International Review of Sociology
Revue Internationale de Sociologie

Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2011, 191
204

RESEARCH ARTICLE
The contextualization of definitions of religion
Karel Dobbelaere*

Centre for Sociological Research of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

(Received October 2009; final version received September 2010)

The author insists on the need to take the social-structural context into account
to evaluate the existing types of definitions of religion. Proposing a definition for
the Western hemisphere, he then checks his definition against sociological studies
referring to new types of religiosity and concludes that sociologists should
differentiate between meaning systems
of which religion is a sub-division
and
spiritualities. In a second step, he discusses two sociological theories about
religion and insists that sociologists should be more careful in using such theories
by taking into consideration the type of religion the theory is concerned with.
Finally, he suggests that rational choice theory and secularization theory might
well be integrated and applied in a European context if we move to the level of the
competing existing meaning systems.
Keywords: meaning systems; spirituality; new religious movements; secularization
theory; rational choice theory

Sociologists who study religion have been confronted with the difficult problem of
defining it. Explicitly, e.g. Emile Durkheim (1898, 1960, pp. 31
66), or implicitly, e.g.
Max Weber (1963), they all have worked with a definition to structure their field.
Nearly 40 years ago, as a young professor, I struggled with that problem in my classes
on Sociology of Religion and published an article written with my colleague
Jan Lauwers (1973). We insisted on the need to take the social-structural context into
account and I still do, but, I want to add in this reflection the need to take also the
theoretical context into account

The importance of the social-structural context

Types of definitions
In sociological textbooks, two types of definitions are prevalent: substantive and
functional definitions. Substantive definitions say what religion is. A good example
is Peter Bergers definition (1967, pp. 26
28, 176 and 178): Religion is the human
enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established. The differentia in this definition
is the category of the sacred, which he takes in the sense understood by the
Religionswissenschaft since Rudolf Otto. J. Milton Yinger (1957, p. 9) offers us a clear
example of a functional definition: Religion, then, can be defined as a system of
beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with . . . ultimate
problems of human life. It is the refusal to capitulate to death, to give up in the face

*Email: dobbelaere.voye@skynet.be.
ISSN 0390-6701 print/ISSN 1469-9273 online
# 2011 University of Rome La Sapienza
DOI: 10.1080/03906701.2011.544199
http://www.informaworld.com
192 K. Dobbelaere

of frustration, to allow hostility to tear apart ones humans associations. Conse-

quently, any such system of beliefs and practices that struggles with, what
Thomas ODea (1966, p. 5) calls the three brute facts of contingency . . .
powerlessness . . . and scarcity (and consequently, frustration and depression) is to
be considered a religion. The differentia in this type of definition is what the beliefs
and practices do.
However, not all definitions are either substantive or functional: some are a
combination of the two. Take, for example, Durkheims well-known definition (1960,
p. 65): A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things,
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden (the substantive component, KD)

beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a church
(the functional component; KD), all those who adhere to it. In other words,
Durkheim says that the consequence, the function of religion, is integration, is the
construction of a cohesive collectivity. More recently, Daniele Hervieu-Leger has
offered a new definition combining a substantive and a functional component. She
proposes to designate as religious this particular modality of the believing which
has the particularity to refer to the legitimating authority of a tradition (Hervieu-
Leger 1993, p. 121).1 For her, The believing is the belief and the acts, it is the lived
belief which includes the whole of the individual and collective convictions, which
are not based on verification, on experimentation, and more broadly, on modes of
recognition and control which characterizes knowledge, but which find their grounds
for existence in that they give meaning and coherence to the subjective existence of
those who adhere to them. The latter part specifies the function of the believing.
And further in her analysis, Hervieu-Leger adds this functional element: the religious
gives rise to religion if the reference to tradition is capable to generate a social
link . . . that a believing community might be constituted (p. 244). The functional
component is similar to Durkheims. But the substantive component refers to three
elements that are firmly united together: the expression of a believing, the memory
of a continuity and the legitimating reference to an authorized version of this
memory, i.e. to a tradition (p. 142). The content of the substantive component is not
specified, the qualifications are purely formal. From this follows that many have
underscored that the definition may be applied to believings that are not religious
(Lambert 2007, p. 24). Consequently, the particular referent of religion should be
specified in a definition of religion.

