Tuzon and Mapagu vs.

CA and Jurado

Public officers not personally liable for injuries occasioned by performance of official duty within scope of official authority; erroneous interpretation of
ordinance does not constitute bad faith.

Facts:

In 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan thought of fund-raising scheme to help finance the construction of a Sports and Nutrition
Center. They adopted Resolution No. 9 whereby all thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh will be required to donate 1% of all the palay
threshed by them.

Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators but Municipal Treasurer Mapagu refused to accept payment and
required him to first secure a mayors permit. Mayor Domingo Tuzon, on the other hand, said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign
the agreement before the permit could be issued.

Jurado filed an action for mandamus with the CFI Cagayan to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license. He filed another petition for
declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the same respondents and
all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan

The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the
implementing agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable to pay actual and moral damages for acting maliciously and in bad faith when
they denied Jurado's application for the mayor's permit and license. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its
legislative powers granted by Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU shall have the power to create its own source
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may solicit
money, materials, and other contributions from private agencies and individuals.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing power of an LGU.

2. WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having withheld from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal
to comply with Resolution No. 9.

Held:

1. NO. While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government merely intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the
threshers, the implementing agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayors permit. This goes
against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory.

If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been
enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent
approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in general. .

2. NO. Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for
them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the
municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. xxx As a rule, a pubic
officer, whether, judicial, quasijudicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in line of his official duty. xxx It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad
faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu)

The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's application was an attempt to compel
him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by
personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it
appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not
Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the
resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial
profit therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement
under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate his threshing
business and thus avoided the lucrocesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act. He could have opted for the less
obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit. (Tuzon and Mapagu vs. CA and Jurado, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992)

QUINTIN F. FELIZARDO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS & NEMESIO B. JOSE, respondents.
Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot located at No. 63-20th St., East Bajac-
Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with an application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Quintin Felizardo. On February 27, 1992,
summons was issued directing the petitioner to file an answer and informing him that the Rule on Summary
Procedure would be applied. 2
In his answer, the petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support his prayer for a
preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 3 for prior
barangay conciliation. 4
At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court
and the sufficiency of the private respondent's cause of action for non-compliance with the said decree.
On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner. 5 On September 17, 1992, upon motion of
the private respondent, the court issued an order for the execution of its decision. 6
On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition
for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. 7
On October 7, 1992, that court issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the writ of
execution. 8 Later, however, on October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari with
injunction was not the proper remedy of the petitioner, appeal being then still available to him. 9
The dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 10 His motion for a reconsideration having
been denied, 11 Felizardo is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:: Whether or not the court acted correctly in proceeding with the case even without the prior barangay
proceeding is a procedural question that could not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only in
an ordinary appeal.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case lodged by the private respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his answer to the
complaint. The only question is whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior
barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or
judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides:
Sec. 412. (b) Where the parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent contained an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would,
therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law. A different conclusion must be reached, however, after a closer look at the attendant circumstances in light
of the following allegations made by the private respondent in his complaint:

Case Digest: Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for
in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to
hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.

Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any
date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress
merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less
than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991.

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election.
Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.

The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable
controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of public respondents.
Borja vs Comelec Case Digest
Three-Term Limit
Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor,
by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to
1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who
was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en
banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was
not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because
he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy
is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the
freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of
election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality
but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Lonzanida vs. Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his
proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of
failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of
execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that
Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that
his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the
appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he
discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post
in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been
by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void
is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption
was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater
portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to
March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this
ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is
rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the
candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is
deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Adormeo vs Comelec Case Digest

Recall, Term of Office, Three-Term Limit, Voluntary Renunciation

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his
second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the
LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall
election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in
the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

Socrates vs Comelec
Post under Local Government , Political Law Case Digests , Term of Office , Three-term limit

FACTS:

Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously
aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and
eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the formers unexpired
term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall election,
is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was
simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but
because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

Latasa vs. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served
for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already
been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001
elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en
banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from the
municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

Held:

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as
that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of
a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be
possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for
quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.

