CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

AND
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Notes and Cases

Part I

by

JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

Third Edition
2010
L

Table of Contents

Introduction j
Philippine Constitutionalism, Birth Pangs and Traumatic Growth 1
1. Early Organic Acts 1
2. The 1935 Constitution 2
3. The 1973 Constitution : 3
4. The Freedom Constitution 4
5. The 1987 Constitution 4

Preamble ; q
1. Notes on the Preamble 6

Article I: The National Territory 7

tiJSfeJ
Section 1 7

1. The Philippine Territory 7

Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies 10

Prenote \q
PRINCIPLES 10
Section 1. Republicanism 10
1. A "democratic and republican state." 10
NOTE: "Constitutional Authoritarianism." 11
2. Nature and functions of government 11
3. Sovereignty 13
A. PEOPLE V.GOZO :,,.. 13
4. Governments de jure and de facto. 14
A. CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 14
B. IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO 18
C. REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN 20
5. Patterns of government 24
TheSecond Pattern: Assembly Goyernment. 25
The Third Pattern: Parliamentarism*.?.?. 25
The Fourth Pattern: Cabinet Government 27
The Fifth Pattern: Presidentialism 29
 Sec. 2. War and peace 29
1. Renunciation of war 29
L 2 . Adoption of international law 30
3. Adherence to policy of peace, freedom, amity 31
Sec. 3. Role of armed forces 32
1. Civilian authority and the role of the military 32
2. Role of the armed forces 32
Sec. 4. Compulsory military and civil service 33
m 1. Compulsory military and civil service; protection of people and State. 33
Sec. 5. Peace and order 35
1. Peace and order, general welfare , 35
Sec. 6. Separation of Church and State 35
r STATE POLICIES 35
1^, Sec. 7. Independent foreign policy 35
1. An independent foreign policy 35
Sec. 8. Nuclear policy 36
1. A policy of freedom from nuclear weapons 36
r Sec. 9. Social order and prosperity 37
Sec. 10. Social justice 38
1. Social justice 38
A. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V.
to COURT OF APPEALS 38
Sec. 11. Dignity of the person 39
Sec. 12 . Sanctity of family life 39
Sec. 13. Youth 39
1. The family and the unborn 39
m 2. Education 39
Sec. 14. Women 40
1. Equality of women and men 40
Sec. 15. Health 40
Sec. 16. Ecology ; 40
km 1. The Right to a balanced ecology 40
A. OPOSA V. FACTORAN, JR 40
B. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V.
COURT OF APPEALS.. 43
Sec. 17. Education ! 48
Sec. 18. Labor : 48
Sec. 19. Independent economy 48
A. GARCIA V. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS 48
 Sec. 20. Role ofprivate sector 52
Sec. 21. Rural development and agrarian reform 52
Sec. 22. Indigenous cultural communities 52
Sec. 23. Non-government organizations 52
Sec. 24. Communications 52
Sec. 25. Local autonomy c
Sec. 26. Equal access to public service 52
1. Equal access topublic service 50
A. PAMATONG V. COMELEC 52
Sec. 27. Honesty in public service 54
Sec. 28. Transparency policy 54
Article VI: Legislative Department 55
Section 1. Legislative power 5R
1. Legislative power eg
2. Initiative and referendum 55
A. GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 56
3. Non-delegability oflegislative power 59
- 4. Non-delegability: CASES 60
A. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION 60
B. TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ 62
C. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION V. MINISTER OFLABOR.. 63
D. CEBUOXYGEN &ACETYLENE CO., INC. V.
SECRETARY DRILON 64
E. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY 65
F. PEOPLE V. DACUYCUY 68
G. EMPLOYEES CONFEDERATION V. NATIONAL
WAGES COMMISSION 70
NOTE: Penal rules 72
NOTE: Separation ofpowers in local governments 72
Sec. 2. Composition ofCongress 72
Sec. 3. Qualification ofSenators 73
A. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD 73
Sec. 4. Theterm ofSenators 73
Sec. 5. House ofRepresentatives 74
1. Sectoral representation and party-list representation 74
2. Cases on Party-List 76
A. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC 76
B. ANG BAGONG BAYANIV. COMELEC 83
 C. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY,
ETAL.V. COMELEC, ETAL. 88
D. BANAT V. COMELEC. _ 92
3. Apportionment. 204
A. TOBIAS V. ABALOS :>#. 104
B. MARIANO, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 106
C. MONTEJO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HO
D. BAGABUYO V. COMELEC ln
Sec. 6. Qualifications of House members H3
1. Qualifications of District Representatives H3
2. Qualifications of party-list Representatives li4
3. Residence qualification: CASES H4
A. GALLEGOV.VERRA ; 114
B. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC 117
C. AQUINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS m
D. DOMINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 122
(Si) 3. Citizenship qualification: CASES 124
A. CO V. HOUSE^ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 124
B. BENGZON V. CRUZ 128
* C. VALLES V. COMELEC 132
Sec. 7. Term of House members 135
1. Term andtenure ; -,05
A. DIMAPORO V. MITRA, JR ; 135
B. FARINAS, ETAL. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 136
sj Sec. 8. Date ofelection 141
1. Election ; 1yl1
r 141
A. CODILLA V. DE VENECIA 141
Sec. 9. Filling vacancies 142
1. Special Election 142
m A. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC 142
Sec. 10. Compensation , 150
1. Salaries, emoluments, allowances 150
**> Sec. 11.Immunities \ 150-
1. Immunity from arrest 150
lm 2- ^^ IIIIIIIIZZ 150
A. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS 150
3. Scope ofthe privilege of speech 154
A. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG 155
B. ANTONINO V. VALENCIA 155

K
 Sec. 12. Disclosures 15g
Sec. 13. Disqualifications 153
A. LIBAN V.GORDON 158
Sec. 14. Prohibitions 159
1. Prohibitions 15g
A. PUYATV.DE GUZMAN, JR 159
Sec. 15. Sessions 16Q
Sec. 16. Officers and rules 160
1. Officers : 16i
A. AVELINO V. CUENCO 161
B. SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA 164
C. ARROYO, ET AL. V. DE VENECIA 168
2. Internal discipline , 172
i#>
A. OSMENA V. PENDATUN 172
B. PAREDES, JR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN 175
m 3. Journals 175
A. UNITED STATES V. PONS 175
B. CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. V. GIMENEZ 177
C. ASTORGAV.VILLEGAS 177
Sec. 17. Electoral Tribunals 182
m 1. The Electoral Tribunals 182
A. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 182
B. ABBAS, ET AL. V. SENATE 187
^ C. BONDOC V. PINEDA 188
r D. GUERREROV. COMELEC 195
E. GARCIA, ET AL. V. HRET 196
F. PIMENTEL, ET AL. V. HRET 197
G. VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC 200
* H. LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC 200
r Sec. 18. Commission onAppointments 204
1. Composition of the Commission on Appointments 204
A. DAZAV. SINGSON 204
B. COSETENG V. MITRA, JR 208
m C. GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES 208
Sec. 19. Formation of Commissions 213
Sec. 20. Records 213
Sec. 21. Legislative investigations 213
1. Legislative investigations 213
^jfel
 m A. BENGZON, JR. V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 213
B. SABIO V. GORDON 21g
C. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE 221
w D- SENATE BLUE RIBBON V. JUDGE MAJADUCON. 224
Sec. 22. Executive privilege
1. Executive Privilege
A. SENATE V. ERMITA IZ....1 229
B. NERIV. SENATE COMMITTEE 244
,w Sec. 23. War and emergency powers .- 252
1. War powers
f AoA
2. Emergency powers oco
_ ZoZ
to Sec. 24. Origin ofbills
zoo
, 1. The Origination clause s 2c
^
Sec. 25. Appropriations Q
zoo

L Riders 254
A. GARCIA V. MATA 254
m 2. Transfer offunds 9__
A. DEMETRIAV. ALBA 255
St>
Sec. 26. 'Subject and title ofbills OKC
ZOO
1. Subject and title of bills ne
zo/

A. TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD 257

m B. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO 259
C. FARINAS, ET AL. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 261
D. TAN V. DEL ROSARIO 1ZZZ 261
E- TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 262
F. TOBIAS V. ABALOS ' 275
km Sec. 27. Passage of bills
z/5
1. Legislation ^ 2?
2. Item veto __
A to

A. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V COURT

OF TAX APPEALS 275
ijsaj
B. GONZALES V. MACARAIG .'.' " 278
C. PHILCONSAV. ENRIQUEZ 286
D. ARROYO V. DE VENECIA '" 304
'$#i
Sec. 28. Taxation
o04
1. The power to tax 304
A. GEROCHIV. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 305
2. Exemptions o0ft
3- CASES :....I~IIIIZIIIIIZZ 308

L
 A. GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 308
B. SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE V. CALOOCAN CITY 312
v C. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT
M& OF AGRARIAN REFORM 313
D. COMMISSIONER OF BIR V. COURT OF APPEALS 315
E. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. SANTOS.:.... 317
1pj
F. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V.
VICTOR LIM 318
Sec. 29. Control of public funds 325
1. Expenditure of public funds 325
A. GUINGONA, JR. V. CARAGUE 325
2. Public purpose 331
3. Special Fund 331
A. OSMENAV. ORBOS 331
Sec. 30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 334
A! FABIAN V. DESIERTO 334
Sec. 31. Title of royalty or nobility 338
Sec. 32. Initiative and referendum 338

Article VII: The Executive Department 339

Section 1. Executive power ? 339
1. Executive power 339
A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, ET AL 339
2. Executive immunity 344
ijijil A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 344
B. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 347
3. Head of State 348
4. Chief Executive 348
5. The Cabinet 348
6. Executive Privilege 348
Sec. 2. Qualifications of President 349
1. Citizenship and Qualification 349
U A. TECSONV. COMELEC 349
Sec. 3. The Vice-President 364
Sec. 4. Election and term of President and Vice-President 364
1. Election and Canvass 365
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC 365
B. CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE 366
C. PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE 366
D. FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 368
 A. GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 308
B. SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE V. CALOOCAN CITY 312
C. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM 313
D. COMMISSIONER OF BIRV. COURT OF APPEALS 315
E. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. SANTOS 317
F. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V.
VICTOR LIM 318
Sec. 29. Control of public funds 325
ft^f
1. Expenditure of public funds 325
A. GUINGONA, JR. V. CARAGUE 325
2. Public purpose 331
3. Special Fund 331
A. OSMENAV. ORBOS 331
Sec. 30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 334
A. FABIAN V. DESIERTO :'. 334
Sec. 31. Title of royalty or nobility 338
Sec. 32. Initiative and referendum 338

Article VII: The Executive Department 339

Section 1. Executive power 339
1. Executive power v 339
A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, ET AL 339
2. Executive immunity 344
A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 344
B. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 347
3. Headof State 348
4. Chief Executive 348
5. The Cabinet , , 348
6. Executive Privilege 348
Sec. 2. Qualifications of President 349
1. Citizenship and Qualification 349
A. TECSON V. COMELEC 349
k&j
Sec. 3. The Vice-President 364
Sec. 4. Election and term of President and Vice-President. 364
1. Election and Canvass 365
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC ?... 365
B. CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE 366
C. PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE 366
D. FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 368
 A. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. V. PANO 462
m B. ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO ....;.... 465
C. NAMARCO V. ARCA 466
(^ D. DE LEON V. CARPIO.. 467
E. BLAQUERA, ETAL. V. ALCASID 468
F. DADOLE, ET AL. V. COA 469
G. DENRV. DENR EMPLOYEES..... * 470
Sec. 18. The Commander in Chief.... 471
1. Commander in Chief. 472
fowl

2. Martial law 473

3. CASES 474
b A. IBP V. ZAMORA 474
B. LACSON V. PEREZ 482
C. SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 483
D. RANDOLF DAVID V. ERMITA.. 486
" Sec. 19. Executive clemency.... 501
iai> 1. Executive clemency in general 501
2. Pardon 501
A. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN, JR 501
*" B. TORRES V. GONZALES 507
r C. IN RE: TORRES V. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF PRISON.. 512
m D. GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 513
E. LLAMAS V. ORBOS 515
F. DRILON V. COURT OF APPEALS 521
*** 3. Amnesty 523
f NOTE: Tax amnesty 524.
4. Limits on executive clemencj' : 524
A. PEOPLE V. SALLE, JR 524
B. ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 528
) Sec. 20. Foreign loans 535
Sec. 21. International agreements 535
1. Foreign relations powers '. 535
2. International agreements 535
3. Deportation of aliens 537
to 4. Cases 537
A. PIMENTELV. ERMITA 537
B. LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ." 540
C. BAYANV. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 547
r D. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTION 564

M'l
 Sec. 5. Oath of Office ti 3gg
('%> Sec. 6. Residence and emoluments 370
Sec. 7. Assumption of office 37Q
1. Vacancy situations at the beginningofthe term 370
&y
Sec-8 370
1. Vacancy situations during the term 371
2. Cases 372
A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 371
B. ESTRADA V.ARROYO 392
j^
Sec. 9. Vacancy in the office of the Vice-President 397
Sec. 10. Procedure 397
Sec. 11. Temporarydisability of the President '. 397
Jffj)
1. Temporary disability 393
A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO 398
m Sec. 12. Serious illness of President 398
Sec. 13. Prohibitions * 393
1. Prohibitions 398
*" A. DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN 398
{ B. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 399
C. BITONIO, JR. V. COA 407
D. PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA 412
Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President ?. 413
to Sec. 15. Prohibited appointments 413
1. Prohibited appointments 413
A. IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA 413
U B. DE LA RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS 417
Sec. 16. Presidential appointments ~^ ;. 418
1. Power of appointment .. 418
A. GOVERNMENT V. SPRINGER 418
[ B. BERMUDEZ V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 419
b C. FLORES V. DRILON AND GORDON '.' 421
D. SARMIENTO V. MISON 423
E. QUINTOS-DELES, ET AL. V. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS 433
I F. CALDERON V. CARALE 438
L G. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO 444
H. RUFINO V. ENDRIGA 456
Sec. 17. Power of control 461
1, Power of control 462
r 2. CASES 462
t&3

Sec. 22. Budget preparation 566

Sec. 23. State of the nation address ; 566

Article VIII: The Judicial Department 567

Section 1. Judicial power 567
1. Judicial power 567
2. CASES 568
A. SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA ;, 568
B. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS 570
C. ECHEGARAY V. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 571
D. UNITED STATES V. NIXON 573
E. INFOTECH FOUNDATION, ET AL. V. COMELEC 575
Sec. 2. Creation of courts 575
1. Congress and judicial power 575
L 2. Cases '. 576
A. MALAGA V. PENACHOS, JR /. 576
Sec. 3. Fiscal autonomy 576
1. Fiscal autonomy 576
2. Cases 577
A. RADIOWEALTH, INC. V. AGREGADO 577
B. BENGZON V.DRILON 579
Sec. 4. The Supreme Court 583
1. Cases 583
A. FORTICH V. CORONA 583
B. PEOPLE V.DY 584
C. PEOPLE V.EBIO / 584
Sec. 5. Powers of Supreme Court xr. 585
1. Powers of the Supreme Court classified 586
2. Judicial review 586
3. Judicial review: Cases and controversy v 587
A. MARBURY V. MADISON 587
B. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION 589
C. TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 590
D. TAN V. MACAPAGAL 591
E. PACUV. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 592
L 4. Judicial review: locus standi ; 593
A. JOYAV.PCGG 593
B. MACASIANO V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 596
C. MARIANO, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 597
D. OPOSAV. FACTORAN.JR 598
ftj

xii
 E. KILOSBAYANV. GUINGONA, JR 600
F. TATAD V. GARCIA, JR .'., 602
G. KILOSBAYANV. MORATO 605
H. TELEBAP V. COMELEC 614
iiiii

I. GONZALES V. NARVASA 615

J. DEL MAR, ET AL. V. PAGCOR 616
to K. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO * 618
L. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 618
M. BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 618
N. IBPV.ZAMORA 618
0. MACALINTALV. COMELEC..... 618
m ' P. WHITE LIGHT CORP. V. CITY OF MANILA 619
5. Political Questions 620
6. Political Questions: CASES... 621
U A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS 621
B. DAZAV.SINGSON 621
m C. SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA 621
D. THE DAVIDE IMPEACHMENT 621
7. Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality 621
*** 8. Rule-making power ; 622
r A. BUSTOS V. LUCERO 622
L B. IN RE CUNANAN 623
C. JAVELLANA V. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT : 625
m 9. Review of Death Penalty 626
A. PEOPLE V. MATEO 626
-

10. Bar integration 627

^ A. IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. DE VERA 628
r Sec. 6. Supervision of courts 629
1. Supervision of courts 629
A. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ 629
B. PEOPLE V. GACOTT, JR 630.
C. JUDGE CAOIBES, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN 632
Sec. 7. Qualifications 632
A. IN RE JBC V. JUDGE QUITAIN 633
B. KILOSBAYANV. ERMITA 633

Sec. 8. Judicial and Bar Council 634

Sec. 9. Appointment 635
Sec. 10. Salary 635

\m

\&&)
 1. Salary of Justices and judges. ,-..., 635
A. NITAFAN V. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE 635
Sec. 11. Security of tenure : 639
1. Security of tenure ; 639
tfoffi)

A. VARGAS V. RILLORAZA 639

| j B. DE LA LLANA V. ALBA ,, 643
\m Sec. 12. Prohibited designation 646
Sec. 13. Decision process : 646
.1. Certification 646
Sec. 14. Content of decisions 646
1. "Decisions" and "petitions," "minute resolutions." 646
m A. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO 647
B. VALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 648
C. PEOPLE V. LIZADA 649
*" D. VELARDE, JR. V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY 651
Sec. 15. Time frame for decisions 657
1. Time frame for decisions 657
A. RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN ! 657
m B. COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. QUINANOLA 658
Sec. 16. Annual report ^ 658

L Article IX: Constitutional Commissions 659

A. COMMON PROVISIONS 659
Section 1. The Commissions 659
1. Independent Commissions , 659
A. MACALINTALV. COMELEC '. _ 659
Sec. 2. Prohibitions 660
Sec. 3. Salary 660
Sec. 4. Appointment of officials and employees 660
1. Independent 660
Sec. 5. Fiscal autonomy 661

1. Automatic release of funds 661

Sec. 6. Procedure 661
1. Rules of procedure 661
A. ARUELO, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 661
B. ANTONIO V. COMELEC 661
Sec. 7. Decisions 662
1. Judicial review 662

A. CUA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 662

ha

B. MISON V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 663

C. MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS.. .; 663
D. AMBIL V. COMELEC 664
E. DUMAYAS, JR. V. COMELEC 664
~ 2. Comelec decisions 664
Sec. 8.. 665
la) B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 9 f 665
Section 1. Organization 665
1. Organization of the Commission 665
** A. GAMINDE V. COA 665
r Sec. 2. Scope 669
1. Scope and purpose of the system 669
2. CASES ; 670
A. EIIB V. COURT OF APPEALS 670
* B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. PAGCOR 671
C. CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE 675
D. SECRETARY GLORIAV. COURT OF APPEALS ! 679
E. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 680
F. DIMAYUGA V. BENEDICTO II : 683
m G. MIRANDA V. CARREON > 686
H. SENERES V. COMELEC AND ROBLES 690

3. Competitive and non-competitive positions 691

tei
4. CASES 692

A. NASECO V. NLRC 692

B. SAMSON V. COURT OF APPEALS 693

C. HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS 693
D. ACHACOSO V.'MACARAIG 694
E. BRIONES V. OSMENA 694
F. MAYOR V.MACARAIG 695
G. BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO, JR 696
H. LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 699
I. SANTIAGO, JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 700
J. ASTRAQUILLO, ET AL. V. MANGLAPUS 702
K. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. CA 704
L. AQUINO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 706
M. PNOC V. NLRC 707
N. LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 708
NOTE: Temporary appointees 709
Sec. 3. Personnel agency 709

L
 1. Mass Appointments 709
Sec. 4. Oath : 710
Sec. 5. Standardization of compensation 710
Sec. 6. "Lame ducks." 710
A. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN 710
Sec. 7. Prohibited appointments .. 711
A. FLORES V. DRILON AND GORDON 711
Sec. 8. Compensation 715
1. Additional or double compensation 715
2. Case 716
A. SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 716
B. BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY V. COA 718
C. HERRERAV. NAPOCOR ; 719
3. Prohibited Compensation 719
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 719
Section 1. Organization....: .'. 720
1.- CASES 720
A. BRILLIANTES V. YORAC 720
B. CAYETANO V. MONSOD 721
Sec. 2. Powers and functions 731
1. Nature of COMELEC powers 732
2. CASES 734
A. GALIDO V. COMELEC 734
B. PEOPLE V. HON. DELGADO 735
C. PEOPLE V. JUDGE INTIMG 736
^)

D. CORPUS V. TANODBAYAN >, 738

E. TAN V. COMELEC ;. '. 738
F. REYES V. RTC 740
G. KILOSBAYAN V. COMELEC 740
H. BUAC AND BAUTISTA V. COMELEC . 741
I. LDP V. COMELEC 742
J. MANANZALA V. COMELEC 747
NOTE: Power to annul 748
NOTE: Power to call special elections. ., 748
NOTE: COMELEC non-powers 748
NOTE: Registration of political parties 748
Sec. 3. En Banc or division..'. 749

i)
A. BAYTAN V. COMELEC 749
B. BALINDONG V. COMELEC 750
Sec. 4. Election period powers 751
Sji)

xvi
 1. Supervision of media and public utilities 752.
A. SANIDADV. COMELEC 752
B. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION V. COMELEC 753
C. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS V. COMELEC 755
Sec. 5. Executive clemency 758
Sec. 6. Multi-party system. .; 758
NOTE: Political parties; registration ; . 758
Sec. 7. Invalid votes 758
Sec. 8. Political parties 759
NOTE: The two-party system , 759
Sec. 9. Election period 759
SQj&l Sec. 10. Protection of candidates. . 759
Sec. 11. Funds 759
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 759
&J
Section 1. Organization 759
' Sec. 2. Powers and functions 760
1. Functions of the COA 760
2. CASES 761
A. DINGCONG V. GUINGONA, JR 761
B." DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V. COA 763
C. RAMOS V. AQUINO 764
D. MAMARIL V.DOMINGO 767
0

E. SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA 767

F. OSMENA V. COA 768
G. BUSTAMANTE V. COA 770
H. OROCIO V. COA 771
I. CALTEX PHILIPPINES V. COA 772
jjpj
J. POLLOSO V. GANGAN AND COA 774
K. DBPV. COA 777
L. PARRENO V. COA 781
Sec. 3. Coverage 782
Sec. 4. Annual report 782

Article X: Local Government 783

GENERAL PROVISIONS 783

Section 1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
ittiiii) Sec. 2. The temtorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 783
1. Local autonomy 783

jijjffiA
 1. Supervision of media and public utilities 752.
A. SANIDAD V. COMELEC 752
B. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION V. COMELEC 753
C. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS V. COMELEC ' 755
Sec. 5. Executive clemency 758
Sec. 6. Multi-party system. .'. 758
NOTE: Political parties; registration . 758
Sec. 7. Invalid votes 758
Sec. 8. Political parties 759
NOTE: The two-party system 759
Sec. 9. Election period .' 759
Sec. 10. Protection of candidates .- 759

Sec. 11. Funds .' 759

D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 759
Section 1. Organization 759
"Sec. 2. Powers and functions 760

1. Functions of the COA 760

2. CASES 761
A. DINGCONG V. GUINGONA, JR 7C1
B. DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V. COA.;.... 763
C. RAMOS V. AQUINO 764
D. MAMARIL V. DOMINGO /. 767
E. SAMBELIV. PROVINCE OF ISABELA 767
F. OSMENA V. COA 768
G. BUSTAMANTE V. COA 770
H. OROCIOV. COA 771
I. CALTEX PHILIPPINES V. COA 772
J. POLLOSO V. GANGAN AND COA 774
K. DBPV.COA 777
L. PARRENO V. COA 781
Sec. 3. Coverage : 782
Sec. 4. Annual report 782
Article X: Local Government 783
GENERAL PROVISIONS 783
Section 1.Territorial and political subdivisions 783
1. Territorial and political subdivisions 783
Sec. 2. The territorial andpolitical subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 783
700
1. Local autonomy
 A. SAN JUAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , 78:
B. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT
OF APPEALS 78,
C. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES 78!
D. PHIL. PETROLEUM CORP.V. MUN. OF PILILLA 79!
E. DADOLE, ET AL. V. COA 79(
F. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V.
VICTOR LIM , 79{
G. LEYNESV. COA 80(
H. BATANGAS CATV V. CA, BATANGAS CITY '. 801
Sec. 3. Local government code 80$
1. Local Government Code 802
A. SANCHEZ V. COMELEC 805
B. GARCIA V. COMELEC " 802
Sec. 4. Power of President 80S
1. General supervision r 809
A. DRILON V. MAYOR LIM 809
Sec. 5. Local finances 812
1. CASE 812
A. MANILA ELECTRIC V. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA 812
B. NPC V. CABANATUAN CITY 815
C. PETRON CORPORATION V. MAYOR TIANGCO ?. 818
Sec. 6. Share in national taxes 819
1. CASE 819
A. PIMENTELV.AGUIRRE 819
Sec. 7. Share in national resources ,-f 821
1. Local government resources n- 821
Sec. 8. Term of elective officials 822
1. CASES : 822
A. BORJA, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 822
B. DAVID V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 827
Sec. 9. Sectoral representation 828
1. Local sectoral representatives 828
A. SUPANGAN, JR. V. SANTOS 828
Sec. 10. Creation, abolition, mergers. ; 833
1. Creation of political units 833
A. TAN V. COMELEC '. 833
B. PADILLA, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 839
C. LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC 842
Ljflal

Sec. 11. Metropolital political subdivisions '. 853

1. Metropolitan political subdivisions 853
A. MMDA V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC 853

frrjfoi
Sec. 12. Classification of cities 858
1. Classification of cities 858
A. ABELLA V. COMELEC 858
** Sec. 13. Local groupings *. 860
r Sec. 14. Regional development councils '. 860
iivfifri
A. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 860
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS 860
Sec. 15. Two autonomous regions 860
\m
1. Autonomous regions 860
Sec. 16. Power of President 861
jffici Sec. 17. Powers not granted 861
1. Powers which are not given to autonomous regions 861
Sec. 18. Organic Act 861
Sj)
1. Creation of autonomous region 861
A. ABBAS V. COMELEC 861
fojftft
B. CORDILLERA REGIONAL ASSEMBLY V. COMELEC 866
C. LEONOR V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION 867
Sec. 19. Enactment of Organic Act 868.
Sec. 20. Powers granted y 868
1. Conflict of laws 868
MJ
2. CASE < 869
A. PANDIV. COURT OF APPEALS 869
Sec. 21. Peace and order, national defense 869
im

Article XI^Accountability of Public Officers 870

Section 1. Publicoffice a public trust : 870
1. Public office a public trust 870
A. HIPOLITO V. MERGAS 870
Sec. 2. Impeachable officers 871
Sec. 3. Impeachment rules 871
1. Impeachment 871
folAA
A. ROMULO V. YNIGUEZ 871
B. IN RE GONZALES 872
C. FRANCISCO, ET AL. V. HOUSE SPEAKER, ET AL.
(THE DAVIDE IMPEACHMENT) :'. 872
Sec. 4. The Sandiganbayan 888

XIX
 1. The Sandiganbayan 888
A. NUNEZ^V. SANDIGANBAYAN ; 888
B. MAYOR LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN 888
Sec. 5. The Ombudsman 889
Sec. 6. 889
Sec. 7. The Special Prosecutor 889
1. The Ombudsman and the Tanodbayan 890
A. ZALDIVARV. SANDIGANBAYAN 890
B. BIR V. OMBUDSMAN ; 890
C. LAUREL V. DESIERTO 891
D. AZARCON V. GUERRERO 893
Sec. 8 Qualifications 893
Sec. 9. Appointment 893
Sec. 10. Rank. r 893
Sec. 11. Term ; 893
Sec. 12. Powers 893
Sec. 13 893
1. Powers and Responsibilities of Ombudsman and Deputies '.. 894
Sec. 14. Fiscal autonomy 897
Sec. 15. Recovery of ill-gotten wealth v 897
Sec. 16. Prohibitions r. 897
Sec. 17. Declaration of assets and liabilities 897
Sec. 18. Allegiance 897

Article XII: National Economy: and Patrimony 898

Section 1. The goals of the national economy ( : 898
1. The national economy..'. 7. 898
Sec. 2. Development of natural resources 898
1. The Regalian Doctrine 899
2. Limits imposed on jura regalia ?. 899
3. The IPRA Case. .'. 900
A. CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR , 900
4. Filipinization of natural resources 912
5. Alienation of natural resources 912
A. SANTA ROSA MINING CO. V. LEIDO, JR 912
B. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS... 914
C. CHAVEZ V. PEA AND AMARI .-.' - 916
D. LAUREL V. GARCIA , ,. 942
6. Utilization of natural resources 949

^jJ
 A. MINERS ASSOCIATION V. FACTORAN, JR. , 949
B. REPUBLIC V. ROSEMOOR .,......, 956
C. LA BUGAL B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V. DENR ,..:..............'........ 961
D. LA BUGAL B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V. DENR

(RECONSIDERATION) , 992
E. PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. V. NAPOCOR 1017
Sec. 3. Land of the public domain * 1019
1. Classification of lands 1020

<jij
A. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. JUDGE AQUINO ! 1020
B. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 1023
2. Disposition and exploitation of agricultural lands of public domain 1028
&&1
3. Right of corporations to acquire land 1028
A. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS.. 1028
I B. TEN FORTY REALTY V. LORENZANA 1033
4. Acquisition by private individuals 1034
"Sec. 4. Forest lands and parks 1034
s> Sec*. 5. Rights of indigenous cultural communities 1035
1. Ancestral lands 1035
[ A. CRUZ AND EUROPA V. SECRETARY 1035
Sec. 6. Social character of property 1035
NOTE: Property and the common good 1035
m Sec. 7. Capacity to acquire private lands ' 1035
Sec. 8. Former Filipinos 1035
1. Private lands 1035
iigl
2. Aliens and private lands 1035
A. RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ 1035
B. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 1036
3. Recovery of invalidly sold private land 1041
A. HALILIV. COURT OF APPEALS 1042
B. FRENZEL V. CATITO : 1044
4. Right of former Filipinos 1048
Sec. 9. Economic planning agency 1049
Sec. 10. Filipinization ofinvestments 1049
1. Foreigninvestment 1049
A. GARCIA V. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS 1049
NOTE: Filipinization and nationalization !049
2. Nationalism 1049
A. MANILA PRINCE V. GSIS 1049
B. TANADA, ETAL. V. ANGARA 1060

[jjijjj
 Sec. 11. Franchises ;.; , 106{
1. Public utilities ; 106,'
A. ALBANO V. REYES 106(
B. TATAD V. GARCIA, JR 106*
C. ILOILO ICE AND STORAGE V. PUBLIC UTILITY BOARD 1071
D. ASSOCIATED COMMUNICATIONS V. NTC 107S
E. JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC. V. CA 107
Sec. 12. Preferential use of Filipino labor and materials 107
Sec. 13. Trade policy 1076
Sec. 14. Practice of professions 1076
Sec. 15. Cooperatives '. >. 1076
Sec. 16. Formation of corporations 1076
1. Formation of private corporations 1076
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. AND NEW AGRIX,
INC. V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK 1076
Sec. 17. Emergency takeovers 1077
1. Takeover of Public Utilities 1077
Sec. 18. Expropriation of public utilities 1077
1. Telephone interconnections 1077
A. REPUBLIC V. PLDT , 1077
B. PLDT V. NTC AND CELLCOM, INC .^ 1079
NOTE: Business affected with public interest 1083
C. AGAN,JR.,ETAL.V.PIATCO , 1083
Sec. 19 .. 1086
1. Monopolies and Restraint of Trade 1086
A. EASTERN ASSURANCE V. LTFRB....' :. 1086
Sec. 20. Central monetary authority 1088
Sec. 21. Foreign loans '. 1088
1. Restrictions on contracting of foreign loans 1088
Sec. 22. Circumventions .7. 1088

Article XVI: General Provisions 1089

Section 1. The Philippine flag 1089
Sec. 2. Name, anthem and seal 1089
Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent :.. 1089
1. State immunity from suit 1089
A. METRANV.PAREDES. 1089
B. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. V. TEODORO 1090
C. PHILROCK V. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS 1090
D. REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO 1092

xxii
 E. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION V. CUSTOMS
ARRASTRE SERVICE 1093
F. TRADERS ROYAL BANK V. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT. 1096
G. FESTEJO V. FERNANDO , 1099
H. MINISTERIO V. CFI 1101
I. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO V. JUDGE FIRME :.7~~ U04
J. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. NLRC *. 1105
K. PNR V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 1106
L. REPUBLIC V. SANDOVAL 1106
NOTE: Statutory waiver 1107
NOTE: Suability vs. liability 1107
2. Immunity in international law 1107
A. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA V. VINZON 1107
B. GTZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 1110
Sec. 4. The Armed Forces 1111
Sec. 5. Oath of affirmation of Armed Forces 1111
Sec. 6. The National Police 1111
1. National police 1111
A. QUILONAV. THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL 1111
B. CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 1112

NOTE: The Integrated National Police 1118

Sec. 7. War veterans 1119
Sec. 8. Retirees! 1119
Sec. 9. Consumer protection 1119
Sec. 10. Communication structures 1119
Sec. 11. Ownership of mass media and advertising agencies 1119
Sec. 12. Indigenous cultural communities 1119

Article XVII: Amendments or Revisions 1120

Section 1. Amendment or revision 1120
Sec. 2. Amendment by initiative 1120
1. Amendment by initiative and referendum 1120
A. SANTIAGO V. COMELEC 1120
B. LAMBINO V. COMELEC '. 1125
Sec. 3. Constitutional Convention 1134
1. Amendment, Revision, Revolution H34
2. Proposal of amendments 1135
3. Proposal ofamendments: CASES 1136
A. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC 1136*
 B. DEL ROSARIO V. COMELEC /.... . 1141
C. IMBONG V. COMELEC ;.......,..'.. - 1142
D. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC. ,..v.;.-.^..;....:... 1143
st NOTE: What amendments or revision may be proposed 1147
NOTE: In the realm of the unusual ...' 1147
Sec. 4. Ratification 1148
1. Ratification '. 1148
r A. PLANAS V. COMELEC 1148
m B. JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 1154
C. MITRA, JR. V. COMELEC 0 1168

Article XVIII: Transitory Provisions 1171

'Mi .

Section 1. First elections 1171

1. Purpose of the Transitory Provisions : , 1171
^ Sec. 2. Term of Senators and Congressmen ..;.... 1171
Sec. 3. Continuity of decrees ? 1171
Sec. 4. Treaties ,....:V. 1171
Sec. 5. Term of President and Vice-President 1171
Sec. 6. Legislative power of President 1172
m Sec. 7. Sectoral representatives ; ; 1172
Sec. 8. Metropolitan Authority 1172
Sec. 9. Subprovinces .;.:... 1172
Sec. 10. Continuity of courts .;.....'. 1172
Sec. 11. Tenure of judiciary members '.;..*.,:..;." 1172
Sec. 12. Unclogging the courts .......;............;:. 1172
Sec. 13. Case / U:.^..^..~v. 1172
Sec. 14. Filed before new Constitution r.r..:....;... ..:: 1173
1. Legal effect of the lapse of the applicable period ......:.......... 1173
Sec. 15. The Constitutional Commissions ...;..... ... 1173
Sec. 16. Reorganization of Civil Service u I..:.....'......... 1173
1. Security of tenure 1173
A. DARIO V. MISON ....:. 1173
h%&\ B. MENDOZA V. QUISUMBING 1182
Sec. 17. Compensation of National Officials ;...;....... 1187
Sec. 18. Salary scales 1187
Sec. 19. Disposition of office properties , 1187
Sec. 20. Free secondary schools a 1187
Sec. 21. Reversion of ill-gotten lands M............. 1187
Sec. 22. Expropriation of idle lands 1187
Sec. 23. Advertising entities. ......<. 1187

XXIV
L
Sec. 24. Private armies ..;.. H87
Sec. 25. US Military Bases H87
r . 1. U.S. Military Bases ; 1188
Sec. 26. Power of sequestration 1188
1. Sequestration, freeze order, provisional takeover 1189
2. Extent of PCGG's power 1190
* A. COJUANGCO, JR. V. ROXAS, ETAL * ;. 1190
Sec. 27. Date of effectivity 1195
1. Date of effectivity of the Constitution 1195
A. DE LEON V. ESGUERRA 1195

iiM-l

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 Introduction

Philippine Constitutionalism,
Birth Pangs and Traumatic Growth

1. Early Organic Acts.

"A constitution, in the American sense ofthe word, is awritten instrument by which the funda
mental powers of government are established, limited, and denned, and by which these powers are
distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of
the body politic. Justice Miller's oft-quoted definition of aconstitution in the American sense also
defines aconstitution in the Philippine sense, for the Philippine concept ofconstitutionalism started
as a transplant from American soil. Inthis definition, the fundamental purpose of a constitution is
presented primarily as both agrant and alimitation ofgovernmental authority. Itis in fact the organic
instrument to which government owes its being: "It is ... to the departments of government what
law is to individuals - nay, itis that from which their existence flows, and by which the powers (or
portions of the right to govern), which may have been committed to them, are prescribed. Itis their
commission - nay, it is their creator."2 It is"the written instrument agreed upon by the people
as the absolute rule ofaction and decision for all departments and officers of the government and
mopposition to which any act orrule of any department orofficer ofthe government, oreven of the
people themselves, will be altogether void."3 It is, inother words, the supreme written law of the land.
Constitutions are usually classified into written and unwritten, or flexible and rigid constitutions
These classifications are of general knowledge and are of very little usefulness for understanding
contemporary constitutions. Hence, the following classification is suggested instead. It is based not
on the content or form ofconstitutions but on the extent to which constitutions are observed as norms
of governmental action.4

1. Normative constitution: its norms direct
governmentalaction, and governmenthabitually
adjusts its actions to the norms. It is like a suit
that fits and is actually worn.
2. Nominal constitution: it is a constitution
which cannot yet be fully operative because of
existing socio-economic conditions. Its principal
value is educational. It points towards the ma
ture state to which a fledging polity must grow.
It is like a suit that is in storage waiting for the
wearer to grow to the proper size.
3. Semantic constitution: The primary
purpose of a constitution is to limit power. A
semantic constitution does just the opposite.

Miller, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (1893); 1SCHWARTZ THE POWERS
OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1963).
2Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 24 (1793).
3COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 3 (1868).
*See LOWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 147-153.

1
fea CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
It is a tool for the perpetuation of power in the
hands of power holders. It is not a suit at all but
a disguise. It has certain unmistakable marks:
"A state president can perpetuate himself in
office; he is empowered to veto the actions of
<m
the legislature without ultimate recourse to the
electorate; the representative assembly is wholly
or in its majority nominated; the confirmation of
policy decisions is left to plebiscites instead of to a
freely elected parhament; elections are conducted
on the single-party ticket."5
A constitutional document may be divided
into three parts:
1. Constitution of government: those provi
sions which set up the governmental structure.
2. Constitution of liberty: the provisions
which guarantee individual fundamental liber
ties against governmental abuse.
3. Constitution of sovereignty:the provisions
which outline the process whereby the sovereign
$HJ
people may change the constitution.
The subject of this volume is Philippine
constitutional law. Constitutional law, as un
derstood both in American and Philippine law, is
not just the text of the constitution itself. It is "a
body of rules resulting from the interpretation by
a high court of cases in which the validity, in rela
tion to the constitutional instrument, of some act
of governmental power,... has been challenged.
This function, conveniently labeled 'Judicial Re
view,' involves the power and duty on the part
of the Court of pronouncing void any such act
which does not square with its own reading of the
constitutional instrument.. ."6 Although we are
under a constitution, the constitution, as Chief
Justice Hughes once said, is what the judges say
it is. The task of the student of constitutional law,
therefore, cannot be reduced to mere exegesis of
the constitutional text. He must plow through
the thousands of pages of court decisions in order
to find the mass of "judge-made" laws that have
grown from the text.7
hId. at 150.
6CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1 (1963).
7For a discussion of the various types of constitutions,
written or unwritten, evolved or enacted, rigid or flexible, see
any standard textbook of political science.
Constitutionalism in the Philippines, under
stood in the American sense, dates back to the
ratification of the Treaty of Paris transferring
Spanish sovereignty over the Islands to the Unit
ed States. Thereafter, Philippine constitutional
law grew from a series of organic documents
enacted by the United States government. These
were: (1) President McKinle^s Instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission,8 (2) the Philip
pine Bill of 1902,9 (3) the Philippine Autonomy
Act of 1916.10
In language and in spirit, these constitu
tional documents were transplants from Ameri
can constitutionalism. Hence, in the process of
interpreting these documents and applying them
to Philippine political and governmental process,
Philippine courts relied on the authoritative
teachings of American jurisprudence. By 1934,
when the United States Congress enacted the
Tydings-McDuffie Law,11 which provided for the
establishment of a Commonwealth Government
to be established under a constitution drafted
and ratified by the Filipino people, the Philip
pines already had a solid'body of constitutional
jurisprudence on which to build.
2. The 1935 Constitution.
By authority of the Tydings-McDuffie Law,
a Constitutional Convention was called. It met
on July 30,1934, and held its final session Feb
ruary 8, 1935. On March 3, 1935, the President
of the United States approved the draft of the
Constitution and on May 14, 1935, the Filipino
electorate ratified the same by an overwhelm
ing majority vote. On November 15, 1935, the
Commonwealth Government established by the
Constitution became operative.
Philippine Independence came on July 4,
1946. The Philippine Republic continued to
operate under the Constitution formulated in
1934-1935. Many felt a certain unease, in that, an
independent republic should continue to operate
under a Constitution that had been fashioned un-
81 Public Laws [of the Philippines] lxiii, February 2,
1900.
9Id. at 1056. Act July 1,1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691.
1011 Public Laws [of the Philippines] 237. Act Aug. 29,
1916, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545.
uAct Mar. 24,1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 546.

der colonial auspices.,12 Gradually, the agitation
for a thorough overhaul of the 1935 Constitution
gathered momentum.
3. The 1973 Constitution.
On March 16, 1967, the PhilippineCongress,
pursuant to the authority given to it by the 1935
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 (later
amended by Resolution No. 4 passed on June 17,
1969) calling a Convention to propose amend
ments to the Constitution. Election of Delegates
to the Convention were held on November 20,
1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention
began on June 1, 1971.
Before the Constitutional Convention could
finish its work, martial law was imposed on the
entire Philippines on September 21, 1972. Even
as some delegates were placed under detention
and others went into hiding or voluntary exile,
the Constitutional Convention continued its
deliberations under an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty. To what extent and how martial
law conditions affected the final outcome of the
convention has not yet been assessed. At any
rate, on November 29, 1972, the Convention ap
proved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines.
On November 30, 1972, the President issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention"
and setting the date of the plebiscite on January
15, 1973.
On January 7, 1973, however, the President
issued General Order No. 20 directing "that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15,
1973, be postponed until further notice."
Meanwhile, the Citizen's Assemblies, orga
nized by Presidential Decree No. 86, were being
asked to answer certain questions, among which
was: "Do you approve of the New Constitution?"
Then, suddenly, on January 17, 1973, while the
Supreme Court was hearing arguments on peti
tions to enjoin the holding of a plebiscite, the
President, by Proclamation No. 1102, announced
l2See BERNAS, "DOES TH E PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
HAVE A CONSTITUTION?" 16 ATENEO L.J. 132 (1967).
INTRODUCTION 3
that the proposed Constitution had been ratified
by an overwhelming vote of the members of the
Citizens Assemblies.
Many could not and would not believe the
news. Some asked the Supreme Court to say
that it was not so.
On March 31,1973, a divided Supreme Court
ruled that "there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect."13
The import of the Supreme Court decision
has been examined elsewhere.u Suffice it here to
recall the oft-quoted observation of Holmes that
"Great cases like hard cases make bad law."15
History will judge whether Javellana v. Execu
tive Secretary is a great case. But to judge by the
splintering of the Supreme Court justices who
collectively wrote the longest set of opinions yet
in the history of the Philippine Supreme Court
a total of 338 pages it was a hard case.
Whether Javellana v. Executive Secretary
made good or bad law, four facts cannot be de
nied: (1) the Supreme Court ruled "that there
[was] no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect";
(2) the Executive Department, with vigor and
with all the resources at its command, proceeded
to implement it; (3) the Legislative Department
was nowhere to be found to object; (4) meanwhile,
ordinary mortals lived and found their fortunes
(and misfortunes) under the new Constitution.
One need not agree with Justice Antonio's
opiate that at bottom of the divergent views in
the Javellana case was "the degree of one's faith
in the nation's leadership and in the matu
rity of judgment of our people."16 Nevertheless,
believers and infidels alike cowered through the
most difficult parts of the Marcos regime.
For over a decade, the principal dramatis
personae did not change. But the script under
went some change. In 1976. the Constitution was
amended to give birth to the interim Batasang
"Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, 141
(1973).
"Bernas, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
803-819 (1984).
"Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400 (1904).
,650 SCRA at 376, italics added.
 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Pambansa, a legislative body which functioned
no better than as a rubber-stamp for the will of
the President which found a new authoritarian
vehicle in Amendment 6 which was also a self-
bestowed gift packaged with the 1976 amend
ments. In 1981, the 1973 Constitution was once
again amended to depart from the parliamentary
form of the original 1973 Constitution to the
presidential. Soon the interim Batasang Pam
bansa gave way to a regularBatasang Pambansa
which, however, was not much sturdier than its
predecessor. Meanwhile, the faith in the leader
ship about v/hich Justice Antonio had spoken in
1973 was totally crumbling.
4. The Freedom Constitution.
The 1973 Constitution ended the same way
that it started unceremoniously.
In November 1985, as the regime of Mr. Mar
cos sunk deeper into unpopularity, the President
gambled by calling for a special presidential
election. Corazon Aquino challenged President
Marcos for the presidency and elections were
held on February 8,1986. On February 15,1986,
the Batasan Pambansa, in the exercise of pow
ers given by the 1973 Constitution, proclaimed
Ferdinand Marcos President amid widespread
protest. Subsequently, starting on the afternoon
of February 22, 1986, Minister of National De
fense Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff
General Fidel Ramos initiated a revolt against
Ferdinand Marcos. Ramos and Enrile placed
their support instead behind Corazon C. Aquino.
Completely outnumbered by the Marcos
forces and confined to Camp Crame and Camp
Aguinaldo, the Enrile-Ramos forces could have
easily been crushed by the Marcos forces. But
hordes of unarmed civilians came to their rescue
by surrounding the two military camps with
masses of human bodies. They dared tanks and
armored vehicles to come at them. The civilian
support given to the outnumbered Enrile-Ramos
forces caused other military elements to switch
their support to Corazon Aquino. By the morning
of February 24, 1986, after elements of the Air
Force switched, it was all over for Mr. Marcos
and all those who had connived to proclaim him
President under the 1973 Constitution. Finally,
on the morning of February 25,1986, Corazon C.
Aquino, in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution and without the sanction of'the
Batasan Pambansa which had chosen to give the
presidency to Mr. Marcos, was proclaimed first
woman President of the Philippines in simple
rites held at the Club Filipino and was immedi
ately sworn in by Senior Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Claudio Teehankee.
Meanwhile, at almost the same time and in
virtue of the Batasan proclamation of February
15, 1986, Mr. Marcos was sworn in by Chief
Justice Ramon Aquino atMalacanang. The night
of the same day, Mr. Marcos, accompanied by a
large entourage of family and supporters, went
into exile.
President Aquino could have made herself
subject to the provisions of the 1973 Constitu
tion by allowing herself to be proclaimed by the
Batasan. She, however, chose not to allow the
Batasan members to undo their perfidy. She
hoped thereby to be able to more effectively re
spond to the extraordinary challenge thrown at
her by a heroic nation which had stood against
a long reigning dictator. She turned her back on
the 1973 Constitution whose officials had denied
her the presidency. Barred by the processes of the
1973 Constitution, she chose instead to govern
under a Provisional Constitution designed to
enable her to meet the people's challenge. The
document of revolutionary defiance was Proc
lamation No. 3.17 Proclamation No. 3 became
popularly known as the "Freedom Constitution."
5. The 1987 Constitution.
Article VI of Proclamation No. 3 said:
ARTICLE VI
ADOPTING A NEW CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. Within sixty (60) days from
date of this Proclamation, a Commission
shall be appointed by the President to draft
a New Constitution. The Commission shall
be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor
more than fifty (50) natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, of recognized probity,
known for their independence, nationalism
and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the
President after consultation with various
sectors of society.
"See Appendix.

SECTION 2. The Commission shall
complete its work within as short a period
as may be consistent with the need both to
hasten the return of normal constitutional
government and to draft a document truly
reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the
Filipino people.
SECTION 3. The Commission shall
conduct public hearings to insure that the
people will have adequate participation in
the formulation of the New Constitution.
SECTION 4. The plenary sessions of
the Commission shall be public and fully
recorded.
SECTION 5. The new Constitution
shall be presented by the Commission to
the President who shall fix the date for the
holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid
and effectiveupon ratification by a majority
INTRODUCTION
of the votes cast in such which shall be held
within a period of sixty (60) days following
its submission to the President.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission con
vened on June 1, 1986 and finished its work on
October 15, 1986. A plebiscite, held on Febru
ary 2, 1987, overwhelmingly ratified the new
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution has nowbeen in op
eration formorethan sixteen years. The govern
mentit set up overcame attempted coups against
the presidency of Corazon Aquino. It overcame
another coup attempt on July 27, 2003.
Since the 1987 Constitution took effect vari
ous movements have been initiated to amend or
revise the Constitution. No attempt so far has
gone beyond informal debate. At the time of this
writing (2010), the Constitution has already
lasted twenty-three years.
 Preamble

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane socdzty and establish a government that shall embody our ide
als and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this constitution.

I. Notes on the Preamble.

The Preamble is not a source of rights or of obligations. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
II, 22 (1905). Because, however, it sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution, it
is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the Constitu
tion. It is thus a source of light.

Its authorship belongs to the "sovereign
Filipino people." Its scope and purpose is "to
build a just and humane society and to estab
lish a government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality and peace."
The use of the first person "We" stresses the
active and sovereign role of the Filipino people
as author of the Constitution. The language thus
differs from that of the 1935 Constitution which
used the third person "The Filipino people,"
thereby suggesting that another power was
merely announcing that the Filipinos werefinally
being allowed to promulgate a constitution.
The phrase "Almighty God," in place of
"Divine Providence" found in the 1935 Constitu
tion, is more personal and more consonant with
personalistFilipino religiosity. The invocation of
God is also a signal that, while church and state
are institutionally separate, God and people are
not.
The phrase "common good" projects the idea
of a social order that enables every citizen to at
tain his or her fullest development economically,
politically, culturally, and spiritually. The phrase
"general welfare" was avoided because it could be
interpreted as "the greatest good for the greatest
number" even if what the greater number wants
does violence to human dignity, as for instance
when the greater majority might want the exter
mination of those who are considered inferior.
The specification of "equality" emphasizes
that a major problem in Philippine society is
the prevalence of gross economic and political
inequalities.
Othe"r departures from the 1935 version are
the following: It adds the final phrase "under the
rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality and peace." "Love" is inserted as a
monument to the love that prevented bloodshed
in the February Revolution. The mention of
"truth" is a protest against the deception which
characterized the previous regime. And "peace"
is mentioned last as the fruit of the convergence
of truth, justice, freedom, and love. The phrase
"the rule of law" expresses the concept that gov
ernment officials have only the authority given
them by law and defined by law, and that such
authority continues only with the consent of the
people.
 Article I

The National Territory

SECTION 1. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY COMPRISES THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPEL

AGO, WITH ALL THE ISLANDS AND WATERS EMBRACED THEREIN, AND ALL OTHER
TERRITORIES OVER WHICH THE PHILIPPINES HAS SOVEREIGNTY OR JURISDIC
TION, CONSISTING OF ITS TERRESTRIAL, FLUVIAL, AND AERIAL DOMAINS, INCLUD
ING ITS TERRITORIAL SEA, THE SEABED, THE SUBSOIL, THE INSULAR SHELVES,
AND OTHER SUBMARINE AREAS. THE WATERS AROUND, BETWEEN, AND CONNECT
ING f HE ISLANDS OF THE ARCHIPELAGO, REGARDLESS OF THEIR BREADTH AND
DIMENSIONS, FORM PART OF THE INTERNAL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

1. The Philippine Territory.

It is sometimes asked why a Constitution should have a definition of national territory at all.
Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the new Constitution defines the national territory of the
Philippines. But the 1935 Constitution had a very special reason for defining it. To be effective, the
1935 Constitution had to be accepted by the President of the United States. Since at the time of the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution there was still some fear that the United States government might
dismember Philippine territory, the delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention believed that
such dismemberment could be prevented by including a definition of Philippine territory in the Con
stitution. It was argued that acceptance of the Constitution by the U.S. President would oblige the
American government topreserve the integrityofPhilippine territoryas defined in the Constitution.

No such special reason compelled the del
egates to the 1971 Constitutional Conventionto
include a definition of National Territory in the
1973 Constitution. Some delegates, however, ar
guedthat a definition ofnationalterritoryshould
be placed in the constitution for the preservation
of the national wealth, for national security, and
as a manifestation of our solidarity as a people.
More importantly, it was the wish of some to
projectin the ConstitutionPhilippineadherence
to the "archipelagic principle" (which will be
discussed below).
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the subject repeated much of the
discussion of the 1971 Constitutional Conven
tion. In the end, there was recognition of the
fact that an article on national territory would
have an educational value. Moreover, there was
apprehension that it would be difficult to explain
why after the 1935 and 1973 provisions on the
national territory the new Constitution should
fail to provide for one.
It should be remembered, however, that a
constitution is municipal law. As such, it binds
onlythe nation promulgating it. Hence, a defini
tion of national territory in the constitution will
bind internationally only if it is supported by
proofthat can stand in international law.
Article I sets down the scope of the national
territory. It includes: (1) the Philippine archi
pelago; (2) all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction; and
(3) the territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas
corresponding to (1) and (2). Moreover, (1) and (2)
consist of terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains.
 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
An archipelago is a body of water studded
with islands. The Philippine archipelago is that
body of water studded with islands which is de
lineated in the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898, as modified by the Treaty of Washington
of November 7,1900 and the Treaty with Great
Britain of January 2, 1930. These are the same
treaties which were enumerated in the 1935
Constitution to delineate Philippine territory.
The 1973 Constitution, however, omitted specific
mention of these treaties because the Constitu
tional Convention delegates hoped to erase every
possible trace of our colonial history from the
new. organic document. The 1987 Constitution
has likewise omitted an explicit enumeration of
the relevant treaties.
The clause "all other territories over which
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction"
includes any territory which presently belongs
or-might in the future belong to the Philippines
through any of the internationally accepted
modes of acquiring territory. Foremost among
these territories are what are referred to by the
1935 Constitution as "all territory over which the
present (1935) Government of the Philippine Is
lands exercises jurisdiction." This had reference
to the Batanes Islands which, although undisput-
edly belonging to the Philippines, apparently lay
outside the lines drawn by the Treaty of Paris.
The clause also includes what was referred
to under the 1973 Constitution as territories
"belonging to the Philippines.by historic right
or legal title," that is, other territories which,
depending on available evidence, might belong
to the Philippines {e.g., Sabah, the Marianas,
Freedomland).
The 1987 Constitution has dropped the
phrase "belonging to the Philippines by historic
right or legal title" found in the 1973 Constitu
tion. The intention in dropping such phrase was
not to surrender the Philippines' claim to Sabah.
The change is merely semantic. It is meant to
avoid the use of language historically offensive
to Malaysia. The new Constitution now uses the
phrase [all territory] "over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction." It neither claims
nor disclaims Sabah but asserts a legal situation
in which Sabah can have a place in Philippine
territory depending on the outcome of the cur
rent dispute. It is a recognition of the fact that
unilateral assertions in a constitution, which is
municipal law, by themselves do not establish a
right to a territory.
The extent of the Philippine claim to its
aerial domain, territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine
areas is not specified. The Philippines simply
lays claim to them to the extent recognized by
international law.
The Philippines makes a special claim with
respect to the "waters around, between and con
necting the islands of the archipelago." These
are claimed as part of its "internal waters"
irrespective of their breadth and. dimension.
Article 53 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea tails these "archipelagic" waters. Article
8(2) affirms the existence of the right ofinnocent
passage through such archipelagic waters. Since,
however, there is no right cf innocent passage
through "internal waters," to this extent the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea conflicts with
the Philippine Constitution.
The Philippine government is clearly aware
of these possible conflicts. Hence, upon its rati
fication of the Convention on the Law of the Sea
on August 5,1984, it added a declaration that the
"signing of the Convention by the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines shall not in
any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign
rights of the Republic of the Philippines under
and arising from the Constitution of the Philip
pines" nor "nullify or impair the sovereignty of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State over
the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority
to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty,
independence, and security."1
Another element of the archipelagic prin
ciple is the straight baseline method of drawing
baselines. This consists of drawing straight lines
connecting appropriate points on the coast with
out departing to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast.
Baselines are important because they are
the dividing line between internal waters and
territorial waters. The 1982 Convention on the
'U.N. Office for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue 1, March 1987, An
nex II, p. 6, quoted in SWEENEY, OLIVER, LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 193 (3RD ED., 1988).
\sj
Law of the Sea requires coastal states to draw
baselines in conformity with the provisions of
the Convention. Prior to 1982, Congress had
already passed two baseline laws, R.A. 3046 and
R.A. 5446. These, however, do not conform com
pletely with the requirements of the Convention.
ARTICLE I: THE NATIONAL TERRITORY 9
Finally, in 2009 Congress passed a new baseline
law, R.A. 9522.
R.A. 9522 provides one set of baselines for the
archipelago and another set ofbasehnes for what
it callsa regime ofislandsoutsidethe archipelago
but belonging to the Philippines.
 Article II

Declaration of Principles
and State Policies

Prenote

The "Declaration ofPrinciples and State Policies" is astatement ofthe basic ideological principles
and policies that underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions shed light on the meaning ofthe
other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in
the implementation of the Constitution.
The Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution ballooned from the
five sections of 1935 and the ten sections of 1973 to twenty-eight sections. The 1987 provisions were
written in the same spirit as their counterparts in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions; buttherfe-was
an attempt todistinguish "principles" from "policies." The "principles" arebinding rules which must
beobserved in the conduct ofgovernment whereas "policies" are guidelines for the orientation of
the state.1 In fact, however, the distinction is of little significance because not all of the six "prin
ciples" are self-executory and some of the. "policies" already anchor justiciable rights.2 Kilosbayan
v. Morato,3 for instance, read Sections 5, 12,13 and 17 as mere "guidelines" which do not yet confer
rights enforceable by the courts but recognized Section 16 as a right-conferring provision because it
speaks of "the right of the people."

PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1. THE PHILIPPINES IS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE

SOVEREIGNTY RESIDES IN THE PEOPLEAND ALL GOVERNMENTAUTHORITY EMA
NATES FROM THEM.

1. A "democratic and republican state."

A state is generally defined as a community
of persons more or less numerous, permanently
occupying a definite portion of territory, inde
pendent of external control, and possessing an
organized government to which the great body
ofinhabitants render habitual obedience. Hence,
commentators break down the concept into the
followingfour elements: people, territory, sover
eignty, government.
Although for the purpose of political sociol
ogy a state, which is a legal concept, may be
distinguished from nation, which is an ethnic
concept, for the purpose of constitutional law
the two terms are not distinct. The Constitution
uses them interchangeably to designate the legal
concept of state as defined above.
As an element of a state, "people" simply
means a community of persons sufficient in num-

lSee IV RECORD OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 768 and 580.

2See e.g. the right to ecological balance in Section 15, infra.
3G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1935, on reconsideration.

