villamor with substantially the same offenses.
Carlos and his counsel, Guerrero, charged respondent with gross ignorance of the
law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment after they lost a civil and a criminal
case tried by respondent. They were also thwarted on appeal. However, in the
pleadings before the CA, they used abusive language in describing the respondents
acts, hence, respondent judge cited them for direct contempt, which was later set
aside by the SC.

ISSUE: Must the respondent be held liable for violation of the Code for Professional
Ethics?

HELD: The case was dismissed. The order of direct contempt may only be
considered as an error of judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for
mere errors of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose. Moreover, judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith.

4. Judge Luis De Leon vs Atty. Jose Torres AC No. 180, June 30, 1956

In 1953, Atty. Jose Torres sent a telegram to Judge Luis De Leon where he
threatened that if the judge wont lift his order of arrest, he shall file criminal, civil
and administrative charges against him. Judge De Leon then issued an order
requiring Atty. Torres to show cause why he should not be disciplined. Torres did
not appear but instead he evaded arrest and went to Manila. Judge De Leon then
decreed an order suspending Torres from the practice of law until otherwise ruled
upon by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding this order, Torres still practiced law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Torres is proper.

HELD: No. He openly defied a lawful order of the court. It must be impressed upon
all lawyers that court orders, even though erroneous, must be respected, especially
by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are
to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to
the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial
incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as
well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system. Torres was suspended
for three months.

5. Lacson, Jr. v. Hernandez, GR No. 113591, February 6, 1995

Facts: In the resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court (a) denied with finality the
motion to reconsider the resolution of 11 May 1994 which denied the instant petition
for the failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent court
committed any reversible error in rendering the challenged decision, and (b) directed
the counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court and declared liable for misconduct for his
"apparently malicious and unfounded accusation that this Court did not read the
petition and for craftily suppressing from the body of the petition the final decision
in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465.
In his compliance dated 6 August 1994, Atty. Fortes admitted the charge but
tried to explain that: 2 This is the first time that counsel filed a petition of this
kind and nature. The latest resolution has greatly enlightened counsel and broaden
its (sic) outlook on the kind and nature of a petition that counsel might file in the
future. And justified his outbursts and offered his apology thus: 6 In view of the
foregoing facts and circumstances, considering counsel was only motivated with his
enthusiasm to protect the interest if his clients, verily those statements were made
without malice. Counsel was grateful to the Highest Tribunal for its enlightening
Resolution. It is with deep regret that this things happened. Counsel sincerely offers
his apologies for the wrong done to the Supreme Court. Counsel assures this
Honorable Court that this incident will not be repeated. Counsel also promises to be
more discreet in his statements in his pleadings.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' assertions in the motion for reconsideration that the
petition was denied wholly on technically; that the Court's peremptory denial
disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings, which is to seek the truth; that the
Court upheld the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons; and, worse, that
the Members of the Court did not read the petition or that if they did, they simply
refused to understand the arguments "in order not to blur [their] preconceived
resolution of this case," are patently unfounded and malicious. His sole purpose was
to show and prove his clients that he was all the time correct and this Court dismally
wrong not only for veering away from the true purpose of judicial proceedings and
suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title, but, worse, for not even reading
the petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order to hide its prejudgment of
the case. In so doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded premises, Atty. Fortes
did an immeasurable disservice to this Court by putting it into dishonor, disrespect,
and public contempt, diminishing public confidence or promoting distrust in the
Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them without
violating their duty to render justice.

Issue: Whether Atty. Fortes violates Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling: Yes, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity to the courts and his duties to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of
Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility), observe candor, fairness and
good faith to the courts (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility), and to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance
(Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics).
His explanation that this is the first petition he has filed with this Court and his
justifications that he was only motivated by his enthusiasm to protect the interests of
his clients are unacceptable. On the contrary, if this was indeed the first petition he
has filed with this Court, he should have striven for the best and demonstrated utmost
candor to and respect for the Court. Instead, he tried to hide the futility of his clients
cause by suppressing vital facts in the petition. As to his enthusiasm to protect his
clients' interest , he should be reminded of what this Court had said in Surigao
Mineral reservation Board: and in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), this Court said: A lawyer is an officer of the
courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrusts in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts
a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous
to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.
Thus has it had been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
Wherefore, for his violations of his oath of office, Section 20, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, ATTY. MARIO G. FORTES is hereby ORDERED to pay a
FINE of Two Thousand Pesos(P2,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 6. Yap-Paras v. Paras, AC No. 4947, June 7, 2007

Facts: For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, dated April
11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty.
Justo Paras, for the latters alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon
him by the Court. The motion alleges:

4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law
and in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that
the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the
running of the period to appeal, and prays that for his violation of the suspension
order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred.