The need to specify the socio-structural context

The functional definitions
With a functional definition, a problem emerges: how can we study functional
alternatives to religion if every possible alternative performing the functions by
which religion is defined must, by definition, also be considered a religion? In his
comments, Yinger adds an element other than functions to his definition: not every
effort to struggle with the ultimate problems of human life is religion, only a certain
kind of effort is religious (1957, p. 8). This poses an additional problem: who is
going to specify that certain effort? An answer to this question seems to be given by
him in answer to another problem concerning his functional definition. If it can be
shown that a given system of beliefs and practices that is generally thought to be
 International Review of Sociology
Revue Internationale de Sociologie 193

religion [italics mine] is not performing the functions by which religion is defined
should we then declare that this system of beliefs and practices is not a religion? Such
error can be avoided by indicating that religion is an effort to perform certain
functions for man (p. 8). It seems then that Yinger is specifying now this certain
kind of effort as being that which is generally thought to be religious by society. In
fact, Yinger is not talking exclusively about functions. Implicitly he adds substantive
elements to his functional definition in order to be able to study functional
alternatives to religion, to wit, those kinds of efforts that are not generally thought
to be religion in the community under study. This allows him also to continue to
consider in a particular society a so-called religion that does not perform the
functions by which religion has been defined as a religion. Should we then not define
religion as that which is called religion in a particular society or in certain parts of a
society?
Systems theorist Niklas Luhmanns (1977, p. 46) definition is based on the typical
function that defines the subsystem religion: the problem of simultaneity of
indefiniteness and certainty (or transcendence and immanence), since, according
to him, for this problem no functional alternatives are available. This is similar to
Freunds (1984, p. 25) position, for whom the central fact around which religion
emerges is death: humans are religious if they believe in a transcendent, a hereafter
(among others nirvana, the immortal soul or the resurrection of the dead).
Luhmanns central system-hypothesis is dass das Religionssystem sich als eine
selbstsubstitutive Ordnung ausdifferenziert hat (1977, p. 48). Such a self-substituting
system orients itself toward the social system, the other sub-systems, and itself.
Spiritual communication to the total system is the primary function, which is
performed by the church through rituals (die Funktionsorientierung). Its relations to
the other social sub-systems are called ancillary functions (die Leistungsorientierung).
And reflexion on the religious system itself is the third type of function (die
Theologie) (pp. 56
59). All three different functions have to be performed separately
but combined together (p. 62). In fact, Luhmann implicitly operates with a
conventional definition of religion based on the type of problems traditional religion
tries to solve. This is an example of a functional definition using substantive
components based on a traditional context. And in fact Luhmann implicitly accepts
this since he writes that religion, as an autonomous sub-system that reacts to its
environment, adapts itself by taking up newly developing religious modes. Will these
new modes pattern themselves according to existing religions? And, could a newly
developing mode imply a loss of transcendence?

The substantive definitions

How about the alternative type, the substantive definition of religion? Such a
definition searches for the essence of religion and defines it as sacred. Sociologists
using such a definition rely on the Religionswissenschaft, which has a universal
approach to religious phenomenon. Sacred is antonym to profane and specifications
of this concept can only be made in formal terms: e.g.; set apart and forbidden,
a mysterious and awesome power, sticking out, opposed to chaos (Berger 1967,
pp. 26
28). The approach of sociologists using such a definition is culturally loaded
and they try to exceed the socio-structural context. They search for a general
evolutionary scheme; examples are Thomas Luckmann (1967) and Robert Bellah
194 K. Dobbelaere

