People of the Philippines vs Anastacio Dela Cruz

March 22 2017
G.R. no. 227398

This is an appeal from the October 16, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06847,
which affirmed the January 29, 2014 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo City (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-25726 and 03-25727, finding Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz (accused-appellant) guilty
of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedents

On May 27, 2003, accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the RTC. In Criminal
Case No. 03-25726, accused appellant was charged with possession of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II
ofR.A. No. 9165. The Informations read:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been lawfully authorized by law, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing 0.03 and 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance or with total weight of 0.09 gram,
which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted thereon by the PNP Crime Laboratory both
gave positive results to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW

In Criminal Case No. 03-25727, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 for the sale of shabu. The Information states:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2003, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been authorized by law to sell or otherwise dispose of
any dangerous drug, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to P02 Rache E. Palconit, who acted as a
poseur-buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance,
for and in consideration of the sum of P200.00, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted
by the PNP Crime Laboratory gave a positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW

On July 22, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued with the
prosecution presenting Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Sharon Lontoc Fabros (Fabros), P02 Rache E. Palconit (Palconit)
and Barangay Captain, Dr. Rina Gabuna Junia (Dr. Junio),as its witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, Palconit, SP02 Gerry Abalos (Abalos), P02 Manuel
Bayeng (Bayeng), and P03 Russel Medina (Medina), conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. A confidential informant (CI) told them that a certain Anastacio was peddling
drugs in the area. A buy-bust team was formed with Abalos as the team leader and Palconit as the poseurbuyer.
Abalos marked two (2) In 00.00 bills for the operation. After briefing and coordination with the local police, the
team was dispatched to Barangay Sta. Cruz. Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target person. Palconit
approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu. After receiving the marked money, accused-
appellant handed to Palconit one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. At that point, Palconit
scratched his head to signal that the sale was consummated, and the rest of the team rushed to the scene.
Abalos introduced themselves as police officers and immediately frisked accused-appellant. Abalos recovered
the marked money and two (2) other plastic sachets containing shabu from the left pocket of accused-appellant's
pants. Thereafter, accused-appellant and the seized items were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Office in Barangay San Roque, Antipolo City. The seized items were turned over to the case
investigator who prepared the corresponding request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, Palconit brought
the seized items to the crime laboratory. After examination, Fabros issued a report confirming that the crystalline
substances in the sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Version of the Defense

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May 25, 2003 at around 1: 15 o'clock in the morning, he was
playing billiards at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio when three (3) armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him.
Without saying anything, the men frisked and handcuffed him but found nothing illegal on him. He was arrested
and brought to an office in Lores where he was detained, interrogated, and forced to admit a wrongdoing. He
was also asked to point to other persons so that he could be released.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 29, 2014 decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. It
also sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The R TC held that
the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated did not automatically render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the
items seized from him as inadmissible for it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved by the apprehending officers. It opined that the witnesses presented by the Prosecution
successfully established the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is hereby found guilty
beyond any shadow of a doubt of the offense charged in the Information and is sentenced to the penalty of Life
Imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 03-25727 with a fine of Php 500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 03-25726,
the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an Imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years with a fine of Php300,ooo.oo as provided for under Sec. 11 Par. (3) of RA 9165, as amended. Anastacio
Hementiza y Dela Cruz is to be promptly committed to the National Bilibid Prisons for immediate service of his
sentence. The seized specimens subject of the instant cases are ordered destroyed in the manner provided by
law.
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its October 16, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It explained that the police
witnesses had adequately established the conduct of the buy-bust operation which resulted in the consummated
sale of the illegal drugs and the recovery of two (2) sachets and the marked money in his possession. The CA
added that prior surveillance of the suspected offender was not a prerequisite for the validity of a buy-bust
operation and that failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 (1), Article II ofR.A. No. 9165, on
the handling of confiscated illegal drugs, as well as its IRR, was not fatal and would not render accused
appellants arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. The CA disposed the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 January 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

In a Resolution,7 dated December 7, 2016, the Court required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In his Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief,8 dated February 28,
2017, accused-appellant manifested that he was adopting his Appellant's Brief filed before the CA as his
supplemental brief for the same had adequately discussed all the matters pertinent to his defense. In its
Manifestation,9 dated February 6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that all matters and
issues raised by accused-appellant had already been discussed in its Brief before the CA and asked that it be
excused from filing its
supplemental brief.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the appeal.

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charge.

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous
drug itself. In People v. Alcuizar, 12 the Court held: The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes
the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved.

This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails. Thus, the chain
of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti. Section 1 (b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as
follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/
confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In Mall ill in v. People, 15 the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was, received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a
witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Indeed,
the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is
one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in
their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance was later
analyzed as heroin was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court
on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the
prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it
could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the
laboratory's findings is inadmissible. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court
cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other
cases by accident or otherwise in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted
for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

In connection thereto, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement officers
should handle seized items in dangerous drugs cases:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/ or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/ or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/ s from
whom such items were confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/ or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination; A certification of the forensic laboratory examination
results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four
(24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/ s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next
twenty-four (24) hours[.] Strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement, however, is not always the
case. Hence, the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

SECTION 21.(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/ s from whom such items were confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer /team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the apprehending officers
with the safeguards provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the records
are bereft of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it appear on record that
the apprehending team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Further, People v. Dahi/17
restated the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.

First Link: Marking of the Drugs

Recovered from the Accused by the
Apprehending Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because the succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from
the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching,
planting or contamination of evidence. Still, there are cases when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as
when the marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place
of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases. In this case, Palconit
claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking
was not immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only placed at the PDEA office, for
which the prosecution did not offer any justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could
not be said that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. For one, neither in the
direct examination nor in the cross examination of Palconit was it mentioned that the markings were made in
the presence of accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely testified that he placed the markings at the
PDEA office, without any allusion to the identities of the persons who were present when he did the markings.

Moreover, in the Incident Report20 as well as in the Affidavit of Arrest, the specific markings made on the seized
items were not mentioned. The same documents merely specified that three (3) small heat sealed transparent
plastic bags containing suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride of undetermined quantity were found in
accused-appellant's possession. Considering that the apprehending officers did not mark the sachets of illegal
drugs at the place of seizure, then, it logically follows that the marking should have been their foremost priority
and should have been made prior to writing the incident report and executing the affidavit of arrest. It,
therefore, behooves the Court how Palconit could have said that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, but
no mention of the same whatsoever was made in both the incident report and in the affidavit of arrest. If the
sachets of illegal drugs were already marked, then there would have been no reason for its non-inclusion in the
aforecited documents. Thus, the Court can only guess the time when the markings were made and whether they
were placed before the preparation of the incident report and the affidavit of arrest. To make matters worse,
from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be
determined how the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit.
Unfortunately, the direct examination of Palconit left much to be desired for it offered no explanation and
justification for these lapses. At most, what can be gleaned is the prosecution's lack of zealousness and interest
in ensuring the conviction of accused-appellant despite the time and resources at its disposal, viz:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two other sachets were recovered, what did
you do?
Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?
Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the
operation was positive.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?
Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the
suspect.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one that was bought and the two others
which were recovered from the target person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory examination.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?
Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.
Prosecutor Sampayo: Do you remember what marking was placed?
Palconit: Yes, ma'm, REP-1, REP-2, REP-3.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What are these markings about?
Palconit: Those are my initials, Rache E. Palconit.
Prosecutor Sampayo: Where did you put the markings?
Palconit: At the sachets.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What sachets are you talking about?
Palconit: The sachet that I bought and the sachets that were recovered.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What marking was placed on the specimen found on his possession?
Palconit: REP-2 and REP-3.
Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?
Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.
Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?
Palconit: Me.22

In People v. De La Cruz, where the marking of the seized items was made at the police station, and without any
showing that the same had been done in the presence of the accused or his representatives, the Court
concluded that the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. No. 9165 in the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impaired the prosecution's case.
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia
will not secure a conviction. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and
it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just
that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth.