On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition praying for

the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts
of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of
oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a
Resolution finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court
resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

During the pendency of Atty. Paras motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant

filed with the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging
thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by
the Court with his continued practice of law. In time, the Court issued a Resolution
dated July 18, 2005, denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras motion for reconsideration,
to wit:

Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting on the
respondents motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of
February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.

The Court further Resolves to NOTE:

(a) the complainants opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for
reconsideration with leave of Court; (b) the respondents motion dated May 6, 2005
for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration; and (c) the
complainants motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying
that respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to
REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-
movants Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment.

After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a
Manifestation, stating that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received
the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.

It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt
and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006
requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court
for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from
receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to

Timely File Required Comment was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations
in petitioner-movants Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed
that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to
naught or violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the
highest punishment to an erring lawyer disbarment or to hold him in contempt for
his failure to comply with this Courts resolutions.

Issue: Whether or not respondent may be suspended for violating the Canons of
ProfessionalResponsibility

Ruling: Yes. The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant
case, as well petitioner-movants counsels, to avoid further squabbles and
unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of the
records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and
petitioners counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between
them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations
between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive sympathy from this Court. Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy,
fairness, candor and civility.
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction
for Atty Paras failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this
sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a
disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect
the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the
misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED.

However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the
respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Courts resolution, with
WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a
repetition of the same act.

7. Soriano v. CA, GR No. 10063, August 28, 2011

Facts: On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes (hereafter,
Deogracias and Rosalina) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City a complaint
against Socorro Abella-Soriano (hereafter Socorro)for declaration and recognition
of real right under an implied contract of services, reformation of instrument and
damages.
The complaint alleged two causes of action. First, Deogracias and Rosalina pleaded
that they were employed by Socorro as manager and administrative assistant of her
property and real estate in 1968. As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro
gave Deogracias and Rosalina one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the
duration of their lifetime. A token monthly rental of one hundred fifty pesos
(P150.00) was imposed on them to enable them to supposedly keep their self-
respect.[13] In the same building, there existed a unit which Deogracias and Rosalina
improved and converted into a pub and restaurant at a cost of four hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P450,000.00). For the use of the premises, Socorro collected rent
from Deogracias and Rosalina in the token amount of one thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500.00) a month supposedly for the main purpose of enabling them to
keep their self respect. From 1968 to 1987, Deogracias and Rosalina were able to
sell and dispose of all the lots in the three residential subdivisions owned by Socorro,
amounting to about ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00). As real estate manager and
administrative assistant, they were also able in the course of twenty years to find
qualified tenants for Socorros commercial buildings. They supervised the
construction and maintenance of Socorros property and collected rent on behalf of
and for the interest of Socorro. Despite all these efforts, on October 17, 1988,
Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to vacate the two units at No. 67 Elias
Angeles St., Naga City.