(1964). Concrete sociological research is only possible if one drops this global
approach and studies what is called sacred in a concrete socio-structural context.
In the context of our Western society the term sacred is used to stimulate in
people attitudes of awe, veneration and respect. Examples of this are shown near
Verdun (France), la voie sacree (the sacred road) and the lieu sacre de Douaumont
(the sacred place of Douaumont), which refer to the sacrifices of the First World
War. However, these would never be considered religious. Consequently, the
concept sacred does not refer exclusively to religious phenomena and has a much
broader meaning. Edward Norbeck (1961, p. 11), looking for what we can safely and
profitably use to distinguish the religious from the nonreligious, concludes that: The
least constricting terms our vocabulary provides to enable us to set off the realm of
religions from the rest of culture are the natural and the super-natural. Durkheim
(1960, p. 41) rejected that position since the idea of the supernatural presupposes the
contrary idea of the natural order; however, this idea is not at all primitive. In fact,
Durkheim tried to define religion as a universal phenomenon, rejecting the notion of
supernatural that is typical of a particular social context. In his study of the
Australian totemic system, he did not even differentiate the religious community, the
so-called church, from the society.

Does all that is called religion in Western societies have a supernatural referent?
After this partial review of the literature, do we then have to decide that in our
Western societies of to-day, in casu our socio-structural context, religion is a system
of beliefs and rituals relative to the supernatural, which unite into a single moral
community all those who adhere to it?2 Since the seventies, sociological studies on
religion have references to new types of religion, among others invisible religion,
diffused religion, implicit religion, new religious movements (NRM) and spirituality.
Do these fit the definition we arrived at?

Invisible religion
In the fourth evolutionary phase of religion, Luckmann describes an emerging
institutionally non-specialized social form of religion, which has been called
Invisible Religion, historically following an institutionally specialized social form
of religion, grosso modo church religion, which has lost its social impact and
individual adherence; in other words, its decline in modern Western societies
expresses secularization. Institutionally specialized religion has become a secondary
institution, but continues to be one of the sources contributing to the thematic
assortment of the modern sacred cosmos (1967, p. 107). The dominant themes of the
emerging new sacred cosmos are difficult to define and to describe according to him,
but he underlines some: individual autonomy, which expresses itself in self-
realization and self-expression, which articulate themselves specifically in the
mobility ethos and the liberalization of sexuality from external control; familism,
which represents an expansion of the private sphere beyond the confines of the
solitary individual (1967, p. 113). These major themes are surrounded by
subordinate, less important topics, which are not selected as the cornerstones in
the construction of subjective systems of ultimate significance, and they originate
in the traditional Christian cosmos or in the secular ideologies of the eighteenth and
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Revue Internationale de Sociologie 195

nineteenth centuries. For the sake of illustration he mentions getting along with
others, adjustment, a fair shake for all, and togetherness. Luckmann further-
more underscores that death and old age do not appear even in the subordinate
topics (1967, p. 114). It is clear that, even if some subordinate themes may have a
religious background, there is no supernatural referent present nor is even death a
topic, which, according to Freund (see above), is the theme around which
traditionally religion emerged. May we then call it an invisible religion?

Diffused religion
Roberto Cipriani has written extensively on this topic. It is a form of cultural
Catholicism whose particularistic values
attachment to the family, love of ones
children, good use of money, managing by oneself and earning a lot
are
combined with universal values
honesty, probity, faith in God, respect for
others, having a clear consciousness, attachment to work, friendship, solidarity,
being content with little and generosity, charity (Cipriani 2001). Here there is a
supernatural referent, God, but it is a definition that describes changes in church
religiosity in a segment of the Catholic world in Italy which is distancing itself from
the Church, especially in relation to religious practices.
Diffused religion is similar to the changes that Jaak Billiet, Karel Dobbelaere,
Rudi Laermans and Liliane Voye have described in the collective conscience of the
Catholic pillar3 in Belgium. Socio-cultural Christianity, replacing the Catholic
canon, functions there now as the sacred canopy for the segmented Catholic world of
olden days. It refers to so-called typical values of the gospel such as social justice, a
humane approach toward people, well-being, solidarity between social classes with
special attention to marginal people, and Gemeinschaftlichkeit. These are values that
have a universal appeal, and which are not specifically Christian. However, by
backing them up with a religious source, the gospels, and occasionally solemnizing
them with religious rituals, they acquired a sacred aura. This new collective
consciousness is still symbolized by a C, referring to Christian, i.e. the gospels,
instead of to the Catholic canon, the latter being considered to have a more restricted
appeal and to be more confining (Billiet and Dobbelaere 1976; Dobbelaere and Voye
1990, pp. 6
8; Laermans 1992, pp. 204
214).