Second Link: Turnover of

the Seized Drugs by the
Apprehending Officer to
the Investigating Officer

The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. This is a necessary step in the
chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and
prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have
possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents. Here, the identity of the
investigating officer was unknown.

Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?

Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the
operation was positive.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?
Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the
suspect.

It is unlikely that Palconit did not know the officer to whom he supposedly turned over the seized drugs. Surely,
this investigating officer worked with him in the same office. Indeed, the apprehending officer and investigating
officer might be one and the same person. If that was the case, however, then there would have been no need to
say that Palconit turned over the seized items to the investigator. He could have simply said that he was the one
who conducted the investigation and prepared the necessary documents for the filing of a criminal case against
accused-appellant. Similarly, in People v. Nandi, where the apprehending officer was unable to identify the
investigating officer to whom he turned over the seized items, the Court held that such circumstance, when
taken in light of the several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the case, raises doubts as to whether
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs had been preserved.

Third Link: Turnover by the

Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at
the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance.
In this case, it was uncertain who received the seized items when it was brought to the forensic laboratory, to
wit:

Prosecutor Sampayo: When the marked money was recovered and two other sachets were recovered, what did
you do?
Palconit: The suspect was brought to the PDEA office.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do at the PDEA office?
Palconit: We turned over the confiscated evidence to the investigator and we informed our CO that the
operation was positive.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What were the confiscated items which were turned over?
Palconit: Buy bust money, one sachet which I bought and two other sachets which were recovered from the
suspect.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What was done with the confiscated sachets, the one that was bought and the two others
which were recovered from the target person?
Palconit: When we arrived at the office, we made a request for laboratory examination.
Prosecutor Sampayo: What did you do with the items?
Palconit: We placed markings on the confiscated items.

xxx
Prosecutor Sampayo: After putting the markings, what did you do?
Palconit: We brought it to the crime laboratory.
Prosecutor Sampayo: Who personally brought it?
Palconit: Me.
Prosecutor Sampayo: Why did you bring it to the crime laboratory?
Palconit: For Laboratory examination

There are several unexplained and doubtful points in this step.

First, Palconit testified that he placed the markings on the sachets upon arrival at the office. Then, he
turned over the seized items to the investigator. In the latter part of his testimony, however, he said that after
placing the markings, he brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory. The circumstances surrounding the
custody of the illegal drugs, from the time they were brought to the PDEA office up to their turnover to the
forensic laboratory, are all muddled. Moreover, it is unclear whether another officer intervened in the handling
of the illegal drugs or it was only Palconit himself who placed the markings and delivered the illegal drugs to the
forensic chemist.
Further, a perusal of the records shows that the request for laboratory examination32 was prepared and
signed by a certain Police Chief Inspector Raul Loy Bargamento (Bargamento), who had necessarily taken custody
of the seized items at some point in order to execute the request for laboratory examination. Yet, Palconit did
not even bother to mention Bargamento in his testimony. The prosecution would have the Court guess (1)
whether Bargamento was the same person to whom Palconit turned over the seized items and (2) whether
Bargamento was the one who handed Palconit the seized items for delivery to the forensic laboratory. Hence,
the identities of the officers who had custody of the illegal drugs, even for momentary periods, are open to
question. Finally, Fabros testified that their office received the request for laboratory examination on May 25,
2003 at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon. The request for laboratory examination33 indicated that the same was
received by Fabros. It is worthy to note, however, that she did not affix her signature thereon. Moreover, in their
testimonies, neither Palconit nor Fabros identified each other as the person who delivered and received the
seized drugs respectively. Hence, for failure of Fabros to mention before the court that she indeed received the
seized drugs from Palconit, her name, appearing on the request for laboratory examination, remained to be
hearsay.
In People v. Beran, 34the investigator of the case claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for
testing, but there was no showing who was the laboratory technician who received the drug from him. The Court
noted that there was serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item had not been
fatally compromised.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked

Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic
Chemist to the Court

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented as
evidence in the criminal Case. In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal drugs were
brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she made a report confirming that the substance contained in the
sachets brought to her was positive for shabu. The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to
remedy the lapses and save the prosecution's case. In People v. Garcia,the Court stated that "the saving clause
applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable grounds."
Failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained.

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

In fine, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence presented does not support a finding of guilt with the
certainty that criminal cases require. The procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring
gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether the shabu seized from accused-appellant
was the same shabu that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in
court as evidence. Hence, the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven. It could be that the accused was
really involved in the sale of shabu, but considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's
evidence, the Court has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof. Law enforcers should not only be
mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but the
prosecution should also prove every material detail in court. Observance of these is necessary to avoid wasting
the efforts and the resources in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The October 16, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C.
No. 0684 7 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against him and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is
confined for some other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately
implement this decision and to inform this Court of the date of the actual release from confinement of the
accused within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Land bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Jose Tapulado

March 8 2017
GR. No. 199141

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 17,
2011 Consolidated Decision and the October 24, 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City
(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01186 and CA-G.R. SP No. 01441, affirming with modification the February 16, 2006
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao City {RTC), fixing the valuation of just compensation at
P200,000.00 per hectare in Civil Case No. 29,507-03, entitled "Heirs of Jose Tapulado namely, Tomasa, Lorenzo,
Teresita, Jose, Jr., Elisa, Romeo, Letecia, all surnamed Tapulado v. Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank
of the Philippines."

The Antecedents:

Jose Tapulado (Tapulado), now deceased, was the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. (P-175 3 5) P-27884 with an area of 17 .8393 hectares located in Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur,
and OCT No. (P-4518) P-12775 with an area of 11.1359 hectares situated in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. In
1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands under the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27; and in 1978, awarded them to the
farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive any compensation from the government.

Actually, it was only on March 24, 1980, that the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the
value of the subject lands, placing them at P38,002.4 7 or P 1,315 .00 per hectare. The respondents, the Heirs of
Tapulado (Tapulados), rejected the valuation of the subject lands. They filed a petition for determination of just
compensation before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB, in tum, referred their petition to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao del Sur (PARO) for the recomputation of the value of the subject lands
under P.D. No. 27 in relation to DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 13. On January 24, 2003, without waiting for
the completion of PARO's re-evaluation of the land, the Tapulados filed a petition before the R TC, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and payment of just compensation. The resort to the RTC was
not contested.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its February 16, 2006 Decision, the RTC pegged the amount of P200,000.00 per hectare as the reasonable
compensation for their properties considering that the Tapulados lost the subject lands and were deprived of the
fruits thereof since 1972. The RTC also awarded the amounts of P300,000.00 as moral damages and Pl00,000.00
as attorney's fees. Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to solidarily pay the petitioners the following
sums:
1. Two Hundred Pesos per square meter for the two hundred eighty nine thousand seven hundred fifty two
square meters.
2. Three Hundred Thousand pesos as moral damages, shock, fright-wounded feelings.
3. One Hundred Thousand pesos as atty.'s fees.
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner LBP filed its motion for reconsideration, 7 but it was denied in the RTC Order,dated July 3, 2006.

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, in its June 17, 2011 Consolidated Decision, the CA agreed with the R TC that the computation of the
just compensation should be in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 because the compensation had remained
unsettled up to the passage of the new law. The CA wrote that for purposes of computing the just compensation,
the value of the property at the time of its taking should be considered. As the copies of the emancipation
patents were not attached, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence
as regards the date of the emancipation patents to serve as the reckoning point of the computation of just
compensation. The CA deleted the award of moral damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit. The dispositive
portion reads:
Accordingly, the Decision dated 16 February 2006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award for moral
damages, attorney's fees and cost of the suit are hereby DELETED.

The records of the case is ordered REMANDED to the Special Agrarian Court, Branch 15, of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, for further reception of evidence as to the date of the grant of the emancipation patents
which shall serve as the basis for the computation of just compensation in accordance with the market data
approach pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. Upon the denial of its motion for partial reconsideration, the LBP
filed this petition.

