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A Brief Account of the Spanish Conquest of Mexico

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The first decades of contact between the so called Old World of Afro-Eurasia and the

New World of the Americas were a period of profound significance in world history. This was

the moment when two worlds collided to create something entirely new. Of particular interest to

historians and scholars is the chain of events that characterized the Spanish conquest of the Aztec

or Mexica Empire. This conquest is significant to historians for a number of reasons. The Aztec

Empire was by far the most advanced and wealthy pre-Colombian civilization encountered by

the newly arriving Spanish in the Americas. Furthermore, its conquest was conducted by a

relatively small number of Spanish conquistadores. Such circumstances beg the question of what

factors led to the success of the Spanish. In narrating the story of the Spanish conquest of

Mexico, I hope to elucidate a number of critical themes and factors that contributed to it.

Specifically, the conquest of the Mexica Empire was facilitated by a combination of strong

Spanish leadership, internal divisions among the native peoples, disease and Spanish military

superiority in the form of tactical and technological advantages. In explaining this series of

events and its relevant themes, I intend to use a combination of Spanish and Nahua primary

sources to provide as balanced of a perspective as possible.

The expedition that would eventually conquer the Mexican mainland was launched in late

1518 from the Spanish colony on Cuba. Despite its initial authorization by the Spanish officials

on Cuba, the expedition to Mexico was technically deemed illegal even before it departed. This

was a result of the suspicions of Governor Velzquez who correctly predicted that Cortes

wouldnt abide by his contract to merely explore and initiate trade relations with the natives1.

Cortes expedition landed in the modern state of Veracruz near central Mexico in April 1519.

1
Bernal Diaz, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished:
Spanish and Nahua Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 43-48.
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Well aware of the illegal nature of his expedition, Cortes sought a means to legitimize his

expedition. To this end, he instructed his men to establish a new settlement now known as

Veracruz. As with all new Spanish cities, Cortes and his men created a town council or

cabildo. The council promptly appointed Cortes as chief justice and captain general. By

allowing this to happen, Cortes freed himself from Governor Velzquezs control by creating a

new hierarchy of authority. Cortes appointment had essentially promoted him to the Kings

representative on the Mexican mainland. Ironically, Cortes strategy was merely following in the

footsteps of other conquistadores such as Governor Velzquez himself.2 First-hand accounts of

this action are related to us by Cortes himself in a letter to Charles V: For the sake of

peacethere should be one person elected in your Majesties name to act in this town and

district in the service of your Majesties as Chief Justice and Captain until such time as your

Majesties having received our report should provide other means by which your Majesties might

best be served. 3

Cortes would further demonstrate his keen and capable leadership with an incident

following the founding of Veracruz. While Cortes had managed to gain the following of most of

his expedition, a number of individuals still maintained their loyalty to Governor Velzquez.

Following an alleged attempt by these loyalists to steal a brig and return to Cuba, Cortes initiated

a particularly memorable act. He ensured that all of his ships had been scuttled so as to eliminate

any possibility of deserters fleeing back to Cuba. Cortes himself describes the event to the king

in the following manner: thinking that if I left the ships there they [the deserters] would make

2
Stuart Schwartz, Introduction, in Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished: Spanish and Nahua Views of the
Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 42.
3
Hernan Corts, Letters to Charles V, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished: Spanish and Nahua Views
of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 177.
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off with them and leave me practically alone, by which had been prevented the great service

which has been done to God and to your Majesty in this land, I found a means under the pretense

that the ships were no longer navigable to pile them up on the shore.4 Due to the nature of this

source as a justification for Cortes actions and the lack of accounts from the deserters

themselves, the actions that initiated this event remain fair game for scrutiny. The motivating

factor for the scuttling however, can be safely assumed. This act had the effect of stranding

Cortes and his men in Mexico, thus forcing them to put all of their effort into achieving success

in the Mexican interior. It can be seen as a decisive act on the part of Cortes who achieved his

goal of maintaining the independence of his operations from Velasquez. This act, along with the

founding of Veracruz gave Cortes both legal and physical independence to conduct his conquest.