Implicit religion
Edward Bailey is the founding father of the study of implicit religion which he started
in 1968 under the name secular religion, which was changed to implicit religion in
1976. The term religion must here be understood, according to him, in terms of the
practice of core intentions and the qualifier implicitly refers to the presence of the
commitment of any kind (Bailey 1998, p. 13). Consequently, the first definition of
implicit religion is commitment(s) and Bailey (1998, pp. 17
18) adds two more
definitions: integrating foci
which directs attention to the whole width of possible
forms of sociality (Bailey 2009, p. 802)
and intensive concerns with extensive
effects
this dual measure of commitment prevents its confusion with momentary
(even if repeated) passions, that are not otherwise influential; or with general
predilections, that are not themselves of serious import (Bailey 1997, p. 9). It is clear
that the study of implicit religion is much broader than the object of the study of
196 K. Dobbelaere

religion we arrived at; it is the study of personal commitments which may, however,
include some supernatural views. In a synthesis of the first three empirical studies,
Bailey (1997, p. 271) describes the continually emerging threads in these studies: As a
system, its implicit religion can be described as involving the sacredness of the Self, as
its highest common factor; the sacredness of other Selves, as its lowest common
multiple; and the sacredness of relationships with other Selves, as its infinite
extrapolation. It is, however, better demonstrated, than described, by its willingness
to pursue, and indulge in, self-sacrifice, for the sake of the Self itself.

New religious movements (NRMs)

Some NRMs, such as the Unification Church, the Family, and ISKCON, want to re-
sacralize the secularized world and its institutions by bringing God (Krishna) back in
the different groups operating in the societal sub-systems such as the family, the
economy, and even the polity. Roy Wallis (1984) has called these world rejecting new
religions. However, the vast majority of NRMs are of another type, they are world
affirming. They offer their members esoteric means for attaining immediate and
automatic assertiveness, heightened spirituality, recovery, success and a clear mind.
Mahikari provides an omitama or amulet; transcendental meditation (TM) a
personal mantra for meditation; Scientology auditing with an e-meter; human
potential movements offer therapies, encounter groups or alternative health and
spiritual centres; Soka Gakkai promotes chanting of an invocation in front of a
mandala, the Gohonzon; while Elan Vital offers the knowledge revealed by Maharaji
or one of his appointed instructors.
Luckmann (1990) has rightly argued that in many NRMs the level of transce-
ndence has been lowered; they have become this-worldly or mundane. The historical
religions, by contrast, are seen as examples of great transcendences, referring to
something other than everyday reality, notwithstanding the fact that they have been
and continue to be involved, although to a lesser extent, in mundane or this-worldly
affairs, attested by the organizational structures that they established, e.g. schools
and hospitals. However, their reference remains transcendental, e.g. the incantations
for healing, for success in examinations or work, or for une ame soeur. Most world-
affirming NRMs appear to reach only the level of intermediate transcendences.
They bridge time and space, promote inter-subjective communication, but remain at
the immanent level of everyday reality. Consequently, some, like TM, claim to be
spiritual rather than religious movements. What we register in many NRMs is a
change in references: the ultimate has become this-worldly.
Consequently, the concept of religion is expanding. There are two typical
reactions towards this. In some societies such groups are called cults or sects
(e.g. in Belgium and France) and, in Belgium (1979) a Parliamentarian Research
Commission was installed to elaborate a policy to fight against illegal practices of
sects and against the dangers they are supposed to represent for society and
individuals. Conversely, minority religions and notably NRMs, seeking legal status
and equal access to public funds and other privileges, which majority religions have,
must apply or go to court (Beckford and Richardson 2007, pp. 403
406). Since
Scientology has been perhaps the most litigious religious group in modern history,
its court cases allow us to denote the two issues NRMs are facing to get
such privileges: to define and defend itself as a genuine religion and apply for
 International Review of Sociology
Revue Internationale de Sociologie 197

registration as a religious group in countries demanding such a status for achieving

tax exemption and other privileges (Richardson 2009, pp. 50
51).