Deogracias and Rosalina averred that Socorro agreed to allow them to use the two
units for the duration of their lifetime as compensation for their services.[18] By now
ejecting them from the premises, Socorro reneged on her obligation.
Second, Deogracias and Rosalina were the owners of two (2) commercial lots with
improvements. On May 28, 1986, Deogracias and Rosalina became indebted to
Socorro in the amount of six hundred thirty eight thousand six hundred thirty five
pesos and thirty six centavos (P638,635.36). The parties agreed that to pay for the
debt, Deogracias and Rosalina were to sell the two (2) commercial lots for two
million and five hundred thousand pesos (P2.5M) and deliver part of the proceeds
of the sale to Socorro. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed
the property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. Instead of a real estate mortgage,
Socorro prepared two (2) documents, a deed of absolute sale[21] covering
Deogracias and Rosalinas property and a memorandum of agreement.[22] Due to
the ascendancy of Soccorro over them and also because of Socorros repeated
assurance that the documents had the same effect as a real estate mortgage,
Deogracias and Rosalina signed the same. Socorro presented the deed of absolute
sale to the register of deeds of Naga City and as a consequence TCT Nos. 9388 and
9424 were released in her favor. It was only in September 1988, that Deogracias and
Rosalina discovered that they were deprived of the ownership of their property.[23]
Thus, Deogracias and Rosalina pray that their true intention of entering into a real
estate mortgage and not an absolute sale be given effect, that the deed of absolute
sale and memorandum of agreement be declared void and that the T.C.T.s issued in
Socorros name be canceled and new T.C.T.s be issued in favor of Deogracias and
Rosalina.
On October 28, 1988, Deogracias and Rosalina paid the filing fee of four hundred
forty pesos (P440.00) and legal research fee of ten pesos (P10.00). The computation
of the filing fee was based on the following amounts:

1. P100,000.00 representing the income of the property under litigation received by

the defendants from its tenants and which the plaintiffs prayed to be returned and
refunded to them; 2. P50,000.00 moral damages;3. P10,000.00 exemplary damages;
4. P50,000.00 attorneys fees.The total of which amounted to P210,000.00.

On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment case
between the same parties over the same premises and that the second cause of action
was premature.

On December 8, 1998, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress, Socorro,

filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order.[29] The
motion prayed that the trial court immediately issue an ex-parte restraining order
commanding private respondents to desist from entering the vacant apartments of
the building subject of the case or from urging the tenants thereof to stop paying
their rentals to the defendant (Socorro).

The Carmelite Sisters talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers and
requested him to immediately act on Socorros urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. Judge Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue the
ex-parte restraining order because a Supreme Court administrative circular required
a hearing with notice to the adverse party. To this statement, Sister Margaret Mary
retorted, Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorros counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask
for an ex-parte restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an order
or circular of the Supreme Court? Do you mean Atty. Padilla does not even know
that there is such an order or circular, when he has a brother in the Supreme Court
(Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla).

Issue: Whether the lawyer violates the Canon 11?

Ruling: Yes. [Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.]

A lawyer is an officer of the Court, bound by the law. It is a lawyers sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to
support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the
judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims
infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless, discipline and
self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for
the orderly administration of justice. Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases
been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground
for disbarment. However, mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case
made in good faith may be tolerated.
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer
of the court, a lawyer may criticize the court. He must do so in a bona
fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of the judges thereof on the
other.Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates
or promotes distrust in judicial administration is proscribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G. R. No. 100633 is PARTLY GRANTED. The

petition in G. R. No. 101550 is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 20236, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the trial
courts order finding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt of court and
imposing on him imprisonment for five (5) days, and ordering him to pay a fine of
one hundred pesos (P100.00) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. With admonition to
the trial court and counsel to observe strictly the strictures of the ethics of the
profession.
 8. In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the SC"
AM No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

Facts: On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was
promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"),
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the
following grounds: I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this
Honorable Courts (sic) assertion that the Executives foreign policy prerogatives
are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and
humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party II. This Honorable Court has
confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of
states to protect the human rights of its citizens especially where the rights asserted
are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.
On July 19, 2010, counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty.
Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their
charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS
HONORABLE COURTS JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO
PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE
SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR
DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE
PETITIONS CLAIMS.
They also claimed that in this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only
of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying
the Petition."
Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the
educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they
treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. They expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary
sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of
the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain
remarks which raise concernfor the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a
reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also
not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further
by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing
the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further
attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult
to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values
of decency and respect.

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding

the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge
is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.
More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged
to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear
in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the
court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the
suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and
is punishable.

The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution
that would not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken asattorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.Re:
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the PhilippinesCollege of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC.
October 19, 2010.
Issue: Whether the respondents violate the Canon 11?

Ruling: CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
Yes, Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical
standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to
condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decisions
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not
the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyones
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents
explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of
decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of
Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending
case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who
called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally
submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Courts
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a
defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open
court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents invocation of
academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys
that respondents own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.