10
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
ber and capable of maintaining the continued
existence of the community and held together
by a common bond of law. It is of no legal conse
quence if they possess diverse racial, cultural, or
economic interests.
Legal sovereignty is the supreme power to
make law. This is lodged in the people. Political
sovereignty is the sum total ofall the influences in
(iiiiilJ
a state, legal and non-legal, which determine the
course oflaw. Stated in terms of auto-limitation,
sovereignty "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction." (Jellinek). A
change in the seat of sovereignty has the effect
of abolishing all political laws. Thus, upon the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, all political laws of Spain were abrogated,
whether- compatible or not with the laws of the
new sovereign. Macariola v.Asuncion, 114 SCRA
77 (May 31,1982.)
A republican state simply means a state
wherein all government authority emanates from
the people and is exercised by representatives
chosen by the people. The hew Constitution calls
the Philippines a "democratic" state. What this
imports is that in the view of the Constitution
the Philippines is not only a representative or
republican state but also shares some aspects
of direct democracy such as "initiative and ref
erendum" in Article VI, Section 32, and Article
XVII, Section 2. The word is also a monument to
the February Revolution which re-won freedom
through direct action of the people.
NOTE: "Constitutional Authoritarian
ism."
"Constitutional authoritarianism," as under
stood and practiced in the Marcos regime under
the 1973 Constitution, was the assumption of
extraordinary powers by the President, includ
ing legislative and judicial and even constituent
powers, where such assumption is authorized by
the letter or at least by the spirit of a legitimately
enacted Constitution.
Constitutional authoritarianism is compat
ijffi^
ible with a republican state if the Constitution
upon which the Executive bases his assumption
of power is a legitimate expression ofthe people's
will and if the Executive who assumes power
received his office through a valid election by
the people. This is so because a republican state
11
is nothing more than a state where sovereignty
resides in the people and where all government
authority emanates from the people.
The new Constitution does not allow "con
stitutional authoritarianism." See Article VII,
Section 18.
2. Nature and functions of government.
Government, as an element of a state, is
defined as "that institution or aggregate of insti
tutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state,
or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or
authority of prescribing them."4 Section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code (1917) defined the
"Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
thus:5
The Government of the Philippine Is
lands is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the func
tions of government are exercised throughout
the Philippine Islands, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the vari
ous arms through which political authority
is made effective in said Islands, whether
pertaining to the central Government or to
the provincial or municipal branches or other
form of local government.
On the national scale, therefore, the term
"government of the Philippines" refers to the
three great departments legislative, executive,
and judicial - mandated by the Constitution,
and on the local level, it means the regional,
provincial, city, municipal and barrio govern
ments. It does not include government entities
which are given a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the corporation law.6Moreover, for
purposes of international law, it is the national
government that has legal personality and it is
the national government that is internationally
responsible for the actions of other agencies and
instrumentalities of the state.
4U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, cited in Bacani v. NACOCO,
100 Phil. 468, 471 (1956).
5Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil, at 471.
6Id. at 474.
 12
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The functions ofgovernment may be classi
fied into constituent and ministrant functions.
The former are the compulsory functions which
constitute the very bonds of society. President
Wilson's enumeration of the constituent func
tion of government was adopted in Bacani v
NACOCO.1 They are:8
(1) The keeping of order and providing for
the protection ofpersons andproperty from vio
lence and robbery.
(2) Thefixing ofthe legalrelations between
manand wife and between parents andchildren.
(3) The regulation ofthe holding, transmis
sion, andinterchange ofproperty, andthedeter
mination ofits liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights
between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishmentofcrime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil
cases.
(7) The determination ofthepolitical duties,
privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings ofthe state with foreign pow
ers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement
of its international interest.
Ministrant functions are the optional func
tions of government intended for achieving a
better life for thecommunity. "The principles for
determining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are:
(1) that a government should do for the public
welfare those thingswhich privatecapital would
not naturally undertake, and (2) that a govern
ment should do those things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the
publicwelfare than is any private individualor
group of individuals."9
For thepurpose ofthedecision inBacani, the
disquisition on the functions ofgovernment was
really oflittle moment. The issue in the casewas
"Id.
*Id. at 472.
*Id. The whole discussion onfunctions ofgovernment in
Bacani was liftedfrom MALCOLM, THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 19-20.
whether NACOCO was part of"government" or
not. And since NACOCO was a corporation with
personality distinct from the government, it was
clearly notpart ofthe government andcould not
therefore claim the privileges which flow from
sovereignty. When, however, government chooses
to operate not through a government-owned
corporation but through an unincorporated
agency, the distinctionbetween constituent and
ministrant functions can be useful. The concepts,
however, seem to belong more to the field of po
litical science thantolaw. Law prefers to use the
termgovernmental and proprietary.
Whether one, however, uses the terms con
stituent and ministrant or governmental and
proprietary, what is important to remember is
that the enumeration of specific government
functions under these headings cannot bestatic.
This was emphasized in the case ofACCFA v.
CUGCO.10 At issue was the characterization of
the functions of a government agency charged
with the implementation of the land reform
program. The function, the Court said, may not
strictly be "constituent" in the sense ofBacani,
but the compelling urgency with which the Con
stitution speaks of social justice does not leave
any doubt that land reform is not an optional
but a compulsory function of sovereignty.11 In
the language of Justice Makalintal:12 "
The growing complexities of modern soci
ety, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government wascalled
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped toadminister for thepublic
welfare than isany private individual orgroup of
individuals," continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities
that the government must undertake in its sover
eign capacity ifit is tomeet theincreasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost every
where else thetendency is undoubtedly towards
a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, bythe Constitution
1030 SCRA649 (1969).
"Id. at 661.
12Id. at 662 (1969).
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
itself in. its declaration of principle concerning
the promotion of social justice.
Among more recent decisions, housing has
been found to be a governmental function since
housing is considered an essential service.13 But
undertaking to supply water for a price, as does
the government corporation National Irrigation
Authority, is considered a trade and not a gov
iyj> ernmental activity.14
NOTE: "Administration" is distinguished
from "government" as the "aggregate of persons
in whose hands the reigns of government are
for the time being (the chief ministers or heads
of departments)." But the terms are often inter
changed.15
3. Sovereignty.
A. People v. Gozo
53.SCRA476, October 26, 1973
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting
her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo,
Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal
mayor for the construction or erection of a build
ing, as well as any modification, alternation,
repair or demolition thereof. She questions its
validity, or at the very least, its applicability to
her, by invoking due process,16 a contention she
would premise on what for her is the teaching
of People v. Fajardo.11 If such a ground were far
from being impressed with solidity,'she stands
on quicksand when she would deny the appli
cability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext
that her house was constructed within the naval
base leased to the American armed forces. While
yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does
not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she
would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign
,3PHHC v. Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA
296, 310 (1987).
"Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman, G.R. No. 55963
& 61045, February 27,1991.
,5United States v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, 339 (1903).
,6According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
"104 Phil. 443 (1958).
13
rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise
therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the
proposition is to make patent how much it is
tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower
court decision must be affirmed with the sole
modification that she is given thirty days from
the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, fail
ing which, she is required to demolish the same.
There is, as mentioned in the opening para
graph of this petition, no support in law for the
stand taken by appellant.
1. Much less is a reversal indicated because
of the alleged absence of the rather novel con
cept of administrative jurisdiction on the part
of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing
that may be said against it. Far worse is the as
sumption at war with controlling and authorita
tive doctrines that the mere existence of military
or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply
into the power to govern. Two leading cases may
be cited to show how offensive is such thinking
to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v.
Acierto,16 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Inter
nal Revenue.19 As was so emphatically set forth
by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement,
it should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was
given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy,
or expediency. The Philippine Government has
not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses commit
ted therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or prefer
ential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such of
fenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also all
such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to
make use of. The first proposition is implied
from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases; the second from the express provisions of
the treaty."20 There was a reiteration of such a
view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled
than that the Philippines being independent and
1892 Phil. 543 (1953); 30 SCRA 968 (December 27,1969).
,930 SCRA 968 (December 27, 1969).
M92 Phil. 534, 542.
 14
P&l CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that
is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws
govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of
its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If
it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty."21 Then came this paragraph deal
ing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to
be admitted that any state may, by its consent,
express or implied, submit to a restriction of
its sovereign rights. There may thus be a cur
tailment ofwhat otherwise is a powerplenary in
character. That, is the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation, which, in the succinctlanguage
ofJellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.' A state then,
if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what otherwise is illimitable competence.22'
The opinion was at pains to point out though
that even then, there is 'at the most diminution
of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.
The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to
some persons found within its territory no lon
ger control. Nor does the matter end there. It is
not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise ofjurisdictional right
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so,
it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil.They are still subjectto
its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished,
but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under the lease of the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947.
They are not and cannot be foreign territory."23
4. Governments de jure and de facto.
A. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil 113(1945)
1. It is a legal truism in political and inter
national law that all acts and proceedings of the
2130 SCRA 968, 973.
ZiIbid.
i3Ibid.t 973-974.
legislative, executive, and judicial departments
ofa defacto government are goodand valid. The
question to be determined is whether or not the
governments established in these Islands under
the names of Philippine Executive Commission
and Republic ofthe Philippines during the Japa
nese military occupation or regime were defacto
governments. If they were, the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good
and valid even after the liberation or reoccupa-
tion of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto govern
ments. The first, or government de facto in a
proper legalsense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or
by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itselfagainst the will
ofthe latter, such as the government ofEngland
under the Commonwealth, iirst by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second
is that which is established and maintained by
militaryforces whoinvade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force,
as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812,
and ofTampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
with Mexico by the troops of the United States.
And the third is that established as an indepen
dent government by the inhabitants ofa country
whorise in insurrection against the parent 3tate,
such as the government of the Southern Confed
eracy in revolt against the Union during the war
ofsecession. Weare not concerned in the present
case with the first kind, but only with the second
and third kinds of de facto governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the
second kind, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Thorington v. Smith (8
Wall.,1), said: "But there is another description
ofgovernment, called also by publicists a govern
ment defacto, but which might, perhaps, be more
aptly denominated a government of paramount
force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1)
that its existence is maintained by active mili
tary power within the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2), that while it exists it must
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
submission to such force, do not become respon
sible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful govern
ment. Actual governments of this sort are estab
lished over districts differing greatly in extent
and conditions. They are usually administered
directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, by civil authority, supported
more or less directly by military force * * *. One
example of this sort of governments is found in
the case of Castine, in Maine, reduced to Bri
liiHjJ
tish possession in the war of 1812 * * *. U.S. v.
Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found
in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war
with Mexico, by the troops of the United States
* * *. Fleming v. Page (9 Howard, 614). These
were cases of temporary possession of territory
by lawful and regular governments at war with
.the country of which the territory so possessed
was part.".
The powers and duties of de facto govern
ments of this description are regulated in Section
III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a
revision of the provisions of the Hague Conven
tions of 1899 on the same subject of Military
i$$}
Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of
said Section III provides that "the authority of
the legitimate power having actually passed into
fjifi
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take
all steps in his power to reestablish, and insure,
as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely presented, the laws
'm$i\
in force in the country."
According to these precepts of the Hague
Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the
right and is burdened with the duty to insure
public order and safety during his military oc
cupation he possesses all the powers of a de facto
government, and he can suspend the old laws and
promulgate new ones and make such changes
in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined
to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances prevailing in the occupied terri
tory, the municipal laws in force in the country,
that is, those laws which enforce public order
fai and regulate the social and commercial life of the
country. On the other hand, laws of a political
nature or affecting political relations, sucb as,
lm
among others, the right of assembly, the right
to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the
right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are
15
considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation. Although the local and
civil administration of justice is suspended as a
matter of course as soon as a country is militarily
occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take
the whole administration into his own hands. In
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are autho
rized to continue administering justice; and the
judges and other judicial officers are kept in their
posts if they accept the authority of the belliger
ent occupant or are required to continue in their
positions under the supervision of the military
or civil authorities appointed by the Commander
in Chief of the occupant. These principles and
practice have the sanction of all publicists who
have considered the subject, and have been as
serted by the Supreme Court and applied by the
Presidents of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on Inter
national Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
belligerent to occupy* and govern the territory
of the enemy while in its military possession,
is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly
from the right to conquer. .We, therefore, do not
look to the Constitution or political institutions
of the conqueror, for authority to establish a
government for the territory of the enemy in
his possession, during its military occupation,
nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are delivered directly
from the laws of war, as established by the us
age of the world and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts - in fine, from
the law of nations * * *. The municipal laws of a
conquered territory or the laws which regulate
private rights continue in force during military
occupation, except so far as they are suspended
or changed by the acts of the conqueror * * *. He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto gov
ernment, and can at his pleasure either change
the existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise
of military authority in an occupied territory,
which were later embodied in the said Hague
Conventions, President McKinley, in his exec
utive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,
1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines
by United States forces, said in part: "Though
the powers of the military occupant are absolute
 16 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
and supreme, and immediately operate upon
the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such
as affect private rights of person and property
and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they
are compatible with the new order of things,
until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are
not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain
in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
The judges and the other officials connected with
the administration ofjustice may, if they accept
the authority of the United States, continue to
administer the ordinary law of the land *as be
tween man and man under the supervision of the
iii) American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's
Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
As to "de facto"government of the third kind,
the Supreme Court of the LTnited States, in the
same case of Thorington v. Smith, supra, recog
nized the government set up by the Confederate
States as a de facto government. In that case, it
was held that "the central government estab
lished for the insurgent States differed from the
temporary governments at Castine and Tampico
in the circumstance that its authority did not
originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was
not, on that account, less actual or less supreme.
And we think that it must be classed among the
governments of which these are examples * * *."
In the case of Williams v. Bruffy (96 U.S.,
176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United
States, discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States, said: "The same general
form of government, the same general laws for
the administration of justice and the protection
of private rights, which had existed in the States
prior to the rebellion, remained during its con
tinuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of
the States do not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they
are, in general, to be treated as valid and bind
ing. As we said in Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall.,
570; 21 Law, ed., 657): 'The existence of a state
of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government or
the regular administration of the laws. Order
was to be preserved, police regulations main
tained, crime prosecuted, property protected,
contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
settled, and the transfer and descentofproperty
regulated, precisely,as in the time of peace. No
one, that we are aware of, seriously questions
the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in
the insurrectionary" States touching these and
kindred subjects, where they were not hostile
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the Con
stitution.' The same doctrine has been asserted
in numerous other cases."
Andthe same court, in the case of Baldy v.
Hunter (171 U.S., 388, 400), held: 'That what
occurred or was done in respect of such matters
under the authority of the laws of these local de;
facto governments should not be disregarded or
held to be invalid merely because these govern
ments were organized in hostility to the Union
established by the national Constitution; this,
because the existence of war between the United
States and the Confederate States did not relieve
those who were within the insurrectionary lines
from the necessity of civil obedience, nor de
stroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the
laws, and because transactions in the ordinary
course of civil society -as organized within the
enemy's territory although they may have indi
rectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de
factoor unlawful government organized to effect
a dissolution of the Union, were without blame
'except when proved to have been entered into
with actual intent to further invasion or insur
rection,"' and 'That judicial and legislative acts
in the respective states composing the so-called
Confederate States should be respected by the
courts if they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the
National Government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the
Philippine Executive Commission, which was
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese
forces, was a civilgovernment established by the
military forces ofoccupation and therefore, a de
facto government of the second kind. It was not
>m
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OFPRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
different from the government established by
the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United
States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The
government established over an enemy's terri
tory during the military occupation may exercise
all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to
all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of
^a little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its charac
ter is the same and the source of its authority the
same. In either case it is a government imposed
by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the
inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the
world, those laws alone determine the legality
or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact
that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil and not a military government and was
run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals,
is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon
occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained
the existing administration under the general
direction of a French official (Langfrey, History
of Napoleon, I, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the
Duke of Wellington, on invading France, autho
rized the local authorities to continue the exercise
oftheir functions, apparently without appointing
an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI,
307.) The Germans, on the other hand, when they
^i
invaded France in 1870, appointed their own of
ficials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every
department of administration and of every rank.
ggs) (Galvo, pars." 2186-93; Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines,
apparently established and organized as a sov
ereign state independent from any other gov
ernment by the Filipino people, was, in truth
gjj
and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation. It was of the same character as the
Philippine Executive Commission, and the ulti
mate source of its authority was the same the
Japanese military authority and government.
As General McArthur stated in his proclama
tion of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has
been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a
so-called government styled as the 'Republic of
the Philippines' was established on October 14,
4^>
1943, based upon neither the free expression of
the people's will nor the sanction of the Govern
17
ment of the United States." Japan had no legal
power to grant independence to the Philippines
or transfer the sovereignty of the United States
to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the
Filipinopeople,beforeits military occupation and
possession of the Islands had matured into an
absolute andpermanentdominion orsovereignty
by a treaty of peace or other means recognized
in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
doctrine in international law, recognized in
Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907
(whichprohibits compulsion ofthe population of
the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostilepower), that belligerentoccupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer
sovereigntyoverthe territory controlled although
the de jure government is during the period of
occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its
rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v.
Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States v. Rice, 4
Wheat., 246; Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 345.) The formation
of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme
contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people
into believing in the apparent magnanimity of
the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning
over the rights of government into the hands of
Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken
belief that, by doing so, Japan would secure the
cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Fili
pino people in her war against the United States
and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philip
pines had been established by the free will of
the Filipino people who, taking advantage of
the withdrawal of the American forces from
the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the
Japanese forces of invasion, had organized
an independent government under that name
with the support and backing of Japan, such
government would have been considered as one
established by the Filipinos in insurrection or
rebellion against the parent state or the United
States. And, as such, it would have been a de
facto government similar to that organized by
the confederate states during the war of secession
and recognized as such by the Supreme Court
of the United States in numerous cases, notably
those of Thorington v. Smith, Williams v.Bruffy,
and Badly v. Hunter, above quoted; and similar
to the short-lived government established by the
 18 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during
the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de
facto government by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of McCleod v. United
States (299 U.S., 416). According to the facts in
the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacu
ated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898,
having first appointed a provisional government,
and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly
in insurrection against Spain, took possession of
the Island and established a republic, governing
until possession thereof was surrendered to the
United States on February 22,1898. And the said
Supreme Court held in that case that "such gov
ernment was ofthe class ofde facto governments
described in I Moore's International Law Digest,
S 20, * * * 'called also by publicists a government
de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
aptly denominated a government of paramount
force * * *."' That is to say, that the government
of a country in possession of belligerent forces
in insurrection or rebellion against the parent
state, rests upon the same principles as that of
a territory occupied by the hostile army of an
enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Execu
tive Commission and the, Republic of the Philip
pines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments,, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court
of justice of those governments, which are not
of a political complexion, were good and valid,
^>
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
occupation of the Philippines by the American
and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas McArthur. According to that
well-known principle in international law, the
1j^>
fact that a territory which has been occupied
by an enemy comes again into the power of its
legitimate government or sovereignty, "does not,
except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of
acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
another it is within his competence to do. Thus
judicial acts done under his control, when they
are not of a political complexion, administrative
acts so done, to the extent that they take effect
during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by pri
vate persons under the sanction of municipal law,
remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social
life of a community would be paralyzed by an
invasion; and as between the state and individu
als the evil would be scarcely less, it would be
hard for example that payment of taxes made
under duress should be ignored, and it would be
contrary to the general interest that sentences
passed upon criminals should be annulled by
the disappearance of the intrusive government."
(Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And
when the occupation and the abandonment have
been each an incident of the same war as in the
present case, postliminy applies, even though
the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the
time substituted his own sovereignty, as the
Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
independence to the Philippines and establishing
the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor,
International Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative
acts of de facto governments which aire not of a
pohtical complexion, are and remain valid after
reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belliger
ent occupant is confirmed by the Proclamation
issued by General Douglas McArthur on October
23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
regulations and processes of the governments es
tablished in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, for it would not have been necessary
for said proclamation to abrogate them if they
were invalid ad initio.
B. In re Letter of Associate Justice
Reynato Puno
AM. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29,1992
A revolution has been defined as "the com
plete overthrow of the established government
in any country or state by those who were pre
viously subject to it"24 or as "a sudden, radical
and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence or
at least some acts ofviolence."25 In Kelsen's book,
General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
as that which "occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order ... a way not prescribed by the first
order itself."26
"Kitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. Ed. 227, 232.
26State v. Diamond, 202 P. 988, 991.
26P. 117 (1946).
fj&0
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
It was through the February 1986 revolu
tion, a relatively peaceful one, and more popu
larly known as "people power revolution" that
the Filipino people tore themselves away from
an existing regime. This revolution also saw
the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
From the natural law point of view, the
right of revolution has been defined as "an in
herent right of a people to cast out their rulers,
change their policy or effect radical reforms in
|pi their system of government or institutions by
force or a general uprising when the legal and
constitutional methods of making change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable."27 It has been said that "the locus of
positive law-making power hes with the people of
the state" and from there is derived "the right of
the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any
existing form of government without regard to
the existing constitution."28
ffijj^i The three (3) clauses that precede the text of
the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution,29 read:
WHEREAS, the new government under
President Corazon C. Aquino was installed
through direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the heroic action of the
people was done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended;
WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the sovereign man
date of the people, do hereby promulgate the
following Provisional Constitution.
These summarize the Aquino government's
position that its mandate is taken from "a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people."
Discussions and opinions oflegal experts also
proclaim that the Aquino government was "revo
lutionary in the sense that it came into existence
*7H. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law
II, 4th edition, 1927.
"Political Rights as Political Questions, The Paradox
f^t of Luther v. Borden, 100 Harvard Law Review 1125, 1133
(1987).
^Proclamation No. 3 (1986).
i|^j
19
in defiance of existing legal processes"30and that
it was a revolutionary government "instituted
by the direct action of the people in opposition
to the authoritarian values and practices of the
overthrown government."31
A question which naturally comes to mind
is whether the then existing legal order was
overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal
order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such
code consists of all the rules found in the enact
ments of the organs of the polity. Where the state
operates under a written constitution, its organs
may be readily determined from a reading of its
provisions. Once such organs are ascertained,
it becomes an easy matter to locate their enact
ments. The rules in such enactments, along with
those in the constitution, comprise the legal order
of that constitutional s'tate."32 It is assumed that
the legal order remains as a "culture system" of
the polity as long as the latter endures33 and that
a point may be reached, however, where the legal
system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is
no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced
by the officials.34
It is widely know that Mrs. Aquino's rise to
the presidency was not due to constitutional pro
cesses; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang
Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organiza
tion of Mrs. Aquino's government which was met
by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the
departure of Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point
where the legal system then in effect had ceased
to be obeyed by the Filipino people.
^J. Bernas, Proclamation No. 3, with Notes by Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. 3 (1986).
31Address by U.P. President, now Senator Edgardo An
gara, Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, March 21, 1986,
27 U.P Gazette 28,29.
"'Fernandez, Law and Polity: Towards a Systems Con
cept of Legal Validity, 46 Phil. Law Journal, 390-391 (1971).
33Jd. at 422.
**Id. at 390-391.
 20 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
C. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Antecedent Facts
Immediately, upon her assumption to office
following the successful EDSARevolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presiden
tial Commission on GoodGovernment ("PCGG").
EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover
all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdi
nand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to ac
complish and carry out the purposes of this order"
and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG,
through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFPBoard")
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board inves
mp tigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus
Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). Oh 27 July 1987, the AFP
Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
i^
recommendation on the reported unexplained
wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Reso
lution reads:
iiiJ
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and
Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
erred in declaring the properties confiscated
from Dimaano's house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue
bears a significant effect on petitioner's case since
these properties comprise most of petitioner's
^gj evidence against private respondents. Petitioner
will not have much evidence to support its case
against private respondents if these properties
are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raid
ing team served at Dimaano's residence a
search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not
present during the raid but Dimaano's cousins
witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together
with other items not included in the search
warrant. The raiding team seized these items:
once baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40
rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
.45; communications equipment, cash consist
ing of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and
land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial
notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure on March 3,1986 or five days
after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner
argues that a revolutionary government was
operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
Vice President Laurel were "taking power in
the name and by the will of the Filipino people."
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary govern
ment effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents' exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclu
sionary right arising from an illegal search ap
plies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
the time of the search. Therefore, the government
may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against
her since at the time of their seizure, private re
spondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25
February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March
1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defi
ance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."
The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitu
tion or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the dejure
government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revo
lutionary government was bound by the Bill of
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Rights ofthe 1973 Constitution during the inter
regnum, that is, after the actual and effective
take-over ofpower by the revolutionary govern
ment following the cessation of resistance by
loyalist forces upto24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitu
tion); and (2)whether the protection accordedto
individuals under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Declaration") remained in effect during the
interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution was not operative duringthe
interregnum. However, werule that the protec
tion accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during
the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders.
Withthe abrogation ofthe 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no munici
pal law higher than the directives and orders of
the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionaryright under a BillofRights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter ofAssociateJustice Reynato
S. Puno, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA 589:
A revolution has been defined as "the com
plete overthrow of the established government
in any country or state by those who were pre
viously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical
and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence or
at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book,
General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
as that which "occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order ... a way not prescribed by the first
order itself."
It was through the February 1986revolution,
a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the "people power revolution" that
the Filipino people tore themselves away from
an existing regime. This revolution also saw
the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
21
From the natural lawpointofview, the right
of revolution has been defined as "an inherent
right ofa people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their
system of government or institutions by force
or a general uprising when the legal and consti
tutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of
positive law-making power lies with the people
ofthe state"andfrom there is derived "theright
of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
any existingform ofgovernment without regard
to the existing constitution."
xxx XXX XXX
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino's rise to
the presidency was not due to constitutionalpro
cesses; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
provisions ofthe 1973 Constitution as a Batasang
Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organiza
tion of Mrs. Aquino's Government which was met
by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the
departure ofthe Marcos Cabinetofficials, revamp
of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the
point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration
orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption
of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the
take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate
the due process and search and seizure clauses
of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in
power was concededly a revolutionary govern
ment bound by no constitution. No one could
validly question the sequestration orders as vio
lative of the Bill of Rights because there was no
Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However,
upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution,
the sequestered companies assailed the seques-
Is*I
22 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
tration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of
the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard &Engineering Co.,Inc.
v.Presidential Commissionon GoodGovernment,
May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181, petitioner Baseco,
while conceding there was no Bill of Rights dur
ing the interregnum, questioned the continued
L validity of the sequestration orders upon adop
tion of the Freedom Constitution in view of the
due process clause in its Bill ofRights. The Court
ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later
the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the
validity of sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face
of the foregoing considerations as to the valid
ity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and
takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the
fact that these particular remedies and the au
thority of the PCGG to issue them have received
constitutional approbation and sanction. As al
ready mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom"
iiiiiii
Constitution recognizes the power and duty of
the President to enact "measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to .. . (r)ecover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and support-"
ers of the previous regime and protect the inter
est of the people through orders ofsequestration
or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
"authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitu
tion and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware
that the sequestration orders would clash with
the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language
recognizing the validity of the sequestration or
fowl
ders. The following discourse by Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is
something schizophrenic about the arguments in
defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Min
ister Salonga's lecture in. the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, of which all of us have
been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues
that everything the Commission is doing is tradi
tionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner
f^f.i
Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major
portion of his lecture developing that argument.
On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he
says that in the end what matters are the results
and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that
the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another wordfor niceties or exceptions.
Now,if everything the PCGG is doing is legal,
why is it asking the CONCOM for special protec
tion? The answer is clear. What they are doing
will not stand the test of ordinary due process,
hence they are asking for protection, for excep
tions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine,
as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes
malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowableextrapolation. Hence, we should not give
the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and
give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolu
tion and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the
heart of the constitutional normalization is the
lull effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in
one breath, ask for constitutional normalization
and at the same time.ask for a temporary halt to
the full functioning of what is at the heart of con
stitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that
would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation
of due process and rule of law. The New Society
word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when
we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first.
Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee
report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the
Bill of Rights for six months after the convening
of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad
deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the
new government to acquire the vice of disregard
ing the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become
difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice
begin to think that they have a vested right to its
practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep
the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are
the results and not the legal niceties is an argu
ment that is very disturbing. When it comes from
a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga,
a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another
staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobu-
L lating. The argument makes the PCGG an auc
tioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
block. If the price is right, the search and seizure
clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account
to us and we will award you the search and seizure
clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the
present government as hostage to the hoarders
of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the
hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the
ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the
due process in the search and seizure clauses.
So, there is something positively revolving about
either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom
captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow
strong, only if it would become convinced of the
values enshrined in the Constitution of a price
that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for
the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of
Section 8 of the committee report and allow the
new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options.
First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo
argumentthat what the PCGG has been doing
has been completely within the pale of the law.
If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be
able to go on, even without the support of Section
8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only
one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty
of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is de
fended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude
with what another Christian replied when asked
to toy around with the law. From his prison cell,
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of
law for my nation's safety sake." I ask the Com
mission to give the devil benefit of law for our
nation's sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President.
Despite the impassioned plea by Commis
sioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitu-,
tion were fully aware that absent Section 26,.,
sequestration orders would not stand the test of
due process under the Bill of Rights.
$fi)
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution remained in force during the
23
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration or
ders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after install
ing itself as the dejure government, assumed re
sponsibility for the State's good faith compliance
with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines
is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property." Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court
has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State. [Andreu v. Com
missioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347 (1951);
Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90
Phil. 256 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Mejoff v. Di
rector of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951)]. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not re
pudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its obliga
tions under the Covenant or the Declaration is
another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice
it to say that the Court considers the Declara
tion as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper sub
jects of the rules of international law laid down
in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or
the Declaration in the same way it repudiated
 24
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure govern
faai ment, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State's good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provi
sional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders oftherevolutionary govern
ment became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives
and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the BillofRights ofthe 1973
Constitution. The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary
tori
governmentto avoidabuses ofthe absolute pow
ers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitu
tion or Bill of Rights existed, directives and or
dersissuedby government officers werevalidso
long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government.
The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration.-In
this case, the revolutionary government pre
sumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper ap
plication,specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrantis thusvalid with respect to
the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team
L seized items not included in the warrant. As ad
mitted by petitioner's witnesses, theraiding team
confiscateditems not included in the warrant...
It is obvious from the testimony ofCaptain
Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The search warrantdid notparticularly describe
L these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team
had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless searchandseizure. Clearly, the raid
ing team exceeded its authority when it seized
these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore
void, and unless these items arecontraband per
fofrl
se, and they are not, they must be returned to
theperson from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is
thelawful owner ofthese items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as
basisto seize and withhold these itemsfrom the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should
be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions ofthe
Sandiganbayan dated 18November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
the records of this case to the Ombudsman for
such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commis
sioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination ofany taxhabihty ofrespondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
5. Patterns of government.
[The following selection gives a conspectus
of the various forms of government that are im
portant for an understanding of the Philippine
situation:35]
What superficially appears to be a bewil
dering variety of applications of constitutional
democracy can be reduced tothefollowing basic
patterns:
1. Ifthepeople, organized as the electorate,
are the preponderant power holder, the pattern
ofgovernment is known as "direct democracy."
2. "Assemblygovernment" is the name for
the pattern in which theparliament asthe rep
resentation ofthe people is the ascendant power
holder.
3. "Parliamentarism" is the name for the
pattern in which an equilibrium between the
independent power holders, parliament and
government, is attempted by integrating the
latter into the former: thepersonnel of the gov
ernment - cabinet - are simultaneously mem
bers of the assembly. Parliamentarism, thus,
is interdependence by integration. In actual-
practice, however, parliamentarism presents
3sLOEWNSTEIN, POLITICAL POWERAND GOVERN
MENTAL PROCESS, 73-106 (1965).
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
itself in two widely divergent forms, depending
Im on whether the parliament is superior in political
power to the cabinet or whether the latter is in
a position to control the former. The supremacy
of the assembly over the government is reflected
by the classical French type of parliamentarism.
The ascendancy of the cabinet over the parlia
ment is institutionalized in the British cabinet
government.
4. If the independent power holders, gov
ernment and parliament, are kept separated
but are constitutionally obligated to corporate
for the formation of the will of the state, interde
pendence is achieVed by coordination instead of
integration. In view of the executive leadership
implied, this pattern is called "presidentialism";
in the United States it is colloquially if erro
neously known as "separation of powers."
5. Finally, constitutional theorist are in the
habit of assigning to the Swiss governmental
system a pattern of its own, for which because
of the collegiate structure of the governmental
power holder, the appellation "directory govern
ment" is common.
The Second Pattern: Assembly
Government.
Of all patterns of constitutional-democratic
government, assembly government is the least
known to constitutional theory and, by what little
is known of it, the most discredited because when
it made its first appearance in revolutionary
France it was held responsible for Robespierre's
dictatorship and the Terror. Yet, in our time, it
has experienced a most unexpected and truly
phenomenal revival by having become the stan
dard pattern of government in the [former] Soviet
orbit. As a pattern of government it is Janus-
faced, capable of serving as the organizational
tool for democracy and autocracy alike.
Briefly stated, assembly government
amounts to this: the legislative assembly, popu
larly elected, holds undisputed supremacy over
all other state organs, subject only to the sover
eign electorate renewing it at regularly recur
rent intervals. In contrast to the dual structure
of parliamentary government which, at least
in theory, presupposes two independent power
25
holders, the assembly and the government, with
reciprocally matching powers in assembly
government the executive is strictly subordi
nated, the servant of the assembly, appointed
and dismissed at the assembly's discretion. The
devolution of executive functions to a government
or to ministers is of a strictly technical character
and does not create rights exercisable outside the
instructions and supervision of the assembly.
No other state organ is legally in the position
to interfere with the autonomy and the power
monopoly of the assembly. Consequently, there
exists no right of dissolution by the government,
though recall by the sovereign electorate may be
feasible. Bicameralism is basically incompatible
with assembly government. Nor does a chief of
state or president, except for strictly ceremonial
functions, or a monarchical establishment be
yond the control of the assembly fit into the pat
tern. In short, the pure type of assembly govern
ment is undiluted and unadulterated Rousseau,
arch-democratic, arch-republican, "monolithic" in
the extreme. It presents the strange phenomenon
of power concentrated in a democratically elected
assembly as the single power holder.
The Third Pattern: Parliamentarism.
Parliamentarism, in its various applications,
is by far the most common pattern of constitu
tional-democratic government today. In contrast
to assembly government and presidentialism,
both artificially constructed products of political
theory, parliamentarism grew organically and
pragmatically after the eclipse of the royal
prerogative by the Glorious Revolution. Subse
quently, the principle of parliamentary govern
ment slowly gained recognition: that the king's
government the cabinet requires the sup
port of the majority of parliament, or at least of
the Commons, and that its political responsibility
to parliament is best served if its members are
simultaneously members of the parliament.. .
Parliamentarism likewise is a generic term
including several widely divergent applications.
For its proper understanding, three points should
be noted. First, the existence ofrepresentative or
"parliamentary" institutions in a state is not tan
tamount to its being operated by the parliamen
tary form of government. Second, parliamentary
government is by no means identical with cabinet
 26
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
government. Since the latter is a specific version
of parliamentary government, the term as such
should be reserved for the British institutional
ization. Third, tobequalified as "parliamentary,"
the governmental structure must posses certain
features common to all its variants and not found
in any other pattern of government.
Basically, parliamentary government is
an attempt to establish between the two inde
pendent andseparatepower holders assembly
and government such an equilibrium that
L neither oneofthem can gain ascendancyoverthe
other. Under this dualism the two powerholders
share in policy decision and policy execution by
legislation. Moreover, since both are endowed
with reciprocal restraints and mutual controls
inter-organ controls they also share in
policy control. As a dualist power configuration,
parliamentarism fitted early constitutionalism
not yet perfected by the admission of the elec
torate as the supreme power holder. This stage
Visa l was finallyreached when the electorate, either in
periodical elections or, in the case of dissolution
of the parliament, at irregular intervals, deter
mined the political complexion of the assembly
and, through it, of the government.
The "ideal type" of this structural arrange
ment is the complete equilibrium of the two in
Bad
dependent power holders, government (cabinet)
and parliament, subject to the periodicalpolitical
reorientation by the verdict of the electorate,
each ofthem endowedwith restraining and con
trolling powerssymmetrically matching those of
the other power holder. The history of constitu
tional government since 1789is nothing but the
search for the magic formula by which a stable
equilibrium between government and parliament
could be established and maintained. The quest
has proved unsuccessful. Almost at all time the
one orthe otherofthe two power holders weighed
heavieron the scalesofthe powerdynamism, and
the oscillations betweenexecutive leadership and
'%}
the supremacy of the representative parliament
appear intrinsically inherent in the practice of
constitutional government.
The following structural elements are com
mon to all variants of genuine parliamentary
government.
First, the members of the government or
cabinet are, as a rule, simultaneously members
of the parliament. . . The rationale behind the
requirement liesin thefactthat the assembly has
greater control over its own members than it has
over outsiders and can subject them to political
responsibility by making them stand up in its
midst and account for their conduct of office.
Second, the government or cabinet consists
of the political leaders of the majority party or
a coalition of parties forming a majority. Since
they must be members of the parliament, the
cabinet is a committee of the assembly, fused
and integrated with it. Although there exists a
personal identity between the membership in
the cabinet and membership in the parliament,
the two power holdersare functionally separate
and independent. In view of the character of the
cabinet as a committee of the parliament, the
pattern is appropriately called interdependence
by integration.
Third, the government-cabinet in itself has
a pyramidal structure with the prime minister,
president ofthe council, minister-president, etc.,
as its apex and recognized leader. Though the
degree ofascendancy ofthe prime minister may
vary from oneparliamentary regime to the other,
the sharing of political power between him and
his collaboration in the government has lately
sufficientlydecreased to allowthe generalization
that, within the collective group of the govern
ment, the prime minister exercises undisputed
supremacy over his ministerial colleagues. The
power ofthegovernment actually isconcentrated
in the person of the prime minister as its leader.
Fourth, the government remains in powerso
longas it commands the support ofthe majority
of the members of the parliament. Power is lost
if the majority withdraws its support or if the
general elections change the majority structure
of the parliament.
Fifth, on principle, policy decision is shared
by the government and the parliament. Both
concur in the legislation implementing thepolicy
decision. In practice, however, their respective
share in the initiating of policy decisions - and
even the drafting of the statute - depends on
the variant ofparliamentarism prevailingin the
specific state. Policy execution byadministration,
on the other hand, is entrusted to the government
under constant supervision of the parliament.
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sixth, it is in policy control that the crux of
E&&1
the pattern of parliamentary government lies.
To be genuine, parliamentarism must be oper
ated by reciprocal control devices at the disposal
of both power holders, the government and the
parliament. The most effective instrumentality
for the benefit of the parliament, is the invoca
tion of political responsibility a constant
M
contingency of the cabinet as a whole (collec
tive responsibility) or of an individual member
of the cabinet (individual responsibility). The
ultima ratio of parliamentary control is the vote
of non-confidence (censure) carried by the par
liamentary majority against the government, or
vice versa, the rejections of a vote of confidence
requested by the government. Resignation of
the government, in this situation, may or may
not lead to dissolution of the parliament and to
new elections. Contrariwise, the most stringent
control device at the disposal of the government
is the right to dissolve the parliament and call
for new elections. In this case, the sovereign elec
torate serves as the arbiter between the party or
parties in opposition to the government and the
government itself; if the opposition is victorious
at the polls, the electorate is presumed to have
disowned the government in power, and the new
government has to be formed by the victorious
&jjj party or party coalition. If, on the other hand, the
government majority is returned, the electorate
is presumed to have indorsed the governmental
policies, and the government remains in power.
However, the electoral verdict can be accurately
ascertained only in the case of the two-party
system.
Dissolution and vote of non-confidence belong
together like piston and cylinder. It is their po
tential reciprocity that makes the wheels of the
parliamentary mechanism turn. Where these
reciprocal powers are not adequately matched,
for example, if the dissolution power of the
government is atrophied or, contrariwise, if the
fc%l
power of parliamentary disapproval is limited,
the parliamentary system in its authentic form
has difficulty operating and may even cease to
exist. In the former case atrophy of the disso
lution power the regime is slanted toward the
supremacy of the parliamentary power holder.
The government is weakened; the parliament,
strengthened. If, on the other hand, the tech
nique of removing a government by a vote of cen
t*i
27
sure is restricted, the regime is slanted toward
the supremacy of the governmental power holder.
In either case much depends on the prevailing
party structure, whether the system is multi
party or two party, and on the degree of1 inter
nal party discipline, which is naturally greater
under the two-party configuration than under
multi-partism. The choice of these alternatives,
by a nation, is neither voluntary or national. It
is conditioned by national experience and char
acter. A specific variant cannot be enjoined by
constitutional provisions.
The Fourth Pattern: Cabinet
Government.
In striking contrast to France, parliamen
tarism in Great Britain and the nations following
the British model signifies the undisputed ascen
dancy of the government prime minister and
cabinetover the parliament or, more precisely,
since the Parliament Act of 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V,
c. 13), over the House of Commons.
The main features of the British version of
parliamentary government may be summarized
thus:
1. It is predicated on the existence of two
alternating parties possessing even chances in
the long run of becoming the majority party at
the general elections. This traditional situation
suffered a temporary interruption when, with
the rise of labor, the dilemma of a three-party
configuration presented itself (1923-31). After
several minority governments (1923-24 and
1929-31) the realistic British solved by it by
eliminating the third party of the Liberals and
returning to the two-party system, which alone
makes a cabinet government possible. For the
same reason the British people stubbornly ad
here to the majority technique in (mostly) single-
membered constituencies. Resisting the tempta
tion of proportional representation, they prefer
a workable government and the unavoidable
inequalities ofmajority elections to a mechanical
equality involving the risk of unstable govern
ments. Population shifts are largely remedied
by a periodical redistribution of seats.
2. The cabinet is a relatively small com
mittee, composed of the leaders of the majority
party. All its members and the other ministers,
 28
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
that is, members ofthe government whoare not
members ofthe inner circleofthe cabinet, must
be members ofthe parliament. The majority of
them sit in the Commons: the share ofthe Lords
inthecomposition of the cabinet was statutorily
regulated by the Ministers of the Crown Act of
1937. (3 Edw. VII and Geo. VI, c. 38.)
3. The official leader of the majority win
ning the general elections is the prime minister
designate. He isthe undisputed leader and supe
rior ofhis cabinet, whose members he chooses at
his discretion. His position vis-a-vis his cabinet
is socommanding that, in actual practice, in the
triangular power configuration he has eclipsed
the cabinet. He determines the policy decisions
afrijijJ
and the manner by which they are tobe executed.
How farheaccepts theadvice ofhis colleagues in
thecabinet depends on hispersonality prestige.
A minimum degree of consultation implying
shared poweris secured by the otherwiserather
elastic rules governing the cabinet's procedure.
But policy determination is monopolized by the
prime minister to such an extent that his role
is sometimes spoken of as "constitutional dic
tatorship." However, this qualification is far off
the mark. The British cabinet system is pre
vented from sliding into authoritarianism by
the self-restraint of the prime minister and the
cabinet; by their respect for therights oftheop
position which, by a turn ofthe political wheel,
may become the government andretaliate; and,
most of all, by the sensitiveness of the govern
ment to public opinion.
4. In view of the concentration of policy
decision in the hands ofthe prime minister and
hiscabinet, the Commons are granted only that
degree ofparticipation inthepolicy execution by
legislation that the prevailing political climate
ofpublic opinion demands. By themselves, the
Commons share in the policy decisions only to
thelimited extent that they confirm inprinciple
those previously taken by thecabinet. The rejec
t>gji/
tion ofa major legislative plan indorsed by the
government would lead to dissolution and the
arbitration of the electorate between Commons
and the cabinet. No such contingency ofa Com
mons majority disowning its cabinet has arisen
since the eighties ofthe last century. This situ
ation implies thatlegislative initiative isstrictly
monopolized by the government. No bill unless
indorsed by the government can reach the stat
aj
ute book. Thelegislative initiativeofthe private
members that is, deputies ofboth parties not
belonging to the cabinet and ministry has
almost completely vanished; it is limited to
non-controversial improvements of the existing
laws. The government has complete control over
the entire legislative process; the drafting ofthe
bills is undertaken by the ministerial bureau
cracy primarily of the Treasury; agenda and
timetable ofthe Commons are arranged to suit
thegovernmental legislative planning. However,
less to avoid retaliation in case the pendulum
has swung to the other end than in deference to
democratic fairness, the legislative business is
conducted in loyal cooperation with the leaders
of the opposition.
5. Policy control, on the other hand, is
vested in both houses of the parliament and in
the electorate. Within the Commons it isprimar7
ily the opposition, lessfrequently alsothe back
benchers ofthe government majority, which acts
asthesemaphore ofpublic opinion and thepeople
at large. The reports that the representatives
bring back from their weeklyvisits to their con
stituencies and relay, through the partywhips,
to the leadership is an important control device.
The outwardly most conspicuous control
technique, however, is the daily practice ofques
tion time. Questions addressed to the individual
ministers serve most ofall the purpose ofcheck
ingonthe administrative sideofpolicy execution
which otherwise - a universal phenomenon of
the transformation of the legislative into the
administrative state not confined to Britain -
tends to emancipate the administration more and
more from the effective control of the Commons.
The House ofLords likewise, though politically
emasculated since the Parliament Act of 1911,
has its sharein policy control through its more
leisurelyconduct ofthe legislativebusinessand
its frequent high-level debates onmajor policies.
6. The British parliamentary personnel
is still one ofthe best existing, if no longer the
elite it used to be in the nineteen century, the
great majority ofthem are men ofintelligence,
integrity, and experience. How does one account
for the truly amazing phenomenon that these
elected representatives submitlikegood soldiers
to the commands oftheir superiors? The key for
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the understanding of British cabinet government
lies in party discipline . . .
From the viewpoint of the process of politi
cal power, cabinet government should be recog
nized as a fusion of the two independent power
holders, cabinet and parliament, into a single
power mechanism in which the two organs are
practically integrated. It is, in essence, interde
pendence ofthe two power holders by integration.
The counterweight lies in the continuous control
of public opinion, represented by the opposition,
and the recurrent general elections. Easily one
of the most successful patterns of government
of our time and, possibly, of all times it
is predicated on the existence of two, and not
more, competing and alternating parties with
the electorate holding the balance between them.
The Fifth Pattern: Presidentialism.
The American [Filipino] reader does not need
a detailed presentation of the American pattern
of government...
The American government is commonly
spoken of as one with "separation of powers," a
designation lately refined to "separated and co
ordinated powers." Abroad, because of the belief
in the dominant position of the president, it is
better known as "presidential government" or
"presidentialism." As has been pointed out previ
ously, the term "powers," figurative rather than
structural, should be replaced by "functions,"
denoting different areas of state activity.
The early concept of a strict and rigid sepa
ration of functions, used by both the American
and the contemporaneous French constitutional
theory and practice, appears an artificial prod
uct, period-and-environment-conditioned by the
speculative rationalism of the Enlightenment.
It was nurtured by the infusion of Newtonian
mechanistic premises into the socio-political
realm and inspired by the belief that the equi
librium established between the several power
holders will result in the permanent harmony of
the state society. The assumption that the power
holders in equipoise would voluntarily dedicate
themselves to cooperation for the common wel
fare was psychologically unsound. It neglected, to
its peril, the demonism of the power dynamism.
The co-existence of several power holders in rigid
isolation was an unworkable illusion, as clearly
29
demonstrated by the French constitution of 1791,
which attempted to apply Montesquieu's separa
tion of functions to a practical test.
NOTE: The only cdnstitutional form of
government the Philippines has experienced
since 1935 is the presidential form. Even the
government of President Marcos under the
1973 Constitution, as revised in 1981, had the
distinguishing marks of a presidential form of
government: (1) separation of powers and (2)
the preeminence of the President. The President
was "head of state and chief executive" (VII, 1);
he inherited the powers of the President under
the 1935 Constitution (VII, 16); he was superior
to the Prime Minister by the fact that he nomi
nated the Prime Minister (LX, 1), approved the
program of government to be administered by
the Prime Minister (LX, 2), terminated the term
of the Prime Minister when he nominated the
successor (IX, 4), and could delegate powers to
the Prime Minister. He also had control over
the ministries (VII, 7). Moreover, while there
was closer relationship between the executive
and the legislature (an understatement!), thus
manifesting "features ofparliamentarism," there
was separation between them. Separation from
the Judiciary also conceptually remained. (Free
Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor,
108 SCRA 757, October 30,1981.)
SEC. 2. THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNC
ES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NA
TIONAL POLICY, ADOPTS THE GENER
ALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTER
NATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAW
OF THE LAND AND ADHERES TO THE
POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE,
FREEDOM, COOPERATION, AND AMITY
WITH ALL NATIONS.
1. Renunciation of war.
There are three parts to Section 2: (1) renun
ciation of war; (2) adoption of the principles of
international law; and (3) adherence to a policy
of peace, freedom, and amity with all nations.
The first two parts were copied by the 1973 Con
stitution from Article II, Section 3, of the 1935
Constitution. The third part is an addition made
by the 1973 Constitution. The present Section2
is an exact copy of the 1973 provision.
 30
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Theinspirationofthis provision onrenuncia
tion ofwar, when first adopted in 1935, was the
Kellogg-Briand PactofAugust 27,1928. ThePact
renouncedwars ofaggression. And this is all that
the Constitution renounces, for the power to wage
a defensive war is of the very essence of sover
eignty. Forthat matter, the Constitution makes
defense ofthe state a dutyofgovernment andof
the people36 andgives to Congress the power to
declare a state of war.37 As one writer, however,
has putit, theprovision is a political gesture of
no significance and a pompous declaration that
impresses no one. By stating thatthe Philippines
"renounces" war as an instrument of national
policy, the implication is that at onetimewarwas
part of Philippine policy. "If the intention were
todeclare the doctrine ofanti-militarism, which
apparently was what the moral and political
leadership ofthe country desired, bettercrafts
manship could have more accurately expressed
it bya statementthatrthe Philippines condemns
war as an instrument ofnationalpolicy orwords
to this effect."38 Apparently, however, this criti
cism, valid as it is, impressed noonein the 1971
Convention nor in the 1986 Commission. Thus,
the phraseology of the 1935 provision has been
retained.
It shouldbe noted, however, that as a mem
berofthe United Nations the Philippines does
not merely renounce war, which is a limited con
cept which does not include someformsofforce.
Asa signatoryto the UnitedNationsCharterthe
Philippines adheres to Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter which says: "All Members shallrefrain
in their international relations from the threat
or use offorce against the territorial integrity
orpolitical independence of any state, or inany
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."
2. Adoption of international law.
Implicit in this provision is the acceptance
ofthe dualist view oflegal systems, namely that
domestic law is distinct from international law.
Since dualism holds that international lawand
municipal lawbelong todifferent spheres, inter
national law becomes part ofmunicipal law only
38Article II, Section 4.
"Article VI, Section 23(1).
MSINCO, supra, note 1 at 120.
ifit isincorporated intomunicipal law. What the
secondpart ofSection 2 does is to make interna
tional law part of the law of the land.
In other jurisdictions, international law
can become part of municipal law only if it is
transformed into domestic law through the ap
propriate constitutional machinery such as an
act of Parliament. This method follows what is
called the doctrine of transformation. Another
theory is the doctrine of incorporation. Black-
stone expressed this in his Commentary when
he said that:
the lawofnations, wherever anyquestion arises
which is properly the object ofits jurisdiction, is
here adopted initsfull extent by the common law,
and it is held to be part of the law ofthe land.
The second part of Section 2 accepts the
doctrine ofincorporation. This provision makes
the Philippines one of the states which make a
specific declaration that international law has
the force also of domestic law.39 International
law therefor can beused byPhilippine courts to
settle domestic disputes in much the same way
that they would use the Civil Code or the Penal
Code and other laws passed by Congress.
What elements of international law become
part ofPhilippine law by incorporation through
Article II, Section 2? Since treaties become part
ofPhilippine law only by ratification, the prin
ciple ofincorporation applies only to customary
law and to treaties which have become part of
customary law. This distinction, however, is
sometimes blurred in some Philippine Supreme
Court decisions.40
A problem, however, which the provision
poses is the matter of determining what these
generally acceptedprinciples ofinternational law
arewhich thePhilippines accepts. Ultimately, in
the absence of the guiding direction of treaties
MSimilar provisions are found in the Austrian Consti
tution, Article 9: 'The generally recognized rules ofinter
national law shall beconsidered as component parts ofthe
Federal Law," and in Article 25 ofthe Constitution ofthe
Federal Republic of Germany: 'The general rules ofpublic
international law are an integral part of federal law."
*See Aloysius Llamzon, "The Generally Accepted Prin
ciples ofInternational Law as Philippine Law: Towards a
Structurally Consistent Use ofCustomary International Law
inPhilippine Courts," aJ.D. Thesis presented to the College
ofLaw, Ateneo deManila University, 2002.
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
or statutes, the process of selecting what these
iijvjiij accepted principles are will have to be done by
the courts. The Supreme Court as a matter of
fact, has had occasion to perform this function.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,41 an alien of
Russian descent who had been detained pending
execution of the order of deportation was ordered
released on bail when after two years the depor
tation order could not be carried out because no
ship or country would take the alien. The Court
said in part:42
JiiffiJ
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec.
3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Univerr
sal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved
by the General Assembly of the United Nations of
which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as ap
plied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was
there resolved that "All human beings are born
free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. l)j-that
!>i->
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality
or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2); that "Everyone has the right to an effec
tive remedy by the competent nationals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
'iii&
Earlier, in Kuroda v. Jalandoni,43 the Court
had said that the provision "is not confined to
the recognition of rules and principles of inter
national law as contained in treaties to which
our government may have been or shall be a
signatory." Thus, although the Philippines is
not a signatory to the Hague Convention and
became a signatory to the Geneva Convention
only in 1947, the Court held that a Philippine
Military Commission had jurisdiction over war
crimes committed in violation of the two conven
tions prior to 1947.
bj The doctrine of immunity from suit of a for
eign state is likewise a principle of international
law whose acceptance in this jurisdiction has
"90 Phil. 70 (1951).
i2Id. at 73-4.
"83 Phil. 171,178 (1949).
31
been established in a long Hne of cases starting
with Raquiza v. Bradford,44and was summarized
and reaffirmed in Baer v. Tizon45
More recently, in Agustin v. Edu,46 a case
involving a presidential Letter of Instruction pre
scribing the use of early warning devices (EWD),
the Court said that the constitutional provision
'"possesses relevance." The Court pointed out
that the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals had been ratified by the Philippine
government under Presidential Decree No. 207.
'It is not for this country to repudiate a com
mitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way
of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war
with the principle of international morality."4*
Likewise, the international duty of protecting
foreign embassies was recognized in J.B.L. Reyes
v. Bagatsing.46
3. Adherence to policy of peace, freedom,
amity.
The third part of Section 2 states that the
Philippines "adheres to the policy of peace, equal
ity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations." This is an abbreviated statement of
Section 1 and Section 3 of an article on Foreign
Relations approved by the 1971 Convention on
second reading on June 2,1972.
Section 1 of the article read:
The Philippines shall pursue a foreign policy
aimed at the fulfillment of the national interest in
a world order based on equality, peace, freedom,
justice, and prosperity for all nations.
Thus, it is seen that the guiding principle of
Philippine foreign policy will be, as it is with all
other nations, the national interest. This "self
ish" policy, however, is tempered with concern
for "equality, peace, freedom, justice."
The last two items of the section "coopera
tion, and amity with all nations" were more
fully expressed by Section 2 of the earlier ap
proved article which said:
"75 Phil. 50 (1945).
4557 SCRA1,6-8 (1974). Along line of cases to the same
effect have followed.
<6S8 SCRA 195, 213 (February 2,1979).
"Id.
G.R. No. 65366, October 25,1983.
 32
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
In the national interest andofinternational
peace and cooperation, the Philippines may ex
tend recognition, exchange diplomatic relations
and establish consular, trade, andcultural rela
tions with other nations irrespective of ideology.
toil
While thewords "cooperation and amity with
all nations" found in Section 2do not expressly
manifest the intent to establish diplomatic and
other relations with all nations irrespective of
ideology, theintentis nonetheless there. Howev
er, constitutionally, the provision is without real
significance; the decision whether toestabhsh or
nottoestabhsh suchrelations remains, asin the
1935 Constitution, a policy question addressed
tothe discretion ofthe political departments.
Finally, while the 1987 text preserves the
1973 counterpart, the 1986 Commission read
into the word "amity" the concept "love" found
in the Preamble.49
SEC. 3. CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS
AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE
MILITARY. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS THE PROTECTOR OF
THE PEOPLE ANDTHE STATE. ITS GOAL
IS TO SECURE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
THE STATEAND THE INTEGRITY OF THE
NATIONAL TERRITORY.
1. Civilian authority and the role of the
military.
tiiiiy
Under the 1935 Constitution, civilian su
premacy was implied from its Article VII, Sec
tion 10(2) which made the President; a civilian
and as civilian, Commander-in:Chief. The 1973
Constitution made the principle explicit. The
first sentence of the present Section 3, except
for the two commas, is a copy of the 1973 provi
sion. The commas were added for emphasis on
iiiiiiiiiii)
"at all times."60
Civilian supremacy came as a legacy of the
Liiyi American conquerors. The process of locally
instilling the principle was so successful under
American rule that, up until the World War II
and even beyond, there was no serious problem
which arose from military submission tocivilian
authority. As the nation developed, however,
"IV RECORD 772.
KId. at 959.
l$0
faith in civilian supremacy began to wane. The
waning ofthat faithbegan when civilian officials
started using military elements for furthering
their ambitions and when military officers began
allowing themselves to be so used. The author
of The Power Elite, put it thus: "As politics gets
into the army, the army gets into politics." Hence,
when theFilipinos drafted the1973 Constitution
it was thought necessary, just to emphasize the
point, tomake theprinciple supremacy ofcivilian
authority explicit.
2. Role of the. armed forces.
The period ofmartial rule up until EDSAI
was another phase inthe constitutional develop
ment. Military abuses were rampantthen.Hence
the 1986 Constitutional Commission thought it
necessary to put down the positive role of the
military in explicit terms. "The Armed Forces of
the Philippines isthe protector ofthe people and
the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
of the State and the integrity of the national
territory."
The second and third sentences ofSection 3,
originally discussed by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission under the General Provisions, are
meant to express the philosophy that underlies
the existence of armed forces. The original for
mulation made by Commissioner Ople read: "The
purpose ofa militaryestablishmentis to secure
the sovereignty of the people and the integrity
ofthe national territory and to serve the general
welfare."51 The provision was born of a desire
to express in positive terms the Commission's
disapproval ofabuses committed by the military
againstcivilians duringthe period ofauthoritar
ianrule.'2 The transposition ofthe two sentences
from the General Provisions to the Declaration
of Principles and specifically asa continuation of
the principle ofcivilian supremacy was meant to
add emphasis on the philosophy they express.53
The phrase "protector ofthepeople" was not
meant to be an assertion of the political role of
the military. But the temptation to read it that
way against thebackground ofthe EDSA eventof
1986 isunderstandable. The intent of the phrase
"protector ofthe people" was rather to make it
MV RECORD 246.
S2See id. at 104-106.
i3Id. at 298-299.
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
foiiifr
act as corrective to military abuses experienced
during martial rule.
Does this mean, however, that the military
has no political role? It does not mean that be
cause the political role is found in the following
sentence. "Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
of the State and the integrity of the national
territory." Thus there are two thoughts in the
constitutional provision: disapproval of military
abuses and guardianship of state sovereignty,
which of course means sovereignty of the people.
The military exercise of political power can be
justified as a last resort when civilian author
ity has lost its legitimacy.
The two sentences, therefore, also yield a
meaning which was not articulated during the
Commission debates. When one reads them in
the light of the unsuccessful military coups of
&ffij|4
1987 and the reasons given for them, and espe
cially in the light of the successful and civilian-
approved coup of February 1986 which became
known as the February Revolution, one cannot
escape the conclusion that the armed forces can
be a legitimate instrument for the overthrow of
a civilian government that has ceased to be a
servant of the people. Such conclusion also finds
support in the principle, accepted by the Commis
sion but not made explicit, that a long standing
tyranny can be legitimately overthrown.54 Civil
ian supremacy, in other words, is, in the final
analysis, not a guaranteed supremacy of civil
ian officers who are in power but of supremacy
of the sovereign people. The Armed Forces, in.
this sense, "is the protector of the people and
the State."
SEC. 4. THE PRIME DUTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS TO SERVE AND PRO
TECT THE PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT
jffljjft MAY CALL UPON THE PEOPLE TO DE
FEND THE STATE AND, IN THE FULFILL
MENT THEREOF, ALL CITIZENS MAY BE
REQUIRED, UNDER CONDITIONS PRO
ffiffi*
VIDED BY LAW, TO RENDER PERSONAL
MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE.
1. Compulsory military and civil service;
protection of people and State.
The 1973 counterpart of this provision was
Article II, Section 2 which read: "The defense of
ASee supra, notes 34 and 35 and text.
t^^
33
the State is a prime duty of the government and
the people, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service." It was almost
a literal reproduction of Article II, Section 2 of
the 1935 Constitution.
In the light of the recent experience with the
Marcos regime which placed inordinate empha
sis on national security, it was understandable
that the Commission should opt for a provision
more people-centered than national security-
centered.55 Thus the old provision was recast to
read: "The prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people." National defense
is placed merely as one of the modes of serving
and protecting the people.
The 1935 provision had been inspired by
Section 37 of the Constitution of the Spanish
Republic.56 The 1935 provision was thought
necessary because of the recognized inadequacy
of a volunteer system both in terms of military
effectiveness and in terms of equality between
the rich and the poor. The report of the Commit
tee on National Defense said in part:57
The volunteer system is not suitable for a
poor country which cannot afford to pay the army
well enough to attract well qualified, able-bodied
young men to the service. The volunteer system
involves the objectionable feature of entrusting
the sacred mission of defending the country to
men lacking in capacity who have proved failures
in other fields of activity. The volunteer system
is undemocratic, because the cannon fodder, with
very few exceptions, consists of proletarians. The
sons of the wealthy can evade the sacred duty of
defending their country, though it is they who
enjoy the advantages obtained through the ser
vices rendered and blood spilled by men to whom
fortune has been unkind. A high morale, which
only a person fighting for an ideal can possess, is
very necessary in an army, and with mercenar
ies fighting for a pittance, such a morale cannot
be attained.
While the inspiration of the 1935 provision
came from the Spanish Constitution, compulsory
KSee IV RECORD at 831-832. See speech of Commis
sioner Rama against the provision depicting it as a remnant
of the old spirit, id. at 831.
^I ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION at 135.
*Vd. at 136.
 34
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
military service is not without precedent in the
American constitutional system to which the
1935 Constitution was heir. The right of the
state to exact compulsory military serviceof its
citizens, as against the contention that such an
exaction would violate the prohibition ofinvolun
tary servitude found in the Thirteenth Amend
ment, was definitively established in 1918. In
the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme
Court declared that the argument based on the
Thirteenth Amendment refuted itself:58 "We are
unable toconceive upon whattheory the exaction
by the government from the citizen of the per
formance ofhis supreme and noble duty of con
tributing to the defense of the rights and honor
of the nation, as the result of a war declared by
the great representative body ofthepeople, can
be said tobe the imposition ofinvoluntary ser
vitude." Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld laws passed in the exercise of this same
state powerrequiring compulsorycivilianlabor
ofthose who areexcused from military service.59
The first Philippine case onthe subject was
People v. Lagman.60 The accused in this case,
prosecuted for failure toregister for military ser
vice underthe National Defense Act, assailed the
validity ofthe Act. The Supreme Court upheld
the lawonthe basisofSection 2 [1935 Constitu
tion] saying:61
i|ffj
The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory militaryservice, does not
go against this constitutional provision butis, on
pi)
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
The dutyofthe Government to defend the State
cannot beperformed except through an army. To
leave theorganization ofan armytothewill ofthe
citizens would betomake this dutyoftheGovern
ment excusable should there be no sufficient men
who volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in
a series ofdecisions thatthecompulsory military
service adopted by reason of the civil war and
the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to
organize and maintainan army.Thisissobecause
M245 U.S. 366, 390(1918).
59SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTI
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PART III RIGHTS
OFTHEPERSON 805 (1968).
6066 Phil. 13 (1938).
G1Id. at 15-6.
m>
the right ofthe Government to require compulsory
military service is a consequence ofits duty to
defend the State and isreciprocal with itsduty to
defend thelife, liberty, andproperty ofthecitizen.
In the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197
U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that,
without violating the Constitution; a person may
be compelled by force, ifneed be, against his will,
against his pecuniary interests, and even against
his religious or political convictions, to take his
place inthe ranks ofthe army ofhis country, and
risk the chance ofbeingshot down in its defense.
In the case ofUnited States vs. Olson (253 Fed.,
233), it was also said that this is notdeprivation
of property without due process oflaw, because,
in its justsense, there is no right ofproperty to
an office or employment. The circumstancethat
these decisions refer tolaws enacted by reason of
theactual existence ofwardoes notmake ourcase
any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis,
whatjustifies compulsory militaryservice is the
defense of the State whether actual or whether
in preparation to make it more effective, in case
of need.
The circumstance that the appellants have
dependent families to support does not excuse
them from their duty to present themselves
before the Acceptance Board because, if such
circumstance exists, they can ask fordeferment
m complying with their duty and, at all events,
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance
to these family responsibilities (Sees. 65 and 69
of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
After the Second World War, the Supreme
Court once more hadoccasion toappeal toSection
2[1935 Constitution]. InPeople v. Manayao, the
Supreme Court said:62
Thisconstitutional provision covers bothtime
of peace and time ofwar, butit is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the
country is involved in war. During such a period
of stress, under a constitution enshrining such
tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to
cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the
Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without
reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence ofthe
Legislature, thatinpromulgating Commonwealth
Act No. 63, under the aegis ofour Constitution,
it intended (but did not declare) that the duties
of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-
quoted constitutional precept could be effectively
cast offby him even when his country isat war, by
thesimple expedient ofsubscribing to an oath of
6278 Phil. 721, 727(1947).
[a>

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 35

allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a SEC. 5. THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or
i^j
by accepting a commission in the military, naval
or air service of such country, or by deserting from
the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
a) It would shock the conscience of any en
lightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by
the very fact of committing the treasonous acts
charged against him, the doing ofwhich under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested
himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby
placed himself beyond the arm of the law. For if
this were so, his very crime would be the shield
that would protect him from punishment.
The 1973 provision altered the 1935 version
and declared national defense to be a prime duty
not just ofthe government but also ofthe people.
The addition of the words "and the people" was
objected to on the ground that national defense
Ifjjj
was the duty only of citizens and not of all the
people, citizens and aliens alike. Sponsors ofthe
provision immediately explained that people in
this section meant citizens. Reference was made
to Article V, Section 1 (1973), which said: 'It shall
be the duty ofthe citizens ... to defend the state
. . ."63 Moreover, reflecting the preoccupation of
the martial law period which overtook the Con
vention, it was pointed out that the citizen's duty
was to defend the state against both external and
f|ftfrl internal aggression.64
As far as the constitutional doctrine on com
pulsory military and civil service is concerned,
the 1987 provision has preserved existing juris
prudence on the subject. One alteration made
on the text is the addition of the phrase "under
conditions provided by law." This was placed in
lieu of "with due regard for objections of con
science" and was intended to give to Congress a
flexible guideline for dealing with conscientious
objectors; but no new doctrine was thereby for
mulated.65
"Session of November 25, 1972. Later, however, on
November 27, 1972, Delegate de Guzman said that while
aliens may not be compelled to render personal military or
civil service, all those enjoying the protection ofthe state may
be required in some other manner to assist in the defense
of the state.
The 1987 Constitution no longer contains a separate
article on duties and obligations of citizens.
"Session of November 27, 1972.
^See IV RECORD 666-667, 681, 691-692, 742.
AND ORDER, THE PROTECTION OF
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY, AND
THE PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL
WELFARE ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE EN
JOYMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE
BLESSINGS OF DEMOCRACY.
1. Peace and order, general welfare.
This provision has no counterpart either
in the 1935 or in the 1973 Constitution. The
mention of "maintenance of peace and order"
provoked the objection that it could create the no
tion that peace and order must be promoted at all
cost and even at the expense of justice and could
encourage the use of military solutions to what
could normally be treated as social, economic and
political problems. But its author, Commissioner
Ambrosio Padilla, explained that the provision
recognized a hierarchy of rights - first, life; sec
ond, liberty; and only third, property.66
SEC. 6. THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE.
NOTE: This will be treated under Article
III, Section 5.
STATE POLICIES
SEC. 7. THE STATE SHALL PURSUE
AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. IN
ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES
THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION
SHALL BE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NATIONAL
INTEREST, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION.
1. An independent foreign policy.
Although Section 7 might read like a coldly
detached statement of a principle, it in fact is a
by-productofthe less than detached discussions
of the future of the military bases in Clark and
Subic. The word "relations" covers the whole
gamut of treaties and international agreements
and other kinds of intercourse. The Section is
the closest reference to military bases that a
dominant majority in the Constitutional Com
mission would allow in the body of the Consti-
66V RECORD 11-14.
 36 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
to
tution. Although the overwhelming sentiment
was that only American military bases could
ever be allowed, and under terms dictated in
Article XVIII, Section 25, for some inexplicable
logic the dominant majority refused to accept the
explicitation of the general principle that "No
foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall
be allowed in Philippine territory."67
Section 7 states a principle which no one
gig)
will dispute but fidelity to which will always be
a matter of debate.68
SEC. 8. THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIS
TENT WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
ADOPTS AND PURSUES A POLICY OF
FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN ITS TERRITORY.
1. A policy of freedom from nuclear weap
iiiisll
ons.
The original formulation of this provision
read thus: "The Philippines is a nuclear-free
country. No portion of its territory shall be used
for the purpose of storing or stockpiling nuclear
weapons, devices or parts thereof." Speaking for
ffl the provision, Commissioner Azcuna said:69
I do not have to elaborate, Madame President,
the enormous destructive capacity of nuclear
weapons, particularly, because Asia has had the
distinct misfortune of being the only place in the
world where nuclear weapons were dropped and
exploded during war. It was not too long ago that
Asia and the world commemorated that fate
ful event. Since the dropping of atomic bombs
in Japan towards the end of World War II, the
technology of nuclear weapons has multiplied
tremendously such that the weapons dropped
in Japan are only used as trigger devices for
the weapons of today. Those bombs were merely
atomic bombs. The bombs of today are hydrogen
Sag)
bombs. Those bombs merely used fission as a
principle. The bombs of today use fusion, the very
power of the sun fusion of nuclear particles,
releasing tremendous energy.
"See IV RECORD 778-813 and discussions of Article
XVHI, Section 25.
68The issue of neutrality was discussed in connection
with this provision but the proposal to adopt neutrality as
pi) a policy was abandoned. See id. at 583, 592-593, 613-615,
635-636, 655-656, 669, 741-742, 753-755.
69Id. at 587. See also id. at 588-589, 681, 815.
An explosion of a nuclear bomb, Madam
President, is considered an uncontrolled nuclear
reaction. That is the definition of a nuclear
explosion. What we seek to prevent from hap
pening within our land is the occurrence of an
uncontrolled nuclear reaction. Why put it in the
Constitution? Why not leave it to the President,
why not leave it to the Senate, to deal with these
matters? Madam President, we are here fram
ing a constitution. We are here in that part of
the Constitution which we call the Article on
the Declaration of Principles. We say that the
Constitution is a reflection of the aspirations
and the ideals, and even the fears, ofour people.
Then why be silent about this?
The provision, as it stands now, raises two
questions. First, what are banned by the provi
sion? Second, how absolute is the ban?
Clearly, the ban is only on nuclear arms
that is, the use and stockpihng of nuclear
weapons, devices, and parts thereof. And this
includes, according to Commissioner Azcuna,
"not only possessing, controlling and manufac
turing nuclear weapons, but also nuclear tests in
our territory, as well as the use of our territory
as dumping ground for radioactive wastes."70
Moreover the ban suggests that, in our relations
with other states., there must be a mechanism for
the verification of the existence or non-existence
of nuclear arms.71 This will therefore affect the
terms of any renewal the country might agree to
of existing military bases agreements with the
United States. The provision must be read as a
mandate to the Philippine government to insist
that the pursuit of a policy on nuclear weapons
is a controlling guideline if there should be any
new negotiation with the United States on the
subject of military bases.72
The provision, however, is not a ban on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.73 Nor is it a ban
on all "nuclear-capable vessels." For a vessel to
be banned, it is not enough that it is capable of
carrying nuclear arms; it must actually carry
nuclear arms.74
The original formulation ofthe provision, cit
ed above, might suggest that the ban on nuclear
70/rf. at 818.
77d. at 815.
12ld. at 816.
nId. at 663, 666, 667-668
uId. at 819. See also 828.
jj^
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
arms is absolute. But, as explained by Commis
sioner Azcuna, that was never the intention:75
ffijf^
In my sponsorship speech, I pointed out that
this is a policy, albeit a basic policy because it is
stated in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in the Constitution. Consequently, what
we are seeking here is primarily a statement ofan
orientation, a basic direction in the Constitution,
that as a matter of policy, we are against nuclear
weapons in our territory. As practiced by other
states, that means prohibition not only of pos
sessing, controlling and manufacturing nuclear
weapons, but also of nuclear tests in our territory,
as well as the use of our territory as a dumping
ground for radioactive wastes. This is embraced
in the policyagainst nuclear weapons in one's ter
iaJ ritory. As practiced both in Latin America, under
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as by the South
Pacific countries that endorsed the Treaty of Raro-
tonga, passage ofships, whether nuclear-powered
or nuclear-arms-bearing, is left to the determina
tion of every state on a case-to-case basis. It is not
per se a violation of a nuclear weapons free zone
to allow a ship that is nuclear-powered or bearing
nuclear weapons to pass or enter one's territory.
However, it has to be done in the light of policy.
There is a policy against the presence of
nuclear weapons and, therefore, the exceptions to
that policy would have to be strictly construed or
justified. What weare saying with the formulation
now is that it can be justified only on the basis
or on the crucible of the national interest. If it is
consistent with the national interest, then really
there is the possibility of deviating from that
policybut the policyis there. The basic direction
is there. There can be deviations now and then
because we said that this is not a 100 percent
rule; this is not absolute. But deviations must be
justified on the basis and the crucible or test of
national interest.
Azcuna, however, did not explicitate what
iiiiiiii
the exception would be.
The exception first surfaced in the reformu
lation which was worded thus: 'The Philippines
shall, consistent with considerations solely of
national interest, pursue a policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons in its territory." Explaining
this reformulation, Commissioner Monsod said
^j
that whether or. not to allow nuclear weapons
would be decided on the basis of what is best for
the "national interest" as this might be defined
Id. at 818. See also id. at 819-821.
37
by the executive and legislative departments.76
Later the word "solely" was dropped in order not
to suggest that the nation's commitment to a
policy against nuclear arms was dictated solely
by national interest; the opposition could also
be based, for example, on the desire for peace in
the region.77
But that was not to be the end of the dis
cussion. Concerned about media reports which
tended to read the provision as a total and abso
lute ban on nuclear arms, Commissioner Monsod
wanted to be doubly sure of what the meaning
was of the phrase "consistent with the national
interest" and so he wanted it rephrased to read
"subjectto the national interest." Thus he elicited
from Commissioner Azcuna the explanation that
"consistent with" means "subject to," that is, "that
both the adoption and the pursuit ofthe policy, as
well as any exception therefrom, must be subject
tthe national interest."78 Still uneasy about the
possibility of misinterpretation, Commissioner
Monsod asked for the approval of a clarificatory
resolution. Co-authored by several Commission
ers, the resolution read:79
Resolved that since it is the intent and sense
ofthe Constitutional Commission that the phrase
"consistent with the national interest" in Section
7 [now Section 8] ofthe Article on Declaration of
Principles involving the policy on nuclear weap
ons in Philippine territory also means "subject
to the national interest" as borne by the records
of the proceedings and the unanimous manifes
tation of the Members of the Commission, the
motion to reconsider and amend such provision
filed by 28 Commissioners is deemed unneces
sary and withdrawn from further consideration
but is hereby incorporated in the records of the
Commission.
No one objected to the resolution and the
problem was deemed settled.
SEC. 9. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE
A JUST AND DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER
THAT WILL ENSURE THE PROSPERITY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATION
AND FREE THE PEOPLE FROM POVERTY
Id. at 814.
"Id. at 816.
Id. at 826.
"Id. at 648.
 38
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
THROUGH POLICIES THAT PROVIDE AD
EQUATE SOCIAL SERVICES, PROMOTE
FULL EMPLOYMENT, A RISING STAN
DARD OF LIVING, AND AN IMPROVED
QUALITY OF LIFE FOR ALL.
SEC. 10. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ALL PHASES OF NA
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
1. Social justice.
The underlying premises of Sections 9 and
10 are that poverty and gross inequality are
major problems besetting the nation and that
theseproblems assaultthe dignity ofthehuman
person.
Social justice, in the sense it is used in the
Constitution, simply means the equalization of
economic, political, and socialopportunitieswith
specialemphasis on the duty of the state to tilt
the balance ofsocial forces by favoring the dis
advantaged in life. In the language ofthe 1935
Convention, it means justice for thecommon'^;
in the shibboleth ofthe 1973 Convention, those
who have less in life must have more in law.
The social justice provision hasbeen chiefly
instrumental in the socialization ofthe attitude
ofjurisprudence to property rights thus gradu
ally eradicating the vestiges of laissez faire in
Philippine society.
For more on socialjustice, see Article XIII.
I sjt
A. Tondo Medical Center Employees v.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 ofthe Rules ofCourt, assailing the
Decision, promulgated by the Court ofAppeals
on26November 2004, denying a petition forthe
nullification ofthe Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Depart
ment ofHealth (DOH); and Executive Order No.
102, "Redirecting theFunctions andOperations
ofthe Department ofHealth," which was issued
by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on
24 May 1999.
Petitioners alleged that the implementation
of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in
makingfree medicine and free medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged
Filipinos. ...
Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be
declared void, since it runs counter tothe aspira
tion andideals ofthe Filipino people as embodied
in the Constitution. Theyclaim that the HSRA's
policies offiscal autonomy, income.generation,
and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5,'
9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1
ofArticle III; Sections 11 and 14 ofArticle XHI;
and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV ofthe 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted
in making inaccessible free medicine and free
medical services. This contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions ofthe Con
stitution areconsidered self-executing, anddo not
require future legislation for their enforcement.
For ifthey are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
nullified by the inaction ofCongress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically
set apart the sections found under Article H of
the 1987 Constitution asnonself-executing and
ruled thatsuch broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented:
Byits verytitle, Article II ofthe Constitution
isa"declaration ofprinciples andstate policies." x
x x.Theseprinciplesin ArticleII are not intended
to be self-executing principles ready for enforce
ment through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aidsor as guides in the exercise ofits
power ofjudicial review, andbythelegislature in
its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13ofArticle II; Section 13
of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance,
the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII
and Section 2 ofArticle XIV of the Constitution
as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions,
igjj
ARTICLE II: DECLARATIONOF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
which merely lay down a general principle,
kiJft are distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non self-executing and, therefore,
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.
Some ofthe constitutional provisions invoked
in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution specifically, Sections 5, 9,10,
11, 13, 15 and 18 the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing
in the aforecited case of Tanada v.Angara.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely
on petitioners' bare allegations that it violates.
the general principles expressed in the non self-
executing provisions they cite herein. There are
taj
two reasons for denying a cause of action to an
alleged infringement of broad constitutional
-principles: basic considerations of due process
and the limitations of judicial power.
SEC. 11. THE STATE VALUES THE
DIGNITY OF EVERY HUMAN PERSON
L the doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court deci
AND GUARANTEES FULL RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS.
SEC. 12. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
i'M
THE SANCTITY OF FAMILY LIFE AND
SHALL PROTECT AND STRENGTHEN
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC AUTONOMOUS
SOCIAL INSTITUTION. IT SHALL EQUAL
LY PROTECT THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER
AND THE LIFE OF THE UNBORN FROM
CONCEPTION. THE NATURAL AND PRI
&j
MARY RIGHT AND DUTY OF PARENTS IN
THE REARING OF THE YOUTH FOR CIVIC
EFFICIENCY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
^a) OF MORAL CHARACTER SHALL RECEIVE
THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.
SEC. 13. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE VITAL ROLE OF THE YOUTH IN
NATION-BUILDING AND SHALL PRO
MOTE AND PROTECT THEIR PHYSICAL,
MORAL, SPIRITUAL, INTELLECTUAL,
AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING. IT SHALL IN
CULCATE IN THE YOUTH PATRIOTISM
AND NATIONALISM, AND ENCOURAGE
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC AND
CIVIC AFFAIRS.
39
1. The family and the unborn.
"Family" in Section 12 simply means a stable
heterosexual relationship. Section 12 also ac
cepts the principle that the family is anterior
to the State and is not a creature of the State.
It protects the family from instrumentalization
by the State.
Two points should be noted about the legal
meaning and purpose of the protection that is
guaranteed for the unborn. First, this is not an
assertion that the unborn is a legal person. Sec
ond, this is not an assertion that the life of the
unborn is placed exactly on the level ofthe life of
the mother. When necessary to save the life ofthe
mother, the life ofthe unborn may be sacrificed;
but not when the purpose is merely to save the
mother from emotional suffering, for which other
remedies must be sought, or to spare the child
from a life of poverty, which can be attended to
by welfare institutions.
Moreover, the overriding purpose in assert
ing that the protection begins from the time of
conception is to prevent the State from adopting
sion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) which
liberalized abortion laws up to the sixth month
of pregnancy by allowing abortion any time dur
ing the first six months of pregnancy provided it
can be done without danger to the mother. The
understanding is that life begins at conception,
although the definition of conception can be a
matter for science to specify.
Incidentally, the respect for life manifested
by the provision harmonizes with the abolition of
the death penalty and the ban on nuclear arms.
2. Education.
In the matter of education, the respective
rights of parents and ofthe State are delineated.
The primary and natural right belongs to the
parents. The Constitution affirms the primary
right of parents in the rearing of children to
prepare them for a productive civic and social
life and at the same time it affirms the secondary
and supportive role of the State. The principle
is also rooted in the basic philosophy of liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause.
This will be taken up under Article XIV.
 40
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
SEC. 14. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN NATION-BUILD
Wj&
ING, AND SHALL ENSURE THE FUNDA
MENTAL EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW
OF WOMEN AND MEN.
1. Equality of women and men.
This provision is new. Beyond stating that
women do havea role in nation-building, the pro
vision makes the more important assertion that
there exists a fundamental equality of women
EiiJ
and menbefore the law. There was, however, no
intent to advocate absolute sameness because
there are obvious biological differences between
men and women.81! It was preciselyto make room
^J for these natural differences that the provision
was made to read "fundamental equality before
the law."81
During the period of.sponsorship and inter
pellation, Commissioner Felicitas Aquino took
the position that the intention was to formulate
the provision in language that wouldbe "self-im
plementing" andwould repeal alldiscriminatory
andanti-feminist laws in the Civil Code. During
the period of amendment, however, Commis
sioner Aquino changed her position. Answering
questions from the floor, she made it clear that
theintentwas nottoachieve an ipso facto repeal
oflaws offensive to equality but merely to give
a push to statutory legislation that-would elimi
nate the inequalities found in existing law. The
following exchange should shed light:82
FR. BERNAS. My problem is that a mere
intent unspecified in a constitutional provision
and an intent which runs contrary to the letter
is not just a vagueness in the letter. The letter
would havetoprevail over whatever unexpressed
intent there is since the letter is clear. The letter
expresses equal protection and every inequality
in existing law must yield to it.
MS. AQUINO. The problem is that if we
provide for an ipsofacto amendment of the Civil
Code, particularly pertaining to thelaws on per
sonal and family relations, the determination of
the rights and duties pertaining thereto carries
with it intricate details which could not proceed
from a vacuum ...
TV RECORD 685, 726-727.
87d. at 882-885. Butironically, it is in some fundamen
tals that men and women are most different.
e2Id. at 878.
And so the matter was left at that.
SEC. 15. THE STATE SHALL PROTECT
AND PROMOTE THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
OF THE PEOPLE AND INSTILL HEALTH
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG THEM.
SEC. 16. THE STATE SHALL PROTECT
AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE TO A BALANCED AND HEALTH
FUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE
RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE.
1. The Right to a balanced ecology.
A. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon
the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which thepetitioners dramatically associ
ate withthe twinconcepts of"inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generationaljustice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation orimpairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
Thecontroversyhas its genesisin CivilCase
No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minorsdulyrepresented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecologi
cal Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
andnon-profit corporation organized for the pur- ,
pose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection ofour environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitu
tion in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers'
class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
'$$y
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
SBl
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests."
The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preserva
tion of said resource but are "so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as genera
tions yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, ac
cepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other
reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
The complaint starts off with the general
averments that the Philippine archipelago of
7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich,
lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may
be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplace
able; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a bal
anced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and
forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residen
tial, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in
a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from the drying up of
the water table, otherwise known as the "aqui
fer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island
of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite,
41
(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss
of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction
of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappear
ance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the
siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction cf corals and other aquatic life lead
ing to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as
is presently experienced by the entire country,
(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains aris
ing from the absence ofthe absorbent mechanism
of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed
and operated for the purpose of supplying water
for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic cli
matic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued defores
tation are so capable of unquestionable demon
stration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as genera
tions yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as herein
after expounded, considers the "rhythm and
 42
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm andharmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal
andconservation ofthe country's forest, mineral,
L land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas'
and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization
be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations. Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment ofa balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obli
gation to ensure the protection ofthat right for
the generations to come.
gj
After a careful perusal of the complaint in
question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find
for the petitioners and rule against the respon
dent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting
to lackofjurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
the said order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation
ofthe Complaint, the Court cannot help butagree
with the defendant. For although webelieve that
plaintiffs have but the noblest ofallintentions,
it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient defi-
niteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete withvague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that
the. matter before it, being impressed with politi
cal color and involving a matter ofpublic policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of
'Separation of Powers' ofthe three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
Wedo not agree with the trial court's conclu
sion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with suf
ficient definiteness a specific legal rightinvolved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint isrepletewithvague assumptions and
conclusions based onunverified data. Areading
ofthe complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fun
damental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II ofthe 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and ad
vance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord withthe rhythmand
harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health
which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and pro
mote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less im
portant than anyofthe civil and political rights
enumeratedin the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different categoryofrights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly andfittingly stressed by
the petitioners the advancement ofwhich may
even be said to predate all governments and con
stitutions. As a matter offact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. Iftheyare now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would
iMH

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCD7LES AND STATE POLICIES 43

rial

not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those, to
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all
come generations which stand to inherit nothing
those they represent) to a balanced and health
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
ful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Adminis
impairing the environment. During the debates trative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
on this right in one ofthe plenary sessions ofthe said right.
Mi
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
A denial or violation of that right by the other
exchange transpired between Commissioner
who has the correlative duty or obligation to
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
Azcuna who sponsored tho section in question:
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting
"MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section man
of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
date the State to provide sanctions against all grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to
i^iJ forms of pollution air, water aha' noise pollution? a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
MR. AZCUNA Yes, Madam President. The
should be renewed or granted.
right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
mi carries with it the correlative duty of not impair
ing the same and, therefore, sanction's may be pro
vided for impairment of environmental balance."83 After a careful examination of the petition
ers' complaint, We find the statements under
The said right implies, among many other the introductory affirmative allegations, as. well
things, the judicious management and conserva as the specific averments under the subheading
tion ofthe country's forests! Without such forests, CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
the ecological or environmental balance would be show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
aftl
irreversibly disrupted. rights. On the basis thereof* they may thus be
Conformably with the enunciated right to a
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
ai
cancellation ofthe TLAs is concerned, there is the
health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation,
need to implead, as party defendants, the grant
development and utilization of the country's
ees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
^&j natural resources, then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit,
the Department of Environment and Natural Re the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and
MJ
sources "shall be the primary government agency
the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
responsible for the conservation, management, July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
development and proper use of the country's hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
i^j
environment and natural resources, specifically amend their complaint to implead as defendants
forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, the holders or grantees ofthe questioned timber
including those in reservation and watershed license agreements.
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well
as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in or B. Laguna Lake Development
der to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits, Authority v. Court of Appeals
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present Q.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994
and future generations of Filipinos." ...
ROMERO, J.:

83IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COM

The clash between the responsibility to the
MISSION 913. City Government of Caloocan to dispose of the
 44 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
M^i
350tons ofgarbage it collects daily and the grow
jgjjjj) ing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free en
vironmentofthe residents ofBarangay Camarin,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of
garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
for adjudication.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are
undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Ba
rangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development
Authority seeking to stop the operation ofthe 8.6
hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
harmful effects on the health ofthe residents and
the possibility of pollution of the water content
of the surrounding area.
iiii
On November 15,1991, the LLDA conducted
an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate that seeps from said
dumpsiteto the nearbycreekwhich is a tributary
ofthe Marilao River. The LLDALegal and Tech
nical personnel found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite
at the Camarin area withoutfirst securingan En
vironmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from
the Environmental ManagementBureau (EMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree
No. 1586, and clearancefromLLDA as required
under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
After a public hearing conducted on Decem
ber 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint
ofTask Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the
water collected from the leachate and the receiv
ingstreamscould considerably affect the quality,
in turn, ofthe receiving waters since it indicates
the presence of bacteria, other than conform,
jgj which may have contaminated the sample during
collection or handling. OnDecember 5,1991,the
LLDA issued a Cease andDesist Order ordering
the City Government ofCaloocan, Metropolitan
Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completelyhalt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other
waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith
stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dump
ing operation was resumed after a meeting
held in July 1992 among the City Government
of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
Environmental Management Bureau Director
Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal
and technical personnel on August 14,1992, the
LLDA issued another order reiterating the De
cember 5,1991,'order and issued an Alias Cease
and Desist Order enjoining the.City Government
of Caloocan from continuing its dumping opera
tions at the Camarin area.
On September 25; 1992, the LLDA, with
the assistanceofthe Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
prohibiting the entry ofall garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area beingutilized
as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for recon
sideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992
with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil
Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
Government of Caloocan sought to be declared
as the sole authority empowered to promote the
health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in- Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.
OnSeptember 25,1992, the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan Cityis
sued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist
order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan
which, at the time, was presided over by Judge
Manuel Jn. Serapio ofthe Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-
retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2,
1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, oth
erwise known as the Pollution ControlLaw, the
cease and desist order issued by it which is the
subject matter of the complaint is reviewable
both upon the law and the facts of the case by
the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional
Trial Court.
It is significant to note that while both par
ties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological bal
ance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin
open dumpsite, the question as to whichagency
can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter
remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims
that it is within its power, as a localgovernment
unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision
ofthe Local Government Code, to determine the
effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the
ecological balance and to see that such balance
is maintained. On the basis of said contention,
r
it questioned, from the inception of the dispute
before the Regional Trial CourtofCaloocan City,
the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of Caloocan has territorial
jurisdiction.
The Court ofAppeals sustained the position
of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Sec
tion 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise
known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing
the defunct National Pollution Control Commis
sion to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree
No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under
Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850,
as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to
institute the necessarylegal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement
or continue implementation of any project, plan
SSSiili
or program within the Laguna de Bay region
withoutprevious clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for
review, the abovementionedruling ofthe Court
of Appeals, contending that, as an administra
45
tive agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presi
dential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order
pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g)
of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which
provides, thus:
SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Func
tions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions: .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue-orders or decisions to compel com
pliance with the provisions of this Executive Or
der and its implementing rules and regulations
only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such dis
continuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under
such conditions as it may determine to be rea
sonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
waste, or for the installation or operation of sew
age works and industrial disposal system or parts
thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Au
thority may also revoke^ suspend or modify any
permit issued under this Order whenever the
same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assis
tance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing
the Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations and the orders and decisions of
the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court
deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded
the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.
In light ofthe relevant environmental protec
tion laws cited which are applicable in this case,'
and the correspondingoverlapping jurisdiction of
government agencies implementing these laws,
rtfiftA
46 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the resolution of the issue of whether or not the
LLDA has the authority and power to issue an
order which, in its nature and effect was injunc
tive, necessarily requires a determination ofthe
threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake De
velopment Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin autho
rized by the City Government of Caloocan which
is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents therein and the sanita
tion and quality ofthe water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such
open garbage dumpsite?
lai
The matter of determining whether there is
such pollution ofthe environment that requires
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a
business establishment is essentially addressed
to the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) ofthe DENR which, by virtue of Section
16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,
has assumed the powers and functions of the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission
created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
tsJ
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary
now assumes the powers and functions of the
i^ai National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pol
lution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where
,the special law provides for another forum.
It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and
the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna
and the cities ofSan Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Que
zon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution. Under such a broad grant and
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforemen
tioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
among others, to pass upon and approve or disap
prove all plans, programs, and projects proposed
by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons
or enterprises where such plans, programs and/
or projects are related to those of the LLDA for
the development of the region.
In the instant case, when the complainant
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA,
the latter's jurisdiction under it charter was val
idly invoked by complainant on the basis of its
allegation that the open dumpsite project ofthe
City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Cama
rin was undertaken without a clearance from the
LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is
also an allegation that the said project was with
out an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction
of the LLDA over this case was recognized by
the Environmental Management Bureau of the
DENR when the latter acted as intermediary
at the meeting among the representatives of
the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDAsometime in July
1992 to discuss the possibility of re:opening the
open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question,
the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue; Does the LLDA have the power and au
thority to issue a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the
LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloo
can to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin
open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been
done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
amended, and other relevant environment laws,
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise
bythe LLDA ofinjunctive powers. By its express
terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter
or modify order requiring the discontinuance
or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4,
par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make
whatever order may be necessaryin the exercise
of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly
conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease
anddesist order" in a language, as suggested by
fijjffij
the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No.
984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw there
from the conclusion that there is a denial ofthe
power to issue the order in question when the
power "tomake, alter ormodify orders requiring
the discontinuance ofpollution" is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assumingarguendothat the authority to is
suea "cease and desist order" were notexpressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough
to the effectthat the rule granting such author
ity need not necessarilybe express. While it is a
iHi^
fundamental rule thatan administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted
to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body withrespect topollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority
of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order"
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in
PollutionAdjudication Board v. Court ofAppeals,
et a/.,84 the Courtruledthat the Pollution Adjudi
cation Board (PAB) has the powerto issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order whenthere isprima
facie evidence ofan establishment exceeding the
84195 SCRA 112 (1991).
47
allowable standards set by the anti-pollution
lawsto the country.Theponente,Associate Jus
tice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
"Exparte ceaseand desistordersare per
mitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollut-
ive and untreated effluents into the rivers
and other inland waters of the Philippines
cannot be made to wait until protracted liti
gation over the ultimate correctnessor pro
priety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals
suchas those whichSolarhas taken, whichof
course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
power to protect the safety, health, and gen
eral welfareand comfortofthe public, as-well
as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting
vital publicinterests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power....
The immediate response to the demands of
"the necessities of protecting vital public inter
ests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology
embodied in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of
every person, it carries the correlative duty of
non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them." It
is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is
party to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of
1978 which recognize health as a fundamental
human right.85
8SIII RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COM
MISSION 119.
 48 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and
desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter
ofprocedure under the circumstances ofthe case,
is a proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had
the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocanas it did in the first instance, no further
p^
legal steps would have been necessary.
This charter ofLLDA, Republic ActNo. 4850,
&g^
as amended, instead ofconferring upon the LLDA
the means of directly enforcing such orders,
have provided under its Section 4(d) the power
to institute "necessary legal proceedingagainst
^i
any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region with
out previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provisionwas designed to invest
the LLDAwith sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation ofall projects initiated in the Laguna
Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of
these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
as>
with cases which might possibly arise where deci
sions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of
suchbroad powers maynot be obeyed, resulting
in the thwarting ofits laudabe objective.To meet
such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus
and injunction which are beyond the powerofthe
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant
anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region
and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns
are concerned, the Court will not dwell further
on the related issues raised which are more
la
appropriately addressed to an administrative
agency with the special knowledge and expertise
of the LLDA.
SEC. 17. THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PRIORITY TO EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE, AND
SPORTS TO FOSTER PATRIOTISM AND
NATIONALISM, ACCELERATE SOCIAL
PROGRESS, AND PROMOTE TOTAL HU
MAN LIBERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
ia)
NOTE: Article XTV is devoted to this topic.
SEC. 18. THE STATE AFFIRMS LABOR
AS A PRIMARY SOCIAL ECONOMIC
FORCE. IT SHALL PROTECT THE RIGHTS
OF WORKERS AND PROMOTE THEIR
WELFARE.
NOTE: When labor is called "a primary
social economic force," what is meant is that the
human factor has primacy over the non-human
factors in production.
The rights of labor are discussed under
Article XIII.
SEC. 19. THE STATE SHALL DEVELOP
A SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT
. NATIONAL ECONOMY EFFECTIVELY
CONTROLLED BY FILIPINOS.
NOTE: This is a guide for interpreting pro
visions onthe nationaleconomy and patrimony.
Any doubt must be resolved in favor of self-reli
ance and independence and in favor ofFilipinos.
A. Garcia v. Board of Investments
G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the
decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/De-
partment ofTrade and Industry (DTI) approving
the transfer ofthe site ofthe proposed petrochem
ical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift
offeedstock for that plant from naphtha onlyto
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
This petition is a sequel to the petition in
G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique
T. Garcia v. the Board ofInvestments,"Septem
ber 7, 1989, where this Courtissued a decision,
ordering the BOI as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
granted.The BoardofInvestments is ordered: (1)
to publish the amended application forregistra
tion of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation,
(2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its
records on the originaland amendedapplications
for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer,
ofthe respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corpo
ration, excluding, however, privileged papers
containing its trade secrets and other business
and financialinformation, and (3)to set forhear-
 ARTICLE II:DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
ing the petitioner's opposition to the amended
EMJ
application in order that he may present at such
hearing all the evidence in his possession in sup
port of his opposition to the transfer ofthe site of
the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas prov
ince. The hearing shall not exceed a period of ten
(10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice
of which should be served by personal service to
the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3)
days in advance. The hearingsmaybe held from
day to day for a period of ten (10) days without
postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibi
tion or preliminary injunction is denied. No costs."
(Rollo, pages 450-451)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion
jjg$)
for partial reconsideration asking that we rule
on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on
the foreign investor's claimofright offinal choice
of plant site, in the light ofthe provisions ofthe
Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code
of1987,this Court on October24,1989, made the
observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not
^) provide that the Limay site should be the only
petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit
the establishment of a petrochemical plant else
where in the country, that the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate
P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803."
Our resolution skirted the issue of whether
the investor given the initial inducements and
other circumstances surrounding its first choice
ofplant site may change it simplybecause it has
the final choice on the matter. TheCourt merely
ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost in
terest in the case by his failure to appear at the
hearing that was set bythe BOI after receipt of
the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived
the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the
motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
iii
A motion for reconsideration of said resolu
tion was filed by the petitioner asking that we
a^J
resolve the basic issue of whether or not the for
eigninvestorhas the right offinal choice ofplant
site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner
at the hearing was because the decision was not
yet final and executory; and that the petitioner
had not therefor waived the right to a hearing
before the BOI.
In the Court's resolution dated January 17,
1990, we stated:
$&1
49
"Does theinvestor havea 'rightoffinal choice'
of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution
nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there
such a 'right offinal choice.'In the first place,the
investor's choice is subject to processing and ap
provalor disapprovalby the BOI(Art. 7, Chapter
II,Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its
application and amended application to the BOI
for approval, theinvestor recognizes thesovereign
prerogativeofour Government, through the BOI,
to approve or disapprove the same after determin
ing whether its proposedproject will be feasible,
desirableand beneficial toour country.Byasking
that his opposition to the LPC'samendedapplica
tion be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise
acknowledges that the BOI. not the investor, has
the last word or the 'final choice' on the matter.
Secondly, as this case has shown, even a
choice that had been approved by the BOI may
not be 'final,' for supervening circumstances and
changesin the conditions of a place may dictate
a corresponding change in the choice of plant site
in order that the project will not fail. After all, our
country will benefit only when a project succeeds,
not when it fails." (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration
ofthe petitioner was denied.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16,
1981, 576 hectares ofthe public domain located
in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for
the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
administration, management, and ownershipof
the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan RefiningCorporation(BRC) is a
whollygovernment owned corporation, located at
Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output
of naphtha.
Taiwaneseinvestors in a petrochemical proj
ect formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corpora
tion (BPC) and applied with BOIforregistration
as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals.
Its application specified Bataan as the plant site.
Oneofthe terms and conditions forregistration
of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker"
and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petro
chemicalplant. The petrochemical plant was to
be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued
a certificateof registration on February 24,1988
by BOI.
 50 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded
fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like, (1)
exemption from taxes on raw materials; (2) re
patriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation
investments in currency originally made and
fofri
at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on
investments. As additional incentive, the House
fo&l of Representatives approved a bill introduced by
the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valorem
tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw
materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No.
88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp.
441-442)
^1 However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong,
chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January
25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire .to amend
the original registration certificate of its project
by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to
Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer
was the insurgency and unstable labor situation,
and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philip
pine Shell Corporation.
Notwithstanding opposition from many quar
ters and the request of the petitioner addressed
to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy
ofthe proposed amendment with its attachments
which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989,
BOI approved the revision of the registration of
BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F;
Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No.
.88637; supra)
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara tes
tifying before the Committee on Ways and Means
of the Senate asserted that:
'The BOI has taken a public position pre
ferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the
petrochemical complex, as this would provide a
better distribution of industries around the Metro
Manila area, x x x In advocating the choice of
Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical
complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I
would like to repeat this that the BOI made it
clear in its view that the BOI or the government
for that matter could only recommend as to where
theproject should be located. TheBOI recognizes
and respects the principle that the final choice is
still with the proponent who would in the final
analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the
project. (Petition, p. 13; Annex D to the petition)
This position has not been denied by BOI in
its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the pres
ent petition.
Section 1, Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitu
tion provides:
"SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty ofthe courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforce
able, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
There is before us an actual controversy
whether the petrochemical plant should remain
in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas,
and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha
only should be changed to naphtha and/or liq
uefied petroleum gas as the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemi
cal Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light
of the categorical submission of the BOI that it
is the investor who has the final choice of the
site and the decision on the feedstock, whether
or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
for the BOI to yield to the wishes ofthe investor,
national interest notwithstanding.
We rule that the Court has a constitutional
duty to step into this controversy and determine
the paramount issue. We grant the petition.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the
plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed.
That is why it organized itself into a corporation
bearing the name Bataan. There is available
576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as
the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under
P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive
real estate for the site unlike in the proposed
transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of
careful study long before any covetous interests
intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not
unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The
respondents have not shown nor reiterated that
iM
ARTICLE II:DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan
or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of
the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, thesewere
taken into account when the firm named itself
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover,
the evidence proves the contrary.
Second, the BRC, a government-owned Fili
iipi
pinocorporation, located in Bataan produces 60%
of the national output of naphtha which can be
used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can
provide the feedstock requirement of the plant.
On the other hand, the country is short ofLPG
and there is need to import the same for use
of the plant in Batangas. The local production
thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of
the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarcedol
lars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally,
essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of
the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been ex
empted by law from the ad valorem tax by the
approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President
Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from
advalorem tax.The lawwas enacted specifically
ilii forthe petrochemical industry. The policy deter
mination by both Congress and the President is
clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should
disregard orcontravene expressed policy by shift
ing the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the
' ^J
1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign in
vestments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities."
The development of a self-reliant and indepen
dent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,Article II of
0 the. Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987"the sound development ofthe na
pd tional economy in consonance with the principles
and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set
goal of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the inves
tor is raising the greater portion of the capital
for the project from local sources by way ofloan
which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal,"
the capitalrequirements would be greatlymini
mized if LPC does not have to buy the land for
sp
51
the project and its feedstock shall be limited.to
naphtha which is certainly more economical,
more readily available than LPG, and does not
have to be imported.
Sixth, if the. plant site is maintained in
Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the
venture to the great benefit and advantage ofthe
government which shall have a participation in
the management ofthe project instead of a firm
which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light ofall the clear advantages mani
fest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practi
cally nothing is shown to justify the transfer to
Batangasexcept a near-absolute discretion given
by BOIto investors not onlyto freelychoose the
site but to transfer it from their own first choice
forreasonswhich remainmurkytosaythe least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration
which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution
provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
"The State shall promote industrialization
and full employmentbased on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through indus
tries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However,the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
xxx xxx xxx
Every provision of the Constitution on the
national economyand patrimony is infused with
the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation
of natural resources, the State's full control over
the development and utilization of our scarce re
sources, agreements with foreigners being based
on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the regula
tion of foreign investments in accordance with
national goals and priorities are too explicitnot
to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary
investment opportunity. It should not be treated
like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-
making venture or even an assembler of cars
or manufacturer of computer chips, where the
BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and
 Ipli
52 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to
its) the national interest. In other ASEAN countries
like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government
superintends the industry by controlling the
upstream or cracker facility.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that
'jj0 the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer ofthe petrochemical plant
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
change of feedstock from naphtha only to naph
tha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final
say is in the investor all other circumstances to
the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advan
tage to the government has been shown by this
transfer. This is a repudiation ofthe independent
policy ofthe government expressed in numerous
laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs
the way it deems best for the national interest.
fcjjjjA
SEC. 20. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF THE PRI
VATE SECTOR, ENCOURAGES PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, AND PROVIDES INCEN
TIVES TO NEEDED INVESTMENTS.
NOTE: When the government unveiled a
iS^J maritime coastal communication system proj
ect designed to ensure the safety of lives at sea,
petitioners who were operating marine ship-to-
shore and shore-to-ship radio under a certificate
iii^ii
of public convenience alleged that under Article
II, Section 20 the government cannot compete in
the business of public correspondence. The Court
answered that Article II, Section 20 "is no more
than an acknowledgement of the importance of
private initiative in building the nation. How
ever, it is hot a call for official abdication of duty
ipj
to citizenry." Marine Radio Communications
Association v. Reyes, G.R. No. 86953, November
6, 1990.
SEC. 21. THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE
COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOP
^[li
MENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM.
NOTE: Comprehensive rural development
includes not only agrarian reform. It also encom
passes a broad spectrum of social, economic,
human, cultural, political, and even industrial
development.
Agrarian reform is discussed under Article
XIII.
SEC. 22. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
AND PROMOTES THE RIGHTS OF IN
DIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL
UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT.
NOTE: Indigenous cultural communities
are discussed under the National Economy and
Patrimony (Article XII) and under Local Govern
ments (Article X).
SEC. 23. THE STATE SHALL ENCOUR
AGE NON-GOVERNMENTAL, COMMUNI
TY-BASED, OR SECTORAL ORGANIZA
TIONS THAT PROMOTE THE WELFARE
OF THE NATION.
SEC. 24. THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE VITAL ROLE OF COMMUNICATION
AND INFORMATION IN NATION-BUILD
ING.
SEC. 25. THE STATE SHALL ENSURE
THE AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERN
MENTS.
NOTE: See Article X.
SEC. 26. THE STATE SHALL GUARAN
TEE EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, AND PROHIBIT
POLITICAL DYNASTIES AS MAY BE DE
FINED BY LAW.
1. Equal access to public service.
A. Pamatong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
TINGA, J.'.
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course
to petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy in its
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, pe
titioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which
were allegedly rendered in violation of his right
to "equal access to opportunities for public ser-
 ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
vice" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process
and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates,
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he
is capable of waging a national campaign since
he has numerous national organizations under
his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage
an international campaign since he has practiced
law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government. Petitioner likewise attacks the va
lidity ofthe form for the Certificate of Candidacy
prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims
that the form does not provide clear and reason
able guidelines for determining the qualifications
of candidates since it does not ask for the candi
date's bio-data and his program of government.
&jfij
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions
involved.
Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the
constitutional provision ensuring "equal access
to opportunities for public office" is the claim
that there is a constitutional right to run for or
;**%!
hold public office and, particularly in his case,
to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limi
SiiiiiJ tations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforce
able right. There.is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed
part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies."
The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treat
ment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforce
able constitutional right but merely specifies a
L
53
guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
An inquiry into the intent of the framers
produces the same determination that the provi
sion is not self-executory. The original wording of
the present Section 26, Article II had read, 'The
State shall broaden opportunities to public office
and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner
(now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. success
fully brought forth an amendment that changed
the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal
access," and the substitution ofthe word "office"
to "service." He explained his proposal in this
wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "EN
SURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what
is important would be equal access to the
opportunity. If you broaden, it would neces
sarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are
possible to accommodate as many people
as are also possible. That is the meaning of
broadening opportunities to public service.
So, in order that we should not mandate the
State to make the government the number
one employer and to limit offices only to what
may be necessary and expedient yet offering
equal opportunities to access to it, I change
the word "broaden."
Obviously, the provision is not intended to
compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. The approval of the "Davide
amendment" indicates the design ofthe framers
to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the
imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the
source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret
the clause as operative in the absence of legisla
tion since its effective means and reach are not
properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of.
claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities,"
and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impre-
ciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
 54 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the framers to inflict on the people an operative
but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access
to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Somevalid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolu
tion No.6452 dated December 10, 2002outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody
&&i equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is
not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered
&M
by the hmitations are meant to be borne by any
one who is minded to file a certificate of candi
dacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the
^j burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge
the constitutionality or validity of Section 69
feiffi-j
of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003.
Thus, their presumed validity stands and has
to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner's reliance on
the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II
of the Constitution is misplaced.
SEC. 27. THE STATE SHALL MAINTAIN
HONESTY AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC
SERVICE AND TAKE POSITIVE AND EF
FECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION.
NOTE: See Article XI.
SEC. 28. SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED BYLAW, THE
STATE ADOPTS AND IMPLEMENTS A
POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
OF ALL ITS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
PUBLIC INTEREST.
 Article VI

Legislative Department

SECTION 1. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF

THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRE
SENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVI
SION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.

1. Legislative power.
iiiii

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. It is vested "in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except
to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum" in Section 32.

The 1987 Constitution has thus restored
bicameralism. The supposed advantages of bi
cameralism are that it (1) allows for a body with
a national perspective to check the parochial
tendency of representatives elected by district;
all
(2) allows for more careful study of legislation;
(3) makes the legislature less susceptible to
control by the Executive; (4) serves as training
ground for national leaders. On the other hand,
the supposed advantages of unicameralism are
simplicity of organization resulting in economy
and efficiency, facility in pinpointing responsibil
sl
ity for legislation, and avoidance of duplication.
In republican systems, there are generally
two kinds of legislative power, original and de
rivative. Original legislative power is possessed
by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the
sovereign people to legislative bodies and is sub
ordinate to the original power ofthe people. This
is the kind of power that is vested in Congress.
Legislative power may also be classified into
constituent, which is" the power to amend or re
vise the Constitution, and ordinary, which is the
power to pass ordinary laws. The people, through
the amendatory process, exercise constituent
power, and, through initiative and referendum,
ordinary legislative power.
There are two kinds of limits on legislative
power, substantive and procedural. Substantive
limits curtail the contents of a law. For example,
no law may be passed which impairs freedom of
speech. Procedural limits curtail the manner of
passing laws. For example, a bill must generally
be approved by the President before it becomes
law.
Provided that the substantive and proce
dural limitations found in the Constitution are
observed, the Congress may legislate on any
subject matter. In other words, the legislative
power of Congress is plenary. (This is different
from the legislative power of the United States
Congress which consists only of the legislative
powers enumerated in the Federal Constitution.)
One ofthe things Congress may not do is pass
irrepealable laws. The power of present and fu
ture legislatures must remain plenary. When one
legislature attempts to pass an irrepealable law,
to that extent it attempts to limit the power of
future legislatures. The power of any legislature
can be limited only by the Constitution.
2. Initiative and Referendum.
The grant of national legislative power to
Congress under the 1987 Constitution is not

55
i&aal
56 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
exclusive. Section 1 says that legislative power is
vested in Congress "except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum." Section 32 elaborates on this
saying: "The Congress shall, as early as possible,
providefor a system ofinitiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
i&jj passed by the Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters thereof."
The power of initiative and referendum is
thus the power ofthe people directly to "propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law
or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body." In republican constitutional
theory, the original legislative power belongs to
the peoplewho,through the Constitution, confer
derivative legislative power on the legislature.
Through Section 1, however, in connection with
Section 32, the people have, in addition to their
constituent power, reserved for themselves
&pj ordinary legislative power. The purpose is to
institutionalize "people power" by providing for
an instrument which can be used should the
legislature show itself indifferent to the needs
ofthe people.1
A. Garcia v. Commission on Elections
isMi
G.R. No. 111230, September 30,1994
PUNO, J.:
The 1987 Constitution is borne ofthe convic
tion that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government. One of the means by
which people power can be exercised is thru ini
tiatives where local ordinances and resolutions
can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize
the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to
be rejected.
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, Serye
1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bata
an agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227.
m RECORD 45.
On May 24,1993, petitioners filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, Serye 1993.
The petition states: [omitted]
.The municipality of Morong did not take any
action on the petition within thirty (30)days after
its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their
power of initiative under the Local Government
Codeof 1991.2 They started to solicit the required
number of signatures3 to cause the repeal of said
resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however,
the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor
and Presiding Officer ofthe Sangguniang Bayan
ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11,1993 to
the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting
the denial of"... the petition for a local initiative
and/or referendum because the exercise will just
promote divisiveness, counter productive and
futility."
In its session of July 6,1993, the COMELEC
en banc resolved to deny the petition for local
initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely
a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not
an ordinance." ..
We grant the petition.
i
The case at bench is of transcendental sig
nificance because it involves an issue of first
impression delineating the extent of the all
important original power of the people to legis
late. Father Bernas explains that "in republican
systems, there are generally two kinds of legis
lative power, original and derivative. Original
legislative power is possessed by the sovereign
people. Derivative legislative power is that which
has been delegated by the sovereign people to leg
islative bodies and is subordinate to the original
power of the people."4
Our constitutional odyssey shows that up
until 1987,our people have not directly exercised
legislative power, both the constituent power to
2Sec. 122, par. (b) of R.A. No. 7160.
3Sec. 122, par. (e) of R.A. No. 7160.
'Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government,
1991 ed., p. 39.

amend or revise the Constitution or the power to
enact ordinary laws. Section 1, Article VI ofthe
&Mi 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power
to Congress, thus "the legislative power shall be
vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre
sentatives." Similarly, Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided
that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a
MiA Batasang Pambansa."
Implicit in the set up was the trust of the
people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit.
So total was their trust that the people did not
reserve for themselves the same power to make
or repeal laws. The omission was to prove unfor
^J tunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolu
tion, the legislature failed the expectations ofthe
people especially when former President Marcos
wielded lawmaking powers under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which
could have bridled the nation's downslide from
democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never
fc&&i saw the light of day.
In February 1986, the people took a direct
hand in the determination of their destiny. They
toppled down the government of former President
Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The
Constitution was rewritten to embody the les
iilJ sons of their sad experience. One of the lessons
is the folly of completely surrendering the power
to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the
perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the
new Constitution became "less trusting of public
officials than the American Constitution."5
For the first time in 1987, the system of
people's initiative was thus installed in our fun
damental law. To be sure, it was a late awaken
ing. ... In any event, the framers of our 1987
Constitution realized the value of initiative and
referendum as an ultimate weapon ofthe people
to negate government malfeasance and mis
feasance and they put in place an overarching
system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were
given the power to amend the Constitution itself.
Sec. 2 ofArt. XVII provides: "Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum ofthe total number
'Sounding Board, Today's Issue of September 6,1994.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 57
of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein."
Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also
endowed with the power to enact or reject any
act or law by congresspr local legislative body.
[Sections 1 and 32 of Article VQ
The COMELEC was also empowered to
enforce and.administer all laws and regula
tions relative to the conduct of an initiative and
referendum. Worthwhile noting is the scope of
coverage of an initiative or referendum as delin
eated by Section 32, Art. VI ofthe Constitution,
. . . any act or law passed by Congress or local
legislative body.
In due time, Congress responded to the man
date of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put
into operation the constitutionalized concept of
initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989,
it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
Liberally borrowed from American laws, RA. No.
6735, among others, spelled out the requirements
for the exercise of the power of initiative and
referendum, the conduct of national initiative
and referendum; procedure of local initiative and
referendum; and their limitations. Then came
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title
XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of
local initiative and referendum.
In light of this legal backdrop, the essential
issue to be resolved in the case at bench is wheth
er Pambayang Kapasyahan Big. 10, serye 1993
ofthe Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is
the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents
take the negative stance as they contend that
under the Local Government Code of 1991 only
an ordinance can be the subject of initiative
We reject respondents' narrow and literal
reading of the above provision for it will collide
with the Constitution and will subvert the intent
of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of
the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative
and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only
ordinances but resolutions as appropriate sub-
 58 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
jects of a local initiative. Section 32 ofArticle VI
provides in luminous language: 'The Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum' and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly pro
pose and enact laws or approve or reject any act
or law or part thereof passed by the Congress,
or local legislative body x x x." An act includes
a resolution. Black [Law Dictionary] defines an
act as "an expression of will or purpose ... it
may denote something done ... as a legislature,
including not merely physical acts, but also de
crees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards,
and determinations . . ." It is basic that a law
should be construed in harmony with and not in
violation of the Constitution. ..
The constitutional command to include acts
(i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of ini
tiative was implemented by Congress when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and Referen
dum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus,
its Section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions
as subjects of initiative on local legislations, viz:
"Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For pur
&&i.j| poses of this act, the following terms shall
mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people
to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through
an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative,
namely:
a. 1. Initiative on the Constitution which
refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers
to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which
;J!*J
refers to a petition proposing to enact a re
gional, provincial, city, municipal, or baran
gay law, resolution or ordinance." (Emphasis
ours).
Similarly, its Section 16 states: "Limitations
Upon Local Legislative Bodies any proposition
on ordinance or resolution approved through
the system of initiative and referendum as here
in provided shall not be repealed, modified or
amended, by the local legislative bodyconcerned
within six (6) months from the date therefrom
. . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also
.promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In
Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct
of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
arid Referendum, on National and Local Laws."
It likewise recognized resolutions as proper
subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its
Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative the
power ofinitiative may be exercised to amend the
Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
law, resolution or ordinance."
There can hardly be any doubt that when
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it in
tended resolutions to be proper subjects of local
initiatives...
Contrary to the submission of the respon
dents, the subsequent enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with
local initiative did not change the scope of its
coverage.More specifically, the Codedid not limit
the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances
alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I
of the Code cited by respondents merely defines
the concept of local initiative as the legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local govern
ment unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with
the subjects or matters t&at can be taken up in
a local initiative. It is Section 124 of the same
Code which does. It states:
"Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initia
tives. (a) The power oflocal initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to sub
jects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
xxx xxx xxx.
This provision clearly does not limit the ap
plication of local initiatives to ordinances, but
to all "subjects or matters which are within the
legal powers ofthe Sanggunians to enact," which
undoubtedly includes resolutions...
Considering the lasting changes that will
be wrought in the social, political, and economic

existence ofthe people ofMorong by the inclusion
of their municipality in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their
voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not
material that the decision ofthe municipality of
Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a
resolution for what matters is its enduring effect
on the welfare of the people of Morong.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623
dated July 6,1993 and Resolution 93-1676dated
July 13,1993 are ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE.
No costs.
fxtol
3. Nondelegability of legislative power.
Ifi his commentary on the Constitution ofthe
United States, Corwin wrote thus:6
At least three distinct ideas have con
tributed to the development of the principle
iJM
that legislative power cannot be delegated.
One is the doctrine of separation of pow
ers: Why go to the trouble of separating
the three powers of government if they can
l&sA
straightway remerge on their own motion?
The second is the concept of due process of
law, which precludes the transfer of regula
tory functions to private persons. Lastly,
there is the maxim of agency "Delegata
potestas non potest delegari," which John
Locke borrowed and formulated as a dogma
of political science ... Chief Justice Taft of
fered the following explanation ofthe origin
and limitations of this idea as a postulate of
constitutional law: "The well-known maxim
'delegata potestas non potest delegari,' ap
plicable to the law of agency in the general
Si^
common law, is well understood and has had
wider application in the construction of our
Federal and State Constitutions than it has
in private law ... The Federal Constitution
and State Constitutions of this country divide
the governmental power into three branches
... In carrying out that constitutional divi
sion ... it is a breach ofthe National funda
mental law if Congress gives up its legislative
[ power and transfers it to the President, or to
6CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 95 (1964).
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 59
the Judicial branch, or if by law-it attempts
to invest itself or its members with either
executive power or judicial power. This is
not to say that the three branches are not
co-ordinate parts of one government and
that each in the field of its duties may not
invoke the action of the two other branches
in so far as the action invoked shall not be
an assumption of the constitutional field of
action of another branch. In determining
what it may do in seeking assistance from
another branch, the extent and character of
that assistance must be fixed according to
common sense and the inherent necessities
of the governmental coordination."
In spite ofthe principle ofnon-delegabilityof
legislative power, it is common knowledge that
numerous statutes have been passed creating
administrative agencies and authorizing them to
exercise vast regulatory powers. The rules and
regulations they issue havethefbrce oflaw. This
phenomenonhas been justified by two different
theories. The first theory is that a non-legislative
bodymay be authorized to "fillup the details" of
a statute. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1825:
"It will not be contended, that Congress can
delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunal,
powers which are strictly and exclusively legis
lative. But Congress may certainly delegate to
others powers which the legislature may right
fully exercise itself . . . The line has not been
exactly drawn which separate those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
the legislature itself, from those of less interest,
in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions, to fill up the details."7 The
other theory, also enunciated by Marshall, is
that Congress may pass contingent legislation,
that is, legislation which leaves to anotherbody
the business of ascertaining the facts necessary
to bring the law into actual operation.8
Under both of the above theories, the func
tion performed by the administrative agency is
notlaw-making but law-execution. In orderto en
sure that the powerdelegatedby the legislature
is notlaw-making power, the statute makingthe
delegation must
dayman v.Southward, 10Wheat 1, 42(1825).
sThe BrigAurora, 7 Cr. 382 (1813).
 60 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
(a) be complete in itself it must set
forth therein the policy to be carried out or
implemented by the delegate ... and (b) fix
a standard the limits of which are suffi
ciently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions . . . Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate
M such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power not only to make law,
M but, also, and this is worse to unmake
it, by adoptingmeasures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of
||j> Congress.. .9
Provided the above requirements of com
pleteness and sufficiency of standards are satis
fied, the regulations passed by an administrative
body pursuant to the delegation made by the
statute are just as binding as if the regulation
had been written in the original statute itself.
If, however, these requirements are not satis-
.yfied, the regulation will not be allowed to affect
private rights. ' POEA, include "claims for death, disability and
4. Non-delegability.
CASES.
A. Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration
166 SCRA 533 (1988)
CRUZ, J:
^fiijffi The private respondent in this case was
awarded the sum of Pi92,000.00 by the Phil
ippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for the death of her husband. The deci
sion is challenged by the petitioner on the prin
cipal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer ofthe M/V
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
"Pelaezv. Auditor General, 15 SCRA569, 576-7(1965).
in Tokyo, Japan, March 15,1985. His widow sue<
for damages under Executive Order No. 797 am
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. Tin
petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued tha
the complaint was cognizable not by the POE/
but the Social Security System and should hav<
been filed against the State Insurance Fund
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdictior
and after considering the position papers of the
parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The
award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits
and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Ad
ministration was created under Executive Ordei
Nc; 797, promulgated on May 1,1982, to promote
and monitor the overseas employment of Filipi
nos and to protect their rights. It replaced the
National Seamen Board created earlier under
Article 20 ofthe Labor Code in 1974. Under Sec
tion 4(a) ofthe said executive order, the POEA is
vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen." These
cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regula
tions on Overseas Employment issued by the
other benefits" arising out of such employment.,0
The award of PI80,000.00 for death benefits
and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular
No. 2, which became effective on February 1,
1984. This circular prescribed a standard con
tract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino sea
men for overseas employment.
But the petitioner questions the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regu
lation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which under the principle, is not sub
ject to delegation.
Sec. 1(d), Rule I, Book VI (1985 Rules).