With the ships scuttled, Cortes and his expedition advanced towards central Mexico. One

of the first polities the Spaniards arrived in was the Tlaxcalan Confederation, a collection of

towns and cities who were hostile to the surrounding Aztecs. The initial encounter between the

Spaniards and the Tlaxcalans was far from friendly. Indeed, the two sides fought a number of

engagements before the Tlaxcalans realized that the newcomers were potential allies against the

Aztecs. This significant encounter offers us the first opportunity to hear not just from the Spanish

but also from native witnesses. Excerpts from sources on both sides illustrate the technological

advantages the Spanish had in combatting the Tlaxcalans. In particular, the psychological effect

of gunpowder is clearly noted. Native accounts of Spanish artillery state that It especially made

him faint when he heard how the guns went off at [the Spaniards] command, sounding like

thunder, causing people actually to swoon...5 Bernal Diaz, a solider with the Spanish, further

4
Corts, Letters to Charles V, p. 78.
5
Fray Bernardino De Sahagn , The Florentine Codex, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished: Spanish
and Nahua Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 167.
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corroborates this assertion, noting that The steady bearing of our artillery, musketeers and

crossbowmen, was indeed a help to us and we did the enemy much damage.6 While popular

conceptions generally view this Spanish martial advantage as having its greatest effect against

the Aztecs, its important to note its critical role in convincing the Tlaxcalans to ally rather than

oppose the Spanish. While no single event best exemplified the stated theme of internal

divisions, its subtle presence can be observed in all of the events following this initial contact.

This alliance, which played on these divisions, would play a crucial role in the eventual success

of the Spanish conquest.

Now allied to a number of native polities, Cortes once more continued his advance

towards Tenochtitlan. With the exception of the tension that resulted in a massacre in the Aztec
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allied city of Cholula, the allied force made a mostly peaceful entrance into the Aztec capital.

While interactions between the two sides were initially friendly, it wasnt long before relations

soured and shortly after, Moctezuma was taken hostage by the Spaniards who held him as

insurance against any possible attacks by the Aztecs. 8 Relations between the two sides continued

to deteriorate and reached an all-time low with the temporary departure of Cortes to deal with

reinforcements sent by Governor Velzquez. The interim commander of the Spanish garrison in

Tenochtitlan, Pedro Alvarado, initiated an attack on a large gathering of Aztec priests and nobles

who were celebrating the Toxcatl festival. This had the effect of not only enraging the already

discontent Aztec population but also eliminating any remaining hopes for diplomatic discourse

or non-violent action with the Aztecs. Moctezuma himself was killed attempting to quell the

mob that resulted from this incident. Having returned to find the city in open revolt, Cortes

6
Diaz, True History, p. 107.
7
Schwartz, Introduction, p. 115-123.
8
Schwartz, Introduction, p. 127-128.
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quickly arranged to have the garrison evacuate the city under the cover of nightfall. The night

was infamously known as La Noche Triste or the night of sorrows due to the high casualties

suffered by the retreating Spaniards and Tlaxcalans. 9

Despite the successful retreat of the allied force from Tenochtitlan, they were still far

from the safety of Tlaxcala. In fact, upon leaving Tenochtitlan and entering the plain of Otumba,

the expedition came face to face with an Aztec army that outnumbered them by the thousands.

The battle that followed demonstrated most clearly the tactical advantages of the Spanish forces

over their numerically superior Aztec foes. Taking advantage of the flat plains of Otumba, the

Spanish launched repeated cavalry charges that decimated the Aztec forces. Diaz notes the

effectiveness of this tactic, stating that our cavalry, favored by the even surface of the plain,

rode through them at will with couched lances, bearing down the enemy wherever they came,

and fighting most manfully.10 The Spanish also did well to concentrate their attacks on the

commander of the Aztec forces, thus quickly eliminating their leadership and diminishing their

morale. Diaz again states that Immediately on Cortes perceiving this chief, who was surrounded

by many nobles wearing plumes of feathers, he exclaimed to his companions, "Now, gentlemen,

let us charge these men, and if we succeed the day is our own.11 While it is clear that Spanish

martial advantages played a crucial role in the victory, other factors should not be ruled out,

especially considering the preponderance of Spanish accounts of the battle and the general lack

of native accounts. Ultimately, the improbable Spanish victory was critical in allowing the allied

