VOL. 1, NO.

3, JUNE 2017 7500204

Sensor networks

Disrupting Anti-Jamming Interference Alignment Sensor Networks with

Optimal Signal Design
Jing Guo1 , Nan Zhao1 , F. Richard Yu2 , Shun Zhang3 , Zhutian Yang4 , and Victor C. M. Leung5
1 School of Information and Communication Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China
2 Department of Systems and Computer Engineering, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada
3 State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University, Xian 710126, China
4 School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
5 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
Student Member, IEEE
Senior Member, IEEE
Member, IEEE
Fellow, IEEE

Manuscript received March 30, 2017; revised May 10, 2017; accepted May 19, 2017. Date of publication May 23, 2017; date of current version June 1, 2017.

AbstractAnti-jamming interference alignment (IA) can battle with the adversarial jamming signals for IA sensor networks
effectively. In this letter, we design jamming signals to optimally disrupt the transmission of anti-jamming IA sensor networks.
Specifically, with only the jamming channel information known for the jammer, we design the jamming signal to minimize
the signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratio (SJNR) at a certain targeted IA receiver with the jamming power constraints.
Furthermore, an approximate expression of the minimized SJNR is presented to estimate the jamming performance
theoretically. Simulation results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed optimal jamming scheme towards
IA sensor networks.

Index TermsSensor networks, anti-jamming scheme, interference alignment sensor networks, jamming design, multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO), signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratio (SJNR).

I. INTRODUCTION networks can be guaranteed. The anti-jamming IA scheme was fur-

ther extended to performed energy harvesting in [16], in which the
Jamming is an important kind of physical attack in wireless sensor
jamming signal is utilized as a source of power supply, instead of
networks [1], [2] through which the legitimate transmission can be
just eliminated. However, the jamming signal in [15] is not particu-
disrupted by deteriorating the quality of the received signals. When
larly designed towards the anti-jamming IA sensor network, and its
the jammer has full or partial channel state information (CSI) about
performance still can be improved.
the legitimate transmit signals, the so-called correlated jamming has
Thus, in this paper, the jamming signal is further designed to disrupt
been studied to disrupt the wireless communication in many different
the legitimate transmission in the anti-jamming IA sensor networks op-
conditions [3], [4]. Specifically, the jammer can destroy the legitimate
timally, standing on the position of jammers. In the proposed scheme,
transmission by intelligently generating the disruptive jamming signal,
with only the jamming channel information known for the jammer, we
which is correlated with the transmit signal. On the other hand, some
design the jamming signal to minimize the signal-to-jamming-plus-
uncorrelated jamming design problems were studied in [5] and [6],
noise ratio (SJNR) at a certain targeted IA receiver with the jamming
in which the channel estimation process of legitimate transmission is
power constraints. In addition, an approximate expression of the min-
disrupted instead of the received signal.
imized received SJNR is also derived to estimate the jamming perfor-
Towards the attack of jamming, plenty of effective anti-jamming
mance theoretically. Finally, simulation results are provided to verify
methods have emerged to battle with the jammers for the legitimate
the effectiveness of the proposed optimal jamming scheme towards
sensor networks [1]. Conventionally, spread spectrum can be used to
anti-jamming IA sensor networks.
combat jamming [7], [8], which becomes invalid when the jammer
Notation: A , A , and Tr{A} are the Hermitian transpose, the
is broadband or has a high transmit power. Recently, several other
pseudo-inverse and the trace of matrix A. CN (a, A) represents a cir-
effective anti-jamming techniques have also been proposed [9][11].
cularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and
Different from all these methods [7][11], interference alignment (IA)
covariance matrix A.
can be exploited to combat the adversarial jammers [12], which is an
effective technique of interference management for multi-user sensor
networks [13], [14]. In [15], an anti-jamming IA scheme was proposed
to handle the jamming signals and the interferences among users to- II. SYSTEM MODEL
gether with the help of IA, and the legitimate transmission of sensor Consider a K-user sensor network with the existence of an ad-
versarial jammer, where the jammer, the kth legitimate transmitter,
Corresponding author: Nan Zhao (e-mail: zhaonan@dlut.edu.cn).
Associate Editor: F. Falcone. and kth legitimate receiver are equipped with N j , M [k] , and N [k] an-
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LSENS.2017.2707280 tennas, respectively. The received signal at the kth receiver can be

1949-307X C 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.