The authority to issue the said regulation
is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797, reading as follows:
"x x x The governing Board of the Ad
ministration (POEA) as hereunder provided,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions ofthe Administration
(POEA)."
The second challenge is more serious as
it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be dele
gated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be. The ascertainment ofthe latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered
by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz., the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.11 Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.12 Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference
oflegislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the
case ofthe legislative power because ofthe many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have
'"'People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56.
12Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359; People v.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 61
become more frequent, bi not necessary. This
had led to the observation that the delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity ofthe
task of government an,d the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth
of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. To many ofthe problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to
provide Lhe required direct and efficacious, not
to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation
of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legis
lature has found it more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a stat
ute by "fillingin" the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. Thisis effected bytheir promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
Theseregulationshave the force and effect oflaw.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such
administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a sig
nificant number of the cases without challenge
by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requir
ingthe model contract is not unlimited as there
is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in
the exercise of said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating thePhilippine Overseas Employment
 62 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Fihpino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court
has accepted as sufficient standards "public inter
est" in People v. Rosenthal,13 "justice and equity"*
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR,14 "public conve
nience and welfare" in Calalarig v. Williams,15
i^i
and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in
Cervantes v. Auditor General,16 to mention only
a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and
experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Commission,1'' and "national
security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED,
with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is
hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
B. Tablarin v. Gutierrez
tei 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
FELICIANO, J.:
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the
argument that Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic
Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the un
due delegation of legislative power, by failing to
establish the necessary standard to be followed
by the delegate, the Board of Medical Educa
tion. The general principle of non-delegation
of legislative power, which both flows from and
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the sepa
ration and allocation of powers among the three
great departments of government,19 must be ap
plied with circumspection in respect of statutes
which, like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with
subjects as obviously complex and technical as
medical education and the practice of medicine
l*Supra.
"70 Phil. 340.
>s70 Phil. 726.
^Supra.
"236 U.S. 247.
,8320 U.S. 99.
"See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v.
Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).
I
in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel
stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service
Commission:20
One thing, however is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation
of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegatus non potest delegare or delegata
potestas non potest delegarei adopted this
practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia
edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University
Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law
(d. 17.18.3) has been made to adopt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giv
ing rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
o the principle of 'subordinate legislation,'
not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments.
(People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeiia, 68 Phil.
318 [1939]). Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty ofadministering
the laws, there is a constantly growing ten
dency toward the delegation ofgreaterpower
by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the courts."21
The standards set for subordinate legisla
tion in tjie exercise of rule making authority
by an administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta22
The standard may be either expressed
[sic] or implied. If the former, the non-dele
gation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out spe
cifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose ofthe act considered as a whole.
In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to
be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe
transit upon the roads.'23
*70 Phil. 221 (1940).
2,70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.
2235SCRA 481 (1970).
M35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point,
Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the fol
lowing tenor:

We believe and so hold that the necessary
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Sb
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation
of medical education" and in Sections 5(a) and
7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself,
and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non
delegation principle.
C. Free Telephone Workers Union v.
m Minister of Labor
* 108 SCRA 757 (1981)
tiiiii) Even on the assumption, indulged in solely
because of the claim earnestly and vigorously
pressed by counsel for petitioner, that the author
ity conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of
^J
legislative character, still no case of an unlawful
delegation of such power, may be discerned...
The strict rule on non delegation was enun
ciated by Justice Laurel in People v. Vera,24 which
declared unconstitutional the then Probation
Act.25 Such an approach, conceded, by some con
stitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite,
nonetheless aroused apprehension for being too
rigid and inflexible. While no doubt appropriate
in that particular case, the institution of a new
"This Court has considered as sufficient standards,
'public welfare,' Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36
Phil. 547 (1917); 'necessary in the interest of law and order,'
Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); 'public inter
est,* People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and 'justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case,' International
Hardwood v.Pangil Federation of Labor,70 Phil. 602 (1940).
In People v. Bxconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes said:
"It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason that legislature often finds it im
practicable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it,
but conform to the standards that the law prescribes." (101
Phil., at 1129; underscoring supplied).
"65 Phil. 56 (1937).
25Act No. 4221 (1935).
$$
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 63
mode of treating offenders, it may pose difficulty
for socialand economic legislation needed by the
times. Even prior to the above-cited Pangasinan
Transportation decision, Justice Laurel himself
in an earlier decision, People, v. Rosenthal in
1939, promulgated less than two years after
Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non
delegation "has been made to adopt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in
the United States and England but in practically
all modern governments. The difficulty lies in
the fixing of the limit and extent of the author
ity. While courts have undertaken to lay down
general principles, the safest is to decide each
case according to its peculiar environment, hav
ing in mind the wholesome legislative purpose
intended to be achieved."26 After which, in came
the even more explicit formulation in Pangasinan
Transportation appearing in the quoted excerpt
from Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore
that there is a marked drift in the direction of
a more liberal approach. It is partly in recogni
tion of the ever-increasing needs for the type of
legislation allowing rule-making in accordance
with standards, explicit or implicit, discernible
from a perusal of the'entire enactment that in
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financ
ing Administration v. Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and Offices21 the
then Justice, now the retired Chief Justice and
presently Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to
refer to "the growing complexities of society"
as well as "the increasing social challenges of
the times."28 It would be self-defeating in the
extreme if the legislation intended to cope with
the grave social and economic problems of the
present and foreseeable future would founder on
the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly
unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine
ofnon-delegation. Fortunately with the retention
in the amended Constitution of some features
of the 1973 Constitution as originally adopted
leading to an appreciable measure ofconcordand
harmony between the policy-makingbranches of
the government, executive and legislative, the
objection on the grounds ofnon-delegation would
2668Phil. 328, 343 (1939).
27L-21484, November 29,1969, 30 SCRA 649.
Ibid., 662.
 64 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS QF GOVERNMENT
be even less persuasive. It is worth repeating
that the Prime Minister, while the choice of the
President, must have the approval of the major
ity of all members of the Batasang Pambansa.29
At least a majority of the cabinet members, the
Ministers being appointed by the President, if
heads of ministries, shall come from its regional
representatives.30 So, also, while the Prime Min
ister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Bata
sang Pambansa for the program of government,
it must be one "approved by the President."31
While conceptually, there still exists a distinction
between formulation and implementation, the
fundamental principle of separation of powers
of which non-delegation is a logical corollary be-
' comes even more flexible and malleable. Even the
j&ffil
case of the United States, with its adherence to
the Madisonian concept of separation of powers,
President Kennedy could state that its Constitu
tion did not make "the Presidency and Congress
rivals for power but partners for progress [with
the two branches] being trustee for the people,
custodians of their heritage."32 With the closer
Ijgjj)
relationship provided for by the amended Consti
tution in our case, there is likely to be even more
promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies
MB
and thereafter unity and vigor in their execution.
A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine,
therefore would be an obstacle to national efforts
at development and progress. There is accord
ingly more receptivity to laws,leaving to admin
istrative and executive agencies the adoption of
such means as may be necessary to effectuate
ji%i
a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting
that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor
Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delega
tion as the "dynamo of modern government."33
He then went on to state that "the occasions for
delegating power to administrative offices[could
be] compassed by a single generalization."34
Thus: Tower should be delegated where there is
agreement that a task must be performed and it
cannot be effectivelyperformed by the legislature
MCf. Article DC, Sec. 1.
^Cf. Ibid.
. "Cf. Ibid. Sec. 2.
"KENNEDY, THE SECOND STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGE (1962),in Nevins ed., The Burden and the Glory,
3 (1964).
^Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47
Col. Law Review, 359 (1947).
uIbid. 361.
without the assistance of a delegate or withou
an expenditure of time so great as to lead to thi
neglect ofequally important business. Delegatioi
is most commonly indicated where the relation*
to be regulated are highly technical or wher<
their regulation requires, a course of continuous
decision."35 His perceptive study could rightfullj
conclude that even in a strictly presidential sys
tem like that of the United States, the doctrine
of non-delegation reflects the American "politi
cal philosophy that insofar as possible issues b
settled [by legislative bodies], an essentially
restrictive approach" may ignore "deep currents
ofsocial force."36 In plainer terms, and as applied
to the Philippines under the amended Constitu
tion with the close ties that bind the executive
and legislative departments, certain features 61
parliamentarism having been retained, it may
be a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation.
The spectre of the non-delegation concept need
not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet
sessions or legislative chambers.
5. By way of summary, this Court holds
that Batas Fambansa Big. 130 insofar as it
empowers the Minister of Labor to assume ju
risdiction over labor disputes causing or likely
to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest and thereafter decide it or
certify the same [to] the National Labor Relations
Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for
being vi6late of the doctrine of non-delegationof
legislative power
D. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v.
Secretary Drilon
176 SCRA 24 (1989)
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue raised in this petition is
whether or not an Implementing Order of the
Secretary ofLabor and Employment (DOLE) can
provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the
law it seeks to implement.
KIbid.
^Ibid.

On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No.
6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage,
iS> as follows:
"Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage
rates of workers and employees in the
private sector, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural, shall be increased by ten pesos
(P10.00) per day, except non-agricultural
workers and employees outside Metro Ma
nila who 3hall receive an increase of eleven
pesos (Pi 1.00) per day: Provided, That those
already receiving above the minimum wage
up to one hundred pesos (P100.00) shall
receive an increase often pesos (P10.00) per
day. Excepted from the provisions of this Act
are domestic helpers and persons employed
in the personal service of another."
The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent
rules implementing the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6640. Section 8 thereof provides:
"Section 8. Wage Increase Tinder Indi
vidual/Collective Agreements. No wage
increase shall be credited as compliance
with the increase prescribed herein unless
expressly provided under valid individual
written/collective agreements; and, provided
further, that such wage increase was granted
in anticipation of the legislative wage in
crease under the act. Such increases shall not
include anniversary wage increase provided
on collective agreements."
In sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules
prohibits the employer from crediting anniver
sary wage increases negotiated under a collec
tive bargaining agreement against such wage
increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.
;$0
The thrust of the argument of petitioner is
that Section 8 of the rules implementing the pro
visions of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the
provision excluding anniversary wage increases
from being credited to the wage increase provided
by said law is null and void on the ground that
the same unduly expands the provisions of the
py
said law.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Public respondents aver that petitioner
should have first appealed to the Secretary of
iljjiiii
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATE DEPARTMENT ' 65
Labor before going to court. It is fundamental
that in a case where only pure questions of
law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot apply because
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality
by the administrative officer. Appeal to the ad
ministrative officer of orders involving questions
of law would be an exercise in futility since
administrative officers cannot decide such is
sues with finality.37 The questions raised in this
petition are questions of law. Hence, the failure
to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be
considered fatal to this petition.
As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of
the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640,
which prohibits the employer from crediting the
anniversary wage increases provided in collective
bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule
that implementing rules cannot add or detract
from the provisions oflaw it is designed to imple
ment. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640,
do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary
wage increases for purposes of compliance with
Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
cannot provide for such a prohibition not contem
plated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of car
rying into effect its general provisions. The law
itself cannot be expanded by such regulations.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act
of Congress.38
E. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
PUNO, J.:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitu
tionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
and For Other Purposes." R.A. No. 8180 ends
twenty-six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream oil industry...
37Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Mondanov. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
38Manuel v. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660
(1971).
 66 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The deregulation process has two phases:
the transition phase and the full deregulation
phase.. ..
The first phase of deregulation commenced
on August 12, 1996.
On February 8, 1997, the President imple
mented the full deregulation of the Downstream
Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitution
ality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 372.
In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wig-
berto Tariada, Flag Human Rights Foundation,
Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and
Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of Section
15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15
provides:
"Sec. 15. Implementation ofFull Deregu
lation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) ofRepublic
pj Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval
of the President, implement the full deregu
lation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March 1997. As far as practicable,
feffifri
the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining
tej and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon
the implementation of the full deregulation
's$$)
as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws
are deemed repealed:
XXX XXX XXX
E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:
"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638,
otherwise known as the "Department of En
ergy Act of 1992, provides that, at the end of
four years from its effectivity last December
1992, the Department (of Energy) shall,
upon approval of the President, institute the.
programs and time table of deregulation of
appropriate energy projects and activities of
the energy sector;
igj
"WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Apt
No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Down
stream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement full de
regulation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March, 1997.'Asfar as practicable;
the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable;
'WHEREAS, pursuant to the lecom-
mendation of the Department of Energy,
there is an imperative need to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry because of the following recent de
velopments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund
on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the
Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16
January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had
been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since Octo
ber 1996 while prices of petroleum products
in the world market had been stable since
mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude
oil prices are beginning to soften for the last
few days while prices of some petroleum
products had already declined; and (iii) the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar has been stable for the past twelve
(12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to
one US dollar;
"WHEREAS, Executive Order No, 377
dated 31 October 1996 provides for an insti
tutional framework for the administration
of the deregulated industry by defining the
functions and responsibilities of various
government agencies;
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry
will foster a truly competitive market which
can better achieve the social policy objectives
of fair prices and adequate, continuous sup
ply of environmentally-clean and high qual
ity petroleum products;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V.
RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the powers vested in me by
law, do hereby declare the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry."

In assailing Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following
submissions:
First, Section 15 ofR.A. No. 8180 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power to the
<m
President and the Secretary of Energy because
it does not provide a determinate or determin
able standard to guide the Executive Branch in
Iflj determining when to implement the full deregu
lation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners
contend that the law does not define when it is
practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recom
mend to the President the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry or when the Presi
dent may consider it practicable to declare full
Z@2) deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of
crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently
defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and
'M(i\
E.O. No. 392
We shall now resolve the petitions on the
merit. . . . The substantive issues are: ... (3)
whether or not Section 15 violates the constitu
tional prohibition on undue delegation of power;
1^1
We shall now slide to the substantive issues
in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail Section
15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame
for the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. We restate its pertinent portion for
>yff-l
emphasis, viz.:
"Sec. 15. Implementation ofFull Deregu
^4 lation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic
Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval
of the President, implement the full deregu
lation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March 1997. As far as practicable,
the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable..."
g)
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as
practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the
m
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT .67
world market" and "stability ofthe pesoexchange
rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear
and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that
they do not provide the "determinate or determin
able standards" which can guide the President in
his decision to fully deregulate the downstream
oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O.
No.392which advanced the date offull deregula
tion is voidfor it illegally considered the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execu
tion of laws has long been settled by this Court.
.... Over the years, as the legal engineering of
men's relationship became more difficult, Con
gress has to rely more on the practice of delegat
ing the execution of laws to the executive and
other administrative agencies. Two tests have
been developed to determine whether the delega
tion of the power to execute laws does not involve
the abdication of the power to make law itself.
We delineated the metes and bounds of these
tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the
attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15
on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both
the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly
provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation
will start at the end of March 1997, regardless
of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation
at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on
the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to ad
vance the date of full deregulation before the end
of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard
to guide the judgment of the President he is
to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate
of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words "as far
as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should
have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do
not set determinate or determinable standards.
The stubborn submission deserves scant con
sideration. The dictionary meanings of these
words are well settled and cannot confuse men of
 68 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practi
cable" as meaning possible to practice or perform,
"decline" as meaning to take a downward direc
tion, and "stable" as meaning firmly established.
The fear of petitioners that these words will
&m1
result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the
Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not
more general standards in other cases.
It ought to follow that the argument that
E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on
indeterminate standards set by R.A. No. 8180
l$d
must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack
against the validity of E.O. No. .392, the issue
need not further detain our discourse. But peti
tioners further posit the thesis that the Executive
i^J
misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully
deregulating the downstream oil industry in
February 1997.
A perusal of Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will
readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors
to be considered by the Department of Energy
and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum prod
ucts in the world market are declining, and (2)
the time when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable. .Section 15 did
jflftjl
not mention the depletion of the QPSF fund as a
factor to be given weight by the'Executive before
ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the
debates in Congress will show that some of our
, ^)
legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition
to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund
must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that
the Executive department failed to follow faith
fully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the extraneous factor of depletion of
the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra
factor cannot be justified on the ground that the
Executive department considered anyway the
stability of the prices of crude oil in the world
$M market and the stability of the exchange rate of
the peso to the dollar. By considering another
factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in
R.A. No. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any
right to alter either by subtraction or addition
the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no
power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the
power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed,
feu
tjj i
to transgress the principle of separation of pow
ers. The exercise of delegated power is given i
strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a men
agent whose action cannot infringe the term;
of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executivi
co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSI
fund with the factors of decline of the price o
crude oil in the world market and the stability
of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of th<
text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine
the weight given by the Executive departmen
to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could wel
be the principal consideration for the early de
regulation. It could have been accorded an equa
significance. Or its importance could be nil. Ir
light of this uncertainty, we rule that the earlj
deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes i
misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
3
F. People v. Dacuycuy.
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the
unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase,
of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment
imposed by law but without a specification as to
the term or duration thereof.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No.
4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person
who shall willfully interfere with, restrain
or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his
rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in
any other manner commit any act to defeat
any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not less
than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court. (Italics supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are
consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
from PlOO.OO to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment.
It is apparent that the law has no prescribed
period or term for the imposable penalty of im
prisonment. While a minimum and maximum
amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there
lii&ft
tai
is no equivalent provision for the penalty of im
prisonment, although both appear to be qualified
by the phrase "in the discretion of the court."
Private respondents contend that a judicial
determination of what Congress intended to be
sat
the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
would be violative of the constitutional prohi
bition against undue delegation of legislative
IM
power, that the absence of a provision on the
specific term of imprisonment constitutes that
penalty into a cruel and unusual form of pun
ishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said
j^f
Section 32 is unconstitutional.
We turn now to the argument of private
respondents that the entire penal provision in
question should be invalidated as an "undue
delegation of legislative power, the duration of
M
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion
granted therein by the legislature to the courts to
determine the period of imprisonment is a mat
ter of statutory construction and not an undue
delegation of legislative power. It is contended
that the prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative power is concerned only with the
SJ
delegation of power to make laws and not to
interpret the same. It is also submitted that
Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the
discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment,
but to choose which of the alternative penalties
shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses
of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting
in courts discretion as to the length of sentence
or amount of fine between designated limits in
sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such
instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by
the courts is not an attempt to use legislative
power or to prescribe and create a law but is
an instance of the administration of justice and
SjJ the application of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases."39What respondent judge obvi
ously overlooked is his own reference to penalties
"between designated limits."
^Rollo, 98-99.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATT7E DEPARTMENT 69
In his commentary on the Constitution of
the United States, Corwin wrote:
x x x At least three distinct ideas have
contributed to the development of the prin
ciple that legislative power cannot be del
egated. One is the doctrine of separation of
powers: Why go to the trouble of separating
the three powers of government if they can
straightway remerge on their own motion?
The second is the concept of due process of
laws which precludes the transfer of regula
tory function to private persons. Lastly, there
is the maxim of agency Delegatapotestas non
potest delegari. *
An apparent exception to the general rule
forbidding the delegation of legislative authority
to the courts exists in cases where discretion is
conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however,
that when the courts are said to exercise a discre
tion, it-must be a mere legal discretion which is
exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow.41
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discre
tion as to the length of sentence or the amount
of fine between designated limits in sentencing
persons convicted of a crime.42
In the case under consideration, the respon
dent judge erroneously assumed that since the
penalty of imprisonment has been provided for
by the legislature, the court is endowed with
the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this pos
tulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of
imprisonment where no points of reference have
been provided by the legislature. What valid del
egation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise
of discretion to fix the length of service of a term
of imprisonment which must be encompassed
within specific or designated limits provided by
law, the absence of which designated limits will
constitute such exercise as an undue delegation,
<Cited in BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHnJPPINES, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., 73.
"16 Am. Jur. 2d, 902.
aOhio ex rei. Lloyds v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, cited in
16 Am.Jur. 2d, 903.
 70 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
if not an outright intrusion into or assumption,
of legislative power.
On the foregoing considerations, and by
ml
virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprison
ment provided in Section 32 thereof should be,
as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
G. Employees Confederation v. National
Wages Commission
G.R. No. 96169, September 24, 1991
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Employers Confederation of the Philip
pines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage
ia)
Order No. NCR-01-A dated October 2.3, 1990 of
the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Board, National Capital Region, promulgated
^ pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No.
6727, "AN ACT TO RATIONALIZE WAGE
POLICY DETERMINATION BY ESTABLISH
ING THE MECHANISM AND PROPER STAN
DARDS THEREFORE, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 99 OF, AND INCORPO
RATING ARTICLES 120,121,122,123,124,126,
Ml AND 127 INTO, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
442 AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FIXING NEW WAGE RATES, PROVIDING
WAGE INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DIS
PERSAL TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," was approved by the
President on June 9,1989. Aside from providing
new wage rates,43 the "Wage Rationalization Act"
also provides, among other things, for various Re
gional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards
foffil
in charge of prescribing minimum wage rates
for all workers in the various regions, and for a
National Wages and Productivity Commission
to review, among other functions, wage levels
determined by the boards.
ail
The Court is inclined to agree with the Gov
ernment. In the National Wages and Productiv-
\m
3R.A. No. 6727, Sec. 4(ca).
ity Commission's Order of November 6, 1990,
the Commission noted that the determination
of wages has generally involved two methods,
the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-ceiling-
method. We quote:
Historically, legislation involving the
adjustment of the minimum wage made use
of two methods. The first method involves the
fixing of determinate amount that would be
added to the prevailing statutory minimum
wage. The other involves "the salary-ceiling-
method" whereby the wage adjustment is
applied to employees receiving a certain
denominated salary ceiling. The first method
was adopted in the earlier wage orders, while
the latter method was used in R.A. Nos. 6640
send 6727. Prior to this, the salary-ceiling-
method was also used in no less than eleven
issuances mandating the grant of Cost-of-
living allowances (P.D. Nos. 525,1123,1614,
1634, 1678,1713 <md Wage Order Nos. 1, 2,
3, 5 and 6). The shift from the first method
to the second method was brought about by
labor disputes arising from wage distortions,
a consequence of the implementation of the
said wage orders. Apparently, the wage
order provisions that wage distortions shall
be resolved through the grievance procedure
was perceived by legislators as ineffective in
checking industrial unrest resulting from
wage order implementations. With the estab
lishment of the second method as a practice
in minimum wage fixing, wage distortion
disputes were minimized.
As the Commission noted, the increasing
trend is toward the second mode, the salary-cap
method, which has reduced disputes arising from
wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by
the floor-wage method). Of course, disputes are
appropriate subjects of collective bargaining and
grievance procedures, but as the Commission
observed and as we are ourselves agreed, bar
gaining has helped very little in correcting wage
distortions. Precisely, Republic Act No. 6727 was-
intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing
for full-time boards to police wages round-the-
clock, and second, by giving the boards enough
powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of
the opinion that Congress meant the boards to
be creative in resolving the annual question of

wages without labor and management knock
ing on the legislature's door at every turn. The
Court's opinion is that if Republic Act No. 6727
intended the boards alone to set floor wages,
the Act would have no need for a board but an
accountant to keep track of the latest consumer
price index, or better, would have Congress done
it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to
the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the
matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group
of men and women bound by statutory standards.
We quote:
ART. 124. Standards/Criteria for Mini
mum WageFixing. The regional minimum
wages to be established by the Regional
^iiaii
Board shall be as nearly adequate as is eco
nomically feasible to maintain the minimum
standards of living necessary for the health,
efficiency and general well-being of the em
ployees within the framework of the national
economic and social development program. In
the determination of such regional minimum
wages, the Regional Board shall, among
other relevant factors, consider the following:
"(a) The demand for living wages;
"(b) Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the con
sumer price index;
"(c) The cost of living and changes or
increases therein;
"(d) The needs of workers and their
families;
"(e) The need to induce industries to
invest in the countryside;
"(f) Improvements in standards ofliving;
"(g) The prevailing wage levels;
"(h) Fair return of the capital invested
and capacity to pay of employers;
"(i) Effects of employment generation
and. family income; and
"(j) The equitable distribution of income
and wealth along the imperatives of economic
and social development."
The Court is not convinced that the Re
gional Board of the National Capital Region, in
decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed
L
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATD7E'DEPARTMENT 71
an unlawful act "of legislation. It- is true that
wage-fixing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act
Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress
may delegate the power to fix rates provided that,
as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves suf
ficient standards. As#this Court has indicated,
it is impressed that the above-quoted standards
are sufficient, and in the Hght of the floor-wage
method's failure, the Court believes that the
Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board
of the National Capital Region.
Apparently, ECOP is of the mistaken impres
sion that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to "get
the Government out of the industry" and leave
labor and management alone in deciding wages.
The Court does not think that the law intended to
deregulate the relation between labor and capital
for several reasons: (1) The Constitution calls
upon the State to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare; (2) the Constitution
also makes it a duty of the State "to intervene
when the common goal so demands" in regulating
property and property relations; (3) the Charter
urges Congress to give priority to the enactment
of measures, among other things, to diffuse the
wealth of the nation and to regulate the use of
property; (4) the Charter recognizes, the "just
share of labor in the fruits of production"; (5)
under the Labor Code, the State shall regulate
the relations between labor and management;
(6) under Republic Act No. 6727 itself, the State
is interested in seeing that workers receive fair
and equitable wages; and (7) the Constitution
is primarily a document of social justice, and
although it has recognized the importance of
the private sector, it has not embraced fully the
concept of laissez faire or otherwise, relied on
pure market forces to govern the economy; We
can not give to the Act a meaning or intent that
will conflict with these basic principles.
NOTE: Recent cases.
The Supreme Court has continued to apply
the same principles that have been developed
in the past. Thus the standby authority given
to the President to increase the value added tax
rate in the Vat Law, R.A. No. 9337, was upheld
as an example of contingent legislation where
the effectivity of the law is made to depend on
 72 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
i&&ij
the verification by the executive of the existence
of certain conditions.44
i&tl
In Gerochi v. DENR,45 the power delegated
to the Energy Regulator Board to fix and impose
a universal charge on electricity end-users was
&iftl
challenged as an undue delegation of the power
to tax. The Court, however, said that, since the
purpose of the law was not revenue generation
but energy regulation, the power involved was
more police power than the power to tax. More
over, the Court added that the power to tax can
be used for regulation. As to the validity of the
delegation to an executive agency, the Court was
satisfied that the delegating law was complete
in itself and the amount to be charged was made
tag certain by the parameters set by the law itself.
The Attrition Act
R.A. No. 9335, the Attrition Act of 1995,
authorizes the BIR and BOC to give awards to
those who surpass the BIRtargets and to impose
sanctions on those who fall short. The awards
are taken from the excess over target as set up
by a Board. The Rules for implementation are
subject to review by an Oversight Committee
of Congress. The validity of the law was chal
lenged on the ground that the delegation to the
President of the power to set targets'was invalid.
However, the law is complete^and has stan
dards for the President to follow. Revenue targets
are based on the original estimated revenue col
lection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the
DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress. Thus, the determination
Igj of revenue targets does not rest solely on the
President.
. NOTE: Penal rules.
&fll
Since rules and regulations promulgated
by administrative agencies pursuant to a valid
delegating statute have the force of law, their
violation may be punished as a penal offense.
However, for an administrative regulation to
have the force of penal law it is necessary that
such violation be made a crime by the delegat
"Abakada Guro Party List Officers v. Executive Sec
retary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005. Reconsidered
October 18, 2005.
"G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007.
ing statute itself46 that the penalty be provided
by the statute itself,47 and that the regulation
be published.48
NOTE: Separation of powers in local
governments.
It should be noted, however, that on the local
level the principle of separation of powers does
not apply strictly between the executive and
the law-making body. This was true under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and this remains
true under the 1987 Constitution. Hence, a local
law-making agency may be given executive func
tions. When what is given to a local legislative
body is executive power, the rules applicable to
the empowerment of administrative agencies
also becomes applicable to the local law-making
body. Thus, in People v. Vera49 the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a statute which left the
activation of a probation system to the discretion
of the Provincial Board. Among the defects which
the Court found in the statute was invalid delega
tion of legislative power. The Court ruled that
the principles for delegation to administrative
agencies had not been satisfied. But this, only
because the Court said that for the purpose of
the statute involved "the provincial boards may
be regarded as administrative bodies."50
The Constitution itself, of course, may create
other exceptions to the rule on non-delegability.
Thus, for instance, Article VI, Section 23(2),
authorizes Congress, in times of war and other
national emergency, to give to the President
"powers necessary and proper to carry out a de
clared national policy," and again, Section 28(2)
authorizes Congress to delegate the power to
fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, ton
nage and wharfage dues, and other duties and
imposts.
SEC. 2. THE SENATE SHALL BE COM
POSED OF TWENTY-FOUR SENATORS
WHO SHALL BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY
THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE PHILIP
PINES, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
46United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).<
7Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398, 404 (1944).
See also United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908); United
States v. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608 (1914).
48Peoplev. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, 642 (1954).
4965 Phil. 56 (1937).
"Jd. at 116.

&&&J
SEC. 3. NO PERSON SHALL BE A
SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-
) BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS
AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE,
ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, A REGIS
TERED VOTER, AND A RESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR NOT LESS THAN TWO
YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
liijiij
DAY OF THE ELECTION.
A. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board
G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008
In these kindred petitions, the constitu
tionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it re
quires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put ir issue.
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10,2004
synchronized national and local elections....
Pimentel Petition
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, sub
^J
ject to the provisions on nuisance candidates,
a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards,
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 73
of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge
the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accord
ingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates
any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution
is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Con
stitution. In the discharge of their defined func
tions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands
of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the
validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provi
sion does not expressly state that non-compliance
with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying
factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plau
sibility if the drug test requirement is optional.
But the particular section of. the law, without
exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory
command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason
that the adverse consequence adverted to can
only refer to and revolve around the election and
the assumption of public office of the candidates.
Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
without meaning and effect whatsoever.
SEC. 4. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
THE SENATORS SHALL BE SIX YEARS
AND SHALL COMMENCE, UNLESS OTH
ERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON
ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT
FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.
NO SENATOR SHALL SERVE FOR
MORE THAN TWO CONSECUTIVE TERMS.
VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OF
FICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL
NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUP
TION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SER-
 74 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
tt&A
VICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH
HE WAS ELECTED.
SEC. 5. (1) THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN
TATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT
MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY
MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED
BY LAW,WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED
AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND
ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PRO^
GRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED
THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF
REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL,
AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANI
ZATIONS.
(2) THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTA
TIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE
UNDER THE PARTY-LIST. FOR THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATI
FICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-
HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED" BY LAW, BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIG
ENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,WOM
iii>
EN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS
AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT
iiiiii)
THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
(3) EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTI
CABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT AND
ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY
WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH
PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE
REPRESENTATIVE.
&i*a
(4) WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOW
ING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS,
THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAP
PORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DIS
TRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS
PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION.
1. Sectoral representation and party-lisi
representation.
There are two related but distinct concepts
found in Section 5: sectoral representation and
party-list or proportional representation. Both
are important for a full understanding of the
provision.
Sectoral representation, was explained by
Commissioner Villacorta thus:51
The idea of giving meaningful repre
sentation, particularly to the farmers and
the workers, would be our Commission's
humble gesture of extending protection to
the interests of these groups which are not
adequately attended to in normal legislative
deliberations. Sectoral representation is a
necessity, especially in these times when
the people are giving the democratic process
another chance, ifnot its last chance. Provid
ing for mechanisms which would enhance the
chances of marginalized sectors in electing
their Representatives to the National Assem
bly will keep their hopes alive in the principle
of peaceful change. This imperative becomes
more urgent when this Commission recently
adopted a bicameral system of legislature.
We have heard apprehensions that the Upper
House might be monopolized by the moneyed
sectors and might protect vested property
interests....
Party-list representation was elucidated by
Commissioner Monsod, its main sponsor:52
I would like to make a distinction from
the beginning that the proposal for the party
list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation. Precisely, the
party-list system seeks to avoid the dilemma
of choice of sectors and who constitute the
members of the sectors. In making the pro
posal on the party list system, we were made
aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will
have reserved seats....
Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, labor
ers and farmers can form a sectoral party or
"Zd. at 84-85,146-147.
62Jd. at 85-86.
jg>
a sectoral organization that will then register
and present candidates of their party. How
do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party-list system,
every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district.
That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will
j&ffii
be asked: What party or organization or co
alition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of
the parties, organizations or coalitions that
$$)
have been registered with the COMELEC
and are entitled to be put in that list. This
can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a re
gional party in Mindanao. One need not be
farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of
the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate
the votes that had been garnered by each
party or each organization one does not
have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party and count
the votes and from there derive the percent
age of the votes that had been cast in favor
of a party, organization or coalition.
Much of the discussion on the party-list
system revolved around the question of how
sectors, that is, especially disadvantaged sectors
of society, should be represented. One view was
that sectoral parties or organizations should be
assured reserved seats in the House; another
view was that they should compete in the party-
iijiijp list system just like any other party or organi
zation.53 The desire to give them reserved seats
was born of the recognition of the inability of the
disadvantaged sectors to compete in the political
process.54 In the end, the Commission approved a
compromise: "For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives"
will be reserved for sectoral representatives who
will be chosen "as provided by law."
This compromise recognizes the handicap
under which disadvantaged sectors operate
"Id. at 252-259; 560-583.
uId. at 561-567.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 75
but at the same time it is meant to motivate
them to strengthen their organizations so that
they will eventually be able to compete in the
regular party-list system three consecutive
terms after the operation ofthe party-list system
commences.55 In the concrete this would mean
that by the elections of 1998 the sectors would
have to compete in the party-list system of the
electoral process.56
The original list of sectors to be represented
included only labor, peasant, urban poor, and
youth sectors. There was a recognition, however,
that these sectors could further be subdivided
by law into sub-sectors.57 Eventually, two other
sectors indigenous cultural communities and
women were added,58 and also "such other sec
tors as may be provided by law."69And Commis
sioner Rigos added: "except the religious sector."60
But, upon question by Commissioner Villacorta,
Rigos explained that a member of the religious
sector may become a sectoral representative but
not as representing the religious sector."1
Originally, the manner of choosing the
sectoral representatives during the transition
period was to be left to ordinary legislation.62
Eventually, however, the Constitutional Com
mission added a supplemental alternative which
became Article XVIII, Section 7: "Until a law is
passed*, the President may fill by appointment
from a list of nominees by the respective sectors
the seats reserved for sectoral representation
in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution."63 Should the President appoint
such sectoral representatives, their term would
be that found in the Constitution. A subsequent
law passed by Congress would not oust those
appointed by the President.64
It should be noted, however, that the text
says "may fill by appointment." The use of the
word "may," which is permissive, was deliberate
"Id. at 567-570, 577-582.
"Id at 585-586.
"Id. 573.
"Id. 574.
"Id. at 587.
"Id.
81M-at589.
^Article VI, Section 5(2).
otV RECORD 328-338.
**Id. 332.
 76 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
3i)
in order to give to the President ample leeway.63
However, the President was not free to choose
L any one he pleases. He or she must choose from
"a list of nominees by the respective sectors;" but
if the President did not like the list of nominees,
%1/tii
she could ask for another list or may decide not
to appoint anyone.66
Must the sectoral representative appointed
iiityl by the President be confirmed by the Commis
sion on Appointment? This was hot discussed in
the Constitutional Commission because sectoral
representation was approved before the commis
igj
sion had done its work on the Commission on
Appointments. When later the matter went to
the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in Quintos-
!is5 Deles v. Commission on Appointments6"1 that
confirmation was needed. TJie Court reasoned
that, since the sectoral representative would be,
under Article XVIII. Section 7, appointed by the
President, he came under Article VII, Section
16 which includes among those needing confir
mation "other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution."
In sum, therefore, Section 5 provides two
regimes: a temporary regime of sectoral repre
sentation for three consecutive .terms > and
a permanent party-list or proportional represen
tation regime. The temporary sectoral represen
tation regime was an answer to the recognized
disadvantage of the marginalized sectors. At the
same time it was a signal to these sectors that
within a period of three congressional terms they
should prepare to compete with other organiza
tions and traditional political parties in a system
of proportional representation that would treat
parties and organization on the same level.
Those qualified to participate in the party-list
system are "registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations" in the manner
explained by Commissioner Monsod. The party-
list representatives will constitute "twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives
iaa)
including those under the party-list." Thus, un
der a total membership of 250, a fully/operative
party-list system would mean 200 district rep
resentatives and 50 party-list representatives.68
65Jd. at 333-336.
iati aM 338.
67177SCRA 259 (1989).
"V RECORD 664-666.
Although the Constitution does not s<
down the mechanics for the operation of tt
system but leaves these to ordinary legislatioj
the 1986 Constitutional Commission had a clef
understanding of the rough outlines of how tt
system should operate.69 Parties or organizatior
desiring to participate in the party-list systej
register themselves together with a list of th
party's or organization's list of nominees fc
party-list representatives. The maximum nun
ber will be prescribed by law and the nominee
will be arranged by the party or organizatio
according to an order of priorities. In every ele
tion for the House of Representatives, each vote
casts two votes: one for the district representativ
of his or her choice and another for the party c
organization of his or her choice. .The votes cas
for'the parties and organizations are totale
nationwide. The number of party-list seats
party or organization will get will depend on th
number of votes it receives in proportion to th
total number of votes cast nationwide.70
2. Cases on party-list.
A. Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec
G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To determine the winners in a Philippine
style party-list election, the Constitution an
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least fou
inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation th
combined number of all party-list congressmei
shall not exceed twenty percent of the tota
membership of the House of Representatives
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold onl;
those parties garnering a minimum of two per
cent of the total valid votes cast for the party-lis
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the Housi
of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each quali
fied party, regardless of the number of votes i
69The Commission was also quite aware of the practica
difficulties which the system could encounter. E.g., see I
RECORD 571-572.
Id. at 253-254.

actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation the
additional seats which a qualified party is en
titled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."
Because the'Comelec violated these legal
parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be
struck down for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to
&p enforce and administer election-related laws. It
has no power to contravene or amend them. Nei
ther does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regula
tions", methods and formulas to implement elec
toy tion laws not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct
or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the
party-list system a normal feature of parlia
mentary democracies into our presidential
form of government, modified by unique Filipino
statutory parameters, presents new paradigms
s^)
and novel questions, which demand innovative
legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on
^$e) time-tested jurisprudence.
Complying with its constitutional duty to
provide by law the "selection or election" ofparty-
list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941
on March 3,1995. Under this statute's policy dec
laration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens be
longing to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enact
Si) ment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
s#J
open party system in order to attain the broad
est possible representation of party, sectoral or
fcj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 77
group interests in the House ofRepresentatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible." (emphasis ours.)
The requirements for entitlement toa party-
list seat in the. House are prescribed bythis law
(RA 7941) in this wise:
"SECTION 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. The party-list represen
tatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of
theHouse ofRepresentatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections
the first five (5)major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be en
titled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coali
tions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coali
tions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) ofthe votes shall be entitled to addition
al seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats."
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Com-
elec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing
the election ofparty-list representatives through
the party-list system.
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the
main question of how to determine the winners
of the subject party-list election can be settled
by addressing the following issues:
 78 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-
list representatives mentioned in Section 5(2),
lli)
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is
it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold require
ment and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirma
tive, how should the additional seats of a quali
^J
fied party be determined?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision of the Constitution
on the composition of the House of Representa
tives reads as follows:
"SECTION 5. (1) The House of Repre
sentatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts appprtioned among
:$$s
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list, system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Consti
WtJ
tution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from
i%|
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by
^) law, except the religious sector."
Clearly, the Constitution makes the numbe
of district representatives the determinant in ai
riving at the number of seats allocated for party
list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty pe
centum of the total number of representative
including those under the party-list." .. .
This means that any increase in the numbe
of district representatives, as may be provide*
by law, will necessarily result in a correspond
ing increase in the number of party-list seats..
The problematic question, however, is this
Does the Constitution require all such allocate*
seats to be filled up all the time and under al
circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
The Constitution simply states that "[t]h<
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is i
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be fillec
up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its
prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, bj
which it prescribed that aparty, organization oi
coalition participating in the party-list electior
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seal
in the House of Representatives.
We'rule that a simple reading of Section 5.
Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested
with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representa
tion. The Constitution explicitly sets down only
the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional preroga
tive, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election
of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and un
derrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain
at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to

liij
a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives...
Considering the foregoing statutory require
ii)
ments, it will be shown presently that Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not manda
tory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application
of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say
that the prerogative to determine whether to
adjust or change this percentage requirement
rests in Congress. Our task now, as should
have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely
scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an in
novative mathematical formula that can, as far
as practicable, implement it within the context
of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as
well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent
or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitu
tional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void
by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid
command of sovereignty that must be respected
and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of
the rule of law.
Second Issue:
In imposing a two percent threshold, Con
gress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representa
tion are actually represented in Congress. This
intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on
\$g} the proposed bill. ..
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitu
tion had in mind a minimum-vote requirement,
^)
the specification of which they left to Congress
to properly determine. Constitutional Commis
sioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable
to modifications in the minimum percentage
mi
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 79
of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who
has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets
a seat. There are about 20 million who. cast
their votes in the last elections. Two-and-
a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a, constituency of 500,000
votes nationwide deserves a seat in the As
sembly. If we bring that down to two percent,
we are talking about 400,000 votes. The aver
age vote per family is three. So, here we are
talking about 134,000 families. We believe
that there are many sectors who will be able
to get seats in the Assembly because many
of them have memberships of over 10,000.
In effect* that is the operational implication
of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid
is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
system. We believe that it is our job to open
up the system and that we should not have
within that system a reserve seat. We think
that people should organize, should-work
hard, and should earn their seats within
that system.''
The two percent threshold is consistent
not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very es
sence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature features
the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are inca
pable ofcontributing significant legislation, and
which might even pose a threat to the stability
of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their
respectiveinhabitants, and on the basis ofa uni
form and progressive ratio"to ensure meaningful
local representation.
Allin all, we hold that the statutory provision
on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function
ofcourtsis simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
Animportant consideration in adopting the
party-Ust system is to promote and encourage a
 80 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
igi j
multi-party system of representation. Again, we
quote Commissioner Monsod:
W0
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just
want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party-list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we
also wanted to avoid the problems of mechan
ics and operation in the implementation of
a concept that has very serious shortcom
ings of classification and of double or triple
votes. We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors
to be there. That is why one of the ways to
do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the
party-list system. This way, we will open
it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe
regional groups, to earn their seats among
the fifty...."
Consistent with the Constitutional Com
mission's pronouncements, Congress set the
seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means
having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of vari
ous interest-representations into the legislature;
thus, no single group, no matter'how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the
validity of the three seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method ofAllocating
Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent
seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having
upheld the constitutionality of the two percent
vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method
of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions
^a)
are entitled to. The very first step there is no
dispute on this is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of
their respective votes as against the total num
ber of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two
percent of the total votes cast have an assured
or guaranteed seat in the House of Representa
tives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than
two percent of the votes shall be entitled to ad
ditional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes." The problem is how to distribute ad
ditional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind
the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two
Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one ad
ditional seat for every additional proportion of
the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent
vote Requirement for the first seat. Translated
in figures, a party that wins at least six percent
of the total votes cast still be entitled to three
seats; another party that gets four percent will
be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This
proposal has the advantage of simplicity and
ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however,
when the parties get very lop-sided votes for
example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the
total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B. to
5 seats and Party C, to .3 seats. Considering the
three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
will each uniformly havethree seats only. We
would then have the spectacle of a party garner
ing two or more times the number of votes ob
tained by another, yet getting the same number
of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will
be contravened and the law rendered nugatory
by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.
The Legal and Logical Formula
for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style
party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In craft
ing a legally defensible and logical solution to
determine the number of additional seats that a
qualified party is entitled to, we need to review
the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in top Prologue, they
are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list:
Second, the two percent threshold only
Sjijf
those parties garnering a minimum of two per
cent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House
of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit each quali
fied party, regardless of the number of votes it
m actuaUy obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation the
additional seats which a qualified party is en
titled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."
w$
The problem, as already stated, is to find a
way to translate "proportional representation"
into a mathematical formula that will not contra
vene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain
such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the pe
titioners, the public and the private respondents,
as well as the members of this Court, that the
initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is com
puted by dividing its votes by the total votes cast
for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on pro
portional representation, the number of seats to
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 81
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example,.the first party received
1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled
to two additional seat&. Another qualified party
which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled
to the same number of seats, since it garnered
only fifty percent of the votes won by the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes
relative to that of the first party whose number
of seats has already been predetermined, the
second party should be given less than that to
which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be
allotted less additional seats than the first party
for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties
and the first party will always be less than 1:1,
(2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
rounding off, because there is no such thing as
a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary round
ing off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given
the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up
in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona,
Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, October 20,1992;
219 SCRA 329, March 1,1993, that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect,
deprive another party's fractional membership.
It would be a violation of the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation. We said
further that "no party can claim more than what
it is entitled to ..."
In any case, the decision on whether to round
off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
Since Congress did not provide for it in the pres
ent law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
Court does not make the law; it merely applies
it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional
Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the.number of
seatsthefirstpartyis entitledto? Theonly basis
given by thelaw is that a partyreceiving at least
''/$$
82 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to
one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's
number of seats and so on...
la
If the proportion of votes received by the first
party without rounding it off is equal to at least
six percent of the total valid votes cast for all
m the party list groups, then the first party shall
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes
without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
sgi
four percent, but less than six percent, then the
first party shall have one additional or a total of
two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
i jjM percent, then the first party shall not be entitled
to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, be
|0 cause the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise,
it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an
^)
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for
the highest rank and are thus entitled to three
seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats
i^l
to which all the parties are entitled may exceed
the maximum number of party-list seats reserved
in the House of Representatives. /
ffrj-l
Note that the above formula will be ap
plicable only in determining the number of
il&j
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of ad
ditional seats of the other qualified parties. As
explained earlier, the use of the same formula
for all would contravene the proportional rep-"
resentation parameter. For example, a second
party obtains six percent of the total number of
ffi>
votes cast. According to the above formula, the
said parts would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However,
if the first party received a significantly higher
amount of votes say, twenty percent to
grant it the same number of seats as the second
KJ party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting
only six percent of the votes will have an equal'
number of representatives as the one obtaining
twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is
to grant the first party a total of three seats; and
the party receiving six percent, additional seats
in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other
Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other quali
fied parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. The formula is encompassed by
the following complex fraction:
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of
the first party
first party (APEC)
Thus, in the case ofABA, the additional num
ber of seats it would be entitled to is computed
as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled
to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for
the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result
would be zero additional seat for each of the other
qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact
mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order
to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the
actual mathematical proportions are not whole
numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons
explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in
excess.of that provided by the law. Furthermore,
Obtaining absolute proportional representation
is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
a maximum of two additional slots. An increase
in the maximum number of additional represen
tatives a party may be entitled to would result
in a more accurate proportional representation.
fc&llj-lj
But the law itself has set the limit: only two ad
ditional seats. Hence, we need to work within
ffffii such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for
determining additional seats happily coincides
with the present number of incumbents; namely,
two for the first party (APEC) and one each for
the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we
affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different
formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes
our methodology for being too strict. We say,
however, that our formula merely translated the
Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical
equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wis
dom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less
strict;" then the formula will also be modified
&fy\
to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
&$)
B. Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus'
Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
ii^i'Ji Resolution approved the participation of 154 or
ganizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginal
ized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or over-
represented.
$&J
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the
Court directed the parties to address the follow
ing issues:
as) "2. Whether or not political parties may
participate in the party-list elections.
j
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 83
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is
exclusive to 'marginalizedand underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Om
nibus Resolution No. 3?85."
The Court's Ruling
Second Issue: Participation
of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW La
bor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most ob
jectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."
For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General,
like the impleaded political parties, submits that
the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. It
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open
to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations."
We now rule on this issue. Under the Con
stitution and RA 7941, private respondents can
not be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides that members of the House of Repre
sentatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article
IX(C) of the Constitution, political parties may
be registered under the party-list system.
During the deliberations in the Constitu
tional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-
list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a
regional party in Mindanao." This was also clear
from the following exchange between Comms.
Jaime Tadeo and Bias Ople:
"MR.TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO.. PDP-
Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
^ffet ]i
84 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
MR. OPLE.
ff)
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party
list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that
the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to
parties that consistently place third or fourth
in congressional district elections to win a seat
in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this
is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or par
ties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they
were always third or, fourth place in each of the
<nj
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
But this way, they would have five or six repre
sentatives in the Assembly even if they would
ii> not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also pro
vides for "a party-list system of registered nation
al, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More
to the point, the law defines "political part}'" as
"an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which,
i^y
as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no
doubt as to the participation of political parties
in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent
provision below:
XXX XXX XXX
iiiiii
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections,
the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be en
titled to participate in the party-list system.
XXX XXX XXX
Indubitably, therefore, political parties
even the major ones may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue: Marginalized
and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in
the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party or any organization or
group for that matter may do so.The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941. Section 5...
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the
provision,a distinguished member ofthe Consti
tutional Commission declared that the purpose
of the party-list provision was to give "genuine
power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when
the provision was discussed, he exultantly an
nounced: "On this first day of August 1986, we
shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our
national history, by giving"genuine power to our
people in the legislature."
The foregoing provision on the party-list
system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, inter
spersed with phrases like "in accordance with
law" or 'jas may be provided bylaw"; it wasthus
up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in
this wise:
"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.
The State shall promote proportional repre
sentation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a
party-list system of registered national, re
gional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof; which will enable Fili
pino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropri
ate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole, to become members of the House
of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full,

free and open party system in order to at
tain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House ofRepresentatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
;*jj
legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible."
TheMarginalized and Underrepresented: to
Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state
policy of promoting proportional representation
t^J by means of the Filipino-style party-list system,
which will "enable" the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
M
1. .who belong to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties;
and "
iiiij)
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policyare "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepre
sented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituen
cies."
"Proportional representation" here does not
iiiiii
refer to the number of people in a particular dis
trict, because the party-list election is national
in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
^j strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exem
plified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
m workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to
claim representation of the marginalized and un
derrepresented, because representation is easy
to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituen
cies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging
^\ to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 85
Finally, "lack ofwell-defined constituency]"
refers to the absence of a traditionally identifi
able electoral group, like voters of a congres
sional district or territorial unit of government.
Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified wjjth the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
In the end, the role ofthe Comelec is to see to
it that onlythose Filipinoswhoare "marginalized
and underrepresented" become members of Con
gress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent ofthe Constitution is clear: to give
genuine power to the people, not only by giving
more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmak
ers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policyofthe implementing law, we repeat, is like
wise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
Organizations and parties,..., to become mem
bers of the House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941,
which states:
"SECTION 5. Registration. Any or
ganized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes
of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or orga
nization or a coalition of such parties or orga
nizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government,
list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may
require; Provided, That the sector shall in
clude labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, Over
seas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
&&J
86 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
a)
not all, sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle
- of statutory construction that words employed
in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference
Mfi
to, the words and the phrases with which they
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of
a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association.
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
o
fel
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory
policy, the Office ofthe Solicitor General submits
that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participa
'S
tion in the party-list system to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society." In fact,
it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may
aSifll
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organiza
tion representing the super rich of Forbes Park
^
or Dasmarinas Village could participate in the
party-list elections.
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes
the position ofthe Office ofthe Solicitor General
(OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks
to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically
those belonging to marginalized and underrep
resented sectors, organizations and parties to
be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system
is not exclusive to the marginalized and under-
represented disregards the clear statutory policy.
Its claim that even the super-rich and overrep-
|y|^
resented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the pe
culiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners
of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sec
i&J
tors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and
common sense. In contrast, and with admirable
candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted
during the Oral Argument that a group of bank
ers, industrialists and sugar planters could not
join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors.
gal
While the business moguls and the mega-rich
are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, thej
are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
for the stark reality is that their economic clout
engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, politi
cal power does not necessarily emanate from the
size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely tc
arise more directly from the number and amount
of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginal
ized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity. It was for them that the party-list sys
tem was enacted to give them not only genuine
hope, but genuine power; to give them the oppor
tunity to be.elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply, to
give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs ofthe State. In its noblest sense, the
party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented
in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk,
the urban poor, even thos'e in the underground
movement to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepre
sented had not been able to win in the congres
sional district elections normally dominated
by traditional politicians and vested groups,
percent ofthe seats in the House of Representa
tives were set aside for the party list system. In
arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled SO percent of the seats in the House
could participate in the party-list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the
Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and
the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose ofthe party-list
provision was to open up the system, in order to
enhance the chance of sectoral groups and orga
nizations to gain representation in the House of
Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold

&m
within it those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely,
it would be illogical to open the system to those
who have long been within it those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congres
ffi^
sional district elections.
The import ofthe open party-list system may
be more vividly understood when compared to
a student dormitory "open house," which by its
nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
j^i
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who
can enter the dormitory even without such spe
cial privilege. In the same vein, the open party-
list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot
tJMi
get elected through regular elections otherwise;
it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepre-
sented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute,
iii^j
but also prejudice the chance ofthe marginalized
and underrepresented, contrary to the intention
ofthe law to enhance it. The party-list system is
jffi$) a tool for the benefit ofthe underprivileged; the
law could not have given the same tool to others,
to the prejudice ofthe*intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the
party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion ofthe qualification of
political parties and other organizations under
<%> the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List
Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to
&gj remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary hear
ings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
down the following guidelines, culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec
in its work.
igj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 87
First, the political party, sector, organization
or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section
5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show
through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
by laws, history, platform of government and
track record that it represents and seeks to up
lift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict ofinterests,
it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest
of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Con
stitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors ...
to be elected to the House of Representatives."
In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. . .
Fourth, a party or an organization must not
be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, or
ganization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any
of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
 88 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
^j
per centum (2%) ofthe votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding election's for
the constituency in which it has registered."
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regula
tions. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941,
which states that the party-list system seeks to
"eriable Filipino citizens belonging to marginal
ized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties... to become members ofthe House
of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy
must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not
be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government.
By the very nature of the party-list system, the
iiliil) party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens.
It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its officials
iM
in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
MtA citizens belonging to marginalized and underrep
resented sectors and organizations to be elected
to the House of Representatives.
iAt\
Sixth, the party must not only comply with
the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
follows:
SECTION 9. Qualifications ofParty-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated
IssSj as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter; a resident of the Philip
'Mi
pines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bonafide
member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day ofthe election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nomi
nees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests
of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lack
ing a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicam
eral committee proceedings that "the nominee
of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district..."
C. Ang Bagong Bayam-OFW Labor Party,
.et al. v. Comelec, et al.
G.k No. 147589, June 25, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before the Court are Motions for proclama
tion filed by various party-list participants. The
ultimate question raised is this: Aside from
those already validly proclaimed pursuant to
earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other
party-list candidates that should be proclaimed
winners? The answer to this question is circum
scribed by the eight-point guideline given in our
June 26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated
cases, as well as by the four unique parameters
of the Philippine party-list system:
"First, the twenty percent allocation
the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty per
cent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected
under the party-list.
&J
"Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of
?.M two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are 'qualified' to have a
seat in the House of Representatives.
^J "Third, the three-seat limiteach quali
fied party, regardless ofthe number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one 'qualifying' and
'ty&i
two additional seats.
"Fourth, proportional representation
the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed 'in proportion
to their total number of votes'."
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002,
the OSG... added that "the proclamation by the
SJ
COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS
and PM (as well as all other qualified parties and
organizations which received at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the same party-list election) as
winners in the said party-list is in order."
M Preparatory to resolving the present Mo
tions and in observance of due process, the Court
resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the
parties, including the OSG, to submit their re
spective Position Papers on the following issues:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec, G.R. Nos.
105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992 and Grego v.
Comelec, 340 Phil. 591, June 19, 1997 and re
lated cases should be deemed applicable to the
determination of winners in party-list elections
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/orga
nizations that were subsequently disqualified for
having failed to meet the eight-point guideline
^J contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should
be deducted from the "total votes cast for the
party-list system" during the said elections
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon
the claims ofthe OSG that the initial recommen
dation contained in Comelec's First Compliance
Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY
and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that
L these two party-list groups should be deemed
qualified.
L
khj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 89
We... accept the OSG's position that indeed
Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and
COCOFED. Therefore,' we now add these two
groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier
mentioned and therebyaihcrease the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of
which parties/organizations won during the last
party-list election.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the
"Total Votes Cast"
The instant Motions for proclamation con
tend that the, disqualification of many party-list
organizations has reduced the "total number of
votes cast for the party-list elections." Because
of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark re
quired by law has now been allegedly attained by
movants. Hence, they now pray for their procla
mation as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b) of RA 7941
(the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system are entitled to have a
seat in the House of Representatives. The criti
cal question now is this: To determine the "total
votes cast for the party-list system," should the
votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be
deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause
"total votes cast for the party-list system" include
only those ballots cast for qualified party-list
candidates?
To answer this question, there is a need to
review related jurisprudence on the matter, es
pecially Labo v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec,
which were mentioned in our February 18,2003
Resolution.
Labo and Grego Not Applicable
In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineli
gibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office." In other words,
the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified
candidate cannot be considered "stray."
However, "this rule would be different if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
 90 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor ofthe ineli
gible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy
of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which
case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
In short, the votes cast for a "notoriously disquali
i&l
fied" candidate may be considered "stray" and
excluded from the canvass.
^| The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated
in Grego, which held that the exception men
tioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the
Ml
one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate."
sal Note, however, that the foregoing pronounce
ments (1) referred to regular elections for local
offices and (2) involved the interpretation of
Section 6 of RA 6646. They were not meant to
cover party-list elections, which are specifically
governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law
clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a
sectoral organization or a coalition" "not entitled
to be voted for shall not be counted":
"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every
voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the
first vote is a vote for candidate for member
ship of the House of Representatives in his
\$i\l
legislative district, and the second, a vote for
the party, organization, or coalition he wants
represented in the House of Representatives:
Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sec
toral organization, or coalition not entitled to
be voted for shall not be counted: Provided,
finally, That the first election under the
party-list system shall be held in May 1998."
The language ofthe law is clear; hence, there
is room, not for interpretation, but merely for
application. Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic
aids is warranted when the language of the law
is plain and unambiguous.
(Ml
Another reason for not applying Labo and
Gregois that these cases involve single elective
posts, while the present controversy pertains
to the acquisition of a number of congressional
seats depending on the total election results
such that even those garnering second, third,
fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed win
ners depending on their compliance with other
requirements.
RA 7941 is a special statute governing the
elections of party-list representatives and is the
controlling law in matters pertaining thereto.
Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into
being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the
latter is a qualification of the former ruling and
law. On the other hand, Grego and other related
cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941
should be construed as inapplicable to the latter.
Subtracting the votes garnered by these dis
qualified party-list groups from the total votes
cast under the party-list system will reduce the
base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two
percent threshold can be more easily attained
by the qualified marginalized and under-repre
sented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of
disqualified party-list participants will increase
and broaden the number of representatives from
these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and
give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941,
which we reproduce thus:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The
State shall promote proportional representa
tion in the election of representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system
of registered, national and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sec
tors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee
a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House ofRepresentatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible."

sj
Need for Patience and Perseverance
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduc
tion of votes obtained by party-list candidates
disqualified after the holding of the party-list
elections will result in the instability of the
system. The reason is that qualified party-list
candidates would be encouraged to seek the dis
qualification ofthe other candidates for the sole
purpose of attaining the needed percentage ofthe
votes cast. Although such scenario may be pos
sible, we believe that the perceived "instability"
can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past
elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified
and disqualified participants' list, which can be
used for future elections; and (2) in the light of
au recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec
will now be guided accordingly when accrediting
new candidates for the next party-list elections
tiivi
and will be able to set the period for accredita
tion in such time and manner as to enable it to
determine their qualifications long before the
elections are held.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance
to have the marginalized and under-represented
sectors ably represented in Congress. The con
!i!A\
troversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001
party-list elections should further embolden,
not distract, the nation in the process of imple
ii'J&l menting a genuine and sound Philippine-style
party-list system. At this point, the Court needs
to stress what it said in Veterans:
zl
[T]he dismal result of the first election
for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
m organizations. It should stir them to. be
more active and vigilant in their campaign
for representation in the State's lawmaking
body. It should also serve as a clarion call for
innovation and creativity in adopting this
novel system of popular democracy.
"With adequate information and dis
semination to the public and more active
sectoral parties, we are confident our people
will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance
and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors,
in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis
of the party-list system, Philippine style."
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 91
We also take this opportunity to-emphasize
that the formulas devised in Veterans for comput
ing the number of nominees that the party-list
winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by
the concerned agencies of government, especially
the Commission on Elections. These formulas
ensure that the number of seats allocated to the
winning party-list candidates conform to the
principle of proportional representation man
dated by the law.
The Party-List Winners
As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by
disqualified party-list candidates are not to be
counted in determining the total votes cast for
the party-list system. In the present cases, the
votes they obtained should be deducted from the
canvass of the total number of votes cast during
the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, fol
lowing Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and
ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now
in order, according to the percentage of votes they
obtained as compared with the total valid votes
cast nationwide.
Epilogue
The determination ofthe winners in the last
party-list elections has been neither easy nor
simple. The novelty ofthe party-list system in our
country necessarily demanded careful study and
deliberation by the Court. Principles and prec
edents in other democracies of the world have
not been very helpful, because our party-list law
(RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters,
giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-
style party-list system. Our difficulties have also
been aggravated by the less than firm actions of
the Commission on Elections referred to earlier,
which had to be reversed based on the OSG's
later submissions.
To help all concerned, especially the Com
mission on Elections, speed up the process of
determining the party-list winners in the future,
we deem it wise to summarize the implementing
processwe followed in this Resolution, as follows:
1. After the promulgation of our Decision
on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to con
duct a factual determination as to which of the
various party-list candidates had passed the
ml
92 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
eight-point guideline we instituted in that Deci
sion. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days
to undertake the work, it was able to submit its
Final Compliance Report only on September 27,
2001.
2. Ofthe various parties and organizations
39 which Comelec allowed to participate in the
2001 party-list elections, it recommended in
its three Compliance Reports to the Court 42
to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were
added, for a total of 46.
3. Next, we determined which of the 46
qualified parties garnered at least two percent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by
the disqualified candidates from the "total votes
cast." Those parties, organizations and coalitions
that had obtained at least two percent of this
balance were declared winners.
4. After identifying the winners, we de
termined, by using the formulas mandated in
Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees, each
winning party was entitled to.
5. The foregoing process would have been
finished long ago and the winners proclaimed
before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec
been more resolute and exacting in the factual
determinations contained in its Compliance Re
ports.
6. In the interest of due process, the Court
required Position Papers on the issue of whether
w)
the votes of disqualified candidates should be
deducted from the "total votes cast" nationwide.
7. The two rollos of these two consolidated
cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost
all ofthe original party-list participants filed
some repeatedly 'motions, pleas, position pa
pers and so on, which all needed attention. Thus,
the Court had to devote an enormous amount of
time and effort poring over, understanding, and
ruling upon these submissions.
8. In the interest of speedy justice, this
matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution
was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the
Court within weeks after it had received the last
Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.
filfoii
r IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the
winners can truly be made much more expedi
tiously, now that there are precedents to guide
all concerned, especially the Commission on
Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has
the herein base list of 46 qualified parties. For
another, given the lessons and experiences in
these proceedings, it can now more speedily,
more carefully and more prudently pass upon the
qualifications of new candidates. Such process
can even be done in advance under such rules
and regulations it may issue, consistent with the
law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here
and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well
in advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each
bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous
journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind
Philippine-style party-list system, the marginal
ized and under-represented sectors of our country
will be accorded ever-widening opportunities to
participate in nation-building, so that they can
help developin peace and harmonya society
that is just, humane, progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having ob
tained at least two percent ofthe total valid votes
cast in the last party-list elections, the following
qualified participants are DECLARED elected
with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA,
COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE!
PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections
to proclaim upon finality of this Resolution
these winners and their respective nominees, we
hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restrain
ing Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them
only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest
that did not qualify and win.
D. Banat v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay
Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for cer
tiorari and mandamus, assails the Resolution
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commis
sion on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-

L?j!|fiA
041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head ofthe National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny
the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT
filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as
NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution.
m
Issues
si
BANAT brought the following issues before
this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-
list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "quali
gii
fier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b)
of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives
be allocated?
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the
other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, act
ing as National Board of Canvassers, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-
Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle
iMl
of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941
particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First
Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
the "First Party" violates the principle of
ifiiit
proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allo
cation of additional seats, one for the "First
Party" and another for the qualifying parties,
violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
i^j>
fa/
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 93
3. The proportional relationships under
the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941.
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Param
eters" of the.Philippine party-list system as
provided for under tne same case of Veterans
Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elec
tions did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it implemented the First-Party Rule in the alloca
tion of seats to qualified party-list organizations,
the same being merely in consonance with the
ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable
case as the issues involved herein are constitu
tional in nature, involving the correct interpreta
tion and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.
Considering the allegations in the petitions
and the comments ofthe parties in these cases,
we defined the following issues in our advisory
for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-
list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed
in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative
seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major
political parties from participating in the party-
list elections? If not, can the major political par
ties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
The Ruling ofthe Court
The petitions have partial merit. We main
tain that a Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly
stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation
the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty per-
iiiiiaJ
94 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
cent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected
t^ under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have
a seat in the House of Representatives;
^} Third,the three-seat limiteach quali
fied party, regardless ofthe number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitledto a maximum
of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation
the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be.computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes."
However, because the formula in Veterans
has flaws in its mathematical interpretation
of the term "proportional representation," this
Court is compelled to revisit the formula for
ffilil) the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated
by the Constitution
i
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representa
'$$}
tives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of regis
tered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
h$$i
number of representatives including those
f under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Consti
^j tution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as
jjffilj
provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A.
NO. 7941 reads:.
Section 11.Number ofParty-List Repre
sentatives. The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
XXX
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution
states'that the "HouseofRepresentatives shall be
composedof not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The
House of Representatives shall be composed of
district representatives and party-list represen
tatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number ofthe members ofthe House
of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of repre
sentatives. We compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the
number oflegislative districts. On this point, we
do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans,
thus:
Number of seats ^ Number of seats
available to legisla available to party-list
tive districts representatives
x.20 =
!io
This formula allows for the corresponding
increase in the number of seats available for
party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress
of the Philippines has 220 district representar
tives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220 55
x.20 =
.80
ijjjyl
Afterprescribing the ratio ofthe numberof
party-list representatives to the total number
iiiiii of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom of
the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List
Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented
by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
a^) All partiesagree ontheformula to determine
the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as onthe formula
to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent ofthe
total party-list votes. However, there are numer
ous interpretations ofthe provisions ofR.A. No.
7941 on the allocation of "additional seats"
underthe Party-List System. Veterans produced
the First PartyRule, and JusticeVicente V. Men-
doza's dissent in-Veterans presented Germany's
Niemeyer formula as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the deter
mination of the manner of allocating the seats
for party-list representatives. Congress enacted
R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) ofSection
11 and Section 12 of which provide.
Section 11. Number ofParty-List Repre
sentatives. x x x
at) In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and co
alitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number ofvotes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and co
alitionsreceiving at least twopercent(2%) of
SiiJ the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be en
titled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitle'd to not more than
three (3) seats.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 95
Section 12. Procedurein Allocating Seats
for Party-List Representatives. TheCOM
ELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitionson a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list repre
sentatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two
interpretations through three formulas to allo
cate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmo
nizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty percent (20%) ofthe total
Members of the House of Representatives
including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI ofthe
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
7941and Comelec Resolution No.2847dated
25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14thCongress, there
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially
be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) ofthe total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that noparty-listgroups
shall have more than three (3) seats (Section
' 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after
deducting the seats obtained by the party-
list groups under the immediately preced
ing paragraph and after deducting from
their total the votes corresponding to those
seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups
whichhave not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, inac
cordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by
BANAT assumes that the 2% vote require-
 96 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

ment is declared unconstitutional, and ap
portions the seats for party-list representa
tives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
BANATstates that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the par
i^ ties, organizations, or coalitions on a nation
wide basis;
(b) rank them according to the ntfmber
of votes received; and
(c) allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization
or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system,
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the
same results: one is based on' the proportional
percentage ofthe votes received by each party as
is*)
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and
the other is "by makingi;he votes of a party-list
with a median percentage of votes as the divisor
in computing the allocation of seats." Thirty-
four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANATs second interpretation.
%)
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono,
and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula
for systematically preventing all the party-list
seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of
seats alloted for the entire Party-List System.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. Af
ter determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of
a qualified party by the total votes ofall qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a
qualified party is computed by multiplying the
total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the wholeintegers as
the equivalent of the number of seats allocated
to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified
parties are given their seats, a second round of
seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats
on the basis of this ranking are allocated until
all the seats are filled up.
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes
to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 "prescribes
the ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating par
ties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number qf votes garnered during the elections.

pffit

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
ALAGAD 423,149 65 PBA 71,544
COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

^)
sal

ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 97

ffij&l

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO * 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 ANWARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! * 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD t 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAYPARAK 42,282

23

ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

24

ALIF" 217,822 72 SB 34,835

25

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

27'.

VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

28

188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

29 ANAD

BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

30

ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

31

BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

32

ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

33
&&)
1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
34

162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

35 TUCP
155,920 83 SM 20,744
36 COCOFED
iii
146,032 84 AG 16,916
37 AGHAM
141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
38 ANAK

ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

39

119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

40 PM

110,769 88 ATS 14,161

41 AVE
}$fy) 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
42 SUARA

110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

43 ASSALAM

107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

44 DIWA

99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

45 ANC

97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

46 SANLAKAS

90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

47 ABC

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
^ 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system
^J
shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table
2 below, weuse the first 20 party-hst candidates
for illustration purposes. The percentage ofvotes
garnered by each partyis arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by eachparty by
15,950,900, the totalnumber ofvotes cast for all
party-list candidates.

iaj

ifej
 98 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Table 2.. The first 20 party-list candidates two percent threshold for the distribution of th-
and their respective percentage ofvotes garnered additional seats as found in the second clause o
over the total votes for the party-list. Section 11(b) of R.A. No: 7941 is unconstitu

Votes Garnered over

Rank Party Votes Garnered Total Votes for Party- Guaranteed Seat
List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

iS)
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% i

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 ATEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN .466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS 385,810 1 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32%
|:pj
* 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 * 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 ANWARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89%
S^ttfl 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

i&) From Table 2 above, we see that only 17
party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list can
jgfr didates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or
the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates
that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guar
anteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation,
we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b)of R.A. No.
7941 provides that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) ofthe votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." This is where petitioners'
and intervenors' problem with the formula in
Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be
in proportion to the votes ofthe first party.
This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation ofthe
tional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossibleto
achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of
the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-
list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party-list elec
tions. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.
Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all
get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of
the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if
we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
 ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 99

even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
{ffij
We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attain
ment ofthe broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
lifiiig
observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
^i based on the number of votes they garnered dur
ing the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coali
^j tions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
I 3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in propor
jjfflftJ
tion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
In computing the additional seats, the guar
anteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat
each, to every tworpercenter. Thus, the remain
ing available seats for allocation as "additional
seats" are the-maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by divid
ing the number of votes garnered by each party
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps
in the second round of seat allocation. First,
the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference be
tween the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats
of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party's share in
the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next
in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled. Thus:

4. Each party, organization, or coalition Table 3. Distribution ofAvailable Party-List

shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Seats

Votes (B) plus Applying

Guaranteed Additional
Garnered (C), in the three
Seat Seats
over whole seat cap
integers
Total Votes
Votes Gar
Rank Party for Party
nered
List, in %
(First Round) (Second
Round)!

(B) (C) (D) (E)

(A)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 RA.

imi
 100 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1.1'J 2 NA.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1.1]I 2 RA.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1.0]L 2 NA.
9 COOP-NATC- 409,883 2.57% 2 N.A.
CO
Lj
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 2 NA
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 2 NA
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 2 NA
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 2 NA.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 2 NA.
!5 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 2 NA. ..
^1 16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 2 NA
17 ANWARAY 321,503 2.02% 2 NA
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 NA.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 NA
p$
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 RA
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% * 0 NA.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 NA
23 KABATAAR 228,637 1.43% 0 NA.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 NA.
25 ALIF 217,522 1.37% 0 NA.
26 SENIOR CITI 213,058 1.34% 0 NA.
^jjl
ZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 NA.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 NA.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 NA.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 NA.
3t ANGKASANG- 170,53.1 1.07% 0 NA.
GA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 NA.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% ' 0 NA.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 NA.
|$j 35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 NA.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 NA.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as
illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-
$$\ list representatives from the 36 winning party-
list organizations. All 55 available party-list
seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to
the parties with sufficient number ofvotes for one
whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation ofMajor Political Parties
in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a
multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elec
tions. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just
want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party-list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system, x x x
We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors
to be there. That is why one ofthe ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the num
ber of representatives from any single
party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party-iist system, x x x.
lis*)
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
XXX
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the
ip) candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited
to political parties. My question is this: Are
we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party-list
concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
i^i
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that
query, I think these parties that the Com
missioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Repre
sentatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the
Christian Democrats can field district can
didates and can also participate in the party
iiii|W) list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When
they come to the party list system, they
ij^fr} will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on
that? Can UNIDO participate in the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For
as long as they field candidates who
t&Sj come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Ta-
iiada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tafiada
would not qualify.
&fl
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field
candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Mon-
sod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
%^ parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to partici
Hgjj)
101
pate in the party list election ifthey can
prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner
is saying is that all political parties can par
ticipate because it imprecisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the
broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Com
missioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin,
pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector.
Lalamuriin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin
itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon
kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under
this system, would UNIDO be banned from
running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said,
UNIDO may field sectoral candidates.
On that condition alone, UNIDO may
be allowed to register for the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Com
missioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang
UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this
will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason
why they should not be able to make com
mon goals with mass organizations so that
the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of
mass organizations. And if this is true
the administration parties, this will betrue
iiiiiiii
102 CONSTTTUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
fylffi
of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is
now being formed. There is no question that
they will be attractive to many mass orga
nizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to
contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties
can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will
challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And
the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is
ijjiiiJ
understood that the parties will enter in the
roll ofthe COMELEC the names of represen
tatives of mass organizations affiliated with
them. So that we may, in time, develop this
excellent system that they have in Europe
where labor organizations and cooperatives,
. for example, distribute themselves either in
the Social Democratic Party and the Chris
tian Democratic Party in Germany, and their
very presence there has a transforming effect
upon the philosophies and the leadership of
those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that
in the United States, the AFL-CIO always
vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that
M
there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine,
reenforce, influence and interact with each
''ftSfl
other so that the very objectives that we set
in this Constitution for sectoral representa
tion are achieved in a wider, more lasting,
and more institutionalized way. Therefore,
I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amend
ment. It installs sectoral representation as
a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty
of being elected representatives later on
through a party list system; and even be
yond that, to become actual political parties
capable of contesting political power in the
wider constitutional arena for major politi
cal parties.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the
iaij(ft concepts put forward by the Constitutional Com
mission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
'afi
Definition of Terms, (a) The party-list
system is a mechanisHLof proportional repre
sentation in the election ofrepresentatives to
the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereofregistered with the Com
mission on Elections (COMELEC). Compo
nent parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-hst system.
(b) A party means either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an orga
nized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constitu
ency is spread over the geographical terri
tory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an orga
nized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a
group of citizens or a coalition of groups
of citizens who share similar physical at
tributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation
of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the
three-seat cap to prevent any party from domi
nating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participat
ing in the party-list system. On the contrary, the

M
framers ofthe Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list
aiit elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members ofthe Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, arid
in the alternative the reservation of the party-
list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections
as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
mi
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties
I^J in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
ti'ml
judicially legislate the exclusion of major politi
cal parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
^>
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the de
liberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed
to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example,
the Liberal Party participates in the party-list
election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize,
or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors.
To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party
can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing
can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for
the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are
prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
fev^i
Qualifications ofParty-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born
citizen ofthe Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately pre
ceding the day of the elections, able to read
:V(jii
and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 103
In case of a nominee ofthe youth sector,
he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral rep
resentative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term sjiall be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not
necessary that the party-list organization's
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and in
firmity" as there is no financial status required
in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk,
he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be
a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allo
cation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Rep
resentatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-
list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-hst
representatives cannot be more than 20% ofthe
members ofthe House of Representatives. How
ever, we cannot allow the continued existence
of a provision in the law which will systemati
cally prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections. Seats for party-hst representatives
shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided
to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major politi
cal parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
 104 CQNSTTTUTlbNAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OFGOVERNMENT
|*tfj
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.
FORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the peti
tion. We SET ASIDE the Resolution ofthe COM
ELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007
in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional
the two percent threshold in the distribution
of additional party-hst seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System
shall be in accordance with the procedure used
in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties
areodisallowed from participating in party-list
elections. This Decision is immediately execu
tory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. Apportionment.
The underlying principle behind the rule
for apportionment is the concept of equality
of representation which is a basic principle of
republicanism. One man's vote should carry as
much weight as the vote of every other man.
Each province, irrespective of population,
is entitled to one representative; each city with
a population of at least 250,000 is entitled to at
least one representative.
"Gerrymandering," which is the formation of
one legislative district out of separate territories
for the purpose offavoring a candidate or a party,
t^j is not allowed. The Constitution says that each
district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory."
A. Tobias v. Abalos
G.R. No. L-114783, December 8,1994
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as
residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality ofMandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City ofMan
daluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed stat
ute, the municipalities ofMandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
iS}
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congres
sional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A.
No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675
into law on February 9,1994.
Pursuant to the Local -Government Code of
1991,a plebiscite was held on April 10,1994. The
people ofMandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipahty
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% ofthe voting popula
tion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, con
tending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for
being violative of three specific provisions ofthe
Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainder of
the former legislative district of San Juan/
Mandaluyong shall become the new legisla
tive district of San Juan with its first repre
sentative to be elected'at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
ihe "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in
Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Con
gress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the
assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted
in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion ofMandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division ofthe
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second afor-
estated subject is not germane to the subject

matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats
of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the
law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a sub
ject distinct from that stated in the title of the
law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections
&Y&{
involve Article VI, Section 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives
iii
shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless other
wise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Ma
nila area in accordance with the number of
L their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
SJ
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in
this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San
&&j
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congres
sional districts under Section 49 of the assailed
law has resulted in an increase in the composi
tion ofthe House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) ofthe Constitu
tion. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec.
5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the ob
servation ofthe Solicitor General that the statu
tory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 105
two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
comphance with the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution:
... Each city with a population of at least
two hundredfifty thousand, oreach province,
shall have at least one representative" (Ar
ticle VI, Section 5[3], Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the afores-
tated constitutional mandate that the creation
of a separate congressional district for the City
of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the cre
ation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logi
cal consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title oOLA. No. 7675.
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Manda
luyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Manda
luyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one
title-one subject" rule has been invariably ad
opted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. It should be suf
ficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction ofthe "one title-one .
subject" rule had been further elucidated in Li-
dasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit;
"Of course, the Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the na-
 106 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
MS
ture, scopeand consequences ofthe proposed
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
SJ
Proceeding now to the other constitutional is
sues raised by petitioners to the effect that there
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to
strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Actenjoysthe presumption ofhaving passed
Saatl
through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At
Mt
any rate, it is not required that all laws emanat
ingfrom the legislature must containall relevant
data considered by Congress in the enactment
of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law
violates the present limit on the number of rep
resentatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the pres
ent limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import ofthe latter clause
is that the present composition of Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
iiiiJ
increase in congressional representation man
dated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence ofproof that Mandaluy
ong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate
legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said ar
gument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlookthe glaring fact that it was Congress it
self which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a
right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to
R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further argu
ments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San
Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved
a change in their legislative district. The conten
tion is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The
matter of separate district representation was
only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of
San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument
that the subject law has resulted in "gerryman
dering," which is the practice of creating legisla
tive districts to favor a particular candidate or
party", is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be
noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative
of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By
dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favor
able to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
MISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
B*. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections
G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7859 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into
a HighlyUrbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati."
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for
prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed
by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Abang, Valentina. Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is
a resident of Makati. The others are residents
of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing
as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional

Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not
properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 ofR.A. No. 7854attempts
to alter or restart the "three-consecutive
p&i
term" limit for local elective officials, in vio
lation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is uncon
stitutional for:
(a), it increased the legislative dis
trict of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation ofthe constitutional
provision requiring a general reappor
asafei tionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the re
turn of every census;
jsjpl (b) the increase in legislative district
was not expressed in the title ofthe bill;
and
(c) the addition of another legisla
tive district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5(3), as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000."
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner
iliij
John H. Osmefia as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails Section
52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on
the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No.
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 de
lineated the land area of the proposed city of
Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Mu
nicipality of Makati shall be converted into a
i^lfyf
highly urbanized city tobe known as the City
ofMak;ati, hereinafter referred toas the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 107
the Municipality ofMakati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
bounded onthe northeast byPasigRiver and
beyond by the CityofMandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by
the municipalities^ Pateros and Taguig; on
the southwest by the Cityof Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and the northwest,
by the City of Manila.
The.foregoing provision shall be without
prejudice to the resolution by the appropri
ate agency or forum of existing boundary
disputes or cases involving questions of
territorial jurisdiction between the City of
Makati and the adjoining local government
units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that
this delineation violates Sections 7 and 450 ofthe
Local Government Codewhich require that the
area of a local government unit should be made
bymetesand bounds, withtechnical descriptions.
The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of
its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits
ofits acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local govern
ment units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
sought to be avoided by the local government unit
requiring that the land area of local government
unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.
Given the facts ofthe cases at bench, we can
not perceive how this evil can be brought about
7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation ofthe land area ofthe proposed City
of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundar
ies. Wenote that said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered
by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot be
any cleared, Section 2 stated that the city's land
 108 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Sx&l
area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that
there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by
Ml
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854,
the territorial dispute between the municipalities
of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out ofa becomingsense of
respect to a co-equal department ofgovernment,
the legislations felt that the dispute shouldbeleft
to the courts to decide. They did not want to fore
closethe dispute by making a legislative finding
of fact which could decide the issue. This would
have ensued if they denned the land area of the
proposed cityby its exact metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. We take judicial notice of
gjjifti the fact that Congress has also refrained from
using the metes and bounds description ofland
areas of other local government units with un
settled boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a boundary
dispute does not per se present an unsurmount-
able difficulty which will prevent Congress form
defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of as local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the exist
ml
ing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati
but as an act of fairness, made them subject to
the ultimate resolution by the courts. Consider
ing these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of
the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil
that the requirement stated therein, viz: 'the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions' was
sM
made in order to provide a means by which
the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement
i&&! on metes and bounds was meant merely as
tool in the establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to
common boundaries with neighboring mu
L
nicipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind
the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that
laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to
those appearing in Torrens titles, as petition
ers seem to imply. To require such descrip
tion in the law as a condition sine qua non
for its validity would be to defeat the very
purpose which the Local Government Code
seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
Code is to empower local government units
and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive
to the needs of their constituents while at
the same time serving as a vital cog No. 7854
on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve
the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code.
It then becomes a case of a master serving
the slave, instead of the other way around.
This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws
must be enforced when ascertained, although
it may not be consistent with the strict let
ter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent ofthe legislature
or wjould otherwise yield conclusions incon
sistent with the general purpose of the act
(Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Tafiada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active in
strument of government which, for purposes
ofinterpretation, means that laws have ends
to achieve, and statutes should be so con
strued as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72
SCRA520).The same rule must indubitably
apply to the case at bar.
Ill
Finally, petitioners in two (2)cases at bench
assail the constitutionality of Section 52, Article
X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter
provides:
"Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its
conversion into a highly-urbanized city,

Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act
No. 7166 as implemented by the Commis
sion on Elections to commence at the next
national elections to be held after the ef-
fectivity ofthis Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmarinas, and Forbes shall
bewiththe first district, in lieuofBarangay
Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of
the second district." (underscoring supplied)
They, contend that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
for: (1) reapportionment cannot made bya special
iMI
law;(2) the addition ofa legislativedistrict is not
expressedin the title ofthe bill;and (3) Makati's
population, as perthe 1990 census, standsat only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the
recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.11 In said case,
$$}
weruled that reapportionment oflegislative dis
tricts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution
clearly provides that Congress shall be com
Bi
posed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unlessotherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Con
:Hii gress from increasing its membership bypassing
a law,other than a general reapportionmentlaw.
This is exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an in
una
crease in Makati's legislative district. Moreover,
to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a
a> review of all the legislative districts allotted to
each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitablesituation wherea newcity
or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. That intolerable situation will
deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle oftheir sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It mustbeforever whole orit is notsovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not in ac
7,G.R. No. 114783, December8,1994.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 109
cord with Section 5(3); Article VI ofthe Constitu
tion for as ofthe latest survey (1990 census) the
population ofMakati stands atonly four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). Said Section provides
inter aha, thatacity with apopulation ofat least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have
at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000)
its legislative district may still be increased'since
ithas met the minimum population requirement
oftwo hundred fifty thousand (250,000). Infact
Section 3of the Ordinance appended to the Con
stitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least
one congressional representative.12
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners'
contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been
expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiter
ated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, the
Constitution does, not command that the title
of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence,'we
ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject andall the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
TOSec. 3. provides: "Any province that may hereafterbe
created, oranycitywhose population may hereafter increase
to morethan two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member
or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis ofthe number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph(3),Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the
provinceout of which such new provincewas created or where
thecity, whose population hasso increased, isgeographically
located shallbe correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within
one hundred, and twenty days before the election."
M
110 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
C. Montejo v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 118702, March 16,1995
PUNO.J.:
'd$&l
More than political fortunes are at stake in
the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Monte
jo,representing the First District ofLeyte, pleads
for the anriulment of Section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representa
tion. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner
seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosafrom
his.district to the Second District of the province.
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the
Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion
of Tolosa in his district. We gave.due course to the
petition considering that, at bottom, it involves
liiiiij the validity of the unprecedented exerciseby the
COMELEC of the legislative power of redistrict
ing and reapportionment.
liiiijfl)
We find Section 1 ofResolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a
significant issue, our first inquiry will relate
to the constitutional power of the respondent
COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one
legislativedistrict to another legislativedistrict
in the province of Leyte. The. basic powers of
respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and admin
^)
istrator of our election laws, are spelled out in
black and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC
does not invoke this provision but relies on the
iiiiii3
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting which
is traditionally regarded as part of the power to
make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportion
ing the Seats of the House of Representatives of
the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
g^
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and
the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive
sections state:
"SECTION 1. For purposes of the election
&j|fri
of Members of the House ofRepresentatives
of the First Congress of the Philippines un
der the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent
elections, and until otherwise provided by
law, the Members thereof shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila Area as follows:
XXX XXX XXX
"SECTION 2. The Commission on Elec
tions is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments cf the reapportionment herein
made.
"SECTION 3. Any province that may
hereafter he created, or any city whose popu
lation may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Mem
bers as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according
to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population
has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjust
ment shall not be made within one hundred
and twenty days before the election." (Em
phasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because
Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C.
Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the
Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised legisla
tive powers under the Provisional Constitution.
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork
of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
now a distinguished member of this Court. The
records reveal that the Constitutional Commis
sion had to resolve several prejudicial issues be
fore authorizing the first congressional elections
under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital
issues were: whether the members of the House
of Representatives would be elected by district
or by province; who shall undertake the appor
tionment ofthe legislative districts; and, howthe
apportionment should be made.73 Commissioner
"Record ofConstitutional Commission, October 9,1986
session, p. 686.
&fei
Davide, Jr., offered three (3)options for the Com
mission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino
to dothe apportionment by law; (2)empowerthe
COMELEC tomakethe apportionment; or (3) let
the Commission exercisethe powerby wayofan
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The dif
ferent dimensions of the options were discussed
by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino
and Bias F. Ople.74...
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission
denied to the COMELEC the major power ofleg
islative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empow
Iffi^
ered the COMELEC "tomake minor adjustments
of the reapportionment herein made." The mean
ing ofthe phrase "minoradjustments"was again
clarifiedin the debates ofthe Commission, viz.:75
&mJ
"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
"I was about to ask the committee the
meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a district
be transferred to another district and call it
a minor adjustment?
"MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done,
Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that
there should be no change in the allocations
per district. However, it may happen that we
l^j
have forgotten a municipality in between,
which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the
correct name of a particular municipality
because of changes made by the interim
Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Ba-
tasang Pambansa. There were many batas
pambansa enacted by both the interim and
the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing
the names of municipalities.
"MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor ad
justment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the or
dinance appended to, and it will be up for
the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such
municipality to a certain district.
&&} "Ibid, pp. 692-694, 700.
"Records of Constitution Commission, Session of Octo
ber 13, 1986, pp. 950-951.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ill
"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. PresidingOffi
cer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division ofa municipality by the
interim BatasangPambansa or the Regular
BatasangPambansaintotwo municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and the new
municipality, but still actually these are
within the geographical district area.
"MR. DE CASTRO. Sothe minoradjust
ment which the COMELEC cannot do is
that; if, for example, my municipality is in
the First District ofLaguna,they cannotput
that in any other district.
"MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor
correction. It is a substantive one.
"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Or
dinance did not also give the respondent COM
ELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district.
The powergranted by Section3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members
(not municipalities) "apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was created ..."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold
that respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of juris
diction when it promulgated Section 1 of its
Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipal
ity of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District
to the Third District of Leyte:
D. Bagabuyo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371
converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro
as a local government unit, and does not merely
provide for the City's legislative apportionment.
This argument essentially proceeds from a mis
understanding of the constitutional concepts of
apportionment of legislative districts and divi
sion of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by
Black's Law Dictionary as the determination
 112 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
of the number of representatives which a State,
&ffi\ county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in
a legislative body in proportion to the popula
tion; the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalizepopulation and votingpower among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is
the realignment orchange in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.
Separately from the legislativedistricts that
legalapportionment or reapportionment speaks
of, are the local government units (historically
and generically referredto as "municipal corpora
tions") that the Constitution itself classified into
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has
been defined as "a body politic and corporate con
stituted bythe incorporation ofthe inhabitants of
a cityor townforthe purposeoflocal government
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition
or alteration of boundary of local government
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities,
^)
and barangays, are covered by the Article on
Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this
Article provides: / concern is the commencement, the termination,
No province, city, municipality, or 6a-
rangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially al
^ tered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit
$j<^
directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article
X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the'authority
to act has been vested in the Legislature. The
Legislature undertakes the apportionment and
reapportionment of legislative districts, and
likewise acts on local government units by set
ting the standards for their creation, division,
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries
and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
abolishing local government units and altering
their boundaries through legislation. Other than
this, not much commonality exists between the
jiij two provisions since they fire inherently differ
entalthough they interface and relate with one
another.
jil|r
The concern that leaps from the text of
Article VI, Section 5 is political representation
and the means to make a legislative district
sufficiently represented so that the people can
be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim
of legislative apportionment is "to equalize
population and voting power among districts."
Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
peoplerepresented; the uniform and progressive
ratio to be observed among the representative
districts; and accessibility and commonality of
interests in terms of each district being, as far
as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent
territory. In terms of the people represented,
every citywith at least 250,000people and every
province (irrespective of population) is entitled
to one representative. In this sense, legislative
districts, on the one hand, and provinces and
cities, on the other, relate and interface with
each other. To ensure continued adherence to
the required standards ofapportionment, Section
5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as
soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation
objective ofArticle VI, Section 5, Article X, Sec
tion 10 expressly speaks of how local government
units may be "created, divided, merged, abol
ished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its
and the modification of local government units'
corporateexistence and territorial coverage; and
it speaks of two specific standards that must be
observedin implementing this concern, namely,
the criteria established in the local government
code and the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income,
population and land area are specified as verifi
able indicators ofviability and capacity to provide
services. The division or merger of existing units
must comply with the same requirements (since
a new local government unit will come into be
ing), provided that a division shall not reduce
the income, population, or land area of the unit
affected to less than the minimum requirement
prescribed in the Code.
A pronounced distinction between Article
VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement ofa plebiscite. The Constitutionand
the Local Government Code expressly require
a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
ftiflp
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a
local government unit. Incontrast, noplebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision. ...
SEC. 6. NO PERSON SHALL BE A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE
SENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-
BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND,ONTHE DAY OFTHE ELECTION, IS
AT LEASTTWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE,
ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND EXCEPT
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES, A
iifti
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT
IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND
A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD
OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMME
DIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION.
1. Qualifications of District Representa
tives.
A district representative must be a natural
born citizen ofthe Philippines, a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident of that district for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day
Vi
of the election. Aparty-list representative must
possess the same qualifications except for the
requirement of being a resident of a district for
^) at leastone yearimmediately preceding the elec
tion. This is because a party-list representative
does not represent a district.
ji^ "Natural-born citizens are those who are citi
zens ofthe Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Sj
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philip
pine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 [of Article IV] shall be deemed
natural-born citizens."76 When the second sen- '
.tence ofSection 4,Article IV, wasbeingdiscussed
bytheConstitutional Commission, one objection
to it was that it would allow citizensby election
to qualify for constitutional positions reserved
for natural-born citizens. The new provision
wasnonetheless accepted on the understanding
that, if desired, the distinction between different
igj
kinds of natural-born citizens could be made for
purposes of qualifying for constitutional offices
when qualification for these offices come up for
'"Article IV, Section 2.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 113
discussion.77 When these offices, however, were
discussed, no distinction was made. Hence, even
citizens byelection who aredeemed tobe natural-
born citizens satisfy thecitizenship qualification
for representatives-(as well as for Senators,
President, and Vice-President).78
The age qualification is the same asthe age
qualification for representatives under the 1935
Constitution andfor Batasanmembers under the
1973 Constitution twentyfive years.79
A representative must not only be a quali
fied elector, buthemust actually be "a registered
voter."
As to the residence requirement, the mean
ingofresidence as found in the election lawunder
the 1935 Constitution has been retained:
The term "residence" as used in the
election lawis synonymous with "domicile,"
whichimports not onlyintention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place coupled with conduct indicative
ofsuch intention (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil.
645). In ordertoacquire a domicile bychoice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an inten
tion to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words,
there must be an animus non revertendi and
an animus manendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time. The acts of the
person must conform with this purpose .. .80
Such residence, according to Faypon v.
Quirino,61 is not necessarily lost even through
prolonged absence:
"I RECORD 355, 369.
78This expanded meaning ofnatural-born citizenship is
nota novel idea.The 1971 Constitutional Convention, which
first formulated the definitionofa natural born citizenas one
who isa citizen from birthwithout having toperform anyact
to acquire or perfect his citizenship, actingas the sole judge
ofthe qualifications ofthe delegates to the Convention, voted
to consider Delegate Ernesto G. Ang a natural borncitizen
and therefore qualified to be a delegate in spite of the fact
that DelegateAng was a citizen by electionunder the 1935
Constitution.
79A reduction of the age qualification to twenty-one
was approved on October 12, 1972, only to be raised later
to twenty-five.
^Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 455-6 (1941).
8I96 Phil. 294, 299 (1954).
 114 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
H)
A citizen may leave the place of his birth
to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course
includes study in other places, practice ofhis
avocation, or engaging in business ...
Sal
The definition of residence given above, when
written by the Court, had reference to residence
as a requirement for suffrage. The same concept
was used for residence as a qualification for
representatives in the 1935 Constitutionand in
the 1973 Constitution. A proposal to make actual
physical residence a requirementwasrejected by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.82
The qualifications must be possessed on the
day of the election.83
Thequalifications ofa sectoral representative
were not explicitlydiscussed by the Commission.
L Since, however, sectoral representatives are,
for a limited period, meant to take the place of
party-list representatives and are a prelude to
fullimplementationofthe party-list system,they
should have the same qualifications as party-list
representatives.
^iij 2. Qualifications of Party-list Representa
tives.
In Bagong Bayani, supra, the majority also
ruled that party-list nominees ")riustrepresent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors."
This means that nominees who do not have this
ideological quality (whichincidentallyis not eas
ilyproved or disproved), they are not qualified to
be members of the House of Representatives as
party-list representatives. But nosuchideologi
calrequirementis found in Section 6 ofArticle VI
which enumerates the qualifications of a member
of the House of Representatives. According to
Section 6, the only difference in qualifications
between district representatives and party-list
representatives is that a party-hstrepresentative
does not represent a district and therefore need
m
not have resided in a single district for at least
one year immediately preceding the election.
In fact, neither does R.A. No. 7941 prescribe an
ideological qualification:
"Sessions of July 23, 1972 and October 12, 1972; II
RECORD 87 (1986).
^Compare with Espinosa v. Aquino, Jr., Senate Electoral
Tribunal, Electoral Case No. 9, January 15, 1969.
i^
SECTION 9. Qualifications ofParty-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philip
pines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bonafide
member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector,
he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral represen
tative who attains the age of thirty (30) dur
ing his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.
3. Residence qualification: Cases.
A. Gallego v. Verra
G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941
OZAETA, J.:
This case is before us on petition for certiorari
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte,whichdeclaredillegal the petitioner's elec
tion to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog,
Leyte,in the general electionsofDecember,1940,
on the ground that, he did not have the residence
qualification ... Respondent Vicente Verra (pe
titioner below) was the unsuccessful opponent of
the petitioner Pedro Gallego, who was declared
electedby the municipal board ofcanvassers with
a majority of nearly 800 votes.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals may be briefly
stated as follows:
Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog,
Leyte. After studying in the Catarman Ag
ricultural School in the province of Samar,
he was employed as a school teacher in the
municipality of Catarman, Samar, as well
as in the municipalities of Burawon, Dulag,
and Abuyog, province of Leyte, and school
teacher ofAbuyog, Leyte, and presented his
taii
candidacy for municipal mayor of his home
town, but was defeated. After his defeat in
that election, finding himself in debt and un
employed, he went to Mindanao in search of
a job. Hefirst wentto OrientalMisamis, but
findingno workthere he proceeded to the si-
tio ofKaato-an, municipality ofMalaybalay,
Bukidnon, whereat he arrived on June 20,
1938, and immediately found employment
as nurseryman in the chichona plantation
ofthe Bureau ofForestry. OnJuly 30ofthe
same year he returned to Abuyogbecause he
had been offered an employmentas teacher
in the public school of the barrio ofUnion,
municipality of ogod, Leyte; but as he did
not accept the offer he returned to Kaato-an
onAugust 23,1938, andresumed hisemploy
ment there as nurseryman of the Bureau of
Forestry. He stayed in the chinchona plan
(Mi tation until he resigned in September 1940.
But during the period ofhis stay, there, his
wife and children remained in Abuyog, and
he visited themin the month ofAugust ofthe
years 1938, and 1940. Altho the Government
offered him a free house in the chinchona
plantation, he never took his family there.
iii Neither, did he avail himself of the offer of
the Government of a parcel of the hectares of
land within the reservation of the chinchona
^1
plantation. Heandhis wife own realproperty
in Abuyog, part ofwhich he acquired during
his stay in Malaybalay.
ijgg) Nevertheless, On October 1, 1938 he
registered himself as an elector in precinct
No. 14 of Lantapan, municipality of Ma
laybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in the
election for assemblymen held in December,
1938. The trial court noted that in his voter's
affidavit (exhibit B) he did not fill the blank
%ffi) space corresponding to the length of time he
had residedin Malaybalay. On January 20,
1940, he obtained and paid for his residence
certificate from the municipal treasurer of
&&i
Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated
that he had resided in said municipality for
one year and a half.
iaJ
Based upon the facts stated in the next pre
ceding paragraph, namely, (1) registration as a
voter, (2) his having actually voted in Malaybalay
in the 1938 election for assemblymen, and (3)
his residence certificate for 1940, the trial Court
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT' 115
of Appeals declared that the herein petitioner
Pedro Gallego hadacquired a residence ordomi
cile of origin inthe municipality of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile oforigin in
the municipality ofAbuyog, Leyte, at the time
he was elected mayoriof the latter municipality,
and, that, therefore, his election wasvoid ...
In this Court the petitioner assigns the fol
lowing errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in hold
ing that the petitioner Pedro Gallego was
a legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidon,
and not of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time of his
election as municipal mayor of the latter
municipality on December 10, 1940.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in af
firming the decision ofthe trial court holding
the election of Pedro Gallego to the office of
municipal mayorofAbuyog, Leyte, null and
void and ordering the exclusion ofGallego
from the office to which he was elected.
The only question presented is .whether or
not Pedro Gallego had been resident ofAbuyog
for at leastone year priorto December 10, 1940.
That question may be approached from either of
two angles: Did he lose his domicile in Abuyog
by the mere fact that he worked in Malaybalay
as a government employee, registered himself
as a voter and voted there in the election for
assemblymen in December, 1938, and secured
hisresidence certificate therefor theyear 1940;
and assuming that he did, had he reacquired
his domicile oforigin at least one year prior to
his election as mayor of Abuyog on December
10, 1040?
The term "residence" as used in the elec
tion law is synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such inten
tion (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new local
ity, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must be an animus non revertendi
and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time. The acts of the person
 116 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
must conform with his purpose. The change of
residence must be voluntary; the residence at
the place chosen for the domicile mustbe actual;
and to the fact of residence there must be added
the animus manendi. (17 am. Jur., Section 16,
pages 599-601.)
In the light of these principles, we are per
suaded that the facts of this case weigh heavily
against the theory that the petitioner had lost
his residence or domicile in Abuyog. We believe,
he did not reside in Malaybalay with the inten
tion of remaining there indefinitely and of not
returning to Abuyog. He is a native of Abuyog.
Notwithstanding his periodic absences from
thereprevious to 1937, whenhe was employed as
ig*i teacher in Samar, Agusan, and other municipali
ties of Leyte, he always returned there. In the
year 1937 he resigned as a school teacher and
presented his candidacy for the office of mayor
of said municipality. His departure therefrom
after his defeat in that election was temporary
and onlyfor purpose of looking for employment
MiaJ
to make up for the financial drawback he had
suffered as*a result of his defeat at the polls.
After he had found employment in Malaybalay,
he did take his wife and children thereto. He
bought the offer of a free house by the govern
ment. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and
did not avail himself of the offer of the Govern
ment often hectares of land within the chichona
reservation in Malaybalay, where he worked as
a nurseryman. During the short period ofabout
(0 two years he stayed in Malaybalay as a govern
mentemployee, he visitedhis home town andhis
family no lessthan threetimes notwithstanding
the great distancebetween the two places.
jjp)
The facts of his case are more analogous
to those of Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36),
'jjfl Yra vs. Aba'o (52 Phil., 380), and Vivero vs.
Murillo (52 Phil., 694) than to those of Nu-
val vs. Guray (52 Phil., 645) and Tanseco vs.
Arteche (57 Phil., 227) which were followed
herein by the Court ofAppeals. In the Teves
case this Court, in reversing the judgment
of the trial court, among other things said:
In this case the respondent-appellant,
Pedro Teves, from the year 1904has had his
own house in the municipality of Dumaguete,
Hei Oriental Negros, wherein he has constantly
been living with his family and he has never
had any house in which he lived either alone
or with his family in the municipality of Ba
cong of said province. All that he has done
in the latter municipality was to register as
elector in 1919, through an affidavit stating
that he was a resident of said municipality;
run for representative "for the second district
of the province of Oriental Negros and vote
in said municipality in said year; run again
for reelection in the year 1922; launch his
0 candidacyfor member ofthe provincialboard
of said province 1925, stating under oath in
all his certificates of candidacy that he was
a resident of said municipality of Bacong.
The affidavit made by him upon register
ingas elector in the municipality ofBacong in
tjie year1919, statingthat hewas a resident
of said municipality; his two certificates of
candidacy for the office ofrepresentative for
the second district of the Province of Oriental
Negros, which were filed, the former in the
year 1919 and the latter in the year 1922.
and the certificate of candidacy for the office
of member of the provincial board filed by
him in the year 1925 in every one of which
he stated that he was a resident of the mu
nicipality of Bacong, are at most a prima
facie evidence of the fact of his residence in
the municipality ofBacong, whichis required
by law in order that the corresponding of
ficials could register him as an elector and
candidate, and not conclusive, and may be
attacked in a corresponding judicial proceed
ing. If, according to the ruling laid down in
the case of Vivero vs. Maurillo cited above,
mereregistration in a municipality in order
to be an elector therein does not make one
a resident of said municipality; if, according
to constant rulings the word "residence" is
synonymous with "home" or "domicile" and
denotes a permanentdwelling place, towhich
an absent person intends to return; if the
right to vote in a municipality requires the
concurrence of two things, the act of resid
ing coupled with the intention to do so; and
if the herein respondent-appellant, Pedro
Teves, has alwayslivedwith his familyin the
municipality ofDumaguete and neverin that
ofBacong, he has neverlost his residence in
Dumaguete. The fact that his registration
as elector in the municipality of Bacong was
jfjftjtyi
L ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ' 117
cancelled only on April 5,1934, upon his peti
tion, did not disqualify him to be a candidate
^i
for the office of municipal president of said
municipality of Dumaguete on the ground
that, as has been stated in the case of Yra vs.
Aba'o cited above, registration in the list of
voters is not one of the conditions prescribed
by Section 431 of the Election Law in order to
be an elector; neither doesfailure to register
&J
as such constitute one of the disqualifications
prescribed in Section 432 of said law. (61
Phil. 36, 39-41.)
L Applying the foregoing pronouncements to
the facts ofpresent case, wefind sufficientground
forthe revocationofthe judgment appealedfrom.
]Mi&
Petitioneralsocontendsthat evenassumingthat
he had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog,
he reacquired it more than one year prior to De
iavjjili cember 10, 1940. In support of that contention
he invokes his letter or note, exhibit 9, addressed
to "Varel" (Valeriano Tupa), vice-president of
the political faction to which petitioner belongs,
in which note he announced his intention to
launch his candidacy again for municipal mayor
of Abuyog as early as the month of May, 1939.
But we do not deem it necessary to pass upon
said contention in view of the conclusion we
have reached that the petitioner did not lose his
domicile of origin.
^)
We might add that the manifest intent of the
law in fixing a residence qualification is to ex
Lui clude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with
the conditions and needs ofa community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office
to serve that community; and when the evidence
on the alleged lack of residence qualification is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as
in the instant case, that the purpose of the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the right
to the office, the will of the electorate should
be respected. Petitioner is a native of Abuyog,
had run for the same office of municipal mayor
of said town in the election preceding the one
in question, had only been absent therefrom
L for about two years without losing contact with
his townspeople and without intention of re
maining and residing indefinitely in the place
of his employment; and he was elected with an
ka
overwhelming majority of nearly 800 votes in a
third-class municipality. These considerations
tSJ
we cannot disregard without doing violence to
the will of the people of said town.
Wherefore, the judgment ofthe court ofap
peals is reversed, with the costs of this instance
against the respondent. So ordered.
B. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
G.R. No. 119976, September 18,1995
KAPUNAN,*/.:
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed
her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative ofthe First DistrictofLeyte with
the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in
item no. 8:
RESIDENCEJN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMME
DIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
Years and seven Months
On March 23, 19995, private respondent
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representa
tive ofthe First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancel
lation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency.
In his petition, private respondent contended
that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one
year residency requirement for candidates to
the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 and in her Certificate of
Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued
declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
the certificate of candidacy."
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certifi
cate. On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[TJhis office cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that it is filed out of time, the
deadline for the filing of the same having
 118 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
already lapsed on March 20,1995. The Cor
rected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
igi
should have been filed on or before the March
20,1995 deadline.
Consequently,petitioner filed the Amended/
Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intrarnuros, Ma
nila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
:Kpi respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In saidAnswer, petitioner averredthat the
M
entry ofthe word "seven" in her original Certifi
cate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify
by adding the words "since childhood" in her
siai
Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence." ...
OnApril 24,1995, the Second Division ofthe
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote
of2to 1,cameup with a Resolution1)findingpri
vate respondentPetition'sforDisqualification in
SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original
Certificate Candidacy.
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the
May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. The Resolution
tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Re
consideration, the Commission RESOLVED
to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re
examination of the resolution granting the
petition for disqualification.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying
petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her procla
mation, petitionercomes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Origi
nal and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classifiedinto two general areas:
I. The Issue of Petitioner's Qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for
election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or
the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons
is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v.
Republic this court,tookthe concept ofdomicile
to mean an individual's "permanent home," "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or
for pleasure, oneintends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent."85 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact
ofresiding or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of return
ing there permanently.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution
on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placedbeyond doubtthe principle
that when the Constitution speaks of "residence"
in election law, it actually means only "domicile"
In the light of the principles just discussed,
has petitioner Imelda RomualdezMarcos satis
fied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6* of the 1987 Constitution? Of
what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District ofLeyte
as seven (7) months?
It is the factofresidence, not a statement-ina
certificate ofcandidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution's residency qualifica
tion requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a
M19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100
Phil 221 (1956).
B/d at 969.

iliiilji
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
rMl
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deUberately and knowingly make
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner
merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
down the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement....
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's
domicile.
'Ml
In support of its asseveration that peti
tioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte; the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,
1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continu
ously lived in Manila." The Resolution addition
ally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact
that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except
Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolu
tion, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived
in San Miguel, Manila where she registered as
a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Gover
nor ofMetro Manila, "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of
Metro Manila," the COMELECstressed. Here is
where the confusion lies.
Jiid
We have stated, many times in the past, that
an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus,
the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate
of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places" flies in the face of settled juris
prudence ...
isii
fej
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 119
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence
in election law and the deliberations of the con
stitutional commission but also the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).86
What is undeniable, however, are the fol
lowing set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution:
In or about 1938 when respondent was
a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she gradu
ated from high school. She pursued her col
lege studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine
Word University in Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese Schqol, still
in Tacloban City. In 1952, she went to Manila
to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House ofRepresentatives. In 1954, she mar
ried ex-President Perdinand E. Marcos when
he was st^ll a congressman of Hocos Norte
and registered, there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic
in 1959, she and her husband lived together
in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines,
she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
MB.P. 881, Sec. 117 states:
XXX XXX XXX
"Any person who transfer residence to another city,
municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation;
profession; employment in private or public service; edu
cational activities; work in military or naval reservations;
service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or
national policeforce; or confinement or detention in govern
ment institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed
to have lost his original residence.
 120 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
^jfji
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that)
she and her family were abducted and kid
napped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
Bgiffj
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992,
respondent ran for election as President of
the Philippines and filed her Certificate of
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is
a resident and registered voter of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts
found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the past four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an inten
tion to abandon her domicile of origin in Taclo
ban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born
in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Taclo
ban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
her domicile of origin by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home prov
ince, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and estab
lishing a political power base where her siblings
and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-
publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part
of the history and lore of the quarter century of
Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC's Resolutions,
or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:87
1. An actual removal or an actual change
of domicile;
8718 Am Jur 219-220.
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof
based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue.. ..
In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
and "residence."88 The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile
by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this
specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious dif
ference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and
a place; but in residence, the relation is one
of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridi
cal, independent of the necessity of physical
presence.
Article 110 of the Civil Code provide:
Article 110. The husband shall fix the
residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband
' if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article
110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence
as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile
of origin in favor of the husband's choice of resi
dence upon marriage.
"TOLENTINO, I COMMENTARIES & JURISPRU
DENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).

In the light of all the principles relating to
residence and domicile enunciated by this court
Mi up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte.
WHEREFORE, having determined that
petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated
April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as&the duly
elected Representative of the First District of
ijftfoi Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
C. Aquino v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
(Many footnotes omitted)
KAPUNAN, J.:
ii
We agree with COMELEC's contention that
in order that petitioner could qualify as a can
didate for Representative of the Second District
of Makati City the latter "must prove that he
has estabUshed not just residence but domicile
of choice."
As found by the COMELEC en banc peti
tioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May
11,1992 elections, indicated not only that he was
a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for
52 years immediately preceding that election. At
the time, his certificate indicated that he was also
L a registered voter of the same district. His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birth
place of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself
to the COMELEC at various times during his
political career, what stands consistently clear
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 121
and unassailable is that his domicile oforigin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Sec
ond District of Makati*City is an alleged lease
agreement ofa condominium unit in the area. As
the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a perma
nent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead ofbuying
one. While a lease contract may be indicative
of respondent's intention to reside in Makati
City it does not engender the kind of per
manency required to prove abandonment of
one's original domicile especially since, by its
terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years,
and respondent Aquino himselftestified that
his intention was really for only one (1) year,
because he has other "residences" in Manila
or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should
never be an indicia of the right to vote or to
be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro
Manila coupled with the short length of time he
claims to be a resident of the condominium unit
in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (peti
tioner) in transferring his physical residence" is
not to acquire a new, residence or domicile "but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representa
tive of the Second District of Makati City." The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identifica
tion sentimental, actual or otherwise with
the area, and the suspicious circumstances under
which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner's claim of residency for the period re
quired by the Constitution, in the Second District
of Makati. COMELEC en banc emphatically
pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed
mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candi
date of Representative, by establishing a
commencement dated of his residence. If
a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot,
 122 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would
be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new
political district is not created out of thin air.
It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipal
ity of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new
Second District cannot be denied. . . .
D. Domino v. Commission
on Elections
G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with
a prayer for preliminary injunction are the
Resolution of 6 May 1998 of the Second Divi
sion of the Commission on Elections (hereafter
COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino
(hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate
for representative of the Lone Legislative District
of the Province of Sarangani in the II May 1998
elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 of the
COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion
for reconsideration.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that
he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in
Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the
said contention, DOMINO presented before the
COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
[EXHIBITS OMITTED]
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division
promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of rep
resentative of the lone district of Sarangani for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certifi
cate of candidacy, on the basis of the following
findings:
What militates against respondent's clain
that he has met the residency requirement for the
position sought is his own Voter's Registratior
Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [An
nex "B", Petition] and his address indicated as 2<
Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara. Quezor
City. This evidence, standing alone, negates al!
his protestations that he established residence al
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as earl)
as January 1997. It is highly improbable, na>
incredible, for respondent who previously ran foi
the same position in the 3rd Legislative District
of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 tc
unwittingly forget the residency requirement foi
the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June
22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct
No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elec
tions on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks
the one (1) year residency requirement provided
for candidates for Member of the House of Rep
resentatives under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution.
All told, petitioner's .evidence conspire to
attest to respondent's lack of residence in the
constituency where he seeks election and while
it may be conceded that he is a registered voter
as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the
position .of Congressman for the Lone District of
the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May
1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en
banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence,
the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in
the main, that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet
the One-year residence requirement.
Before us DOMINO raised the following is
sues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani

and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive
and binding upon the whole world, including
the Commission on Elections;
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has
resided in the subject congressional district
for at least one (1) year immediately preced
ing the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COM
ELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a
quo for the disqualification of petitioner.
iiiwi
The First Issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the deci
sion of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him
a resident of the Province ofSarangani and not
of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained.
%>
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided
in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the
said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of
the COMELEC to determine whether false rep
resentation as to material facts was made in the
certificate of candidacy, that will include, among
others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceed
ings as to the right of DOMINO to be included
or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdiction, does not pre
clude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass
upon the issue of compliance with the residency
requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclu
Ml
sion of voters in the list of voters are summary
in character. Thus, the factual findings of the
trial court and its resultant conclusions in the
exclusion proceedings on matters other than
the right to vote in the precinct within its ter
ritorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the
COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or
exclusion proceedings may pass upon any ques
tion necessary to decide the issue raised includ
ing the questions ofcitizenship and residence of
the challenged voter, the authority to order the
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 123
necessarily carries with it the power to inquire
into and settle all matters essential to the exer
cise of said authority. However, except for the
right to remain in the list of voters or for being
excluded therefrom for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held,
a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding,
even if final and unappealable, does not acquire
the nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does
not operate as a bar to any future action that a
party may. take concerning the subject passed
upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an
exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive
on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as a
voter in any other election.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province
of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in
his certificate of candidacy? -
We hold in the negative.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of
origin was Candon, IlocosSur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice
at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
QuezonCity, as shown by his certificate ofcandi
dacyforthe position ofrepresentative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and
has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. To success
fully effect a change of domicile one must dem
onstrate an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the formerplace ofresidence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In other words, there must basi
cally be animus manendi coupled with animus,
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; thechange of residence must be
iiiii)
124 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
^J
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
It is the contention of petitioner that his
actual' physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani
since December 1996 was sufficiently established
by the lease of a house and lot located therein in
January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifi
cations under oath of the residents of that place
that they have seen petitioner and his family
residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical
is not in itself sufficient to show that from said
date he had transferred his residence in that
place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. While
"residence" simply requires bodily presence in
a given plaqe, "domicile" requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared
and probable intent to make it one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home.
As a general rule, the principal elements
of domicile, physical presence in the locality
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile,
must concur in order to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of
these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a
domicile without actual residence in the locality
does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does
the fact of physical presence without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime
in January 1997, does not adequately support
a change of domicile. The lease contract may
be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside
in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no mat
ter how long, without the intention to abandon
it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house
and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e.,
15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence
of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter
in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While
voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give
rise to a strong presumption of residence espe
cially in this case where DOMINO registered
in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
election franchise is a deliberate public asser
tion of the fact of residence, and is said to have
decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon
the place the elector claims as, or believes to be,
his residence. The fact that a party continuously
voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
His claim that his registration in Quezon
City was erroneous arid was caused by events
over which he had no control cannot be sustained.
The general registration of voters for purposes
of the May 1998 ejections was scheduled for two
(2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21,
and 22.
While, Domino's intention to establish
residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the
fact that be bought the house he was renting on
November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation
of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22
October 1997, and that he. applied for transfer
of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani
by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year
residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency
requirement, both intent and actual presence in
the district one intends to represent must satisfy
the length of time prescribed by the fundamen
tal law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void.
3. Citizenship qualification: CASES.
A. Co v. House Electoral Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking
for the setting aside and reversal ofa decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is.a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
iiMl)
purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or
not, in making that determination, the HRET
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
fljjtfJ
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
o ter in Manila, the respondent looked for work
The records show that in the year 1895,
the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of
i^i)
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from
the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose
Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
... As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met
a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932
according to Catholic faith and practice.
^3
The couple bore eight children, one of whom
is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after
trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15,1957, the Court of First Instance
of Samar issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28,1955 as final and executory and that
Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan
took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At.the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath,
the private respondent then a minor of nine
years was finishing his elementary education in
the province of Samar. There is nothing in the
records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
jiiiajl)
insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education,
the private respondent, in search for better edu
cation, went-to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 125
The private respondent graduated from col
lege, and thereafter took and passed the CPA
Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were bet-
here. He found a jolj in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family
in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention
which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship
on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's
full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went
home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and
spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during
those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged
for several years in the management of their
family business decided to be of greater service
to his province and ran for public office. Hence,
when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the
elections for representative in the second district
of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the
people of Northern Samar as their representative
in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two
petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead
the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution
found in Article IV read:
"SECTION 1, the following are citizens
of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Phil
ippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
i)
126 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17,1973,
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citi
zenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
4. Those who are naturalized in accor
dance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any
ji
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens."
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph
3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2,1987 but
also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended
to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Com
^l mission, viz.:
"Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provi
sion of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or
would it also cover those who elected it under
the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody
who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution
whether the election was done before or after
January 17,1973." (Records of the Constitu
E^J
tional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis
supplied).
XXX XXX XXX
mJ
"Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citi
zenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or
less decided to extend the interpretation of
who is a natural-born Citizen as provided in
Section4 ofthe 1973 Constitution by adding
that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Pre
siding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes."
XXX
XXX XXX
"Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well
that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
written book, he said that the decision was
designed merely to accommodate former del
egate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now
it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas
is goingagainst this intention by supporting
the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see,
there has been an evolution in my thinking.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)
XXX XXX XXX
"Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes
very important because his election of Phil
ippine citizenship makes him not only a
Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress ...
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware
of that and for that reason we will leave it
to the body to approve that provision of Sec
tion 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis
for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born
a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a
Filipino citizen or a natural born citizen."
(Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 231)"
XXX XXX XXX
"Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provi
sion is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
mothers but alien fathers would have to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
ofmajority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Fili
pino citizens." (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent
of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow inter
pretation resulting in an inequitable situation.
It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law,
the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would
result in absurdity and injustice, (Casela v. Court
liiiiii)
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be con
strued so as to give it effective operation and
baai suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence,
it is the spirit of the provision which should pre
vail-over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly,
103 U.S. 580)
The provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born
of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-
born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of
a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino moth
ers with an alien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural-
born citizens.
tti0}
Hence, the bestowment of the status of
"natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of
citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments
were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally
all those born before the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship either before
or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question
is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment
was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd
situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
|J
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 127
those acts valid which would have been nil at the
time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispu'te that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the time
of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue
ofwhether or not the respondent elected or chose
to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2
of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers
before January 17,1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or
in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is tc ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.
The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when the re
spondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in
1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election"
as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Flqrencio Mallare (59
SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exer
cise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise ofthe right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship." (p.
52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
We repeat that any election of Philippine
citizenship on the part of the private respondent
 128 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
would not only, have been superfluous but it
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How
$0 can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting
view as to how Mr. Ong 'elected citizenship. It
observed that "when protestee was only nine
years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became
a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised
fc> Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit
to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that
had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's
father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral
procedure of stripping Mr. Cng^ father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late
date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of
the father through a collateral approach. This
is) can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on
a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico,
31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
To ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null
and void would run against the principle of due
process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid
to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's
lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not rise beyond
^1 where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
|g) The issue before us is not the nullification
of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan.
Our function is to determine whether or not
the HRET committed abuse of authority in the
exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent
traces his natural born citizenship through his
mother, not through the citizenship of his father.
'&}
The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent "chose"
to be a Filipino when he came ofage. At that time
and up to the present, both mother and father
were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have
elected any other citizenship unless he first for
mally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor
of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons
faced with a problem of election, there was no
foreign nationality-of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.
B. Bengzon v. Cruz
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C.
Cruzyisat issue in this case, in view of the con
stitutional requirement that "no person shall be
a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen."
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen
ofthe Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, onApril 27,1960, ofFilipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
losehis citizenship by, among others, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces ofa foreign-country." ...
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reac
quired his Philippine citizenship through repa
triation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for re-election.
The issue now before us is whether respon
dent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
an American citizen, can still be considered a

natural-born Filipino upon his rea~cquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may
no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation.
He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Consti
tution expressly states that natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that
he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from
birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.
j&^
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are
Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Phil
ippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17,1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
iiii and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accor
dance with law.
There are two ways ofacquiring citizenship:
(1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen,
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-
born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
iiiiiiiJ
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens
are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Com
*m>
iiggj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 129
monwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised NaturaHzation Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and
by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its prom
ulgation when the court is satisfied that during
the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to
a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Govern
ment promulgated rules; or (4) committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizen
ship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. CommonwealthAct No.
63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition
and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode ofinitially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philip
pine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citi
zenship must possess certain qualifications and
none of the disqualifications mentioned in Sec
tion 4 of CA. No. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, maybe had
under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; (2) servicein the armed forces ofthe allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time;
(4) marriage ofa Filipinowomanto an alien; and
(5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process
ofnaturalization, repatriation simplyconsists of
the takingofan oath ofallegiance tothe Republic
of the Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concernedresides or last resided.
 130 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Ini4n.^aro v. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 (1999),
we held:
mj
.... Parenthetically, under these stat
utes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to
file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
icii}
Republic of the Philippines and to register
that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided
in the Philippines.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recov
ery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
jtj^j)
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Fili
iiiiijij pino,citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA. No. 2630, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service
iigj
to, or accepting commission in; the Armed
Forces of the United States, of after separa
tion from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
i^l
Having thus taken the required oath of al
legiance to the Republic and having registered
tpi)
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz
is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had
to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the BET in
its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was
first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is
one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to
be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
7
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there
were two categories of, Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those
who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17,1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform
an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now
considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who
are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: 'Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Fili
pinos are considered not natural-born citizens.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen,
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a

natural-born Fihpino. Noteworthy is the absence
in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losingPhilippinecitizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the
^j)
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship,
he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
pa
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of the House of Represen
tatives.
Afinal point. The HRET has been empowered
by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualificationsof the members of the House. The
L Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the
M)
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul
the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
^^) Court's judgment for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of
the assailed decision. There is no such showing
%j0
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
MISSED.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2,
Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-
born citizens as "those who are citizens of the
tm Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PRO
VIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHIL
iiiv/
IPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO
LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDER
ING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COM
ffiifi MISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE UNITED STATES, provides:
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 131
0 SECTION 1. Any person who had
lost his Philippine citizenship be render
ing service to, or .accepting commission in
the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizen
ship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering
the same with the Local Civil Registry in
the place.where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship."
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts be
fore he could again become a Filipino citizen. He
had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and register his oath with the
Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan.
He had to renounce his American citizenship
and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born
citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpreta
tion and construction of a constitution is to give
effect to the intention of the framers and of the
people who adopted it. Words appearing in a
Constitution are used according to their plain,
natural, and usual significance and import and
must be understood in the sense most obvious to
the common understanding of the people at the
time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-borncitizensof the
Philippines"is precise, clear and definite.Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it
other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is
not phrased in general language which may call
for construction of what the words imply.
The definition of a natural-born citizen in
the Constitution must be applied to this petition
according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the
"reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through
anyofthese modes: (naturalization,repatriation
and legislationunder Section3, CA. No. 63) re
sults in the restoration of previous status, either
as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a
simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
 132 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
If citizenship is gained through natural
ization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen
concerned can not be considered natural-born.
Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to
become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent ofJustice Jose C.
Vitug in the instant case, concurred in by Justice
Jose A.R. Melo [in the HRET decision]:
"Repatriation is the resumption or re
covery of the original nationality upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions. While an
applicant need not have to undergo the te
dious and time consuming process required
by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473,
as amended), he, nevertheless, would still
have to make an express and unequivocal
act of formally rejecting his adopted state
and reaffirming his total and exclusive al
legiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be
considered a natural-born citizen under the
first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987
Constitution, one should not have to perform
any act at all or go through any process,
judicial or administrative, to enable him to
tjgS) reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines
that a natural-born citizen is one who is able
to claim citizenship without any prior decla
igjjj)
ration on his part of a desire? to obtain such
status. Under this view, the term 'natural
born' citizens could also cover those who have
been collectively deemed citizens by reason
of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and those who have been accorded by
the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens
I'JgJ (those born in the Philippines of alien parents
who, before the adoption of the 1935 Con
stitution had been elected to public office.)"
jg> The two dissenting Justices correctly stated
that the "stringent requirement of the Constitu
tion is so placed as to insure that only Filipino
citizens with an absolute and permanent degree
^1
of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for
membership in Congress, the branch of the gov
ernment directly involved and given the delicate
%l
task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
'The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen,
first constitutionally defined in the 1973
Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Consti
tution, particularly in Section 2, Article F
thereof, is meant to refer to those 'who ar
citizens of the Philippines from birth withou
having to perform any act to acquire or per
feet their citizenship,' and to those 'who elec
Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, tin
Supreme Court has declared that where tin
law speaks in clear and categorical language
there is no room for interpretation, vacilla
tion or equivocation there is only room foi
application. The phrase 'from birth' indicate*
that there is a starting point of his citizenshit
and this citizenship should be continuous
constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for electior
to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
member of the House of Representatives must
be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution
intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including
that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise,
the Constitution should have simply provided
that a candidate for such position can be merely
a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local
elective officers.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT thepetition.
C. Valles v. Comelec
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
PURISHMA, J.:
[The issue in this case is the citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez]
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which de
termines nationality or citizenship on the basis
of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez,
&iJ
an Australian. Historically, this was a year be
fore the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
v^>
at that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts
by which the United States governed the country.
'Hip\ These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902
and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law.
814 Amongothers, these laws defined who were
deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine
ipj
citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philip
pineIslandscontinuing to residetherein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
ofApril, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in the Philippine Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto,
^r)
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
PhilippineIslands and as such entitled to the
protection ofthe United States, except such
^J as shall have elected to preserve their alle
giance to the Crown ofSpain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight, (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
jpl
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Phil
ippine Islands whowere Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citi
zens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their alle
giance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions ofthe treaty ofpeace be
^)
tween the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, and except such others as have
since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Phil
ippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
t&y
insular possessions ofthe United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine
igi
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 133
Islands who are citizens of the United States,
or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein, (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of
the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11,1899and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondent's father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on January 5,1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copyof an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law,Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to bea Philip
pine citizen. Byvirtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle ofjus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philip
pine citizenship...
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which
confers citizenship by virtue of blood relation
ship, was subsequently retained under the 1973
Constitution...
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosa
lind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having
been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
beingborn in Australians not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the
assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced
herPhilippine citizenship. To buttress this con
tention, petitioner citedprivaterespondent's ap
plication for anAlien Certificate ofRegistration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate ofResidence
(ICR), onSeptember 19,1988, andtheissuance to
her of an Australian passport on March 3,1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino
citizenmaylosehis citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
 134 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
s^
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance
%>
to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age
or more;
i&a
(4) By accepting commission in the military,
naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate, of
naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent
sjja authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
k4 (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage,
to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husband's country, she acquires his na
tionality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by re
nunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner's contention that the application of
private respondent for an alien certificate of reg
istration, and her Australian passport, is bereft
of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case
:&tfi
olAznar v. COMELEC [185 SCRA 703] and in
the more recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and
COMELEC [G.R. No. 135083, May 26,1999].
:>ift/L
In the case olAznar, the Court ruled that the
mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder
ofa certificate stating that he is an American did
j0) not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that
an application for an alien certificate of registra
tion was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COM
ELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and was holding an American passport on April
22,1997, only a year before he filed a certificate
'jjiA
of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Aus
tralian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
to
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. [Com
monwealth Act No. 63, Section 1.] As held by
this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one's citizenship.oThe application
of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado
v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act No.
63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as
a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship.
Since private respondent did not lose or renounce
her Philippine citizenship, petitioner's claim
that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the
assumption that the private respondent had
dual citizenship, still, she is disquahfied to run
for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40
of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The fol
lowing persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
xxx. .xxx.
.xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx. .XXX.
.XXX
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado v. Manzano,
the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in
the Local Government Code and reconciled the
same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Con
stitution on dual allegiance. ["Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."] Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, with-
i'at

ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 135

i^p

out performing any act, and as an involuntary

consequence of the conflicting laws of different
^t WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
countries, be also a citizen of another state,
MISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
July 17,1998 and January 15,1999, respectively,
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez

"xxx the phrase 'dual citizenship' in
R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, xxx must be understood as referring
to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
ijf> this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent
had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. [Mercado
v. Manzano, supra.] The filing of a certificate of
ijffi* candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizen
ship, effectively removing any disqualification
as a dual citizen. [Ibid.] This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she
is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance
&S)
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
teJ respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian
citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on
January 15 1992, private respondent executed
a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department
tyi
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private re
'^k
spondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to
fcy.'i
settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation
was effective, petitioner's claim that private re
spondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor
of Davao Oriental.
SEC. 7. THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE
YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT
NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE
NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.
NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL SERVE FOR
MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION
OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF
TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN
INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF
HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
1. Term and tenure.
A. Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991
In theorizing that the provision under
consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse
"term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly dis
tinguished by the Solicitor General:
'The term of office prescribed by the Con
stitution may not be extended or shortened
by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period
during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure), may be affected by circum
stances within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term
or it may not exist at all. These situations will
not change the duration ofthe term ofoffice
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12).'v
Under the questioned provision, when an
elective official covered thereby files a certificate
 136 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his
term. The term remains and his successor, if any,
is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
B. Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003
km CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seek
ing to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa 31g. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective
office. Any elective official, whether na
tional or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a per
manent capacity, except for President and
fcsa
Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in
G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farinas,
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and
Agapito A. Aquino. . .
The petitioners now come to the Court al
leging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for
being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in
its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of
Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilar
ity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006,
on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the
p^-%
elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes
a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the cer
tificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced
in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protec
tion clause of the Constitution because it repeals
Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes
a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive
office or position. Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, includ
ing active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corpora
tions, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006 discriminates against appointive officials.
By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official
who runs for office other than the one which
he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned/therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in,public
office even as they campaign for re-election or
election for another elective position. On the
other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
their offices upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006
is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not
only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which pro
vides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval" is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence*
which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
ij&)
hence, should not have been repealed. The peti
tioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v.Mitra, Jr., [202 SCRA 779 (1991)]that Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of
Public Officers":
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all
mi times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker
and Secretary General of the House of Repre
sentatives acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for
notjconsidering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom,
upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.
The Court's Ruling
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the
petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which this Court had declared in
Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the con
stitutional provision on accountability of public
officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching sig
nificance" that justifies this Court's adoption ofa
liberal stance vis-a-vis the procedural matter on
standing. Moreover, with the national elections
barely seven months away, it behooves the Court
to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the
Court is quite apropos:
. . . All await the decision of this Court
on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent multiplic
ity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality... be now
resolved. It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 137
national elections beings barely six months
away, reinforce our stand.
Every statute is presumed valid. The pre
sumption is that the legislature intended to en
act a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
It is equally well-established, however, that
the courts,as guardians ofthe Constitution, have
the inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted by the legislature transcends
the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And
where the acts of the other branches of govern
ment run afoul of the Constitution, it is'the
judiciary's solemn and sacred duty to nullify
the same.
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court
shall now resolve the substantial issues raised
by the petitions.
Section 14 of Pep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Con
gress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of
the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legisla
tion as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered
encroaches. The provision merely calls for all
parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compli
ance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title,
the Court laid down the rule that
c
Constitutional provisions relating to
the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation.
The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without
 138 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplish
ing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful ancl Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides
not only the declaration of principles but also the
objectives thereof:
tM) Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The
State shall, during the election period, super
vise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the operation
of media of communication or information to
guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for
public service, including access to media time
and space, and the equitable right to reply,
for public information campaigns and fora
among candidates and assure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimi
nation.
The Court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehen
sive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code within its contempla
tion. To require that the said repeal of Section 67
of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist
that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes
a limitation on elective officials who run for
an office other than the one they are holding,
to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does
not violate the "one subject-one title" rule.
This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means ofcarrying out the
general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code as a.form of harassment
or discrimination that had to be done away with
and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For
sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
pelicy as it would encourage political adventur
ism. But policy matters are not the concern
of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches
of the government. It is not for this Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment
is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice
to bring them within the range of judicial cogni
zance. Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision
and by its' pronouncement in the same case
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal
the law on its belief that the election process is
thereby enhanced and the paramount objective
of election laws the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress
is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the con
stitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the no
tice, action and study of the legislators and the
public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that
the legislators were not apprised of the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively de
liberated upon by the members of the House. In
fact, the petitioners, as members of the House

"ofRepresentatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the
existence of the provision repealing Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not
Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code per
taining to elective officials gives undue benefit
to such officials as against the appointive ones
and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in
the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. The
Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which it is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist be
tween elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to
an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their
officeby virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 139
entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure ofthe appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between
the two sets ofofficials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, BookV ofthe Administrative Code
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engagingin
any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except tovote. Under the sameprovision,
elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expresslyallowed
to take part in political and electoral activities.
ByrepealingSection67 but retaining Section
66 ofthe Omnibus Election Code,the legislators
'deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently with respect to the effect on
their tenure in the office of the filing of the cer
tificates of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not within
the power of the Court to pass upon or look into
the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification
are similarly treated, the equal protection clause
of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In
this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullifi
cation of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
petitioners insist that the entire law should be
nullified. They contend that irregularities at
tended the passage of the said law particularly
in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicam
eral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a
conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd
BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the mem
bers;
Mi
140 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its
proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was
&j
not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof
as well as its senator-members at the time it
was presented to and rammed for approval by
jilij the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted
by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report
i&fll was instantly made and passed around for the
signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation
of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that con
vened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity",clauses of SB No. 1741
and HB No. 000, as well as that of the compro
mise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on
November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that
complywith the publication required by the Civil
Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in
its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006,
with the provision that "This Act shall take effect
flfr&j
immediately upon its approval";
h. The copy of the compromipe bill submit
ted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February
7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now ap
pears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise
bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no
objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to
the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain
a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject mea
sure"; and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano
amendment," which is Section 12 of the compro
mise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was
the subject of the purported proposed amend
ment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as
stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision
states, thusly:
Sec. 12.Limitation on Elected Officials.
Any elected officialwho runsibr president
and vice-president shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing
"of the certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to gc
behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,'
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification o]
the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment
A review of cases reveals the Court's consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reasor
to deviate from the salutary rule in this case
where the irregularities alleged by the petition
ers mostly involved the internal rules of Con
gress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
Conference Committee by the House. This Court
is ndt the proper forum for the enforcement oJ
these internal rules oCongress, whether House
or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely proce
dural and with their observance the courts have
no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as tc
the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must
be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its
ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in vary
ing forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting
a law, a House of Congress failed.to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmefia v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."'
The Effectivity Clause Is Defective
Finally, the ''Effectivity" clause (Section 16)
ofRep.Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall
take effect immediately upon its approval." is
defective. However, the same does not render
L
the entire law invalid. In Tanada v. Tuvera, this
Court laid down the rule:
. . . the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself,
kail
which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened
or extended . . .
L Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, Rep. Act No.
9006, notwithstanding its express statement,
kn took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
I In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of
the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
r law is that the courts do not involve themselves
with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
L statute. That is the exclusive -concern of the
legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitu
tional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DIS
MISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
[Footnotes Omitted]
SEC. 8. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVID
ED BY LAW, THE REGULAR ELECTION
ifci'i OF THE SENATORS AND THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL BE HELD ON THE SECOND MON
DAY OF MAY.
l%i
1. Election.
A. Codilla v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002
PUNO, J.:
In a democracy, the first self-evident prin
ciple is that he who has been rejected by the
L
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 141
people cannotrepresent the people! Respondent
Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino
M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14,
2001 elections as Representative of the 4th leg
islative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated
legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that
she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the
sovereign will of the people is not subject to the
discretion of any official of the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo
Warranto directed against respondents Speaker
Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto
P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to
compel them to implement the decision of the
Commission on Elections en banc by (a) admin
istering the oath of office to petitioner as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of
the petitioner in the Roll ofMembers ofthe House
of Representatives, and against respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into,
and unlawfully holding and exercising the said
public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
[The decision next details the steps leading
to the final proclamation of Codilla as the win
ning candidate.]
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt
by the House of Representatives of a copy of the
COMELEC en baric resolution on September
20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on
the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner
sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October
25,2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T.
Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Ser
gio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of
Representatives to act decisively on the matter
in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever
remedy is available should their action remain
unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, SpeakerDeVenecia sent a letter
dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COM
ELEC decision and we are inclined to sus
tain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially
ij&j
142 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech,
inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated
September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly
defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling.
This ultimately means that implementing
the decision would result in the spectacle
of having two (2) legislators occupying the
same congressional seat, a legal situation,
i-folii! the only consideration, that effectively deters
the HOUSE'S liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that
the implementation of the COMELEC deci
sion is a matter that can be best, and with
finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court,
which, hopefully, shall act on it most expedi
tiously." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus
and quo warranto.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath
and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte
is no longer a matter of discretion on the part
of the public respondents. The facts are settled
and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin. who only got
53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
'k&b COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation ofrespondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of
the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged
before this Court by respondent Locsin and said
tafliiE
Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Rep
resentative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
has been finally settled by the COMELEC en
banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter. The rule of law demands that its
Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land.
There is no alternative to the rule of law except
the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Man
damus is granted. Public Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall administer the oath
of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.,
as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent
Secretary-General shall likewise register the
name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This decision shall be
immediately executory.
SEC. 9. IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE
SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE OF REPRE
SENTATIVES, A SPECIAL ELECTION MAY
BE CALLED TO FILL SUCH VACANCY IN
THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW,
BUT THE SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THUS
ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR THE
UNEXPIRED TERM.
1. Special Election.
A. Tolentino v. Comelec
G.R. No. 148334, January 21. 2004
CARPIO, J.:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency
in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guin-
gona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President.
Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President
on 9 February 2001.
i
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation,
the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolu
tion No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultane
ously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. Resolution No.
84 further provided that the "Senatorial candi
date garnering the 13th highest number of votes
shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends
on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had can
vassed the election results from all the provinces
but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming
candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution
No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve
(12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years

and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teo
Eaafr
fisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto")
and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th
and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolen-
tino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters
and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for pro
hibition, impleading only COMELEC as respon
dent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming with finality the candidate for
itai Senator receiving the 13th highest number of
votes as the winner in the special election for a
single three-year term seat. Accordingly, peti
tioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation
to such effect.
sAi
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction be
cause: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as re
quired under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645
("R.A. No. 6645"); (2) it failed to require senato
rial candidates to indicate in their certificates of
candidacy whether they seek election under the
special or regular elections as allegedly required
under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881;
and, consequently: (3) it failed to specify in the
VotersInformation Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section
4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A.
No. 6646"). Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes
iMib cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14May
2001 elections without distinction such that
"there were no two separate Senate elections
held simultaneously but just a single electionfor
thirteen seats, irrespective of term."
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if
held simultaneously, a specialand a regular elec
tion must be distinguished in the documentation
as well as in the canvassing of their results. To
support their claim, petitioners cite the special
elections simultaneously held with the regular
elections of November 1951 and November 1955
to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando
Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who
became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 143
the Senate. Petitioners point out that in those
elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
votes castfor the senatorial candidates running
under the regular elections from the votes cast
for the candidates running under the special
elections. COMELEC alsoseparatelyproclaimed
the winners in each of*those elections.
Petitioners sought the issuance ofa tempo
rary restraining order during the pendency of
their petition.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for
resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a peti
tion for quo warranto over which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing
to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election
to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters: The Nature of
the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction
Aquo warranto proceedingis, among others,
one to determine the right of a public officer in
the exercise of his office and to oust him from
its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the solejudge of
all contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in
the instant petition shows, however, that what
petitioners are questioning is the validity of the
special election on 14 May 2001 in which Hona
san was elected. Petitioners'various prayers are,
namely: (1) a "declaration" that no special elec
tion was held simultaneously with the general
elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COM
ELEC from declaring anyone as having won in
 144 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution
Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Reso
lutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the
special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers
on COMELEC's alleged failure to comply with
certain requirements pertaining to the conduct
of that special election. Clearly then, the petition
does not seek to determine Honasan's right in
the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners'
prayer for the annulment of Honasan's proclama
tion and, ultimately, election is merely incidental
to petitioners' cause of action. Consequently, the
Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the
instant petition.
Whether a Special Election for a Single,
Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly
Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitu
tion, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Repre
sentatives "in the manner prescribed by law,"
thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in
the House of Representatives, a.special elec
tion may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Consti
tution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which
provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises
in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months
or in the House of Representatives at least
one (1) year before the next regular election
for Members of Congress, the Commission
on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution
of the Senate or the House of Representa
tives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election
to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess,
an official communication on the existence of
the vacancy and call for a special election by
the President of the Senate or by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as the case
L
may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose.
The Senator or Member of the House ofRep
resentatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elec
tions shall fix the date-of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45)
days nor later than ninety (90) days from the
date of such resolution or communication,
stating among other things the office or of
fices to be voted for: Provided, however, That
if within the said period a general election
is scheduled to be held, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with such gen
eral election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subse
quently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and
Special Elections. .. ."In case a permanent
vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before
the expiration of the term, the Commission
shall call and hold a special election to fill
the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days
nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case
of such vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with
the next succeeding regular election. (Em
phasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at
least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires
COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing
the date of the special election, which shall not
be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than
ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy
but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the
office or offices; to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special
senatorial election simultaneously with the 14
May 2001 regular elections, comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relat
ing to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections

reveals that they contain nothing which would
amount to a compliance, either strict or sub
(sj
stantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in
its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases
^&j did COMELEC state that it would holda special
election for a single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14
May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give'formal notice
that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.
Su)
The controversy thus turns on whether COM
ELEC's failure, assuming it did fail, to comply
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
^j
6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and
accordingly rendered Honasan's proclamation
as the winner in that special election void. More
precisely, the question is whether the special
election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such
election and for lack of notice as to the office to be
filled and the manner by which the winner in the
special election is to be determined. For reasons
stated below,the Court answers in the negative.
ay
COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice of the
Time ofthe Special Election Did Not Negate the
Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is^the giving
notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by
the body with the duty to give such call, is indis
pensable to the election's validity. In a general
election, where the law fixes the date of the elec
tion, the election is valid without any call by the
body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule
is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next
general elections fixes the date at which the spe
cial election is to be held and operates as the call
for that election. Consequently, an election held
at the time thus prescribed is not invalidatedby
the fact that the body charged by law with the
igi duty of calling ttie election failed to do so. This
is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call
for the election by some authority and the law
thus charges voters with knowledge of the time
and place-of the election.
I'fMii
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 145
Conversely, where the law does not fix the
time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and
place after the happening of a condition prec
edent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory; and failure to
do sowill renderthe election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645 itselfprovides that in caseofvacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy
shall be held simultaneously with the next suc
ceeding regular election. Accordingly, the special
election to fill thevacancy in theSenate arising
from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-
President in February 2001 could not be held at
anyother time but mustbeheldsimultaneously
with the next succeeding regular elections on
14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with
knowledge of this statutory notice and COM
ELEC's failure to give the additional notice did
not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the
present case involved a special election to fill
a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In
such a case, the holding of the special election
is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year be
fore the expiration of the term. The time of the
election is left to the discretion of COMELEC
subject only to the limitation that it holds the
special election withinthe range oftimeprovided
in Section 2 of R;A. No. 6645, as amended. This
makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended; for COMELEC to
"call... a special election . . . not earlier than
60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occur
rence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office
to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call
and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold
a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it
will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the
congressional district involved to know the time
and place of the special election and the office to
be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies.them.
No Proof that COMELEC's Failure to Give
Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner
of Determining the Winner in the Special Elec
tion Misled Voters
 146 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The test in determining the validity' of a
special election in relation to the failure to give
notice of the special election is whether the want
of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of
the special election. If the lack of official notice
misled a substantial number of voters who
wrongly believed that there was no special elec
tion to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percent
age of voters would be void.
The required notice to the voters in the
tffiijf)
14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers
two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold
a special election to fill a vacant single three-
year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections scheduled on the same date.
Second, that COMELEC will, proclaim as win
ner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th
highest number of votes in the special election.
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that
COMELEC's failure to give this required notice
misled a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of the special senatorial elec
tion or led them to believe that there was no such
special election.
^j)
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that
since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no
special election took place. This bare assertion
carries no value. Section 2 of R,A. No. 6645, as
amended, charged those who Voted in the elec
tions of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guin-
gona's appointment as Vice-President in Febru
ary 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding
regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the
absence of formal notice from COMELEC does
not preclude the possibility that the voters had
actual notice of the special election, the office
to be voted in that election, and the manner by
which COMELEC would determine the win
ner. Such actual notice could come from many
sources, such as media reports of the enactment
of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during
the campaign.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes
md
in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply
cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Ho
nasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their
tiijsJ
right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of
the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe
to annul elections and will only do so when it is
"impossible to distinguish what votes are law
ful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatever, or that the great body
of the voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation, and threats from exercising their
franchise."
3
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to
respect the electorate's will and let the results
of the election stand, despite irregularities that
may have attended the conduct of the elections.
This is but to acknowledge the purpose and role
of elections in a democratic society such as ours,
which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the
affairs of their government, either in deter
mining who shall be their public officials or in
deciding some question of public interest; and
for that purpose all of the legal voters should
be permitted, unhampered and unmolested,
to cast their ballot. When that is done and
no frauds have been committed, the ballots
should be counted and the election should
not be declared null. Innocent voters should
not be deprived of their participation in the
affairs of their government for mere irregu
larities on the part of the election officers,
for which they are in no way responsible. A
different rule would make the manner and
method of performing a public duty of greater
importance than the duty itself.
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim
that the manner by which COMELEC conducted
the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001
is a nullity because COMELEC failed to docu
ment separately the candidates and to canvass
separately the votes cast for the special election.
No such requirements exist in our election laws.
What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the elec
tion," if necessary, and "state, among others,
the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Big.
881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and
on Section 4(4) of R.A. No/6646 on the printing

of election returns and tally sheets, to support
their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern
ijsi elections in general and in no way require sepa
rate documentation of candidates or separate
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and
special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COM-
ELEO in conducting the special election on 14
May 2001 merely implemented the procedure
specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84.
Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as
introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator
Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which
the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona
would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of
Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate
agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing,
as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term
of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr."
Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare
COMELEC and the candidates needless expendi
tures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I
move that we now consider Proposed Sen
ate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to
Resolution No. 84],
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Is there any objec
tion? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Reso
lution No. 934 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will
read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] SECRETARY]. Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE
EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE
SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COM
MISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH
ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANE
OUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION
ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR
THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR
THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 147
Philippines in 1998 for a term which will
expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her
Excellency President Gloria MacapagalAr
royo nominated Senator Guingona as Vicer
President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator
Guingona has been confirmed by a majority
vote of all the members of both House of
Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona willtake
his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the
Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 pro
vides that the election for twelve (12) Sena
tors, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial
city and municipal officials shall be held on
the second Monday and every three years
thereafter;....
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is
hereby resolved, tc certify, as it hereby certi
fies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate
and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
Senator thus elected to serve only for the
unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I
move for the adoption of this resolution.
SfENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Mr. Presi
dent.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Os-
mena is recognized.
S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Thank you,
Mr. President. Will the distinguished Major
ity Leader, Chairman of the Committee on
Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a
few questions?
SfENATOR] T[ATAD].With trepidation,
Mr. President. [Laughter]
L
148 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). What a way
of flattery. [Laughter]
jigl
Mr. President, I think I recall that some
time in 1951 or 1953, there was a special
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As
a matter of fact, the one who was elected in
that special election was then Congressman,
later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
iiM
In that election, Mr. President, the can
didates contested the seat. In other words,
the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth
JM senator because at that time there were
only eight to elect a. member or rather, a
candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that
when we ran after the EDSA revolution,
twice there were 24 candidates and the first
12 were elected to a six-year term and the
next 12 were elected to a three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this
going to be done in this election? Is the
candidate with the 13th largest number of
votes going to be the one to take a three-year
term? Or is there going to be an election for
^)
a position of senator for the unexpired term
of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr,President,in
this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics
to the Commission on Elections. But person
ally, I would like to suggest that probably,
the candidate obtaining the 13th largest
number of votes be declared as elected to fill
up the unexpired term ofSenator Guingona.
Hjj S[ENATOR] 0[SMENA] (J). Is there a
law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the
3&&I
vacancy is for a specific office?I am really at
a loss. I am rising here because I think it is
something that we should consider. I do not
know if we can .. . No, this is not a Concur
rent Resolution.
S[ENATOR]T[ATAD]. May we solicit the
legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. May I share this
information that under Republic Act No.
6645, what is needed is a resolution of this
fe,
Chamber calling attention to the need for
the holding of a special election to fill up the
StlJ
vacancy created, in this particular case, by
the appointment of our colleague, Senator
Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission
on Elections so that a slot for the particular
candidate to fill up would be that reserved
for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other
words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxx xxx xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco
is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest,
subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
the effect that in the simultaneous elections,
the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the
special election for this purpose. So we just
nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues.
It is better for the candidates. It is also less
expensive because the ballot will be printed
and there will be less disfranchisement. _
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Ifwe can just deem
it therefore under this resolution to be such
a special election, maybe, we satisfy the re
quirement of the law.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Yes. In other
words, this shall be a guidance for the Com
elec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec
will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already
consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously
as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Yes. That will be
a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the spon
sor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the
sponsor say?
M
SfENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President,
that is a most satisfactory proposal because
I do not believe that there will be anyone
running specifically
tsj
T[HE] PRESIDENT], Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this
position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
(Ml T[HE] PRESIDENT]. Actually, I think
what is going to happen is the 13th candidate
will be running with specific groups.
SfENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever
gets No. 13.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. I think we can
specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.
SfENATOR] TfATADj. Subject to style,
iga
we accept that amendment and if there will
be no other amendment, I move for the adop
tion of this resolution.
xxx xxx xxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amend
ments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] PRESIDENT]. There is a motion
^i
to adopt this resolution. Is there any objec
tion? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
^ai
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its
discretion to use means and methods to conduct
the special election within the confines of R.A.
^i
No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's
proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84.
This Court has consistently acknowledged and
affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion
in adopting means to carry out its mandate of en
suring free, orderly, and honest elections subject
only to the limitation that the means so adopted
are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 38 COMELEC's decision to abandon
the means it employed in the 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt
l%f
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 149'
the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but
a legitimate exercise ofits discretion. Conversely,
this Court willnot interfere should COMELEC,
in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose
to revert to the means it followed in the 13 No
vember 1951.and 8 November 1955 elections.
That COMELEC adopts means that are novel
or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it
liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have
earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitu
tional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government.
In the discharge of its functions, it should notf
be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may
this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment ofthe great objective
for which it was created free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with
its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere.
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary,
and the giving of notice to the electorate of nec
essary information regarding a special election,
are central to an informed exercise of the right
of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant
to the present case have led us to conclude that
COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice
did not invalidate the special senatorial election
held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take
chances in future elections. We remind COME
LEC to comply strictly with all the requirements
under applicable laws relative to the conduct of
regular elections in general and special elections
in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutier-
rez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
PUNO, J., dissented.
liityll
150 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
iM\
SEC. 10. THE SALARIES OF SENA
TORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
liiffit REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE DETER
MINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID
COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE
jS)
FULL TERM OF ALL THE MEMBERS
OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH
gg&) INCREASE.
1. Salaries, emoluments, allowances.
as)
The purpose of delaying the effectivity of any
increase in salary is to place a "legal bar to the
legislators' yielding to the natural temptation
to increase their salaries," Philconsa u. Mathay,
18 SCRA 300, 307 (1966). While the letter of
the present law prohibits immediate increase of
"said compensation." that is. salaries, it is sub
mitted that one may legitimately appeal to the
spirit of the prohibition, expressed in Philconsa
v. Mathay, supra, and read the prohibition as
an absolute ban on any form of direct or indirect
increase of salary.
Office and necessary travel allowances,
however, do not form part of the salary or com
pensation. Hence, increased allowances take
effect immediately: Nor is there a legal limit en
the amount that may be appropriated. The only
limit is moral, because, according to Section 20,
the books of Congress are audited by the Com
mission on Audit "which shall publish annually
p$\ an itemized list of amounts paid and expenses
incurred for each Member."
SEC. 11. A SENATOR OR MEMBER
0
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE
BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS IM
ipi PRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM
ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN
SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUES
TIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY
igj
OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR
DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY
COMMITTEE THEREOF.
1. Immunity from Arrest.
The 1987 privilege differs from the privilege
under the 1935 Constitution, and for that matter
from the privilege under the American Consti
0j
tution, in that under the 1935 Constitution tl
privilege was only from civil arrest. In no way d:
the 1935 Constitution protect a legislator fro
arrest for a criminal offense. Martinez v. Morj
44 SCRA 22 (1972). Under the new Constiti
tion, however, as under the 1973 Constitutio:
a legislator is privileged from arrest even for
criminal offense provided that the offense w*
not punishable by a penalty of more than s:
years imprisonment.
The privilege is available only "while tl
Congress is in session," whether regular or sp
cial and whether or not the legislator is actual,
attending a session. Hence, it is not availab
while Congress is on recess. Since the purpose
the privilege is to protect the legislator again;
harassment which will keep him away from lej
isiative sessions, there is no point in extendir
the privilege to the period when the Congress
not in session.
2. Case.
People v.-Jalosjos
G.R Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjc
is a full-fledged member of Congress who is no-
confined at the national penitentiary while k
conviction for statutory rape on two counts an
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pendin
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motio
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge th
duties of a Congressman, including attendanc
at legislative sessions and committee meeting
despite his having been convicted in the firs
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt a
accused from statutes and rules which appl
to validly incarcerated persons in general? I
answering the query, we are called upon t
balance relevant and conflicting factors in th
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege i
the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To B
Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Membe

of House of Representatives" was filed on the
grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an
expression of popular will cannot be rendered
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right
or interest not even the police power of the
State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without rep
resentation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from perform
Hi)
ing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal
and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to
him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed
a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.
i|fifo
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a
bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention
does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to
leave jail.
^1
The primary argument of the movant is
the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their repre
sentative in Congress. Having been re-elected
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible
by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sov
ereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of
tp its benefits. However, in spite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT1 151
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition
that all top officials of Government executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty
of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression
in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the of
ficial from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred
from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher
the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedi
ence rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of Repre
sentatives, the latter customarily addressed
as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an ex
emption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article
VI on the Legislative Department:
SECTION 15. The Senators and Mem
bers of the House of Representatives shall in
all cases except treason, felony, and breach
of the peace be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same;
Because of the broad coverage of felony and
breach of the peace, the exemption applied only
to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamen
tary immunity from arrest. He was subject to
the same general laws governing all persons
still to be tried or whose convictions were pend
ing appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privi
lege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years im
prisonment, be privileged from arrest during
 152 ''CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
his attendance at its sessions and in going to
and returning from the.same. .
For offenses punishable by more than six
years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
immunity and the intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the provision,
&J&&1
to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa
shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty-four hours
after its adjournment for a recess or for its
&jjj
next session, otherwise such privilege shall
cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the
same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman
to the custody of the law. The requirement that
he should be attending sessions or committee
meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a mem
ber of Congress' function to attend sessions is
^)
underscored by Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each rjouse shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a
%tt
smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not
given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling
in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, at 773
(1992), which states, inter alia, that
, The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
i*jjj
the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office,
it must be assumed that they did this with
the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will
of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It
can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling
that the Aguinaldo case involves the administra
tive removal of a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confine
ment pending appeal is not removal. He remains
a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether
pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into
custody for purposes of the administration of jus
tice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 19 Phil.
208,212, it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not
the injury to the complainant. After conviction
in the Regional Trial Court; the accused may be
denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration
if there is risk of his absconding. (Cubillo v. City
Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980]).
The accused-appellant states that the plea of
the electorate which voted him into office cannot
be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to
perform congressional duties outside his regular
place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for
accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues
in the House of Representatives for him to attend
the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body
whose call he initially spurned which accused-
appellant is invoking to justify his present mo
tion. This can hot be countenanced because, to

reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-
defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a
mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several
occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his
cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Com
mittee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex,
Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/
suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treat
ment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up
at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown
in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant
commuted by chartered plane and private, ve
hicle.
WiJ
He also calls attention to various instances,
after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/
permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-
volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) estab
lishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) plant
ing mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation.
For this purpose, he was assigned one guard
ii0
and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
going to and from the project area and his place
of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at
the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical
Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the aboveprivileges
are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
:$$\
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an
emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant
to attend congressional sessions and commit
tee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 153
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates.accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. ..
The accused-appellant avers that his con
stituents in the First District ofZamboanga del
Norte want their voices to be heard and that since
he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate.
He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention doesnot necessarily curtail his duty to
discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when
he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself ad
mits that like any other member of the House
of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214,
North Wing Building, House of Representa
tives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for
by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an office
at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
constituents." Accused-appellant further admits
that while under detention, he has filed several
bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has
been receiving his salaries and other monetary
benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant
has been discharging his mandate as a member
of the House of Representatives consistent with
the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to per
form these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the
accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom
of action. They did so with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines
of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that
he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
 154 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OP GOVERNMENT
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us
boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
L The Constitution guarantees: "... nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons simi
L larly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs
of government may not show any undue favorit
ism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality
nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a
substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substan
tial differentiation which reihoves the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as
all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even es
sential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison...
isj The Court cannot validate badges ofinequal
ity. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plau
sibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the posi
tion of Congressman is not a reasonable classifi
cation in criminal law enforcement....
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's
personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a per
son to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its gen
eral sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court
or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
I The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his move
ments from place to place, or of his free action
according to his own pleasure and will. Imprison
ment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion and it
"[is] something more than mere loss of freedom.
ma\
It includes the notion of restraint within limits
.defined by wall or any exterior barrier."
It can be seen from the foregoing that inca]
ceration, by its nature, changes an individual
status in society. Prison officials have the difficu
and oftenthankless jobofpreserving the securit
in a potentially explosivesetting, as well as ofai
tempting to provide rehabilitation that prepare
inmates for re-entry into the social mainstrean
Necessarily, both these demands require th
curtailment and elimination of certain fights.
Premises considered, we are constrained t
rule against the accused-appellant's claim tha
re-election to public office gives priority to an;
other right or interest, including the police powe
of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereb-
DENIED.
7
3. Scope of the privilege of speech.
In the first place, the privilege is a protectioi
only against forums other than the Congress it
self. It doesnot protect the assemblyman agains
the disciplinary authority of the Congress but i
is an absolute protection against suits for libel
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960). Ir
the second place, "speech or debate" include*
utterances made in the performance of officia.
functions, such asspeeches delivered, statements
made, votes cast, as well as bills introduced anc
other acts done in the performance of officia]
duties. Jimenez v.Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
(1966). To come under the privilege, it is not es
sential that the Congress be in session when the
utterance is made. What is essential is that the
utterance must constitute "legislative action",
that is, it must be part of the deliberative and
communicative process by which legislators par
ticipate in committee or congressional proceed:
ings in the consideration of proposed legislation
or of other matters which the Constitution has
placed within the jurisdiction of the Congress.
Gravel v. U.S., 90 LW 5053 (1972). See also An-
tonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70 (May 27, 1974).
Like the privilege from arrest, the privilege
of speech is intended to leave the legislator un
impeded in the performance of his duties and free
from fear of harassment from outside. Moreover,
the privilege extends to agents of assemblymen,
provided that the "agency" consists precisely in
assisting the legislator in the performance of
'legislative action." Gravel v. U.S., supra.

A. Jimenez v. Cabangbang
G.R No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
j&tfl
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally
jjj^j
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several
Sj
sums of money, by way of damages for the publi
cation of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang....
Jfifoi
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even
if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the
publication in question is a privileged communi
cation; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The^irstissue stems:from the fact that, at the
time of said publication, defendant was a member
of the House of Representatives and Chairman
of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:
ifaftl
The Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their atten
dance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and
for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. (Article
VI, Section 15 [1935])
The determination of the first issue depends
on whether or not the aforementioned pubHcation
falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used
in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
tm
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while
the same is in session, as well as bills introduced
in Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises hous
ing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congres
sional Committees duly authorized to perform its
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 155
functions as such, at the time of the performance
of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does
not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November
14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not
in session, and defendant caused said letter to
be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said
date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a mem
ber of Congress or as officer or any Committee
thereof: Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication
is not absolutely privileged.
B. Antonrno^v. Valencia
G:R No. L-26526, May 27, 1974
TEEHANKEE, Jr.
The Court finds thafedefendant-appellant has
failed to discharge the burden of substantiating
the errors of fact and of law allegedly committed
by the trial court in its appealed decision and
therefore affirms in toto the appealed judgment
holding that defendant caused and was liable
for the issuance and publication of the libelous
press release attacking the honor, integrity and
reputation of plaintiff and rejecting defendant's
defense of qualified privilege and defensive libel
and accordingly sentencing defendant to pay
plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
with interest at the legal rate plus P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
This case arose as an aftermath of the No
vember 1963 local elections when the official can
didate of the Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento)
for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista
Party standard bearer (Vicente Duterte), and
plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator
of the Republic and LP head in that province at
tributed the loss of the LP candidate to the sup
port given by defendant BrigidoR. Valencia then
Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications
to the independent LP candidate (Constancio
 156 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Maglana) which divided the LP votes. In public
statements widely quoted in the metropolitan
newspapers, plaintiff stated that had not defen
dant "sabotaged" and "double-crossed"the LP, its
official candidate would have won the election.
wi
The cordial relations between the two LP
leaders which had begun since their student
days in the U.P. College of Engineering became
iM strained. In the Taliba issue of December 21,
1963, it was reported that plaintiff would file
unrevealed administrative charges against de
fendant with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was
still convalescing in the hospital from a heart
attack on January 27, 1964 while attending a
Senate session, he filed a formal request with
the said Senate committee to investigate the ac
tions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works
and Communications in connection with certain
specifiedalleged anomalous acquisitions ofpublic
works supplies and equipment, as follows:
Plaintiffs charges as filed with the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee together with defen
dant's comments thereon that they wore "politi
t'JBi'l cally inspired" and had already been answered
in the past and that records of the transactions
were open to public scrutiny were carried by the
pre"ss, particularly in the Bulletin and Newsday
issues of March 5, 1964.
On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-
page press release was issued by the office of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communica
tions, Exhibit A, and the contents thereof were
published or reported on the front pages of the
six metropolitan papers.
Portions of the said published press release
are quoted thus: "a) Since Senator Antonino has
stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have
no recourse but start telling the truth about him;
b) This is no play of words and in due time I will
file charges against the Senator before the Blue
RibbonCommittee for reportedly anomalous acts
that can make him a disgrace to his Senate posi
tion; c)... for personal selfish reasons, Antonino
had taken advantage of his position as a member
ofthe Monetary Board and even as a Senator; d)
Antonino Tiad suspicious connections with no less
^J
than 22 corporations when he became a member
of the Monetary Board'; e) Is it not the height of
liaii
abuse of power to threaten an American witl
deportation and make him cover from gettini
a concession because you are a Senator of tin
Philippines and in the end you get the conces
sion yourself? and f) I cannot avoid unmaskinj
certain alleged high anomalous activities of th<
Senator as a memberofthe Monetary Board anc
as a member of the Philippine Senate.
Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 th<
present civil action in the Manila court of firs!
instance for the recovery against defendant oJ
Pi million as moral damages, P100,000 as ex
emplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as
"litigationexpenses and attorney's fees.
Defendant claimed in his answer that he did
not issue or cause the publication of the press
release; that at any rate, they were made in
good faith and in self-defense and that they were
qualifiedly privileged in character. He sought
by way of counterclaim from plaintiff the sum
of Pl.25 million as moral damages, P100.000 as
exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000
as litigation expense and attorney's fees, which
plaintiff disclaimed in due course as without
basis.
.... As per the Court's resolution of March
3, 1969, the motion of Senator Magnolia W.
Antonino as administratrix to substitute her
deceased husband as plaintiff-appellee was
granted.'
Defendant-appellant raises questions of fact
and of law in his brief.
On the question of fact, the Court finds that
no error was committed by the trial court in
findingthat the press release, Exhibit A, issued
by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public
Works and Communications . ..
In his second and third assignments of er
ror, defendant claims that the trial court erred
in holding that the press release is libelous and
that it is not protected as a qualified privilege
communication.
There can be no serious question as to the de
famatory and libelous nature of the statements in
defendant'spress release which depicted plaintiff
as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high
public offices as monetary board member and

senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains;
and imputed to him the commission of certain
serious offenses in violation of the Constitution
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
As defendant's imputations against plaintiff,
were not made privately nor officially as to be
qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held
that by virtue of their defamatory and libelous
nature against the honor, integrity and reputa
tion of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed. It
yMJ
further correctly ruled that defendant had not
overcome such presumption of malice, not having
shown the truth thereof, or that they were pub
lished with good intentions and with justifiable
motive or even from the most liberal standpoint
that they were made in the exercise of the right of
fair comment on the character, good faith, ability
and sincerity of public officials.
The trial court likewise properly rejected
defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel
thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the defen
dant on the argument that he had been libeled
by the plaintiff and accordingly the former was
justified to hit back with another libel. The em
phasis laid had been misplaced and based upon
a wrong premise. The defendant was charged
with the commission of certain anomalous trans
actions in his capacity as Secretary of Public
Works and Communications and the same were
filed with the Investigation Committee (Blue
Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the
Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, the
s^j said charges, even assuming that they contain
defamatory imputation, would not be Ubelous
because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a
privileged communication."
As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court
finds that the record amply supports the trial
i%-i court's finding that there was no evidence, di
rect or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable
for the publication in the metropolitan press
of his charges against defendant with the Blue
Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Ap
pointments, which were at any rate qualifiedly
privileged. Furthermore, the trial court had aptly
&I&J
observed that it was doubtful whether plaintiffs
charges against defendant of political "sabotage"
&&l
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 157
and "double-crossing" could be held to be defama
tory or libelous, since "(A) review ofcontemporary-
politics in our country tends, to show that no
stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who
changes political parties. Neither is it unusual
for card-bearing party members to support can
didates belonging to the other political party. As
a matter of fact, even way back during the time
when the late President Quezon was the head
of the Filipino participation in the Government
while the Philippines was still a dependency of
the United States, he was quoted to have stated
that *Myloyalty to my party ends when my loy
alty to my country begins.' Presumably, on the
basis of this 'classical' utterance of that dynamic
and beloved former President of the Philippines
that those who were elected as official standard
bearers of one party, after election switched to
and affiliated with another political party, are
referred to as 'patriots."'
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
NOTE: In a Senate privilege speech Senator
Santiago said the following:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am
foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots.
I would father be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots xxx.
Senator Santiago explained that "those
statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its com
mittee. The purpose of her speech, according to
her, was to bring out in the open controversial,
anomalies in governance with a view to future re
medial legislation. She averred that she wanted
to exposewhat she believed, 'to be an unjust act
of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],' which, after
sending out public invitations for nomination to
the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only
 158 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
U
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination.
tad
The Court upheld her defense oh the ground
of parliamentary immunity but added that "the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits
of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in ques
tion were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as state
ing that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court
a "Supreme Court of idiots." Pobre v. Defensor
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009.
SEC. 12. ALL MEMBERS OF THE SEN
ATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN
TATIVES SHALL, UPON ASSUMPTION
OF OFFICE, MAKE A FULL DISCLOSURE
OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS
INTERESTS. THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE
HOUSE CONCERNED OF A POTENTIAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY
ARISE FROM THE FILING OF A PRO
POSED LEGISLATION OF WHICH THEY
ARE AUTHORS.
SEC. 13. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR
EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT,
OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR IN
STRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUD
ING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CON
^i
TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR
SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM
WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. NEI
THER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY
OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN CRE
ATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF
INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
A. Liban v. Gordon
G.R No. 175352, July 15, 2009
DECISION
CARPIO, J.
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard
J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his
seat in the Senate.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or
controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution applies to the
case of respondent who is Chairman of the
0 PNRC and at the same time a Member of
the Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be au
tomatically removed as a Senator pursuant
to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution; and
r
4. Whether petitioners may legally
institute this petition against respondent.
The substantial issue boils down to whether
the officeof the PNRC Chairman is a government
office or an officein a government-owned or con
trolled corporation for purposes of the prohibition
in Section 13, Article VI of-the Constitution.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this
Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that
it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule
66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1.Action by Government against
individuals. An action for the usurpation
ofa public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers
an act which by provision of law, constitutes
a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a
corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.

r
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing
Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Rox-
as signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known
as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organi
zation, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for
the most vulnerable without consideration of
Hi)
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status,
or political affiliation...
The government does not control the PNRC.
Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only
six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board
of Governors are appointed by the President of
the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or
four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors
are not appointed by the President....
aS^i The PNRC is not government-owned but
privately owned. The vast majority of the thou
sands of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students. Under the PNRC Charter,
those who contribute to the annual fund cam
paign of the PNRC are entitled to membership
in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between
6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member
for one year upon contributing P35, PlOO, P300,
P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners,
whether residents or not, can be members of the
PNRC....
See dissent, Nachura, J.
SEC. 14. NO SENATOR OR MEMBER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUN
SEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE
OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBU
NALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER
SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY
iiftj CONTRACTWITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE
OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 159
THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVI
SION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY
THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERN
MENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPO
RATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING
HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT
INTERVENE IN A&Y MATTER BEFORE
ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR
HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE
HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.
1. Prohibitions.
A. Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr.
113 SCRA 31 (1982)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. :
This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction is poised against the
Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. ...
c) May 25-31,1979. The Puyat Group claims
that at conferences of the parties with respon
dent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
which the Puyat Group objected on Constitu
tional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the
1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that
no Assemblj'man could "appear as counsel before
xxx any administrative body," and SEC was
an administrative body The cited Consti
tutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was
called, it turned out that:
(i) On. May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Es
tanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares ofstock
ofIPI for P200.00 upon request ofrespondent
aji^l)
160 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
to
Acero to qualify him to run for election as a
Director.
i^J
* (ii) The deed of sale, howevet, was nota
rized only onMay 30, 1979 and was sought
to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31,1979, the day following
the notarization ofAssemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Mo
tion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave
to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Or
der allowing intervention that precipitated the
instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
lpt\
The issue which will be resolved is whether
or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stock
holder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating Section 11, Article VHI of the
Constitution..
What really has to be resolved is whether
&&J
or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assem
blyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an-administra
tive body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for In
tervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said tobe appearingas counsel. Ostensibly, he is
not appearing on behalf of another, although he
is joining the cause of the private respondents.
His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership often (10) shares of
IPI in respect ofthe matter in litigation and not
for the protection ofthe petitioners nor respon
dents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances mili
tate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a
mere P200.00 worth ofstock in IPI, representing
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares.
He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on.
May 30,1979, after the contested election of Di
rectors on May 14,1979, after the quo warranto
suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC
$0
and one daybefore the scheduled hearing ofthe
case before the SECon May31, 1979. Andwhat
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent EustaquioT.C. Acero, but which was
objected tobypetitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of tjie objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground oflegalinterest in the
matter under litigation. And it may be noted that
in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant ofrespondent
Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we
are constrained to find that there has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel before x x x an
administrative body" and, in ouropinion, that isa
circumvention ofthe Constitutional prohibition.
The"intervention" wasan afterthought toenable
him toappear actively intheproceedings insome
othercapacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
that is, toenablehimeventually to vote and to be
elected as Director in the event ofan unfavorable
outcomeofthe SEC Case would be pure naivete.
He would still appearas counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would
make the constitutional provision ineffective...
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's
Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave tointervene in SEC Case No. 1747ishereby
reversed and set aside.
SEC. 15. THE CONGRESS SHALL
CONVENE ONCE EVERY YEAR ON THE
FOURTH MONDAY OF JULY FOR ITS
REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A DIFFER
ENT DATEIS FIXED BYLAW, ANDSHALL
CONTINUE TO BE IN SESSION FOR SUCH
NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY DETER
MINE UNTIL THIRTY DAYS BEFORE
THE OPENING OF ITS NEXT REGULAR
SESSION, EXCLUSIVE OF SATURDAYS,
SUNDAYS, AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS. THE
PRESIDENT MAY CALL A SPECIAL SES
SION AT ANY TIME.
SEC. 16. (1) THE SENATE SHALL
ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ITS SPEAKER,
BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RES
PECTIVE MEMBERS.

EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH
OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NEC
ESSARY.
(2) A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE
SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO
BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER
MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND
MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF
ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER,
AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH
HOUSE MAY PROVIDE.
(3) EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE
THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUN
ISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BE
HAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE
OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS,
SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PEN
ALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED,
SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS.
(4) EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A
JOURNAL OF fTS PROCEEDINGS, AND
FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE
SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS MAY,
IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL
SECURITY; AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ON
&&)
ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST
OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERS PRES
ENT, BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEP A
RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.
(5) NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE
SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL,
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTH
ER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE
DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN
THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES
SHALL BE SITTING.
Liiiiiiiiiii
1. Officers.
A. Avelino v. Cuenco
G.R No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
RESOLUTION
jjjj The Court believes the following essential
facts .have been established:
ijj^
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 161
In the session of the Senate of February 18,
1949,Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada requested that
his right to speak on the floor on the next session
day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino
be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21,1949, hours before the open
ing of the session Senator Tanada and Senator
Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of
the Senate a resolution enumerating charges
against ttie then Senate President and ordering
the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to
constitute a quorum were at the Senate session
hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the
petitioner was already in his office, said peti
tioner delayed his appearance at the session hall
until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended
the rostrum, he did not immediately open the
session, but instead requested from the Secretary
a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators
Tanada and Sanidad and in the presence of the
public he read slowly and carefully said resolu
tion, after which.he called and conferred with
his colleagues Senators Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insis
tent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco
that the session be opened, the petitioner finally
called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto
who was confined in a hospital and Senator Con-
fesor who is in the United States, all the Senators
were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long estab
lished practice, moved that the roll call be dis
pensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said
motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated
plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use
of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tanada
from delivering his privilege speech. The roll
was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual
practice, to dispense with the reading of the
minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed
by Senators Tirona and David, evidently, again,
in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before
and after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Tanada repeatedly stood up to claim his right
 162 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the
petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored
him; and when after the reading ofthe minutes,
Senator Tanada insisted on being recognized
by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he
would order the arrest of any senator who would
speak without being previously recognized by
him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of
his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continu
ously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!"
everytime the latter would ask for recognition of
Senator Tanada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct
broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-
arrangement. At about this same time Senator
Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's
followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he
moved for adjournment of session, evidently,
again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tanada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition
to the adjournment of the session and this op
position was seconded by herein respondent
who moved that the motion of adjournment be
submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for
adjournment and herein respondent also reit
erated his opposition to the adjournment and
again moved that the motion of Senator David
\m
be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel
and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out
of the session hall followed by Senators David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalonaand Clarin,
while the rest of the senators remained. Where
upon Senator Melecio Arranz, Senate President
Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present
took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
t&ii)
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that
it be made of record it was so made that
the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Arranz andthe remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then sug
gested that respondent be designated to preside,
over the session, which suggestion was carried
'$$} unanimously. The respondent thereupon took
the Chair.
(gig)
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was
approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting
Secretary, because theAssistant Secretary, who
was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tanada, after being recognized by
the Chair, was then finally able to dehver his
privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad
read aloud the complete text of said Resolution
(No. 68), and submittedhis motion forapproval
thereofandthesame was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz
again occupying the Chair, after the respondent
had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad intro
duced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution
declaring vacant the position of the President
of the Senate and designating the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the
Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was
unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
Thenext daythe Presidentofthe Philippines
recognized the respondent as acting president of
the Philippine Senate.
Byhis petition in this quowarranto proceed
ing petitioner asks the Court to declare him the
rightful President of the Philippine Senate and
oust respondent.
The Court has examined allprincipal angles
of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
subject-matter?
b. If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67
validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the
negative, in viewofthe separation ofpowers,the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino
vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over,
by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance
of the Vera case even if the rights of the elec
tors of the suspended senators were allegedly

affected without any immediate remedy. A for
tiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedylies in the Sen
ate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate
domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal
to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revo
lution. No state of things has been proved that
might change the temper of the Filipino people
as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we
should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into
a rash action inconsistent with the calm that
should characterize judicial deliberations.
It is furthermore believed that the recogni
tion accorded by the Chief Executive to the re
spondent makes it adviseable, more than ever,
to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated
by this Court in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these
sub-questions. (1)Was the sessionofthe so-called
rump Senate a continuation of the session val
idly assembled with twenty two Senators in the
morning of February 21,1949?; (2) Was there a
quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the
present to pass on these questions onceit is held,
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over
the case. What follows is the opinion of the bther
four on those subquestions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction,
there is unanimity in the view that the session
under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the
morning session and that a minority often sena
tors may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the
other twelve senators from passing a resolution
that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution
been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation
of the morning session, was it validly consti
tuted? In other words, was there the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 163
of the business of the Senate? Justices Paras,
Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly
because the minutes say so, secondly, because
at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pen-
datun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of
the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority
of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each
House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House"
does not mean "all" the members. Even a major
ity of all the members constitute "the House."
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p.
239). There is a difference between a majority of
"all the members of the House" and a majority
of "the House," the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12)
of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo
believes furthermore that even if the twelve did
not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered
the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members;
if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against
and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justices agree that the
Court being confronted with the practical situa
tion that of the twenty-three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the
days immediately after this decision, twelve
senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as
the rightful President of the Senate, that office
being essentially one that depends exclusively
uponthe willofthe majorityofthe senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President
of that body being amendable at any time by
that majority. And at any sessionhereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid
all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit
of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could
ratify all their acts and thereby place them be
yond the shadow of a doubt.
liBj
164 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
As already stated, the six justices herein
above mentioned voted to dismiss the petition.
i$i) Without costs.
QUERY: Would the same conclusion be
reached ifthe case had happened under the 1987
Constitution?
B. Santiago v. Guingona
G.R No. 134577, November 18, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John
ffifi.l Henry R. Osmena as presiding officer,convened
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of
the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of
party affiliation, the composition of the Senate
was as follows:
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino
(LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Chris
tian
}
Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of
the Philippi nes (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
23 total number of senators 7 (The last six
members are all classified by petitioners as "in
dependent.")
On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Nominated by Sen. Bias F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo
B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
^
Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President.
of the Senate.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that,
with the agreement ofSenator Santiago, alleg
edly the only other member of the minority, he
was assuming the position ofminority leader. He
explained that thos"e who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only
those who had votedforhim,the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader in
formed the body that he was in receiptof a let
ter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue
thereof, the Senate Presidentformally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
Thefollowing day,Senators Santiagoand Ta
tad filed before this Court the subjectpetitionfor
quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had beenusurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, right
fully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the.parties'pleadings, the Courtformu
lated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the
Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave
abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings and a
careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and
con,the Court finds that no constitutional or legal
infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended
the recognition of and the assumption into office
byRespondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.