Spiritualities
Here, we are not concerned about spirituality within Christianity, but in spirituality
outside it, what Eva Hamberg (2009, p. 746) calls unchurched spirituality.
Spirituality starts, according to Paul Heelas, from the idea that humans are by
nature spiritual beings. Accordingly, the inner life of spirituality is bringing life
to life. Involving as it does inner sources of authority and significance, taking away
the transcendent God of theism leaves the heart of spiritualities of life intact (Heelas
2009, p. 759). It is a belief in the God within, not without (p. 777). In her analysis of
the concept of spirituality, Hamberg (2009, p. 748) points out that it is used in
different senses by scholars, but tends to have important themes in common.
Referring to McGuire, Hamberg (2009) cites the following features: holism,
autonomy, eclecticism, tolerance, this-worldly activism and pragmatism, apprecia-
tion of materiality, and blurring of boundaries between sacred and profane. In a
reference to Roof, she underscores that he puts emphasis on experience: Generally,
primacy is placed not on reason or inherited faith, but on experience, or anticipation
of experience, engaging the whole person activating, or reactivating, individual as
well as collective energies (p. 750). Finally she stresses individualism as a
characteristic: a focus on the self, has often been noted as an aspect of
contemporary spirituality (p. 751).

The need for differentiation: meaning systems, religions and spiritualities

It is clear that the variety of studies in the field of sociology of religion calls for a
differentiation in the field. Diffused religion fits the substantive definition we
arrived at. In fact it analyses a type of belonging, a religion a la carte, that a large
majority of Catholics have arrived at in the Western hemisphere.
The Invisible Religion (1967) is the title of the English version of the book Das
Problem der Religion in der Modernen Gesellschaft (1963) in which Luckmann
describes the evolution of social forms of religion. The modern or fourth form is the
institutionally non-specialized social form of religion, and he describes some themes
that are part of the modern sacred cosmos as we have seen. Would it not be more
fitting to call this so-called sacred cosmos a meaning system consisting of values
and themes, some inherited from Christianity, that give ultimate significance to
individuals and legitimate their priorities? And is that not also the research topic of
Baileys Implicit Religion: the search for the core commitments, which integrate the
lives of individuals? Bailey (1997, p. 39) himself points out the closeness of the two
concepts. Why not call both research projects studies of individual and collective
meaning systems? I know that the use of the term systems may suggest that they
are well integrated. But the use of the term system suggests merely a hypothesis: to
study how well integrated the individual and social core values are. And is the term
meaning system not the more general term which implies religion as a specific form?
The fact that Hamberg feels the need to call the recent use of spirituality
unchurched spirituality, to differentiate it from spiritualities in the religions itself,
indicates that sociologists and other social scientists are looking for a term to point
198 K. Dobbelaere

out a basis, a fundament for the actual vision of individuals who do not refer to the
God without but to the God within. It is a holistic vision based on experience,
which is not systematized either. This indicates that it is built on ongoing experiences.
What is then the difference with religion? That it does not refer to the sacred
supernatural, but to the sacredness of life itself.
And what about the so-called NRMs? Some have a reference towards the
supernatural and may be called religion even if they are mostly mundane in offering
so-called sacred means to be successful in life. Others do not have such reference
and might better be called spiritual movements, like the suggestion of TM.
There is, however, a big difference between religions and other meaning systems.
Religions have been systematized by specialists (e.g. theologians), they have an
established orthodoxy and an authority which claims to have the right to define the
correct content of the beliefs, the moral principles and deduced norms, and the
consecrated forms of the rituals. For sure there are other meaning systems that are
also authoritatively defined, communism for example. But if we study religion as it is
lived by people, it is not much more systematized than the lived spirituality is, which
does not (not yet?) have an authoritative leadership.