In its Memorandum, the petitioner raised this SOLE ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE SAC FOR
THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE DATE OF THE GRANT OF EMANCIPATION PATENT AND THE
COMPUTATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MARKET-DATA APPROACH DESPITE THE
CLEAR MANDATE OF DAR A.O. NO. 1, SERIES OF 2010, IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9700 AS TO THE
FORMULA TO BE USED
AND THAT THE RECKONING DATE IN COMPUTING JUST COMPENSATION IS JUNE 30, 2009.

Petitioner LBP avers that in fixing the just compensation for the subject properties, the guidelines set forth in
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2010, pursuant to R.A. No. 9700, should be applied. The Tapulados, on the other hand,
contend that though they agree with the CA that the date of taking for purposes of judicial determination of just
compensation should be reckoned from the date of the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, but remanding the
case to the R TC for another computation would only entail injustice and prejudice to them as their lands had
long been taken since 1972 and thereafter distributed to the farmer beneficiaries.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the CA that the case should be remanded to the RTC for the computation of just
compensation. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9700,14 the Court had consistently ruled that when a property
had been taken pursuant to P.D. No. 27 and the agrarian process was still incomplete because the payment of
just compensation was still to be settled after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, the computation of just
compensation should be determined using the factors provided under Section 17 thereof, to wit:

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by the government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 9700, the LBP agreed with the order of remand for the computation of just
compensation conformably with the said law. A reading of R.A. No. 9700, however, reveals that the case still falls
within the ambit of Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended. Section 5 of R.A. No. 9700, clearly provides that
"previously acquired lands wherein the valuation is subject to challenge shall be completed and resolved
pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended." Thus: Section 5. Section 7 of Republic Act. No 6657, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 7. Priorities. - The DAR, in coordination with the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall plan and
program the final acquisition and distribution of all remaining unacquired and undistributed agricultural lands
from the effectivity of this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Phase One : During the five (5)-year extension period hereafter all remaining lands above fifty (50) hectares shall
be covered for purposes of agrarian reform upon the effectivity of this Act. All private agricultural lands of
landowners with aggregate land holdings in excess of fifty (50) hectares which have already been subjected to a
notice of coverage issued
on or before December 10, 2008; rice and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27; all idle or abandoned
lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform: Provided, That with respect to
voluntary land transfer only those submitted by June 30, 2009 shall be allowed. Provided, further, That after June
30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition:
Provided, furthermore, That all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by
landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended: Provided, finally, as mandated by the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, and Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, only farmers (tenants or lessees)
and regular farmworkers actually tilling the lands, as certified under oath by the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) and attested under oath by the landowners; are the qualified beneficiaries. The intended
beneficiaries shall state
under oath before the judge of the city or municipal court that he/ she is willing to work on the land to make it
productive and to assume the obligation of paying the amortization for the compensation of the land and the
land taxes thereon; all lands foreclosed by government financial institutions; all lands acquired by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); and all other lands owned by the government devoted to
or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act,
with the implementation to be completed by June 30, 2012.
(Emphasis supplied)

This provision was further clarified by DAR A.O. No. 02-09, the "Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition
and Distribution of Agricultural Lands under R.A. No. 6657, as amended by RA No. 9700," which provides that:

VI. TRANSITORY PROVISION

With respect to cases where the Master List of ARBs17 has been finalized on or before July 1, 2009 pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 2003, the acquisition and distribution of landholdings shall continue to be
processed under the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.

However, with respect to land valuation, all Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 shall be valued in
accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, all agrarian reform cases where the master lists of agrarian reform beneficiaries had already been finalized
on or before July 1, 2009 or where the claim folders had been transmitted to and received by LBP on or before
the said date, the determination of just compensation should be in accordance with the pertinent DAR
regulations, applying Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

In the case at bench, the subject property was awarded to the farmer beneficiaries
in 1978. On March 24, 1980, LBP approved its initial valuation. Clearly, the process of the determination of just
compensation should be governed by Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. Accordingly, the Court sets aside the R TC
valuation of their property at P200,000.00 per hectare. The RTC valuation failed to comply with the parameters
of Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR regulation. In fact, the RTC neither used any formula in coming up with
the valuation of the subject land nor explained its reason for deviating therefrom. It simply declared the amount
of P200,000.00 per hectare as the fair and reasonable amount of compensation, without any clear basis.
Although the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the RTC, sitting as a SAC, must
consider the factors mentioned in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.18 The RTC is bound to observe the basic factors
and formula prescribed by the DAR pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.19 Nonetheless, when the RTC is
faced with situations that do not warrant the strict application of the formula, it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations
before it. In such a case, however, the RTC is duty bound to explain and
justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors
and formula.20 In the recent case of Alfonso v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,21 the Court stressed that:

For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR's
expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section
17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just
compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find
that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before
them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a
reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the power to
make a final determination of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)

Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the government since 1972, it has
no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the computation of the just compensation in
accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because the basis for the RTC determination of just compensation
was not clear. In the determination of just compensation, the R TC should be guided by the following:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the
names of the farmer beneficiaries.
2. Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless, while it should take into account the different
formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations
before it do not warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for deviating
therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation. 3. Interest may
be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous
cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the
payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per annum from the time
of taking and 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.
The Court is not unaware that the properties have been awarded to the farmer beneficiaries in 1978. Since then
the Tapulados have not received any compensation for their lands. Remanding the case to the R TC would
further delay the payment of just compensation due them. So as not to prolong the agony of the Tapulados, the
RTC should conduct a preliminary summary hearing to determine the amount that the LBP is willing to pay and
order the payment thereof to the Tapulados pendente lite. Thereafter, the R TC should proceed to conduct the
hearing proper to determine the balance due to the Tapulados.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Davao City, for the immediate determination of just compensation in the foregoing. In the interest of justice, the
R TC is ordered to conduct a preliminary summary hearing to determine the amount the LBP is willing to pay and
order the payment thereof to the Tapulados pendente lite.
Thereafter, the RTC should proceed with dispatch to hear the parties on the balance due to the Tapulados and to
submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommendations within sixty ( 60) days from notice of this
disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Career Executive Service Board vs Civil Service Commission

March 7, 2017
GR. No. 197762

The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).The
Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly included in the Career Executive
Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for
permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate the
respective jurisdictions granted by law to the competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 1 the CESB seeks the reversal of the Decision3 and Resolution4 of
the CSC declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a CESB Resolution refusing to
declassify certain positions in PAO; and (b) the PAO positions involved in the appeal do not require third-level
eligibility. The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute. On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a
copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy of the Department of Justice (DOJ). This document stated, among
others, that out of 35 filled positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES
eligibility. In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing)
sent a letter to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her that the positions of Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already
permanent in nature pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to
the occupants thereof. A second letter dated 9 November 20 I 09 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing
to reiterate its earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in support of the
assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their occupants may only be removed for
cause provided by law. Based on the foregoing
premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the Department of
Justice (DOJ). On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB,
through Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica. 10 The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB
would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO
positions to determine whether they may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.

The DOJ Legal Opinion

While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de Lima to
inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB. He also reiterated the PAO's opinion that the
subject positions must be considered permanent in nature, and not subject to CES requirements. In a letter 13
sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta on 3 January 2011, Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III
elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:

cont.
Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-level officials of the PAO are permanent is
without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES.
xx xx
Regional Public Attorneys shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Public
Attorney. The Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys shall not be
removed or suspended, except for cause provided by law; Provided, That the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, the
Regional Public Attorneys and The Assistant Regional Public Attorneys, the Provincial Public Attorneys, the City
Public Attorneys and Municipal District Public Attorney shall preferably have served as Public Attorneys for at
least five (5) years immediately prior to their appointment as such. The administrative and support personnel
and other lawyers in the Public Attorney's Office shall be appointed by the Chief Public Attorney, in accordance
with civil service laws, rules, and regulations."

Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are
occupying CES positions, it is required by law that they should be CES eligible to become permanent appointees
to the said position.

xx xx
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are not permanent, despite your claims to the
contrary, considering that they do not possess the required CES eligibility for the said positions. As such, they
cannot invoke their right to security of tenure even if it was expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO Law.
xx xx

Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional
Public Attorneys are temporary, they are required to subsequently take the CES examination. In the absence of
any evidence that would show compliance with the said condition, it is presumed that the top-level officials of
the PAO are non-CES eligible; therefore they may be removed from office by the appointing authority without
violating their constitutional and statutory security of tenure. The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of
an appointment does not automatically translate to an exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that
has the authority to exempt certain positions from CES requirements. 15 The DOJ further rejected the claim that
the occupants of the subject positions were exercising quasi-judicial functions. It explained that while the
lawyers of the PAO regularly conduct mediation, conciliation or arbitration of disputes, their functions do not
entail the rendition of judgments or decisions - an essential element of the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.

The CSC Legal Opinion

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal
opinion on the same matter. The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the former's decision to seek the opinion
and requested the latter to issue no further opinion or statement, oral or written, relative to the qualifications of
the PAO officials.
On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal opinion. Citing its mandate as an independent
constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render opinions and rulings on all
personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the
subject positions in the PAO:
The law is explicit that the positions [of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public
Attorney in PAO shall have the same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of the Chief
State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Regional State Prosecutor, respectively. These, of course
include the eligibility requirement for these positions.

xx xx
The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the Prosecutor General (the retitled position of Chief
State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor
have the same qualifications as those of an associate justice of the CA.

xx xx
No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges in the judiciary are required, among other things,
practice of law as requirement for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the Presiding Justice
and the Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) have the same qualifications as those provided for in the
Constitution for Justices of the Supreme Court[,] which includes, among other requirements, practice of law. This
means that the Constitution and the Civil Service Law prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the appropriate civil service
eligibility therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g. CESE, CSEE) is not proper, if not,
illegal under the circumstances. In fact, even in the 1997 Qualification Standards Manual of the Commission, all
of these positions require RA 1080 BAR eligibility for purposes of appointment.
xx xx

Thus, it is the Commission's op1mon that for purposes of permanent appointment to the positions of Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no third level eligibility is required
but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.

CESB Resolution No. 918

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB Resolution No, 918) denying the PAO's request
to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification Study22 submitted by its secretariat, the
CESB noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial competence"23 and were thus
part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be
considered permanent. The CESB explained:

WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent rank as CES positions, the Secretariat
revisited its previous classification as part of the CES [ ofj the above positions of PAO and conducted a position
classification of the above positions and arrived at the following findings:
1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant
Regional Public Attorneys who are all presidential appointees fall within the criteria set under CESB Resolution
No. 299, s. 2009, namely: a. The position is a career position; b. The position is above division chief level; c. The
duties and responsibilities of the position require
the performance of executive or managerial functions.
2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which provides that:
xx xx
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:

"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to render,
free of charge, legal representation, assistance, and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil,
labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the service, the PAO may be
called upon by proper government authorities to render such service to other persons, subject to
existing laws, rules and regulations."

The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate of PAO to perform only non-executive functions. All that the
aforecited provision states is that the PAO is mandated to render legal representation, assistance and counseling
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases, free of charge. Notably,
the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys evidently require leadership and
managerial competence.

WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject pos1t10ns are CES in nature and as such, the eligibility requirement
for appointment thereto is CES eligibility. With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against
that of the CSC, the CESB stated:

WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board which has the mandate over Third-level
positions in the Career Service and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 provides: Section 8.
Classes of Positions in the Civil Service. - ( l) Classes of positions in the career service, appointment to which
requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels
as follows:
xx xx
(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

(2) x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.

WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 760, the Supreme
Court ruled that "where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the
other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the
special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be
taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act."

WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 is the exception
to [the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;

xx xx
WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in accordance with existing laws and pertinent
jurisprudence on matters pertaining to the CES.

Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal and an Urgent Notice of Appeal with
the CSC.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSC

Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the resolution was
rendered contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071, the 1987 Constitution and the CSC letter-opinion; and
(b) the CESB usurped the legislative function of Congress when the former required additional qualifications for
appointment to certain PAO positions. The PAO likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC,
because the latter had the power to review decisions
and actions of one of its attached agencies - the CESB.

In an Order dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal. Instead of submitting a
comment, however, the CESB filed a Motion for Clarification29 to assail the authority of the CSC to review its
Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a
controversy between two government entities regarding questions of law; and (b) the CESB was an autonomous
agency whose actions were appealable to the Office of the
President. In addition, the CESB emphasized the inability of the CSC to render an unbiased ruling on the case,
considering the latter's previous legal opinion on the appropriate eligibility for key positions in the PAO.

In a Decision dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. As a
preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the appeal, which involved the
employment status and qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil service. It was supposedly a
matter falling within its broad and plenary authority under the Constitution and the Administrative Code. The
CSC also declared that the authority of the CESB over third-level employees was limited to the imposition of
entry requirements and "should not be interpreted as cutting off the reach of the Commission over this
particular class of positions."

Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the revisory power of the CSC, given that an attached office is not
entirely and totally insulated from its mother agency. 35 With respect to the provision in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan36 on appeals from the CESB to the Office of the President, the CSC construed this
requirement as pertaining only to disciplinary proceedings. On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO
officials. It declared that the CESB would be in violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional
qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO
positions:
The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO positions under the existing laws. It is
gleaned that nowhere in these laws is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification
requirements for attaining tenurial security. All that the laws uniformly prescribe for the positions in question is
practice of law for certain period of time, which presupposes bar license. This being the case, the CESB cannot, in
the guise of enforcing and administering the policies of the third-level, validly impose qualifications in addition to
what the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of qualification requirement which is not otherwise
specified in the statutes. As an administrative agency, the CESB can only promulgate rules and regulations which
must be consistent with and in harmony with the provisions of the laws, and it cannot add or subtract thereto.
Most evidently, therefore, in promulgating the assailed resolution, which sets out additional qualifications for the
subject positions in the PAO, the CESB has overstepped the bounds of its authority. xx x.

In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power of the CESB to identify other positions equivalent
to those enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 as being part of the third-level or CES for as long as they
come within the ambit of the appointing prerogative of the President. Yet, such grant of authority is derived from
a general law (the Administrative Code) and hence, it must be deemed circumscribed or qualified by the special
law governing the PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO Law, in conjunction with other laws, merely fixes practice of law as
the principal qualification requirement for the positions of Acosta, et al.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the CESB Resolution No. 918 dated
January 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for not being in conformity with law and jurisprudence. It is
declared that the following key positions in the Public Attorney's Office do not require third-level eligibility and
CESO rank for purposes of tenurial security:
1. Chief Public Attorney;
2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys;
3. Regional Public Attorneys; and
4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.
The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was denied.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC. It
asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB, given the latter's autonomy as
an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should have been appealed to the Office of the President, and
not to the CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part 1 n of the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO
positions are supposedly part of the CES, based on criteria established by the CESB.41 These criteria were set
pursuant to the latter's power to identify positions belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to
prescribe the requirements for entry thereto. The Petition further reiterates the alleged inability of the CSC to
decide the case with impartiality. In its Comment, the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the CESB before
this Court should be dismissed outright for being an improper remedy and for violating the hierarchy of courts.
The CSC further asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO's appeal from the CESB Resolution in this case. Citing its
mandate as the central personnel agency of the government based on the 1987 Constitution and the
Administrative Code, the CSC insists that it has broad authority to administer and enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly
encompasses the power to review and revise the decisions and actions of offices attached to it, such as the CESB.
It also claims that the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within its jurisdiction.

Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own Comment43 on the Petition. They assert that (a) the
Petition should be dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious procedural and jurisdictional flaws; (b) the CSC
properly exercised its jurisdiction when it resolved the appeal in this case; and ( c) CESB Resolution No. 918
contravened R.A. 9406 in relation to the 1987 Constitution, R.A. I 0071 and the CSC letter opinion dated 7
January 2011. Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the Court
likewise required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of the
government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter. On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required
Comment. On the issue of jurisdiction, it supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and
the Administrative Code as the sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with
regard to personnel matters such as the reclassification of positions. As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts
that the subject positions in the PAO should be declassified from the CES. It points out that the primary function
of these PAO officials -- the provision of legal assistance to the indigent - is specialized in nature in contrast, their
managerial functions are merely incidental to their role. The OSG further contends that the manifest intent of
the law is to require PAO officials to have the same qualifications as their counterparts in the National
Prosecution Service (NPS). Consequently, the OSG argued that the decision of the CESB to declassify certain
posts in the NPS should have likewise resulted in the declassification of the corresponding positions in the PAO.

In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG, the CESB urges the Court to adhere to the alleged limitations on the
general authority of the CSC over all matters concerning the civil service. In particular, the CESB asserts its
specific and exclusive mandate to administer all matters pertaining to the third-level of the career service.
Included in these matters is the power to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of its members. Moreover, the CESB insists that it is an
agency within the Executive Department under the Integrated Reorganization Plan; hence, its decisions are
appealable only to the Office of t.he President. Lastly, the CESB maintains that the subject positions properly
belong to the CES, considering that executive and managerial functions must be exercised by the occupants
thereof.

ISSUES
The following issues are presented for resolution:
( 1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper remedy to question the assailed CSC
Decision and Resolution (2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to
reverse CESB Resolution No. 918
(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and declared that third-level
eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions

OUR RULING

We DENY the Petition.

At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC. In
any event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it
resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level
eligibility is not required for the subject positions.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition is

not the appropriate remedy to challenge
the ruling of the CSC.

As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections of respondents to the remedy availed of by the
CESB to question the ruling of the CSC. Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by the CESB before this Court was improper, because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for review
under Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is disputing the
authority and jurisdiction of the CSC. We find in favor of respondents. It is settled that a resort to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
concurrence of both these requisites:

Section l. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
docuP-"lents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment he
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal
available to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1
of Rule 43 specifically provides for appeals from decisions of the CSC:

Section 1. Scope. -- This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.

xx xx
Section 5. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible
copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court
or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by
the petitioner. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals
the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified
motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay
the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen ( 15) days from notice of the denial.
(Emphasis
supplied)

In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, the CESB asserts that the allegations
in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CSC, as well as the lack of
jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending the latter's ruling - are not suitable for an appeal under
Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds properly pertain to a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.

We find the CESB 's contention untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if both
requirements are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked; and an appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy is unavailable. Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient. This Court has,
in fact, dismissed a Petition for Certiorari assailing another CSC Resolution precisely on this ground. In Mahinay
v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled: As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal
from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA. The special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal
provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Madrigal Tran.\port, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of
appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's
choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even
if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under
Rule 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless of the
grounds invoked therein.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the supposed
transcendental importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC Decision is gravely prejudicial to the
mandate of the Petitioner." Even when confronted by respondents with regard to the availability of an appeal,
the CESB still failed to cite any special justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted to
focus on the nature of the grounds asserted in its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference to
grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a resort to a petition under Rule 65. Considering the failure of the CESB
to offer a compelling explanation for its insistence upon the special remedies of certiorari and prohibition, the
Court finds no justification for a liberal application of the rules.

In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As will be further explained, we find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the PAO, the CSC merely exercised the
authority granted to it by the Constitution as the central personnel agency of the government.

The CSC acted within its }urisdiction

when it resolved the PAO's appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.

At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the respective authorities granted by law to two agencies
involved in the management of government personnel - the CSC and the CESB. This particular dispute involves
not only the jurisdiction of each office over personnel belonging to the third-level of the civil service, but also the
relationship between the two offices.

On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members of the CES. Specifically, it refers to the
identification and classification of positions belonging to the third-level, as well as the establishment of the
qualifications for appointment to those posts. The CESB further emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on the
basis of this Court's ruling that its status as an attached agency only pertains to policy and program coordination.

The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review actions and decisions of its attached agencies,
including the CESB. The CSC further claims original and appellate jurisdiction over administrative cases involving
contested appointments, pursuant to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government.

In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the civil service, this Court must ensure that the
respective powers and functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined. After analyzing and harmonizing the
legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the Court concludes that the CSC has the authority to
review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived at this conclusion after a consideration of (a) the broad
mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code; and (b) the specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization
Plan and the Administrative Code.

As the central personnel agency of the

government, the CSC has broad authority
to pass upon all civil service matters.

Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC the administration of the civil service, which is
comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." In particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B
provides for the mandate of this independent constitutional commission:

SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
(Emphases
supplied)

The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the intention to emphasize the status of the CSC
as the "central personnel agency of the Government with all powers and functions inherent in and incidental to
human resources management."50 As a matter of fact, the original proposed provision on the functions of the
CSC reads:

Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government.shall establish a career
service, promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y] positions, prescribe conditions of
employment except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law, and
exercise alt powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management, to promote
morale, efficiency, and integrity in the Civil Service. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an aimual
report on its personnel programs, and perform such other functions as may be provided by law.(Emphases
supplied)

Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987 Constitution,52 it is
evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a "central personnel agency" was considered
all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate
and enforce policies on personnel actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all
powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management:

MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the Civil Service as embodied in our original
draft?
MS. AQUINO: No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35 to 40 of page 2 until line 1 of page 3 would not in
any way minimize the powers of the Civil Service (Commission] because they are
deemed implicitly included in the all-embracing definition and concept of "central personnel agency of the
government." I believe that the lines we have mentioned are but redundant articulation of that
same concept, unnecessary surplus.
MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to promulgate policies on personnel actions be encompassed
by the Commissioner's amendment?
MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining lines 33 to 35. I proposed an amendment after the
words "career service.'' I am only doing away with unnecessary redundancy.
MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in the original provision are still being granted by the
Civil Service Commission despite the elimination of the listing of these powers and functions?
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a central personnel agency, it would have to necessarily
execute all of these functions.
MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions be a source of ambiguity and controversies later
on as to the extent of the powers and functions of the commission?
MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of ambiguity because the concept of a central
personnel agency is a generally accepted concept and as experience would bear out, this function is actually
being carried out already by the Civil Service Commission, except that we are integrating this concept. I do not
think that it would be susceptible of any ambiguity.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trefias). Yes, Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification. The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of the
Civil Service Commission - to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino
kindly indicate to us the corresponding provisions and her proposed amendment which would encompass the
powers to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions?
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already subsumed under the concept of a central
personnel agency.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to line I of page 3
inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase "central personnel agency of the government."
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2 and line 1 of the subsequent page, it was
only subjected to a little modification.
MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase " ... promulgate and enforce policies on
personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to
compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is understood to be subsumed
under and included in the concept of a central personnel agency.
MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that. 53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of the CSC should therefore be read as the
comprehensive authority to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient administration of the entire
civil service, including the CES. The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while
recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11), (14), and
(19), are of particular relevance to this dispute:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.-The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks
in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote
economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;
( 4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position
classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay
scales, classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all
heads of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari;

xx xx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of
the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy thereof;
xx xx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of Service beyond retirement age;

xx xx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be
provided by law.

It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the specific powers to pass upon all civil
service matters. The question before the Court today is whether this broad authority encompasses matters
pertaining to the CES and is, as such, recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the CESB. To allow us to
understand the legal framework governing the two agencies and to harmonize the provisions of law, it is now
necessary for the Court to examine the history and the mandate of the CESB. It may thereby determine the
proper relation between the CSC and the CESB.

The CESB has been granted specific and

limited powers under the law.