First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Aue/mo u.
m
Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949), in arguing that this
Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is
the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit
m that the definitions of "majority" and "minority"
involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specificallySection 16(1),Article VI thereof, stat
ing that "[tjhe Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
a) Respondents and the solicitor general, in
their separate Comments, contend in common
that the issue of who is the lawful Senate mi
nority leader is an internal matter pertaining
ie)
exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over
which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction
without transgressing the principle ofseparation
of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is in
volved, as the fundamental law does not provide
for the office of a minority leader in the Senate.
The legislature alone has the full discretion to
provide for such office and, in that event, to de
termine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
ta
Respondents also maintain that Avelino
cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of
the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
aaj
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circum
stances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdic
tion over the petition. The solicitor general adds
that there is not even any legislative practice to
support the petitioner's theory that a senator
who votes for the winning Senate President is
precluded from becoming the minority leader.
iBi
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court
carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important
tig)
and basic question, which it has ruled upon in
the past.
L In Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1068
(1957), this Court endeavored to define political
question. And we said that "it refers to 'those
questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government.' It is con
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 165
cernedwith issues dependentuponthe wisdom,
not [the] legality, of a particular measure."
The Court ruled that the validity ofthe selec
tion of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
by the senators was not a political question. The
choice of these memBers did not depend on the
Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
Thus, the Courtheld that not onlywas it clearly
within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of the selection proceedings, but it was also its
duty to consider and determine the issue.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987
Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
of the political departments. It speaks ofjudicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the
court of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or in
strumentality of the Government."
In the instant controversy, the petitioners
one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist try to hew closely to these
jurisprudential parameters. They claim that
Section 16(1), Article VI of the Constitution, has
not been observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdic
tion over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine,
however, that jurisdiction over the s.ubject mat
ter-of a case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition, regardless of whether
the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of
aj
166 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OPGOVERNMENT
M
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdic
tion over the petition. It is well within the power
tsaj and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse
their discretion in exercise of their functions and
^j
prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the peti
tion, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate
minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
i^i
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate
the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the
affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate
President "by majority vote of all its members"
sSJ
carries with it a judicial duty to determine the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well
as who may elect a minority leader. They argue
^} that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional
provision refers to that group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Senate President and (2)
accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly,
those who voted for the lossing nominee and ac
cepted no such chairmanships comprise the mi
nority, to whom the right to determine the minor
ity leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert,
Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate
minority leader, since he voted for Respondent
Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the
jjS)
members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot
choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan
and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation
proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
jaj
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House.
The term "majority" has been judicially
defined a number of times. When referring to
a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total." The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional
clause simply mean that the Senate President
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all
the senators. Notbyany construaldoes it thereb:
delineatewhocomprise the "majority," muchles:
the "minority," in the said body.And there is n<
showing that the framers of our Constitutioi
had in mind other than the usual meanings o
these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be electee
by a number constituting more than one haL
of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shaL"
ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically becomethe minority leader.
The Comment of Respondent Guingona fur
nishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioner's Reply. During the eighth
Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomina
tion ofSen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President
was seconded by a member of the minority, then
Sen.Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth rejgular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed
the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was
reached to assign committee chairmanships to
all senators, including those belonging to the
minority. This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader
was allowed to chair a committee. History would
also show that the "majority" in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to
which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the "minority" normally referred to a party
with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms
"majority" and "minority." Majority may also re
fer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes," not necessarily more*than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.
In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or fac
tion with a smaller number of votes or adherents
than the majority." Between two unequal parts
or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority,
while the lesser would be the minority. But where
there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
to select the leader representing all the minori
ties. In a government with a multi-party system

such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identi
fied by the Comelec as the "dominant minority
party" for purposes of the general elections. In
the prevailing composition of the present Sen
ate, members either belong to different political
parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribe which of the
many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the
manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on
the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other of
&ffi)
ficers as it may deem necessary." To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
m
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each
house of Congress the power "to determine the
rules of its proceedings." Pursuant thereto, the
Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to
govern its internal affairs.. .
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not pro
vide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the hold
ers thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
m
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts
of the Senate relative thereto...
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their ef-
fectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them." Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the. courts, for said rules may be waived or
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 167
disregardedby the legislativebody at will, upon
the concurrence of a majority.
In view ofthe foregoing, Congressverily has
the power and prerogative to provide for such of
ficers as it may deem. And it is certainly within
its own jurisdiction %tnd discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this preroga
tive. This Court has no authority to interfere
and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles'that it is boundto protectand uphold
the very duty that justifies the Court's being.
Constitutional respect and a becomingregard for
the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal workings
of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be nei
ther a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized
arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
one without color of title or who is not entitled
by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is
the proper legal remedy to determine the right
or title to the contested public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. . .
The action may be brought by the solicitor
general or a public prosecutor or any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise
by another. The action shall be brought against
the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into
or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or
standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the stat
utes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in
no way can it be said that illegality or irregular
ity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption
and exercise ofthe powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of
his specific acts as minority leader.
i-jj-fol
168 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OPGOVERNMENT
C. Arroyo, e* a/, v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
<<&*(i
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibi
^uj tion challenging the validity of Republic Act No.
8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing
Saj
so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on
the manufacture and sale ofbeer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the
House ofRepresentatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Ex
tail
ecutive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and
the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, charging
violation ofthe rules ofthe House which petition
L ers claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House ofRepresen
tatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved
on third reading on September 12, 1996 and
iM
transmitted on September 16,1996 to the Senate
which approved it with certain amendments on
third reading on November 17,1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submit
ted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on Novem
ber 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep.
Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his spon
sorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.
iiiiii
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco
objected to the motion and asked for a head count.
After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The in
'i-tit terpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to
interpellate. . . Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was -going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript ofthe session on Novem
ber 21,1996 ofthe HouseofRepresentatives, as
published by Congress in th,e newspaperissues
of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR,ALBANO. Mr*. Speaker, I movethat
we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
Any objection to the motion?
MR.ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speak
er?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
There being none, approved.
' (Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a min
ute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked
the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
There was a motion by.the Majority Leader
for approval of the report, and the Chair
called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so
I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to
adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries ofboth Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of

Representatives and by the Senate on November
21,1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four
different versions of the transcript of this portion
of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript
of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in
the session hall immediately after the session . not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996,
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained
from the operators of the sound system; (2) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to
3:40 p.m."of November 21, 1996, as certified by
the Chief of the Transcription Division on No-
' vember 21,1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certi-
fied'by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lag-
man; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ
oh three points, to wit: (1) in the audio sound
recording the word "approved," which appears
on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November
'fiifoi 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only
once, while in the other versions it is repeated
three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for
a quorum because I will raise the question of the
quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently de
\l^
nied by respondents. However, there is no need to
discuss this point as petitioners have announced
that, in order to expedite the resolution of this
petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes
of this proceeding the word "approved" appears
in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Repre
sentatives on the conference committee report
on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null
and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House; that these rules embody
the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3)
that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitu
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 169
tion itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1)
in violation ofRuleVIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103
oftherules oftheHouse, theChair, insubmitting
the conference committee reporttothe House, did
for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioningthe presence
of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,
3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
question, "What is that... Mr. Speaker?" and
did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve
or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and in
stead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion
and afterward declared the report approved; and
(4) in violation ofRule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI,
123, and Rule XVIII, 109, the Chair suspended
the sessionwithout first ruling on Rep.Arroyo's
question which, it is alleged, is a point of order
or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon
the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at
the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was
hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De
Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
formally challenging the existence of a quorum
and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound
by the certification of the Speaker of the House
that the law had been properly passed, consider
ing the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass
on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask
for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership
of the Court.
After considering the arguments of the par
ties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion
in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.
 170 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts
that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not
claim that there was no quorum but only that,
by some maneuver allegedly, in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in vary
ing forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
apower to inquire into allegations that, in enacting
a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeha v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."'
We conclude this survey with the useful
summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each
House of Congress to determine its rules of pro
ceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character.
The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Conse
quently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in char
acter. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In this case no rights of private individuals
are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal proceedings
of a House than members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long as no violation
of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the
three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which
our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the
working of our system ofgovernment,jnorethan
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation
of the rules of the House. We must accordingly
decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chiei
Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under
Art. VIII. 1, "nothing involving abuse of discre
tion [by the other branches of the government]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
beyond judicial review." Implicit in this state
ment of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this
Court is subject to the case and controversy re
quirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
left to the political departments to decide, such
as those relating to national security, it has not
altogether done away with political questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art.
VIII, 1, this Court's function is merely [to]
check whether or not the governmental branch
or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has
a different view. In the absence of a showing...

[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power It has no power
to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
If, then, the established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such
a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to
call for the exercise of our Art..VIII, 1 power.
k&\
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage
of the law in the House was "railroaded." They
claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query
to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Al
bano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved
for the approval and ratification of the confer
ence committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: 'There being none, approved." At the
fet
same time the Chair was saying this, however,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that. . . Mr.
Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talk
ing simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's
motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with
the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
the approval of the conference committee report
should have been stated by the Chair and later
the individual votes of the Members should have
been taken. They say that the method used in
this case is a legislator's nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one
or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives
has been cited which specifically requires that
in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the So
licitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No.
fe;.J
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 171
7198 was approved was by no means a unique
one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was
the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code
of 1991 and the conference committee report on
the bills amending the.Tariff and CustomsCode
were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as be
ing contrary to the rules of the House. The point
was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M.
Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of
the Chair. Mr.Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody
objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I
came here-fceven years ago, and it has been
the procedure in this House that ifsomebody
objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised
by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
what his attitude is now on his point of or
der. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance
with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one
that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance,
to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the
Chair announces "The bill is approved on
second reading." If there was any doubt as
to the vote, any motion to divide would have
been proper. So, if that motion is not pre
sented, we assume that the House approves
the measure. So I believe there is substantial
compliance here, and if anybody wants a di
vision of the House he can always ask for it,
and the Chair can announce how many are
in favor and how many are against.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method
to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just. The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method
do not present any matter for judicial consider
ation. ...
 172 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Nor does the Constitution require that the
yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in
the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the
veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact
that in the approval of the original bill the votes
of the Members by yeas and nays had already
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to
repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented
from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result
of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow
the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did
not say anything anymore. While it is true that
the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until
4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep.
Arroyo could at least have objected if there was
anything he wanted to say. The fact, however,
is that he did not. The Journal of November 21,
1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being
no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
iiiiiii
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21,
1996. (Emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December
2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predica
ment was largely of their own making. Instead
of submitting the proper motions for the House
to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency
of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the
passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question
was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep.
Albano's motion to adjourn would have prece
r&ftl dence and would have put an end to any further
consideration of the question.
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how i1
can plausibly be contended that in signing the
bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent
Speaker of the House acted with grave abuse oi
his discretion.
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine
the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses ol
Congress that it was passed on November 21.
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much
energy and learning is devoted in the separate
opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide.
to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is nc
claim either here or in the decision in the EVA1
cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption.
In one case, we "went behind" an enrolled bill
and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved
by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the
contrary, this Court will respect the certification
of the presiding officers of both Houses that a
bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this
Court has refused to determine claims that the
three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts." This Court quoted from Wigmore
on Evidence the following excerpt which embod
ies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
2. Internal discipline.
A. Osmena v. Pendatun
109 Phil. 863(1960)
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio
Osmena, Jr., submitted to this Court a veri
fied petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressman in their capacity
as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for an
nulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringement ofhis parliamentary immunity; he

also asked, principally, that said members of the
special committee be enjoined from proceeding
in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate
his charges against the President with the ad
monition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copyofHouse Resolu
tion No. 59, the pertinent portion of which read
&ffil
as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June,
^|J 1960, the Honorable Sergio Osmena, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives
from the Second District of the province
of Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on
the one hour privilege to deliver a speech,
-entitled 'A Message to Garcia';
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech,
the Congressman from the Second District
of Cebu states the following:
xxxx
"The people, Mr. President, have been
hearing of ugly reports that under your un
popular administration the free things they
used to get from the government are now for
sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of
the gravity and seriousness of a criminal
case, the culprit can always be bailed out for
ever from jail as long as he can come across
with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an
anomalous situation would reflect badly on
the kind of justice that your administration
is dispensing, x x x"
WHEREAS, the charge of the gentleman
from the Second District of Cebu, if niade
maliciously or recklessly and without basis
in truth and fact, would constitute a seri
ous assault upon the dignity and prestige
of the Office of the President, which is the
one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the
Filipino people and would expose said office
to contempt, and disrepute: xxx
Resolved by the House ofRepresentatives,
that a special committee of fifteen members
to be appointed by the Speaker be and the
same hereby is, created to investigate the
truth of the charges against the President of
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 173
the Philippines, made by Honorable Sergio
Osmena, Jr., in his privilege speechofJune
23, I960, and for such purpose it is autho
rized to summon Honorable SergioOsmena,
Jr., to appear before it to substantiate his
charges as well a$ to issue subpoena and/or
subpoena duces tecum to require the atten
dance of witnesses and/or the production of
pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable
Sergio Osmena, Jr., fails to do so to require
him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special commit
tee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session
of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Os
mena alleged: first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity
for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech
and words, the House took up other business,
and Rule XVII, Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House
provides that if other business had intervened
after the Member had uttered obnoxious words
in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor
nor be subject to censure by the House.
There is no question that Congressman
Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before
the House, made the serious imputations of
bribery against the President which are quoted
in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created
for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for
having made the imputations and for failing to
produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by
resolution of the House, suspended from office
for a period of fifteen months, for serious disor
derly behavior.
As previously stated Osmena contended in
his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him
complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no
disorderly behavior for which he could be pun-
L>
174 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
ished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned
and disciplined therefore, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other
business before approving House Resolution No.
59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that
the House has no power, under the Constitution
to suspend one of its members.
Section 15 of Article VI of our Constitution
provides that "for any speech or debate" in Con
gress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives "shall not be questioned in any
other place." This section was taken or is a copy
of Sec. 6, Clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution
of the United States. In that country, the provi
sion has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions
for their words uttered in Congress, the members
of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamen
tary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parlia
ment, its purpose is "to enable and encourage
a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and.success" for "it
is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy
the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense." [Terry v. Brand-
howe, 341 U.S. 367.] Such immunity has come
to this country from the practices of Parliament
as construed and applied by the Congress of the
United States. Its extent and application remain
no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil ac
tions before the courts or any other forum outside
of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are con
sidered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was
censured for using the following language on the
^jpt
feM
floor ofthe House: "Amonstrosity, a measure the
most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol.
2, pp. 789-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during
debate. (2 Hinds' Precedent, 799-801). In one
case, a member of Congress was summoned to
testify on a statement made by him in debate
but he invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Prec
edents 123-124).
For unparliamentary conduct, members
of Parliament or Congress have been, or_could
be censured, committed to prison, [Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 189; Hiss v. Barlett and
Gray, 468, 63 Am, Rec. 768, 770.] suspended,
even 'expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
The appendix to this decision amply attests to
the consensus of informed opinion regarding the
practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension
of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine
Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for
one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine
House ojF Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of the petition
er: the House may no longer take action against
me, he argues, because after my speech, and
before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken
up other business. Respondents answer that
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved
by the house, that such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according
to standard parliamentary practice may be.done
by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the
House may suspend the operation of its Rules,
it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its
right to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to
laws [Rules of the House have not the force of
 176 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
lamation, February 28 and that the appellant
is charged with having violated the provisions
ofAct No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment ofthe Legislature, andthis reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or
extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court
can take judicial notice of the journals. These
questions will beconsidered in thereverse order.
... On page 793 ofVolume 7 ofthe Commis
sion Journal for the ordinary and special sessions
ofthe Third Philippine Legislature, the following
appears:
"The Journal for Saturday, February
28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine
die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature. Thehourofmidnight
having arrived, on motion of Commissioner
Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber ofthe
PhilippineLegislature, adjournedsinedie."
While there are adjudicated cases in this
jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the
$j&
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts
in determiningthe questionwhether a particular
bill became a law or not. The result is that the
law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty
to take judicial notice ofthe legislative journals
of the special session of the Philippine Legisla
ture of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous
or contradictory as to the aetual time ofadjourn
ment. They show, with absolute certainty, that
the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the
printed Act (No. 2381), published byauthority of
law, is conclusive evidence as to the date whenit
was passed, we will inquire whether the courts
l&afc,) may go behind the legislative journals for the
purpose ofdetermining the date ofadjournment
when such journals are clear and explicit. From
the foregoing it is clear that this investigation
belongs entirely to the branch of legal science
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evi
dence. On the one hand, it is maintained that
the Legislature did not, as we have indicated,
adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but
on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged
fact may be established by extraneous evidence;
while, on the other hand, it is urged that the
contents ofthe legislative journals are conclusive
evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order
to understand these opposing positions, it is nec
essarytoconsider the nature and characterofthe
evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood
to be that which proves or disproves "any matter
in question or to influence the beliefrespecting
it," and "conclusive evidence is that whichestab
lishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol.
1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in
order to establish his contention, must neces
sarily depend upon the memory or recollection
of witnesses, while the legislative journals are
the acts of the Government or sovereign itself.
Fromtheir very nature and objectthe records of
the Legislature are as important as those of the
judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity ofthe
journals ofthe Philippine Legislature, whenthey
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Govern
ment was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. But
counsel in his argument says that the public
knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped
on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so
until the determination of the discussion of all
pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands
of the clock was stayed in order to enable the
Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently
within the time fixedby the Governor's proclama
tion for the expiration of the special session, in
direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. If the clock, was in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight
as compared with that ofaltering the probative
force and character of legislative records, and
making the proof of legislative action depend
upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death or absence* and so imperfect on account
ofthe treachery ofmemory. Long, longcenturies
ago, these considerations of public policy led to
the adoption ofthe rule giving verity and unim
peachability to legislative records.." (Capito vs.
Topping, W. Vds., 22 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1089.)

... As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Fed
jffiij eral Government and the various states, we do
not hesitate to follow the courts in that country
in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight
on February 28, 1914. This settles the question,
and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.
fe)
B. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenez
7 SCRA 347(1963)
CONCEPCION, J.:
The only question for determination in this
case is whether omot "urea" and "formaldehyde"
are exempt by the law from the payment of the
jgg) aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
"The margin established by the Mon
etary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon
the sale of foreign exchange for the importa
tion of the following:
xxxxx
"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users."
Petitioners maintains that the term "urea
formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (italics
ours) and that respondent herein, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank,
have erred in holding otherwise. In this connec
tion, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials
in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the
National Institute of Science and Technology
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the
view that:
"Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical
solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as
condensation product from definite propor
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 177
tions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity,
and time of reaction. This produce when ap
plied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low
cost adhesive fo* use in the manufacture of
plywood."
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a
finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde."
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill ap
proved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and
"formaldehyde," and that the members of Con
gress intended to exempt "urea" and "formalde
hyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea formaldehyde," not the latter as finished
product, citing in support of this view the state
ments made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But, said individual state
ments do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of
the House of Representatives ... Furthermore,
it is well settled that the enrolled bill which
uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the Presi
dent. (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14,
1961). If there has been any mistake in the print
ing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and under
mining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or cu
rative legislation, not by judicial decree.
C. Astorga v. Villegas
56 SCRA 714 (1974)
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
The present controversy revolves around
the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which be-
 178 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
came Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice Mayor of
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the
Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic
Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
iik Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear
undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a
bill of local application, was filed in the House
$i) of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21,1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate Com
mittee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
&^\
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.
The committee favorably recommended approval
with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator
$pa&\
Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Pro tempore of the Municipal Board
who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of
the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments to Section l89 were
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Sen
ate. The amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Sen
ate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Sen
ate sent a letter to the House of Representatives
that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
L Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended
by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amend
ments which were the ones actually approved
by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No.
9266 as sent back to it, and copies were then cer
tified and attested by the Secretary of the House
of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate
and the Senate President. On June 16,1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed
copies of the bill to the President of the Philip-
89Amending Section 10 of R.A. No. 409 defining the pow
ers and duties of the Vice-Mayor.
pines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way
of approval of June 18,1964. The bill thereupon
became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a
result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction
from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 is
sued a press statement that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President of the Philippines was a wrong version
of the bill actually passed by the Senate because
it did not embody the amendments introduced
by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence the Senate President, through the
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated
July 11,1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses
as well as by the presiding officers thereof was
not the bill duly approved by Congress and that
he considered his signature on the enrolled bill
as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter
dated July 21,1964 made the further clarification
that the invalidation by the Senate President of
his signature meant that the bill on which his
signature appeared had never been approved by
the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the
bill a valid enactment.
On July 31,1964 the President of the Philip
pines sent a message to the presiding officers of
both Houses of Congress informing them that
in view of the circumstances he was officially
withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
9266 (which had been returned to the Senate
the previous July 3), adding that "it would be
untenable and against public policy to convert
into law what was not actually approved by the
two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Ma
nila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments.in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic
Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city
police force who had been assigned to the Vice-
Mayor presumably under authority of Republic
Act 4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor
Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A.
Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on Sep
tember 7,1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/
or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents
Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief
of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and ihe
Members of the municipal board to comply with
the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
gg)
Respondents' position is that the so-called
Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was
not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and
not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in
the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respon
L dent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an
official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, ''enjoining the petitioner Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any
of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly
conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under
the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not other
wise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any
other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, HerminioA.Astorga,
has since been succeeded by others as Vice-
Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon
and Antonio Reguiza, with previous leave of this
&y
Court, appeared as amid curiae, and have filed
extensive and highly enlightening memoranda
on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious
citations of authorities, principally decisions of
United States Federal and State Courts, have
been submitted on the question of whether the
"enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry"
rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A
similar question came up before this Court and
elicited differing opinions in the caseofMabanag,
et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78
Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court
in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine,
it cannot be truly said that the question has
been laid to rest and that the decision therein
jM
constitutes a binding precedent.
&}
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 179
The issue in that case was whether or not a
resolution ofboth Houses ofCongress proposing
an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called
parity rights provision) had been passed by "a
vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives"
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro
Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V.
Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hon-
tiveros, held that the case involved a political
question which was not within the province of
the judiciary in view of the principle of separa
tion of powers in our government. The "enrolled
bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the
ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reason
ing being that "if a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule'
born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate
opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla,
holding that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve
the question presented, and affirming categori
cally that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and
the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as
amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the
Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil proce
dure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis
on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Com
mission, or of any legislative body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress (may be proved) by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or
by copies certified by the clerk or secretary,
printed by their order; provided, that in the
case of acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding of
ficers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authen
ticating bills duly approved by both Houses,
 180 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
fifaftl
namely, by the signatures of their respective pre
siding officersand secretaries on the printed copy
of the approved bill.90 It has been held that this
procedureis merelya modeofauthentication,91 to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being
presented to him has been duly approved by Con
gress and is ready for his approval or rejection.92
The function of an attestation is therefore not of
approval, because a bill is considered approved
r&fc)
after it has passed both Houses. Even where
such attestation is provided for in the Constitu
tion authorities are divided as to whether or not
$0 the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid.93 The
affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in
effect giving the presiding officers the power
of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to
the contrary*94 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill
where the Constitution does not even provide
that the presiding officers should sign the bill
before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the
(State) Constitution required the presiding offi
cers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill
was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment.95 Another case however, under the
same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill
was not conclusive evidence.96 But in the case of
Field vs. Clark,97 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the signatures of the presiding officers on a
igl
bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authori
ties in the United States are thus not unanimous
on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is
set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark ...
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory
is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal
and independent departments," which requires
xSee Rules of the House of Representatives, Rules 11(d)
and WO) and the Rules of the Senate; Sections 3(e) and 6(h).
9,Brown v. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160,164
92Taylor v. Wilson, 22 NW 119,120.
MSee Annotations in 95 ALR 273.
wBrown v. Morris, supra, at pp. 164-165.
^a ^Hammond v. Lynch, 151 NW 81,88.
"Lynch v. Hutchinson, 76 NE 370.
87143 U.S. 294, 303; 36 L.ed. 294.
gjiii
Msi
the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated." Thus it has also been stated
in other cases that if the attestation is absent
and the same is not required for the validity of
a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its
due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions,98 although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still
be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what
shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill.
It does not require the presiding officers to cer
tify to the same. But the said Constitution does
contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10(4). "Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may in its judgment require secrecy; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members pres
ent, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21. (2). "No bill shall be passed by ei
ther House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereofin its final form furnished
its Members at least three calendar days
' prior to its passage, except when the Presi
dent shall have certified to the necessity of
its immediate enactment. Upon the last read
ing of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage
shall be taken immediately thereafter and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of
the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a coequal department of the
government,99 is neutralized in this case by the
fact that the Senate President declared his sig
nature on the bill to be invalid and issued a sub
sequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had
"Gray v. Taylor, 113 P 558,591, affirmed in 227 U.S. 51,
57, 57 L.ed. 413, 416; Pelt v. Payne, 30 SW 426,427.
"Field v. Clark, supra, at p. 303; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1,13; Morales v. Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27,1969, 27
SCRA 131, 134.
 yt
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously
this declaration should be accordedevengreater
Effi*l respect than the attestation it invalidated, which
it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
undisputable in logic.
$$ As far as Congress itself is concerned, there
is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made
by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law-making process in
Congressends when the bill is approvedby both
Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already
\^J
present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the
(1935) Constitution says that "[e]very billpassed
by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President."100 In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
interpreting a similar provision in the State Con
stitution, said that the same "makes it clear that
the indispensable step is the final passage and
it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted
as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer,
other proof that it has 'passed both houses' will
ijjjj) satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the
bill is not mandatory but argues that the dis
claimerthereofbythe Senate President, granting
it to have been validly made, would only mean
that there was no attestation at all, but would
not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is
pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain
valid and binding. This argument begs the issue.
L It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of
its absence upon the vaHdity of the statute. The
inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such at
testation as result of the disclaimer, and conse
quently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case
the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings ofeach House
of Congressis no ordinary record. The Constitu
""ArticleVI, Section 20(1).The 1973 Constitution simi
frfo'J
larly provides inArticle VIII, Section 20(i) that"[E]very bill
passed by the National Assembly shall, before it-becomes a
law, be presented to the Prime Minister x x x."
ijjii
^j
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 181
tion requires it. While it is true that thejournal
is not authenticated and is subject to the risks
of misprinting and other errors, the point is ir
relevantin this case. This courtis merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances ofthis.case,this
Courtcan do this and resort to the Senatejour
nal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were intro
duced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but werenot incorporatedin the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This court
is not asked to incorporate such amendments
into the alleged law, which admitted is a risky
undertaking,101 but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of
the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and subse
quently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rec
tification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the
petition is denied and the so-called RepublicAct
No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OFREPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED FOURHUNDRED NINE,AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MA
NILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted
and therefore didnot become law.The temporary
restraining order dated April 28,1965 is hereby
made permanent.
NOTE: The duty to keep a Journal has a dual
purpose: (1) "to insure publicity to the proceed
ings of the legislature, and a correspondent
mSee, for example, the decision of this Court in Casco
Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963, 7
SCRA 347 and Morales v. Subido, supra.
 182 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
^ffii
responsibility of the members to their respective
constituents," and (2) to provide proof of what
actually transpired in the legislature. 1 Story
Commentaries 840, quoted with approval in Field
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).
^i The Constitution exempts from publication
only such matters "as may, in [the Congress!
judgment, affect national security." This new
rule is an application of Section 7 of the Bill of
Rights which says:
The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recog
nized. Access to official records, and to
.documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
If the enrolled bill conflicts with the Journal
i^>
on a matter required by the Constitution to be
entered in the Journal, which should prevail? The
Supreme Court has explicitly left this matter an
open question in Moralesv. Subido,27 SCRA131
(1969).
SEC. 17. THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF
ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELEC
TION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS
OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS.
EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE
COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS, THREE
OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO BE DESIGNATED
BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE, AND THE RE
iiiiiiiJ
MAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REP
RESENTATIVES, AS THE CASE MAY BE,
WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS
OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND
THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS
REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE
SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN.
1. The Electoral Tribunals.
A. Angara v. -Electoral
Commission
63 Phil. 134(1936)
LAUREL, J.:
Having disposed of the question of jurisdic
tion, we shall now proceed to pass upon the
second proposition and determine whether the
Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution
of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the elec
tion of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereofby the National As
sembly on December 3,1935. As able counsel for
the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges
on the interpretation of Section 4 of Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Com
mission composed of three Justices of the Su
preme Court designated by the ChiefJustice,
and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provi
sion and inquire into the intention of its framers
and the people who adopted it so that we may
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and
significance.
The original provision regarding this subject
in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (Sec. 7,
par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly
shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members," was taken from
clause 1 of Section 5, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States providing that "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members,***." The Act

of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1)
modified this provision by the insertion of the
word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall
be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members,***"
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each
House of the Legislature over the particular cases
therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, respec
tively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919],
39 Phil. 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an
independent tribunal for the purpose of decid
ing contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
of the Constitutional Convention, which sub
committee submitted a report on August 30,
1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal
of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
protests not only against the election of members
of the legislature but also against the election of
executive officers for whose election the vote of
the whole nation is required, as well as to initi
ate impeachment proceedings against specified
executive and judicial officers. For the purpose
of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was
to be composed of three justice designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house
&fl
of the legislature to which the contest corre
sponds, three members to be designated by the
majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the
Chief Justice is also a member in which case the
latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was
submitted by the Committee on Constitutional
miiJ
Guarantees to the Convention on September 15,
1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four
Mfo\
members, that is, two senators to be designated
one each from the two major parties in the Sen
ate and two representatives to be designated one
each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representa
tion to the executive department in the persons
of two representatives to be designated by the
fi/iji
President.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 183
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative
Power was also preparing its report. As submit
ted to the Convention on September 24, 1934,
subsection 5, Section 5, of the proposed Article
on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections* returns and qualifica
tions of the members of either House and all
cases contesting the election of any of their
members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House,
by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of
votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitu
tional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction
as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees which was probably inspired by
the Spanish plan (Art. 121, Constitution of the
Spanish Republic of 1931); was soon abandoned
in favor of the proposition of the Committee on
Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as an Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modi
fied the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the
Electoral Commission and made further changes
in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature.
The draft as finally submitted to the Convention
on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and quali
fications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the elec
tion of any of its Members shall be judged
by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having
the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of
the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of
said justices.
 184 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
jjijtfjj
During the discussion of the amendment
introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo,
and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "The National As
sembly shall be the sole and exclusive judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
Members," the following illuminating remarks
were made on the floor of the Convention in its
j^js)
session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
********
"Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have
a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning
of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11
E&i&l of the draft, reading: The elections, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the Na
tional Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged
by an Electoral Commission, ***,' I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the
Member whose election is not contested shall
also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question
about the election of the members, there is
nothing to be judged; that is why the word
'judge' is used to indicate a controversy. If
there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to
the Electoral Commission and there is noth
ing to be determined.
&&1
"Mr. VENTURA. But does that, carry
the idea also that the Electoral Commission
shall confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?
"Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confir
mation. As the gentleman knows, the action
of the House of Representatives confirming
the election of its members is just a matter of
the rules of the assembly. It is not constitu
tional. It is not necessary. After a man files
his credentials that he has been elected, that
is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
tjijjfrl "Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that
this is sufficient, as we have observed that
for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of
election of a member to a legislative body,
because he will not authorize his pay.
"Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with
regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
in this case the municipal council pro
claims who has been elected, and it ends
there, unless there is contest. It is the same
case; there is no need on the part of the Elec
toral Commission unless there is a contest.
The first clause refers to the case referred
to by the gentleman from Cavite where one
person tries to be elected in place of another
who was declared elected. For example, in
a case when the residence of the man who
has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected
is in question.
"However, if the assembly desires to an
nul the power of the commission, it may do
so by certain maneuvers upon its first meet
ing when the returns are submitted to the
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Elec
toral Commission all the powers exercised
by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns and qualifications of the members.
When there is no contest, there is nothing
to be judged.
"Mr. VENTURA, Then it should be
eliminated.
"Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different mat
ter, I think, Mr. Delegate.
"Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a
similar question as that propounded by the
gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose
a while ago. However, I want to ask more
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites
cases contesting the election as separate from
the first part of the section which refers to
elections, returns and qualifications.
"Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake
of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elec
tions are already included in the phrase 'the
elections, returns and qualifications.' This
phrase 'and contested elections'was inserted
merely for the sake of clarity.

E&I-&4
"Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph,
may not the Electoral Commission, at its
own instance, refuse to confirm the election
of the members?
"Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless
there is a protest.
"Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the
gentleman yield?
[m
'THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may
yield, if he so desires.
"Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
"Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentle
man from Capiz believe that unless this
power is granted to the assembly, the as
sembly on its own motion does not have the
right to contest the election and qualification
of its members?
"Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that
the gentleman is right. If this draft is re
tained as it is, even if two-thirds of the as
sembly believe that a member has not the
qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to
rempve shall only be retained by the Elec
toral Commission.
p$)
"Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for mis
conduct.
"Mr. LABRADOR. 1 mean with respect
to the qualifications of the members.
"Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can
question the eligibility, he must go to the
Electoral Commission and make the question
before the Electoral Commission.
*Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral
Commission shall decide whether the election
is contested or not contested.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir; that is thepurpose.
"Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would
like to be informed if the Electoral Commis
sion has power and authority to pass upon
the qualification of the members of the Na
tional Assembly even though that question
has not been raised.
I
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 185
"Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they
havenopower, because they canonlyjudge."
> In the same session, the first clause of
the aforesaid draft reading 'The election,
returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly and" was eliminated
by the Sponsoring Committee in response
to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim
Mumar and others. In explaining the differ
ence between the original draft and the draft
as amended Delegate Roxas speaking for the
Sponsoring Committee said:
*******
"Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, senor Presi-
dente, consiste solamente en obviarla objecion
apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de
que la primera clausula del draft que dice:
"The elections, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly'
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion
de los miembros que no han sido protesta-
dos y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos
que la enmienda tiene razon en ese sentido,
si enmenlamos el draft, de tal modo que se
lea como sigue: 'Allcases contesting the elec
tion', de modo que losjueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos
en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador
was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la
enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del
Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el
Comite?
"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el
draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y
otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Su-
prema, no creo Su Senoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miem
bros del Tribunal Supremo?
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si
el tribunal o la Comision esta constituido en
^l
186 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros
a&ftl
de la Corte Surpema consideraran la cues-
tion sobre la base de us meritos, sabiendo
que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar
el triunfo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que
en un caso como ese, podriamos hancer que
tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el
partidismo no les daria el triunfo."
********
The amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore
the power to decide contests relating to the elec
tion, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly to the National Assembly
itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934,
Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft
bj' reducing the representation of the minority
party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to ac
cord more representation to the majority party.
The Convention rejected this amendment by a
vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46),
thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft
was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections,
returns and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly shall be judged
by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having
the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of
the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of
' said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was
submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4.' There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the larg
est number of votes arid three by the party
having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commis
sion shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly."
When the foregoing draft was submitted for
approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Com
mittee, through President Recto, to effectuate
the original intention of the Convention agreed
to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
between the phrase "judge of and the words
"the election." which was accordingly accepted
by the Convention.
The members of the Constitutional Conven
tion who framed our fundamental law were in
their majority men mature in years and ex
perience. To be sure, many of them were familiar
with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When, therefore,
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Com
mission as a constitutional organ and invested it
with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifica
tions of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of
their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission
was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the
plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by
that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that
can be said now is that upon the approval of the
Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Com
mission is the expression of the wisdom and "ul
timate justice of the people." (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

B. Abbas, et al. v. Senate
166 SCRA 651 (1988)
GANCAYCO, J.:
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed
before the respondent Tribunal an election
contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition
who were proclaimed senators-elect in the
May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the
U/til
Commission on Elections. The respondent
Tribunal was at the time composed of three
(3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro
L. Yap (Chairman), Associate Justices Andres
R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and
Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales,
iilWl
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal
A.J. Tamano and Victor Ziga.
On November 17,1987, the petitioners, with
the exception of Senator Estrada but including
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been desig
nated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator
Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the
Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the re
spondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
^j
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case
No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are
im interested parties to said case, as respondents
therein....
The petitioners, in essence, argue that con
siderations of public policy and the norms of
fair play and due process imperatively require
the mass disqualification sought and that the
doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be
the foundation of the questioned Resolutions
does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
fa*i
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules
of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's
Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions
of whatever nature is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 187
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if
not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with-
no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situ
ation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in .the context of the situation, leave
the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that
the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor
repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that
in fact the most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Sec
tion 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdic
tion and powers.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus provid
ing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices
of the Supreme Court and Members of the Sen
ate, the Constitution intended that both those
"judicial" and "legislative" components com
monly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribu
nal correctly stated one part of this proposition
when it held that said provision "x x x is clear
expression of an intent that all (such) contests x
x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are
represented." The other part, of course, is that
the constitutional provision just as clearly man
dates the participation in the same process of
decision of a representative or representatives
of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by
the fact that the proportion of Senators to Jus
tices in the prescribed membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 an unmistakable
indication that the "legislative component" can
not be totally excluded from participation in
the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent
of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which
precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting
in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
(Ml&i
188 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the Senate without inviting the same objections
to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge
if shorn of the participation of its entire member
ship of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consid
eration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is
in the highest public interest as evidenced by
its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
C. Bondoc v. Pineda
jffliffli G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a question of power. May
the House of Representatives, at the request of
the dominant political party therein, change that
party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a deci
sion freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court
iMJ
review and annul that action of the House?
In the local and congressional elections held
on May 11,1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the La-
ban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
tiigj
were rival candidates for the position of Repre
sentative for the Fourth District of the province
of Pampanga. Each received the following votes
&wll
in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes
Difference 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed
winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed
a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (for short).
which is composed of nine (9) members, thre<
of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court anc
the remaining six are members of the House o:
Representatives chosen on the basis of propor
tiqnal representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered undei
the party-list system represented therein (Sec
17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)...
After the revision of the ballots, the presenta
tion of evidence, and submission of memoranda.
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in
July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached
in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin
of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the
LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast
in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least
four (4) months the finalization of the decision
in the case.
The re-examination and re-appreciation of
the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead
over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camas
ura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congress
man Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to
his "Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco,
Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final
tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted
for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice
and self-respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's
agreement" among the members of the HRET
that they would "abide by the result of the ap
preciation of the contested ballot Congressman
Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest
in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting
appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5,1991, the HRET issued a Notice
of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991
at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of
the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the prom
ulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by

letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur,
by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled
him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from
the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Dandihg" Co
juangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political
party; and that as those acts are "not only in
imical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but
also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on
March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions.
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco
notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the
ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and
asked the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters
ii^
where party membership is a prerequisite.
At 9:45 in the morning of March 14, 1991,
the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice
Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following
letter dated March 13,1991, from the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representa
fasaaA tives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of
the letter from the LDP, the House of Represen
tatives, during its plenary session on March 13,
1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter
reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
liiiip Constitution Hills
Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Elec
toral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13
March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal
on the basis of an LDP communication which is
Eiifi
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 189
self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto
attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
Officer-in-charge
Operations Department
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano
promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associ
ate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of
this "distressing development" and asked to be
relieved from their assignments in the HRET.
By the above action (of the House) the prom
ulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the
electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda"
(HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for
14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even
if there were no legal impediment to its prom
ulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5
to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the
party-litigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready
as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23
votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because
some members of the Tribunal requested re-ap
preciation of some ballots, the finalization of the
decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the deci
sion, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz
and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen
Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles,
is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A.
Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose
E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's votein the Bondoc
v.Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote,
for which he earned the respect pi the Tribunal
but also the loss of the confidence of the leader
of his party.
 190 CONSTITUTIONALSTRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Under the above circumstances an untenable
situation has come about. It is extremely difficult
to continue with membership in the Tribunal
i&iiftj
and for the Tribunal to preserve it. Integrity
and credibility as a constitutional body charged
with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the
unseating of an incumbent member of Congress
is being prevented at all costs. We believe that
the Tribunal should not be hampered in the per
formance of its constitutional function by factors
which have nothing to do with the merits of the
cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience
teaches that the provision for proportional rep
resentation in the Tribunal found in Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be
amended to provide instead fbr a return to the
composition mandated in the*1935 Constitution,
that is: three (3) members chosen by the House
or Senate upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes and three (3) of the
party having the second largest number of votes:
and a judicial component consisting of three (3)
justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no
party or coalition of parties can dominate the
legislative component in the Tribunal.
^i
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal could perhaps sit as the Sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the, House of Rep
resentatives. Similarly, the House of Represen
tatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of
the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser
chances of non-judicial elements playing a de
cisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provi
sion in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so
designated should divest themselves of affiliation
with their respective political parties, to insure
their independence and objectivity as they sit in
Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for
decision by the' Tribunal. Bondoc should have
been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera
v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v.
&i)
Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy
Week recess.
t^J
But political factors are blocking the accom
plishment of the constitutionally mandated task
of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of
the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled
to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
XXX XXX XXX
At the open session of the HRET in the
afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulga
tion of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The
resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has
received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held
on March 13,1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congress
man Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, the Tribunal Resolved to
cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc
vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this
afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concur
rence offive members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot
be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Jus
tices-members of the Supreme Court, being of
the opinion that this development undermines
the independence of the Tribunal and derails the
orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have
asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date,
for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congress
man Cerilles also manifested his intention to
resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congress
men Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention,
(p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19,1991, this Court, after deliber
ating on the request for relief ofJustices Herrera,
Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to
return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court
observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional
functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the
iiiiijj)
'sole judge' of all contests relationship to
the election, returns and qualifications of
]kM
the members of Congress, all members of
these bodies are appropriately guided only
by purely legal considerations in the decision
of the cases before them and that in the con
templation of the Constitution the members-
legislators, thereof, upon assumption oftheir
duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer
^)
as representatives of their respective politi
cal parties but as impartial judges. The view
was also submitted that, to further bolster
i&J the independence of the Tribunals, the term
of office of every member thereof should be
considered co-extensive with the correspond
ing legislative term and may not be legally
terminated except only by death, resignation,
permanent disability, or removal for valid
cause, not including political disloyalty.
m)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to
DECLINE the request ofjustices Herrera, Cruz,
and Feliciano to be relieved from their member
'^ ship in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume
their duties therein; b) to EXPRESS its concern
over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions
purely judicial in character despite the inclusion
tiui) oflegislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE
the view that the term of all the members of the
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
'M&
legislature, is co-extensive with the correspond
ing legislative term and cannot be terminated
at will but only for valid legal cause, and to
REQUIRE the Justices-members ofthe Tribunal
to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the
first instance.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives
Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol,
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other repre
sentative who may be appointed Vice Represen
iiiiijljj tative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying
this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Rep
resentatives of March 13, 1991, "to withdraw
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 191
the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining
respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be des
ignated in place of respondent Camasura from
assuming, occupying and discharging functions
as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering re
spondent Camasura to immediately reassume
and discharge his functions as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just
and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, with
out giving it due course, required the respondents
to comment on the petition within ten days from
notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganiz
ing and allowing participation in its proceedings
of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever
is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G.
Camasura in said House of Representatives Elec
toral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal
of the nomination and rescission of the election
of said Congressman Camasura as member of
the HRET by the House of Representatives is
resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered
by the Court."
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did
not oppose the petition. >
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea
for the dismissal of the petition is centered
on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members.
Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the
Commission on Appointments as well), hence,
it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of
them whenever the ratio in the representation
of the political parties in the House or Senate
is materially changed on account of death,
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party; that a Tribunal member's term
of office is not co-extensive with his legislative
term, for if a member of the Tribunal who-
changes his party affiliation is not removed
from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision
i 4jjj)
192 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
lifltift
mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified; and that 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11M
tf&J the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from
the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 3 jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
and the decision to rescind his membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative
of the House-of-Representatives, hence, it is a
purely political question beyond the reach of
judicial review.
Now, is the House of Representatives em
powered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to
;$$}
interfere with the disposition of an election con
test in the House Electoral Tribunal through the
ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the
tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitu
tion . . . re-echoes Section 11, Article VI of the
1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in
the tribunal which is now based on proportional
representation from all the political parties, in
stead of equal representation of three members
from each of the first and second largest political
aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 con
^J stitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have an Electoral
^y Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of ail
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be desig
nated by the Chief Justice, and the remain
ing six shall be Members of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House,
three upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest member of
votes therein. The senior Justice in each
$$) Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1
935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices
held the deciding votes, and it was impossible
for any political party to control the voting in
the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an
electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section
the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive
judge ofcontests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives(Robles vs. HouseofRepresenta
tives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, Febru
ary 5,1990). The tribunal was created to function
as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-politicalbody
in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as
well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional conven
tion creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for the determination of contests to legislative
office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commis
sion to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assem
bly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the solejudge of all con
tests relating to election returns and qualifica
tions of members of the legislative houses, and,
as such, are independent bodies which must be
permitted to select their own employees, and to
supervise and control them, without any legisla
tive interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant
of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction,
the House Electoral Tribunal must be indepen
dent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congres
sional electioncontests is not to be shared by it
with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits ofits authority, an

independent organ; while composed of a majority
of members of the legislature it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
XXX XXX XXX
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional
organ created for the specific purpose of deter
mining contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assem
bly may not be interfered with by the judiciary
when and while acting within the limits of its au
thority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
\S$}
over the Electoral Commission for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the commission as
sole judge of all contests relating to the election
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139.)
TheJndependence of the electoral tribunal
was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Con
ili stitution...
The independence of the House Electoral
Tribunal, so zealously guarded by the fram
ers of our Constitution, would, however, be a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein,
may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of
the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of
the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representa
tives removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to
the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of
the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional preroga
tive of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the
sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House
of Representatives in the work of the House
Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to
a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party
in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would
be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 193
may as well abandon all hope at'the threshold
of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to partyis not a valid cause
for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must
be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartial
ity, and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence,
"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party disci
pline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of
a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congress
man Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result ofthe examination and appreciation
of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives commit
ted a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and
a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura
violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expul
sion resolution of the House of Representatives
is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right
to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as
"sole judge" of congressional election contests,
are entitled to security of tenure just as mem
bers of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIH, 1987
Constitution). Therefore, membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration
of the member's congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party,
or removal for other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group.
As the records of this case fail to show that Con
gressman Camasura has become a registered
memberofanother political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a
valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security
of tenure.
 194 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
ig)
There is nothing to the argument of respon
dent Pineda that members of the House Electoral
<j Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure
because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the
end of the congressional term, namely: ChiefJus
tice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to
the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Jus
tice Florentino P. feliciano, and the latter, who
was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of
absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It
Hi should be stressed, however, that those changes
in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present
attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to
resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano
to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their
own free will, for valid reasons, and with no co
vert design to derail the disposition of a pending
case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is dif
ferent. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP
to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had
revealed to the Secretary-General of the party
how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose
of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was
to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the
HRETs decision may not be promulgated, and
so that the way could be cleared for the LDP
to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the
LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly
aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's
vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been
invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights
against the strong arm of the majority party in
the House of Representatives. The Court cannot
be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his
charge that the House of Representatives had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in remov
ing Congressman Camasura from the House
gj
Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as
guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its jur
dicial power and discharge its duty to protect his
rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the
House. The Court must perform its duty under
the Constitution "even when the violator be the
highest official of the land or the Government
itself' (Concurring opinion ofJ. AntonioBarredc
in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Cama
sura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the
House of Representatives was not for a lawful
and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with
the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and
to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House
of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, there
fore, ^declare null and void the resolution dated
March 13,1991 of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of Congressman Camasura as a member
of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner,
Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he
prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is granted. The deci
sion of the House of Representatives withdraw
ing the nomination and rescinding the election
of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as
a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
hereby declared null and void ab initio for being
violative of the Constitution, and Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated
to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.
Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Consid
ering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice
of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
and in the interest ofjustice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be
done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., disssented.

ffiffi
D>. Guerrero v. Comelec
G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
In the Second Division of the COMELEC,
Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent
Farinas as a candidate for the position of Con
gressman. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman
in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to
?%i file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office...
itfl
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of
the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98-227,
disposing as follows:
ijfM
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to
DISMISS the instant petition for utter lack of
merit.
t&iii
"SO ORDERED."
$$i
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed
through as scheduled. The post-election tally of
votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farinas got a
'/>l total of 56,369 votes representing the highest
number of votes received in the first district.
Farinas was duly proclaimed winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could
not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farinas,
^>
since the latter was not the official candidate
of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP), but was an independent candidate.
Another person cannot substitute for an inde
&&\
pendent candidate. Thus, Farinas' certificate of
candidacy claiming to be the official candidate
of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Farinas was
igi fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
On June 3,1998, Farinas took his oath of of
fice as a member of the House of Representatives.
Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the
following grounds:
'm
jjy
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 195
We find pertinent for our resolution this
issue:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of re
spondent Farinas is already within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives?
In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC
had noted that respondent Farinas had taken his
oath and assumed office as a Member of the 11th
Congress and by express mandate of the Consti
tution, it had lost jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal
of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or in
validity of the certificate of candidacy of Farinas
amounted to grave abuse of discretion on its part.
He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitu
tional duty to uphold and enforce all laws relative
to elections. . .
In the present case, we find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when
it held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA
98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office
of respondent Farinas as Representative for the
first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COM
ELEC is vested with the power to declare valid
or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to
exercise that power following the proclamation
and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries sepa
rating the COMELEC and the ElectoralTribunal
of the Houseof Representatives (HRET). Under
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications ofmembers ofthe House ofRepre
sentatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a member of the House of Representa
tives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and theHRETs own jurisdic
tion begins. Thus, the COMELEC's decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case
is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own
jurisdiction and functions.
However, petitioner contends that thejuris
dictionofthe HRET as defined under ArticleVI,
st
196 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
4w>
Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to
the qualifications prescribed under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he
claims that any issue which does not involve
these constitutional qualifications is beyond the
i^ii
realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy being a statutory qualification under
the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale
of the HRET, according to him.
This contention lacks cogency and is far from
persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitu
tion cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word
iij$J
"qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the
term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc
nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in stat
utory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts, should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the applica
tion of a law where none is indicated. For firstly,
the drafters of the fundamental law, in making
no qualification in the use of a general word or
expression, must have intended no distinction at
all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish
where there are facts or circumstances showing
that the lawgiver intended a distinction or quali
Ijj fication. In such a case, the courts would merely
give effect to the lawgiver's intent.
Petitioner further argues that the HRET
sgj assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proc
lamation of the winning candidate. He contends
that if a candidate fails to satisfy the statutory
requirements to qualify him as a candidate,
li)
his subsequent proclamation is void ab initio.
Where the proclamation is null and void, there
is no proclamation at all and the mere assump
j^l tion of office by the proclaimed candidate does
not deprive the COMELEC at all of its power to
declare such nullity, according to petitioner. But
as we already held, in an electoral contest where
%)
the validity of the proclamation of a winning
candidate who has taken his oath of office and
assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that
issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids du
plicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
Sjfi between constitutional bodies, with due regard
to the people's mandate.
Whether respondent Farinas validly sub
^J stituted Chevylle V. Farinas and whether re
spondent became a legitimate candidate, in our
view, must likewise be addressed to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus
can we demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional
provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each
House of Congress shall be the "solejudge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DIS
MISSED for lack of merit. Costs against peti
tioner.
QUERY: Is the issue here one of "qualifica
tion" or of "election"?
E. Garcia, et al. v. HRET
G.R. No. 134792, August 12,1999
r
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Jr.
May a petition for quo warranto before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
be summarily dismissed for failure to pay cash
deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified
payment thereof?
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten
(10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's
proclamation as duly elected Representative for
the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly
registered voters in the district, filed a petition
for quo warranto before the House of Represen
tatives ElectoralTribunal (HRET) against Con
gressman Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned
the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office in the House of Representatives, claiming
that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a constitutional requirement.
They prayed that Congressman Angping be
declared ineligible to assume or hold office as
member of the House of Representatives and for
the candidate who received the highest number
of votes from among the qualified candidates to
be proclaimed the winner.
Upon filing of the their petition, petitioners
duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.
On June 10,1998, however, the HRET issued
a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo
warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash
deposit required by its Rules. After receiving a
copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid
the P5.000.00 cash deposit on June 26, 1998

and attached the corresponding receipt to the
Motion for Reconsideration they filed with the
HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of
Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required
a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees
for quo warranto cases.
Hence, the instant Petition, filed on August
j&*fr 14, 1998,
[The second issue is] whether or not the
HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
'gi\ in summarily dismissing the petition for quo war
ranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate
the same even after the payment of the required
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET pro
vides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner
in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with
the Tribunal.
It is not disputed that petitioners did not
iiaiiisi
initially pay the required cash deposit; but after
their petition was summarily dismissed by the
HRET for such non-payment, petitioners rectified
their inadvertence and paid the Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the
same time seeking a reconsideration of the dis
missal.
. . . . It was a judgment call of the HRET
which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As
long as the exercise of discretion is based on
well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this
case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to
the Tribunal.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the
ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representa
tives, not being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. This is a serious charge, which, if
true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified
from such office. In view of the delicate nature
^Ijfl
and importance of this charge, the observance
of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken
seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e.,
the speedy and orderly determination of the true
will of the electorate. Correlatively, party liti
gants appearing before the HRET or, to be more
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 197
precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know
and are expected to properly comply with the pro
cedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal
without being formally ordered to do so. They
cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to
the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance
of those requirements it decides to dismiss their
petition. Imperative justice requires the proper
observance of technicalities precisely designed to
ensure its proper and swift dispensation.
*Therefore, we find that the HRET did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its
Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for
quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition
for certiorari cannot prosper.
Indeed, the function of this Court is merely
to check whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the HRET in the dismissal
of the petition for quo warranto before it. A peti
tion for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court will prosper only if there is a showing of
grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
tribunal. In the absence of such a shewing, there
is no reason for this Court to annul the decision
of the respondent tribunal or to substitute it with
its own judgment, for the simple reason that it is
not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
the correctness of the assailed decision. In this
case, as we have stated above, we find that the
HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion.
The instant petition must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement a--s
to costs.
F. Pimentel, et al v. HRET
G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002
CARPIO, Jr.
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions
for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail
the composition of the House of Representa
tives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for brevity)
and the Commission on Appointments ("CA"for
 198 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
brevity). Petitioners pray that respondents be
ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and
reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and
the CA to include party-list representatives in
accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the
CA be enjoined from exercising their functions
until they have been reorganized.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COM
&a
POSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITU
TIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPOR
TIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE
THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESEN
TATIVES IN THE HRET.
1M$
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEM
BERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COM
MISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES
jj^i THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
OP' PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF
THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECON
STITUTE THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES.CON
STITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRE
TION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General ar
gues that the instant petitions are procedurally
defective and substantially lacking in merit for
having been filed prematurely, thus:
"It is a generally accepted principle that
the averments in the pleading determine the
existence of a cause of action. In the instant
petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they
or any one of them was elected by a party or
organization registered under the party-list
system as a Member of the HRET or CA to
represent said party or organization under
the party-list system of the House of Repre
sentatives."
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the is
sues raised in the petitions under review, citing
the following pronouncement in Guingona, Jr.
v. Gonzales:
'Where constitutional issues are prop
erly raised in the context of the alleged facts,
procedural questions acquire a relatively
minor significance, and the transcendental
importance to the public of the case demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely
brushing aside . . technicalities of proce
dure."
Petitioners' reliance on Guingona, Jr. v.
Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural ques
tions" that petitioners want the Court to brush
aside are not mere technicalities but substantive
matters that are specifically provided for in the
constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the
House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from
among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers
on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitu
tion, each chamber of Congress exercises the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among, their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective
electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiter
ated in Rules 3 and 4(a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
to wit:
"Rule 3. Composition. The Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the ChiefJustice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the House
of Representatives who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organiza
tions registered under the party-list system
 ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 199

represented therein. The Senior Justice in being subject to the mandatory 'constitutional
the Tribunal shall be its Chairman. rule on proportional representation. However,
\m under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Rule 4. Organization. (a) Upon the
designation of the Justices of the Supreme * Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
Court and the election of the Members of the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or
House of Representatives who are to com
pose the House of Representatives Electoral grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine
Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal ^of separation of powers calls for each branch of
shall meet for its organization and adoption government to be left alone to discharge its du
of such resolutions as it may deem proper." ties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate
(Emphasis supplied) on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for member
Likewise, Section. 1 of the Rules of the Com ship in the HRET and the CA.
mission on Appointments provides:
The instant petitions are bereft of any alle
"Section 1. Composition of the Commis gation that respondents prevented the party-list
sion On Appointments. Within thirty (30) groups in the House from participating in the
"days after both Houses of Congress shall election of members of the HRET and the CA.
have organized themselves with the election Neither does it appear that after the May 11,
of the Senate President and the Speaker of 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
the House of Representatives, the Commis representatives from seeking membership in the
sion on Appointments shall be constituted. HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
ffip) It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators available facts that the party-list groups in the
and twelve (12) members of the House of House at that time simply refrained from par
Representatives, elected by each House on ticipating in the election process. The party-list
the basis of proportional representation from representatives did not designate their nominees
the political parties and parties or organiza even up" to the time they filed the instant peti
tions registered under the party-list system tions, with the predictable result that the House
represented herein. (Emphasis supplied) did not consider any party-list representative for
Thus, even assuming that party-list rep election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary
resentatives comprise a sufficient number and recourse of the party-list representatives lies
have agreed to designate common nominees to with the House of Representatives, the Court
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse cannot resolve the issues presented by petition
clearly rests with the House of Representatives ers at this time.
and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list rep Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a
resentatives must first show to the House that constitutional question will not be heard and
they possess the required numerical strength to resolved by the courts unless the following re
be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only quirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there
if the House fails to comply with the directive of must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or
the Constitution on proportional representation party raising the constitutional issue must have
of political parties in the HRET and the CA can a personal and substantial interest in the resolu
the party-list representatives seek recourse to tion of the controversy; (3) the controversy must
this Court under its power of judicial review. be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity;
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue
recourse to the House is necessary before peti must be indispensable to the final determination
tioners may bring the instant case to the court. of the controversy.
Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this
The five party-list representatives who are
Court is premature.
petitioners in the instant case have not alleged
The discretion of the House to choose its that they are entitled to, and have been unlaw
members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, fully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA.
tsJ
200 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Neither have they claimed that they have been
nominated by the party-list groups in the House
iM to the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not
possess the personal and substantial interest
required to confer them with locus standi. The
party raising the constitutional issue must have
"such personal stake in the outcome of the con
troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of dif
ficult constitutional questions."
We likewise find no grave abuse in the ac
'iii
tion or lack of action by the HRET and the CA
in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel.
Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
sj 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
G. Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec
G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007
The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
'<&&{
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Stated in an
^] other manner, where the candidate has already
been proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file
an electoral protest with the HRET.
IM\
In the present case, it is not disputed that
respondent Unico has already been proclaimed
and taken his oath of office as a Member of the
House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress);
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had
already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's
xM petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns
and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's
proclamation. These are matters that are best
addressed to the sound judgment and discretion
of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that
respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the
validity of the proclamation of a winning can
didate who has taken his oath of office and
assumed his post as Congressman is raised,
bin
that issue is best addressed to the HRET.
The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for
it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash
of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies,
with due regard to the people's mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance
of petitioner Chato's election protest against
respondent Unico would be to usurp the con
stitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
Petitioner Chato's remedy would have been to
file an election protest before the said tribunal,
not this petition for certiorari. The special civil
action of certiorari is available only if there is
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (1)
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction, and
(b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
to annul or modify the proceeding. There must
be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise
of power for certiorari to prosper.
All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution dated March 17,
2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon re
spondent Unico's proclamation and oath-taking
as a Member of the House of Representatives.
On the contrary, it demonstrated fealty to the
constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its members.
H. Limkaichong v. Comelec
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009
DECISION
PERALTA, J:
The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26,
2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for
her disqualification were instituted before the
COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from
her locality. On April 4,2007, Napoleon Camero,
a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Ori-

ental, filed the petition for her disqualification
on the ground that she lacked the citizenship
requirement of a Member of the House of Rep
resentatives.
In her separate Answers to the petitions,
Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born
Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Fili
pino father and a natural-born Filipino mother,
Mi who had reacquired her status as such due to
her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time
of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19)
days had already passed after her father took his
m
Oath of Allegiance on October 21,1959 and after
he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on
the same day. She contended that the COMELEC
should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of
cause of action....
The COMELEC consolidated the two (2)
petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-
247 and 07-248, entitled IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN
SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER CANDIDACY
AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF
NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the
disqualification cases), which remainedpending
on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local
Elections were conducted.
After the casting, countingand canvassingof
Mi
votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged
as the winner with 65,708 votesor by a margin
of 7,746 votes over another congressional candi
S) date, Olivia Paras (Paras), who obtained 57,962.
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the
COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate
of the First District of Negros Oriental.
In a Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007,
the COMELEC SecondDivisiongranted the pe
titions in the disqualification cases, disqualified
Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative
of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed
the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to
strike out her name from the list ofeligible candi
ift) dates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) to suspend her proclamation....
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commis
sion on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 201
directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-
LIMKAICHONG from the list ofeligible candi
dates for the said position, and the concerned
Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold
and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN
SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if
any, until this decision has become final.
SO ORDERED.
The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division on the evening
ofMay 17, 2007, and accordinglysuspended the
proclamation of Limkaichong.
The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the
involved cases.
On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance
with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, recon
vened and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives
for the First District of Negros Oriental.
The Court heard the parties in oral argu
ment on August 26, 2008, during which the fol
lowing issues were tackled:
1. Whether the proclamation of Limka
ichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Negros Oriental is valid;
2. Whether said proclamation divested
the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction
to resolve the issue of Limkaichong's citizen
ship;
3. Whether the House of Representa
tives Electoral Tribunal shall assume juris
diction, in lieu of the COMELEC, over the
issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;
4. Whether the COMELEC Second Divi
sion and the COMELEC En Banc correctly
ruled that Limkaichong is disqualified from
running as a Member of the House of Rep
resentatives on the ground that she is not a
natural-born citizen;
 202 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
5. Whether the COMELEC disqualifica
tion of Limkaichong is final and executory;
and,
6. Whether the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; may be compelled to pro
hibit Limkaichong from assuming her duties
as a Member of the House of Representatives.
On same day, the Court required the parties
to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days
their respective memoranda, after which the peti
tions shall be deemed submitted for resolution,
with or without the memoranda.
Whether Limkaichong's proclamation
was valid.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered its
Joint Resolution dated May 17,2007. On May 20,
2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COM
ELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as
well as for the lifting of the. incorporated direc
tive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution ofthe May 17,2007
Ml
Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended,
there was no impediment to the valid proclama
tion of Limkaichong as the winner.
\m
Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy-
guideline. It is also an administrative inter
pretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987
Constitution, namely: (i) Section 17, Article VI
:&fl
(ii); Section 2(2), Article IX-C; Section 6 of R.A.
6646; and Sections 241 and 243, Article XX of
the OEC
Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the
COMELEC's constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to
the conduct of the elections.. ..
II
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclama
tion, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC,
should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases.
In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Lim
kaichong argued that her proclamation on May
25, 2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her
qualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with
the HRET.
Biraogo, oh the other hand, believed other
wise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the
issue concerning Limkaichong's disqualification
is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when
Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007,
the matter was still pending resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc.
We do not agree. The Court has invariably
held that once, a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
officey as a Member of the House of Represen
tatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows
then that the proclamation of a winning candi
date divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his quali
fication should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide.a case
involving a Member of the House of Representa
tives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is
the State, through its representatives designated
by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings.
It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen's descendant.
Ill
Whether the COMELEC Second Division
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly dis
qualified Limkaichong on the ground that
she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In resolving the disqualification cases, the
COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries
in the docket book of the OSG, the only remain
ing record of the naturalization proceedings, and
ruled on the basis thereof that the naturaliza-

tion proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichong's
father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and
void. The COMELEC Second Division adopted
Villando and Camero's arguments that the OSG
was deprived of its participation in the said case
for it was not furnished copies of the following:
(a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) granting the petition for natural
ization; and (b) the September 21,1959 Order of
the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen.
Thus, when the latter took his oath of allegiance
on October 21,1959, it was exactly 30 days after
his declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or one
day short of the reglementary period required un
der Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No.
473. Such defects were fatal to the naturaliza
tion proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented
the same from gaining finality. The COMELEC
Second Division concluded that since Julio Ong
Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through
the said naturalization proceedings, it follows
that Limkaichong remains a-Chinese national
and is disqualified to run as candidate and be
elected as a Member of the House of Represen
tatives.
We cannot resolve the matter of Limka
ichong's citizenship as the same should have
been challenged in appropriate proceedings as
earlier stated.
Whether the Speaker ofthe House ofRep
resentatives may be compelled to prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as
a Member of the House of Representatives.
Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia[
should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives because he has no power to
allow an alien to sit and continue to sit therein
as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of
his legal authority. Moreover, Biraogo opposes
Limkaichong's assumption of office in the House
of Representatives since she is not qualified to
sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus,
disqualified by virtue of a final and executory
judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied
on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
June 29, 2007, which affirmed the COMELEC
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 203
Second Division Joint Resolution'dated May 17,
2007 disqualifying Limkaichong from holding
public office. He contended that the said Reso
lution q>ted June 29, 2007 is already final and
executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant
to the principle of rets judicata.
De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that
he should not be faulted for honoring the proc
lamation of Limkaichong, because it had the
hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power
to exclude any Member, of the House of Rep
resentatives motu proprio. In their Comment
on the petition, respondents De Venecia, et al.,
contended that the enrollment of a Member in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representa
tives and his/her recognition as such becomes the
ministerial duty of the Secretary General and
the House of Representatives upon presenta
tion by such Member of a valid Certificate
of Proclamation and Oath of Office.
Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's,
substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16,
2008 stating that under the circumstances, the
House of Representatives, and its officials, are
without recourse except to honor the validity of
the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same
is canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue
to recognize her as the duly elected Representa
tive of the First District of Negros Oriental until
it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla,
to recognize somebody else. He went on.to state
that after assumption by the Member-elect, or
having acquired a presumptively valid title to
the office, the House of Representatives cannot,
motu proprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any rec
ognition given to a sitting Member or to "remove"
his name from its roll, as such would amount to
a removal of such Member from his office with
out due process of law. Verily, it is only after a
determination by the appropriate tribunal (as
in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and
executory order, that the Member does not have
a right to the office(i.e., not being a duly elected
Member), that the House of Representatives is
directed to exclude the said Member.
Their contentions are meritorious. The un
seating ofa Member ofthe House ofRepresenta
tives should be exercised with great caution and
after the proper proceedings for the ouster has
been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat
 204 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
JIM
someone, who obtained the highest number of
votes in the elections, and during the pendency
E&ftJ
of the proceedings determining one's qualifica
tion or disqualification, would amount to disen
franchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED
and the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA
Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is REVERSED and
^) SET ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos.
179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
NOTE: The law.allowing Congress and Com-
elec to entertain pre-proclaation cases is chal
lenged on the argument that this undermines
the ndependence of the Tribunals. But Congress
and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon
iii)
the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There
is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one
hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other,
are exercised on different occasions and for dif
ferent purposes. The PET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or VicePresident.
The SET is the sole judge of all contests relat
ing to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the
PET and the SET can only be invoked once the
winning presidential, vice presidential or sena
torial candidates have been proclaimed. On the
other hand, Congress and the COMELEC en banc
shall determine only the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress
^jfAfr
and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this
power before the proclamation of the winning
presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial
candidates. Banat v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177508,
August 7, 2009.
iiiiii/
SEC. 18. THERE SHALL BE A COMMIS
SION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,
AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE
SENATORS AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
[&&
to
ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BA
SIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA
TION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES
AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS
REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION SHALL
NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE.
THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL
APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT
WITHIN THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE
CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION.
THE COMMISSION SHALL RULE BY A
MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS.
1. Composition of the Commission on Ap
pointments.
r
A. Daza v. Singson
180 SCRA 496 (1989) .
CRUZ, J:
After the congressional elections of May 11,
1987, the House of Representatives proportion
ally apportioned its twelve seats in the Com
mission on Appointments among the several
political parties represented in that chamber,
including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban,
the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL,
in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among
those chosen and was listed as a representative
of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng De-
mokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, result
ing in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the
Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former
party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House
of Representatives revised its representation in
(the Commission on Appointments by withdraw
ing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giv
ing this to the newly-formed LDP. On December
1988, the chamber elected a new set of represen
tatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent
Luis C. Singson as the' additional member from
the LDP.

iiiii
Thepetitionercameto this CourtonJanuary
13,1989, to challenge his removal from the Com
mission on Appointments and the assumption
ofhis seat by the respondent. Actinginitially on
his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both
the petitioner and the respondent from serving
in the Commission on Appointments.
Briefly stated, the contention of the peti
tioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his elec
tion thereto is permanent under the doctrine an
nounced in Cunanan v. Tan.102 His claim is that
the reorganization of the House representation
in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a
duly registered political party and has not yet
$$fo attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the
question raised by the petitioner is political in na
ture and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
He also maintains that he has been improperly
impleaded, the real party respondent being the
House of Representatives which changed its
representation in the Commission on Appoint
ments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it
required that the.political party be registered to
be entitled to proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the par
ties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor
General as amicus curiaein compliance with an
order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution ...
jfef)
Ruling first on the jurisdiction issue, we hold
that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the
Court has the competence to act on the matter at
bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not
a discretionary act of the House of Representa
tives that may not be reviewed by us because it
is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments.
,025 SCRA l.
'p0
ARTICLEVI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 205
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us waspolitical
in nature, we would still not be precludedfrom
resolving it under the expandedjurisdiction con
ferred uponus that now covers, in propercases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Judicial power includes the duty ofthe courts
ofjustice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforce
able, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Coming now to the more crucial question,
the Court notes that both the petitioner and the
respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v.
Tan to support their respective positions. It is
best, therefore, to make a quick review of that
case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representa
tives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Na-
cionalistaParty, 29by the Liberal Party and 1by
an independent. Accordingly, the representation
of the chamber in the Commission on Appoint
ments was apportioned to 8 members from the
Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista
Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal
Party and formed what was called the Allied
Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize
the chamber. Included in this reorganization was
the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments where three of the Nacionalista
congressmen originally chosen were displaced
by three of their party colleagues who had joined
the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim
appointment as Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration was rejected by
the Commission on Appointments as thus re-
 206 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
organized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was
thereafter designatedin his pla"ce. Cunanan then
came to this Court, contending that the rejection
of his appointment was null and void because
the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied
Majority was a merely temporary combination
as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffili
i|^
ated from their party and permanently joined
the newpoHtical group. Officially, they werestill
members of the Nacionalista Party. Then reor
ganization ofthe Commission onAppointments
was invalid because it was not based on the pro
portional representation ofthe political parties
in the House of Representatives as required by
the Constitution. The Court held:
x x x In other words, a shifting of votes at
a given time, even if dueto arrangements of
a more or less temporary nature, like the one
that has led to the formation of the so-called
"Allied Majority," does not suffice to autho
rize a reorganization of the membership of
the Commission for the said House. Other
wise the Commission on Appointments may
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The
framers of our Constitution could not have
intended to thus place a constitutional organ,
like the Commission on Appointments, at the
mercy of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the
biBd
LDP is not the permanent political party con
templatedin the Constitution because it has not
beenregisteredin accordance withArticle IX-B,
Section 2(5), in relation to the otherprovisions of
the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called
party nasi not yet achieved stability and sug
gests it might benodifferent from several other
political groups that have died aa-bornin\" like
the UNA, or have subsequently floundered, like
the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from
a different viewpoint. According to him, that
caseexpresslyallows reorganizationat any time
to reflect changes in the political alignments in
Congress, provided only that such changes are
permanent. Thecreation of.the LDP constituting
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which
no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had trans
ferred was a permanent change. That change
fullyjustified his designation to the Commission
on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional
provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members
of the House of Representatives elected by each
House, respectively, on the basis ofproportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL
PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the
authority of each House of Congress to see to it
that this requirement is dulycomplied with.As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon- the initial organization of the
Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If
by reason ofsuccessful electionprotests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion from
the political party to which they belonged and/or
of theiraffiHation with another political party,
the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the
House is clothed with authority to declare vacant
the necessary number of seats in the Commis
sion on Appointments held by members of said
House belonging to the political party adversely
affected bythe changeand then fill saidvacancies
in conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this
matter between the petitioner and the respon
dent (who was supported by the Solicitor Gen
eral)an important development has supervened
to considerably simplify the present controversy.
The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argu
ment heavilyon the non-registration ofthe LDP
which, he claims has not provided the permanent
poHtical realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization...
On November 23,1989, however, that argu
ment boomeranged against the petitioner. On
that date, the Commission on Elections in an
en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its
First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting
thepetition ofthe LDP forregistration as a poHti
cal party.103 This has taken the wind out of the
sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must
now limp to shore as best he can.
wagpp No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).
iiiiii)
&)
The petitioner's contention that, even if
registered, the party must stiU pass the test of
&&>
time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.
Under this theory, a registered party obtaining
the majority of the seats in the House of Rep
resentatives (or the Senate) would still not be
entitled to representation in the Commission on
Appointments as long as it was organized only
recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal
Party itself would fall in such a category. That
partywascreated in December 1945 by. a faction
of the NacionaHsta Party that seceded therefrom
jii^y
to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presi
dency of the Philippines in the election held on
April 23,1946.104 The Liberal Party won. At that
time it was only four months old. Yet no ques
tion was raised as to its right to be represented
in the Commission on Appointments and in the
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the
majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more
than one year now. It now has 157 members in
the House of Representatives and 6 members in
the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the
President of the Philippines and its President
is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over
recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true
that there have been, and there still are, some
internal disagreements among its members, but
these are to be expected in any political organiza
tion, especially if it is democratic in structure. In
fact, even the monoHthic Communist Party in a
number of socialist states has undergone similar
dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely
cannot be considered still temporary because of
such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pur
sued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House
of Representatives would have to be denied rep
fci
resentation in the Commission on Appointments
and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner
says is now "history only," should also be written
off.The independents also cannot be represented
because they belong to no poHtical party. That
would virtually leave the Liberal Party only
with all of its seventeen members to claim all
104Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The Continu
ft^)
ing Past, 1978 edition, pp. 181-187 & 188; Manuel Buenafe,
Wartime. Philippines, 1950 edition, p. 284.
W
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 207
the twelveseats ofthe House ofRepresentatives
in the Commission on Appointments and the six
legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that'when with 41 members
the Liberal Party was allotted two of the seats
in the Commission oh Appointments, it did not
express any objection.105 Inconsistently, the pe
titioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from
it of one seat although its original number has
been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the
petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive
in a general congressional election, the LDP
has doubtless also passed that test, if only vi
cariously. It may even be said that as it now
commands the biggest foUowing in the House of
Representatives, the party has not only survived
but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was
never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold,nn1view of the
foregoing considerations, that the issue present
ed to us is justiciable rather poHtical [sic[,involv
ing as it does the legality and not the wisdom of
the act complained of, or the manner of fiUing
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by the Constitution. Even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our
powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of
the Constitution, which includes the authority
to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or instrumental
ity of the government. As for the alleged technical
flaw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, tlje same
may be brushed aside, conformably to existing
doctrine, so that the important constitutional is
sue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve
that issue in favor of the authority of the House
of Representatives to change its representation
in the Commission on Appointments to reflect
at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be perma
nent and do not include the temporary aHiances
or factional divisions not involving severance
,05The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna Verano-Yap,
who is now affiliated with the Liberal Party.
iffft*
208 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts ofallegiance from one political
party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to in
tervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by
the House ofRepresentatives or the Commission
on Appointmentsas the bodies directlyinvolved.
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and,
more importantly, because a constitutional
stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alter
native for us except to act, and to act decisively.
In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our
wiU upon the said agencies, or substituting our
discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our
sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
ii) Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest
we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order dated January
13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the
respondenthas beenvalidlyelectedas a member
^^
of the Commission on Appointments and is en
titled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr.
187 SCRA 377 (1990)
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The congressional elections of May 11; 1987
resulted in the election to the House of Repre
sentatives of the candidates of diverse political
parties'such as the PDP-Laban,Lakas ng Bansa
(LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido,Kilusan ng
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababai-
han Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some
independents. Petitioner Anna DominiqueM.L.
Coseteng was the only candidate elected under
the banner of KAIBA.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng
wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra request
ing that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on
ffijij^
Appointments and HouseElectoral TribunalHer
request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen,
s=J
namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio
Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabo-
chan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo
N. Joson, Antonio H. CeriUes and Isacio Pelaez.
Petitioner Coseteng . . . alleged that she
is qualified to sit in the Commission on Ap
pointments as a representative of the Minority
because she has the support of nine (9) other
congressmen and congresswomenofthe Minority
The indorsements ofthe nine (9) congressmen
and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
election to the Commission are inconsequential
because they are not members of her party and
they sfgnedidentical indorsements in favorofher
rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
C. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971, October 20,1992
CAMPOS, JR., Jr.
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit,
respondents Senators Alberto Romulo and Wig-
berto Tafiada from sitting and assuming the posi
tion of members of the Commission on Appoint
ments and to prohibit Senators NeptaHGonzales,
as ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from
recognizing and allowing the respondent sena
tors to sit as members thereof.
As a result of the national elections held last
May 11,1992, the-Senate is composed ofthe fol
lowing members or Senators representing the
respective political affiliations:
15 senators
LDP
NPC 5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD 3 senators
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed
to by the parties as follows:
No. of Senators of a Political Party x 12 seats
Total No. of senators elected.

the resulting composition of the senate based on
the rule of proportional representation of each
political party with elected representatives in
the Senate, is as follows:
Political Party/ Proportional
Political Coalition Membership
Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members.
At the organization meeting of the Senate
held on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo in his
capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated,
for and in behalf of the LDP. eight (8) senators
for membership in the Commission on Appoint
ments, namely, Senators Angara, Herrera,
Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Ro
mulo. The nomination of the eighth senator was
objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John Os-
a^ mena, in representation of the NPC. To resolve
the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed
a compromise to the effect that the Senate elect
^1 ". . . 12 members to the Commission
on Appointments, eight coming from LDP,
two coming from NPC, one coming from the
Liberal Party, with the understanding that
there are strong reservations against this
proportion or these numbers so that if later
on in an action in the Supreme Court, if any
ial party is found to have an excess in repre
sentation, that the party will necessarily
reduce its representation, and if any party
is found to have a deficiency in representa
tion, that party will be entitled to nominate
and have elected by this body its additional
representative."
ijjl
The proposed compromise above stated was
a temporary arrangement and, inspite of the
objections of Senators Guingona and Osmena,
jut
to enable the Commission on Appointments to
be organized by the election of its members, it
was approved. The elected members consisted of
eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and
one LAKAS-NUCD.
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATTVE DEPARTMENT 209
(LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance
ofa writ ofprohibition to prohibitthe respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio
Chairman ofthe Commission onAppointments,
from recognizing the membership of Senators
Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator electedby
the LDP, and Wigberto L. Tanada, as the lone
member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in
the Commission on Appointments, on the ground
that the proposed compromise of Senator To
lentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the mi
nority political parties in the Senate, consistent
with the Constitution, to combine their fractional
representation in the Commission on Appoint
ments to complete one seat therein, and to decide
who, among the senators in their ranks, shall
be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution
of 1987 provides for the creation of a Commis
sion on Appointments and the allocation of its
membership . . .
Based on the mathematical computation
of proportional representation of the various
political parties with elected senator in the Sen
ate, each of these political parties is entitled to
a fractional membership in the Commission on
Appointments as stated in the first paragraph
of this decision. Each political party has a claim
to an extra hah0 seat, and the election of respon
dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP ma
jority is precisely questioned by the petitioners
because, according to them, it unduly increased
the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in
the Commission and reduced the membership of
the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly.
In view of the conflicting claims of each of the
political parties/coalition duly represented in the .
Senate to a fractional membership in the Com
mission on Appointments, the election ofrespon
dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada has
become controversial and its validity question
able. Hence, this petition. It has been established
that the legality of filling up the membership of
the Commission on Appointments is a justifiable
issue and not a political question.106
,06Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA 377 (1990).
 210 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
We deem it necessary to resolve the respon
dents' argument as to the nature of the instant
petition. There is no doubt that the issues in
volved herein are constitutional in nature and
are of vital importance to our nation. They in
volve the interpretation of Section 18, Article VI
of the Constitution which creates a Commission
on Appointments. Where constitutional issues
are properly raised in the context ofthe alleged
facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively
minor significance, and the "transcendentalim
portance to the public ofthe case demands that
theybesettledpromptly and definitely brushing
aside ... technicalities of procedure."107
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar,
the instant petition may be regarded as one of
prohibition wherein the Senate is claimed to
have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it designated respondent Senator Romulo
as eighth member of the Commission on Ap
pointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and
Si respondent Senator Tanada as LP nominee, not
withstanding, that in both instances, LDP and
LP are each entitled only to "half a member." In
the alternative, the petition may be regarded as
one for mandamus, in which it is claimed that
the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which each is entitled. Considering
the importanceofthe case at bar and in keeping
with the Court's duty under the Constitution
jffff) to keep the other branches of the government
within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws ofthe land, this Court has decided to brush
aside legal technicalities of procedure and take
cognizance of this case.
The issues for determination by this Court
'$& may be stated as follows:
1) Whether the electionofSenators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto E. Tanada as members of
|^i the Commission on Appointments is in accor
dance with the provision of Section 18 ofArticle
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2) If said membership of the respondent
senators in the Commission is violative of the
Constitutional provision, did the respondent
'$?&}
""Osmena v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750
(1991).
t^
Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing
the respondent Senators?
3) If there was grave abuse of discretion
by respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining,
prohibiting and restraining the respondent Sena
tors from sitting as members ofand participating
in the proceedingsofthe Commission on Appoint
ments be issued?
It is an established fact to which all the par
ties agree that the mathematical representation
ofeach ofthe political parties represented in the
Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
2.5
NPC
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties
that each of them is entitled to a fractional mem
bership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A
literal interpretation of Se'ction 18 of Article VI
of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application than as above. The problem is what
to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in
the Senate converted a fractional half member
ship into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latter's representation in
the Commission on Appointments to less than
their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is dearly a violation of Section 18 because
it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membership in the Commission be based
on the proportional representation of the politi
cal parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Tanada that un
der the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo
Tanada,108 and the case of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member
108Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

of the Commission on Appointments because
of: (a) the physical impossibility of dividing a
person, so that the fractional membership must
be rounded up into one senator; (b) being the
sole elected senator of his party, his party is
entitled to be represented in the Commission on
Appointments; (c) having been elected senator,
rounding up into one full senator his fractional
membership is consistent with the provision and
spirit of the Constitution and would be in full
accord, with the principle of republicanism that
emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators men
tioned cannot be invoked as a precedent in sup
port of incumbent Senator Tanada's claim to a
membership in the present Commission on Ap
pointments. In the time of his illustrious father,
out of 24 elected senators in the upper chamber of
Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Tanada, who belonged
to the Citizens' Party, was the lone opposition.
By force of circumstance, he became a member
of the Commission on Appointments because
he alone represented the minority party. Had
there been another senator belonging to a party
other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the
opposition party would have arisen. In the case
of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators
elected from the opposition party, namely, he
and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of pro
portional representation mentioned earlier (see
formula), the opposition was entitled to one full
iffift
member (not a fractional membership). Senator
Enrile was thus legaUy nominated and elected
as the minority representative in the Senate. In
the present case, if there were a poHtical party
other than the present four political parties is
the Senate and We follow Senator Tanada's
claim that he is entitled to full membership as
lone representative of his party. We would have
the anomaly of having 13 senators, where the
Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Com
mission on Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to member
ship in the Commission on Appointments by
nomination and election of the LDP majority in
the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compli
ance with the requirement that twelve senators
lu
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. 211
shall be elected on the basis^of proportional rep-"
resentation of the political parties represented
therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Com
mission on Appointments by adding together two
halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give
the LDP an added member in the Commission
by utilizing the fractional membership of the
minority political party, who is deprived of half
a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and
does not leave any discretion to the majority
party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the
rule on proportional representation; otherwise,
the party with a majority representation in the
Senate or the House of Representatives can by
sheer force of numbers impose its will on the
hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appoint
ments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on
the majority party in the Senate and helps to
maintain the balance of power. No party can
claim more than what it is entitled to under such
rule. To allow it to elect more than its propor
tional share of members is to confer upon such a
party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power
to impose its will on the minority, who by the
same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful
membership in the Commission.
Section 18 also assures representation in the
Commission on Appointments of any political
party who succeeds in electing members to the
Senate, provided that the number of senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the
Commission on Appointments. Drawing from the
ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.,109 a
political party must have at least two senators
in the Senate to be able to have a representative
in the Commissionon Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such a party
a membership in the Commission on Appoint
ments. This applies to the respondent Senator*
Tanada.
109187 SCRA 377 (1990).
 212 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
We lay down the following guidelines ac
cordingly:
liiiii)
1) In the Senate, a political party or coali
tion must have at least two duly elected senators
for every seat in the Commission on Appoint
ments.
2) Where there are more than two political
parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Sen
ate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the
Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim
that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the
Commissionon Appointments. The Constitution
does not contemplate that the Commission on
Appointments must necessarily include twelve
(12) senators and twelve (12) members of the
Hoifce of Representatives. What the Constitu
tion requires is that there be at least a majority
of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all
the members and in Section 19, the Commission
shall meet only while Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
ipj
members "to discharge such powers and func
tions herein conferred upon it." Implementing
the above provisions ofthe Constitution, Section
10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commissionon
Appointments, provides as follows:
"Sec. 10. Place of Meeting and Quorim: The
Commission shall meet at either the session hall
of the Senate or the House of Representatives
uponcallofthe Chairman or as the Commission
may designate. The presence of at least thirteen
L (13) members is necessary to constitute a quo
rum. Provided, however, that at least four (4) of
the members constituting the quorum should
come from either house " exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted
It is quite evident that the Constitution
does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members
of the House of Representatives in order that
the Commission may function. Other instances
may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial
bodies which perform their functions even if not
fully constituted and even if their compositionis
expressly specified by the Constitution. Among
aJ these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Com
mission, Commission on Elections, Commission
ted
on Audit. They perform their functions so long as
there is the required quorum, usually a majority
of its membership. The Commission on Appoint
ments may perform its functions and transact its
business even if only ten (10) senators are elected
thereto as long as a quorum exists.
It may also be mentioned that while the
Constitution provides for equal membership from
the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the Commission on Appointments, the senators
on the one hand, and the representatives, on the
other, do not vote separately but jointly, and usu
ally along party lines. Even if Senator Tanada
would not be able to sit in the Commission on Ap
pointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be
represented in the Commission by Congressman
Ponce Enrile who has become a member of the
LP. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop
any of the political parties from forming a coali
tion with another political party in order to fill
up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
. Assuming that the Constitution intended
that there be always twelve (12) senators in the
Commission on Appointments, the instant situa
tion cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard
of the rule on proportional representation. The
election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada
as members ofthe Commission on Appointments
by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Their nomination and election by
the LDP majority by sheer forceof superiority in
numbers during the Senate organization meeting
of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
discretion. Where power is exercised in a man
ner inconsistent with the command of the Con
stitution, and by reason of numerical strength,
knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said
by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis
of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the
matter before this Court, We declare the election
of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto
Tanada as members of the Commission on Ap
pointments as nuUand voidforbeing in violation
of the rule on proportional representation under
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
ofthe Philippines. Accordingly, a writ ofprohibi

iiiii
tion is hereby issued ordering the said respon
dents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to
desist from assuming, occupying and discharging
the functions of members of the Commission on
Appointments; and ordering the respondent Sen
ate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity
as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, to desist from recognizing the
membership of the respondent Senators and from
allowing and permitting them from sitting and
participating as members of said Commission.
SO ORDERED.
&i4
NOTE: The Constitution gives to the two
Houses of Congress the primary "jurisdiction
over who should sit in the Commission on
Appointments. This includes determination of
party affiliation and number of party members
for the purpose of determining proportional
representation. Drilon, et al. v. Speaker, G.R.
No. 180055, July 31, 2009.
ffi-M
SEC. 19. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
AND THE COMMISSION ON APPOINT
MENTS SHALL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND
$fcJ
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH
THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND
THE SPEAKER. THE COMMISSION ON AP
POINTMENTS SHALL MEET ONLYWHILE
THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION, AT THE
CALL OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY
OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE
SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ARE
HEREIN CONFERRED UPON IT.
SEC. 20. THE RECORDS AND BOOKS
OF ACCOUNTS OF THE CONGRESS
SHALL BE PRESERVED AND BE OPEN
TO THE PUBLIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW, AND SUCH BOOKS SHALL BE AU
DITED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
L WHICH SHALL PUBLISH ANNUALLY AN
ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS PAID TO
AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH
MEMBER.
SEC. 21. THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS
RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CON
DUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLA
ARTICLEVJ: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 213
TION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY
PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE.
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING
IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES
SHALL BE RESPECTED.
1. Legislative investigations.
a
A. Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee
G.R. No. L-89914, November 20, 1991
PADILLA, Jr.
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer
forthe issuance ofa temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring
the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at
its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group
in thirty-six (36)or thirty-nine (39)corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philip
pines, represented by the Presidential Commis
sion on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by
the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandigan-
bayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35)
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benja
min 'Kokoy* Romualdez, et al", for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times
by impleading new defendants and or amplify
ing the allegations therein. Under the Second
Amended Complaint, the herein petitioners were
impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein
petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others
that:
"14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Ro
mualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez,
acting by themselves and/or in unlawful
concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Mar
cos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence
and connection with the latter Defendant
spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves
at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:
[Details omitted]
 214 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as defen
dants) filed their respective answers. Meanwhile,
from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the
disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez cor
porations" were carried in various metropolitan
newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that
the Romualdez firms had not been sequestered
because of the opposition of certain PCGG offi
cials who "had worked previously as lawyers of
the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported
otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March
1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986
j^ji revolution, the "Romualdez companies" were
sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to
a holding company controUed by Romualdez, and
that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-
law, had effectively taken over the firms, even
pending negotiations for the purchase of the
corporations, for the same price of P5 million
which was reportedly way below the fair value
of their assets.
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority
Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before
the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL
Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila
Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo
Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into
the possible violation of the law in the case, par
ticularly with regard to Republic Act,No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the
Mi
matter was referred by the Senate to the Com
mittee on Accountabihty of Public Officers (Blue
Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on
the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before
L it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
"sale of the thirty-six (36) corporations belonging
to Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo
Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants
in.Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused
to testify invoking his constitutional right to due
process, and averring that the publicity gener
ated by respondent Committee's inquiry could
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in
Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, there
upon, suspended its inquiry and directed the
petitioners to file their memorandum on the
constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued
a resolution6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the
petitioners' plea to be excused from testifying,
and the Committee voted to pursue and continue
its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali
Gonzales dissented.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Com
mittee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings
before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdic
tion and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
disregard of their constitutional rights, and to
their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice
and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the
present petition for prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or injunc
tive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose
S. Sandejas, filed with the Court a motion for
intervention, which the Court granted in the
resolution of 21 December 1989, and required
the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
to comment on the petition in intervention. In
compliance therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee filed its comment thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by peti
tioners and intervenor, we will first tackle the
jurisdictional question raised by the respondent
Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee
claims that this Court cannot properly inquire
into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting
legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin
the Congress or any of its regular and special
committees like what petitioners seek from
making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, which obtains
in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable...
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries"
is a task that this Court must perform under

the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case,110 "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation man
dated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the appli
cability of the principle in appropriate cases."111
4&i}A
The Court is thus of the considered view that
it has jurisdiction over the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the scope and
MS extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private af
fairs in purported aid of legislation.
\M Coming to the specific issues raised in this
case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legisla
a^4 tive purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legisla
tion; (2) the sale or disposition of the Romualdez
corporations is a "purely private transaction"
which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue
a&i)
Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the
inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes
the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
"The Senate or the House of Represen
tatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
fasii
in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appear
ing in or affected by such.inquiries shall be
respected."
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
. noNeptali A. Gonzales, et al. v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig,
Jr.. et al, G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA
452, 463.
"'Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution pro
vides:
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estab
lished by law.
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or.instrumentality of the Government."
M4
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 215
therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules ofproce
dure" and that, "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
It follows then that the rights of persons under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled tp testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or
investigations is specifically provided for in Sec.
1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing In
quiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination
of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legisla
tion. They may also extend to any and aU matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in
the Senate alone.
As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Naza-
reno, et al.,nz the inquiry, to be within the juris
diction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in
it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate
or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules,
the Senate may refer to any committee or com
mittees any speech or resolution filed by any
Senator which in its judgment requires an ap
propriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of
an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is pro
posed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile re
veals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement
which was published in various newspapers on
2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby"
Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa
wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September
1988 categorically denying that he Had "taken
over" the FMMC Group of Companies; that
former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by
Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August
ll2No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29.
216 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
1988 that there has been no takeover by him
(Lopa); and that these repeated allegations of
a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are
baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile,
during the session of the Senate on 13 September
1988, to avail of the privilege hour, so that he
could respond to the said Lopa letter, and also
to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the
Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim
of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he
(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Com
panies are "baseless" and "malicious." ...
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech
in the following tenor:
"Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for
the Senate to look into the possible violation
of the law in the case particularly with regard
to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which
reads as follows and I quote:
'Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives.
It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity,
within the third civil degree, of the President
of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or
the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives,
to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application
with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who
prior to the assumption of office of any of
the above officials to whom he is related, has
been already dealing with the Government
along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by
him for approval of which is not discretion
ary on the part of the officials concerned but
depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the
exercise of a profession.'
"Mr. President, I have done duty to this
Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august
Body to make its own conclusion."
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile con
tained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, othr
erwise known as 'The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Rib
bon Committee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection
with the aUeged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolu
tion No. 212 is to look into the charges against
the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders
of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of
the Constitution.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated
inquiry by respondent Committee is not really
"in aid of legislation" because it is not related to
a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
since the aim of the investigation is to find out
v/hether or not the relatives of the President or
Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," a matter that appears more within the prov
ince of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that
Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of
this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States,11*
it was held:
" .... The power of congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad. It encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possi
bly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic, or poHtical
system for the purpose of enabling Congress
to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government
to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.
But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is
not unhmited. There is no general authority
to expose the private affairs of individuals
U3354 U.S. 178,1 L. ed. 2d 1273 (1957).