The theoretical context

In the first part of this article I have analysed the definitions of religion employed in
the sociology of religion taking the social-structural context into account. In the
introduction I added that it is also important to take the theoretical context of our
research into account. In a study to evaluate the level of secularization of Western
societies in connection with the rise and spread of NRMs, reference was made to
conventional secularization and traditional secularization theory without any
serious analysis of the theoretically grounded predictions of secularization theory
itself (Robbins and Lucas 2007, pp. 230
231). In order to test theories with the
available empirical data we should analyse our data on the basis of the predictions of
the theory taking the types of religion the theory is concerned with seriously. In her
study of unchurched spiritualities, Hamberg (2009, pp. 747
748) rightfully stressed
that, in order to evaluate the level of secularization in Europe in connection with
these emerging spiritualities, it is important to define not only the levels of analysis
but also religion or religiousness. I want to add that in studies of the sociology of
religion one has not only to take into account the definition of religion and the
connected fields of spiritualities and meaning systems, but also the types of religion
the theory is concerned with. To make my point, let us concentrate on a sociological
theory closely related to religion. To explain secularization, one often refers to
modernization; however, that is a multidimensional concept which implies many
processes such as urbanization, migration, industrialization, rationalization, etc.
A theory should be more specific (Dobbelaere 2002).
Modern societies are primarily differentiated along functional lines that overlay
the prior forms of segmentary and social class differentiation (Luhmann 1982,
pp. 262
265) and have developed different sub-systems (e.g. economy, polity, science,
family, education etc.). These sub-systems perform their own particular function
(production and distribution of goods and services; taking binding decisions;
production of valid knowledge, procreation and mutual support, teaching).
To guarantee these functions and to communicate with their environment,
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Revue Internationale de Sociologie 199

organizations have been established (enterprises; political parties; research centres,

families, schools and universities). In each sub-system and in its relations with the
environment, communication is based on the medium of the sub-system (money;
power; knowledge, love, information and know-how). Each organization also
functions according to the values of the sub-system (competition and success;
separation of powers; reliability and validity, primacy of love; truth) and its specific
norms.
Regarding religion, these organizations claim their autonomy and reject
religiously prescribed rules, i.e. the autonomization of the so-called secular sub-
systems. For example, the separation of church and state; the development of science
as an autonomous secular perspective; the rejection of church proscriptions about
birth control; the emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority; and the
rejection of religious control over arts and literature. Diagnosing the loss of religions
influence on the secular sub-systems, religious authorities were the first to talk about
the emancipation of the secular. In other words, secularization describes the effects of
functional differentiation for the religious sub-system and its organizations, i.e. the
churches.
Thus, the sociological explanation of secularization starts with the process of
functional differentiation: religion becomes a sub-system alongside other subsystems
and in this process the religious organizations lose their overarching claims over the
autonomous secular sub-systems. Consequently, we may define secularization as the
process by which religious authorities lost control over the secular sub-systems.
Churchly norms lose their effect upon the functioning of these sub-systems; examples
in the medical sub-system are the laws on abortion and euthanasia and, in the family,
laws on divorce and on same-sex marriages.
This process started a long time ago and is still going on; indeed laws on
euthanasia or same-sex marriages for example have not been passed in all Western
countries. We should also be aware that there are reversals; indeed it should be noted
that governments can re-sacralize society or sub-systems of society. This occurred in
post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. As Irena Borowik (1999, p. 9) points
out: A new power had to be devised to serve as a substitute for the communist
ideology in order to integrate the society. Religion seems to be the best solution in
this respect. Since in the process of manifestly secularizing society during the
communist regimes, education was an important means, the re-introduction of
religious classes in the curricula was used to de-secularize society, e.g. in Romania
(Flora and Szilagyi 2005, pp. 133
134) and in Poland (Mach and Mach 1999,
pp. 407
408 and 410). Other reversals occurred in the legislation concerning the
family on divorce and contraception and in medicine on abortion and euthanasia
(Borowik 1999, pp. 16
17, Zrinscak 1999, p. 131).
As the religious authorities have lost control over the so-called secular sub-
systems, they also lost it over the Catholic organizational structures they had
initiated at the end of the nineteenth century to protect their flock from the
secularization tendencies in society (Righart 1986). In certain countries, Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, these organizations were integrated in an
organizational complex which is called a pillar (Righart 1986). However, in the
Netherlands, studies have demonstrated that about a century after its emergence, the
Catholic pillar begun to totter (Coleman 1978, Thurlings 1978). In Belgium,
the Catholic pillar survived organizationally but changed its collective consciousness
200 K. Dobbelaere