On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435 authorizing the President to reorganize different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government. The statute also created a
Commission on Reorganization with the mandate to study and investigate the status of all offices in the executive
branch. This commission was also tasked to submit an integrated reorganization plan to the President, and later
on to Congress, for approval. The Commission was given until 31 December 1970 to present its plan to the
President.
After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a proposed Integrated Reorganization Plan55 was submitted
to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970. The plan included a proposal to develop a
professionalized and competent civil service through the establishment of the CES - a group of senior
administrators carefully selected for managerial posts in the higher levels. To promulgate standards for the CES,
the Commission on Reorganization recommended the creation of the CESB:
To promulgate standards, rules and procedures regarding the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the Career Executive Service, a Board is proposed to be established. The Board shall
be composed of high-level officials to provide a government-wide view and to ensure effective support for the
establishment and development of a corps of highly competent, professional administrators.

The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review, but Martial Law was declared before the proposal
could be acted upon. Four days after the declaration of Martial Law, however, the Integrated Reorganization Plan
was approved by former President Marcos through Presidential Decree No. 1. This approved plan included the
creation of the CES and the CESB.

The CES was created to "form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented career
administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service." The CESB was likewise established to serve as
the governing body of the CES with the following functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards and procedures
for the selection, classification, compensation and career development of members of the CES; (b) to set up the
organization and operation of the civil service in accordance with the guidelines provided in the plan; ( c) to
prepare a program of training and
career development for members of the CES; ( d) to investigate and adjudicate administrative complaints against
members of the CES.

When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB was given the additional authority to (a) identify
other officers belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by law;65 and (b) prescribe
requirements for entrance to the third-level.

Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers granted to the CESB are specific and limited. This
Court must now determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers in harmony with the broad
constitutional mandate of the CSC.

The specific powers of the CESB must be

narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the
comprehensive authority granted to the
CSC by the Constitution and relevant
statutes.

As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the broad mandate of the CSC and the specific authority
granted to the CESB is at the root of this controversy. The question we must resolve, in particular, is whether the
CSC had the authority to review and ultimately reverse CESB Resolution No. 918, upon the appeal of the PAO. For
its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code have granted it
the exclusive authority to identify the positions belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to prescribe
the eligibility requirements for appointments thereto.67 It
thus asserts that the foregoing matters are beyond the revisory jurisdiction of the CSC, and must instead be
appealed to the Office of the President in accordance with the specific provisions of the aforementioned laws.
This special mandate must allegedly prevail over the general authority granted to the CSC.

As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this Court's pronouncement in Eugenio v. CSc68 on its
autonomy from its mother agency. The CESB contends that its attachment to the CSC is only for the purpose of
policy and program coordination. Allegedly, this attachment does not mean that the former's decisions,
particularly CESB
Resolution No. 918, are subject to the CSC's review.

On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon the appeal from CESB Resolution No. 918 by virtue
of its status as the central personnel agency of the government. It contends that the CESB 's authority to
prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of the civil service does not mean that the CSC no longer has
jurisdiction over that class of positions. It also points out that the case involves a personnel action that is within
the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law.

We uphold the position of the CSC.

It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution
and other laws. In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of the CES must be interpreted in a
manner that takes into account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and other
statutes.
The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the qualifications for these
posts. These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted to the CESB under the Administrative
Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact alone does not push the matter beyond the
reach of the CSC.
As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the comprehensive
mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12,
Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been expressly granted the power to promulgate
policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personne1 and
other civil service matters.

Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil service matter falling
within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the repercussions of the issue concerning
the appointments of those occupying the posts in question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is
implicated.

It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the decisions of agencies
attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of
the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory.
Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's review
on appeal. Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the CESB
that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We note that the supporting
provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers only to administrative cases involving the
discipline of members of the CES: The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of
members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and opera ti on of the Service
in accordance with the following guidelines:

xx xx
h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against members of the Career
Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and Paragraph I (d) of Article II, Chapter III of this
Part; provided that appeals shall be made to the Career Executive Service Board instead of the Civil Service
Commission. Administrative cases involving members of the Service on assignment with the Board shall be
investigated and adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)

In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary cases involving
members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that particular type of case, because
members of the CES arc all presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the
power to discipline, it is only reasonable for the president to be given the ultimate authority to discipline
presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No.
918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the
Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly appealed
to the CSC. From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the
PAO's appeal. The arguments of the
CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.

The CSC correctly ruled that third level

eligibility is not required for the subject
positions.

The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution - whether the CSC ruled in accordance with law when the
latter declared that it was not necessary for occupants of the subject PAO posts to possess third-level eligibility.

On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is required for the positions pursuant to R.A. 9406 in
relation to R.A. 10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys to have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and retirement privileges as the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutor and Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the NPS under P.D. 1275.
The latter law is the old one that governs the NPS and requires third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial
posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply, because R.A. 9406 could not have referred to a law that
had not yet been enacted at the time. It also asserts that the subsequent declassification of prosecutors cannot
benefit members of the PAO, because the prosecutors exercise quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members
do not.

On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas Pambansa Blg.
(B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements. It emphasizes
that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain
period of time and presuppose a bar license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that the posts concerned are highly
technical in nature because they primarily involve legal practice, and any managerial functions performed are
merely incidental to their principal roles. It also claims that the legislature could never have intended to require
third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts when it enacted R.A. 9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with the conclusion of the CSC.
To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level eligibility would be to amend the law
and defeat its spirit and intent.

The CESB effectively amended the

law when it required the occupants
of the subject PAO positions to
obtain third-level eligibility.

The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the government is lodged in Congress 75 as part of its
plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet societal demands. From this
authority emanates the right to change the qualifications for existing statutory offices.

It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which provides for the
qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and
Assistant Regional Public Attorneys:
SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other PAO Officials. -
The PAO shall be headed by a Chief Public Attorney and shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys. Each PAO Regional Office established in each of the administrative regions of the country shall be
headed by a Regional Public Attorney who shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public Attorney. The
authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Chief Public Attorney.

xx xx

The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and
retirement privileges as those of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service. The Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and
retirement privileges as those of
the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service.

xx xx
The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of a Regional State Prosecutor and
the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service respectively.

At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications of officials of the NPS, to which the foregoing
provision referred, were provided by Section 3 of P.O. 1275:
Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution Staff shall be composed
of prosecuting officers in such number as herein below determined. It shall be headed
by a Chief State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors. The Chief State
Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors; and the members of the Prosecution Staff shall be
selected from among qualified and professionally trained members of
the legal profession who arc of proven integrity and competence and have been in the actual practice of the legal
profession for at least five (5) years prior to their appointment or have held during like
period, any position requiring the qualifications of a lawyer. (Emphases supplied)

Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of 2010 was passed. In updating the qualifications for
senior positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another set of positions, this time in the judiciary:

SECTION 14. Qualifications. Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General shall
have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy
the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be
appointed by the President.

SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service shall have the following
ranks:
Rank Position/Title
Prosecutor V (I) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors and
City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law
Prosecutor IV ( 1) Deputy State Prosecutors;

xx xx
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five (25) prosecutors;
and
(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with
at least twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area
established by law.

SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Officers. - Prosecutors
with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives,
salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions
and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall
be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits
as those of a Judge of the Regional Trial Court.

A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals79 are required to have the same qualifications as the members of this Court. 80 On the other hand,
judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a separate provision. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that
occupants of the subject PAO positions are only mandated to comply with requirements as to age, citizenship,
education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for
the CESB to impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments. To do so would be
to amend the law and to overrule Congress.

While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of the civil
service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the qualifications specifically set by law for
certain positions. Hence, even granting that the occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial
and executive functions as incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional
qualifications for them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express
provisions of statutes enacted by the latter. It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the
specific qualifications imposed by Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have
considered the entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406 and prescribed the
relevant qualifications for each position. The choice not to require third level eligibility in this instance must be
respected - not only by the CESB but also by this Court - as a matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of
a statute.

The intent of R.A. 9406 to establish

and maintain the parity in
qualifications between the senior
officials of the PAO and the NPS
must he respected.

This Court must likewise reject the CESB 's contention that the declassification of positions in the NPS (as a result
of the enactment of R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a supposed difference in their functions. This
argument goes against the express terms and the clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is therefore untenable.