i&M
withoutjustification in terms ofthe functions
of congress. This was freely conceded by the
Solicitor General in his argument in this case.
Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive
and judicial departments ofgovernment. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related
to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for
the personal aggrandizement of the investi
gators or to 'punish' those investigated are
indefensible." (itaHcs supplied)
It cannot be overlooked that when respon
dent^Committee decided to conduct its investi
gation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein,
is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since
the issues in said complaint had long been joined
by the filing of petitioners' respective answers
thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by
the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandigan
E&J
bayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted
by that court. To allow the respondent Commit
tee to conduct its own investigation of an issue
already before the Sandiganbayan would not
only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
between a legislative committee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were
Iji^i
to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibility of its influence being made to bear
on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
cannot be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to
probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan,
would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had .much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt v. United States,114
it was held that:
"Broad as it is, the power is not, however,
without Hmitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it can
,H360 U.S. 109, 3 L ed. 2d 1115, 69 S CT 1081 (1959).
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATT7E DEPARTMENT 217
not inquire into matters which are within
the exclusive province of one of tlie other
branches of the government. Lacking the
judicial power given to the Judiciary, it can
not inquire into matters that are exclusively
the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive "
Now to another matter. It has been held that
"a congressional committee's right to inquire is
'subject to\all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action,' including
'the relevant Hmitations of the Bill of Rights'."115
In another case
"... the mere semblance of legislative
purpose would not justify an inquiry in the
face of the Bill of Rights. The critical ele
ment is the existence of, and the weight to
be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress
in demanding disclosures from an unwilling
witness. We cannot simply assume, however,
that every congressional investigation is
justified by a public need that over-balances
any private rights affected. To do so would
be to abdicate the responsibility placed by
the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure
that the Congress does not unjustifiably en
croach upon an individual's right to privacy
nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, reli
gion or assembly."116
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to an individual is the right against
self-incrimination. This right construed as the
right to remain completely silent may be availed
of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may
be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court
in Romeo Chavez v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al.117 thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different
tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled
to take the witness stand and claim the privilege
"Maurice A. Hutcheson v. U.S., 369 US 599.
,16Watkins v. US, 354 USS 178 citing US v, Rumely,
345 US 41.
,,7G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968 24 SCRA 663.
 218 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
^&j
as each question requiring an incriminating an
swer is shot at liim, an accused may altogether
refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is ex
sij tended to respondents in administrative investi
gations but only if they partake of the nature of
a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. In Galman v. Pamaran,118 the Court
reiterated the doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan (6
SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses
to invoke the right against self-incrimination
not only in criminal proceedings but also in all
other types of suit.
It was held that:
SiB&l
"We did not therein state that since he is
not an accused and>the case is not a criminal
case. Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness
stand and testify, and that he can invoke his
right against self-incrimination only when a
question which tends to elicit an answer that
will incriminate him is propounded to him.
Clearly then, it is not the character of the
suit involved but the nature of the proceed
ings that controls. The privilege has consis
tently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not."
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we
presently rule that petitioners may not be com
pelled by the respondent Committee to appear,
testify and produce evidence before it, it is only
because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would
feai
be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Court holds that, under the facts, including
the circumstance that petitioners are presently
impleaded as defendants in a case before the
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues inti
mately related to the subject of contemplated
inquiry before the respondent Committee, the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is
)m
118G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30,1985,138 SCRA 294.
hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners
and intervenor to testify before it and produce
evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent
to the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I
believe we do not possess. We are encroaching
on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the
Senate from proceeding with a constitutionally
vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative
prerogative investigations in aid of legislation.
We do so because we somehow feel that the pur
ported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the
motives behind an act of a House of Congress.
Neither can we substitute our judgment for its
judgment on a matter specifically given to it by
the Constitution. The scope of the legislative
power is broad. It encompasses practically every
aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of
regulation. How can this Court say that unrav
eling the tangled and secret skeins behind the
acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of
39 corporations under the past regime and their
sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of
the new dispensation will not result in useful
legislation?
B. Sabio v. Gordon
G.R. No. 174177, October 17, 2006
DECISION
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is
being questioned on the ground that it tramples
upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative
inquiry under Article.VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights

of persons appearing in or affected by such in
quiries shall be respected.
&&A
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Sen
ate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),
"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
aaifr Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOM-
SAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the al
leged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors."
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Ino-
cencio, under the authority of Senator Richard
JJMi*
J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of
the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enter
prises and Committee on PubHc Sendees. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate
on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined
the invitation because of prior commitment. At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10,2006, Senator Gordon issued a
Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate
President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman
Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario
ai'^
to appear in the public hearing scheduled on
August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know
relative to the matters specified in Senate Res.
S3> No. 455....
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear.
In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18,
&*a 2006, he reiterated his earHer position, invoking
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand,
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Hold
ings Corporation relied on the position paper
they previously filed, which raised issues on the
propriety of legislative inquiry.
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O.
Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator
iiiiiul
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 219
Gordon, sent another notice to Chairman Sabio
requiring him to appear and testify on the same
subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The
notice was issued "under the same authority
of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously
served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply
with the notice. He sent a letter dated September
4, 2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his reason
for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue
an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring
Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede,
Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.
On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the
Senate their Compliance and Explanation, which
partly reads:
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should
not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evi
dence in any judicial legislative or adminis
trative proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No.
1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legis
lative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of
the need to provide protection to the PCGG in
order to ensure the unhampered performance of
its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law,
Section 4(b) of which had not been amended,
repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses
of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or
repeal the provision in controversy. Until then, it
stands to be respected as part of the legal system
in this jurisdiction.
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen.
Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that
the anomalous transactions referred to in the
P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending
cases before the regular courts, the Sandigan
bayan and the Supreme Court....
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commit
tee (203 SCRA 767, 784 [l991]), the Honorable
Supreme Court held:
 220 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
"... [T]he issues sought to be investi
gated by the respondent Committee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by
the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
plifiS
respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the
Sandigabayan would not only pose the pos
sibility of conflicting judgments between a
:p{j$
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal,
but if the Committee's judgment were to be
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibiHty of its influence being made to
bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandi
ganbayan cannot be discounted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance
and Explanation, the Gommittee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the
Committee on Public Services issued an Order
&&&
directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.),
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for
contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the
approval of Senate President Villar and the ma
jority of the Committees' members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45
a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chair
man Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82
EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the
Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court
a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and
PubHc Enterprises and Committee on Public Ser
vices, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon
and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Crucial to the resolution of the present
petitions is the fundamental issue of whether
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the
1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the
merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners that their refusal to appear
before respondent Senate Committees is justi
fied. With the resolution of this issue, all the
other issues raised by the parties have become
inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice:
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitutio
granting respondent Senate Committees tb
power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Represei
tatives or any of its. respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislatio
in accordance with its duly pubHshed rule
of procedure. The rights of persons appea:
ing in or affected by such inquiries shall h
respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 40
of E.O. No. 1 Hmiting such power of legislativ
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members c
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislativ
or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commissio
shall be required to testify or produce ev
dence in any judicial, legislative or adminii
trative proceeding concerning matters withi
its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clea
and unequivocal repugnancy between the tw
quoted provisions that warrants a declaratio
that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 198
Constitution, a brief consideration of the Cor
gress' power of inquiry is imperative.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippin
Congress' power of inquiry, provisions oh sue.
power made their maiden appearance in Articl
VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. The:
came the 1987 Constitution incorporating th
present Article VI, Section 12. What was there
fore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, a
influenced by American jurisprudence, becam
explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognize
the power of investigation, not just of Congress
but also of "any of its committee." This is sig
nificant because it constitutes a direct conferra
of investigatory power upon the committee
and it means that the mechanisms which th
Houses can take in order to effectively perforn
its investigative function are also available t
the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power o
inquiry has gained more solid existence an
expansive construal. The Court's high regard t

such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch." Verily, the Court rein
forced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation
&
of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation"
and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive
with the power to legislate."
ttf
Considering these jurisprudential instruc
tions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant
with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts
the PCGG members and stafffrom the Congress'
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress' power
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends "to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abol
ish." PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot
pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress,
in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsis
tent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitu
ia) tion stating that: "Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."
C. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
DECISION
NACHURA, Jr.
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on
March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respon
dent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies, as represented by
its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 221
The petition seeks the issuance of a tem
porary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin re
spondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry
pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution
No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are
officers of petitioner jSCB-Philippines to at
tend and testify before any further hearing to
be conducted by respondent, particularly that
set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any
hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the
petitioners dh the Watch List. It also prays that
judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoe-
nae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to
petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent
from compelling petitioners to appear and testify
in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
Resolution No. 166.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respon
dent, delivered a privilege speech entitled
"Arrogance of Wealth" before the Senate
based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
denouncing SCB-Philippines for seUing un
registered foreign securities in violation of
the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No.
8799) and urging the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudu
lent activity in the future. Upon motion of
Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was
referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege
speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S.
Resolution No. 166, . . . DIRECTING THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEG
ISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF
UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SE
CURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS
OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVEST
ING PUBLIC
Acting on the referral, respondent, through
its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set
the initial hearing on February 28,2005 to inves
tigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of
the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.
 222 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Respondent invited petitioners, among oth
ers, to attend the hearing, requesting them to
submit their written position paper. Petition
ers, through counsel, submitted to respondent a
letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their
position, particularly stressing that there were
cases pending in court allegedly involving the
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry,
thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry.
Petitioners argue that respondent has no
jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its
subject matter is the very same subject matter
of [several cases already filed in court].
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, the petitioners claim that since the
issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines iHegally
sold unregistered foreign securities is already
preempted by the courts that took cognizance
of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does
not apply squarely to petitioners' case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared
that the issue to be investigated was one over
i-i-ittfi
which jurisdiction had already been acquired
by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Sen
ate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the
matter would create the possibility ofconflicting
judgments; and that the inquiry into the same
justiciable controversy would be an encroach
ment on the exclusive domain ofjudicial jurisdic
tion that had set-in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there
are a number of cases already pending in various
courts and administrative bodies involving the
petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unreg
istered foreign securities, there is a resemblance
between this case and Bengzon. However, the
similarity ends there.
Central to the Court's ruling in Bengzon
that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was
without any constitutional mooring to conduct
the legislative investigation was the Court's
determination that the intended inquiry was
not in aid of legislation. The Court found that
Ijjji*)
the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such
investigation contained no suggestion ofany con
templated legislation; it merely called upon the
Senate to look into possible violations of Section
5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held
that the requested probe failed to comply with a
fundamental requirement "of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Senate or the House of Represen
tatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appear
ing in or effected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue
Ribbcfn Committee from proceeding with the
legislative investigation in that case.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this dis
tinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not
obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No.
166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by
the respondent Committee, as found in the last
three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:
WHEREAS, existing laws including
the Securities Regulation Code seem to be
inadequate in preventing the sale of unreg
istered securities and in effectively enforcing
the registration rules intended to protect the
investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory interven
tion by the SEC and BSP likewise appears
inadequate in preventing the conduct of
proscribed activities in a manner that would
protect the investing public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial
legislation to address the situation, having in
mind the imposition of proportionate penal
ties to offending entities and their directors,
officers and representatives among other
additional regulatory measures; (emphasis
supplied)
The unmistakable objective of the investiga
tion, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes
the error in petitioners' aUegation that the inqui
ry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very
same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce

the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank
in selling unregistered foreign securities x x
x." This fallacy is made more glaring when we
consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to im
]jpi mediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legisla
tion, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future."
^s&fr Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Oth
erwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative, complaint. Surely, the exercise
of sovereign legislative authority, of which the
power of legislative inquiry is an essential com
ponent, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal
or an administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case
Arnault v. Nazareno
l^i
[T]he power of inquiry - with process
to enforce it - is an essential and appropri
iii) ate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information re
specting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information - which is not
infrequently true - recourse must be had to
others who possess it.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they
were singled out by the respondent Committee.
The Court notes that among those invited as re
source persons were officials of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were
subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the
respondent relative to their separate findings
on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign secu
rities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the
objective of the investigation was the quest for
L remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the
recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry
conducted by respondent was, in fact, "in aid of
collection." They claim that Atty. Bocobo and
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 223
ManuelBaviera,the latter a party to the pending
court cases cited by petitioners, were onlyseeking
a friendly forum so that they could recover their
investments from SCB-Philippines; and that
the respondent has allowed itself to be used as
the conveniently available vehicle to effect this
purpose.
However, as correctly pointed out by respon
dent in its Comment on the petition, Atty. Bocobo
did not fite a complaint before the Senate for the
purpose of recovering his investment. On the con
trary, and as confirmed during the initial hear
ing on February 28, 2005, his letter-complaint
humbly requested the Senate to conduct an
inquiry into the purportedly illegal activities of
SCB-Phihppines, with the end view of preventing
the future occurrence of any similar fraudulent
activity by the banks in general. Baviera, on the
other hand, was not a "complainant" but merely
a witness in the investigationt invited to testify
on the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign
securities by SCB-Philippines, being one of the
supposed victims thereof.
The Court further notes that when it denied
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a TRO to
restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005, re
spondent proceeded with the investigation. On
the said date, outraged by petitioners' imputation
that it was conducting the investigation "in aid of
collection," respondent held petitioners, together
with their counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo,
in contempt and ordered their detention for six
hours.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Recon
sideration of this Court's Resolution dated March
14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, alleging that their be
ing held in contempt was without legal basis, as
the phrase "in aid of coUection" partakes of an
absolutely privileged aUegation in the petition.
We do not agree. The Court has already ex
pounded on the essence of the contempt power
of Congress and its committees in this wise -
The principle that Congress or any of its
bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and poHcy.
Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative
 224 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
power. How could a legislative body obtain
the knowledge and information on which to
base intended legislation if it cannot require
and compelthe disclosure ofsuch knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish
~kJ
a defiance of its power and authority? When
the fraimers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making
each branch supreme within the realm ofits
iiijfli)
respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be> full and
complete, independently of each other's au
thority or power.And how couldthe author
ity and power become complete if for every
act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act
of contumacy against it, the legislative body
must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with
affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its
committees of the power to punish contempt is
based on the principle ofself-preservation. As the
branch ofthe government vested with the legisla
tivepower, independentlyofthe judicial branch,
it can assert its authority and punish contuma
cious acts against it. Such power is sui generis,
as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se, but to the sovereign character
ofthe legislature as oneofthe three independent
and coordinate branches of government.
In this case, petitioners' imputation that the
investigation was "in aid ofcoUection" is a direct
chaUenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the lat
ter. In this light, we find the contempt citation
againstthe petitionersreasonable andjustified.
D. Senate Blue Ribbon v.
Judge Majaducon
G.R. No. 136760, July 29, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Jr.
For resolution are two consoHdated petitions:
(a) G.R. No. 136760, for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and preliminary injunction, assailing
the resolution dated November 11,1998 of Judge
Jose S. Majaduconofthe RegionalTrial Court of
|^
fcty)
General Santos City, Branch 23, which denied
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's motion
to dismiss the petition for prohibition, injunc
tion with writ of preliminary injunction filed by
private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano; and
(b) G.R. No. 138378, for review of the resolution
dated April 15,1999 of respondent Judge Maja
ducon declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 136760:
On August 28, 1998, Senator Bias F. Ople
filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
charges ofthen Defense Secretary Orlando Mer-
cado that a group of active and retired military
officers were organizing a coup d'etat to prevent
the administration of then President Joseph Es
trada from probing alleged fund irregularities in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto
III also filed Resolution No. 160, "directing the
appropriate senate committee to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment
portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).. .."
The Senate President referred the two reso
lutions to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee) and the Committee on National
Defense and Security.
During the public hearings conducted by
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (hereafter
called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City,
designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10.500.00
per square meter from private respondent Atty.
Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed
with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per
square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service
of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano,
directing him to appear and testify before it.
Respondent refused to appear at the hearing.
Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and

preHminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court
&
of General Santos City, Branch 23, which was
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.
On October 21,1998, the trial court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order directing the Com
mittee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding
with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in Gen
eral Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or
Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling
and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and
"from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Re
gion XI, particularly from General Santos City,
pending the hearing of the petition for prohibi
tion and injunction."
On November 5,1998, the Committee filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of
(a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a
m G.R. No. 138378:
valid cause of action. It further argued that the
issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order
was invalid for violating the rule against ex-parte
issuance thereof; and that the same was not
enforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court.
iiiii On November 11,1998, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss and granted the
writ of preliminary injunction, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSID
ERED, the motion to dismiss is DENIED,
and the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNC
ffil TION is hereby issued against respondent. It
is enjoined from enforcing its subpoenas to
petitioner in Region XI to appear and testify
before it in any of its inquiry or investigation
anywhere in the Philippines regarding the
acquisition by the AFP-RSBS of Lot X, MR-
1160-D, located in General Santos City. The
,^J
bond of petitioner filed on October 21, 1998,
for P500,000.00 for the TRO also serves as
his bond in this injunction.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari
which was docketed as G.R. No. 136760, aUeging
SsJ
that respondent Judge Majaducon committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction when he:
I. DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 225
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FILED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, ATTY. NILO J.
FLAVIANO, AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN
SP. CIVIL CASE NO. 496.
II. ISSUED (1) A TEMPORARY RE
STRAINING ORD&R EX-PARTE FOR A PE
RIOD OF TWENTY (20) DAYS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER ON OCTOBER 21, 1998, AND
(2) A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ON NOVEMBER 11, 1998 ENJOINING THE
PETITIONER FROM ENFORCING ITS SUB
POENAS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN
REGION XI.
IH. APPLIED THERULING OF BENGZON
VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON IN GRANTING
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PRIVATE RESPON
DENT.
On January 13, 1999, the newspaper, The
Philippine Star published a news report on the
filing by the Committee with this Court of the
petition for certiorari which was docketed as G.R.
No. 136760. The news report quoted portions
of the petition filed by the Committee, aUeging
that Regional Trial Court Judge Majaducon was
guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and proce
dures when he issued the temporary restraining
order and the writ of preliminary injunction
because, under the principle of separation of
powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise
by the legislature of its authority to conduct in
vestigations in aid of legislation.
Reacting to the.aforesaid news report,
respondent Judge Majaducon motu proprio
initiated a charge for indirect contempt of court
against Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., news
reporter Perseus Echeminada, Philippine Star
pubHsher Maximo Soliven, editor-in-chiefRamon
J. Farolan, and executive editor Bobby G. dela
Cruz, which was docketed as Special Civil Case
No. 496.Judge Majaducon averred that the news
report created in the minds of the reader the im
pressionthat he violated the separation ofpowers
clause of the Constitution and that he was guilty
of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures.
After the respondents submitted their re
spective answers, a decision was rendered on
April 15,1999 finding petitionerPimentelguilty
of indirect contempt.
 226 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Hence, the instant petition based on the fol
lowing grounds:
L THE EXPRESSION "GROSS IGNO
RANCE OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE"
OR "GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW' IN
REFERENCE TO THE RESPONDENTS EX-
PARTE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IS NOT PEJORATIVE AS TO CONSTITUTE A
GROUND FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II. THIS HONORABLE COURT ITSELF
USES "GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW'
'&)
AND OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SIMILAR
FORCEFUL IMPORT IN DESCRIBING GROSS
AND PALPABLE ERRORS OF JUDGES.
III. BY UPHOLDING HIS CONTEMPT
CHARGE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS, IN EFFECT,
&&) PREEMPTED THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
RESOLVING THEISSUES RAISED AGAINST
HIM IN G.R. NO. 136760.
a^j
IV. THE PUBLICATION BY PHILIPPINE
STAR OF THE BLUE RIBBON PETITION IN
G.R. NO. 136760, OR EXCERPTS THEREOF
WAS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF FREE
DOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS.
The two petitions, namely, G.R. No. 136760
tig,) and G.R. No. 138378, were ordered consolidated
on December 11, 2000.
The issues for resolution in these joint peti
L tions are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge
Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discre
tion when he dismissed petitioner's motion to dis
miss the petition for prohibition and issued the
M0
writ of preHminary injunction; and. (b) whether
or not respondent Judge erred in convicting pe
titioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of court.
iig)
On the first issue, petitioner Committee con
tends that courts have no jurisdiction to restrain
Congress from performing its constitutionally
vested function to conduct investigations in aid
of legislation, foUowing the principle of separa
tion of powers. Moreover, the petition filed by
respondent Flaviano before the trial court failed
m*
to state a cause of action considering that the
legislative inquiry did not deal with the issuance
of the patent and title to Lot X, MR-1160-D in
ijiiii
the name of AFP-RSBS, which is well within the
court's jurisdiction, but with the anomaly in the
purchase thereof, which faUs squarely within th<
ambit of Senate Resolutions Nos. 157 and 160.
On the other hand, respondent Flaviano con
tends that the trial court may properly intervent
into investigations by Congress pursuant to th<
power of judicial review vested in it by the Con
stitution. He avers that he has a vaHd cause o:
action to file the petition for prohibition consider
ing that the Committee's investigation will delvt
into the validity of the patenting and titling of L01
X, MR-1160-D which, as admitted by petitioner
falls within the competence of judicial courts
In fact, the validity of the purchase by AFP-
RSBS of the subject lot is already the subject o:
a pending action before the Regional Trial Courl
of General Santos City and the Ombudsman oi
Mindanao. Finally, he cites the case of Bengzon v
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [G.R. No. 89914
20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767] and argues
that preliminary injunction may issue in cases
pending before administrative bodies such as the
Ombudsman or the Office of the Prosecutor as
long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights is in danger. Furthermore,
an information against him has been filed with
the Sandiganbayan.
We find for petitioner. There is grave abuse
of discretion when the respondent acts in a capri
cious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
in the exercise of his judgment, as when the
assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal
justification. In this case, the assailed resolu
tion of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued
without legal basis.
The principle of separation of powers essen
tially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of
legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is pre
vented from invading the domain of the others.
When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served
subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investiga
tion of the alleged misuse and mismanagement
of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legisla
tion. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section
21 of the Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
fffffi]
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such in
quiries shaU be respected.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no
authority to prohibit the Committee from requir
ing respondent to appear and testify before it.
The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent,
does not apply in this case. We agree with peti
tioner Committee that the factual circumstances
therein are different from those in the case at
bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was
involved and the subject matter of the inquiry
was more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. More specifically, the
investigation in the said case was an offshoot of
the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who
urged the Senate to look into a possible violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by
the relatives ofthen President Corazon Aquino,
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, in connection
iiiiii) with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez! On the other
hand, there was in this case a clear legislative
purpose, as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160,
and the appropriate Senate Committee was di
rected to look into the reported misuse and mis
management of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the
$0)
intention of enacting appropriate legislation to
protect the rights and interests of the officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Further, in Bengzon, the vaHdity of the sale of
Romualdez's corporations was pending with the
Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee decided to conduct its investigation.
In short, the issue had already been pre-empted
by the court.
In the instant case, the complaint against
respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in
the sale of Lot X, MR-1160 was still pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman when the
Committee served subpoena on him. In other
words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the
matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment
by the legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction
of another branch of the government. Clearly,
there was no basis for the respondent Judge to
apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of
petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for pro
hibition amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
ijp)
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 227
In G.R. No. 138378, petitioner, Senator Aq-
uilino Pimentel, Jr., contends that respondent
judge erred in finding him, as representative
of the Committee, guilty of indirect contempt
of court under Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Pimentel,
the phrase "gross ignorance of the rules of law
and procedure," which the Committee used in
the petition, is not depreciatory, but merely a
description of normal usage in petitions where
the acts of lower courts are challenged before
higher judicial bodies. In fact, this Court often
uses the phrase in its decisions to describe judges
who commit gross and palpable mistakes in
their interpretation and application of the law.
Petitioner further maintains that when the Com
mittee used the phrase, it did so without malice.
Rather, it was only to stress the unfamiliarity of
or disregard by the respondent Judge of a basic
rule of procedure, and to buttress its arguments
in support of its petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Pimentel also contends that he
had no participation in the publication in the
Philippine Star of excerpts from the Committee's
petition for certiorari. Even assuming arguendo
that it was within his control, he pointed out that
he could not have prevented the editors and writ
ers of the newspaper from publishing the same,
lest he violate their constitutional right of free
expression. Indeed, the report by the Philippine
Star of the filing of the petition and the reproduc
tion of its contents was a legitimate exercise of
press freedom.
Respondent Judge counters that Pimentel
was guilty of indirect contempt of court, first
for causing the publication of the Committee's
petition in the Philippine Star notwithstanding
that the same was subjudice, second, for making
derogatory remarks in the petition itself which
affected the honor and integrity of the respondent
judge and degraded the administration ofjustice;
and third, for making it appear that an admin
istrative complaint was filed against respondent
Judge for gross ignorance of the law. These, he
said, constituted mahcious and false report which
obstructed the administration of justice.
Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to bepunished
after charge and hearing. After a charge in
|g)
228 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt;
xxx XXX xxx
d) Any improper conduct tending, di
rectly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;....
After deliberating on the parties' arguments,
we find that petitioner Pimentel is not guilty of
improper conduct which obstructs or degrades
the administration of justice.
Verily, it does not appear that Pimentel
'caused the publication in the Philippine Star of
the fact of filing of the petition for certiorari by
the Committee and the reproduction of excerpts
thereof. He had no right to choose which news
articles will see print in the newspaper. Rather,
it is the publisher thereof which decides which
news events will be reported in the broadsheet.
In. doing so, it is allowed "the widest latitude of
choice as to what items should see the light of day
so long as they are relevant to a matter of public
interest," pursuant to its right of press freedom.
Respondent Judge's allegation that peti
tioner made it appear that an administrative
complaint was filed against him is without
basis. From a careful perusal of the records, it
i&^i
appears that while the Committee prayed for the
imposition of administrative sanctions against
respondent Judge Majaducon for gross ignorance
of the law, no formal administrative complaint
was instituted separately from the petition for
certiorari.
FinaHy, the statement that respondent Judge
was grossly ignorant of the rules of law and
procedure does not constitute improper conduct
m
that tends to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. As correctly argued
by petitioner, the phrase "gross ignorance of the
rules of law and procedure" is ordinarily found
lii
in administrative complaints and is a necessary
description to support a petition which seeks the
annulment of an order of a judge wherein basic
legal principles are disregarded.
<$P
In this connection,it bears stressing that the
power to declare a person in contempt of court
must be exercised on the preservative, not vin
dictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. This was aptly
expressed in the case ofNazareno v. Barnes [220
Phil. 452 (1985)]
A judge, as a public servant, should not be
so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or of
fended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion
about him which may not altogether be flattering
to him. After aU, what matters is that a judge
performs his duties in accordance with the dic
tates of his conscience and the Hght that God has
given him. A judge should never aUow himself to
be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or petti
ness in the performance of his duties. He should
always bear in mind that the power of the court to
punish for contempt should be exercised for pur
poses that are impersonal, because that power
is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 136760 and
138378 are GRANTED. The resolution of the Re
gional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch
23, in Special Civil Case No. 496 dated November
11, 1998, which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's motion to dismiss, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Writ ofPreHminary Injunc
tion issued by the trial court on November 11,
1998 is DISSOLVED. The resolution dated April
15, 1999, which declared Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt ofcourt,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
indirect contempt is ordered DISMISSED.
NOTE: When the Constitution says that
"The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected," it simply
means that legislative investigations must be
"subject to the Hmitations placed by the Consti
tution on governmental action." And since all
governmental action must be exercised subject
to constitutional limitations, principaUy found in
the Bill of Rights, this limitation really creates
no new constitutional right.
In addition to the above express limitations
on the power of Congress is the impHcit limitation
that the legislature's power to commit a witness
for contempt terminates when the legislative
'#$&
tafel
body ceases to exist upon its final adjournment.
"This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the
power to impose such a penalty is the right which
the legislature has to self-preservation, and
which right is enforceable during the existence of
the legislative body."Avancefia, C.J., concurring
in Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170,186 (1930).
NOTE: Need to publish Rules.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitu
tion explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respec
tive committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly pubHshed
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
iM> of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic re
quirements of due process. Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. What constitutes publication is set forth in
^) Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general cir
culation in the Philippines." The absence of any
amendment to the rules published some years
ago cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of leg
islation only in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure, and does not make any dis
tinction whether or not these rules have under
gone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to pubHsh the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate. Garcillqno v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008.
However, Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution states: "Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionaUy construed
as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicialsupervision and interference, excepton a
clear showing ofsuch arbitrary and improvident
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 229
use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process. But the Senate is still subjectto the
imperatives of quorum, voting, and pubHcation.
The Senates /rules have been pubHshedand were
followed by the Senate. Dela Paz v. Senate, G.R.
No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
>
SEC. 22. THE HEADS OF DEPART
MENTS MAY UPON THEIR OWN INITIA
TIVE, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
PRESIDENT, OR UPON THE REQUEST
OF EITHER HOUSE, AS THE RULES OF
EACH HOUSE SHALL PROVIDE, APPEAR
BEFORE AND BE HEARD BY SUCH HOUSE
ON ANY MATTER PERTAINING TO THEIR
DEPARTMENTS. WRITTEN QUESTIONS
SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESI
DENT OF THE SENATE OR THE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AT LEAST THREE DAYS BEFORE THEIR
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE. INTERPEL
LATIONS SHALL NOT BE LIMITED TO
V/RITTEN QUESTIONS, BUT MAY COVER
MATTERS RELATED THERETO. WHEN
THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST SO REQUIRES AND
THE PRESIDENT SO STATES IN WRIT
ING, THE APPEARANCE SHALL BE CON
DUCTED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION.
1. Executive privilege.
A. Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, Jr.
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Commit
tee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
 230 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
EJSfel
The Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security likewise issued invitationsdated
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of
the AFP: the Commanding General of the Phil
ippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon;
inspectorGeneralofthe AFP Vice AdmiralMateo
M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence
of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief
of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen.
Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent
of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant
Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col.
Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as re
source persons in a public hearing scheduled on
September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privi
\M
lege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr.,
delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has
Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of
Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the
Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege
Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered
^)
on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the
Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege
Speech of Senator Rodolfo Blazon delivered on
August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Dan
ger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Sena
tor Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal - Resolution
Directing the Committee on National Defense
foivt and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, and in the NationaMnterest, on the
Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate
Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed
i&i
by Senator Biazon - Resolution Directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the
Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing sched
uled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief
of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by
letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for
its postponement "due to a pressing operational
situation that demands [his] utmost personal
attention" while "some of the invited AFP of
ficers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters."
On September 28, 2005, Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[s] dated
^j
September 27, 2005 "respectfully requesting]
for the postponement of the hearing [regarding
the NorthRail project] to which various officials
of the Executive Department have been invited"
in order to "afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various
issues so that they may better enlighten the Sen
ate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote Ex
ecutive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are
unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent
belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrange
ments as well as notices to all resource persons
were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on
September 28, 2005 a letter from the President
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose
L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until
a copy of the report of the UP Law Center dn the
contract agreements relative to the project had
been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued
E.O. 464, "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS,
ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEG
ISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLA
TION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The
salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads ofDe
partments Before Congress. In accordance
with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitu
tion and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers be
tween co-equal branches of the government,
all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing
' before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall
only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Cover
age of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of con
fidentiality based on executive privilege is
L
fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
n&j
Employees provides that Public Officials
and Employees shall not use or divulge con
fidential or classified information officially
im known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice
the public interest.
aWl Executive privilege covers all confiden
tial or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by
this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence be
tween the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte
v. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002);
&)
Military, diplomatic and other national
security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged
(Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commis
sion on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,
9 December 1998).
'iiiit
Information between inter-government
agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties
^) and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presi
dential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
L Discussion in close-door Cabinet meet
ings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and
public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Au
thority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are
covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments
whoin the judgment ofthe department heads
are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 231
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National PoHce (PNP) officers
with rank of chief superintendent or higher
and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in
the judgment of the National Security Advis
er arecovered bythe executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined
by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Pub
lic Officials Before Congress. All public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) hereof
shall secure prior consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence
to the rule on executive privilege and respect
for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid oflegislation. (Emphasisand
underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate Presi
dent Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter
informing him "that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting
[regarding the NorthRail project] will notbe able
to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said
officials have not secured the required consent
from the President." On even date which was
also the scheduled date of the hearing on the
allegedwiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to
Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee
on National Defense and Security, informing
him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo],
thru the Secretary of National Defense, no of
ficer ofthe [AFP] is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without
seeking a writtenapproval from the President"
and "that no approval has been granted by the
President to any AFP officer to appear before
the public hearing ofthe Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005."
 232 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, dock
eted as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667,
for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before
this Court chaUenging the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita
et al., on the other hand, pray in their consoH-
:f&l
dated memorandum on March 13, 2006 for the
dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be re
solved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power
of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of
the people to information on matters of pubHc
concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed
grave abuse of discretion when they implemented
tali!
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation.
Constitutionality ofE.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the ap
pearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the
possession of these officials. To resolve the ques
tion of whether such withholding of information
violates the Constitution, consideration of the
general power of Congress to obtain informa
tion, otherwise known-as the power of inquiry,
is in order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 ofArticle VI of the Con
stitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House
of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring
supplied)
i*l
This provision is worded exactly as Section
8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except
that, in the latter, it vests the power ofinquiry in
the unicameral legislature established therein
the Batasang Pambansa and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a
similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno, a case decided in 1950 under that
Constitution, the Court already recognized that
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
legislate.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of in
quiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded
on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by execu
tive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject,
by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right
to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience
during the so-called "McCarthy era," however,
the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may
thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might
not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus
beyond the constitutional power of Congress.
Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress
to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is
to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
.concerned, or to any person for that matter, the
possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry. Given such statement in
its invitations, along with the usual indication
of the subject of inquiry and the questions rela
tive to and in furtherance thereof, there would
be less room for speculation on the part of the
person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid
of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes
crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative
power of inquiry. The provision requires that the

inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate
or House's duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity
of an inquiry conducted without duly published
rules ofprocedure. Section 21 also mandates that
iM?i the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees
in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable
before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by
m\
the persons affected, even if they belong to the
executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, none appearing to
obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of
abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might
be established, resulting in palpable violations
of tlie rights guaranteed to members of the ex
j&j ecutive department under the BiU of Rights. In
such instances, depending on the particulars of
each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial
sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legisla
tion, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the
rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it
being mentioned in its provisions, its preambu-
lar clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of
executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new
in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to
the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being
ofAmerican origin, it is best understood in light
^i of how it has been defined and used in the legal
literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the
power of the Government to withhold informa
tion from the pubHc, the courts, and the Con
gress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right
ofthe President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress,
the courts, and.ultimately the public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a
clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed
claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 233
that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to
speak of executive privileges "since presidential
refusals to furnish information mav be actuated
bv anv of at least three distinct kinds of consid
erations, and may be asserted, with differing
degrees ofsuccess, in the context ofeither judicial
or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains,
is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the
ground that the information is cf such nature
that its disclosure would subvert crucial mili
tary or diplomatic objectives. Another variety
is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of
the Government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of
law to officers charged with the enforcement of
that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal
deliberations has been said to attach to intra-
governmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which govern
mental decisions and policies are formulated.
Tribe's comment is supported by the ruling
in In re Sealed Case, thus:
"Since the beginnings of our nation,
executive officials have claimed a variety of
privileges to resist disclosure of information
the confidentiality of which thev felt was
crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibiHties of the executive branch of
our government. Courts ruled early that the
executive had a right to withhold documents
that might reveal military or state secrets.
The courts have also granted the executive a
right to withhold the identity of government
informers in some circumstances and a quaH-
fied right to withhold information related to
pending investigations, xxx" (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The entry in Black's Law Dictionary on "ex
ecutive privilege" is similarly instructive regard
ing the scope of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitution
al doctrine of separation of powers, exempts
the executive from disclosure requirements
applicable to the ordinary citizen or organi
zation where such exemption is necessary to
 234 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not
only to military and diplomatic secrets but
also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive' domestic decisional
and policy making functions, that is, those
documents reflecting the frank expression
necessary in intra-governmental advisory
and deHberative communications. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
^J
That a type of information is recognized as
privileged does not, however, necessarily mean
that it would be considered privileged in all in
stances. For in determining the vaHdity of a claim
of privilege, the question that must be asked is
not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also
whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.
The leading case on executive privilege in the
United States is U.S. v. Nixon, decided in 1974.
In issue in that case was the validity of President
Nixon's claim of executive privilege against a
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the
production of certain tapes and documents relat
ing to the Watergate investigations. The claim
of privilege was based on the President's general
interest in the confidentiality of his conversations
and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that
while there is no expHcit reference to a privilege
of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates
to the effective discharge of a President's powers.
The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President's
claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must
be balanced against the public interest in the fair
administration of criminal justice. Notably, the
Court was careful to clarify that it was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a
civil litigation or against congressional demands
for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims
of executive privilege against Congress
are rare. Despite frequent assertion of the
privilege to deny information to Congress,
beginning with President Washington's re
fusal to turn over treaty negotiation records
to the House of Representatives, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never adjudicated the
issue. However, the U.S. Court of Appeal
for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a cas
decided earlier in the same year as Nixor
recognized the President's privilege over hi
conversations against a congressional sut
poena. Anticipating the balancing approac
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixor
the Court of Appeals weighed the publi
interest protected by the claim of privileg
against the interest that would be serve-
by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling tha
the balance favored the President, the Cour
declined to enforce the subpoena.
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executiv
privilege was recognized by this Court in Almont
v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in referenc-
to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quotei
the following portion of the Nixon decision whicl
explains the basis for the privilege:
'The expectation of a President to tht
confidentiality of his conversations and cor
respondences, like the claim of confidential
ity of judicial deliberations, for example, ha:
all the values to which v/e accord deferenci
for the privacy of all citizens and, added t<
those values, is the necessity for protection o
the public interest in candid, objective, an(
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidentia
decision-making. A President and those wh(
assist him must be free to explore alterna
tives in the process of shaping policies anc
making decisions and to do so in a way manj
would be unwilling to express except private
ly. These are the considerations justifying i
presumptive privilege for Presidential com
munications. The privilege is fundamental tc
the operation of government and inextricablj
rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution xxx" (Emphasis and underscor
ing supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum
issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly
stated in the decision, the right of the people tc
information. Nonetheless, the Court recognized
that there are certain types of information which
the government may withhold from the public,
thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name,
that executive privilege may be claimed against
citizens' demands for information.

faa
In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that
this jurisdiction recognizes the common law
holding that there is a "governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters." The same case held
that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a
recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Au
thority, the Court ruled that the right to infor
mation does not extend to matters recognized as
"privileged information under the separation of
&J4fr
powers," by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions
in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held
E&iA that information on military and diplomatic
secrets and those affecting national security,
and information on investigations of crimes by
law enforcement agencies before the prosecution
of the accused were exempted from the right to
information.
From the above discussion on the meaning
and scope of executive privilege, both in the
United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear
principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether
asserted against Congress, the courts, or the pub
lic, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any rec
ognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact
of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordi
nary character of the exemptions indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against execu
tive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both
require the officials covered by them to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing
before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which con
ivMjfr strain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department
ti^i
heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a
prior determination by any official whether they
iiliij
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 235
are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself
has, through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike
also Section 3, the coverage of department heads
under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
department heads' possession of any information
which might be covered by executive privilege. In
fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-a-vis Sec
tion 2, there is no reference to executive privilege
at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 as grounded on Article VI, Section 22
of the Constitution on what has been referred to
as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments
may upon their own initiative, with the con
sent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall
be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives
at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus
requires an examination of the meaning of Sec
tion 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides
for the question hour must be interpreted vis-a
vis Section 21 which provides for the power of
either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commis
sion shows, the framers were aware.that these
two provisions involved distinct functions of
Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. xxx When we
amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the
Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that
members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled
anymore to appear before the House of Rep
resentatives or before the Senate. I have a
particular problem in this regard, Madam
President, because in our experience in
the Regular Batasang Pambansa - as the
[%&
236 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Gentleman himself has experienced in the
interim Batasang Pambansa one of the
most competent inputs that we can put in
our committee dehberations, either in aid of
legislationor in congressional investigations,
is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We
usually invite them, but if they do not come
and it is a congressional investigation, we
usuaUy issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement
madeby Commissioner Suarez when he said
that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may
refuse to come to the House of Representa?
tives or the Senate [when requested under
Section22] doesnot mean that they need not
come when they are invited or subpoenaed
by the committee of either House when it
comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or
congressional investigation. According to
Commissioner Suarez, that is aUowed and
their presence can be had under Section 21.
Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam
iii
President, because Section 20 refers only
to what was originally the Question Hour,
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically
toinquiriesin aid oflegislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned
and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inqui
ries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretion
ary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to
Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one
iS/fifi
ofthe proponents ofthe amendmentto makethe
appearance ofdepartmentheadsdiscretionary in
the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to
the members of the Commission that the Com
mittee on Style, precisely in recognition of this
distinction, later moved the provision on question
hour from its original position as Section 20 in
the original draft down to Section 31, far from
i^ the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
This gave rise to the following exchange during
the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his
capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to
the Article on Legislative and may I request
the chairperson of the Legislative Depart
ment, Commissioner Davide, to give his
reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding
Officer.I have only one reaction to the Ques
tion Hour. I propose that instead of putting
it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative
Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does
the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner
Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we consid
ered that previously when we sequenced this
but we reasoned that in Section 21, which
is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power
of Congress in terms ofits own lawmaking;
whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a
power in terms of its own lawmaking power
because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of
legislation. And so we put Question Hour as
Section 31.1 hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power,
and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearanceofthe membersofCabinet would
be very,very essential not onlyin the applica
tion of check and balance but also, in effect,
in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with
the committee, we find merit in the sugges
tion of Commissioner Davide. In other words,
we are accepting that and so this Section 31
would now become Section 22. Would it be,
Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. (Emphasis and un
derscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in
the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
Maambong proceeded fromthe same assumption

that these provisions pertained to two different
functions ofthe legislature. Both Commissioners
understood that the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is different from the power
to conduct inquiries during the question hour.
CommissionerDavide's onlyconcernwas that the
two provisions onthese distinctpowers beplaced
closely together, they being complementary to
each other. Neither Commissioner considered
them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two
Commissioners' alone. From the above-quoted
exchange, Commissioner Maambong's committee
- the Committee on Style - shared the view that
the two provisions reflected distinct functions of
Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other-
hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman
ofthe Committee onthe Legislative Department.
ll%jiJ
Hisviews maythus bepresumed as representing
that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated
by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and
the other ministers accountable for their acts
andthe operation ofthe government, correspond
ing to what is known in Britain as the question
period. There was a specific provision fora ques
tion hour in the 1973 Constitution which made
the appearance of ministers mandatory. The
same perfectly conformedto the parliamentary
system estabHshed by that Constitution, where
the ministers are alsomembers ofthe legislature
and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary
system of government is the immediate account
ability of the Prims Minister and the Cabinet to
the National Assembly. They shallberesponsible
tothe National Assembly forthe program ofgov
ernment and shall determine the guidelines of
nationalpolicy. Unlikein the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials
cannotbe terminated before their term expired,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in
office onlyas longas they enjoythe confidence of
the National Assembly. The moment this confi
dence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
may be changed.
fojffi)
The framers of the 1987 Constitution re
moved the mandatorynature ofsuchappearance
i^i
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 237
during the question hour in the present Consti
tution so as toconform more fuUy toa system of
separation ofpowers. To thatextent, thequestion
hour, as it is presently understood in this juris
diction, departs from the question period ofthe
parliamentary system. That department heads
maynotberequiredto appearin a question hour
does not, however, mean that the legislature is
rendered powerless to elicit information from
them inall circumstances. Inf^ct, inlight of the
absence ofa mandatory question period, the need
to enforce Congress' right to executive informa
tionin the performance ofits legislative function
becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has
anything to tell us on the subjectunder dis
cussion, it is that the Congress has the right
to obtaininformationfromany sourceeven
from officials ofdepartments and agencies in
the executive branch. In the UnitedJStates
there is, unlike the situation which prevails
in a parliamentary system such as that
in Britain, a clear separation between the
legislative and executive branches. It is this
very separation that makes the congressional
right to obtain information from the execu
tive so essential, if the functions of the Con
gress as the elected representatives of the
people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence ofclose rapport betweenthe legisla
tive and executive branchesin this country,
comparable to those which exist under a
parliamentary system, and the nonexistence
in the Congress of an institution such as the
British question period have perforce made
reliance by the Congress upon its right to
obtain information from the executive essen
tial, if it is intelligently to perform its legis
lative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses
the right to obtain executive information, its
powerofoversight ofadministration in a sys
tem such as ours becomes a power devoid of
most ofits practical content, since it depends
for its effectiveness solely upon information
parceled out ex gratia by the executive. (Em
phasis and underscoring suppHed)
Sections 2i and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress. One specificaUyrelates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
 238 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the aim of which is to elicit information that may
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the poWer to conduct a question hour, the objec
tive of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress' oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed
on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such
iisii) information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report oftheir per
iiii
formance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance
is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the.
appearance is mandatory for the same, reasons
stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress
may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Consti
^i
tutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to com
pel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of in
quiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
m) fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this
powerthe President on whom executive power
is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded
to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members ofthe Supreme
\$$h
Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested
fei
in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it dur
ing the oral argument upon interpellation of the
Chief Justice.
Having established the proper interpreta
tion of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution,
the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitu
tionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and
the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid
of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads
in the question hour contemplated in the provi
sion of said Section 22 ofArticle VI. The reading
is dictated by the basic rule of construction that
issuances must be interpreted, as much as pos
sible, in a way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to* secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on-its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Con
stitution, the appearance of department heads in
the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be appHed to ap
pearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the depart
ment head to appear in such inquiry: unless a
valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Execu
tive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires aH the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive
departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP,
and aU senior national security officials who, in
the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e., department heads, Chief
of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
National Security Adviser), are "covered by the
executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other
officers as may be determined by the President.
Given the title of Section 2 "Nature, Scope
and Coverage of Executive Privilege" it is
evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis,
the determination by the President under this
provision is intended to be based on a similar
finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b)
of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privi
lege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of
the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific
categories of information and not to categories
of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464
which deals with the nature, scope and coverage
of executive privilege, the reference to persons
being "covered by the executive privilege" may
be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the
person is in possession of information which is,
in the judgment of the head of office concerned,
fefty)
privileged as defined in Section. 2(a). The Court
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this
is the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated
head of office or by the President that an official
is "covered by the executive privilege," such of
ficial is subjected to the requirement that he
first secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to
give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which
already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior
consent is the determination by a head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464,
or by the President herself, that such official is
^
in possession of information that is covered by
executive privilege. This determination then
becomes the basis for the official's not showing
up in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes
E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or. a head of office
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 239
authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged, arid that
the President has not reversed such determina
tion. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege,"
amounts to an implied claim that the informa
tion is being withheld by the executive branch,
by authority of the President, on the basis of
executive privilege. Verily, there is an impHed
claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of re
spondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the impHed nature
of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464.
It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be
conducted by the Committee of the Whole
regarding the NorthRail Project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 Septem
ber 2005 at 10:00 a.m.. please be informed
that officials of the Executive Department in
vited to appear at the meeting will not be able
to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive Order No.
464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance
Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers,
Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privi
lege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries
In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitu
tion, And For Other Purposes." Said officials
have not secured the required consent from
the President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke execu
tive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource per
sons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it
expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot
attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however,
are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
assumes that the invited officials are covered by
E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination
has been made, by the designated head of office
or the President, that the invited official pos
sesses information that is covered by executive
privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the
 240 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
letter that such determination has been made,
the same must be deemed impHed. Respecting
&tiflt the statement that the invited officials have
not secured the consent of the President, it only
means that the President has not reversed the
standing prohibition against their appearance
before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita's
letter leads to the conclusion that the executive
^J
branch, either through the President or the heads
of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a
determination that the information required by
the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
writing, there has been no contrary pronounce
ment from the President. In fine, an implied
claim ofprivilege has been made by the executive.
While there is no PhiHppine case that di
rectly addresses the issue of whether executive
iffifcl privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is
gathered from Chavezv. PEA that certain infor
mation in the possession of the executive may
vaHdly be claimed as privileged even against
Jili)
Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the in
formation demanded by petitioner is privi
leged information rooted in the. separation
of powers. The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences,
jp> or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal-deliberations
of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, of executive sessions of either house
fc&)
of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
This kind ofinformation cannot be pried open
bv a co-equal branch of government. A frank
j^jrf) exchange of exploratory ideas and assess
ments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making
of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power. This is not
the situation in the instant case.
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be
dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact
that it sanctions claims of executive privilege.
^| This Court must look further and assess the
claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege
must be assessed on a case to case basis,
:mi
examining the ground invoked therefor and
the particular circumstances surrounding
it, there is, in an impHed claim of privilege,
a defect that renders it invaHd per se. By its
very nature, and as demonstrated by the let
ter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted
above, the implied claim authorized by Sec
tion 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any
' specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a)
enumerates the types of information-that
are covered by the privilege under the chal
lenged order, Congress is left to speculate
as to which among them is being referred
to by the executive. The enumeration is not
eVen intended to be comprehensive, but a
mere statement of what is included in the
phrase "confidential or classified information
between the President and the publicofficers
covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the requested infor
mation privileged. It does"not suffice to merely
declare that the President, or an authorized head
of office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determi
nation. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
dark on how the requested information could
be classified as privileged. That the message is
couched in terms that, on first impression, do
not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it
more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive
branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemp
tion from an obHgation to disclose information,
must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v.
Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government
and must be asserted by it; it can neither
be claimed nor waived by a private party.
It is not to be lightly invoked. There must
be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
head of the department which has control
over the matter, after actual personal con
sideration by that officer. The court itself
must determine whether the circumstances
 m
iisaJ
are appropriate for the claim of privilege,
and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of
the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect. (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement ofthe specific basis
ofa claim ofexecutive privilege, thereis no way
of determining whether it falls under one of the
traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be
respected. These, in substance, were the same
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege as
serted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
Vasquez and, more in point, against a commit
tee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is
enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an
assessment of the potential harm result
ing from disclosure impossible, thereby
preventing the Court from balancing such
harm against plaintiffs' needs to determine
whether to override any claims of privilege.
(Underscoring supplied)
jiil)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:
On the present state of the record, this
Court is not called upon to perform this bal
ancing operation. In stating its objection to
claimant's interrogatories, government as
serts, and nothing more, that the disclosures
ityi
sought by claimant would inhibit the free
expression of opinion that non-disclosure is
designed to protect. The government has not
^) shown nor even alleged that those who
evaluated claimant's product were involved
in internal policymaking, generally, or in
aa
this particular instance. Privilege cannot be
set up bv an unsupported claim. The facts
upon which the privilege is based must be
established. To find these interrogatories
objectionably this Court would have to as.
sume that the evaluation and classification of
claimant's products was a matter of internal
to policy formulation, an assumption in which
this Court is unwilling to indulge suasponte.
(Emphasis and underscoring suppHed)
tfekl Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy
similarly emphasizes that "anagency must pro-
ifel
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 241e
vide 'precise andcertain' reasons for preserving
the confidentiahty ofrequested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. ofAmerica ampli
fies, thus:
A formal anjd proper claim ofexecutive
privilege requires a specific designation and
description ofthe documents within its scope
as well as precise and certain reasons for
preserving their confidentiality. Without this
specificity, it is impossible for a court fri ana
lyze the claim short of disclosure of the very
thing sought to be protected Asthe affidavit
. now stands, the Court has Httle more than its
sua sponte speculation with which to weigh
the applicability ofthe claim. An improperly
asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as
Reynolds requires, the Court cannot recog
nize the claim in the instant case because it is
legally insufficient to allow the Court to make
a just and reasonable determination as to its
applicability.Torecognize such a broadclaim
in whichthe Defendant has givennoprecise
or compelling reasons to shield these docu
ments from outside scrutiny, would make a
farce ofthe wholeprocedure. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch ofgovern
ment, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearlystating the groundstherefor. Ap
ropos is the foUowing ruling in McPhaul v. U.S.:
We think the Court's decision in United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724,
is highly relevant to these questions. For it
is as true here as it was there, that 'if (pe
titioner) had legitimate reasons for failing
to produce the records of the association,.^
decent respect for the House of Representa
tives, bv whose authority the subpoenas
issued, would have required that (he) state
(his) reasons for noncompliance upon the
return of the writ. Such a statement would
havegiven the Subcommittee an opportunity
to avoidthe blocking ofits inquiry by taking
other appropriate steps to obtain the records.
'To deny the Committee the opportunity to
consider the objection or remedy is in itself a
contempt of its authority and an obstruction
ofits processes. His failure to make any such
$0
242 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
statement was "a patent evasion of the duty
of one summoned to produce papers before
a congressional committee[, and] cannot be
condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring sup
plied; citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not
require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determin
ing the requisite degree ofparticularity wouldbe
the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus,
Hoffman v. U.S. declares:
"The witness is not exonerated from
answering merely because he declares that
in so doing he would incriminate himself
his say-so does not of itself establish the
hazard of incrimination. It is for the court
to say whether his silence is justified, and to
require him to answer if 'it clearly appears
to the court that he is mistaken.' However, if
the witness, upon interposing his claim, were
foftffl required to prove the hazard in the sense
in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled
to surrender the very protection which the
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain
the privilege, it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in
iW which it is asked, that a responsive answer
to the question or an explanation of whv it
cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result."
<j&l
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.
I
464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead
of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for
Congress to determine whether the withholding
^ of information is justified under the circum
stances of each case. It severely frustrates the
power of inquiry of Congress.
ty^j In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464
uiust be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to
Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines,
binding only on the heads of office mentioned
iiiiiii
in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive
privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on
the other branches of government. It may thus
be construed as a mere expression of opinion by
the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another
ground for invalidating the challenged order the
alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the
heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate
of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of
the United States where, so it claims, only the
President can assert executive privilege to with
hold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually
provides that, once the head of office determines
that ascertain information is privileged, such de
termination is presumed to bear the President's
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the
official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the Presi
dent that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President
to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is
contrary to the exceptional nature of the privi
lege. Executive privilege, as already discussed,
is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the
fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
of the executive branch, or in those instances
where exemption from disclosure is necessary to
the discharge of highly important executive re
sponsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege
is thus premised on the fact that certain infor
mation must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such
high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of
the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit
to the President the power to invoke the privi
lege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf,
in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is "By order of the President,"
which means that he personally consulted with

her. The privilege being an extraordinary power,
it must be wielded only by the highest official
|ffl
in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. There is even less reason
to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section
2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is
being summoned by Congress on a matter which,
in his own judgment, might be covered by execu
tive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to. inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide
the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither
the President nor the. Executive Secretary in
vokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound
to respect the failure of the official to appear
before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed
purposes for requiring officials to secure the
consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O.
464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public
;%0
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legisla
tion." That such rights must indeed be respected
by Congress is an echo from Article VI, Section
'hfl
21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3,
it is clear that it is essentially an authorization
for implied claims of executive privilege, for
which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to
ensure respect for such officials does not change
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O. 464 is concerned only with the demands
of Congress for the appearance of executive of
ficials in the hearings conducted by it, and not
with the demands of citizens for information
pursuant to their right to information on matters
of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
'ij0
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 243
claiming, however, that what is involved in the
present controversy is not merely the legislative
power of inquiry, but the right of the people to
information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions
between the right of Cjpngress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the
right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen
for the production of documents pursuant to
his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued
by Congress. Neither does the right to informa
tion grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong
only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of rep
resentatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people
are exercising-their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of
legislation are generally conducted in public,
however, any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people
of information which, being presumed to be in
aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter
before Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal
means allowed by their freedom of expression.
Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be main
tained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's
will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effec
tive only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in
the discussion are aware of the issues and
have access to information relating thereto
can such bear fruit. (Emphasis and under
scoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people
to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
Si
244 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as
direct as its violation of the legislature's power
of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its
publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officialsof the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same
is exempt from the need for publication. On the
need for publishing even those statutes that do
not directly apply to people in general, Tanada
v. Tuvera states:
tai
The term "laws" should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is
a law granting citizenship to a particular in
dividual, like a relative of President Marcos
. who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be saidi;hat such a law does
not affect the public although it unquestion
^foij ably does not apply directly to aUthe people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body poHtic
may question in the political forums or. if he
is a proper partv. even in courts of justice.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Although the above statement was made in
reference to statutes, logic dictates that the chal
lenged order must be covered by the publication
requirement. Asexplained above, E.O. 464has a
^J
direct effect on the right of the people to informa
tion on matters of public concern. It is, therefore,
a matter of public interest which members of
the body poHtic may question before this Court.
Dueprocessthus requires that the people should
have been apprised ofthis issuance before it was
implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to infor
mation from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground
L that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however,
allow the executive branch to evade congres
sional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or profferir
its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient
invoking said provisions, the power of Congre*
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is fru
trated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accon
plish...was to reverse the old presumptic
in favor of secrecy, based on the divine rigl
of kings, and nobles, and replace it with
presumption in favor of publicity, based c
the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Unde
scoring supplied)
-Resort to any means then by which officia
of the executive branch could refuse to divulge h
formation cannot be presumed vaHd. Otherwis
we shall not have merely nullified the power <
our legislature to inquire into the operations
government, but we shaU have given up som
thing of much greater value - our right as
people, to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTL
GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Jlxecuti\
Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "ENSURIN
OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE O
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENC
TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEG
AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLI
OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIV
INQUIRIES IN Alt) OF LEGISLATION W
DERTHE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHE
PURPOSES," are declared VOID. Sections 1 an
2(a) are, however, VALID.
B. Neri v. Senate Committee
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Assailed in this motion for reconsider*
tion is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (th
"Decision"), granting the petition for certiora:
filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against th
respondent Senate CommitteesonAccountabiHt
of Public Officers and Investigations,Trade an
Commerce, and National Defense and Securit
(collectively the "respondent Committees").
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
On September 26,2007, petitioner appeare
before respondent Committees and testified fc

about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning
the National Broadband Project (the "NBNProj
fe> ect"), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC")
to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
fciHit
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Com
mission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 MiUion in
exchange for his approval ofthe NBN Project.
He further narrated that he informedPresident
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further onPresidentArroyo and petitioner's dis
cussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner
refused toanswer, invoking "executive privilege."
l&&i
To bespecific, petitioner refused toanswer ques
tions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directedhim to prioritizeit, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in know
ingpetitioner's answers to thesethreequestions
byrequiring himtoappearand testify once more
on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote
to respondent Committees and requested them
to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the
ground of executive privilege....
The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita
pertinently stated [in part]:
l^i Considering that Sec. Neri has been
lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he
has answered all questions propounded to
iaj
him except the foregoing questions involving
executiveprivilege,wetherefore request that
his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the
ZTE/NBN project be dispensed with.
OnNovember 20,2007, petitioner did notap
pear before respondentCommittees uponorders
ofthePresident invoking executive privilege. On
November 22,2007, the respondent Committees
issued the show-cause letter requiring him to
explain whyhe should not becitedin contempt.
On November 29, 2007, in petitioner's reply to
respondent Committees, he manifested that it
was not his intention to ignore the Senate hear
w>
ing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 245
by executive privilege. He also manifested his
willingness toappear andtestify should there be
new matters to be taken up. Hejust requested
that he befurnished "inadvance as towhatelse"
he "needs to clarify."
On the same date, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the above Order. He insisted
that hehadnotshown "any contemptible conduct
worthy ofcontempt and arrest." Heemphasized
his willingness to testify on new matters, but
respondent Committees did not respond to his
request foi*advance notice of questions. He also
mentioned the petition for certiorari he previ
ously filed withthis CourtonDecember 7,2007.
According tohim, thisshould restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the orderdatedJanu
ary30, 2008 which declared him incontempt and
directed Ijis arrest and detention.
Thecore issuesthat arisefrom the foregoing
respective contentions of the opposing parties
are as follows:
(1) whetheror not there is a recognized pre
sumptive presidential communications privilege
in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal
basis tohold that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by executive
privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees
have shown that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise
of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the contempt order.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue
that the Court's declaration that presidential
communications are presumptively privileged
reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate
 246 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
ttpi
v. Ermita that "inclinesheavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent
Committees then claim that the Court erred in
relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
Respondent Committees argue as if this
Ifeaft
were the first time the presumption in favor of
the presidential communications privilege is
mentioned and adoptedin our legalsystem.That
iiiiii is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the
presidential communications privilege is fun
damental to the operation of government and
j-feaj
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,
the caserelied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumer
ated the cases in which the claim of executive
privilege was recognized, among them Almonte
v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission
on Good Gdvernment (PCGG), and Chavez v.
PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that
"there are certain types of information which
thegovernment may withhold from the public,"
that there is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding, military, diplomatic and other national
PAJ
security matters"; andthat "therighttoinforma
tion does not extend to matters recognized as
'privileged information' under the separation of
powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions
in closed-door Cabinet meetings."
tij
Respondent Committees' observation that
this Court's Decision reversed the "presumption
that inclines heavily against executive secrecy
L and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piece
meal interpretation of the said Decision. The
Court has repeatedly heldthat in ordertoarrive
at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
specific portion thereof should be isolated and
resorted to, but the decision must be considered
in its entirety.
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made
in the context of the circumstances obtaining in
Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections
2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464,
Seriesof2005. The pertinent portionofthe deci
sion in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the mean
ingandscope ofexecutive privilege, both in
L
aj
the United States and in this jurisprudence,
a clear principle emerges. Executive privi
lege, whether asserted against Congress,
the courts, or the pubHc, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information
of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereofmaybe validor not depending onthe
groundinvoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
any recognition that executive officials are
exemptfrom the duty to disclose information
hv the mere fact of being executive officials.
Indeed,-the extraordinary character of th
exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-
quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers tc
the "exemption" being claimed by the executive
officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No
464, solely byvirtueoftheir positions in the Ex
ecutive Branch. This means that when an execu
tive official, who is one of those mentioned in tht
said Sec. 2(b) ofE.O. No.464, claims to be exempi
from disclosure, there can be no presumption o:
authorization to invoke executive privilege giver
by the President to said executive official, sucr
that the presumption in this situation incline*
heavily against executive secrecy and in favoi
of disclosure.
The constitutional infirmity found in the
blanket authorization to invoke executive privi
lege granted by the President to executive offi
cialsin Sec. 2(b) ofE.O. No. 464does not obtaii
in this case.
In this case, it was the President hersetf
through Executive Secretary Ermita, who in
voked executive privilege on a specific matte:
involving an executive agreement between thi
Philippines and China, which wasthe subject o
the three(3) questions propounded to petitione:
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees
investigation. Thus, the factual setting of thi
case markedly differs from that passed upon ii
Senate v. Ermita.

II
ThereAre Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered byExecutive
Privilege
Respondent Committees claim that the com
munications elicited by the three (3) questions
are not covered by executive privilege because
the elements othe presidential communications
privilege are not present.
A. The power to enter into an executive
^J
agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that
the power to secure a foreign loan does not
relate to a "quintessential and rion-delegable
presidential power," because the Constitution
iiiiil does not vest it in the President alone, but also
in the Monetary Board which is required to give
its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the con
currence of another entity does not make such
iJafri
power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined
as the most perfect embodiment of something,
the concentrated essence of substance. On the
jfrfli other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power
or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even
if delegated, the responsibility remains with the
obligor. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This
authority.of the President to enter into execu
tive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionaUy been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the
President has to secure the prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does
not diminish the executive nature of the power.
The inviolate doctrine of separation of pow
ers among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each
branch ofthat part ofthe governmental power as
signed to it by the sovereign people. There is the
corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitu
ARTICLEVI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 247
tion to temper the official acts oeach of these
three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that
certain legislative acts require action from the
President for their vaHdity does not render such
acts less legislative in nature. A good exampleis
the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of
the Constitution mandates thatevery biU passed
by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President who shaU approve
or veto the same. The fact that the approval or
vetoing of $he bill is lodged with the President
does not render the power to pass law executive
in nature. This is because the power to pass law
is generally/a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the
executive power to enter or not to enter into a
contract to secure foreign loans does not become
less executive in nature because of conditions laid
down in the Constitution. The final decision in
the exercise of the said executive power is stiU
lodged in the Office of the President.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity"
was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communicationsprivilege but, in any
case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek
reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine
of operational proximity' for the reason that 'It
may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to commu
nications between those who are 'operationally
proximate' to the President but who may have
"no direct communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of
"operational proximity" was laid down in In re:
Sealed Case precisely to Hmit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege. The U.S.
court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
extension of the privilege risks and, therefore,
carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining
it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the
agencies, and then only to White House staffthat
has "operational proximity" to direct presidential
decision-making, thus:
We are aware that such an extension,
unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish
the purposes of the privilege, could pose a
significant risk of expanding to a large swath
of the executive branch a privilege that is
 248 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
bottomed on a recognition of the unique role
of the President. In order to limit this risk,
the presidential communications privilege
should be construed as narrowly as is con
sistent with ensuring that the confidentiaHty
of the President's decision-making process
is adequately protected. Not every person
who plays a role in the.development of
presidential advice, no matter how remote
iij and removed from the President, can qualify,
for the privilege. In particular, the privilege
should not extend to staff outside the White
iiffit House in executive branch agencies. Instead,
the privilegeshould apply only to communi
cations authored or solicited and received by
those members of an immediate White House
pJ
advisor's staffwho have broad and significant
responsibiHtyfor investigation and formulat
ing the advice to be given the President on
Mi the particular matter to whichthe communi
cations relate. Only communications at that
level are close enough to the President to be
&&1"
revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a
risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS,
997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity"
to the President that matters in determining
lM whether "[t]he President's confidentiaHty in
terests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding
the privilege "to a large swath of the executive
branch" (a fear apparently entertained by re
spondents) is absentbecause the official involved
jsii here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term "advisor" of the Presidentjin fact,
her alter egoand a member ofher officialfamily.
Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the of
ficial involved is far too remote, this Court also
mentioned in the Decision the organizational test
laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department
ofJustice. This goes to showthat the operational
proximity test used in the Decision is not con
sidered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to
limit the availabihty of executive privilege only
to officialswho stand proximate to the President,
not only by reason of their function, but also
by reason of their positions in the Executive's
organizational structure. Thus, respondent Com
mittees' fear that the scope of the privilege would
be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the
operational proximity test is unfounded.
k&J
C. ThePresident'sclaim of executiveprivilege
is not merelybased on a generalized interest;and
in balancing respondent Committees' and the
President's clashing interests, the Court did hot
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that
the Court erred in upholding the President's
invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of
executive privilege because (a) between respon
dent Committees' specificand demonstrated need
and the President's generalized interest in con
fidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance
in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of
interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of
the 1987 PhiHppine Constitution on government
transparency, accountability and disclosure of
information, specificaUy, Article III, Section 7;
Article II, Section 28; Article XI, Section 1; Ar
ticle XVI,Section 10; Article VII, Section 20' and
Article XII, Sections 9, 21, and 22.
It must be stressed that the President's claim
ofexecutiveprivilegeis not merely founded on her
generalized interest in confidentiaHty. The Letter
dated November 15,2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita specified presidential communications
privilegein relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the
bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege
is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosedmight impair our dip
lomatic as weU as economic relations with
the People's RepubHc of China. Given the
confidential nature in which this information
were conveyed to the President, he cannot
provide the Committee any further details
of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect, (emphasis supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held
that Congress must not require the Execu
tive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compeldisclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant
to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.
It is easy to discern the danger that
goes with the disclosure of the President's
communication with her advisor. The NBN

Project involves a foreign country as a party
to the agreement. It was actually a product
of the meeting of minds between officials
of the Philippines and China. Whatever
the President says about the agreement
particularly while official negotiations are
ongoing are matters which China will
surely view with particular interest. There
is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
adversely affect our diplomatic as well as
economic relationswith the People's Republic
of China. ...
Privileged character of diplomatic negotia
tions
The privileged character of diplomatic ne
gotiations has been recognized in this jurisdic
tion. In discussing valid limitations on the right
to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG
held that "information on inter-government ex
changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reason
able safeguards for'the sake of national interest."
Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in
People's Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF)
v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the
reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court
adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curiiss-Wright
Export Corp. that the Presidentis the sole organ
of the nation in its negotiations with foreign
countries . . .
Considering that the information sought
through the three (3) questions subject of this
Petition involves the President's dealings with
a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court
is wary of approving the view that Congress
may peremptorily inquire into not only official,
documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors onthe pretext that saidquestions
serve some vague legislative need. Regardless
of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee
unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief
Executive to unrestricted congressional inqui
ries done with increased frequency and great
publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge
constitutional functions in the face of intense and
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
unchecked legislative incursion into the core of
the President's decision-making process, which
inevitably would involve her conversations with
a member of her Cabinet.
With respect to respondent Committees' in
vocation ofconstitutional prescriptions regarding
the right of the people to information and public
accountability and transparency, the Courtfinds
nothing in these arguments to support respon
dent Committees' case.
There is no debate as to the importance of
the constitutional right of the people to infor
mation and the constitutional policies on public
accountability and transparency. These are the
twin postulates vital to the effective functioning
of a democratic government. The citizenry can
become prey to the whims and capricesof those
towhom the power has beendelegated iftheyare
denied access to information. And the policies on
public accountabilityand democratic government
would certainly be mere empty words if access
to such information of public concern is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
executive privilege with respect to three (3)
specific questions, did not in any way curb the
public's right to information or diminish the
importance of public accountability and trans
parency.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions citedby
respondent Committees do not espouse an abso
lute right to information. By their wording, the
intention of the Framers to subject such
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the
assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Com
mittees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All
that is expected from them is to respect matters
that are covered by executive privilege.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
the Communications Elicited by the Three
Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their
Functions
In the Decision, the majority held that "there
is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
 250 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
would justify the Hmitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority." In the
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Commit
tees argue that the information elicited by the
three (3)questions are necessary in the discharge
of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to
consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and
(b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents'
assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that
executive privilege is subjectto balancing against
other interests and it is necessary to resolve the
competing interests in a manner that would
\m
preserve the essential functions of each branch.
There, the Court weighed between presidential
privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial
process. In giving more weight to the latter, the
Court ruled that the President's generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demon
strated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and
unqualified privilege would stand in the way of
the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions
In the case at bar, we are not confronted
with a court's need for facts in order to adjudge
HabiHty in a criminal case but rather with the
Senate's need for information in relation to its
legislative functions. This leads us to consider
once again just how critical is the subject in
formation in the discharge of respondent Com
mittees' functions. The burden to show this is
on the respondent Committees, since they seek
to intrude into the sphere of competence of the
President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would "aid" them
in crafting legislation.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting
legislation cannot be equated with the compeUing
or demonstratively critical and specific need for
facts which is so essential to the judicial power
Mrt to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare
standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot
iiiijj
be lightly applied to the instant case, which un
like Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of
the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting
pojnt in resolving the conflicting claims between
the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the
recognized existence of the presumptive presi
dential communications privilege....
The presumption in favor of Presidential
communications puts the burden on the re
spondent Senate Committees to overturn the
presumption by demonstrating their specific
need for the information to be elicited by the
answers to the three (3) questions subject of this
case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
there^ is simply a generalized assertion that, the
information is pertinent to the exercise of the'
power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear
what matters relating to these bills could not be
determined without the said information sought
by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed
out by the Honorable Justice Dante 0. Tinga in
his Separate Concurring Opinion:
...If respondents are operating under
the premise that the president and/or her
executive officials have committed wrongdo
ings that need to be corrected or prevented
from recurring by remedial legislation, the
answer to those three questions will not nec
essarily bolster or inhibit respondents from
proceeding with such legislation. They could
easily presume the worst of the president in
enacting such legislation.
For sure, a factual basis for situations
covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislatives bodies can come up with relevant
legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases
by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral
Argument before this Court, the counsel for re
spondent Committees impliedly admitted that
the Senate could stiU come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3)
questions. In other words, the information being
eHcited is not so critical after all....
The general thrust and the tenor of the three
(3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the

OfficeOf the President. While it may be a worthy
endeavor to investigate the potential culpabil
ity of high government officials, including the
President, in a given government transaction,
it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform.
The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to
determine anyone's guilt of a crime or wrongdo
ing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary
cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
adjudicate or prosecute.
si
Legislative inquiries., unlike court proceed
ings, are not subject to the exacting standards of
evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual
findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section
10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries irl Aid of Legislation provides that
"technical rules of evidence applicable to judi
cial proceedings which do not affect substantive
rights need not be observed by the Committee."
Court rules which prohibit leading, hypotheti
cal, or repetitive questions or questions calling
for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not ap
ply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from
&M* the highest public official to the most ordinary
citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a
competent court or body.
IV
iigi)
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt
Order
iiiii) The legitimacy of the claim of executive privi
lege having been fully discussed in the preceding
pages, we see no reason to discuss it once again.
Respondent Committees' second argument
rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita, requiring invitations or subpoenas
to contain the "possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry" along with
the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry
and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof is not provided for by the Constitution
and is merely an obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale
and necessity of compliance with these require
ments.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 251
An unconstrained congressional investiga
tive power, like an unchecked Executive, gener
ates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that
the investigative power of Congress has been
abused (or has the potential for abuse) have
been raised many imes. Constant exposure
to congressional subpoena takes its toU on the
ability of the Executive to function effectively.
The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita
are modest mechanisms that would not unduly
limit Congress' power. The legislative inquiry
must be confined to permissible areas and thus,
prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in
the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson. Likewise,
witnesses have their constitutional right to due
process. They should be adequately informed
what matters are to be covered by the inquiry.
It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent
information and documents. To our mind, these
requirements concede too little political costs or
burdens on the part of Congress when viewed
vis-a-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry..-..
Clearly, petitioner's request to be furnished
an advance copy of questions is a reasonable
demand that should have been granted by re
spondent Committees.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testifican
dum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific
reference to any pending Senate biU. It did not
also inform petitioner of the questions to be
asked. As it were, the subpoena merely com
manded him to "testify on what he knows relative
to the subject matter under inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent Com
mittees contend that their Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the
"Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court.
While it is true that this Court must refrain from
reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as
a co-equal branch of government, however, when
a constitutional requirement exists, the Court
has the duty to look into Congress' compliance
therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to pos
sible violations of the Constitution simply out
of courtesy....
The language of Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
 252 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
conducted in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its leg
islative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise
make the published rules clearly state that the
same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to suffi
ciently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its
present rules on legislative inquiries to be ef
fective even in the next Congress, it could have
easily adopted the same language it had used in
its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should
likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject
Rules are null and void. Only those that result
in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such viola
m tion, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective.
NOTE: Military officers.
The President has constitutional authority,
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, to
prevent a military officer from appearing in an
investigation. This is distinct from the power of
the President over department secretaries. An
officer who defies such injunction is liable under
f^\
military justice.
At the same time, any chamber of Congress
which seeks to appear before it a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order
to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law
of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.
When General Gudani appeared before the
Senate disobeying EO 464, he was stripped of
his responsibility and subjected to Court mar
tial. Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, April
15, 2006.
ij||j
SEC. 23. (1) THE CONGRESS, BY A
VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF BOTH HOUSES
IN JOINT SESSION ASSEMBLED, VOTING
SEPARATELY, SHALL HAVE THE SOLE
POWER TO DECLARE THE EXISTENCE
OF A STATE OF WAR.
(2) IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER NA
TIONAL EMERGENCY, THE CONGRESS
MAY BY LAW AUTHORIZE THE PRESI
DENT, FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUB
JECT TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY
PRESCRIBE, TO EXERCISE POWERS NEC
ESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT A
DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY. UNLESS
SOONER WITHDRAWN BY RESOLUTION
OF THE CONGRESS, SUCH POWER SHALL
CEASE UPON THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT
THEREOF.
1. War powers.
The 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25,
gave to Congress "the sole power to declare war;"
the present provision, as also the 1973 provision,
gives to Congress "the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war." The difference be
tween the two phraseologies is not substantial
but merely in emphasis. The two phrases are
interchangeable, even under the 1935 Constitu
tion; but the second phrase emphasizes more the
fact that the Philippines, according to Article II,
Section2, renounces aggressive war as an instru
ment of national policy.
While the Constitution gives to the legisla
ture the power to declare the existence of a state
of war and to enact aU measures to support the
war, the actual power to makewar is lodged else
where, that is, in the executive power which holds
the sword of the nation. The executive power,
when necessary, may make war even in the ab
sence of a declaration of war. In the words of the
American Supreme Court, war being a question
of actualities, "the President was bound to meet
it in the shape it presented itself, without wait
ing for Congress to baptize it with a name; and
no name given to it by him or them could change
the fact." See Prize Cases, 2 Bl. 635 (U.S. 1863).
2. Emergency powers.
Under the present provision, Congress may
authorize the President "to exercise powers nee-

essary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy." Note that the nature of the delegable
power is not specified. It is submitted that, on
the basis of this provision, the President may be
given emergency legislative powers if Congress
so desires. This is confirmed by the explanation
made on the floor of the 1971 Convention, which
is the source of this provision, that emergency
powers can include the power to rule by "execu
tive fiat." A resolution of Congress withdrawing
the emergency powers does not need presidential
approval.
SEC. 24. ALL APPROPRIATION, REV
ENUE OR TARIFF BILLS, BILLS AU
$gS THORIZING INCREASE OF THE PUBLIC
DEBT, BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION,
AND PRIVATE BILLS SHALL ORIGINATE
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF REP
RESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY
PROPOSE OR CONCUR WITH AMEND
MENTS.
e
1. The Origination clause.
An appropriation biU is one whose purpose is
to set aside a sum of money for pubHc use. Only
appropriation bills in the strict sense of the word
are comprehended by the provision; bills for other
purposes which incidentally set aside money for
that purpose are not included.
Similarly revenue or tariff bills are those
ffifft
which are strictly for the raising of revenues;
biUs for other purposes which incidentaUy create
revenue are not comprehended.
Bills of local application are those whose
\m
reach is limited to specific localities, such for
instance as the creation of a town. Private bills
are those, which affect private persons, such for
instance as a biU granting citizenship to a specific
foreigner.
The theory behind the rule requiring that
(i$\
these originate in the House of Representatives
is that district Representatives are closer to the
pulse of the people than senators are and are
therefore in a better position to determine both
PJ
the extent of the legal burden they are capable
of bearing and the benefits that they need.
The meaning of origination from the House
and the scope of the Senate's power to introduce
iaiijij
faj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 253
amendments were thoroughly discussed in To
lentino v. Secretary of Finance119 involving R.A.
No. 7716, the Value Added Tax (VAT)law. After
the House version of the bill was sent to the
Senate, the Senate introduced a substitute biU
which apparently it had prepared in anticipation
of the House bill. Later the President certified
to the urgency of passing the Senate version of
the bill. After the two versions had gone through
a-Conference Committee, the House approved
the Conference Committee report which for all
practical purposes was the Senate bill. Was there
a violation of the rule on origination?
The constitutional rule is that revenue biUs
must "originate exclusively" from the House
of Representatives. The Court said that the
exclusivity of the prerogative of the House of
Representatives means simply that the House
alone can initiate the passage of a revenue bill,
such that, if the House does not initiate one, no
revenue law will be passed. But once the House
has approved a revenue bill and passed it on to
the Senate, the Senate can completely overhaul
it, by amendment of parts or by amendment by
substitution, and come out with one completely
different from what the House approved. It does
not matter whether the Senate already antici
pated a bill from the House and formulated one
to take the place of whatever the House might
send. The Court rejected the idea that the Sen
ate is bound to retain the essence of what the
other House approved. Textually, it is the "bill"
which must exclusively originate from the House;
but the "law" itself which is the product of the
total bicameral legislative process originates not
just from the House but from both Senate and
House.120
SEC. 25. (1) THE CONGRESS MAY
NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERN
MENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET.
THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF
PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL
BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
::9235 SCRA 630 (1994), affirmed on reconsideration
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6,1995.
Id. at 661-662.
!&&$
254 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
ifMll>
(2) NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT
SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RE
LATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PAR
TICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN.
ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT
il^l
SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION
TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT
RELATES.
(3) THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS
SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PRO
CEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIA
TIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES.
(4) A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS
BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE
FORWHlfcH IT IS INTENDED, ANDSHALL
BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY
AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NA
TIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED
BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PRO
POSAL THEREIN.
(5) NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED AU
THORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPRO
PRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN
i|Wl TATIVES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE HEADS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY,
BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT
ss>
ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIA
TIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE
OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER
ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE APPRO
PRIATIONS.
(6) DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPRO
Si)
PRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS
SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUB
LIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY
APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUB
JECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE
PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
(7) IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL
YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE
FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL AP
PROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING
FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPRO
PRIATIONS LAW FQR THE PRECEDING
FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE
ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE
AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL AP
PROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BY THE
CONGRESS.
1. Riders. *
A. Garcia v. Mata
65 SCRA 517 (1975)
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review
the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466,
entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus
Hon. Ernesto Mata (Juan Ponce Enrile), et al.,
respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the
"Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" of Republic Act No. 1600121 uncon
stitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.
We affirm the judgment a quo.
The petitioner consequently argues that his
reversion to inactive status on November 15,
1960 was in violation of the above-quoted provi
sion which prohibits the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers on active duty with at
least ten years of accumulated active commis
sioned service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend
that the said provision has no relevance or per
tinence whatsoever to the budget in question or
to any appropriation item contained therein, and
is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par.
2122 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriation bill
unless it relates specifically to some par
ticular appropriation therein; and any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to such appropriation.
"'Otherwise known as the Appropriation Act for the
Fiscal Year 1956-1957.
mArt. VIII, Sec. 16, par. 2 of the 1973 Constitution of
the Philippines.