Rivera vs Comelec
Post under Local Government , Political Law Case Digests , Term of Office , Three-term limit

FACTS:

The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino Boking
Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales.

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for
the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001
to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer"
since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti--
graft case from January to July 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for re-election as mayor in the 2004 elections.

HELD:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor.
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted
service for the full term and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not
being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. (Rivera vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9,
2007)

Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September
2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had
been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X,
sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon
B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the
three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can
be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

Victoria vs COMELEC and Jesus James Calisin GR 109005 (January 10, 1994)
Posted on October 3, 2012
G.R. 109005;
229 SCRA 269
January 10, 1994
FACTS:
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions
of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azanas position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking
Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent.
In answer to private respondents petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution
dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking, garnering 21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as second
ranking member with 21.19%. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number
of registered voters in the district.
However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the
total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.
ISSUE:
The issue at bar is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for purposes of succession.
HELD:
The Local Government provides:
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by
each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
The law is clear. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words.
Petitioners contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well
be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law.
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1999 was committed. The petition is DISMISSED.

Recabo vs Comelec
Post under Election Cases , Local Government , Permanent Vacancy , Political Law Case Digests
FACTS:

On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP
(LAKAS). His nomination is evidence by the certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of the said political party.
On April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claiming to be the official candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same municipality, also filed his certificate of
candidacy. Recabo submitted to the Comelec a copy of the certificate of his nomination and acceptance signed only by one representative of LAKAS,
Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the other representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank.

Reyes filed with the Comelec a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Recabo, alleging that Recabo is a substitute candidate of his mother,
Candelaria B. Recabo. Reyes submits that since the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by Robert
Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS in favor of Candelaria. Therefore, Candelaria not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an
independent candidate only. And since Candelaria is an independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res.
No. 2977 promulgated on January 15, 1998, no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate.
Comelec cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Recabo. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, Recabo filed before the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that: 1) His certificate of candidacy and that of his mother whom he
substituted substantially complied with the requirements of being official candidate of the LAKAS; 2) The people of Mainit have spoken loud and clear in his
favor by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them; and, 3) By cancelling his certificate of candidacy,
Comelec acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is valid?

NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: The certificate of nomination by registered political parties of their official candidates
shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed
and attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so.

Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP issued an `Authorization designating two (2) Party officers to nominate, sign, attest
under oath and issue the Official Certificates of Nomination, namely, Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S. Barbers. Consistent with the foregoing, the
certificate of nomination and acceptance, as pointed out by the Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party officers.

The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his mother did not comply with the requirements of being official candidates of LAKAS Party. The
certificate of nomination was invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer as compared to Reyes which was signed by the National
Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.

Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy to curb the evil that the Comelec sought to
abate pursuant to its mandate to hold free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. As the respondent Commission stated, to allow respondent to
run under the circumstances adverted to herein would put the election process in mockery and disrepute for we would in effect be allowing an anomalous
situation where a single political party may field-in multiple candidates for a single election position.

It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later withdrew the same on March 31, 1998.
In the meantime, Reyes, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998. Thereafter, Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2, 1998, in
substitution of his mother who had withdrawn earlier.
Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same political party, at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy there was no
more void to fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no
more vacancy to be substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery of our electoral
process, which envisions one candidate from a political party for each position.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to establish the results of the election.

To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall resolve the second issue first that the electorate has spoken loud and clear in favor of petitioner by
giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the popular will as clearly
expressed in votes cast and counted should prevail, such that the election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his certificate.
Recabo submitted a Certified List of Candidates with their Votes Obtained and an undated `Certified List of Winning Candidates both signed by the Acting
Election Officer and Election Officer-OIC, respectively.
In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion to rule that: xxx. According to Section 17, a certificate of votes can only be evidence to prove
tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly committed in the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated x x x. A certificate of votes
does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are.
In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning candidates sufficient evidence of the real results of the election. Moreover, the certificate of votes
submitted does not conform with Section 16 of R.A. 6646. It does not state the number of votes obtained in words; it does not state the number of the
precinct, the total number of voters who voted in the precinct and the time issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified true and correct by a certain
Lydia P. Mahinay as acting election officer. As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A. 6646 requires that the certificate of votes be signed and thumbmarked by
each member of the board of election inspectors.
Thus, the doctrine that a mere technicality cannot be used to frustrate the peoples will finds no application in the case at bar considering that the results of
the election have not been duly established.