As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The amendment was
done to provide for "the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement
privileges" of senior officials of both the PAO and the NPS. The deliberations of Congress on R.A. 9406 reveal its
intention to establish parity between the two offices. The lawmakers clearly viewed
these officers as counterparts in the administration of justice:
Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should equalize the prosecution and the defense.
The PAO Office is actually an arm of the same government to protect those who need protection.
Senator Pimentel. That is right.
Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the arm of the government to punish those who
would need punishment. So, these two perform the same class of service for the nation and they should be
equalized.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that that is why precisely I made this observation that talking alone of
starting pay, the level of starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be lower than the starting pay of a prosecutor.
Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that amendment.
Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed amendment. (Emphases supplied)

During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator

Franklin M. Drilon explained that equal treatment of the two offices was essential:

SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should have the same salary as the Chief State
Prosecutor and down the line, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera. And I want to put this on record
because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO lawyers here before us and we want to explain why we have
placed this.

xx xx
SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said - you know, I want to put on record why we had tried to streamline the salary
structure and place it at the same level as the Chief State Prosecutor. Because we do not want a salary distortion
in the Department of Justice where you have the PAO higher than the prosecutors. That's why we want to put
them on equal footing rather than mag - you know, there'll be whipsawing. You place the prosecutors below the
PAO. I can assure you that tomorrow the PAO will come to us - the prosecutors will come to us and say, "Put us
higher than the PAO lawyers." So you will have whipsawing here.

Although these statements were made to address the specific issue of salary, this Court considers them as
manifestations of the intent to create and maintain parity between prosecutors and public attorneys. In Re:
Vicente S. E. Veloso, 86 this Court considered similar provisions in other laws as confirmations of the legislative
intent to grant equal treatment to certain classes of public officers:

Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for appointment, confer the rank,
and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public officers in the
Executive Department, such as the following:
(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); and
(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, and the members of
the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice.

The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank conferred, and the
salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public officers covered by
the said laws. The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific public officers in the executive
department and the Judges and Justices who are covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other
relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the
special nature of their official functions render services which are as important as the rendered by the Judges
and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of the members of the Judiciary
in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial systems.

To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to senior officials of the PAO and the NPS, parity in their
qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the revised qualifications of those in the NPS
must also be considered applicable to those in the PAO. The declassification of positions in the NPS should thus
benefit their counterpart positions in the PAO. There is no justification for treating the two offices differently,
given the plain provisions and the rationale of the law.

This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent of the law if it sustains the view of the CESB. We
cannot construe R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the amendments brought about by
R.A. I 0071. To do so would defeat the legislature's very purpose; this is to equalize the qualifications of the NPS
and the PAO.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the
central personnel agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the PAO from CESB
Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed the
said resolution, which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted, the third-level eligibility
required by the CESB as an additional qualification for these posts contravened not only the express terms, but
also the clear intent of R.A. 9406. For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the improper remedy
the CESB has resorted to, this Court must dismiss the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. CSC Decision No. 110067
and Resolution No. 1100719 dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June 2011, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Agapito Cardino vs Commission on Elections En Banc

March 7, 2017
GR. No. 216637

The Court resolves the instant petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino), which assails the Resolution2 dated December 16, 2014 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and the Resolution3 dated January 30, 2015 of the
COMELEC En Banc in EPC No. 2013-06. Both resolutions denied the petition for quo warranto filed by Cardino
against private respondent Rosalina G. Jalosjos (Jalosjos).

The Facts
During the May 13, 2013 Elections, Cardino and Jalosjos both ran for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte. On May 15, 2013, Jalosjos was proclaimed the winner after garnering 18,414 votes
compared to Cardino's 16,346 votes.

Cardino immediately filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, which sought to nullify the
candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility. Said petition was docketed as EPC No. 2013-06 before the
COMELEC Second Division.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America (USA). Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship
under Republic Act No. 92255 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, USA. On
August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and an Order of Approval
of citizenship retention and reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when Jalosjos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012, she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation
of her American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De
Guzman-Laput of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Cardino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Jalosjos left the Philippines for
the USA on May 30, 2012 and she presented her US passport to the immigration authorities. Jalosjos then
arrived back in the Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 p.m. using her
US passport. Cardino, therefore, argued that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have personally appeared
in Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte before Judge De Guzman Laput on July 16, 2012 to execute, sign and swear to
her Affidavit of Renunciation.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document that had no legal effect. As such,
when Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City, she still possessed both Philippine and American
citizenships and was therefore disqualified from running for any elective local position. Given that Jalosjos' COC
was void ab initio, she was never a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City. Cardino, thus, prayed for Jalosjos to be
declared ineligible to run for Mayor of Dapitan City, that her proclamation be set aside, and that he be
proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor of Dapitan City.

Jalosjos answered6.that the date of "16th day of July, 2012" was mistakenly indicated in the Affidavit of
Renunciation instead of its actual execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosjos claimed that it was on the latter date
that she appeared before Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship. Jalosjos further contended that Cardino failed to show that Judge De Guzman-Laput
denied having administered the oath that Jalosjos took as she renounced said citizenship. Jalosjos averred that
she had no reason to make it appear that she renounced her American citizenship on July 16, 2012. The actual
date of Jalosjos' renunciation of her American citizenship on July 19, 2012 allegedly complied with the
requirements under Republic Act No. 9225 such that she remained eligible for the position of Mayor of Dapitan
City.

Before the COMELEC Second Division, Cardino offered the following pieces of documentary evidence, among
others, to prove that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have personally appeared, signed and sworn to
her Affidavit of Renunciation on July 16, 2012: (a) a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, reflecting
Jalosjos' arrival in the country on July 17, 2012; (b) Jalosjos' vacation and sick leave applications from May 29,
2012 up to July 18, 2012; and (c) a certification from the Houston Eye Associates, showing that Jalosjos
underwent a medical examination in Houston, Texas, USA on July 15, 2012.
On the other hand, Jalosjos offered, inter alia, the following evidence:
(a) the judicial affidavit of Jalosjos, 10 which narrated the events involving the execution of her Affidavit of
Renunciation on July 19, 2012; (b) the judicial affidavit of Eric Corro (Corro),11 a member of the staff of Jalosjos
who drafted the Affidavit of Renunciation; and ( c) the letter complaint filed by Cardino against Judge De
Guzman-Laput before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), docketed as OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ, and its
attachments.

On July 22, 2014, Judge De Guzman-Laput testified by deposition before the Provincial Election Supervisor in
Dipolog City wherein she positively stated that it was on July 19, 2012 that Jalosjos personally appeared before
her to subscribe to the Affidavit ofRenunciation. In the assailed Resolution dated December 16, 2014, the
COMELEC Second Division dismissed Cardino's petition for quo warranto in this wise:

.. allegedly executed and subscribed before [Judge -De Guzman-Laput] on July 16, 2012 or one day before
respondent Jalosjos arrived in Manila. [Jalosjos] did not dispute the date indicated in the Affidavit of
Renunciation. However, the said date was only a result of a clerical error as it was on July 19, 2012 that [Jalosjos]
made a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenships before a public officer. The Affidavit of
Renunciation cannot be considered falsified but only one
containing clerical error in the date of execution.

xx xx
To the mind of this Commission, [Judge De Guzman-Laput] amply explained the discrepancy as to the date
indicated in the affidavit. [Cardino] never refuted the assertion of clerical error. He only relied on the date of the
affidavit which appears to be erroneous. The premise that the affidavit was subscribed to on July 16, 2012 is
already debunked by the admission by the public officer authorized to administer oaths that there was a clerical
error in the said Affidavit. We lend credence to the testimony of [Judge De Guzman-Laput] as she was the public
officer who administered the oath. Furthermore, [Cardino] did not provide any assertion contradicting her.
[Cardino] did not provide any proof on the insinuation that the Judge has motives to falsely testify in the case.
[Cardino] failed to present even a single testimony to support his claim. The negative testimony that the
renunciation did not take place cannot overcome the positive testimony that there was one. The testimony of
[Judge De Guzman-Laput] goes to show that [Jalosjos] made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship[s]. The document Affidavit of Renunciation was the evidence and result of such. The eligibility
of [Jalosjos] cannot just be negated by the clerical error in a document evidencing her renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships. Lastly, [Jalosjos] obtained the plurality of votes for the position of mayor of Dapitan City in
the May 13, 2013 Elections. This Commission cannot hold hostage the will of the electorate on the unproven
allegation that a requirement was not met by [Jalosjos].

xx xx
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cardino moved for a reconsideration15
of the above resolution but the same was denied in the assailed Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the
COMELEC En Banc.