A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A.
tea
No. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation
to any appropriation item therein, or to the Ap
propriation Act as a whole. From the very first
clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when
there is no emergency, no reserve officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be
titfi
called to a tour of active duty for more than
two years during any period of five consecu
tive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evi
dent. While R.A. No. 1600 appropriated money
for the operation of the Government for the fiscal
,a*j year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to
the fundamental governmental policy matters
of the calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status ofreserve officers in the AFP. The
ijjjai
incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout
the entire paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees,
"it was a non-appropriation item inserted in
an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against 'riders' to the
general appropriation act." It was indeed a new
and completely unrelated provision attached to
the Appropriation Act.
'&!}
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is
denied, and the decision of the lower court dis
' isl missing the complaint is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
2. Transfer of funds.
A. Demetria v. Alba
148 SCRA 208 (1987)
FERNAN, J:
lifil Assailed in this petition for prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preHminary injunction is the
constitutionahty of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
JJJ
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as
concerned citizens of this country, as members
of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa
representing their millions of constituents, as
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 255
parties with general interest common to all the
people ofthe Philippines, and as taxpayerswhose
vital interests maybe affected by the outcome of
the reliefs prayed for listed the grounds relied
upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET
REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES
TTPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER
OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO
THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PUR
POSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED
TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESI
DENTTO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS,
FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED
BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DE
CREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DEL
EGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO
THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CON
TINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY
THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMEN
TATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is
readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority
to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the
 256 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOF GOVERNMENT
General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provi
sion under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed autho
rizing any transfer of appropriations, how
ever, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional com
missions may by law be authorized to aug
ment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropria
tions.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation
for one item to another was explicit and cat
egorical under the 1973 Constitution. However,
to afford the heads of the different branches of
the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use
of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or con
stitutional body concerned. The leeway granted
was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified,
i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be
made only if there are savings from another item
in the appropriation of the government branch
or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
iiiiii unduly overextends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one depart
ment, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after
tal its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually sav
ings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental
mi
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutiona
infirmities render the provision in question nul
and void.
"For the love of money is the root of al!
evil: xxx "and money belonging to no one ir
particular, i.e., public funds, provide an ever
greater temptation for misappropriation and
embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in
the minds pf the framers of the constitution in
meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds ac
embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions
on the release of money from the treasury [Sec.
18(1)];the restrictions on the use of public funds
for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)];the prohibition to
transfer an appropriation for an item to another
[Sec.16(5)] and the requirement of specifications
[Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards
designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure
of publicrfunds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts
all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly
observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited
authority bestowed upon the President, "xxx
Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgatesfor the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, results
in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling
party may well expand [sic] public money not on
the basis of development priorities but on politi
cal and personal expediency." The contention of
public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section
44 of P.D. No. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Sec
tion 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
must perforce fall flat on its face.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is grant
ed. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void
for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. 26. (1) EVERY BILL PASSED BY
THE CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY
ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EX
PRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
(2) NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER
HOUSE SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS
IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON

$ffL*
SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COP
IES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORM HAVE
BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS
THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EX
CEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES
TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE
ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAM
ITY OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST
READING OF A BILL, NO AMENDMENT
THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND THE
VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMME
DIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS
^ AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
1. Subject and title of bills.
itaftl
A. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208 (1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This petition .. . assails the constitutional
ity of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board"
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred
to as the BOARD)...
On November 5, 1985, a month after the
promulgation of the abovementioned decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the Na
tional Internal Revenue Code providing, inter
alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall
be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
The rationale behind the enactment of the
DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses
as follows:
"1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms in
cluding, among others, videotapes, discs,
cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced
the operations of moviehouses and theaters,
and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical
attendance by at least forty percent (40%)
ii>
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 257
and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial
losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establish
ments collectively earn around P600 Million
per annum from rentals, sales and disposi
tion of videograms, and such earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving
the Government of approximately Pi80 Mil
lion in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activi
ties of videogram establishments have "also
affected the viability of the movie industry,
particularly the more than 1,200 movie
houses and theaters throughout the country,
and occasioned industry-wide displacement
and unemployment due to the shutdown of
numerous moviehouses and theaters;
4. WHEREAS, in order to ensure
national economic recovery, it is imperative
for the Government to create an environment
conducive to growth and development
of all business industries, including the
movie industry which has an accumulated
investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the
activities of videogram establishments will
not only alleviate the dire financial condi
tion of the movie industry upon which more
than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers
depend for their livelihood, but also provide
an additional source of revenue for the Gov
ernment, and at the same time rationalize
the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregu
lated showing of obscene videogram features
constitutes a clear and present danger to the
moral and spiritual well-being of the youth,
and impairs the mandate of the Constitution
for the State to support the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the develop
ment of moral character and promote their
physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and
groups have called for remedial measures to
curb these blatant malpractices which have
flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
 258 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave
emergencies corroding the moral values of
jj&i the people and betraying the national eco
nomic recovery program, bold emergency
measures must be adopted with dispatch;
.x x x" (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality
of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax
of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the
local government is a RIDER and the same
is not germane to the subject matter thereof;
iU
We shall consider the foregoing objections
in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof'123 is suf
ficiently complied with if the title be comprehen
sive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary
that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The require
ment is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub
ject and title.124 An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying
siisii out the general object."125 The rule also is that
the constitutional requirement as to the title of
a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation.126 It
should be given a practical rather than technical
construction.127
'"Section 19(1), Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section
26(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
"Sumulong v. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10,
1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al,
L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 418.
1MPublic Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 111. 314, 8 A.
L. R. 466, 470.
"Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpo
ration, No. 44257, November 22,1938,66 Phil. 483; Cordero
v. Cabatuando, et al, supra.
,27Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, supra.
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's
contention that the tax provision of the DECREE
is a rider is without merit. That section reads,
inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposi
tion of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
of a videogram containing a reproduction of
any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to
the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila,
the tax shall be shared equally by the City/
Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and ger
mane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of,, the general object of the
DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory
Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision
is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that gen
eral subject and title. As a tool for regulation'2"
it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE.
The express purpose of the DECREE to include
taxation of the video industry in order to regu
late and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled
distribution of videograms is evident from Pre
ambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain
the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers
all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter be
an index to the body of the DECREE.129
,28United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44,1950, cited
in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p. 594.
I29People v. Carlos, L-239, June 30,1947, 78 Phil. 535.

B. Phil. Judges Ass'h v. Prado
G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993
m before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is
CRUZ, Jr.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the
independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by
the petitioners that this hallmark of republican
ism is impaired by the statute and circular they
are here challenging. The Supreme Court is
itself affected by these measures and is thus an
interested party that should ordinarily not also
be a judge at the same time. Under our system
of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge, because no
other office has the authority to do so. We shall
iiM
therefore act upon this matter not with officious-
ness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and,.as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35
W&l
of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philip
pine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
9228. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metro
politan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its
Register of Deeds, along with certain other gov
ernment offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower
courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as the sending
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect
Ui&j judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the re
quired readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its pas
sage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important
principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
gfj
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as
the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 259
every statute is supposed to have first been care
fully studied and determined to be constitutional
clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed,
the attack against its validity must be rejected
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Ar
ticle VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing
that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall em
brace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent
hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore
be overlooked and carelessly and unintention
ally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceed
ings as is usually made, of the subject of legisla
tion that is being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.130
It is the submission of the petitioners that
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not ex
pressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect
its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating
the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Provid
ing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in
Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following ob
jectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy
transfer of mail and other postal matters,
from sender to addressee, with full recogni
tion of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promoteinternational interchange,
cooperation and understanding through the
,30COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th
Ed., pp. 295-296; State v. Dolan, 14 L.R.A. 1259; State v.
Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
 260 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
unhampered flow or exchange of postal
matters between nations;
ijimi
c) to cause or effect a wide range of
postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to,
philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues
are generated by and within the industry
to finance the overall cost of providing the
varied range of postal delivery and messen-
gerial services as well as the expansion and
itel
continuous upgrading of service standards
by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No, 7354, which is the princi
pal target of the petition, reads as follows:
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, de
crees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.
iiavl
All franking privileges authorized by law
are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts
vj^t
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
Corporation may continue the franking privilege
under Circular No. 35 dated October 24,1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrange
ments and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We
do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an
index to the body of the act, or to be as com
prehensive as to cover every single detail of
the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reason
ably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second
aj paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senat
Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Com
mittee Report, its addition violates .Article VI.
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall be
come a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Mem
bers three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereaf
ter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring
that amendment to any bill when the House and
the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both cham
bers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject
of any disagreement between both Houses and so
the second paragraph could not have been validly
added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee
is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal gen
erally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference
bill. But occasionally a conference committee
produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate. These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p. 81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference
Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Sen
L ate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved
by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3,1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Court may not inquire beyond the certifica
tion of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenez131 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final read
ing of the bill).132 The journals are themselves
also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held
in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,133
where we explained the reason thus:
jjjj&J
III
The third and most serious challenge of
the petitioners is based on the equal protection
clause.
We are unable to agree with the respondents
that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature un
der the police power. On the contrary, we find its
tsi
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision
that denies the Judiciary the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power
into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the
duty and power to correct.
,S17 SCRA 347.
l32Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
,3834 Phil. 729.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 261
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No.7354against the
attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
and that it was not passed in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section
35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall
"be deprived of the equal protection of the laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full
awarenesaofthe criticism it is certain to provoke.
While ruling against the discrimination in this
case, we may ourselves be accused of similar dis
crimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criti
cism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is
a fact of life in the political system that we are
prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot even
debate with our detractors. We can only decide
the cases before us as the law imposes on us the
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us
the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially
GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
C. Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003
See supra, under Section 7.
D. Tan v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
VITUG, J.:
These two consolidated special civil actions
for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also
commonly known as the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely
affected by the continued implementation of the
amendatory legislation.
In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7496.violates the
following provisions of the Constitution:
 262 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
"Article VI, Section 26(1). Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof."
"Article VI, Section 28(1). The rule of the
taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation."
"Article III, Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of... property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws."
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner contends that the title of House
Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No.
7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289).
The full text of the title actually reads:
"An Act Adopting the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged In
The Practice of Their Profession, Amending
Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as Amended."
liwfl
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitu
tion has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent
log-rolling legislation intended to unite the
members of the legislature who favor any one of
unrelated subjects in the support of the whole
act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the
legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as
are usually made, of the subjects of legislation.
The above objectives of the fundamental law ap
pear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything
else would be to require a virtual compendium
of the law which could not have been the intend
ment of the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No.
7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement
that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable"
in that the law would now attempt to tax single
U
proprietorships and professionals differently
from the manner it imposes the tax on corpora
tions and partnerships. The contention clearly
forgets, however, that such a system of income
, taxation has long been the prevailing rule even
prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred con
cept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objectsoftaxation, similarly situated,
are to be treated alike both in privileges and li
abilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento,
91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classifi
cation as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)the
categorization is germane to achieve the legisla
tive purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being
equal, to both present and future conditions, and
(4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola s.
City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco v. PAGCOR,
197 SCRA 771).
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea
of petitioner to have the law declared unconsti
tutional for being violative of due process must
perforce fail.
E. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
MENDOZA, Jr.
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the
sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It
is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services. Republic
Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its admin
istration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and
prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds sum
marized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this
Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate
Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the
Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of
the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following
provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?
1. 1 emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
2. 4
3. 5 thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
4. 10
B. Does the law violate the following
other provisions of the Constitution?
1. Art. VI, 28(1)
2. Art. VI, 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order
they are stated above. As will presently be ex
plained not all of these questions are judicially
cognizable, because not all provisions of the
Constitution are self executing and, therefore,
judicially enforceable. The other departments
of the government are equally charged with the
enforcement of the Constitution, especially the
provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in en
acting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded
Valued-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the
Constitution because, although H. No. 11197
had originated in the House of Representatives,
it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No.
tlijjj 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce
the bill which the President signed into law. The
following provisions of the Constitution are cited
in support of the proposition that because Repub
lic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it
did not originate in the House ofRepresentatives
and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 263
thepublic debt, bills oflocal application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively inthe
House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
Id., . 26(2): JSfo bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days
before jts passage, except when the Presi
dent certifies to the necessity of its immedi
ate enactment to meet a public calamity or
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between
July 22,1992 and August 31,1993, several bills134
were introduced in the House of Representa
tives seeking to amend certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code relative to the
value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred
to the House Ways and Means Committee which
recommended for approval a substitute measure,
H. No. 11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT; SYSTEM TO
WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102,103,104,105,106,107,108 AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V,
AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE LX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTER
NAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED.
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on
second reading starting November 6, 1993 and,
on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the
House of Representatives after third and final
reading.
It was sent to the Senate on November 23,
1993 and later referred by that body to its Com
mittee on Ways and Means.
134H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030,9210, 9297,
10012and 10100. (Respondents' Consolidated Memorandum,
Annexes 3-12).
I
264 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Sift I
On February 7,1994, the Senate Committee
submitted its report recommending approval of
S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO
ifftM
WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR
THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100,
102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237,
AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE
V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
It was stated that the bill was being sub
mitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129,
taking into consideration P. S. Res. No. 734 and
S5A
rL B. No. 11197."
On February 8,1994, the Senate began con
sideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished
debates on the bill and approved it on second
reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day,
it approved the bill on third reading by the af
firmative votes of 13 of its members, with one
abstention.
H. No. 1197 and its Senate version (S. No.
1630) were then referred to a conference com
mittee which, after meeting four times '(April 13,
19, 21 and 25,1994), recommended that "House
i'jji&fr
Bill No. 1197, in consolidation with Senate Bill
No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the at
tached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved
by the conferees."
IfifffiJ
The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN
ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRA
TION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMEND
ING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved
by the House of Representatives on April 27,
1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The
enrolled bill was then presented to the President
of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed
it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12,
1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two
liijiifi
newspapers of general circulation and, on May
28,1994, it took effect, although its implementa
tion was suspended until June 30,1994 toallow
time for the registration of business entities. It
would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but
its enforcement was stopped because the Court,
by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a
temporary restraining order on June 30,1994.
First. Petitioners' contention is that Repub
lic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively"
in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills, H. No.. 11197 and SI No. 1630. In this con
nection, petitioners point out that although Art.
VI, 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution,135 it is notable in two respects: the
verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philip
pine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and
the phrase "as on other bills" in the American
version is omitted. This means, according to
them, that to be considered as having originated
in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain
the essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To
begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill
which is required by the Constitution to "origi
nate exclusively" in the House of Representa
tives. It is important to emphasize this, because
a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility
of a third version by the conference committee
will be discussed later. At this point, what is im
portant to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in
the enactment of the law must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amend
ments" but also to "propose amendments." It
would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.
,MU.S. CONST., Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 1: "AU bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on
other bills."

iliffiijj
The contention that the constitutional de
sign is to limit the Senate's power in respect
of revenue bills in order to compensate for the
grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power
and thereby equalize its powers and those of the
House overlooks the fact that the powers being
compared are different. Weare dealing here with
the legislative power, which under the Constitu
tion is vested not in any particular chamber but
in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of
"a Senate and a House of Representatives." The
exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the
exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a
check on the executive power. There is, therefore,
no justification for comparing the legislative pow
ers of the House and of the Senate on the basis
liiSiiA
of the possession of such non-legislative power
by the Senate. The possession of a similar power
by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of as
giving it more legislative powers than the House
of Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provi
sion (Sec. 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based
on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate
had inserted in the TariffAct of 1909, was upheld
against the claim that the provision was a rev
ii?
enue bill which originated in the Senate in con
travention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution.136
Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a
provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from
the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as
changing the whole of bills following the enact
ing clause and substituting its own versions. In
1883, for example, it struck out everything after
the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in
its place its own measure, and the House sub
sequently accepted the amendment. The U.S.
Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what
later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act
of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill,
in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill
of 1992.137 Given, then, the power of the Senate
to propose amendments, the Senate can propose
its own version even with respect to bills which
are required by the Constitution to originate in
the House.
136Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 309, 58 L. Ed. 117
(1914).
^j*)
mF.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 309, n. 2 (1945).
ts>
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 265
It is insisted, however,that S. No. 1630was
passed not in substitution of H. No. 1197but of
another Senate bill (S. No.1129)earlier filedand
that what the Senate did was merely to "take
[H. No. 1197] into consideration" in enacting S.
No. 1630. There is really no difference between
the Senate preserving H. No. 1197 up to the en
acting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (which, it would
seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the otherhand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on
the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff,
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills oflocalapplica
tion must come from the House of Representa
tives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach
the same problems from the national perspec
tive. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
ofits receipt ofthe bill from the House, solongas
action by the Senate, as a body is withheld pend
ing receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot,
therefore, understand the alarm expressed over
the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 1197, S. No. 1129
had been filed in the Senate. After all it does
not appear that the Senate ever considered it.
It was only after the Senate had received H. No.
1197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral
to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of
H. No. 1197 and the submission by the Commit
tee on February 7,1994 of S. No. 1630. For that
matter, if the question were simply the priority
in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was
in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the
VAT law was first filed on July 22,1992. Several
other bills had been filed in the House before
S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No.
1197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.
 266 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFX30VERNMENT
Second. Enough has been said to show that
it was within the power of the Senate to propose
i]jn
S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument
of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution138 because the second and third
readings were done on the same day, March 24,
1994. But this was because on February 24,1994
and again on March 22,1994, the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill
jisi) on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immedi
ate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualified
the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be
read in relation to the "except" clause, because
%(j(i
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same
sentence. To construe the "except" clause as sim
ply dispensing with the second requirement in
the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution
three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate
the very premise of the "except" clause: the neces
sity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill
which is certified in order to meet a public calam
ity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that
is dispensed with by presidential certification,
the time saved would be so negligible as to be
of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It
aa
may well be doubted whether doing away with
'"Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly re
quire that bills must pass three readings in each House, this
was clearly implied from its Art. VI, sec. 21(2) so that the two
Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the pas
sage of bills. Later the requirement was expressly provided
in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI, sec. 26(2) was
taken. Art. VIII, Sec. 19(2) of the 1973 document provided:
No bill shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to the
m> Members three days before its passage, except when
the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its im
mediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emer
gency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
the necessityof printing and distributing copies
of the bill three days before the third reading
would insure speedy enactment of a law in the
face of an emergency requiring the calling of a
special election for President and Vice-President.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to
be made within seven days of the convening of
Congress in emergency session.139
That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution
can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
of legislative practice. For example, the bill defin
ing the certiorarijurisdiction of this Court which,
in consolidation with the Senate version, became
RepublicAct No. 5440, was passed on second and
third readings in the House of Representatives
on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill
had been certified by the President as urgent.140
There is, therefore, no merit in the conten
tion that presidential certification dispenses only
with the requirement for the printing of the bill
and its distribution three days before its passage
but not with the requirement of three readings
on separate days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification
of the bill in this case was invalid because there
was no emergency, the condition stated in the
certification of a "growing budget deficit" not be
ing an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Sen
ate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual
,MArt. VII, Sec. 10 provides: "The Congress shall, at ten
o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in
the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, con
vene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to
elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier
than forty-five days not later than sixty days from the time
of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of
this Constitution and shall becomelaw upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress.Appropriations for the special
election shall bechargedagainst any current appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of
the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election."
H0JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA
TIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS, FOURTH SESSION 398-399
(1968).

basis of the certification. To the contrary, by
passing S. No. 1630 on second and third read
ingsonMarch 24, J994, the Senateaccepted the
President's certification. Should such certifica
tion be now reviewed by this Court, especially
'tiia'i
when no evidence has been shownthat, because
S, No. 1630 was taken up on second and third
readings on the same day, the members of the
Senate were deprived of the time needed for the
i&fft
study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeascorpus or decla
fig)
ration ofmartial law under Art. VII, 18, or the
existence ofa national emergency justifying the
.delegation ofextraordinary powersto the Presi
ant dent under Art. VI, 23(2), is subjectto judicial
review because basic rights ofindividuals may
be at hazard. But the factual basis of presiden
tial certification of bills, which involves doing
away with procedural requirements designed to
insure that bills are duly consideredby members
of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact
that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not
H. No. 1197. That is because S. No. 1630 was
what the Senate was considering.Whenthe mat
ter was before the House, the President likewise
certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill
which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill
which the Conference Committee prepared by
consolidating H. No. 1197 and S. No. 1630. It is
claimed that the Conference Committee report
included provisions not found in either the House
bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions
were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference
Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the
last two days of its session on April 21 and 25,
1994 the Committee met behind closed doors.
We are not told, however, whetherthe provisions
were not the result of the give and take that often
mark the proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraor
dinary about the fact that the Conference Com
mittee metin executive sessions. Often the only
way to reach agreement on conflictingprovisions
is to meet behind closed doors, with only the
conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise
is likely to be made. The Court is not about to
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 267
take the suggestion ofa cabal orsinister motive
attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of
their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25,1994,
nor read anything into the incomplete remarks
of the members, marked in the transcript of
stenographic notes bji ellipses. The incomplete
sentences are probably dueto the stenographer's
own limitations or to the incoherence that some
times characterize conversations.William Safire
noted some such lapses in recorded talks even
by recent past Presidents of the United States.
In any event, in the United States conference
committees had been customarily heldin execu
tive sessions with only the conferees and their
staffs in attendance.141 Only in November 1975
was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions.
Even then a majority of either chamber's confer
ees may vote in public to close the meetings.142
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill
emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has
been explained:
Under congressional rules ofprocedure,
conference committees are not expected to
make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions'to which
both houses have already agreed or by in
serting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provisionto enforce. Note the problemwhen
one house amends a proposal originating in
either house by striking out everything fol
lowing the enactingclause and substituting
provisions whichmakeit an entirelynewbill.
The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft
essentially a new bill.. ,143
The result is a third version, which is con
sidered an "amendment in the nature of a sub
stitute," the only requirement for which being
that the third versionbe germane to the subject
of the House and Senate bills.144
M1Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ
864-865 (1952).
H2CONG. QUARTERLY 65 (1983); M. JEWELL, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 169
(1986); LEES AND SHAW, COMMITTEES IN LEGISLA-
TURES 163 (1979).
,43W. KEEFE AND M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEG
ISLATIVE PROCESS 149 (1985).
U4W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES
AND POLICY PROCESS 214 (1984).
 268 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is
within the power of a conference committee to
Ijfifl
include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in
the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
there is no reason why it cannot propose several
provisions, collectively considered as an "amend
ment in the nature of a substitute," so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject ofthe
bills before the committee. After all, its report
was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of
the legislative department. The charge that in
this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any
basis.145
HSThe charge is an old one. In the United States, the
same change, including claims that important provisions
were being "surreptitiously added" in the committee, was
iigjjjj made in the 1940s. But no satisfactory alternative to the
conference committee has been devised. And today, given
the bicameral nature of the U.S. Congress, the charge is no
longer heard. Compare the following from a 1945comment:
"Asa devise for oiling the machinery of legislation, commit
tees of conference are, under American conditions, useful, if
not indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings.
Without exception, they work behind closeddoors, hold no
hearings, and give their proceedings nopublicity. Doubtless
^
it would be difficult for them to make headway if they did
otherwise. Nevertheless, in view of the power which they
wield, strong objection can be, and is, raised. For, while the
committeesare supposed to deal onlywith actual differences
iliji]) between the houses and to stay well within the bounds set
bythe extreme positions which the houses havetaken,they
often work into measures, as reported, provisions of their
owndevising, even goingso far as to rewrite whole sections
with the sole purpose of incorporating the views which the
majority members happen to hold In practice, thisoften
results in the adoptionofimportant provisions, moreor less
surreptitiously added, without consideration byeitherhouse
in other words, legislation nominally by Congress but actu
ally byconference committee. Any remedy found will prob
ably take the form ofreducing the needforusingconference
committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that end is
that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate
committees ofthe two houses, but to joint committees, which
not only would hold single setsofhearings, butmight delib
erate and report backbills to the twohousesin such agreed
form that further significantdifferences would notbe likelyto
develop. Arrangements ofthis nature yield excellent results
in thelegislature ofMassachusetts. Butthereareobstacles to
adoption ofthe planforCongress, nottheleastofthem being
a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in
which senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated
below, theoutlook forthe reform is problematical.'' F.A. OGG
AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
Nonetheless, it is argued that under th<
respective Rules of the Senate and the House o
Representatives a conference committee can onl;
act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill am
a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules th-
Conference Committee inserted provisions no
found in the bills submitted to it. The followin;
provisions are cited in support of this contention
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
Sec. 26. In the event that the Senat
does not agree with the House of Represen
tatives on the provision of any bill or join
resolution,, the differences shall be settlet
by a conference committee of both House
which shall meet within ten days after thei
composition.
The President shall designate th
members of the conference committee ii
accordance with subparagraph (c), Sectioi
3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee. Report sha't
contain a detailed and sufficiently explici
statement of the changes in or amendment
to the subject measure, and shall be signet
by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shal
not be in order unless the report has beei
filed with the Secretary of the Senate an*
copies thereof have been distributed to th-
Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
Sec. 85. Conference Committee Reporti
In the event that the House does not agre-
with the Senate on the amendments to an;
bill or joint resolution, the differences ma:
be settled by conference committees of boti
Chambers.
The consideration of conference commit
tee reports shall always be in order, excep
whenthe journal is beingread, whilethe rol
is beingcalled or the Houseis dividingon an;
question. Each of the pages of such report
shall be signed by the conferees. Eachrepor
sat
L ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
s/iaM contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments
ffiffi)
to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall
not be in order unless copies thereof are dis
fa&l
tributed to the Members: Provided, That in
the last fifteen days of each session period it
shall be deemed sufficient that three copiesof
the report, signed as above provided, are de
liiiiii)
posited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
&foi)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a
conference committee to a consideration of con
^
flicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the
Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If
there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the
precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supple
ment of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's
Manual." The following is then quoted from the
Jefferson's Manual:
jjkifr
The managers of a conference must con
fine themselves to the differences committed
ft&J to them... and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane
to a question in issue.
^*J Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in
case there is no specific rule applicable, resort
must be to the legislative practice. The Jeffer
iiijiiJ
son's Manual is resorted to only as supplement.
It is common place in Congress that conference
committee reports include new matters which,
though germane, have not been committed to
the committee. This practice was admitted by
Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases.
Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jeffer
son's Manual must be considered to have been
modified by the legislative practice. If a change
is desired in the practice it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by"
any constitutional provision but is only an in
ternal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, 16(3)
of the Constitution provides that "Each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings...."
This observation applies to the other conten
^)
tion that the Rules of the two chambers were
likewise disregarded in the preparation of the
Jfoffl
ti^i
269
Conference Committee Report because the Re
port did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently
explicit statement ofchanges in, or amendments
to, the subject measure." The Report used brack
ets and capital letters to indicate the changes.
This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We
cannot say that in using these marks and sym
bols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern."146 Our concern is with the pro
cedural requirements of the Constitution for the
enactment of laws. As far as these requirements
are concerned, we are satisfied that they have
been faithfully observed in these cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that
the Committee's Report in these cases must
have undergone three readings in each ofthe two
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end
to negotiation since each house may seek modifi
cations of the compromise bill. The nature ofthe
bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with
the only alternative that if it is not approved by
both houses, another conference committee must
be appointed. But then again the result would
still be a compromise measure that may not be
wholly satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed
as referring only to bills introduced for the first
time in either house of Congress, not to the con
ference committee report. For if the purpose of
requiring three readings is to give members of
Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gain
said that H. No. 1197 was passed in the House
after three readings; that in the Senate it was
considered on first reading and then referred
to a committee of that body; that although the
Senate committee did not report out the House
bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which
it had prepared by "taking into consideration"
the House bill; that for its part the Conference
Committee consblidated the two bills and pre
pareda compromise version; that the Conference
Committee Report was thereafter approved by
the House and the Senate, presumably after ap-
,460smenav. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 (1960).
 270 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
propriate study by their members. We cannot say
that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress
were not fully informed of the provisions of the
bill. The allegation that the Conference Commit
tee usurped the legislative power of Congress is,
in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to
the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must
*^
be resolved in its favor. Our cases147 manifest firm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but'
igi) also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had
not been obtained or that certain provisions of
:piii
a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing
of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look
behind the proceedings of a coequal branch ofthe
a0 government. There is no reason now to depart
from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled
ijgj
bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case143 we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions
of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Sen
ate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill,
admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature,
so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled
bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional
^)
procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allega
tion that the Conference Committee "surrepti
tiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline the invitation
to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No.
11582, namely, that it violates Art. IV, 26(1)
which provides that "Every bill passed by Con-
ulE.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco
(Phil.)Inc.y. Gimenez, 7 SCRA347 (1963); Morales v. Subido,
27 SCRA 131 (1969).
,48Astorgav. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
!&jjj)
gress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended
that neither H. No. 1197 nor S. No. 1630 provided
for removal of exemption of PAL transactions
from the payment of the VAT and that this was
made only in the Conference Committee bill
which became Republic Act No. 7716 without
reflecting this fact in its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)SYSTEM, WID
ENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING
ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEAL
ING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended
is Sec. 103, which originally read:
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The
following shall be exempt from the value-
added tax:
(q) Transactions which are exempt un
der special laws or international agreements
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the
VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted
under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the pay
ment of all "other taxes ; . . now or in the near
future," in consideration of the payment by it
either of the corporate income tax or a franchise
tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic
Act No. 7716, 103 of the NIRC now provides:
103. Exempt transactions. The follow
ing shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
(q) Transactions which are exempt un
der special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972,1491,
1590....
The effect of the amendment is to remove the
exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is
concerned. .
IftlM
The question is whether this -amendment of
103 of the NtRC is fairly embraced in the title
^> of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention
is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those
which the statute amends. We think it is, since
the title states that the purpose of the statute is
lisj
to expand the VATsystem, and one way of doing
this is to widen its base by withdrawing some
of the exemptions granted before. To insist that
P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the
law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which
it is specifically referred to, would be to insist
ilftl
that the title of a bill should be a complete index
of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title is
intended to prevent surprise upon the members
of Congress and to inform the people of pending
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be
heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, peti
tioner did not know before that its exemption had
%1 been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in
the title but perhaps for the same reason other
statutes, although published, pass unnoticed
ggj
until some event somehow calls attention to
their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act
No. 7716 is not any more general than the title
of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and
taj
yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The
title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRAN
CHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAIN
TAIN AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the con
uSJ stitutional requirement in such a manner that
courts do not unduly interfere with the enact
ment of necessary legislation and to consider it
&&) sufficientifthe title expresses the general subject
of the statute and all its provisions are germane
to the general subject thus expressed.149
It is further contended that amendment
of petitioner's franchise may only be made by
M9See, e.g., Alalayan v. National PowerCorp., 24 SCRA
pi
172 (1968); Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962);
Sumulongv. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941).
s^>
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 271
special law, in view of Sec. 24 of P.D. No. 1590
which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any sec
tion or provisionhereof may onlybe modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special
law or decree that?shall specifically modify,
amend, or repeal this franchise or any section
or provision thereof.
This provision is evidently intended to pre
vent the amendment of the franchise by mere
implication resulting from the enactment of a
later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the
fact that a franchise is a contract which can be
altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, it was held that
an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for
the payment of tax on certain goods and articles
imported into the Philippines, did not amend the
franchise ofplaintiff, which exempted it fromall
taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It
was held that a special law cannot be amended
by a general law.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act
No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise
(P.p. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from
the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's
exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within
the powerofCongressto do under Art. XII.11of
the Constitution, which provides that the grant
of a franchise for the operation of a public utility
is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress when the common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of
Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that
on its face the statute violates the guarantees of
freedom of speech, press and religion. The pos
sible "chilling effect" which it may have on the
essential freedom of the mind and conscience and
the need to assure that the channels of commu
nication are open and operating importunately
demand the exercise of this Court's power of
review.
kiS
272. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
w
There is, however, no justification for passing
upon the claims that the law also violates the
fc&i rule that taxation must be progressive and that
it denies petitioners' right to due process and
the equal protection of the laws. The reason for
this different treatment has been cogently stated
iiijiJ
by an eminent authority on constitutional law
thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled
by law, it is freedom that commands a moment
^1
of respect; when property is imperiled it is the
lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionahty in civil liberties
cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause."150
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate
harm makes the need for judicial intervention
less evident and underscores the essential nature
of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds
of regressivity, denial of due process and equal
protection and impairment of contracts as a mere
academic discussion of the merits of the law. For
i^j}
the fact is that there have even been no notices
of assessments issued to petitioners and no de
terminations at the administrative levels of their
claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of
the law and enable us to reach sound judgment
regarding so fundamental questions as those
raised in these suits.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT
is that it is regressive and that it violates the re
quirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uni
form and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve
a progressive system of taxation." Petitioners
in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled
"VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity,
Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the
International Monetary Fund, that "VAT pay
[ffliA
ment by low-income households will be a higher
proportion of their incomes (and expenditures)
than payments by higher-income households.
That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petition
ers contend that as a result of the uniform 10%
VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who
are in the higher-income bracket, which before
lay were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been
IMP.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SU
PREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449,
459 (1967).
reduced, while basic commodities, which before
were taxed at rates ranging from 3%'to 5%, are
now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the
law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed
by respondents that in fact-it distributes the tax
burden to as many goods and services as possible
particularly to those which are within the reach
of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts
basic goods and services. It is thus equitable.
The goods and properties subject to the VAT are
those used or consumed by higher-income groups.
These include real properties held primarily for
sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of business, the right or privilege to use
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist
buses, and the like. On the other hand, small
business establishments, with annual gross
sales of less than P500.000, are exempted. This,
according to respondents, removes from the cov
erage of the law some 30,000 business establish
ments. On the other hand, an occasional paper
of the Center for Research and Communication
cites a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal
impact on inflation and income distribution and
that while additional expenditure for the lowest
income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that
for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is
P8.340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base
any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in
the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-
income group in society harder than it will the
"rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philip
pines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely
an academic exercise. On the other hand, the
CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of
exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while
maintaining that granted to electric coopera
tives, not only goes against the constitutional
policy to promote cooperatives as instruments
of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies
such cooperatives the equal protection of the law
is actually a policy argument. The legislature is
not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none"
in choosing the subject of taxation.
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA),
jgjj
petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will
reduce the mark up of its members by as much
$ifti as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere
allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the
Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R.
No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its
members out ofcirculation because their profits
from advertisements will notbeenough topayfor
their tax liability, while purporting to be based
H$< onthe financial statements ofthe newspapers in
question, still falls short of the establishment of
facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating
the question whether the tax is oppressive and
confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative stan
iii dard for courts to enforce. What Congress is
required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve
a progressive system of taxation." This is a di
I =KMt
rective to Congress, just like the directive to it
to give priority to the enactment of laws for the
enhancement of human dignity and the reduc
tion ofsocial, economic and political inequalities
(Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion ofthe right
to "quality education" (Art. XIV, 1). These
provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentivestolegislation,not as judicially enforce
able rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapati-
ranl&1 should have laid to rest the question now
raised againstthe VAT. There similar arguments
made against the original VAT Law (Executive
Order No. 273) were heldtobehypothetical, with
no more basis than newspaper articles which
this Court found to be "hearsay and [without]
evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716
merelyexpands the base ofthe VAT systemand
itscoverage asprovided intheoriginal VAT Law,
further debateon the desirabilityand wisdom of
jg&) the lawshould have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless
hypothetical is the contention ofCREBA that the
|wi
impositionofthe VAT on the sales and leases of
real estate by virtue of contracts entered into
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate
j&jjj) theconstitutional provision that"No law impair-
16,P.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SU
^0)
PREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449
459 (1967).
ftffii
m
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 273
ing the obligation of contracts shall be passed/'
It is enough tosay that theparties toa contract
cannot, through theexercise ofprophetic discern
ment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of
the State. For not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as be
tween parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a basic postulateofthe legal order.
The policy ofprotecting contracts against impair
ment presupposes the maintenance ofa govern
ment which retains adequate authority to secure
thepeace and good order ofsociety.
In truth, the ContractClause has neverbeen
thought as a limitation on the exercise of the
State's power oftaxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consid
eration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No.
115852, and wedonot Understandit to make this
claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above,
is that the removal ofits tax exemption cannot
be made by a general, butonly by a specific, law.
The substantive issues raised in someofthe
cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical
form because of the lack of a concrete record.
We accept that this Court does, not only ad
judicate private cases; that public actions by
"non-Hohfeldian"162 or ideological plaintiffs are
now cognizable provided they meet the stand
ing requirement ofthe Constitution; that under
Art. VIII, 1, par. 2 the Court has a "special
function" of vindicating constitutional rights.
Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that
we do not have before us in these cases a fully
developed factual record that alone can impart
to ouradjudication the impact ofactuality163 to
I62The term is Professor Jaffe's (JUDICIAL CONTROL
OFADMJNISTRATIVEACTION [1965]) adopted byJustice
Harlan in his dissent in Fiast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-
120, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 973 (1968) todistinguish between the
personal and proprietary interest oftraditional plaintiffs and
thepublic interest ofa citizen suing in a public action. The
term was mentioned by some members of this Court in the
Lotto case (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375,
May 5, 1994).
'"Compare Justice Laurel: "Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity ofargument by the par
ties, andlimited further totheconstitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only leadto dialectics and barrenlegal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities." Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
 274 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREAND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
insure that decision-makingis informed and well
grounded. Needless to say,wedonot havepower
iia
to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect
we are being asked to do what the Conference
Committee is preciselyaccused ofhaving donein
these cases to sit as a third legislative chamber
to review legislation.
We are told, however, that the power of ju
dicial review is not so much power as it is duty
imposed on this Court by the Constitution and
that we would be remiss in the performance of
IftjSl
that dutyifwedecline to look behindthe barriers
set bythe principle ofseparation ofpowers. Art.
VIII, 1, par. 2 is citedin supportofthis view:
Judicial powerincludesthe duty ofthe courts
ofjustice tosettleactualcontroversies involving
rights which arelegally demandable andenforce
able, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
^) branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Toview the judicial powerofreview as a duty
is nothing new. ChiefJustice Marshall said so
in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in
Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must of necessity expound and inter
pret that rule. If two lawsconflict with each
im
other, the courts must decide on the opera
tion of each.154
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in
1936in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to
%> allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullifyor
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation as
signedto it by the Constitutionto determine
conflicting claimsofauthority under the Con
stitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
1M1 Cranch 137. 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
L
L
This conception of the judicial power has
been affirmed in several cases155 of this Court
following Angara.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke
this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention
in what is essentially a case that at best is not
ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly defines
our justificationin terms of"cases," and nothing
but "cases." That the other departments of the
governmentmay have committed a grave abuse
of discretion is not an independent ground for
exercising our power. Disregard of the essen
tial limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirement can in the long run only result in
undermining our authority as a court oflaw. For,
as judges, what we are called upon to render is
judgment according to what may appear to be
the opinion of the day.
******
In the preceeding pages we have endeavored
to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic
Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive as
pects as this has been raised in the various cases
before us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the
Constitution have been complied with by Con
gress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal
requirements for the enactment of statutes be
yond those prescribedby the Constitutionhave
been observed is precluded by the principle oi
separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom
of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere
with the free exercise of religion, nor deny tc
any ofthe parties the right to an education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual
foundation of record, claims that the law is re
gressive, oppressive and confiscatory and thai
it violates vested rights protected under the
Contract Clause are prematurely raised and dc
notjustify the grant ofprospective reliefby writ
of prohibition.
'"People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937); Tanada v
Cuenco, 103 Phil.1051,1061-2 (1957); Macias v.COMELEC
3 SCRA 1, 7-8 (1961).
UM
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases
are DISMISSED.
ig
NOTE: A bill of local application, such as
one asking for the conversion of a municipality
into a city, is deemed to have originated from the
House provided that the bill of the House was
filed prior to the filing of the bill in the Senate
even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own
version. The VAT case is reiterated. Alvarez v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 118303,January 31, 1996.
F. Tobias v. Abalos
(See supra under Art. VI, Sec. 5)
SEC. 27. (1) EVERY BILL'PASSED BY
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT
BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO
THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE
SAME, HE SHALL SIGN IT; OTHERWISE,
i'isi
HE SHALL VETO IT AND RETURN THE
SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE
HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH
SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT
LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED
TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER SUCH
RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE
SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT
SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE
OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY
WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECON
SIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY TWO-
THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT
HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN
ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH
HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY
YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE
MEMBERS VOTING FOR OR AGAINST
SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS JOURNAL.
THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE
HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE
WHERE IT ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY
L DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT
THEREOF; OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BE
COME A LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT.
(2) THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE
POWER TO VETO ANY PARTICULAR ITEM
OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION, REV
ENUE, OR TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VETO
SHALL NOT AFFECT THE ITEM OR ITEMS
TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT.
Eiiil
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 275
1. Legislation.
Two steps are required before a bill finally
becomes a law. First,it mustbeapproved byCon
gress. The legislativeactionrequired ofCongress
is a positiveact; there is no enactment oflawby
legislative inaction. Miller v. Mardo, 2SCRA 398,
908-9 (1961). Second, it must be approved bythe
President. Approval by the President maybe by
positive act or by inaction. "The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the
date ofreceipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become
a law as if he had signed it."
Publication of a bill in every case is indis
pensable for its effectivity. However, the legis
lature has discretion to determine the manner
and duration of'publication before effectivity.
Total omission of publication would be a denial
of due process in that the people would not know
what laws to obey. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446 (1986).
2. Item veto.
A. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Tax Appeals
185 SCRA 329 (1990)
MEDL\LDEA, J:
In Commissionerof Internal Revenue v. Ma
nila Hotel Corporation; et al., G.R. No. 83250,
September 26, 1989, We overruled a decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals which declared the
collection of caterer's tax under Section 191-A
of Republic Act No. 6110 illegal because Sec. 42
of House Bill No. 17839, which carries that pro
viso, was vetoed by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos when the bill was presented to him and
Congress had not taken any step to override the
presidential veto. We held thus:
The power of the State to impose the
3% caterer's tax is not debatable. The Court
of Tax Appeals erred, however, in holding
that the tax was abolished as a result of the
presidential veto of August 4, 1969. It failed
to examine .the law then, and up to now,
existing on the subject which has always
imposed a 3% caterer's tax on operators of
restaurants. Since the Manila Hotel oper
ates restaurants in its premises, it is liable
 276 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
to pay the tax provided in paragraph (1),
Section 206 of the Tax Code. (Commissioner
*ofInternal Revenue v. Manila Hotel Corpora
tion and the Court of Tax Appeals, G. R. No.
83250, September 26, 1989)
The petition now before Us presents an
identical question: whether the presidential veto
referred to the entire section or merely to the
lai imposition of 20%tax on gross receipts of opera
tors or proprietors of restaurants, refreshments
parlors, bars and other eating places which are
maintained within the premises or compound
of a hotel, motel or resthouses. Reference to the
Manila Hotel case, therefore, might have been
sufficient to dispose ofthis petition were it not for
the position ofthe CTAthat a chiefexecutivehas
no power to veto part of an item in a bill; either
he vetoes an entire section or approves it but not
a fraction thereof.
iSi*)
Herein private respondent, Manila Golf &
Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation.
True, it maintains a golf course and operates a
clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room,
but these facilities are for the exclusive use of its
members and accompanied guests, and it charges
on cost-plus-expense basis. As such, it claims it
should have been exempt from payment of privi
lege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of
s&j Section 191-A of R. A. No. 6110, otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Tax Law." Section 191-A reads:
Sec. 191-A. Caterer. A caterer's tax is
fc&4
hereby imposed as follows:
(1) On proprietors or operators of restau
rants, refreshment parlors and other eating
places, including clubs, and caterers, three
per cent of their gross receipts.
(2) On proprietors or operators ofrestau
rants, bars, cafes and other eating places,
including clubs, where distilled spirits, fer
mented liquors, or wines are served, three
per cent of their gross receipts from sale
of food or refreshments and seven per cent
of their gross receipts from sale of distilled
spirits, fermented liquors or wines. Two sets
of commercial invoices or receipts serially
numbered in duplicate shall be separately
prepared and issued, one for sale of refresh
ments served, and another for each sale
of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or
wines served, the originals of the invoices
or receipts to be issued to the purchaser or
customer.
(3) On proprietors or operators of restau
rants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and
other eating places which are maintained
within the premises or compound of a hotel,
motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai,
cabaret, night or day club by means of a con
necting door or passage twenty per cent of
their gross receipts.
Where the establishments arc operated
or maintained by clubs ofany kind or nature
(irrespective of the disposition of their net in
comeand whether or not they cater exclusively
to membersor their guests) the keepersof the
establishments shall pay the corresponding
tax at the rate fixed qpove. (Italics ours)
Republic Act No. 6110 took effect on Septem
ber 1, 1969. By this virtue, petitioners assessed
the club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and
restaurants, and also percentage tax (caterer's
tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/
wines for the period covering September 1969
to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96.
The club protested claiming the assessment to be
without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by
then President Marcos. The veto message reads:
"MALACAriANG
Manila
August 4, 1969
Gentlemen of the House
of Representatives:
I have the honor to inform you that I have
this day signed H.B. No. 17839, entitled:
'AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PRO
VISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL-
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-(3),
Article VI, of the Constitution, however, I have
vetoedthe following items in this bill:
xxx xxx xxx
pp. 44, SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section
191-A which imposes a caterer's tax of three
percent of the gross receipts of proprietors
or operators of restaurants, refreshment

parlors and other eating places; three percent
ofgrossreceipts fromsale offood or refresh
ment and seven percent on gross receipts
from the sale of distilled spirits, fermented
liquors orwines, on proprietors oroperators
of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eat
ing places, including clubs, where distilled
spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are
served; and twenty percent ofgross receipts
tjffifii on proprietor or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other
eating places maintained within the prem
iajijj
ises orcompound ofa hotel, motel, resthouso,
cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or
dayclub, orwhich are accessible topatrons of
said establishments by means ofaconnecting
door or passage.
The burden of taxation will be shifted to
the consuming public.
The development of hotels, essential to
our tourist industry, may be restrained con
sidering that a big portion ofhotel earnings
comes from food sale, x x x"
This bill, H. B. No. 17839, has become Re
public Act No. 6110.
Respectfully,
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"
&jjfl
The protestation ofthe club was denied by
the petitioner who maintains that Section 42
was not entirely vetoed but merely the words
ta
'hotels, motels, resthouses" ontheground that it
might restrain the development of hotels which
is essential to the tourism industry. This in fact
was the position of the House Ways and Means
Committee whichreported, to wit:
When Congress decided to split Section
itiftil
191into twoparts, one dealing with contrac
tors, and the other dealing with those who
serve food and drinks, the intention was to
classify andtoimprove. While theCongress
expanded the coverage of both 191 and 191-
A, it also provided for certain exemptions.
The veto message seems to object to certain
additions to 191-A. What additions are ob-
jectionablescan be gleaned from the reasons
given: a general reason that this sort of tax
kfoi is passed on to the consuming public, and a
particular reason that hotel developments,
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 277
so essential to the tourist industry, may be
restrained. These reasons have been taken
together in the interpretations of the veto
message and the delegations of such en
terprises as are connected with the tourist
industryhas therefore beenrecommended.
To interpret the veto message otherwise
would result in the exemption ofentities al
ready subject of tax. This would be absurd.
Where the Congress wanted toexempt, itwas
so provided in the bill. While the President
mayvetoany item or items in a revenue bill,
theconstitution does not give him the power
to repeal an existing tax. (2nd Indorsement
dated December 9,1969, Chairman on Ways
andMeans, Sixth Congress ofthe Republic
ofthePhil.) (Exhs. 14, p.85, B.I.R. rec). (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
It wasbyreasonofthis interpretationofthe
Committee that R. A. No. 6110 was published in
Volume 66, No. 18,p. 4531 ofthe Official Gazette
(May 4,1970)in such a way that Section 191-A
was included in the text save for the words "ho
tels, motels, resthouses."
As already mentioned, theCourt ofTax Ap-
peals^ upon petition by the club, sustained the
latter's position reasoning thatthe veto message
was clear and unqualified, as in fact it was con
firmed three years later, after much controversy,
by the Office ofthe President, thus:
"Mr. Antero M. Sison, Jr.
San Martin Building, 1564,
A. Mabini, P.O. Box 2288
Manila, Philippines
Dear Sir:
With reference to yourletter dated July 14,
1972, we wish to inform you that Section 42
(which contains Sec. 191-A) of House Bill No.
17839, now R.A. 6110 was one of the Sections
vetoed bythePresident in hisveto message dated
August 4, 1969, vetoing certain sections of the
said revenue bill.
Very Truly Yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO T. AGUIRRE, JR.
Presidential Staff Assistant"
(p. 49, R0u0)
 278 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
IS&i
As mentioned earHer, We have already ruled
that the presidential veto referred merely to the
^i inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the
20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole
section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the CTA
opined that the President could not veto words
or phrases in a billbut onlyan entire item.Obvi
ously, what the CTAmeant by "item" was an en
tire section. We do not agree. But even assuming
it to be so, it would also be to petitioner's favor.
The ineffectual veto by the President rendered
the whole Section 191-A as not having been ve
toed at all and it, therefore, became law as an
unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever.
(See Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valeria, No.
L-20740,-June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486).
However, We agree with then Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza and his associates
that inclusion of hotels, motels, and resthouses
in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in
themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art.
&MI
VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore,
the President has the power to veto. An "item"
in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire
section imposing a particular kind of tax, but
rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate.
In the portion of a revenue bill which actually
imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and
enumerates the persons liable therefor with the
corresponding tax rate. To construe the word
"item" as referring to the whole section would
tie the President's hand in choosing either to
approvethe wholesection at the expenseofalso
approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the
expense of foregoing the collection of the kind
of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to
be prevented in giving the President the power
to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be
perpetrated rendering that power inutile (See
Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa.
161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED
and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in
CTA Case No. 2630 is set aside. Section 191-A of
RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable and, hence,
the Manila Golf & Country Club Inc. is liable for
the amount assessed against it.
SO ORDERED.
L
B. Gonzales v. Macaraig
G.R. No. 87636, November 19,1990
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This constitutional controversy between the
legislative and executive departments ofgovern
ment stemmed from Senate Resolution No. 381,
adopted on 2 February 1989:
Authorizing and Directing the Commit
tee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit
with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto
by the President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No.
19186) and For Other Purposes.
Petitioners are thus before us as members
and ex-officio members of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate and as "substantial tax
payers whose vital interests may be affected by
this case."
Respondents are members of the Cabinet
tasked with the implementation of the General
Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990, some of
them incumbents, while others have already
been replaced, and include the National Treasur
er and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of
whom are being sued in their official capacities.
Tne Background Facts
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed
House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropria
tions Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it
eliminated or decreased certain items included in
the proposed budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision
on the passage of bills, Congress presented the
said Bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed
the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven
(7) Special Provisions and Section55,a "General
Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same

Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset,
further expressed:
&&I
WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is here
by Resolved, That the Senate express its
sense that the veto by the President of Sec
tion 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of
the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H. B.
No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without any force and effect; hence,
K&&I
the aforesaid Section 55 remains;
xxx xxx xxx
Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Peti
tion for Prohibition/Mandamus was filed, with a
prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing
mainly the constitutionality or legality of the
Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to
enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act
No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by
the Court.
The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989
(Section 55 [FY '89] hereinafter), which was ve
toed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Resto
ration or Increase of Recommended Appro
priations Disapproved and/or Reduced by
Congress: No item of appropriation recom
mended by the President in the Budget
submitted to Congress pursuant to Article
VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has
been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall
be restored or increased by the use of appro
priations authorized for other purposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation for
u) any purpose recommended by the President
in the Budget shall be deemed to have been
disapproved by Congress if no correspond
ing appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presiden
tial veto:
The provision violates Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed,
this Section would nullify not only the con
stitutional and statutory authority of the
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 279
President, but also that of the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respec
tive offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations. A careful
review of the legislative action on the budget
as submitted shows that in almost all cases,
the budgets of agencies as recommended by
the President, as well as those of the Senate,
the House of Representatives, and the Con
stitutional Commissions, have been reduced.
An unwanted consequence of tlfis provision
is the inability of the President, the Presi
dent of the Senate, Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitu
tional Commissions to augment any item of
appropriation of their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective
appropriations even in cases of calamity or
in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation of essential public services
and infrastructure projects.
Furthermore, this provision is inconsis
tent with Section 12 and other similar pro
visions of this General Appropriations Act.
A substantially similar provision as the ve
toed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations
Act of 1990, this time crafted as follows:
B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 16. Use of Savings. The Presi
dent of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre
sentatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commis
sions under Article IX of the Constitution
and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to augment any item in this Act for their
respective offices from savings in other items
of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT
NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION RECOM
MENDED" BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE
BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION
22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS
BEEN DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY
 280 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
CONGRESS SHALL BE RESTORED OR
INCREASED BY THE USE OF APPRO
PRIATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER
PURPOSES IN THIS ACT BY AUGMENTA
TION. AN ITEM OF APPROPRIATION FOR
ANYPURPOSE RECOMMENDED BYTHE^
PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SHALL BE
DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED
BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING
&H
APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIFIC
PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT.
iliiii)
It should be noted that in the 1989 Appro
priations Act, the "Use of Savings" appears in
Section 12, separate and apart from Section 55;
whereas in the 1990 Appropriations Act, the
"Use of Savings" and the vetoed provision have
been commingled in Section 16 only, with the
vetoed provision made to appear as a condition
or restriction.
Essentially the same reason was given for
the veto of Section 16 (FY '90), thus:
I am vetoing this provision for the reason
that it violates Section 25(5) of Article VI of
the Constitution in relation to Sections 44
and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A.
No. 6670 which authorizes the President
to use savings to augment any item of ap
propriations in the Executive Branch of the
1^
Government.
Parenthetically, there is a case pending
in the Supreme Court relative to the validity
&y>
of the President's veto on Section 55 of the
General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688
upon which' the amendment on this Section
was based. Inclusion, therefore, of the pro
viso in the last sentence of this section might
prejudice the Executive Branch's position in
the case.
Moreover, if allowed, this Section would
nullify not only the constitutional and statu
tory authority of the President, but also that
of the officials enumerated under Section
25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution, to
augment any item in the general appropria
tions law for their respective appropriations..
An unwanted consequence of this provi
sion would be the inability of the President,
the President of the Senate, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
iki&b
of the Supreme Court, and heads of Consi
tutional Commissions to augment any ite
of appropriation of their respective offic
from savings in other items of their respe
tive appropriations even in cases of nation
emergency or in the. event of urgent need
accelerate the implementation of essenti
public services and infrastructure projects
The fundamental issue raised is whether i
not the veto by the President of Section 55 of tl
1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY '89), ar
subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of tr
1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90),
unconstitutional and without effect.
The Contending Views
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchore
on the following grounds: (1) the President
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills:
limited to item/s and does not cover provision/.
therefore, she exceeded her authority when sh
vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (F
'90) which are provisions; (2) when the Presides
objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, sh
cannot exercise the item-veto power but shoul
veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power doe
not carry with it the power to strike out cond:
tions or restrictions for that would be legislatior
in violation of the doctrine of separation of pow
ers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Articl
VI, Section 25[5] of the 1987 Constitution, has t
be provided for by law and, therefore, Congres
is also vested with the prerogative to impos
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for publi
respondents, counters that the issue at bar is j
political question beyond the power ofthis Cour
to determine; that petitioners had a politica
remedy, which was to override the veto; tha
Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to
the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits th<
President's veto; that the power of the Presiden
to augment items in the appropriations for th<
executive branches had already been providec
for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44
and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended b)
Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the
President is empowered by the Constitution tc
veto provisions or other "distinct and severable
parts" of an Appropriations Bill.

The Extent of the President's Item-veto Power
The focal issue for resolution is whether or
not the President exceeded the item-veto power
accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,
has the President the power to veto "provisions"
ijfkl of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions and not
items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the
item-veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed
in Article VT,Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution
reading, in full, as follows:
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the
jflfiift
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. Ifhe approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such re
^J
consideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to
iiiiiiii) the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting
for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto
of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto
power of the President and if exercised would
result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general
rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the
item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows
the exercise of the veto over a particular item or
^
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
As specified, the President may not veto less than
te^
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 281
all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other
words, the power given the executive to disap
prove any item or items in an Appropriations
Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
ofan item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to
veto of items of appropriation bills and first came.
into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of
Congressof29 August 1916.This was followed by
the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar
provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except
that the veto power was made more expansive
by the inclusion of this sentence:
xxx When a provision of an appropria
tion bill affects one or more items of the same,
the President cannot veto the provision with
out at the same time vetoing the particular
item or items to which it relates xxx.
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the
President's veto power to include the veto of item
or items of revenue and tariff bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution,
the section took a more simple and compact
form, thus:
Section 20(2). The Prime Minister shall
have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
It is to be noted that the counterpart provi
sion in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Sec
tion 27[2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction
except for the public official concerned. In other
words, also eliminated has been any reference
to the veto of a provision. The vital question is:
should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as
a disallowance of the power to veto a provision,
as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary
legislation and practice are concededly differ
ent. An item in a bill refers to the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts x
x x of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an
indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d
120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United
States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v.
 282 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S. Ct
252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an item of an
gii> appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law, which happens to
be put into an appropriation bill."
It is our considered opinion that, notwith
standing the elimination in Article VI, section
27(2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference
im)
to the veto of a provision the extent of the Presi
dent's veto power as previously defined by the
1935 Constitution has not changed. This is be
cause the eliminated proviso merely pronounces
the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto. (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil.,
912, 916 [1926]; 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1st ed.? 154-155 [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitu
tional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein and that
any such provision shall be limited in its opera
tion to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25[2]). In other
words, in the true sense of the term, a provision
in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its opera
tion to some particular appropriation to which
it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
Petitioners' further submission that, since
the exercise of the veto power by the President
partakes of the nature of legislative powers it
should be strictly construed, is negatived by the
following dictum in Bengzon, supra, reading:
The Constitution is a limitation upon
the power of the legislative department of
the government, but in this respect it is a
grant of power to the executive department.
The Legislature has the affirmative power
^0
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional exercise
of which he may defeat the will of the Leg
islature. It follows that the Chief Executive
must find his authority in the Constitution.
But in exercising that authority he may no
be confined to rules of strict constructioi
or hampered by the unwise interference o
the judiciary. The courts will indulge ever
intendment in favor of the constitutional
ity of a veto the same as they will presum<
the constitutionality "of an act as originalh
passed by the Legislature (Commonwealtl
v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A.
882; People v. Board of Councilmen [1892]
20 N. Y. S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 10<
Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53 A. L
R., 258 [at 9171).
Inappropriateness of the so-called ^Provisions"
But even assuming arguendo thatproviswni3
are beyond the executive power to veto, we are ol
the opinion that Section 55 (FY '89) and Sectior
16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary
sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25(2) of the
1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 25(2) No provision or enactment
shall be embraced in the general appropria
tions bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision
in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifi
cally to some "particular appropriation" therein.
The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do
not relate to any particular or distinctive ap
propriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Ap
propriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face
of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to
be made to the original recommendations made
by the President and to the source indicated
by petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative
Budget Research and Monitoring Office"(Annex
B-l and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sec
tions are more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from savings
rather* than a budgetary appropriation. Conse
quently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY
'90) although labeled as "provisions," are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be treated

as items for the purpose of the President's veto
power (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d,
to 157-158).
Just as the President may not use his
item-veto to'usurp constitutional powers
conferred on the legislature, neither can
the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as
chief executive officer of the state including
in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The
Governor's constitutional power to veto bills
of general legislation ... cannot be abridged
by the careful placement of such measures in
a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing
the Governor to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or ve
toing 'items' of expenditure essential to the
operation of government. The legislature
cannot by location of a bill give it immunity
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent
the Governors veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item- of ap
propriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government in contravention of
the separation of powers doctrine . . . We
are no more willing to allow the legislature
to use its appropriation power to infringe on
the Governor's constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we
are to allow the Governor to encroach on
the constitutional powers of the legislature.
In order to avoid this result, we hold that,
when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill,
such provisions must be treated as 'items'for
purposes of the Governor's item veto power
over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx Legislative control cannot be exer
cised in such a manner as to encumber the
general appropriation bill with veto-proof
'logrolling measure,' special interest provi
sions which could not succeed if separately
enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of
legislation incorporated in a bill to insure
passage without veto, xxx (Italics supplied)
jjijjp
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 283
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Conditions/
Restrictions"
Petitioners maintain, however, that Con
gress is free to impose conditions in an Appro
priations Bill and where conditions are attached,
the veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson
(11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30,
1964,11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory
is that Section 55 (FY'89) and Section 16 (FY'90)
are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond
the veto power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the
power of appropriation is the power to specify
how money shall be spent; and that in addition to
distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifica
tions, conditions, hmitations or restrictions on
expenditure offunds. Settled also is the rule that
the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition
or proviso of an appropriation, while allowing
the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v.
Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling
in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a
condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not
include a veto of the items to which the condition
related was deemed invalid and without effect
whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions
should be such in the real sense of the term, not
some matters which are more properly dealt with
in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La,
346, So 2d 153). Restrictions or conditions in an
Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection
with money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is ap
propriateness.
It is not enough that a provision be re
lated to the institution or agency to which
funds are appropriated. Conditions and
limitations properly included in an appro
priation bill must exhibit such a connexity
with money items of appropriation that they
logicallybelong in a schedule of expenditures
... the ultimate test is one of appropriateness
(Henry v. Edwards, supra, at 158).
Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to be
inappropriate "conditions." While they, particu-
 284 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
larly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully
drafted" to appear as true conditions or limita
tions, they are actually general law measures
more appropriate for substantive and, therefore,
separate legislation.
Further, neither of them shows the neces
sary connection with a schedule of expenditures.
The reason, as explained earlier, is that items
reduced or disapproved by Congress would not
appear on the face of the enrolled bill or Appro
priations Act itself. They can only be detected
when compared with the original budgetary sub
mittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY
'89) and 16 (FY '90) themselves provide that an
item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved
by Congress if no corresponding appropriation
for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
Considering that the vetoed provisions are
not, in the budgetary sense of the term, condi
^)
tions or restrictions, the case of Bolinao Electron
ics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by
petitioners, becomes inapplicable. In that case,
a public works bill contained an item appropri
ating a certain sum for assistance to television
stations, subject to the condition that the amount
would not be available to places where there were
commercial television stations. Then President
Macapagal approved the appropriation but ve
toed the condition. When challenged before this
Court, it was held that the veto,was ineffectual
and that the approval of the item carried with it
the approval of the condition attached to it. In
contrast with the case at bar, there is no condi
tion, in the budgetary sense ofthe term, attached
to an appropriation or item in the appropriation
bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sec
tions 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) partake more
of a curtailment on the power to augment from
savings; in other words, "a general provision of
api law, which happens to be put in an appropriation
bill" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra).
The Power ofAugmentation and The Validity
of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they
nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and
the heads of different branches of government to
augment any item in the General Appropriations
Law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations,
as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25(5) of the
Constitution. Said provision reads:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed au
thorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre
sentatives, the ChiefJustice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Com-
cmissions may, by law, be authorized to aug
ment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropria
tions (Italics ours).
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to aug-
ment from savings lies dormant until authorized
by law.
This Court upheld the validity of the power
of augmentation from savings in Demetria v.
Alba, which ruled:
x x x to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of
the constitutional, commissions consider
able flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the
enactment of a law authorizing the transfer
of funds for the purpose of augmenting an
item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway
granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be trans
ferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be
allowed for the purpose of augmenting an
item and such transfer may be made only if
there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch
or constitutional body (G.R. No. 71977, 27
February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
The 1973 Constitution contained an identical
authority to augment from savings in its Article
VIII, Section 16(5), except for mention of the
Prime Minister among the officials vested with
that power.166
,56Sec. 16(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may
by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.

In 1977, the statutory authority ofthe Presi
dent to augment any appropriation ofthe execu
tive department in the General Appropriations
Actfrom savings was specifically provided forin
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, as
Ml amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
It reads:
fortl
Sec. 44. x x x
The President shall, likewise, have the
authority to augment any appropriation of
igj
the Executive Department in the General
Appropriations Act, from savings in the ap- - augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
propriations of another department, bureau,
office or agencywithin the Executive Branch, tional and statutory authority of the President
pursuant to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. and other key officials to augment any item or
.16(5) of the Constitution (now Sec. 25[5],
Art. VI) (Emphasis ours). (N.B.: The first
paragraph declared void in Demetria v.Alba,
supra, has been deleted).
Similarly,the use by the President ofsavings
to cover deficits'is specifically authorized in the
same Decree. Thus:
Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in
Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except
as otherwise provided in the General Ap
propriations Act, any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the General
Appropriations Act for programs and projects
of any department, office or agency, may,
with the approval of the President be used to
cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: xxx
A more recent grant is found in Section 12
of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the
text of which is repeated in the first paragraph
of Section 16 (FY '90). Section 12 reads:
Sec. 12. Use ofSavings.The President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to aug
ment any item in this Act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
There should be no question, therefore, that
statutory authority has, in fact, been granted.
Sjjl
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 285
And once given, the heads of the different
branches of the Government and those of the
Constitutional Commissionsare afforded consid
erable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra).The doctrine
ofseparation ofpowers is in no way endangered
because the transfer is made within a depart
ment (or branch of government) and not fromone
department (branch) toanother (CRUZ, Isagani
A, Philippine Political Law [1989], p. 155).
When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90),
therefore, prohibit the restoration orincrease by
reduced by Congress, they impair the constitu
any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such
authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
items by no means vests in the Executive the
power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners
contend, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch con
cerned, the sourcing to comeonly from savings.
More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for
such a special power as that of augmentation
fromsavings, the same is merelyincorporated in
the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropria
tions Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of
which is to make appropriation of moneyfrom the
public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary ofJustice,
292 U.S., 410, 57 S. Ct. 252). It is a legislative
authorization of receipts and expenditures. The
power ofaugmentation from savings, on the other
hand, can by no means be considered a specific
appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation
item inserted in an appropriation measure.
The same thing must be said of Section
55 (FY '89), taken in conjunction with Section
12, and Section 16 (FY '90), which prohibit the
restoration or increase by augmentation of ap
propriations disapproved and or reduced by
Congress. They are non-appropriation items,
an appropriation being a setting apart by law
of a certain sum from the public revenue for a
specified purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Jus
tice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating
that they are more of a substantive expression
of a legislative objective to restrict the power of
augmentation granted to the President and other
 286 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
key officials.They are actually matters ofgeneral
law and more properly the subject of a separate,
iii) legislation that will embody, define and delimit
the scope of the special power of augmentation
from savings instead of being inappropriately
$$}
incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act.
To sanction this practice would be to give the
Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold
the power from the Executive and other officials,
m*
and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of
that power.
If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section
55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90), Congress, as
petitioners argue, intended to amend or repeal
Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason
should it have so provided in a separate enact
ment, it being basic that implied repeals are not
favored. For the same reason, we cannot sub
scribe to petitioners' allegation that Pres. Decree
No. 1177 has been revoked by the 1987 Constitu
tion. The 1987 Constitution itselfprovides for the
continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution until amended, repealed, or revoked
(1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3).
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the
exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
'$&$ unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto
may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of
I^J
members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article
VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no
attempt to override the Presidential veto. Peti- *
tioners' argument that the veto is ineffectual so
that there is "nothing to override" (citing Bolinao)
has lost force and effect with the executive veto
having been herein upheld.
As we see it, there need be no future conflict
if the legislative and executive branches of gov
ernment adhere to the spirit of the Constitution,
each exercising its respective powers with due
deference to the constitutional responsibilities
and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate
equilibrium of governmental powers remains on
^>
even keel.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the
assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this
Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, J., see dissent.
Gutierrez, J., see dissent.
Padilla, J., see dissent.
C. Philconsa v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
QUIASON, Jr.
Onceagain this Court is called upon the rule
on the conflictingclaims ofauthority between the
Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the
powers ofthe purse and the sword. Providing the
focus for the contest between the President and
the Congress over control of the national budget
are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention
is being sought by a group of concerned taxpay
ers on the claim that Congress and the President
have impermissibly exceed their respective au
thorities, and by several Senators on the claim
that the President has committed grave abuse
of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the
exercise of his veto power.
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropria
tion Bill of 1994 (GABof 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on Decem
ber 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropria
tions in the proposed budget previously submit
ted by the President. It also authorized members
of Congress to propose and identify projects in
the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to reahgn
their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage
and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Con
stitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30,1993, the President signed
the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, NINETEEN

HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the
$ity
same day, the President delivered his Presiden
tial Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the
bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
VfAl
No step was taken in either House of Con
gress to override the vetoes.
'jiiill
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Con
stitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and
Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a
writ ofprohibition to declare as unconstitutional
and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide
Development Fund, the special provision in
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for
ijpl
Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the
Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess
(^ of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the
veto of the President of the Special Provision
of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp.
88-90. 104-105).
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of
the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J.
'Hgji
Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chair
man of the Committee on Finance, and Senator
Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and
the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpay
ers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality
of the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Om
budsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of
lajij the veto of the special provision in the appropria
tion for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G.
*iy Romulo and Wigberto Tanada (a co-petitioner
in G.R. No. 113174), together with the Free
dom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic
corporation, sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the Execu
tive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department
^
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 287
of Budget and Management, the National Trea
surer, and the COA.
Petitioners Tanada and Romulo sued as
members of the Philippine Senate and taxpay
ers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt Coali
tion sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the
constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the
special provision in the appropriations for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefor.
In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Tanada and
Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the same
respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this peti
tion, petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
(1) the veto on four special provisions added to
items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2)
the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also-sought the issuance of tem
porary restraining orders to enjoin respondents
Secretary of Budget and Management, National
Treasurer and COA from enforcing the ques
tioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the
Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs
on the time-honored principle of according the
presumption of validity to statutes and the pre
sumption of regularity to official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of
most of the issues raised in the four petitions,
the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene
Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as
Amicus Curiae, which they graciously did.
II
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund.
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Coun
trywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00
to "be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambu
lances and computers and other priority projects
 288 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries." Said Article provides:
"COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
For Fund requirements of countrywide de
^) velopment projects P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount
herein appropriated shall be used for infrastruc
ture, purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed
and identified by officials concerned according
to the following allocations: Representatives,
P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each;
Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That,
the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a
revolving fund to be administered by a govern
ment financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund
for lending operations. Prior years releases to
local government units and national government
agencies for this purpose shall be turned over
to the government financial institution which
shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities
released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released
^^
quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and
Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned
implementing agency not later than five (5) days
after the beginning of each quarter upon submis
sion of the list of projects and activities by the
officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The
Department of Budget and Management shall
submit within thirty (30) days after the end of
each quarter a report to the Senate Commit
tee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from this
Fund. The report shall include the listing of the
$~i projects, locations, implementing agencies and
the endorsing officials" (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the
members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Coun
trywide Development Fund is an encroachment
jjflffi
by the legislature on executive power, since said
power in an appropriation act is in implementa
tion of a law. They argue that the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the
making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, the only function given to the Congress
by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78-86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power
called by James Madison as "the power of the
purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to
the veto power of the President. The President
may propose the budget, but still the final say
on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the
Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it
the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is
explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries. . . ." It was
Congress itself that determined the purposes for
the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide
Development Fund involves implementation of
the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Con
gress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI
of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
examine whether the proposals submitted by
the members of Congress fall within the specific
items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
up, and if qualified, he next determines whether
they are in line with other projects planned for
the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects
qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the
President who shall implement them. In short,
the proposals and identifications made by the
members of Congress are merely recommenda
tory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying
by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994
is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a work
able government and its interpretation must
take into account the complexities, realities
is)
and politics attendant to the operation of the
poUtical branches of government. Prior to the
GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of
appropriations for the constituents of the mem
bers of Congress, with the members close to the
fe>
Congressional leadership or who hold cards for
"horse-trading," getting more than their less fa
vored colleagues. The members of Congress also
had to reckon with an unsympathetic President,
iilii)
who could exercise his veto power to cancel from
the appropriation bill a pet project of a Repre
sentative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund at
tempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a
recognition that individual members ofCongress,
^) far more than the President and their congres
sional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable
about the needs of their respective constituents
and the priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation
^i
for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which
P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current
operating expenditures, while the appro
priation for the House of Representatives is
Pl,171,924,000.00 of which Pl,165,297,000.00 is
appropriated for current operating expenditures
(GAA of 1994, pp. 2,4, 9, 12).
The Special Provision Applicable to the Con
*0 gress of the Philippines provides:
"4. Realignment of Allocation for Op
erating Expenses. A member of Congress
may realign his allocation for operational
. expenses to any other expense category
provided the total of said allocation is not
exceeded." (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The appropriation for operating expenditures
for each House is further divided into expendi
tures for salaries, personal services, other com
pensation benefits, maintenance expenses and
other operating expenses. In turn, each member
of Congress is allotted for his own operating ex
penditure a proportionate share ofthe appropria
tion for the House to which he belongs. Ifhe does
not spend for one item of expense, the provision
in question allows him to transfer his allocation
in said item to another item of expense.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 289
Petitioners assail the special provision al
lowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other
expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that
this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article
VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
"No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations: however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations."
The proviso of said Article of the Constitu
tion grants the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives the
power to augment items in an appropriation act
for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their appropriations, whenever there is
a law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the
operating expenses of members of Congress is
authorized by Section 16 of the General Provi
sions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
"Expenditure Components. Except by
act of the Congress of the Philippines, no
change or modification shall be made in the
expenditure items authorized in this Act and
other appropriation laws unless in cases of
augmentations from savings in appropria
tions as authorized under Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution." (GAA of 1994,
p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President
and the Speaker ofthe House ofRepresentatives,
but not the individual members of Congress are
the ones authorized to realign the savings as
appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to
the Congress of the Philippines, the members
of Congress only determine the necessity ofthe
realignment ofthe savings in the allotments for
their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the ones who
know whether there are deficiencies in other
items oftheir operating expenses that need aug-
 290 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
mentation. However, it is the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall approve the re
alignment. Before giving their stamp of approval,
these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or trans
ferred are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to be
taken; and
tsi
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expen
sgj
diture to which said transfer or realignment
is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated
P86,323,428,000.00 for debt service (Article
XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only
P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Educa
tion, Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that
Congress cannot give debt service the highest
priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94)
because under the Constitution it should be
education that is entitled to the highest funding.
They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof,
which provides:
"(5) The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education and ensure
iyi>
that teaching will attract and retain its right
ful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of
EM job satisfaction and fulfillment."
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v.
Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)j where this court
held that Section 5(5), Article XTV of the Consti
tution, is merely directory, thus:
"While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XTV of the Constitution, Congress is
mandated to 'assign the highest budgetary
priority to education' in order to 'insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful
juf'V
share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of
job satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985,
the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school
system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations
Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all. department budgets. This
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid consti
tutional mandate according highest priority to
education.
Having faithfully complied therewith,
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was
inheiited from the previous administration. It
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at slake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional."
G.R. NO. 113105
G.R. NO. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to
Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service)
of the GAA of 1994 which provides:
"Special Provisions.
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation
authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in
excess of the amount herein appropriated shall
be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the congress
of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquida
tors.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of Fi
nance shall submit a quarterly report of actual
foreign and domestic debt service payments to

iMt
the House Committee on Appropriations and
Senate Finance Committee within one (1) month
after each quarter" (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Pro
vision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation for debt service in said Article.
According to the President's Veto Message:
"IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT
SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur
flffii fully with the desire of Congress to reduce
the debt burden by decreasing the appropria
tion for debt service as well as the inclusion
of the Special Provision quoted below. Nev
ertheless, I believe that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA. This must be addressed by revis
ing our debt policy by way of innovative and
comprehensive debt reduction programs con
ceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-
Term Philippine Development Plan.
:Mt
Appropriations for payment of public debt,
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing
Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish
Wfil to emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been
upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Teo-
fisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. GuillermoN Carague, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.,'
G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special
provision for the reason that the GAA is not the
appropriate legislative measure to amend the
ajfefl provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D.
No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
'Use of the Fund. The appropriation
^il
authorized herein shall be used for pay
ment of principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED,
That any payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines
with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED FURTHER, That
in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
f${\
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 291
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators'" (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot
veto the Special Provision on the appropria
tion for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86,323,4<J8.00 for said purpose
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General
counterposed that the Special Provision did not
relate to the item of appropriation for debt service
and could therefore be the subject of an item veto
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60;<JRollo, G.R.No.
113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put
to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
452 (1990). In that case, the issue was stated by
the Court, thus:
'The fundamental issue raised is wheth
er or not the veto by the President of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89, and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and
without effect."
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there
would not be any misunderstanding about it,
thus:
'The focal issue for resolution is whether
or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or dif
ferently put, has the President the power to
veto '[provisions' of an Appropriations Bill?"
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which
are similar to those invoked in the present case,
are stated as follows:
"In essence, petitioners' cause is an
chored on the following grounds: (1) the
President's line-veto power as regards ap
propriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
her authority when she vetoed Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to
a provision of an appropriation bill, she can
not exercise the item-veto power but should
veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power
does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would
 292 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
- be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of
&&i augmentation in Article VT, Section 25(5) of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for
by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions
on the exercise of that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill
not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may
ha
be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that
any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particu
lar appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25[2]). In
other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited
in its operation to some particular appropria
tion to which it relates, and does not relate
to the entire bill."
The Court went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that "provisions"
are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were
not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the
term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that
should be treated as "items" for the purpose of
the President's veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La.,
346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropri
ate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
"item," which can be vetoed by the President in
the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Pro
u
vision applicable to the appropriation for debt
service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of
the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "in
appropriate" provision referring to funds other
than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the
General Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and
to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by
the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the ap
propriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in
favor of the constitutionahty of a veto, the same
as it will presume the constitutionality of an act
of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31
Ariz. 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the
President, is actually a part of the legislative
process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found hi
Article VI on the Legislative Department rather
than in ArticleVII on the Executive Department
in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound
basis to indulge in the presumption of validity
of a veto. The burden shifts on those question
ing the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power* the President
has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts
thereof (1987 Constitution, Aft. VI, Sec. 27[1]).
The exception to the general veto power is the
power given to the President to veto any par
ticular item or items in a general appropriations
bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[21). In so
doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special
type of legislation, whose content is limited to
specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The
Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple
Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the
Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S.
Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was
adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of insert
ing provisions, including conditions, restrictions
and limitations, to items in appropriations bills,
the Constitutional Convention added the follow
ing sentence to Section 20(2), Article VT of the
1935 Constitution:
"... When a provision of an appropriation
bill affects one or more items of the same, the
President cannot veto the provision without

at the same time vetoing the particular item
or items to which it relates " legislature deprive the Governor of the con
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the
President was empbwered to veto separately
not only items in an appropriations bill but also
|&s) "provisions."
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain
the aforementioned sentence added to Section
11(2) of Article VI.of the 1935 Constitution, it
included the following provision:
"No provision or enactment shall be em
\mi
braced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to someparticular appropria
tion therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operationto the appropria
tion to which it relates3 (Art.VI, Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omis
in) sion of that sentence of Section 16(2) ofthe 1935
Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not
be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the
power of the President to veto a "provision."
As the Constitution is explicit that the
provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein" and "be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates," it follows that any provision
&y
which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item
ofappropriation, is considered "aninappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from
an item. Also to be included in the category of
"inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to
amend other laws, because clearly these kind
of laws have no place in anappropriations bill.
These *are matters of general legislation more
ii^ii appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
FormerJustice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae,
commented that Congress cannot by law estab
lish conditions for and regulate the exercise of
powers ofthe President given by the Constitution
for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion
into executiveprerogative.
The doctrine of"inappropriate provision" was
well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra, thus:
"Just as the President may not use his
item-veto to usurp constitutional powers
^1
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 293
conferred on the legislature, neither can the
stitutional powersconferred on him as chief
executive officer ofthe state byincluding in
a general appropriation bill matters more
properlyenacted in separate legislation.The
Governor's constitutional power to veto bills
ofgeneral legislation ... cannot beabridged
by the careful placement of such measures
in a general appropriation bill, therebyforc
ing the Governor to choose between approv
ing unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing 'items' of expenditures essential to
the operation ofgovernment. The legislature
cannot bylocation of a bill give it immunity
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent
the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of ap
propriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government in contravention of
the separation of powers doctrine . . . We
are no more willing to allow the legislature
to use its appropriation power to infringe on
the Governor's constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we
are to allow the Governor to encroach on
the constitutional powers of the legislature.
In order to avoid this result, we hold that,
when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill,
suchprovisions mustbetreated as Items'for
purposes of the Governor's item veto power
over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Legislative control cannot be exer
cised in such a manner as to encumber the
general appropriation bill with veto-proof
'log-rollingmeasures,' special interest provi
sions which could not succeed if separately
enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of leg
islation incorporated in a bill to insure pas
sage without veto " (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo
that the veto of the Special Provision on the
ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President
 294 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt
payment without complying with the conditions
. for automatic appropriation under the provisions
OfR.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and
the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by
the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No.
fjjrl
1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the Presi
dent will not faithfully execute the laws. The
writ ofprohibition will not issue on the fear that
official actions will be done in contravention of
the laws.
Ml
The President vetoed the entire paragraph
one of the Special Provision of the item on debt
service, including the provisos that the appro
priation authorized in said item "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These
provisos are germane to and have a direct con
nection with the item on debt service. Inherent
in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v.
Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said pro
visos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be
vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said
provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misun
derstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of
the Special Provision of the item on debt service
only with respect to the proviso therein requir
ing that "any payment in excess of the amount
herein, appropriated shall be subject to the ap
proval of the President of the Philippines with
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philip
pines ..."
G.R. No. 113174
G,R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
1. Veto ofprovisions for revolving funds of
SUCs.
In the appropriation for State Universities
and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed spe
cial provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed
are the following:
"(H.7) West Visayas State University
'Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned
by the University subject to Section 13 of
the special provisions applicable to all State
Universities and Colleges shall be equally
shared by the University and the University
hospital' (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
XXX xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
'Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC
House and Human Resources Development
Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State
College derived from the operation of its
LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted
into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an
authorized government depository bank for
the operational expenses of these projects/
services. The net income of the Revolving
Fund at the end of the year shall be remitted
to the National Treasury and shall accrue
to the General Fund. The implementing
guidelines shall be issued by the Depart
ment of Budget and Management" (GAA of
1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to
all SUC's are the following:
"12.Use of Income from Extension Ser
vices. State Universities and Colleges are
authorized to use their income from their
extension services. Subject to the approval of
the Board of Regents and the approval of a
special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter
5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, such income shall
be utilized solely for faculty development,
instructional materials and work study pro
gram" (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
"13.Tncome of State Universities and
Colleges. The income of State Universities
and Colleges derived from tuition fees and
other sources as may be imposed by gov
erning boards other than those accruing to
revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872
and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded
as trust receipts pursuant to Section 40,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be
deposited with the National Treasury and
recorded as a Special Account in the General

Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No.
1437 for the use of the institution, subject
afotl
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292: PROVIDED, That disbursements
from the Special Account shall not exceed
the amount actually earned and deposited:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash ad
vance on such income may be allowed State
Universities and Colleges representing up to
one-half of income actually realized during
the preceding, year and this cash advance
shall be charged against income actually
earned during the budget year: AND PRO
VIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall
such funds be used to create positions, nor
for payment of salaries, wages or allowances,
except as may be specifically approved by the
Department of Budget and Management for
income-producing activities, or to purchase
equipment or books, without the prior ap
proval of the President of the Philippines
pursuant to Letter of Implementation No.
29.
All collections of the State Universities and
Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended
for private recipient units, including private
foundations affiliated with these institutions
shall be dully acknowledged with official receipts
and deposited as a trust receipt before said in
come shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reasons for the veto
thus:
"Pursuant to Section 65 of the Govern
ment Auditing Code of the Philippines,
Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of
the Constitution, all income earned by all
Government offices and agencies shall accrue
to the General Fund of the Government in
line with the One Fund Policy enunciated
by Section 29(1), Article VI and Section 22,
ai&frl
Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise,
the creation and establishment of revolving
funds shall be authorized by substantive law
pursuant to Section 66 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Phihppines and Section
45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution and existing
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 295
law, I have noted the proliferation ofspecial
provisions authorizing the use of agency in
come as well as the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the fact that
such income were1 already considered as
integral part of the revenue and financing
sources ofthe National Expenditure Program
which I previously submitted to Congress.
Hence, the grant of new special provisions
authorizing the use of agency income and the
establishment of revolving funds over and
above the agency appropriations authorized
in this Act shall effectively reduce the financ
ing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same
time, increase the level of expenditures of
some agencies beyond the well-coordinated,
rationalized levels for such agencies. This
corresponding increases the overall deficit
of the National Government" (Veto Message,
p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he disal
lowed by his veto the "use of income" and the
creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Vi-
sayas State University and Leyte State Colleges
when he allowed other government offices, like
the National Stud Farm, to use their income for
their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when
the President vetoed said special provisions
while allowing similar provisions in other gov
ernment agencies. If some government agencies
were allowed to use their income and maintain
a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because
these agencies have been enjoying such privilege
before by virtue of the special laws authorizing
such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund
policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National
Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities .
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for
the Department of Budget and Management's
Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administra
tive)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department
of Public Works and Highways, the President
vetoed the second paragraph of Special Provi-
 296 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
sion No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ratio
of works to be contracted for the maintenance of
national roads and bridges. The said paragraph
reads as follows:
"2. Release and Use of Road Mainte
nance Funds. Funds allotted for the mainte
nance and repair of roads which are provided
in this Act for the Department of Public
Works and Highways shall be released to
the respective Engineering District, subject
to such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Department of Budget and
Management. Maintenance funds for roads
and bridges shall be exempt from budgetary
reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated
for the maintenance of national roads and
bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%)
shall be contracted out in accordance with
guidelines to be issued by the Department
of Public Works and Highways. The bal
ance shall be used for maintenance by force
account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road
maintenance fund appropriated herein to be
applied across the board to the allocation of
each region shall be set aside for the main
tenance of roads which may be converted to
or taken over as national roads during the
current year and the same shall be released
to the central office of the said department
for eventual sub-allotment to the concern
region and district: PROVIDED, That any
balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be
restored to the regions on apro-rata basis for
the maintenance of existing national roads'
No retention or deduction as reserves
or overhead expenses shall be made, except
as authorized by law or upon direction of
the President" (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786;
Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for
the veto:
#"While I am cognizant of the well-
intended desire of Congress to impose cer
tain restrictions contained in some special
provisions, I am equally aware that many
programs, projects and activities of agen
cies would require some degree of flexibility
Mi
to ensure their successful implementation
and therefore risk their completion. Fur
thermore, not only could the restrictions
and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in
a breach of contractual obligations.
D.l.a. A study conducted by the Infra
structure Agencies show that for practical
intent and purposes, maintenance by con
tract could be undertaken to an optimum
of seventy percent (70%) and the remaining
thirty percent (30%) by force account. More
over, the policy of maximizing implemen
tation through contract maintenance is a
covenant of the Road and Road Transport
Program Loan from the Asian Develop
ment Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990)
and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is
a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD)
Loan for the Highway Management Project
(IBRD Loan No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and consider
ing the policy of the government to encourage
and maximize private sector participation
in the regular repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing
the underlined second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public
Works and Highways" (Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision
No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of
Congress and the President. While Congress
expressly laid down the condition that only 30%
of the total appropriation for road maintenance
should be contracted out, the President, on the
basis of a comprehensive study, believed that
contracting out road maintenance projects at an
option of 70% would be more efficient, economical
and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject
of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for
road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70%
by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition
by Congress of special provisions, conditions to
items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be.
vetoed separately from the items to which they

relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the
budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
TheSolicitor Generalwashard put injustify
ing the veto of this special provision. He merely
argued that the provision is a completeturnabout
iiii)
from an entrenched practice of the government
to maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to
veto a provision separate from the item to which
it refers. o
The veto of the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
therefore unconstitutional.
iMsi
3. Vetg of provision on purchase of medi
cines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the
special provision on the purchase by the AFP of
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs
Law (RA. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
"12.Purchase ofMedicines. The purchase
of medicines by all Armed Forces of the
Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall
strictly comply with the formulary embodied
in the National Drug Policy of the Depart
ment of Health" (GAAof 1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desir
able to subject the purchase of medicines to a
standard formulary, "it is believedmoreprudent
to provide for a transition period for its adoption
and smooth implementation in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
&$&
The Special Provision which requires that
all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in
iiiiiJ
the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Healthis an "appropriate" provision. It is a mere
advertence by Congress to the fact that there is
an existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that
requires"the extensiveuse ofdrugs with generic
names through a rational system ofprocurement
and distribution." The President believes that it
ismore prudent toprovide for a transition period
forthe smooth implementation ofthe law in the
case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, asimplied by Section 11 (Education
Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however,
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 297
cannot justify his veto of the provision on the
purchase of medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable
from the appropriationitem onpurchasesofmed
icines by the AFP, the,special provision cannot
be vetoed by the President without also vetoing
the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation
v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
4.. Veto, of provision on prior approval of
Congress for purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization
of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined
proviso of the Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use
of Fund," which requires the prior approval of
theCongress for the release ofthe corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the "SpecificProhibition":
"2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount
herein appropriated, priority shall be given
for the acquisition ofAFP assets necessary
for protecting marine, mineral, forest and
other resources within Philippine territorial
borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface
intrusions and to support diplomatic moves
aimed at preserving national dignity, sov
ereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That
the said modernization fund shall not be
released until a Table of Organization and
Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to
and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Mod
ernization Fund shall not be used for pay
ment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers" (GAA of 1994,
p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated
that the said condition and prohibition violate
the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment
of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equip
ment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed
Forcesofthe Philippines" (VetoMessage, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No.
2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No.
 298 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
3 are conditions or limitations related to the item
on the AFP modernization plan.
arfift
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2
on the "use of Fund" for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all pur
chases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or
legislative veto." By way of definition, a congres
sional veto is a means whereby the legislature
can block or modify administrative action taken
under a statute. It is a form of legislative control
in the implementation of particular executive
actions. The form may be either negative, that
is requiring disapproval of the executive action,
or affirmative, requiring approval of the execu
tive action. This device represents a significant
attempt by Congress to move from oversight of
the executive to shared administration (Dixon,
The Congressional Veto and Separation of Pow
ers: The Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina
Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious
questions involving the principle of separation
of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity
of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 becau.se the issues at
hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative ap
%A
proval of executive acts must be incorporated in
a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being
"inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her
memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress
cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly
by attaching conditions to the exercise of that
power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief)
through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, pro
hibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted
for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. Ill, Sec. 10), more so,
contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore
valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to
augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension
and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the
new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
"2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff,
AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of National Defense, to use sav
ings in the appropriations provided herein to
augment the pension fund being managed by
the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System as provided under Sections 2(a) and
3 of P.D. No. 361" (GAA of 1994, p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of
retirement and separation benefits should be
covered by direct appropriations specifically ap
proved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1)
of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message,
pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision
on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condi
tion or limitation which is so intertwined with
the item of appropriation that it could not be
separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief
of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5) no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and
under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an ap
propriation made by law. While Section 25(5)
allows as an exception the realignment of savings
to augment items in the general appropriations
law for the executive branch, such right must and
can be exercised only by the President pursuant
to a specific law.