as I have already described (see section Diffused religion above). The reference was
changed: Catholic norms were considered to be too confining; the C in the acronym
no longer meant Catholic but Christian, and the core values were grounded in the
gospels rather than in the teachings of the Catholic Church (Dobbelaere 1988,
pp. 83
87).
At the same time, the religious authorities lost control over the beliefs, practices
and moral norms of the faithful. A pick and choose religion developed, also called a
religion a la carte, a term I used suggesting that the set menu was no longer taken
but that the individual believer chooses the beliefs (s)he can accept, selects his/her
ritual practices and follows the ethical norms (s)he could agree with. Decades ago, a
Belgian bishop stated in a long interview in the press that a religion a la carte was
unacceptable for the Catholic authorities; they and they alone had the authority to
define the religious doctrine based on the scriptures and the tradition. Notwith-
standing this claim of the authorities, a religion a la carte developed (Norris and
Inglehart 2004, pp. 64
89, Brechon 2007, pp. 465
485). This is what is called
individual secularization: the individual defines his own religion, picking from the
churchly offers that which (s)he can accept, incorporating also certain beliefs and
practices from other religions such as reincarnation, a belief alien to Christianity,
and yoga.
Individual secularization is thus the rejection by the individual of the set
practices, norms and beliefs of the authorities of the churches. A large number of
former members of the churches even left them; for example in Belgium only 50%
called themselves Catholic, according to the European Values Study (EVS) of 2009;
in 1981 this was still 72% of the population. More, about 60% of the Belgian
population less than 45 years old called themselves unchurched in 2009 (EVS). The
Western European percentage of unchurched was 24% according to EVS in 1999,
varying from 54% in the Netherlands to 9 and 3% in Ireland and Greece (Brechon
2007, p. 468). The emergence and the spread of new religious movements since the
four last decades of the twentieth century are related to the process of globalization
and intercontinental mobility, but also to the process of individual secularization
that opened a market. Those NRMs which Wallis (1984) has called world rejecting
new religions may be considered as religions according to our definition. However,
the vast majority are of another type, which Wallis called world affirming NRMs,
and only some would fit our definition of religion (see section New religious
movements above). Moreover the numbers of the members of religious NRMs are
too small to compensate for the losses of the major religions. Thus the NRMs largely
confirm individual secularization.
Finally, how do we have to interpret the rise of unchurched spiritualities? They
are, as we have seen, basically focused on the self: the central belief is the god within,
not without and primacy is given to personal experience not to inherited faith or
reason. This means that they do not fit the definition of religion we arrived at and
consequently they also cannot be used to invalidate the secularization theory I have
presented, to the contrary they confirm individual secularization. Is the rise of
unchurched spiritualities, or what is called so, the omen of the disappearance of the
traditional religions, being replaced by a new religionless meaning system? Or is it the
beginning of a overwhelmingly religionless society? Only the future will be able to
answer this.
 International Review of Sociology
Revue Internationale de Sociologie 201