In the petition before this Court, Cardino faults the COMELEC for refusing to declare the ineligibility of Jalosjos
for her failure to comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225 of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath when
she filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012. Cardino insists that Jalosjos' Affidavit of
Renunciation was falsified and, therefore, void ab initio as it was physically impossible for her to have executed,
signed and sworn to her Affidavit of Renunciation before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012.
Consequently, there was no valid personal sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships on the part of
Jalosjos.

As to the testimonial evidence adduced by Jalosjos, Cardino brushed them aside as mere self-serving and
inconsistent testimonies of biased witnesses. Cardino alleged that Judge De Guzman-Laput had every reason to
falsely testify in favor of Jalosjos given the pendency of the administrative case that Cardino filed against Judge
De Guzman-Laput before the Supreme Court (OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ) involving the allegedly fraudulent
execution of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation. In her Comment16 to the petition, Jalosjos maintains that her
Affidavit of Renunciation is not falsified, but one that merely contains a clerical error in the date of execution.
The same was actually executed and sworn to before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 19, 2012 and it was
through an error of the personnel who prepared the affidavit that the date of July 16, 2012 was indicated
thereon. Jalosjos admits that she could not have executed the affidavit on July 16, 2012 as she was still in the
USA on said date. Jalosjos explains that after she arrived in Manila on July 17, 2012, she bought a ticket for a
flight to Dipolog City in Zamboanga del Norte on July 19, 2012. Jalosjos then informed Corro that she wanted to
appear before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 19, 2012 so that her staff could make the necessary
arrangements. Jalosjos did in fact fly from Manila to Dipolog City on board Cebu Pacific Flight No. SJ-703 and
arrived there around 2:00 p.m. of July 19, 2012. At around 5:00 p.m. that day, Jalosjos personally appeared
before Judge De Guzman-Laput at the latter's sala in the MTC of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte and renounced
her American citizenship by executing the Affidavit of Renunciation under oath. Jalosjos stresses that Judge De
Guzman-Laput herself confirmed that Jalosjos personally appeared on July 19, 2012 before the latter at her sala
in the MTC of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte to renounce her American citizenship. Cardino, on the other
hand, failed to present any evidence that would controvert the testimonies of Jalosjos and her witnesses that
she in fact appeared before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 19, 2012 to personally renounce her American
citizenship. Jalosjos asserts that the mistake in the entry for the date of execution of the Affidavit of Renunciation
did not negate the fact she still performed the necessary acts to renounce her American citizenship under oath
before she filed her COC for Mayor in the May 13, 2013 Elections. In its Comment 17 to the petition, the
COMELEC argues that Cardino' s petition for quo warranto was correctly dismissed as Jalosjos validly executed a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before Judge De Guzman-Laput prior to the filing of
her COC.

The COMELEC avers that the date July 16, 2012 written on Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was proven to be a
mere clerical error. This fact was explained by Judge De Guzman-Laput when she testified that Jalosjos personally
appeared before her and sworn to the Affidavit of Renunciation on July 19, 2012. The COMELEC posits that since
Jalosjos won the elections, all doubts should be resolved in favor of her eligibility.

In his Consolidated Reply to the above comments, Cardino stands pat on his position that Jalosjos' defense of
clerical error cannot be used to override the established fact that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to
appear before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012 to renounce her American citizenship under oath.

After evaluating the facts and evidence of this case, the Court fails to find any action on the part of the COMELEC
that constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. At the outset, the Court
notes that term of the contested office in this case, i.e., the mayorship of Dapitan City following the May 13,
2013 Elections, already expired on June 30, 2016. The issues regarding the eligibility of Jalosjos for the said
position and Cardino's supposed right to be declared the winner for said term had been rendered moot and
academic.

However, we deem it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits considering that litigation on the question
of Jalosjos' citizenship is capable of repetition in that it is likely to recur if she would run again for public office.

The present case arose from a petition for quo warranto filed by Cardino under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which pertinently reads:

According ta .Cardino, the ineligibility of Jalosjos stemmed from the fact that she was a dual citizen of the
Philippines and the USA when she submitted her COC for Mayor in the May 13, 2013 elections. This is proscribed
by Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xx
xx
(d) Those with dual citizenship[.]

In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained in detail the requirements that must be
complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a person with dual citizenship can be qualified to run for any
elective public office, to wit:

[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
( 1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
xx xx

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and
single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation. Cardino asserts
the spuriousness of the affidavit based on the date of its supposed execution on July 16, 2012; whereas Jalosjos
claims otherwise, insisting that while the affidavit was so dated, the same was merely an error as the affidavit
was executed and subscribed to on July 19, 2012.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division that the date of July 16, 2012 in the Affidavit of
Renunciation was indeed a clerical error. The COMELEC Second Division gave greater weight to the evidence
offered by Jalosjos, particularly the testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who unequivocally stated that Jalosjos
personally appeared before her sala "n July 19, 2012 to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation. The COMELEC
Second Division found that Cardino failed
to disprove Judge De Guzman-Laput's testimony.

After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no proper reason to disturb the factual findings
of the COMELEC. We reiterate our ruling in Typoco v. Commission on Elections that: The findings of fact of
administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-reviewable by courts of justice.
This principle is applied with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the poll body - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself-
on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. To repeat, the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's
function, as mandated by the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction, not that it simply erred or has a different view. Time and again, the Court has held that a
petition for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain. (Citations omitted.)

Notably, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in resolving the administrative case filed by Cardino against
Judge De Guzman-Laput relative to the incidents of this case. Thus, in our Resolution24 dated June 18, 2014 in
OCA IPI No. 13-2627-MTJ, we adopted and approved the following conclusions of law and recommendations of
the OCA:

EVALUATION: On the issue of falsification, this Office finds for respondent Judge. There was really no reason why
respondent Judge would have to falsify the date of the notarization of the Affidavit of Renunciation when
indicating the actual date of notarization, 19 July 2012, would not have affected the validity of the affidavit.
There was no deadline to reckon with since the Affidavit of Renunciation was required to be executed, at the
latest, on the day of the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and Jalosjos filed it later or on 1 October 2012. In
sum, the facts surrounding this particular issue lead to the conclusion that the date appearing in the Affidavit of
Renunciation is the result of an honest mistake. Furthermore, respondent Judge could not have
falsified the Affidavit of Renunciation just to do Jalosjos a favor. Respondent Judge was correct in saying that if
there was anybody who benefited from her inadvertence, it was complainant since the mistake gave him a
ground to question the validity of the election of Jalosjos as mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga [d]el Norte. Also,
it must be noted that the subject notarized document was used by Jalosjos only after several months after it was
notarized, or in October 2012. Evidently, there was no urgency for the said document to be notarized in July
2012, thereby negating any probable impropriety with respect thereto.

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that with
respect to the instant complaint of Agapito J. Cardino relative to the violation of SC Circular No. 1-90, Judge
Veronica C. DG-Laput, Municipal Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte, be REMINDED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties, and be STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

All things considered, the Court affirms the findings of the COMELEC Second Division that Jalosjos' Affidavit of
Renunciation is not a falsified document. As such, Jalosjos complied with the provisions of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof, Jalosjos was able to fully divest herself of her American citizenship, thus
making her eligible to run for the mayorship ofDapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Resolution dated December 16, 2014 of the Commission
on Elections Second Division and the Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Commission on Elections En Banc
in EPC No. 2013-06 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.