ISSUE: Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the position of vice-mayor being the second highest winning candidate?
No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of the election. A certificate of canvass issued on the basis of the election
returns is required to proclaim the elected candidate. It is settled that the disqualification or non-qualification of the winner in a vice mayoralty race does
not justify the proclamation of the defeated candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost
the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a
field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

ISSUE: How then the vacancy should be filled up?

The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner should be filled up in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become the vice-mayor. (G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

Posted on October 3, 2012
GR No. 112889
243 SCRA 538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution
which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or
grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California,
U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that
country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing
in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates
disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28)
against private respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be
made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Post under Disqualification from office , Election law , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via a
Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc.
Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to
determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a
fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA
Court and of the felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:
No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent
to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent
to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been
filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the
filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was
clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint
and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24,
1996)
MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having
been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any elective local position.
ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of
the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship
and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy
Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions
upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested.
She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter
and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
 II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate
days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a
bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it
is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term
and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the
position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
 Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No.
9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its
plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer
to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13,
2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress
nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting
an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in
any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for
the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.

Abas kida v senate (feb 28, 2012)

FACTS:

These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA)
No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?

2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory powers over autonomous regions?

HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.

POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials
from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective
officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned
in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the
people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as
long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument
to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and
unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.

2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding
regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since
these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of
the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned
in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.

3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their
positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions
until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in
a holdover capacity.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the
period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus, bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials
from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.

4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.Although
the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another
date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where
elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such
as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments
covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it
that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President's appointment
power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President,
and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. This is incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already
made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

MR DENIED.

Ledesma v ca
Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice Secretarys Power of Control Over Prosecutors
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the
Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; xxxx.
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other
duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted
to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority
to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.
Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:i[24]
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative
agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may
judicial recourse be allowed.

Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not Foreclosed by the Ruling in Crespo

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,ii[25] the Court clarified that Crespoiii[26] did not foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary
investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice.
The justice secretarys power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. In his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify
or reverse resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act No. 5180, as amended,iv[27] specifically in Section 1 (d):
(d) x x x Provided, finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary of
Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state
prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the
respondent, based on the same sworn statements or evidence submitted without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular No. 7 dated January 25, 1990 governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals
under Section 2 are limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However, Section 4 provides an exception: appeals from resolutions finding
probable cause upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been arraigned. In the present
case, petitioners appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course on August 26, 1992 pursuant to this Circular.
On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded by Department Order No. 223; however, the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged:
SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prisin correccional,
regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality, pursuant to Department Order
No. 318 dated August 28, 1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2,
1993. Such appeals shall also be governed by these rules.
SEC. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions.--No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or
City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error
or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the
pendency of the appeal, x x x appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of review of the secretary of justice is recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112
of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.--x x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the
fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information.
This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising from his power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the
government, not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by petitioner.

People v pena

We likewise cannot uphold the lower court's finding of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his
rank. There is no doubt that the victim was of higher rank than the accused since the former was the barangay captain, while the latter, as chief barangay
tanod, was the former's subordinate. However, there is no proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the accused deliberately intended to insult the
rank of the victim as barangay captain. 25

constantino v sandiganbayan

The Municipality of Malungon listed as one of its priority programs, the acquisition of a fleet of heavy equipment needed by the municipality in its
development projects.1[5] For this purpose, it appropriated an amount of P2.2 Million per annum for a period of five (5) years beginning in 1996 for the
amortization of such purchase.2[6] Pursuant thereto, the municipality conducted two (2) public biddings for suppliers of the required fleet of heavy
equipment. Both attempts, however, failed. Hence, the Sangguniang Bayan instead passed Resolution No. 21 on 22 February 1996, authorizing petitioner
Constantino to enter into a negotiated contract for the lease/purchase of the needed fleet of heavy equipment.3[7]

In light of the forego[i]ng facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on the record, it is difficult to perceive how the
Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the transaction in
question. It is difficult to see how the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation entered into pursuant to
Resolution No. 21 and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council through its Resolution No. 38 could be deemed an
infringement of the same Resolution No. 21. In truth, an examination of the pertinent writings (the resolution, the two (2)
instruments constituting the negotiated contract, and the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their integrity and congruity.
It is in fine, difficult to see how those pertinent written instrument, could establish a prima facie case to warrant the preventive
suspension of Mayor Constantino. A person with the most elementary grasp of the English language would, from merely scanning
those material documents, at once realize that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed wishes of the Sangguniang
Bayan.

xxxx

The investigator also opined that Resolution No. 21 should be interpreted in light of other official documents, executed a
year earlier. He [Graft Prosecutor Buena] does not explain why he did not adopt the more obvious construction of Resolution No. 21
indicated by the elementary doctrine that it is within the power and prerogative of the town council to repeal its prior acts, either
expressly, or by the passage of essentially inconsistent resolutions. When the town council passed Resolution No. 21 without any
mention whatever of those prior official documents respecting the acquisition to heavy equipment, the evident intention was to
supersede them and to have such acquisition governed solely by Resolution No. 21. This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact
that the Sanggunian expressly admitted in the Second Whereas Clause of its Resolution No. 21 that there had been a failure of
bidders to submit bids despite of two biddings ... public announcement [sic] the two biddings being obviously related to said earlier
official acts of the town council. The conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the Council (with full awareness of said
negotiated contract,) and of the delivery of equipment thereunder, had requested the Mayor to put the equipment into operation
for the town projects. The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Councils intention, which it expressed in clear language, to
confer on the Mayor ample discretion to execute a negotiated contract with any interested party, without regard to any official acts
of the Council prior to Resolution No. 21.
 It is also difficult to see why the patent inaccuracies in the affidavit-complaint and Resolution No. 47 were ignored as
difficult to understand how the execution of two writings to embody one contract of lease/purchase could be regarded as fatally
defective, and even indicative of a criminal conspiracy, or why said two writings should be interpreted in such a way as to magnify
their seeming inconsistencies. The fundamental and familiar legal principle which the Office of the Ombudsman ignored is that it is
perfectly legitimate for a bilateral contract to be embodied in two or more separate writings, and that in such an event the writings
should be read and interpreted together in such a way as to eliminate seeming inconsistencies and render the parties intention
effectual.

The statement in the appealed Resolution as to the absence of prior consent of the Council to the negotiated contract
executed by Mayor Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation flies in the teeth of the evidence; there is unrebutted proof that the
heavy equipment delivered to the Municipality pursuant to the contract, was inspected by designated councilors and municipal
officers; that shortly thereafter, the negotiated contract composed of two documents was explained and discussed at the session of
the town Council of February 29, 1996; and that afterwards the Council requested Mayor Constantino to put the equipment into
operation. (Emphasis supplied)4[46]

Public Bidding as the Primary Mode of Procurement. Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of supplies or property by local government
units shall be through competitive bidding.

Section 28. Other Modes of Procurement. Local government units may make procurement of their supply and property requirements without
public bidding and through any of the following modes applicable in the circumstances, as provided hereunder:

a. personal canvass of responsible merchants;

b. emergency purchase;
c. negotiated purchase;
d. direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
e. purchase from government entities.
xxxx

People v agustin fortes

R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Under Section 408 of said Code, offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
one (1) year or a fine exceeding P5,000.00 are excepted from referral to the Lupon. Hence, rape is still exlcuded from the required referral.
Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact been raped, then either she or her father should have first
informed the barangay captain about the incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission of a crime to a barangay captain is not a prerequisite for the
formal institution of criminal charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rapes was not among the crimes which required referral to the
Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted from such a referral considering that
the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days imprisonment. 43 If the complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain
and instead reported the incident directly to the police, it is quite obvious that they wanted immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest and forestall
any possible escape on his part.

Lacurom v jacoba
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing
fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.5[50]

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced
with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers
of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also
SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents
that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.