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7500204 VOL. 1, NO. 3, JUNE 2017

 [] [] 
expressed as z = E z z
R[] is the autocorrelation matrix of z[] , in which z[]
is the jamming signal that is specially designed towards the th user.

K
[] []
y [k] = u[k] H[ki] v[i] x [i] + u[k] H[k] H[]
j Rz H j is the autocorrelation matrix of the received jamming
j z+u
[k] [k]
n (1)
i=1 j z at the th receiver.
signal H[]
According to (5), if we want to minimize SJNR[] , the received
where H[ki] C N M denotes the CSI along the link from the ith
[k] [i]
jamming power at the th user J [] should be maximized by properly
N [k] N j
transmitter to the kth receiver. H[k] j C represents the channel designing R[]z . The objective function can be expressed as
gain matrix between the adversarial jammer and the kth receiver. Each
element in H[ki] and H[k] 
R[] = arg max J []
j is assumed to be independent and identically z
R[]
z
distributed and follow CN (0, 1). v[k] C M 1 and u[k] C N 1 are
[k] [k]

z } P j , Rz = Rz .
s.t. Tr{R[] [] []
(9)
unitary precoding and decoding vectors for the kth user, respectively.
x [k] denotes the transmit signal of the kth user with the power con- To solve this optimization problem of (9), we first set n = min{N j , N },
straint P [k] . n[k] C N 1 denotes the additive white Gaussian noise
[k]
[] []
which represents the rank of the autocorrelation matrix H[] j Rz H j .
(AWGN) vector at the kth receiver, which follows the distribution of Let ei , i = 1, ..., n, represent the orthonormal basis of the received
[]

CN (0, n2 I N [k] ). z represents the jamming signal emitted by the adver- jamming signal H[] j z, and we have
 
sarial jammer, with the power constraint E z z = P j .

n
To enhance the performance of the kth receiver, we can resort to H[] [] []
= i[] ei[] ei[]
j Rz H j (10)
the anti-jamming IA scheme [15], and simultaneously eliminate both i=1
the jamming and interferences among different users if the following
where i[] is the corresponding transmit power for the ith jamming
conditions are satisfied:
spatial dimension. Since the CSI among the legitimate transmitters
u[k] H[ki] v[i] = 0, i = k (2) and receivers is unknown by the jammer, the optimal method for the
jammer to minimize the SJNR is to maximize the power of each
j = 0.
u[k] H[k] (3)
jamming spatial dimension. Thus we set 1[] = ... = n[] = [] , and
For notational simplicity, all the legitimate users are assumed to the objective function of (9) can be rewritten as
have the same parameters, i.e., M [k] = M, N [k] = N and P [k] = P, 
R[] = arg max []
z
k = 1, 2, . . . , K . With the constraints from (2) to (3), we can obtain R[]
z

the feasibility conditions of the anti-jamming IA scheme as [15]. 

n
[] []
s.t. H[]
j Rz H j = [] ei[] ei[]
M + N K + 1 + N j , N N j + 1, M 1. (4) i=1

z } P j , Rz = Rz .
Tr{R[] [] []
(11)
The jamming signal can be eliminated effectively according to the
anti-jamming IA scheme. However, the jamming signal in (1) is not First, we consider the case of N < N j + 1, i.e., N j N , and the
specially designed towards the anti-jamming IA scheme, and the jam- feasibility condition in (4) cannot be met. The optimal design of the
ming performance still can be improved when it is properly designed. autocorrelation matrix R[] z can be summarized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Decompose the th jamming channel as H[] j =
[] [] [] []
S j  j D j , where S j ,  j and D j are the results of the sin-
[] []