By way of conclusion
In an overview of definitions of religion, we came to the conclusion that in the
Western context: Religion is a system of beliefs and rituals relative to the
supernatural, which unite into a single moral community all those who adhere to
it. We did not propose this definition as a universal definition, but stressed the social
context in which we have worked. Analysing the extensions of religion by adding
epithets to the term, we came to the conclusion that we have to distinguish
spiritualities and secular meaning systems from religion. In a second step, we stressed
that a strict definition of religion is needed to come to valid conclusions in
sociological research and that we also have to take into account the types of religion
that the theory is concerned with: this sets the limits of its applicability. Finally, to
evaluate the validity of a theory we can neither loosely use the theory nor refer to it,
as in our example, as the conventional or traditional secularization theory. All
these precautions should allow us to come to valid conclusions within the limits that
we have set ourselves. Does this analysis help us to integrate rational choice theory
(RCT) and secularization theory and adapt it to the (West) European context?
RCT holds that a religious pluralistic situation may promote church commit-
ment. This theory makes three important points. RCT postulates a latent religiosity
on the demand side (Stark 1997, p. 8) that should become manifest by active
competition between religious firms on the supply side (Stark 1997, p. 17). However,
this is only possible in a pluralistic religious situation where religious firms compete
for customers and to the extent that the supply side is not limited by state
regulations, suppressing or subsidizing religions (Finke 1997, pp. 50
51, Iannaccone
1997, pp. 40
41). State and religion should be de-regulated to allow competition
between religious firms; in the opposite case, religious firms are lazy (Stark and
Iannaccone, 1994) since there is no need for competition. Stated this way, RCT only
works in states that are secularized on the societal level. Consequently, there is no
opposition between secularization theory and RCT.
The problem in applying RCT in Europe is that competition between Christian
churches is limited by an agreement between the representatives of the Anglican,
Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches to renounce all competitive evangeliza-
tion which might express a spirit of competition between them (Willaime 2004,
p. 32). Consequently, the competition between so-called religious firms is limited to
sects and new religious movements (NRM) themselves and between them and the
Christian churches. However, due to state regulations, for example in Belgium and
France, and the anti-sect witch-hunt in the media (also in Belgium and especially
France), there is no fair competition. Do we have then to conclude that the RCT is
not applicable in Europe? I do not think so; we should apply the steps that were
pointed out in our analysis and extend the notion of religion on the supply side of the
RCT and move to a more general concept that includes religion.
In fact religion is only a sub-category of the more general concept meaning
system. It is a particular meaning system since it has a supernatural referent. There
are alongside religion other meaning systems, among others hedonism, materialism
and individualism. The competition in Europe is more between religious meaning
systems and non-religious meaning systems, more particularly, between religious and
a- or anti-religious meaning systems. To give some examples: the laicization or
manifest process of societal secularization attests to that. In Spain, the proposal to
202 K. Dobbelaere

eliminate religion as a study subject in state schools; in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Spain, the legalization of homo-marriages; and in Belgium and the Netherlands, the
legalization of euthanasia . . . these laws or legal propositions are opposed by the
Catholic Church and, in Belgium, the extension of the law on euthanasia to children
also by the Orthodox Church and Islam.
All these laws are motivated in reference to the so-called religious and moral
pluralism which should, under certain conditions, permit individuals to follow their
own conscience. These laws are promoted by humanist associations and by political
parties that are strongly influenced by members of atheistic lodges. Do we have a
possibility on the basis of other studies to calculate the heterogeneity in meaning
systems taking religious, humanist and atheist firms into account? We have to think
about it and study ways in which to define the different meaning systems and how to
evaluate their respective strength. However, measuring pluralism does not measure
competition, a critique addressed to supply studies. We also have to introduce
measures of competition. Integrating so-called conflicting theories in an integrated
research project is possible if we use the different steps that have allowed us to specify
religion and other meaning systems taking the social context into account. It allows
us to move towards integration instead of mutual rejection.

Notes
1. Designer comme religieuse cette modalite particuliere du croire qui a en propre den appeler a
lautorite legitimatrice dune tradition.
2. In his analysis of the social history of definitions of religion, Yves Lambert (1991, p. 81)
comes to the same conclusion: religions reference is the supra-empirique. See also his
posthumous book (2007, pp. 22
25).
3. Pillars are organizational structures integrating organizations performing all kinds of social
functions and activities on a religious or ideological basis. In Belgium, besides a Catholic
pillar, there is a Socialist and a Liberal pillar. The original Catholic pillar, now called
Christian, embraces schools, hospitals, old peoples homes, youth and adult move-
ments, social welfare organisations, a sick fund, a trade union, etc. (Dobbelaere 2009,
pp. 63
73).

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