9
Schwartz, Introduction, p. 156-159.
10
Bernal Diaz, The History of the Conquest of New Spain, edited by David Carrasco (University of New Mexico
Press, 2008), 233
11
Diaz, True History, p. 234.
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force to finally escape and to live to fight another day. That day would come with the eventual

return of the allied force to Tenochtitlan.

Arguably the most climatic event of the whole Spanish conquest of Mexico was the final

siege of Tenochtitlan that concluded the conquest. The siege itself reflected the culmination of

the previously emphasized factors that facilitated the thus far successful Spanish conquest. Upon

returning to the safety of Tlaxcala, Cortes and his Tlaxcalan allies wasted no time in preparing a

counterattack. Cortes continued his former policy of exploiting the factional politics between the

Aztecs and their subject states in order to gain additional allies.12 In addition to their political

isolation and martial disadvantages, the Aztecs also suffered from a more subtle Spanish

advantage: disease. During their stay in Tenochtitlan, the Spanish almost certainly transmitted

diseases such as smallpox to the native populace. While the Spaniards had a degree of immunity

to these diseases, the natives, including the Aztecs, had no such advantage. The Florentine

Codex, which was composed of native Nahua accounts of the Conquest, attests to the devastating

impact of disease in Tenochtitlan: Before the Spaniards appeared to us, first an epidemic broke

out, a sickness of pustulesLarge bumps spread on people; some were entirely coveredAnd

many were disabled or paralyzed by itThe Mexica warriors were greatly weakened by it. 13

The overwhelming combination of factors ranging from strong Spanish leadership and

military superiority to disease would lead one to naturally assume that the final conquest of

Tenochtitlan was a matter of ease to the allied force. However; this view severely underestimates

the spirited and effective resistance of the Aztec defenders; the allied force ultimately took more

than two months to secure the city. Nonetheless, it remains an important task for historians to

12
Schwartz, Introduction, p. 182-184.
13
Sahagn , The Florentine Codex, p. 190
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isolate some of the variables that contributed towards the conquest of a powerful empire by a

relatively small group of illegal adventurers. These themes help us frame not just the conquest of

Mexico but also the Spanish conquest of much of the Southern end of the Americas. These same

variables played a critical role in Spanish advances into the Inca Empire of Peru and into the

Mayan states of the Yucatan. The conquest of Mexico continues to bear relevance to this day in

explaining the broader legacy of the Spanish conquests. Latin America as we know it today is a

fusion of indigenous and Spanish cultures and peoples. The collaborative effort of conquest, as

exhibited in the key role internal politics played, helps us understand the fusion of cultures that

followed. Spanish conquest was not a one sided affair of European domination. Rather, it was the

insertion of a new player into the Americas that, alongside other native players, created a new

order. As such, we can juxtapose analyses of the Spanish conquests with efforts by other

Europeans, such as the English, to better understand the differences between the modern

American nations that arose from those efforts.

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Works Cited

Bernal Diaz, The History of the Conquest of New Spain, edited by David Carrasco (University

of New Mexico Press, 2008), 233-234

Bernal Diaz, The True History of the Conquest of New Spain, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors

and Vanquished: Spanish and Nahua Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St.

Martins, 2000), p. 167.

Fray Bernardino De Sahagn , The Florentine Codex, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors and

Vanquished: Spanish and Nahua Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St.

Martins, 2000), p. 167.

Hernan Corts, Letters to Charles V, in Stuart Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished: Spanish

and Nahua Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 177.

Stuart Schwartz, Introduction, in Schwartz, ed., Victors and Vanquished: Spanish and Nahua

Views of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), p. 3.