III. OPTIMAL JAMMING SIGNAL DESIGN gular value decomposition (SVD) of H[] [] []
j . Specifically, S j and D j
N N j
In the performance analysis of Section II, the jamming signal is are two unitary matrices, and  j C []
is a diagonal matrix with
not specially designed, and thus the performance of the anti-jamming the singular values j,1[]
, ..., j,n
[]
on the diagonal. Thus, the optimal
IA scheme can be guaranteed. In this section, the jamming signal design of R[]
z can be obtained as

is optimally designed aiming at disrupting the transmission of one 1
 P 1
specific legitimate user, without loss of generality, the th user. z = N
R[]
j
D []
Diag , ..., , 0, .., 0 D[] . (12)
1 j
[] 2
[]
2 j
Assume that the jamming signal is optimally designed towards the i=1 2
[] j,1 j,N
j,i
th user. The SJNR for the th receiver can be expressed in (5), where
Accordingly, the received jamming signal power [] is maximized as
SJNR[] =

N
1
H v v H
Pu [] [] [] []
u [] [] [] = P j /
 2
. (13)
 K  i=1 j,i
[]
[] [] []
u[] H j Rz H j + i=1,i= H v v H[i] + n2 I N u[]
[i] [i] [i]
 N [] []
Proof: When N j N , [] i=1 ei ei = [] I N . Thus the equa-

S []
tion H j Rz H j = [] i=1 ei[] ei[] in (11) can be reformed as
[] [] [] N
= . (5)
J [] + I [] + n2
[] [] [] [] [] []
j  j D j Rz D j  j S j
S[] = [] I N
S [] = Pu[] H[] v[] v[] H[] u[] (6)
[] [] [] []
 []
j D j Rz D j  j = [] I N

K
 
I [] = u[] H[i] v[i] v[i] H[i] u[] (7)
D[]
j Rz D j =  j
[k] [k] [k] [k]
 [k]
j
i=1,i=

[] [] []
 
J []
=u []
j Rz H j u .
H[] (8) z = Dj j
R[] [] [] []
 []
j D[]
j .
 VOL. 1, NO. 3, JUNE 2017 7500204

Therefore, we have TABLE 1. Simulation Parameters.

1 1 Parameter Value
R[] = [] D[]
j Diag , ..., , 0, .., 0 D[] . (14)
z
[] 2 []
2 j K 3
j,1 j,N
M 4
4
From the waterfilling principle, the [] in (11) can be maximized as N
N P 1 mW
[] = P j / i=1
 1
[] 2
.
j,i SNR 30 dB
Thus, the optimal R[]
z in (12) of Theorem 1 is proved.  Nj 6 in Fig. 1; from 3 to 10 in Fig. 2
In the proposed scheme of jamming design, only the jamming chan- Pj 10 mW in Fig. 2; from 1 mW to 20 mW in Fig. 1
nel information H[]
j should be available at the jammer, which is easy
to achieve. In the anti-jamming IA scheme, the CSI of the legitimate
users should be estimated at each receiver and then fed back to the
where the last step in the above derivations utilize the [17, Lemma
transmitters. Thus the jamming channel information H[] j can be ob- 2.10]. Substituting (19) into (17), we can obtain the results in
tained by the jammer through the feedback.
Theorem 2.
From Theorem 1, the power of the received jamming signal with
Then, for the case of N j < N , the anti-jamming IA scheme is
the decoding vector u[] can be expressed as
feasible according to (4). Once the legitimate network is deployed, the
Pj number of antennas is usually fixed. On the contrary, the jammer can
J [] =  N . (15)
i=1
1
2
flexibly change its antenna configuring. Thus, we can activate more
[]
j,i jamming antennas to meet N j N , and our proposed scheme will
Interestingly, the value of J [] does not depend on the structure of take effect. 
the decoder u[] , which can be confirmed by the derivations in (16),
shown at the bottom of the page.
Based on (5) and (15), the minimum SJNR at the th receiver can IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
be presented as In the simulation, we consider a 3-user anti-jamming IA sensor
[] S [] network in the presence of an adversarial jammer with M = 4 and N =

SJNR = . (17)
Pj 4. The transmit power of each IA user is set to 1 mW, and the signal-
N 1 + n2
i=1 [] 2
j,i
to-noise ratio (SNR) is fixed at 30 dB. The simulation parameters
are summarized in Table 1. First, we compare the average SJNR of
According to the expression of minimum SJNR in (17), an approxi- the targeted IA user with different P j as shown in Fig. 1, in the cases
mate expression can be achieved in Theorem 2 to estimate the received when the jamming signal is optimally designed and when the jamming
SJNR at the th receiver. signal is randomly generated. We set N j = 6. From the results, we can
Theorem 2: When N j > N , the minimum SJNR at the th receiver see that the average SJNR of the targeted receiver when the jamming
in (17) can be approximately expressed as signal is optimally designed is much lower than that when no jamming
[] S [] design is adopted, which reflects that the proposed optimal design can

SJNR . (18) disrupt the anti-jamming IA sensor network much more effectively.
N N
P j jN + n2
We can also find that when the jamming power P j increases, the SJNR
Proof: Taking the expectation of J [] , we can obtain becomes lower as well. In addition, the approximate value of SJNR
    is very close to the simulated value, and thus we can utilize (18) to
[] [] []
J [] = E J [] = E u[] H[]
j Rz H j u estimate the performance of the proposed scheme theoretically.
Then, the average SJNR of the targeted IA user is compared with
N
1  N
1 different N j in Fig. 2, with P j = 10 mW. From the results, we can see
= E Pj / = P j /E
[]
2 []
2
that the SJNR with optimal jamming design is lower than that without
i=1 j,i i=1 j,i
  jamming design, only when N j N = 4. This is consistent with the
1  Nj N
= P j /E Tr H[] []
Pj analysis in Section III. Besides, the SJNR will become lower when N j
j Hj (19)
N becomes larger and N j 3, which means that the performance of the

  1 1  
J []
=u []
H[] [] [] []
j Rz H j u =u []
S[] [] []
j j Dj

[]
D[]
j Diag , ..., []
, 0, .., 0 D j [] []
j j Sj
D[] u[]
[] 2
[] 2
j,1 j,N

    1 1   
[] []
= u[] S[]  []

[]
D D Diag , ..., , 0, .., 0 D[]
j Dj
[]
 []
j Sj
[]
u[]
j j j j
[] 2
[] 2
j,1 j,N

1 1  
=
[] u[] S[]  []
j Diag , ..., , 0, .., 0  [] [] []
S u = 
[] []
u S [] []
S u[] = 
[] . (16)
j
[] 2 []
2 j j j j
j,1 j,N
7500204
Fig. 1. Comparison of the average SJNR with different jamming power
in the cases when the jamming signal is optimally designed and when
no jamming design is adopted (K = 3, M = 4, N = 4, N j = 6).
Fig. 2. Comparison of the average SJNR with different jamming an-
tennas in the cases when the jamming signal is optimally designed
and when no jamming design is adopted (K = 3, M = 4, N = 4,
P j = 10 mW).
proposed scheme can be improved with more jamming antennas. In
addition, we can also find that the approximate value of SJNR is very
close to the simulated value when N j > N , which is consistent with
Theorem 2.
VOL. 1, NO. 3, JUNE 2017
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the optimal design of jamming signal to-
wards the anti-jamming IA sensor network, standing on the position of
jammers. In the scheme, the jamming signal was optimally designed
to minimize the SJNR of a targeted IA receiver, with only the CSI
between the jammer and the targeted receiver. In addition, an approx-
imate expression of minimum SJNR was also derived to analyze the
jamming performance theoretically. Simulation results were presented
to verify the effectiveness of the proposed jamming scheme.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported in part by the Xinghai Scholars Program and in part by the
National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61671101.
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