6. Condition on the deactivation of the
CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for
the CAFGU's including the payment of separa
tion benefits but it added the following Special
Provision:
"1. CAFGU Compensation and Separa
tion Benefit. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for the compensation
of CAFGU's including the payment of their
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year
subsistence allowance for the 11,000 mem
bers who will be deactivated in 1994. The
Chief of Staff, AFP, shall subject to the ap
proval of the Secretary of National Defense,
promulgate policies and procedures for the
payment of separation benefit" (GAA of 1994,
p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message
that the implementation of this Special Provision
to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to
prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No.
1597 and R.A. No. 6758. He gave the following
reasons for imposing the condition:
iiiiwii}
"I am well cognizant of the laudable
intention of Congress in proposing the
amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the
fttafiJ CAFGU. However, it is premature at this
point in time of our peace process to earmark
and declare through special provision the
i?Mi
actual number of CAFGU members to be
deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that
the number to be deactivated would largely
depend on the result or degree of success
&&) of the on-going peace initiatives which are
not yet precisely determinable today. I have
desisted, therefore, to directly veto said pro
visions because this would mean the loss of
the entire special provision to the prejudice
of its beneficent provisions. I therefore de
clare that the actual implementation of this
special provision shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to the pro
visions of P.D. No. 1597 and R,A. No. 6758"
(Veto Message, P. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has
required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when
it appropriated the money for payment of the
separation pay of the members of thereof. The
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 299
President, however, directed that the deactiva
tion should be done in accordance to his time
table, taking into consideration the peace and
order situation in the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the
President was tantamdunt to an administrative
embargo of the congressional will to implement
the Constitution's command to dissolve the
CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, p. 14; G.R.
No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the
President cannot impair or withhold expendi
tures authorized and appropriated by Congress
when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, who should determine
when the services of the CAFCU's are no longer
needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 92-95).
This is the first case before this Court where
the power of the President to impound is put in
issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type
(Notes: Impoundment ofFunds, 86 Harvard Law
Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power
to impound argue that once Congress has set
aside the fund for a specific purpose in an ap
propriations act, it becomes mandatory on the
part of the President to implement the project
and to spend the money appropriated therefor
the President has no discretion on the matter,
for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation
of an appropriation item, the President in ef
fect exercises a veto power that is not expressly
granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact,
the Constitution does not say anything about im
pounding. The source of the Executive authority
must be found elsewhere.
Proponents ofimpoundmenthave invoked at
least three principalsources ofthe authority of
the President. Foremost is the authority to im
pound given tohim either expressly orimpliedly
gjiiftl
300 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
by Congress. Second is the executive power
drawn from the President's role as Commander-
in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause
which ironically is the same provisions invoked
by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execu
tion of the laws requires that the President desist
from implementing the law if doing so would
prejudice public interest. An example given is
when through efficient and prudent manage
ment of a project, substantial savings are made.
In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the
President to spend the entire amount budgeted
in the law (Notes: Presidential Impoundmenti
Constitutional Theories and Political Realities,
61 GeorgetownLaw Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes:
Protecting theFisc:Executive Impoundment and
Congressional Power, 82 YaleLaw Journal 1686
[1973]).
We do not find anything in the language
used in the challenged Special Provision that
would imply that Congress intended to deny to
the President the right to defer or reduce the
spending,much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at one in 1994. But even if such is
the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another
law considering that it abrades the powers ofthe
Commander-in-Chiefand there are existing laws
on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended.
Again we state: a provisionin an appropriations
Lfo&l
act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws,
in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the
Supreme Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme
Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Con
^j
gress added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
"1. Augmentation of any Item in the
Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court and
the Lower Courts may be utilized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to aug
ment any item of the Court's appropriations
i%if
for (a) printing of decisions and publication
of 'Philippine Reports'; (b) commutable ter
minal leaves of Justices and other person
nel of the Supreme Court and payment of
adjusted pension rates to retired Justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, main
tenance, improvement and other operating
expenses of the courts' libraries, including
purchase of books and periodicals; (d) pur
chase, maintenance and improvement ol
printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses
for the employment of temporary employ
ees, contractual and casual employees, for
judicial administration; (f) maintenance
and improvement of the Court's Electronic
Data Processing System; (g) extraordinary
expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance
in international conferences and conduct of
training programs; (h) commutable trans-
portation.and representation allowances and
fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court,
Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and
other Court personnel in accordance with the
rates prescribed by law; and (i)compensation
of attorney-de-o//?cio; PROVIDED, That as
mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in
salary and allowances shall be subject to the
usual procedures and policiesas providedfor
under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws"
(GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
"5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the
Commission on Audit is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and audit
ing rules and regulations, to use savings for
the payment of fringe benefits as may be
authorized by law for officials and personnel
of the Commission" (GAA of 1994, p. 1161;
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
"6. Augmentation of Items in the Appro
priation ofthe Office ofthe Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to

appropriate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations to augment items of ap
iil propriation in the Office of the Ombudsman
from savings in other items of appropriation
actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training
and information materials; (b) repair, main
tenance and improvement of OMB Central
and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of
liB) books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation
and transportation allowances of officials
and employees who by reason of their posi
aiii)
tions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits
as may be authorized specifically by law for
officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to
Section 8 of Article LX-Bof the Constitution;
and (e) for other official purposes subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regula
tions" (GAAof 1994, p. 1178, Emphasis sup
plied).
xxx xxx xxx
\m Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
"1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate
accounting and auditing rules and regula
is) tions, to augment any item of appropriation
in the office of the CHR from savings in other
items of appropriations actually released, for:
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions,
resolutions, training materials and educa
tional publications; (b) repair, maintenance
and improvement of Commission's central
and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books,
journals, periodicals and equipment, (d)
payment of commutable representation and
transportation allowances of officials and
aij
employees who by reason of their positions
are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as
may be authorized by law for officials and
personnel of CHR, subject to accounting
and auditing rules and regulations" (GAA
of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
t^j
In his Veto Message, the President expressed
his approval of the conditions included in the
GAA of 1994. He noted that:
"The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 301
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional
which states that 'no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive ad
ditional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specificallyauthorized by law.' I am,
therefore, confident that the heads of the
said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law
and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization
(Veto Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed
by the President violated the independence and
fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Om
budsman, the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned
by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Con
gress itself, not by the President. The .Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional
mandate that additional or indirect compensa
tion can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are
mere reminders that the disbursements of ap
propriations must be made in accordance with
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated
as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the
President imposed the condition that the imple
mentation of the budget of the COA be subject
to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."
The provisions subject to said condition
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
"3. Revolving Fund. The income of the
Commission on Audit derived from sources
authorized by the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not
exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000)
shall be constituted into a revolving fund
which shall be used for maintenance, operat
ing and other incidental expenses to enhance
audit services and audit-related activities.
The fund shall be deposited in an authorized
government depository ban, and withdrawals
therefrom shall be made in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law and imple
menting rules and regulations: PROVIDED,
That any interests earned on such deposit
shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to
 302 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
the National Treasury and shall accrueto the
General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That
the Commission on Audit shall submit to the
Department of Budget and Management a
quarterly report of income and expenditures
j^'ii of said revolving fund" (GAA of 1994, pp.
1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to
rationalize" the implementation, applicability
and operation of use of income and revolving
funds. The Veto Message stated:
"... I have observed that there are old
and long existing special provisions autho
rizing the use of income and the creation of
revolving funds. As a rule, such authoriza
;&&)
tions should be discouraged. However, I take
it that these authorizations have legal/statu
tory basis aside from being already a vested
right to the agencies concerned which should
not be jeopardized through the Veto Message.
There is, however, imperative need to ratio
nalize their implementation, applicability
m
and operation, thus, in order to substantive
the purpose and intention of said provisions,
I hereby declare that the operationalization
ijjp of the following provisions during budget
implementation shall be subject to the guide
lines to be issued by the President pursuant
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VT of E.O. No.
292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445
in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General
Provisions of this Act" (Veto Message, p. 6;
jjtf> Emphasis supplied).
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH,
the President imposed the condition that in
the implementation of DPWH projects, the
administrative and engineering overhead of
5% and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary
administrative guidelines to be formulated
by the Executive pursuant to existing laws."
The condition was imposed because the pro
vision "needs further study" according to the
President.
The following provision was made subject to
said condition:
"9. Engineering and Administrative
Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%)
of the amount for infrastructure project
released by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be deducted by DPWHfor
administrative overhead, detailed engineer
ing and construction supervision, testing and
quality control, and the like, thus insuring
that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of
the released fund is available for direct
implementation of the project. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That for school buildings, health
centers, daycare centers and barangay halls,
the deductible amount shall not exceed three
percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this
provision shall subject the government official or
employee concerned to administrative, civil and/
or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National
Housing Authority (NHA), the President im
posed the condition that allocations for spe
cific projects shall be released and disbursed
"in accordance with the housing program of
the government, subject to prior Executive
approval."
The provision subject to the said condition
reads:
"3. Allocations for Specific Projects. The
following allocations for the specified projects
shall be set aside for corollary works and used
exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and
construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks,
drainage, waterworks systems, facilities and
amenities, in the area: PROVIDED, That
any road to be constructed or rehabilitated
shall conform with the specifications and
standards set by the Department of PubHc
- Works and Highways for such kind of road:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings that
may be available in the future shall be used
for road repair, rehabilitation and construc
tion:
(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less
than P5,000,000.
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig)
Not less than P3,000,000.
(3) BagongLipunan Condominium Proj
ect (Taguig) Not less tjian P2,000,000.
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount
appropriated for the implementation of various
projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million

Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P7,500,000)
shall be allocated to the Dasmarinas Bagong
Bayanresettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos
(P18,000,000) to the CarmOna Relocation Center
Area (Gen. Marinao Alvarez) and Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and
Services, all ofwhich will be for the cementing
of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
|gi 5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An alloca
tionofEight Million Pesos(P8,000,000) shall be
set aside for the asphalting ofseven (7) kilometer
jiii)
mainroad ofSapangPalay,San JoseDelMonte,
Bulacan" (GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a)
that the "operationalization" of the special pro
vision on revolving fund of the COA "shall be
subjectto guidelinesto be issued by the President
pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of
E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445
in relation to Sections _2and 3 of the General
Provisions ofthis Act" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation ofSpecial
Provision No. 9 ofthe DPWH on the mandatory
retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released
bysaid Department "besubjectto the necessary
^1
administrative guidelines to be formulated by
the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888; p. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the
appropriations authorized for the NHA can be
released only "in accordance with the housing
program of the government subject to prior Ex
ecutive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp.
10-11; 14-16). . v. Licera, 65 SCRA270 [1975]). Decisionsof the
The conditions objected to by petitioners are
mere reminders that the implementation of the
itemsonwhichthe said conditions wereimposed,
should bedone in accordance withexisting laws,
regulationsor policies. Theydid not add anything
fy$ to what was already in place at the time of the
approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the
President said that the expenditures shall be
subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. The
issuance of administrative guidelines on the use
ofpublic funds authorized byCongress is simply
an exercise by the President ofhis constitutional
''iiij<i
dutyto see that the laws are faithfullyexecuted
(1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 303
Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Ex
ecution Clause, the President has the power to
take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional
Law, p. 147[1977]). These steps are the ones to
be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail ofthe special civil
actions but those remedies canbeused only when
respondents have acted "without or in excess" of
jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse ofdiscretion,"
(Revised Rules ofCourt, Rule 65, Section 2). How
can we begrudge the President for vetoing the
Special Provision on the appropriation for debt
payment when he merely followed our decision
in Gonzales? How can wesay that Congress has
abused its discretion when it appropriated a
bigger sum for debt payment than the amount
appropriated for education, when it merely fol
lowed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 ofthe Civil Code ofthe Philippines,
provides:
"Judicial decisionsapplying or interpret
ing the laws or the constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines."
The Court's interpretation ofthe law is part
of that law as of the date of its enactment since
the court's interpretation merely establishes the
contemporary legislative intent that the con
strued law purports to carry into effect (People
Supreme Court assume the same authority as
statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation,
136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona, and Gonzales are consid
ered hard cases that make bad laws and should
be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior
acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DIS
MISSED, except with respect with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as
they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
special provision on debt service specifying that
the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use
of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators," and (2)G.R.
L
304 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the an
nulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph
of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appro
priation for the Department of Public Works
and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and
tm (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of
medicines by the Armed Forces ofthe Phihppines
(GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
D. Arroyo v. De Venecia
j^j) See supra under Secion 16.
SEC. 28. (1) THE RULE OF TAXATION
SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROG
RESSIVE SYiSTEM OF TAXATION. 6 of the power to tax is to raise revenue. However,
(2) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW,
m)
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO FIX
WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND SUB
JECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RE
m*
STRICTIONS AS IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF
RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT QUOTAS,
TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND
i^i OTHER DUTIES OR ikPOSTS WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE GOV
ERNMENT.
(3) CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS,
CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR
CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO,
MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES,
AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IM
PROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY,
AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELI
GIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
'$& TAXATION.
(4) NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EX
EMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT
THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
1. The power to tax.
In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v. Fertiphil
Corp.167 the Court had occasion to review the
sgj
validity of LOI 1465, a martial rule product,
I57G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008.
which imposed a ten peso capital contribution for
the sale of each bag of fertilizer "until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable." PPI was a
private corporation. Clearly, therefore, the impo
sition was for private benefit and not for a public
purpose and therefore invalid. The Court also
found that, even if seen as an exercise of police
power, the imposition would still be invalid for
not being for a public purpose.
Moreover, although the power to tax is leg:
islative in nature, Section 28(2) itself authorizes
Congress to delegate it to the President. But
the President is bound by the conditions set by
Congress.168 This is one exception to the rule of
non-delegability of legislative power.
The obvious, primary, and specific purpose
from the earliest days of the history of the power
of taxation, the power to tax has been recognized
as an instrument of national economic and social
policy. It has, for instance, been used as an in
strument for the extermination of undesirable ac
tivities and enterprises. In the celebrated words
of Justice Marshall, the power to tax involves
the power to destroy. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat, 316, 431 (U.S. 1819)..
The power to tax has also been used as a
tool for regulation. For the purpose of regulat
ing property, the State can choose to exercise
its police power or its power to tax. "It is beyond
serious question that a tax does not cease to be
valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activities taxed...
The principle applies even though the revenue
obtained is obviously negligible,... or the rev
enue purpose.of the tax may be secondary . . ."
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,44 (1950).
Another aspect of the power to tax is what the
United States Supreme Court has characterized
as "the power "to keep alive." This is the founda
tion for the imposition of tariffs designed for the
encouragement and protection of locally pro
duced goods against competition from imports.
'The enactment and enforcement of a number
of customs revenue laws drawn with a motive
of maintaining a system of protection, since the
revenue law of 1789, are matters of history ...
""Southern Cross v. Philippine Cement, G.R. No.
158540, July 8, 2004. .

whatever we may thinkofthewisdom ofa protec
tion policy." Hampton and Co. v. United States,
lm 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).
The power to tax exists for the general wel
fare. Hence implicit in the power is the limita
tion that it should beexercised only for a public
purpose. In the words of Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wall, 655, 664 (U.S. 1875), "To lay,
withone hand, the power ofthe government on
the property ofthe citizen, and with the other to
bestow it upon favored individuals toaidprivate
enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none
^>
the less a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and. is called taxation."
The concept of uniformity of taxation is
derived from Article I, Section 8, of the United
States Constitution which prescribes that "all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the Unites States." It will thus
be seen that whereas the American provision
whence the Philippine rule derived has refer
ence to "duties, imposts, and excises," that is,
to indirect taxes, the Philippine requirement
of uniformity applies to taxation in general.
Philippine jurisprudence, however, from its
earliest days has interpreted "uniformity" in
the Philippine Constitution in the same way as
"uniformity" in the American Constitution. In
the words of Churchill v. Concepcion, 34 Phil.
969, 976-7 (1916), "uniformity" in the Constitu
tion does "notsignify an intrinsic, but simply a
geographical uniformity ... A tax is uniform,
within the Constitutional requirement, when it
operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject of it is found."
Moreover, the requirement of "uniformity"
hasbeen interpreted byPhilippine jurisprudence
as equivalent to the requirement of valid classi
ga>
fication under the equal protection clause, Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. v. City ofButuan, 24 SCRA 789,
795-96 (1968).
The word "equitable" seems to add nothing
except by way of emphasis.
A tax system is progressive when the rate
increases as the tax base increases. The explicit
ii
mention of progressive taxation in the Constitu
tion reflects the wish of the Commission that the
legislature should use the power oftaxation as
an instrument for a more equitable distribution
of wealth.
jjijvii)
ARTICLE VLAEGISLATTVE DEPARTMENT 305
A.Gerochi v. Department of Energy
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
DECISION
NACHURA, Jr.
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng
Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers
Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before
this Court in this original action praying that
Section 34ofRepublic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise
known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
Charge, and Rule 18 oftheRules and Regulations
(IRR) which seeks toimplement thesaid imposi
tion, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners
also pray that the Universal Charge imposed
upon theconsumers berefunded andthat a pre
liminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (TRO)i>edssued directing the respondents
torefrainfrom implementing, charging, and col
lecting the said charge. The assailed provision
of law reads:
SECTION 34. Universal Charge. .
Within one (1) year from the effectivity of
thisAct, a universal charge tobedetermined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be
imposed on all electricity end-users for the
following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in
excessofthe amount assumed by the Nation
al Government and stranded contract costs
of NPC and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities result
ingfrom the restructuring ofthe industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and
royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis-a-vis imported energy
fuels;
(d)An environmental charge equivalent
to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-
hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to
an environmental fund to be used solely for
watershed rehabilitation and management. .
Said fund shall be managed by NPC under
existing arrangements; and
 306 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
(e) A charge to account for all forms of
cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding
three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-by-
passable charge which shall be passed on and
collected from all end-users on a monthly basis
by the distribution utilities. Collections by the
distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any
SijjJ
given month shall be remitted to the PSALM in the case at bench. In said cases, the respec
Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the , tive funds were created in order to balance and
succeeding month, net of any amount due to stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act
ti\ the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-
generating entitynotconnected to a distribution
utility shall remit its corresponding universal
charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM
Corp., as administrator ofthe fund, shall create
a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed
onlyforthe purposesspecified hereinin an open
and transparent manner. All amount collected
for the universal charge shall be distributed to
the respectivebeneficiaries within a reasonable
period to be provided by the ERC."
Petitioners submit that the assailed provi
fal
sion of law and its IRR which sought to imple
ment the same are unconstitutional on the fol
lowing grounds:
tm
1) The universal charge provided for
under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to
be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of
the IRR of the said law is a tax which is
to be collected from all electric end-users
and self-generating entities. The power to
tax is strictly a legislative function and as
pi
such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency.like the
ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same
unlimited authority. The assailed provision
clearly provides that the Universal Charge
is to be determined, fixed and approved by
the ERC,hence leaving to the latter complete
discretionary legislative authority.
2)The ERCis also empowered to approve
and determine where the funds collected
should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal
Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation as the consumers were not
given a chance to be heard and represented.
Petitioners contend that the Universal
Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC.
They argue that the cases invoked by the re
spondents clearly show the regulatory purpose
of the charges imposed therein, which is not so
as buffer to counteract the changes and adjust
ments in prices, peso devaluation, and other
variables which cannot be adequately and timely
monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a
need to delegate powers to administrative bod
ies. Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge
is imposed not for a similar purpose.
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge
imposed under Sec.34 ofthe EPIRAis a tax; and
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to
distinguish the State's power of taxation from
the police power.
The powerto tax is an incident ofsovereignty
and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
its very nature no limits, so that security against
its abuse is to be found only in the responsibil
ity of the legislature which imposes the tax on
the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on
the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, and their promptandcertainavail
ability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory
behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates
from necessity; without taxes, government can
not fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people.
On the other hand, police power is the
power ofthe state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property. It is the most pervasive, the least
limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. The justifica
tion is found in the Latin maxims salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare ofthe people is the
supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (so use your propertyas not to injure the

property of others). As an inherent attribute of
sovereigntywhich virtually extends to all public
iiiiili) needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, asparens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers. We have held that the power to "regu
fc&J
late"meansthe power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the
interests, first and foremost, of the public, then
^J
of the utility and of its patrons.
The conservative and pivotal distinction
between these two powers rests in the purpose
&i>
for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge
through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police
power, particularly its regulatory dimension,
${l is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34
which enumerates the purposes for which the
Universal Charge is imposed and which can be
amply discerned as regulatory in character. The
EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It
is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total
electrification of the country;
jjl^i (b) To ensure the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of
electric power;
JjJA'u 1
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable
prices of electricity in a regime offree and fair
competition and full public accountability to
achieve greater operational and economic
efficiency and enhance the competitiveness
of Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private
capital and broaden the ownership base of
the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory
treatment of public and private sector enti
ties in the process of restructuring the elec
tric power industry;
iijjjj
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 307
(f) To protect the public interest as it is
affected by the rates and services ofelectric
utilities and other providers ofelectric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmen
tally compatible energy sources and infra
structure; *
(h) To promote the utilization of in
digenous and new and renewable energy
resources in power generation in order to
reduce dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and trans
parent privatization of the assets and li
abilities of the National Power Corporation
(NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely in
dependent regulatory body and system to
ensure consumer protection and enhance
the competitive operation of the electricity
market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of
energy and other modalities of demand side
management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be
gleanedthat the assailed TJniversal Chargeis not
a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's
police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine
that the taxing power may be used as an imple
ment of police power. In Valmonte v. Energy
Regulatory Board, etal. and in Gaston v. Repub
lic Planters Bank, this Court held that the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made
in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine
was reiterated in Osmena v. Orbos with respect'
to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners
that the instant case is different from the afore
mentioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a
Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under
the administration of PSALM. The STF has some
notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and
the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost
recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to
determine whether there is under-recovery
or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level
of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case
of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure
 308 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OFGOVERNMENT
that any excess amount shall be remitted to
the STF. A separate account shall be created
forthese amountswhichshall beheldin trust
for any future claims ofdistribution utilities
for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the
stranded cost recovery period, any remain
ing amount in this account shall be used to
reducethe electricityrates to the end-users.
2) Withrespectto the assailedUniversal
f^i
Charge, if the total amount collected for the
same is greater than the actual availments
against it, the PSALM shall retain the bal
ancewithin the STF to payforperiods where
a shortfall occurs.
3) Upon expiration of the term of
PSALM, the administration ofthe STFshall
be transferred to the DOFor any ofthe DOF
attached agencies as'designated bytheDOF
^
Secretary.
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
Evidently, the establishment and main
la
tenance of the Special Trust Fund under
the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No.
9136, is well within the pervasive and non-
waivable power and responsibility ofthe gov
ernment to securethe physicaland economic
survival and well-being of the community,
jfjyt
that comprehensive sovereign authority we
designate as the police power of the State.
This feature ofthe Universal Charge further
boosts the position that the same is an exaction
sal
imposed primarily in pursuit ofthe State's po
lice objectives. The STF reasonably serves and
assures the attainment and perpetuity of the
tmj
purposes for which the Universal Charge is im
posed, i.e., toensure theviability ofthe country's
electric power industry.
ffi^
2. Exemptions.
Under the conditions laid down in Section
28, exemptions from taxation may be provided
by law.
Section 28(3), andArticle XIV, Section 4(3 &
4) areconstitutionally provided exemptions. Un
der Section3, the exemptionis only for taxes as
sessed as property taxes,as contradistinguished
from excise taxes. Lladoc v. Commissioner ofIn
ternal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292,295 (1965). "Under
ae>
the 1935 Constitution: 'Cemeteries, churches,
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
and all lands, buildings, and improvementsused
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educa
tional purposes shall be exempt from taxation.'
The presentConstitution has added: 'charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries'
and required that for the exemption of 'lands,
buildings, and improvements,' they should not
only be'exclusively' but also 'actually* and'direct
ly' used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes . . . There must be proof therefore of
the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
andimprovements for religious orcharitable [or
educational] purposes tobeexempt from taxation
. . ." Province ofAbra v. Hernando and Roman
Catholic Bishop, 107 SCRA 104,108-9 (L-49336,
August 31, 1981).
3. Cases
A. Garcia v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992
FELICIANO, Jr.
On27 November 1990*, the Presidentissued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in ad
dition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of five percent
(5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was im
posed across the board on allimported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products im
ported into the Philippines. This additional duty
was subsequently increased from five percent
(5%) advalorem tonine percent (9%) advalorem
by thepromulgation ofExecutive Order No. 443:
dated 3 January 1991.
On24July 1991, the DepartmentofFinance
requested the Tariff Commission to initiate th
process required by the Tariffand Customs Code
for the imposition ofa specific levy on crude oi
and other petroleum products, covered by H
Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Sectior
104 ofthe Tariffand Customs Code as amended
Accordingly, the TariffCommission, following th<
procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tarif
and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearinj
to give interested parties an opportunity to b<
heard and to present evidence insupport ofthei
respective positions.

Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was is
sued by the President on 15 August 1991 reduc
&pt
ing the rate of additional duty on all imported
articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent
c
(5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude
iiii oil and other oil products which continued to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the
Tariff Commission submitted to the President
a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil
Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consider
^4
ation and appropriate action. Seven (7) days
later, the President issued Executive Order No.
478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addi
tion to the aforementioned additional duty ofnine
percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad
valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter
or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Pro
hibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the
validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments."
He contends that since the Constitution vests
the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power of issu
ing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are
in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Turning first to the question of constitution
ality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Consti
tution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course,
within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478, assuming they may be character
ized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the
President, that they must be enacted instead by
ftfifct
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 309
the Congress of the Phihppines. Section 26(2)of
Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize
the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such hmitations and restric
tions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas^ tonnage and wharfage
dues, arid other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development
program of the Government." (Underscoring
supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permis
sion1 to Congress to authorize the President
"subject to such hmitations and restrictions as
[Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific
limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or im
posts ....-'
The relevant congressional statute is the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provi
sions thereof. These are the provisions which
the President explicitly invoked in promulgat
ing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section
104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
relevant part:
"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters,
headings and subheadings and the rates
of import duty under Section 104 of Presi
dential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent
amendments issued under Executive Orders
and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted
and form part of this Code."
There shall be levied, collected, and paid
uponall importedarticles the rates ofdutyindi
cated in the Section under this section except as
otherwise specifically provided for in this Code:
Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not ex
ceed one hundred percent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subse
quently fixed pursuant toSection Four Hundred
One of this Code shall be subjectto periodic in
vestigation by the Tariff Commission and may
be revised by the President upon recommenda
tion of the National Economic and Development
Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be
quoted in full:
 310 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security, and
subject to the limitations herein prescribed,
the President, upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Au
thority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA),
is hereby empowered: (1)to increase, reduce
or remove existing protective rates ofimport
duty (including any necessary change in
classification). The existing rates may be
increased or decreased but in no case shall
the reduced rate of import duty be lower than
the basic rate often (10) percent ad valorem,
nor shall the increased rate of import duty be
higher than a maximum ofonehundred (100)
percent ad valorem; (2) to establish import
quota or to ban imports ofany commodity, as
may be necessary; and (3) to impose an ad
ditional duty on all imports not exceedingten
(10)per cent ad valorem whenever necessary;
Provided, That upon periodic investigations
by the Tariff Commission and recommenda
tion of the NEDA, the President may cause
a gradual reduction of protection levels
granted in Section One hundred and four
\m
of this Code, including those subsequently
granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submit^
ted to the President by the NEDA pursuant
to the provisions of this section, except in
the imposition of an additional duty not
'$&$
exceeding ten (10) percent ad valorem, the
Commission shall conduct an investigation
in the course of which they shall hold public
fefeil hearings wherein interested parties shall
be afforded reasonable opportunity to be
present, produce evidence and to be heard.
The Commission shall also hear the views
and recommendations of any government
office, agency or instrumentality concerned.
The Commission shall submit their findings
and recommendations to the NEDA within
thirty (30) days after the terminationofthe
public hearings.
M c. The power ofthe President to increase
or decrease rates of import duty within the
limits fixed in subsection 'a' shall include the
authority to modify the form ofduty.In modi
fying the form ofduty, the corresponding ad
&afti \
ijjftj
valorem or specific equivalents of the dul
with respect to imports from the princip;
competing foreign country for the most recei
representative period shall be used as base
d. The Commissioner of Customs sha
regularly furnish the Commission a cor,
of all customs import entries as filed in tl
Bureau of Customs. The Commission or r
duly authorized representatives shall ha"\
access to, and the right to copyoall liquidate
customs import entries and other documen
appended thereto as finally filed in the Con
mission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rul<
and regulations necessary to carry out tl:
provisions of this section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pu
suant to the provisions of this section shs
take effect thirty (30) days after promulg;
tion, except in the imposition of addition,
duty not exceeding ten (10) percent ad v;
lorem which shall take effect at the discretic
of the President." (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thru
of the delegated authorizations found in Sectioi
104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, I
contending that the President is authorized
act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "
protect localindustries and products for the sal
of the national economy, general welfare an
or national security." He goes on to claim that
"E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having not]
ing to do whatsoever with the protection
local industries and products for the sal
of national economy, general welfare an
or national security. On the contrary, the
work in reverse, especially as to crude o:
an essential product which we do not ha*
to protect, since we produce only minim
quantities and have to import the rest
what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowed
solely to enable the government to fail
government finances, contrary to Sections S
and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitutio
as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff ar
Customs Code." (Underscoring in the orig
nal).

The Court is not persuaded. In the first place,.
there is nothing in the language of either Section
m\
104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that
suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority. The entire contention of petitioner is
anchored on just two (2) words, one foundin Sec
tion 401(a)(1): "existing protective rates of import
duty," and the second in the proviso found at the
end of Section 401(a):" protection levels granted
in Section 104 of this Code . . . ." We believe
that the words "protective" and "protection" are
simply not enough to support the very broad and
encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks
to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular
theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice that
the Bureau of Customs which administers the
Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2)
principal traditional generators or producers
of governmental revenue, the other being the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third
agency, non-traditional in character, that gener
ates lower but still comparable levels of revenue
for the government The Philippine Amusement
and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are
assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very
much like taxes which are frequently imposed
for both revenue-raising and for regulatory
purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs
i&irt duties" is "the name given to taxes on the impor
tation and exportation of commodities, the tariff
or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from,
or exported to, a foreign country." The levying
^J
of customs duties on imported goods may have
in some measure the effect of protecting local
industries where such local industries actually
exist and are producing comparable goods. Si
multaneously, however, the very same customs
duties inevitably have the effect of producing
governmental revenues. Customs duties like
internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, de
signed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
commonly, customs duties, which constitute
taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of
which become public funds have either or both
the generation of revenue and the regulation of
economic or social activity as their moving pur
poses and frequently, it is very difficult to say
ia
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 311
which, in a particular instance, is the dominant
or principal objective. In the instant case, since
the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen
percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,
the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported
oil products may be seen to have some "protec
tive" impact upon indigenous oil production. For
the effective price of imported crude oil and oil
products is increased. At the same time, it can
not be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the
government are raised by the imposition of such
increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the,fourth place, petitioner's concept
which he urges us to build into our constitu
tional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow
one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code establishes general standards with which
the exercise of the authority delegated by that
provision to the President must be consistent:
that authority must be exercised in "the inter
est of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." Petitioner, however, insists
that the "protection of local industries" is the
only permissible objective that can be secured
by the exercise of that delegated authority, and
that therefore "protection of local industries"
is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of
"the national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." We find it extremely difficult
to take seriously such a confined and closed view
of the legislative standards and policies summed
up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that
the protection of consumers, who after all consti
tute the very great bulk of our population, is at
the very least as important a dimension of "the
national economy, general welfare and national
security" as the protection of local industries.
And so customs duties may be reduced or even
removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
consumers from the high prices and shoddy qual
ity and inefficient service that tariff-protected
and subsidized local manufacturers may other
wise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff
rates are commonly established and the cor
responding customs duties levied and collected
upon articles and goods which are not found at all
and not produced in the Phihppines. The Tariff
and Customs Code is replete with such articles
jp;i
312 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
and commodities: among the more interesting
examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); casto-
reum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter
5, 5.14); olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or
European fungi growing under the soil on tree
roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,8.01);
figs (Chapter 8,8.03); caviar (Chapter 16,16.01);
aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.01); special diagnostic
instruments and apparatus for human medicine
and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray genera
tors; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90,
90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties maybe
&iai
seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes
purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage
any importation of the items involved. In either
iiai case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there
are any competing local industries to protect.
^j Accordingly, we believe and so hold that
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may
be conceded to be substantially moved by the
desire to generate additional public revenues,
H&t
are not, for that reason alone, either constitu
tionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner
has not successfully overcome the presumptions
of constitutionality and legality to which those
Executive Orders are entitled.
B. Systems Plus Computer College v.
Caloocan City
G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003.
Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is
a non-stock and non-profit educational institu
tion organized and established in 1997 with busi
ness address at 141-143 10th Avenue, Caloocan
City. As such, it enjoys property tax exemption
from the local government on its buildings but
not on the parcels of land which petitioner is rent
s&j ing for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies,
Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated As
sembly) and Pair Management and Development
Corporation (Pair Management).
On January 8, 1998, petitioner requested
respondent city government ofCaloocan,through
respondent Mamerto Manahan, City Assessor
and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to
the parcels of land claiming that the same were
being used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes pursuant to Article VI,
Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution and other
applicable provisions of the Local Government
Code.
On February 5,1998, respondent city govern
ment, on recommendation of respondent Atty.
Nestor Francisco, City Legal Officer, deniecl the
request on the ground that the subject parcels
of land were owned by Consolidated Assembly
and Pair Management which derived income
therefrom in the form of rentals and other local
taxes assumed by the petitioner. Hence, from
the land owners' standpoint, the same were not
actually, directly and exclusively used for edu
cational purposes.
On February 15,1999, the petitioner, on the
one hand, and the Consolidated Assembly and
Pair Management, on the other, entered into
separate agreements which.in effect novated
their existing contracts of lease on the subject
parcels of land and converted them to donations
of the beneficial use thereof.
On February 19, 1999," the petitioner wrote
respondent. City Assessor informing the latter
of the new agreements and seeking a reconsid
eration of respondent's earlier denial of the ap
plication for tax exemption. In this connection,
a duly notarized certification jointly issued by
Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management to
the effect that they no longer received income by
way of rentals from the subject properties, accom
panied by the corresponding board resolutions,
were submitted by the petitioner. Nevertheless,
on July 21, 1999, respondent city government
again denied the application for tax exemption,
reasoning out as follows:
Firstly, it may be reasonably implied
from the above facts that SYSTEMS COM
PUTER COLLEGE is an agency for its sister
corporations, particularly, PAIR MANAGE
MENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY, INC. to
evade payment of Real Property Taxes.
It bears stressing that immediately after
the denial by this Office of the first request of
SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE for
Real Property Tax Exemption of the properties
then leased to it by its sister companies; PAIR
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPO-

RATION and CONSOLIDATED ASSEMBLY,
INC.j the latter corporations donated the ben
eficial use of the subject properties to SYSTEMS
PLU&COMPUTER COLLEGE, if only to evade
payment of Real Property Taxes.
The revenue officers, in proper cases, may
disregard the separate corporate entity where it
serves as a shield for tax evasion....
Secondly, the grant of exemption from taxa
tion rests upon the theory that an exemption
will benefit the body of people, and not upon
any idea of lessening the burden of individual
or corporate owners.
Thirdly, while the beneficial use of the
properties being sought to be exempt from Real
Property Taxes were donated to SYSTEMS PLUS
COMPUTER COLLEGE, there is no showing
that the same are "actually, directly and exclu
sively" used either for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes.
Igi
Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which, how
ever, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely
^1
motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court when it ruled: (1) that mandamus
does not he against the public respondents and
(2) that petitioner failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies.
si
Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding
a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
officeor which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Where administrative
remedies are available, a petition for mandamus
does not lie.
Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of
appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
is available from an adverse ruling or action of
the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the
assessment of property...
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 313
Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to
enforce, through the petition for mandamus, a
clear legal right under the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code granting tax exemptionon propertiesactu
ally, directly and exclusivelyused foreducational
purposes. But petitioner is taking an unwar
ranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously
presumes the existence of the fact which it must
first prove by competent and sufficient evidence
before the Gity Assessor. It must be stressed
that the authority to receive evidence, as basis
for classification of properties for taxation, is
legally vested on the respondent City Assessor
whose action is appealable to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, if necessary.
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority
of the concerned administrative agencies and
directly seek redress from the courts even on the
pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of
law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, as in the
case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only
after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention
of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner
should first avail of all the means affordedby the
administrative processes.
Besides, mandamus does not lie against the
respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his
function of assessing properties for taxation pur
poses. While its duty to conduct assessments is a
ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof
is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the
rule that mandamus may not be availed of to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way, or to retract or reverse an action
already taken in the exercise of either.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for cer
tiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
C. Central Mindanao University v.
Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992
NOTE: This case is added simply because
of its interpretation of the-meaning of "directly,
actually and exclusively."
 314 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
CAMPOS, JR., Jr.
&&A This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify
the proceedings and decision of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB
for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set
aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the
DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous
portions of the Central Mindanao University
(CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in
mi
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
This case originated in a complaint filed by
complainants calling themselves as the Bukid-
non Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers
Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the
leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso
against the CMU, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as
Tenants, under the CARP.
From the records, the following facts are
evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricul
tural education institution owned and run by the
estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon
province
The questioned decision of the Adju
dication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the CMU
land is primarily based on the alleged fact that
<iUti the land subject hereof is "not directly, actually
and exclusively used for school sites, because the
same was leased to Philippine Packing Corpora
&*
tion (now Del Monte Philippines)." In support of
this view, the Board held that the "respondent
University failed to show that it is using actually,
really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to
the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the
same is directly used without any intervening
agency or person," and "there is no definite and
concrete showing that the use of said lands are
tJMH
essentially indispensable for educational pur
poses." The reliance by the respondents Board
and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal
definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Diction
ary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the or
dinary reader a classroom meaning of the phras
"is actually directly and exclusively," but in s
doing they missed the true meaning of Sectio
10, R.A. No. 6657, as to what lands are exempte
or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. }io. 6651
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agraria:
Reform Law of 1988, are as follows:.
Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensiv
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall covei
regardless of tenurial arrangement an-
commodity produced, all public and privat
agricultural lands as provided in Proclama
tion No. 131 and Executive Order No. 22'
including other lands of the public domaii
suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands ar
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reforn
Program:
Sec. 10. EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLV
SIONS. Lands actually, directly and exclu
sively used and found to be necessary fo
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation
fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, wa
tersheds and mangroves, national defense
school sites and campuses including experi
mental farm stations operated by public o
private schools for educational purposes
seeds and seedlings research and pilot pro
duction centers, church sites and convent:
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites an<
Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, com
munal burial grounds and cemeteries, pena
colonies and penal farms actually workec
by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers and al
lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope anc
over, except those already developed shal
be exempt from the coverage of this Act
[Emphasis added.]
The construction given by the DARAB tc
Section 10 restricts the land area of the CML
to its present needs or to a land area presently
actively exploited and utilized by the university
in carrying out its present education prograir
with its present student population and academic
facility overlooking the very significant factor ol

growth of the university in the years to come.
By the nature of the CMU, which is a school
established to promote agriculture and indus
try, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land
for future programs of expansion is obvious. At
the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same
manner as land grant colleges in America, a type
of educational institution which blazed the trail
for the development of vast tracts of unexplored
and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-
West. What we now know as Michigan State
University, Penn State University and Illinois
State University, started as small land grant
colleges, with meager funding to support their
ever increasing educational programs. They were
given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest
lands to be developed to support their numerous
expanding activities in the fields of agricultural
technology and scientific research. Funds for
the support of the educational programs of land
grant colleges came from government appro
priation, tuition and other student fees, private
endowments and gifts, and earnings from mis
cellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit
that President Garcia issued Proclamation No.
476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and
JiHi
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College
(forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of
3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set
up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao,
in order that it can have enough resources and
wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural edu
cational institution, to develop and train future
farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to
that part of the country.
iM
As to the determination of when and what
lands are found to be necessary for use by the
CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve
and answer the question and pass upon the
problem of its needs in relation to its avowed
objectives for which the land was given to it by
the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of
Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment
or discretion on this matter, unless the eviden
tiary facts are so manifest as to- show that the
CMU has no real need for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares or
dered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August
20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
iftifjJ
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 315
(4) It is exempt from coverage under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because the
lands are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found jto be necessary for school
site and campus, including experimental
farm stations for educational purposes, and
for establishing seed and seedling research
and pilot production centers.
D. Commissioner of BIR v.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124043, October 14,1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is the income derived from rentals of real
property owaed by the Young Men's Christian
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA)
established as "a welfare, educational and
charitable non-profit corporation" subject to
income tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) and the Constitution?
The Facts
The facts are undisputed. Private Respon
dent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution,
which conducts various programs and activities
that are beneficial to the public, especially the
young people, pursuant to its religious, educa
tional and charitable objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among
others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing
out a portion of its premises to small shop own
ers, like restaurants and canteen operators, and
P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-
members. On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of
internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment
to private respondent, in the total amount of
P415,615.01 includingsurcharge and interest, for
deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded with
holding taxes on rentals and professional fees
and deficiency withholding tax on wages.Private
respondent formally protested the assessment
and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a
letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR
denied the claims of YMCA.
Contesting the denial of its protest, the
YMCA filed a petition for review at the Courtof
 316 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
(4jij
Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due
course, the CTA issued this ruling in favor of
the YMCA:
This Court's Ruling: The petition is meri
torious.
Second Issue: Is the Rental Income of the
YMCA Taxable?
Constitutional Provisions on Taxation
Invoking not only the NIRC but also the
fundamental law, private respondent submits
that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987
Constitution, exempts'"charitable institutions"
from the payment not only of property taxes but
also of income tax from any source. In support of
its novel theory, it compares"the use of the words
"charitable institutions," "actually" and "directly"
in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, on the
$$
one hand; and in Article VI, Section 22, par. 3 of
the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand.
Private respondent enunciates three points.
First, the present provision is divisible into two
categories: (1) "[c]haritable institutions, churches
and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques and non-profit cemeteries," the in
comes of which are, from whatever source, all
tax-exempt; and (2) "[a]U lands, buildings and
improvements actually and directly used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes,"
which are exempt only from property taxes. Sec
ond, Lladoc v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue,
hiii
14 SCRA 292, June 16, 1965, which limited the
exemption only to the payment of property taxes,
referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution
kfflil
and not to its counterparts in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions. Third, the phrase "actu
ally, directly and exclusively used for religious,
m charitable or educational purposes" refers not
only to "all lands, buildings and improvements,"
but also to the above-quoted first category which
includes charitable institutions like the private
respondent.
The Court is not persuaded. The debates,
interpellations and expressions of opinion ofthe
framers of the Constitution reveal their intent
which, in turn, may have guided the people in
ajVo
ratifying the Charter. Such intent must be ef
fectuated.
Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
a former constitutional commissioner, who is
now a member of this Court, stressed during
the Concom debates that"... what is exempted
is not the institution itself. . .; those exempted
from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and
improvements actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational pur
poses." Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member
of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
exemption created by said provision pertained
only to property taxes.
In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that "[t]he tax
exemption covers property taxes only." Indeed,
the income tax exemption claimed by private
respondent finds no basis in Article VT, Section
28, par. 3 of the Constitution.
Private respondent also invokes Article XTV,
Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter, 36 claiming
that the YMCA "is a non-stock, non-profit edu
cational institution whose revenues and assets
are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes
on its properties and income." We reiterate that
private respondent is exempt from the payment
of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals
from its property. The bare allegation alone that
it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institu
tion is insufficient to justify its exemption from
the payment of income tax.
As previously discussed, laws allowing
tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.
Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemp
tion it claims under the aforecited provision, it
must prove with substantial evidence that (1)
it falls under the classification non-stock., non
profit educational institution; and (2) the income
it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes. However, the Court notes that not a
scintilla of evidence was submitted by private re
spondent to prove that it met the said requisites.
Is the YMCA an educational institution
within the purview ofArticle XTV, Section 4, par.
3 of the Constitution? We nuethat it isnot. The

term "educational institution" or "institution of
learning" has acquired a well-known technical
meaning, of which the members of the Consti-
tutionaT Commission are deemed cognizant.
Under the Education Act of 1982, such term
refers to schools. The school system is synony
mous with formal education, which "refers to the
hierarchically structured and chronologically
isj graded learnings organized and provided by the
formal school system and for which certification
is required in order for the learner to progress
through the grades or move to the higher levels."
^)
The Court has examined the "Amended Articles
of Incorporation" and "By-Laws" of the YMCA,
but found nothing in them that even hints that
it is a school or an educational institution.
Furthermore, under the Education Act of
1982, even non-formal education is understood
to be school-based and "private auspices such as
foundations and civic-spirited organizations" are
ruled out. It is settled that the term "educational
institution," when used in laws granting tax ex
emptions, refers to a "... school seminary, college
or educational establishment..." Therefore, the
private respondent cannot be deemed one of the
educational institutions covered by the constitu
tional provision under consideration.
Is)
". . . Words used in the Constitution
are to be taken in their ordinary accepta
tion. While in its broadest and best sense
education embraces all forms and phases of
'Mi instruction, improvement and development
of mind and body, and as well of religious
and moral sentiments, yet in the common
understanding and application it means a
place where systematic instruction in any or
all of the useful branches of learning is given
by methods common to schools and institu
lm
tions of learning. That we conceive to be the
true intent and scope of the term [educational
institutions,] as used in the Constitution."
Moreover, without conceding that Private
Respondent YMCA is an educational institu
tion, the Court also notes that the former did
not submit proof of the proportionate amount
of the subject income that was actually, directly
and exclusively used for educational purposes.
&M)
Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA by-laws,
which formed part of the evidence submitted,
is patently insufficient, since the same merely
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 317
signified that "[t]he net income derived from
the rentals of the commercial buildings shall be
apportioned to the Federation and Member As
sociations as the National Board may decide."
In sum, we find no basis for granting the YMCA
exemption from income* tax under the constitu
tional provision invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deci
sion of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that
the income derived by petitioner from rentals
of its real property is subject to income tax. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
E. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Santos
G.R. No. 119252, August 18, 1997
HERMOSISIMA, JR., Jr.
Of grave concern to this Court is the judicial
pronouncement of the court a quo that certain
provisions of the Tariff & Customs Code and
the National Internal Revenue Code are uncon
stitutional. This provokes the issue: Can the
Regional Trial Courts declare a law inoperative
and without force and effect or otherwise uncon
stitutional? Ifit can, under what circumstances?
In this petition, the Commissioner of Inter
nal Revenue and the Commissioner of Customs
jointly seek the reversal of the Decision, dated
February 16,1995, of herein public respondent,
Hon. Apolinario B. Santos, Presiding Judge of
Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City.
The public respondent, in addressing the
third issue, ruled that the laws in question are
confiscatory and oppressive. Again, virtually
adopting verbatim the reasons presented by the
private respondents in their position paper, the
lower court stated:
"The Court finds that indeed government
taxation policy treats (jewelry as non-essen-
kai
318 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
sai
tial luxury item and therefore, taxed heavily.
Aside from the ten percent (10%) value added
tax (VAT), local jewelry manufacturers con
tend with the (manufacturing) excise tax of
twenty percent (20%) (to be applied in stages)
customs duties on imported raw materials,
the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. In con
trast, imported gemstones and other precious
metals are dutyfree in Hongkong, Thailand,
Malaysia and Singapore.
The Court elaborates further on the experi
ences of other countries in their treatment of the
jewelry sector.
M) We rule in favor of the petitioners.
It is interesting to note that public respon
dent, in the dispositive portion of his decision,
. perhaps keeping in mind his limitations under
the law as a trial judge, did not go so far as to
declare the laws in question to be unconstitu
tional. However, therein he declared the laws
to be inoperative and without force and effect
insofar as the private respondents are concerned.
But, respondent judge, in the body of his decision,
gsa
unequivocally but wrongly declared the said pro
visions of law to be violative of Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution...
^>
We find it incongruous, in the face of the
sweeping pronouncements made by Judge San
tea
tos in his decision, that private respondents can
still persist in their argument that the former
did not overreach the restrictions dictated upon
him by law. There is no doubt in the Court's
mind, despite protestations to the contrary,
that respondent judge encroached upon matters
properly falling within the province of legislative
functions. In citing as basis for his decision un-
proven comparative data pertaining to differenc
es between tax rates of various Asian countries,
and concluding that the jewelry industry in the
Philippines suffers as a result, the respondent
.ju*dge took it upon himself to supplant legislative
policy regarding jewelry taxation. In advocating
the abolition of local tax and duty on jewelry sim
ply because other countries have adopted such
policies, the respondent judge overlooked the fact
that such matters are not for him to decide. There
are reasons why jewelry, a non-essential item, is
taxed as it is in this country, and these reasons
deliberated upon by our legislature, are beyonc
the reach of judicial questioning...
What we see here is a debate on the WIS
DOM of the laws in question. This is a mattei
on which the RTC is not competent to rule...
The respondents presented an exhaustive
study on the tax rates on jewelry levied by differ
ent Asian countries. This is meant to convince us
that compared to other countries, the tax rates
imposed on said industry in the Phihppines is op
pressive and confiscatory. This Court, however,
cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates
of other countries should be used as a yardstick
in determining what may be the proper subjects
of taxation in our own country...
F. John Hay Peoples Alternative
Coalition v. Victor Lim
G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, Jr.
By the present petition for prohibition, man
damus and declaratory relief with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in
the main, the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, "CREAT
ING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE
AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP
JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7227."
Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCEL
ERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY
RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE
USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION
AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYFORTHIS
PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Develop
ment Act of 1992," which was enacted on March
13,1992, set out the policy of the government to
accelerate the sound and balanced conversion
into alternative productive uses of the former
military bases under the 1947 Philippines-Unit
ed States of America Military Bases Agreement,
namely, the Clark and Subic military reserva-
to
tions as well as their extensions including the
John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp)
in the City of Baguio.
As-rioted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created
public respondent Bases Conversion and De
velopment Authority (BCDA), vesting it with
powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of
carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing
the base areas in accordance with the declared
government policy.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic
iffijj
Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic
SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be
delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the
President of the Philippines.
R.A. No. 7227 grantedthe Subic SEZ incen
tives-ranging from tax and duty-free importa
tions, exemption of businesses therein from
iii)
local and national.taxes, to other hallmarks of a
liberalized financial and business climate.
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority
Hj&
to the President to create through executive proc
lamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special
Economic Zones (SEZ)*in the areas covered re
spectively by the Clark military reservation, the
Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union,
and Camp John Hay.
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agree
Ity) ment with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.)
Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internatio
nale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corpo
rations registered under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a
joint venture for the development of Poro Point
in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier
tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four
months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA,
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a-Joint
Venture Agreement whereby they bound them
'$}
selves to put up a joint venture company known
as the Baguio International Development and
L Management Corporation which would lease
areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for
the purpose of turning such places into principal
tourist and recreation spots, as originally envi
sioned by the parties under their Memorandum
of Agreement.
ii->
a&)
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 319
The Baguio City government, meanwhile
passed a number of resolutions in response to the
actions taken by BCDA as owner and administra
tor of Camp John Hay.
By Resolution of September 29, 1993, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (the
sanggunian) officially asked BCDA to exclude
all the barangays partly or totally located within
Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of
any plan or program for its development.
By a subsequent Resolution dated January
19,1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an
abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership
over the home lots being occupied by residents
of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military
reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on Feb
ruary 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and
submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the
development of Camp John Hay. The sanggu-
nian's vision expressed, among other things, a
kind of development that affords protection to
the environment, the making of a family-oriented
type of tourist destination, priority in employ
ment opportunities for Baguio residents and free
access to the base area, guaranteed participation
of the city government in the management and
operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously
named nine barangays from the area for develop
ment, and liability for local taxes of businesses
to be established within the camp'.
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed
to some, but rejected or modified the other pro
posals of the sanggunian. They stressed the need
to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition
precedent to its full development in accordance
with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a
resolution requesting the Mayor to order the de
termination of realty taxes which may otherwise
be collected from real properties of Camp John
Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently
guide the sanggunian in determining its position
on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ,
it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such
declaration would exempt the camp's property
and the economic activity therein from local or
national taxation.
 320 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
More than a month later, however, the
sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series
of 1994), seeking and supporting, subject to its
pfoi)
concurrence, the issuance by then President Ra
mos of a presidential proclamation declaring an
area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
Together with this resolution was submitted a
draft of the proposed proclamation for consider
ation by the President.
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos is
sued Proclamation No. 420, the title of which
was earlier indicated, which established a SEZ
on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the
law and the resolution of concurrence by the
t^jfr) City Council of Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Phihppines, do hereby create
and designate a portion of the area covered by
the former John Hay reservation as embraced,
covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America, as amended, as the
John Hay Special Economic Zone, and accord
ingly order:
SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay
Special Economic Zone. The John Hay
Special Economic Zone shall cover the area
consisting of Two Hundred Eighty Eight and
one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of
the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677)
hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more
or less, which have been surveyed and veri
fied by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as defined by the
following technical description:
WiJ
A parcel of land, situated in the City of
Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon,
and particularly described in survey plans
Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030
as approved on 16 August 1993 and 26 Au
gust 1993, respectively, by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, in
i$$
detail containing:
Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6,
Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of
Ccs-131102-000030
^>
jSjjsj
-and-
Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lc
9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lc
17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 bein
portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 8*:
With a combined area of TWO HUN
DRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTI
HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided,Tha
the area consisting of approximately Six an
two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, pres
ently occupied by the VOA and the resident
of the Ambassador of the United States, shal
be considered as part of the SEZ only upoi
turnover of the properties to the governmen
of the Republic of the Phihppines.
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hai
Special Economic Zone. .Pursuant to Sec
tion 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the Base:
Conversion and Development Authority is
hereby established as the governing body o
the John Hay Special Economic Zone and
as such, authorized to determine the utiliza
tion and disposition of the lands comprising
it, subject to private-rights, if any, and ir
consultation and coordination with the Cit3
Government of Baguio after consultatior
with its inhabitants, and to promulgate the
necessary policies, rules, and regulations tc
govern and regulate the zone thru the John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
which is its implementing arm for its eco
nomic development and optimum utilization.
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay
Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Sec
tion 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No.
7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation shall implement all necessary
policies, rules, and regulations governing
the zone, including investment incentives,
in consultation with pertinent government
departments. Among others, the zone shall
have all the applicable incentives of the
Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable
incentives granted in the Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of
1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
and new investment laws that may herein
after be enacted.
 i^l
ajjjj)
Sec. 4. ifoZe 0/ Departments, Bureaus,
Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities.
&a
All Heads of departments, bureaus, of
fices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government are hereby directed to give full
support to Bases Conversion and Develop
ment Authority and/or its implementing
subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate the
necessary approvals to expedite the imple
mentation of various projects of the conver
W
sion program.
Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as
$ai herein provided, the affected local govern
ment units shall retain their basic autonomy
and identity.
Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders,
rules, and regulations, or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with the provisions
of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 7. Effectivity.This proclamation
shall take effect immediately.
'H0
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of
July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and ninety-four.
jjMjl
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420
spawned the present petition for prohibition,
mandamus and declaratory reliefwhich was filed
J^jj) on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its
constitutionality or validity as well as the legal
ity of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint
Venture Agreement between public respondent
isyl
BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allow
ance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR
AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS
INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE
Lai) PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED
ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.
II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE
POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE
AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS
INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITU
TIONAL.
iiijji)
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 321
IE. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTI
TUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE
RULE THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE
UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
IV. THE MEMCtftANDUM OF AGREE
MENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BE
TWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RE
SPONDENTS BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING
BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT
NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.
V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF THE.MEMORANDUM OF AGREE
MENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BE
TWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPON
DENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOP
MENT AUTHORITY IS [sic] ILLEGAL.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOP
MENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT
HAVING UNDERGONE ENVIRONMEN
TAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING
ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A
VALID ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AS
SESSMENT.
.. The issues boil down to:
(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is consti
tutional by providing for national and local tax
exemption within and granting other economic
incentives to the John Hay Special Economic
Zone; and
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is consti
tutional for limiting or interfering with the local
autonomy of Baguio City;
It is settled that when questions of consti
tutional significance are raised, the court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise ofjudicial
reviewis pleaded at the earhest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
 322 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
An actual case or controversy refers to an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate
liiiiii)
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or an
ticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite
and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations
of parties who are pitted against each other due
to their adverse legal interests. There is in the
present case a real clash of interests and rights
between petitioners and respondents arising
) from the issuance of a presidential proclamation
that converts a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting
that such proclamation contains unconstitutional
provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concur
rence of the affected local government units to
the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in
the country. The grant by the law on local gov
ernment units of the right of concurrence on the
bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal
standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition
of the real interests that communities nearby
or surrounding a particular base area have in
its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners,
being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal
and substantial such that they have sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act being challenged. Theirs is a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the proclamation and not merely an interest in
the question involved or an incidental interest,
for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc
lamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City.
Having cleared the way for judicial review,
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420,
as framed in the second and third issues above,
must now be addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners' objec
tionagainstthe creationby Proclamation No. 420
ofa regime oftax exemption within the John Hay
SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R.A. No.
7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs
yet to be established in base areas, unlike the
grant underSection 12thereof oftax exemption
and investment incentives to the therein estab
lished Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to
the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus
sgj
contravenes Article VI, Section 28(4) of the Con
stitution which provides that "No law granting,
any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress."
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the chal
lenged provision, reads:
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay
Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Sec
tion 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No.
7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation shall implement all necessary
policies, rules, and regulations governing
the zone, including investment incentives,
in consultation with pertinent government
departments. Among others, the zone shall
have all the applicable incentives of the
Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable
incentives granted in the Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of
1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
and new investment laws that may here
inafter be enacted. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No.
7227 provides:
w v ' wv ^cy^c
(a) Within the framework and subject
to the mandate and limitations of the Con
stitution and the pertinent provisions of the
Local Government Code, the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-
sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial
and investment center to generate employ
ment opportunities in and around the zone
and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone
shall be operated and managed as a sepa
rate customs territory ensuring free flow
or movement of goods and capital within,
into and exported out of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
such as tax and duty free importations ofraw
materials, capital and equipment. However,
exportation or removal ofgoods fromthe ter
ritory ofthe Subic Special Economic Zone to

the other parts of the Philippine territory
shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
m
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws,
rules and regulations to the contrary not
withstanding, no taxes, local and national,
shall be imposed within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three
percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all
businesses and enterprises within the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to
the National Government, one percent (1%)
each to the local government units affected
by the declaration of the zone in proportion
to their population area, and other factors.
In addition, there is hereby established a
development fund of one percent (1%) of the
gross income earned by all businesses and en
terprises within the Subic Special Economic
Zone to be utilized for" the Municipality of
Subic, and other municipalities contiguous
to be base areas. In case of conflict between
national and local laws with respect to tax
exemption privileges in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved
in favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall
be applied and free markets for foreign ex
change, gold, securities and futures shall be
allowed and maintained in the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
:$$*
(e) The Central Bank, through the Mon
etary Board, shall supervise and regulate the
operations of banks and other financial in
stitutions within the Subic Special Economic
Zone;
(f) Banking and Finance shall be lib
eralized with the establishment of foreign
currency depository units of local commercial
banks and offshore banking units of foreign
banks with minimum Central Bank regula
tion;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Spe
cial Economic Zone whose continuing invest
ment shall not be less than Two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse
^j and dependent children under twenty-one
(21) years of age, shall be granted permanent
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT* 323
resident status within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. They shall have freedom
of ingress and egress to and from the Subic
Special Economic Zone without any need of
special authorization from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in
Section 13 of this Act may also issue work
ing visas renewable every two (2) years to
foreign executives and other aliens possess
ing highly-technical skills which no Filipino
within the Subic Special Economic Zone
possesses, as certified by the Department of
Labor and Employment. The names of aliens
granted permanent residence status and
working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation within thirty
(30) days after issuance thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No.
7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted
by Congress with tax exemption, investment
incentives and the like. There is no express ex
tension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs
still to be created at the time via presidential
proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the
exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and invest
ment privileges accorded it under the law ...
As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section
12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given to Subic
SEZ consist principally of exemption from tariff
or customs duties, national and local taxes of
business entities therein (paragraphs [b] and
[c]), free market and trade of specified goods or
properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking and
finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration
rules for foreign investors (paragraph g). Yet,
apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also
makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits
existing in other laws such as the privilege of
export processing zone-based businesses of im
portingcapital equipment and raw materials free
from taxes, duties and other restrictions;] tax
and dutyexemptions, tax holiday, tax credit,and
other incentives under the Omnibus Investments
Code of1987;] and the applicability to the subject
zone of rules governing foreign investments in
the Philippines.
 'iMii
324 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERSOFGOVERNMENT
&$
While the grant of economic incentives may
be essential to the creation and success of SEZs,
ia&l
free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof
to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The
incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive
only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of
the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support
therein. Neither doesthe same grant ofprivileges
to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other
laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation
No. 420, which laws were already extant before
the issuance of the proclamation or the enact
ment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the
assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It
is the legislature, unless limited by a provision
of the state constitution, that has full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of prop
erty from taxation, its power to exempt being as
broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress,
the Constitution may itself provide for specific
tax exemptions, or local governments may pass
ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.
The challenged grant of tax exemption would
circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a
law granting any tax exemption must have the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. In the same vein, the other kinds of
'$#) privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are
by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate
upon.
i i;:fifo) Contrary to public respondents' suggestions,
the claimed statutory exemption of the John
Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and
unmistakable from the language of the law on
which it is based; it must be expressly granted
in a statute stated in a language too clear to
be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied
as it must be categorically and unmistakably
expressed.
If it were the intent of the legislature to grant
iiiiiijj
to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption
and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would
have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy
of the political departments of the government
on either of two grounds-infringement of the
Ifoiati
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.
tai
This Court then declares that the grant by
Proclamation No. 420 oftaxexemption andother
privileges to the John HaySEZ is void for being
violative of the Constitution. This renders it
unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners' claim
that the same grant violatesthe equal protection
guarantee.
Withrespectto the final issueraisedbypeti
tioners that Proclamation No. 420 is unconsti
tutional for beingin derogation ofBaguio City's
local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted
against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set
up as the governing body of the John Hay SEZ.
Petitioners argue that there is no authority
of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to
the governance of BCDA which has just over
sight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to
diminish the city government's power over an
area within its jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation
No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of
control over the local government instead ofjust
mere supervision.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted
with, amongother things, the following purpose:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) To own, hold and/or administer the mili
tary reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wal
lace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station,
San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt.
Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those
portions of Metro Manila Camps which may be
transferred to it by the President;
xxx xxx xxx
With such broad rights of ownership and
administration vested in BCDA over Camp John
Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject
to certain limitations provided for by law. By
designating BCDA as the governing agency of
the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes
or reiterates the statutory role or functions it
has been granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax
immunity and financial incentives as contained
in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclama
tion No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed
proclamation cannot be declared unconstitution
al, the other parts thereof not being repugnant

to law or the Constitution. The delineation and
declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the
ftfiiJ
powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. The requisite prior concurrence by
the Baguio City government to such proclama
tion appears to have been given in the form of a
duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The
other provisions of the proclamation had been
proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary
to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. This Court finds that
' the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420
converting a delineated portion of Camp John
Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from
the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof,
hence they stand.
SEC. 29. (1) NO MONEY SHALL BE
PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT
IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION
MADE BY LAW.
(2) NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY
j^J
SHALL BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED,
PAID, OR EMPLOYED, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT,
OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH,
DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITU
TION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR ANY
PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR OTH
ER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY
AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST,
PREACHER, MINISTER, OR DIGNITARY
IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES,
OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR
GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPRO
SARIUM.
(3) ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY
TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECLAL PURPOSE
SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND
AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE
ONJUY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A
SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN
FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BAL
ANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED
TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOV
ERNMENT.
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 325
1. Expenditure of public funds.
Congess has control of the expenditure of
public funds. "No money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance ofan appropriation
made by law."
A. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
GANCAYCO, Jr.
This is a case of first impression whereby
petitioner question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the
1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as
follows:
The 1990 budget consist of P98.4 Bil
lion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropria
tions Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while
the appropriations for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions.of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by
P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Pro
cess in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No.
1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guar
antee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Phihppines on Its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose."
There can be no question that petitioners
as Senators of the Republic of the Phihppines
may bring this unit where a constitutional is
sue is raised. [Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., G.R.
No. 87656, November 19, 1990.] Indeed, even a
taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful
expenditure of public funds. [Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969) and
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs.
Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966).]
 326 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
The petition seeks the declaration of the
unconstitutionahty of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The position
also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said
decrees.
The questions raised in the instant petition
are
"I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P
86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990
U BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE XTV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
n.AREPDNo.81,PDNo. 1177 AND PD
g&j No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SEC
TION 29(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CON
STITUTION?"
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised
ai
in the petition which this Court may properly
take cognizance of.
Of the first issue, the petitioners aver-
L "According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the
Constitution:
'(5) The state shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education arid ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its right
ful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of
job satisfaction and fulfillment.'
L "The reason "behind the said provisions is
stated, thus:
'In explaining his proposed amendment,
?m\ Mr. Ople stated that all the great and sincere
piety professed by every President and every
Congress of the Philippines since the end of
World War II for the economic welfare of the
public schoolteachers always ended up in
failure and this failure, he stated, had caused
mass defection of the best and brightest
teachers to other careers, including menial
jobs in overseas employment and concerted
actions by them to project their grievances,
mainly over low pay and abject working
conditions.
fa" i
'He pointed to the high expectations gen
erated by the February Revolution, especially
keen among public schoolteachers, which
at present exacerbate these long frustrated
hopes.
'Mr. Ople stated that despite thesincer-
ity of all administrations that tried vainly
to respond to the needs of the teachers, the
central problem that always defeated their
pious intentions was really the one budget
ary priority in the sense that any proposed
increase for public schoolteachers had to be
^multiplied many times by the number of
government employees in general and their
equitable claims to any pay standardization
such that the pay rate of teachers is hope
lessly pegged to the rate of government work
ers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed
the prospect of a significant pay increase for
teachers.
'Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition
by the Constitution of the highest priority for
public schoolteachers, and by implication, for
all teachers, would ensure that the President
and Congress would be strongly urged by a
constitutional mandate togrant to them such
a level of remuneration and other incentives
that would take teaching competitive again
and attractive to the best available talents
in the nation.
'Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before
World War II, teaching competed most suc
cessfully against all other career choices for
the best and the brightest of the younger
generation. It is for this reason, he stated,
that his proposed amendment if approved
would ensure that teaching would be restored
to its lost glory as the career of choice for
the most talented and most public-spirited
of the younger generation in the sense that
it would become the countervailing measure
against the continued decline of teaching
and the wholesale desertion of this noble
profession presently taking place. He further
stated that this would ensure that the future
and the quality of the population would be
asserted as a toppriority against many clam
orous and importunate but less important
claims of the present.' (Journal claims of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)

"However, as against this constitutional
intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
i\
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated
for the Department of Education in the 1990
budget. It is plain, therefore, that the said
appropriation for debt service is inconsistent
with the Constitution, hence, void (Art. 7,
New Civil Code)."
While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XVI of the Constitution Congress is man
dated to "assign the highest budgetary priority
to education" in order to "insure that teaching
fAi will attract and retain its rightful share of the
best available talents through adequate remu
neration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive
it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985,
the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school
system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations
Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid consti
tutional mandate according highest priority to
education.
Having faithfully complied therewith,
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was
inherited from the previous administration. It
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
to!
an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners
made the following observations:
ARTICLEVI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 327
Petitioners argue that the said .automatic
appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of
then President Marcos became functus oficio
when he was ousted in February, 1986; that
upon the expiration of the one-man legislature
in the person of President Marcos, the legislative
power was restored to Cbngress on February 2,
1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the
people; that there is a need for a new legislation
by Congress providing for automatic appropria
tion, but Congress, up to the present, has not
approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8
Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990
budget is an administrative act that rests on no
law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming
arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of
President Marcosafter the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative
under Section 3, Article XVTH which provides -
"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, ex
ecutive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed,
or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said de
crees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI
of the Constitution, i.e.,
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House ofRepresentatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments."
(Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the Presi
dent, [Section 27, Article VI, Constitution.] then
a law must be passed by Congress to authorize
said automatic appropriation. Further, petition
ers state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides
are follows -
"Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
They assert that there must be definiteness,
certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
L
328 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
[Citing State vs. Eggers, 16 L.R.A. N.S. 630;
State vs. La Grane, 41 Pac. 1075; 1 Tanada and
iffiftl
Carreon, Political Law, 1961 ed., p. 253; State
vs. Moore, 69 N.W. 3735, pages 15 to 20, Rollo.]
Otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President who determines in
JffiJ advance the amount appropriated for the debt
service. [Citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
and Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), 1
&j&i
Taiiada and Carreon, supra, pages 421 to 4422;
Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., page
220.]
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVHI of the Constitution
recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, execu-
' tive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution
has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by
the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect un
less they are inconsistent with the Constitution
or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential
decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal
and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should
be made available when they shall become due
'dM\
precisely without the necessity of periodic en
actments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefor, since both the periods and necessities
mi
are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the
flexibility for the effective execution of debt
\m
management policies.
Its political wisdom has been convincing
discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues
"x x x First, for example, it enables the
Government to take advantage of a favorable
turn of market conditions by redeeming high-
interest securities and borrowing at lower
rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term
Mi
instruments, or too enter into arrangements
that could lighten our outstanding debt
burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-
to-debt or/other such schemes. Second, the
automatic appropriation obviates the serious
difficulties in debt servicing arising from any
deviation from what has been previously pro
grammed. The annual debt service estimates,
which are usually made one year in advance,
are based on a mathematical set or matrix
or, in layman's parlance, 'basket' of foreign
exchange and interest rate assumptions
which may significantly differ from actual
rates not even in proportion to changes on
the basis of the assumptions. Absent an au
tomatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon
Congressional action, which by the time this
comes, may no longer be responsive to the
intended conditions which in the meantime
may have already drastically changed. In
the meantime, also, delayed payments and
arrearages may have supervened, only to
worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure
ration in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before
due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the
loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon
the continuance of the person of President
Marcos and his legislative power goes against
the intent and purpose of the law. The pur
pose is foreseen to subsist with or without
the person of Marcos."
The argument of petitioners that the said
presidential decrees did not meet the require
ment and are therefore inconsistent with Sec
tions 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitu
tion which requires, among others, that "all
appropriations, xxx bills authorizing increase
of public debt" must be passed by Congress and
approved by the President is untenable. Cer
tainly, the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that existing laws in the statute
books including existing presidential decrees
appropriating public money are reduced to mere
"bills" that must again go through the legislative
mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to
"bills" is that they mean appropriation measures
still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of
the framers thereof were otherwise they should

ik&l
have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner.
Well-knownis the rule that repeal or amend
ment by-implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction
of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is
so clearly stated. ' '
The Court finds that in this'case the ques
tioned laws are complete in all their essential
terms and conditions and sufficient standards
are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as
amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be
automatically set aside in order to enable the
L, Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges
on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred
as guaranteed by it when they shall become due
without the need to enact a separate law appro
priating funds therefor as the need arises. The
purpose of these laws is to enable the government
^
to make prompt payment and/or advances for all
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing
of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees
do not state specific amounts to be paid, neces
sitated by the very nature of the problem being
addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided
in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited
discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for
debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal bank
ingcharges onthe loans,credits or indebtedness,
or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international
markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and
when they shall become due. No uncertainty
arises in executive implementation as the limit
will be the exact amounts as shown by the books
of the Treasury.
^i
The Government budgetary process has
been graphically described to consist of four
major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor
General:
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 329
"The Government budgeting process
consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step
is essentially tasked upon the Executive
Branch and covers the estimation of gov
ernment revenues,* the determination of
budgetary priorities and activities within the
constraints imposed by available revenues
and by borrowing limits, and the transla
tion of desired priorities and activities into
expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the bud
get call issued by the Department of Budget
and Management. Each agency is required to
submit agency budget estimates in line with
the requirements consistent with the general
ceilings set by the Development Budget Co
ordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC
staff, based on the macroeconomic projec
tions of interest rates (e.g., LIBOR rate) and
estimated sources of domestic and foreign
financing, estimates debt call, then Bureau
of Treasury computers for the interest and
principal payments for the year for all direct
national government borrowings and other
liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this
stage, Congress enters the picture and de
liberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President, and Congress.in the exercise
of its own judgment and wisdom formulates
an appropriation act precisely following the
process established by the Constitution,
which specifies that no money may be paid
from the Treasury except in accordance with
an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the Gen
eral Appropriations Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under R.A. No. 4860
and 245, as amended and P.D. No. 1967.
Precisely in the light of this subsisting au
thorization as embodiedin said RepublicActs
and PD for debt services, Congress does not
concern itself with details for implementa
tion by the Executive, but largely with an
nual levels and approval thereof upon due
deliberations as part of the whole obligation
program for the year. Upon such approval,
330 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Congress has spoken and..cannot be said to
have delegated its wisdom to the Executive,
on whose part lies the implementation or
execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Ex
ecutive, the third phase of the budget process
covers the various operational aspects of
budgeting. The establishment of obligation
authority eeilings, the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities,
the continuing review of government fiscal
position, the regulation of fund releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules,
and other related activities comprise this
phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fund is
triggered by a request of the Bureau of the
Treasury for allotments from the Depart
ment of Budget and Management, one
quarter in advance of payment schedule,
to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of
Treasury, upon receiving officialbillings from
the creditors, remits payments to creditors
through the Central Bank or to the Sinking
Fund established for government security
issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth
phase refers to the evaluation-of actual
performance and initially approved work
targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired
and work accomplished are compared with
the targets set at time the agency budgets
were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legisla
tive power as clearly above shown, petitioners
insist nevertheless that subject presidential
decrees constitute undue delegation of legisla
tive power to the executive on the alleged ground
that the appropriations therein are not exact,
certain or definite, invoking in support therefor
the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution
under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW
974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the
Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitu
tion does not require a definite, certain, exact or
'specific appropriation made by law.' Section 29,
Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of
these words and simply states: .
'Section 29(1). No money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in.pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.'
More significantly, there is no provi
sion in our Constitution that provides or
prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be 'made by law,' such as pre
cisely the authorization or appropriation
under the questioned presidential decrees. In
other words, in terms of time horizons, an ap
propriation may be impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as" expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment
of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as
well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act
or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public
funds for specific public purposes, such as
the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative inten
tion clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Ap
propriations, 32 p. 272), whether in the past
or in the present."
Thus, in accordance with Section 22,-Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon
C. Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the
Fiscal Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure
program covering the estimated obligation that
will be incurred by the national government
during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion.
Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is aside for debt
servicing as follows:
as authorized under P.D. No. 1967 and R.A. No.
4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No.
4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they
are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
The Executive was thus merely complying with
the duty to implement the same.

There can be no question as to the patrio
tism and good motive of petitioners in filing this
petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail
on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As
to whether or not the country should honor its
international debt, more especially the enormous
amount that had been incurred by the past ad
ministration, which appears to be the ultimate
objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the
aj
Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for
Congress and the Executive to determine in the
exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs. '
2. Public purpose.
The specific limits on the power of Congress
are those found in Section 29(2). Aside from the
explicit limitations, there is also the all impor
tant implicit limitation that public money can
be appropriated only for a public purpose.. This
iSs>
limitation arises from the relation between the
power to spend and the power to tax. "The right
of the legislature to appropriate public funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under the
constitutional provisions against taxation except
for public purposes ... no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public pur
^ pose." 81 CJS p. 1147.
Where the sum of 85,000 pesos was appro
priated by Congress for a feeder road running
tej through a private subdivision owned by a private
individual, the appropriation was not considered
to be for a public purpose even if the feeder road
was later donated to the government. The sub
^ft
sequent donation of the road did not validate the
law because the validity of a statute depends
upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
approval, and not upon events occurring or acts
performed subsequently. Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331-346 (I960).
aJ
3. Special fund.
A. Osmena v. Orbos
G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993
^i
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petitioner seeks the corrective, prohibi
tive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65
$M
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 331
of the Rules of Court, upon the following posited
grounds, viz.:
. 1) the invalidity of the "TRUST AC
COUNT" in the books of account of the
Ministry of Energy (now the Office of Energy
Affairs) created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1,
of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation
of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29
(3) Article VI of the Constitution;"
2) the unconstitutionality of 8, para
graph 1(c) of P.D. No. 1956 as amended by
Executive Order No. 137 for "being an undue
and invalid delegation of legislative power to
the Energy Regulatory Board;"
3) the illegality of the reimbursements
to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price.
Stabilization Fund, because it contravenes
8 paragraph 2(2) of P.D. 1956 as amended;
and
4) the consequent nullity of the Order
dated December 10,1990 and the necessity of
a rollback of the pump prices and petroleum
products to the levels prevailing prior to the
said Order.
It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984
President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956
creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse
oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from ex
change rate adjustments and from increases in
the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently the OPSF was reclassified into
a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O 1024,
and ordered released from the National Treasury
to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive
Order also authorized the investment ofthe fund
in government securities, with the earnings from
such placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino amended P.D.
1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137
on February 27,1987 expanding the grounds for
reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
under recovery incurred as a result of the reduc
tion of domestic prices of petroleum products
the amount of the under recovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.
 332 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Now, the petition alleges that the status of
the OPSF as of March 31 1991 showed a "Ter
minal Fund Balance deficit" of some P12.877
billion; that to abatethe worsening deficit; "the
Energy Regulatory Board issued an Order on
December 10, 1990, approving the increase in
M
pump prices of petroleum products," and at the
rate ofrecoupment the OPSF deficit shouldhave
been fully covered in a span of six (6) months,
but this notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar
Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as
Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman
Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory
Board "are poised to accept process and pay
'41A
claims not authorized under P.D. 1956."
The petition further avers that the creation
of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of
im
the Constitution, reading as follows:
"(3)All money collected on any tax levied
altii
for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purposes
only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government."
The petitioner argues that "the monies col
]mi lected pursuant to P.D. 1956 as amended, must
be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not' as a 'trust
account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a' special
tax is collected for a specific purpose the revenue
generatedtherefrom shall Tje treated as a special
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated,
and not channeled to another government objec
tive." Petitioner further points out that since "a
'specialfund' consistsofmoniescollected through
the taxing power ofa State, such amounts belong
to the State, although the use thereof is limited
to the special purpose/objective for which it was
created."
mj He also contends that the delegation of
"legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
\iM
"(2)The Congress may, by law, authorize
the President to fix, within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restric
tions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
IfcE
dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development
program of the Government";
and inasmuch as the delegation relates to the
exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions, must be quantitative,
that is, the law must not only specify how to tax,
who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but
also impose a specific limit on how much to tax."
The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust
account" is illegal per se, but maintains that the
monies collected, which form part of-the OPSF
should be maintained in a special account of the
general fund for the reason that the Constitution
so provides, and because they are, supposedly,
taxes levied for a special purpose. He assumes
that the Fund is formed from a tax undoubt
edly because a portion thereof is taken from
collections of ad valorem taxes and the increases
thereon.
It thus appears that the challenge posed by
the petitioner is premised primarily on the view
that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the
taxation powerofthe State. The SolicitorGeneral
observes that the "argument rests on the assump
tion that the OPSF is a form of revenue measure
drawing from a special tax to be expended for a
special purpose." The petitioner's perceptions
are, in the Court's view, not quite correct.
To address this critical misgiving in the
position of the petitioner on these issues, the
Court recalls its holding in Valmonte v. Energy
Regulatory Boara\ et al.159
'The foregoing arguments suggest the
presence of misconceptions about the nature
and functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a
'Trust Account' which was established 'for
the purpose ofminimizing the frequent price
changes brought about by exchange rate
adjustment and/or changes in world market
prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products." Under P.D. No. 1956,as amended
by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 Febru-
,S9G.R. Nos. L-79601-03 [23 June 1988] 162 SCRA 521;
Decided jointly with Citizen's Alliance for Consumer Protec
tionv.EnergyRegulatory Board,etal., G.R. Nos.L-78888-90,
and Kilusang Mayo UnoLaborCenterv. EnergyRegulatory,
Boardetal., G.R. Nos.L-79690-92; emphasis supplied.
i'lfiA
iM
ary 1987, this Trust Account may be funded
from any of the following sources:
ogj
"a) Any increase in the taxcollectionfrom
adjmlorem taxor customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this
a*i
Decree arising from exchange rate adjust
ment, as may be determined by the Minister
of Finance in consultation with the Board of
Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a
result of the lifting of taxexemptions ofgov
ernment corporations, as may be determined
iiil
by the Minister of Finance in consultation
"with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount tobe imposed
on petroleum products to augment the re
sources of the Fund through an appropriate
Order that may be issued by the Board of
fell Energy requiring payment ofpersons or com
panies engagedin the business ofimporting,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum
&*f4
products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials
in case the actual peso costs paid by oil com
^J
panies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign
exchange rate as fixed by the Board of En
ergy."
xxx virv
AAO. xxx
tot The fact that the world market prices of oil,
measured by the spot market in Rotterdam, vary
from dayto dayis ofjudicialnotice. Freight rates
for hauling crude oil and petroleum products
from sources of supply to the Phihppines may
alsovaryfrom time to time.The exchange rate of
the peso vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and other con
yi vertible foreign currencies alsochanges from day
today. Thesefluctuations in world market prices
and in tanker rates and foreign exchange rates
wouldin a completely free market translate into
tyi
corresponding adjustments in domestic prices
ofoil andpetroleum products withsympathetic
frequency. Butdomestic prices which varyfrom
^J dayto dayor evenonlyfrom weekto weekwould
result in a chaotic market with unpredictable
effects upon the country's economy in general.
ay The OPSF was established precisely to protect
local consumers from the adverse consequences
jjffjfl
%}
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 333
that such frequentooil price adjustments may
have upon the economy: Thus, the OPSF serves
as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of
the purchaseprice ofoilandpetroleum products
paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues
are inputted and from which amounts are drawn
from time to time to reimburse oil companies,
when appropriate situations arise, for increases
in, as well as under recovery of, costs ofcrude im
portation. TheOPSF is thus a buffer mechanism
through which the domestic consumer prices of
oilandpetroleum products are stabilized, instead
offluctuating every so often, and oil companies
areallowed torecover thoseportions oftheir costs
which they would not otherwise recovergiven the
level ofdomesticprices existing atanygiven time.
To the extent that some taxrevenues are also put
into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through
which thedomestic pricesofpetroleum products
aresubsidized inpart.It appears to theCourt that
theestablishment and maintenance of theOPSF
is well within that pervasive and non-waivable
power and responsibility of the government to
secure, the physical and economic survival and
vjell-being ofthecommunity, that comprehensive
sovereign authority we designate as the police
power oftheState. The stabilization, and subsidy
of domesticprices ofpetroleum products and fuel
oil clearly critical in importance considering,
among other things, the continuing high level of
dependence of the country on imported crude oil
are appropriately regarded as public purposes."
Alsoofrelevance is this Court's ruling in re
lation to the sugar stabihzation fund the nature
of which is not far different from the OPSF. In
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank160 this Court
upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees
and explained their nature and character, viz.:
"The stabilization fees collected are in
the nature ofa tax, whichis within the power
of the State to impose for the promotion of
the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.
148). The tax collected is not in a pure exer
cise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide a means for
the stabilization of the sugar industry. The
levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta, supra).
,60158 SCRA 626.
 334 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
XXX xxx xxx
'The stabilization fees in question are
levied by the State upon sugar millers, plant
ers and producers for a special purpose that
of'financing the growth and development of
the sugar industry and all its components,
stabilization of the domestic market includ
ing the foreign market.' The fact that the
jjjafcj State has taken possession of moneys pur
suant to law is sufficient to constitute them
state funds, even though they are held for a
special purpose (Lawrencev. AmericanSure
ty Co., 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in
42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied
for a special purpose, the revenues collected
are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in
the language of the statute, 'administered
in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the
purpose has been fulfilledor abandoned, the
balance if any, is to be transferred to the
general funds ofthe Government. That is the
essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Con
stitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[3]), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23[1]).
The character of the Stabilization Fund as
a special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact
that the funds are deposited in the Philippine Na
tional Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury,
MJ moneys from which may be paid out only in pur
suance of an appropriation made by law (1987)
Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1)"."
'>$jtl
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds
collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the
i^j
State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund
is plain from the special treatment given it by
E.O. No. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
'iMi
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the prac
tice is not without precedent.
L With regard to the alleged undue delega
tion of legislative power, the Court finds that
the provisionconferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
productsprovides a sufficient standard by which
i^J
the authority must be exercised. In addition to
the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly autho
rizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Fund.
In relation to the third question respecting
the illegality of the reimbursements to oil com
panies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund, because allegedly in contravention of
8, paragraph 2(2) of P.D. 1956, as amended the
Court finds for the petitioner.
SEC. 30. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED
INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURIS
DICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS
PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION
WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCUR
RENCE.
A. Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
REGALADO, Jr.
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
"Joint Order" issued by public respondents on
June 18,1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411
which granted the motion for reconsideration of
and absolved private respondent from adminis
trative charges for inter aha grave misconduct
committed by him as then Assistant Regional
Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-
statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMATConstruction Develop
ment Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged
in the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED) when he allegedly committed
the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
 &wl
PROMAT participated in the bidding for
L government construction projects including those
under the FMED, and private respondent,report
edlytaking advantage ofhis official position, in
veigled petitioner into an amorous relationship.
L Their affair lasted for some time, in the course
of which private respondent gifted PROMAT
with public works contracts and interceded for
^J
it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties and
when petitioner tried to terminate their relation-.
ship, private respondent refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employingacts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
j&iJ
eventually filed the aforementioned administra
tive case against him in a letter-complaint dated
July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal
of private respondent for. violation of Section
19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
^j 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No.
807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary
prayer for his preventive suspension. For pur
poses of this case, the charges referred to may
be subsumed under the category of oppression,
misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
sM
On January 31, 1996. Graft Investigator
Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding
private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service
Ui&l with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His
resolution bore the approval ofDirector Napoleon
Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera of their office.
%i
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order
dated February 26,1996, approved the aforesaid
ajJ
resolution with modifications, by finding private
respondent guilty of misconduct and meting but
the penalty of suspension without pay for one
year. After private respondent moved for recon
sideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered
that the former's new counsel had been his "class
mate and close associate" hence, he inhibited
*%.> himself. The case was transferred to respondent
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who,
in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18,
^J
1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private
respondent from the administrative charges.
iiyt
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 335
II
In thepresentappeal, petitioner argues that
Section 27ofRepublic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989)pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, or
ders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorariwithin ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section
7,RuleIH ofAdministrative Order No. 07(Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
when a respondent is absolved of the charges
in an administrative proceeding the decision
of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to
restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid
Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic
Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of
this Court. Because of the aforecited provision
in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that
she found it "necessary to take an alternative
recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.,
becauseofthe doubtit creates on the availabihty
of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments
and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman
is empowered by the Constitution and the law to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section
13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution pro
vides, among others, that the Office of the Om
budsman can "(promulgate its rules ofprocedure
and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the
Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. :... No court shall
hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Om
budsman except the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law.
xxx XXX XXX
 336 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
Sec. 18. ifa/es of Procedure. (1) The
sitl
Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate
its own rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, func
tions, and duties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. (1) Ad
ministrative investigations by the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with
its rules of procedure and consistent with due
process...
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Deci
sions. All provisionary orders at the Office
of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any or
der, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5)
Kal days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
&&J
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombuds
man when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or repri
mand, suspension of not more than one month
salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, or
ders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
M Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
^t
motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified
by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest
of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that,
on the foregoing constitutional and statutory
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity
taJ
of the rules of procedure formulated by the Of
fice of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of
proceedingsbefore it, including those rules with
respect to the availability or non-availability ol
appeal in administrative cases, such as Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
m
After respondents' separate comments had
been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact,
which does not appear to have been seriously
considered before, that the administrative li
ability of a public official could fall under the
.
jurisdiction ofboth the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
offenses imputed to herein private respondent
were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act
No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Sec
tion 9, Batas Pambansa Big. 129 by Republic Act
No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases
were made appealable to the Court of Appeals
effective March 18,1995, while those ofthe Office
of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same
administrative case involving two respondents,
the proceedings against one could eventually
have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while
the other may have found its way to the Ombuds
man from which it is sought to be brought to this
Court. Yet systematic and efficient case manage
ment would dictate the consolidation of those
cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency
and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section
30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the ap
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as pro
vided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November
17,1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional
prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is
that a challenge on constitutional grounds must
be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom
did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible
rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the ob
servance of the judiciary and other departments
of the government and the judges are sworn
to support its provisions, the courts are nOt at
 Mi
libertyto overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear
that a statute transgresses the authority vested
in a legislative body, it is the duty ofthe courtsto
declare that the constitution, andnotthestatute,
ijM
governsin a case before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass
upon constitutional questions which are not
raised in the pleadings, the rule has been rec
ognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does
not precludea court from inquiring into its own.
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment
that- it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute,
on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding
'<M
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the
regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the
court below or that of the appellate court is in
volved in which caseit mayberaised at anytime
or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero
motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction
at any point in the case where that fact is devel
oped. Thecourt has a clearlyrecognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in anyproceeding.
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding,
the Court believedthat the parties hereto should
befurther heard onthis constitutional question.
Correspondingly, the following resolution was
issuedonMay14,1998, the material parts stat
iii^j
ing as follows:
The Court observes that the present peti
tion, from the very allegations thereof, is "an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No.
Ml 0-95-0411, entitled'TeresitaG. Fabianvs. Engr.
Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Re
gion IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved
the latter from the administrative charges for
s&flfl
grave misconduct, among others."
It is further averred therein that the present
^wj appeal to this Court is allowed under Section
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No.
6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Mt
&j
ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 337
Ombudsman issued its Rules ofProcedure, Sec
tion 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It willberecalledthat R.A. No. 6770
was enacted on November17,1989, with Section
27 thereof pertinentlyproviding that all admin
istrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions ofthe Office ofthe Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
?he Court notes, however, that neither the
petition nor the two comments thereon tooAk
into account or discussed the validity of the
aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in-light"
of the provisions of Section 30, ArticleVI of the
1987 Constitution that "(n)o lawshallbepassed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Su
preme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and consent."
In view of the fact that the appellate juris
diction of the Court is invoked and involved in
this case, and the foregoing legal considerations
appear to impugnthe constitutionahty and valid
ity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to
it, the Courtdeemsit necessarythat the parties
be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved
before conducting further proceedings in this
appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
require the parties to SUBMIT their position
and arguments on the matter subject of this
resolution byfiling their corresponding pleadings
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of
the Solicitor General has complied with such
requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
any submission it should have presented. On the
other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that
the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications
of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative
of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She
claims that what is proscribed is the passage of
a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court "as provided in this Constitution,"
and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all
338 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREANDPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT
cases in which only an error or question of law
is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of
the Constitution authorizes this Court to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders
"as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,"
said Section 27 does not increase this Court's ap
pellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the
mode ofappeal shall be by petition for certiorari
under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein
are only questions of law of which this Court
already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse.
It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has al
lowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a
substantial number of cases and instances even
if questions of fact are directly involved and
have to be resolved by the appellate court. Also,
the very prevision cited by petitioner specifies
that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court con
templated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgments and orders of lower courts," that is,
the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legis
lature intends that the decisions or resolutions
of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable
by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicialagencyand,
for that matter, any special statutory court. No
suchprovision onappellate procedure is required
for the regular courts of the integrated judicial
system because they arewhatarereferred toand
already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
THE SUBMISSION THAT BECAUSE
THIS COURT HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE
OF CASES INVOLVING SECTION 27 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770, THAT FACT MAY
BE VIEWED AS "ACQUIESCENCE" OR "AC
CEPTANCE" BY IT OF THE APPELLATE
JURISDICTION CONTEMPLATED IN
SAID SECTION 27, IS UNFORTUNATELY
TOO TENUOUS. THE JURISDICTION OF A
COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUI
ESCENCE AS A MATTER OF FACT BUT AN
ISSUE OF CONFERMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW. BESIDES, WE HAVE ALREADY
DISCUSSED THE CASES REFERRED TO,
INCLUDING THE INACCURACIES OF
SOME STATEMENTS THEREIN, AND WE
HAVE POINTED OUT THE INSTANCES
WHEN RULE 45 IS INVOLVED, HENCE
COVERED BY SECTION 27 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6770 NOW UNDER DISCUSSION,
AND WHEN THAT PROVISION WOULD
NOT APPLY IF IT IS A JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER RULE 65.
SEC. 31. NO LAW GRANTING A TITLE
OF ROYALTY OR NOBILITY SHALL BE
ENACTED.
SEC. 32. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS
EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PROVIDE FOR A
SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFEREN
DUM, AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERE
FROM, WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN
DIRECTLY PROPOSE AND ENACT LAWS
OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR
LAW OR PART THEREOF PASSED BY
THE CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLA
TIVE BODY AFTER THE REGISTRATION
OF A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY
AT LEAST TEN PER CENTUM OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOT
ERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PER CENTUM OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF.