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ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS AQUINO (G.R. NO.

L-39086)

FACTS:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the
Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for
non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure
by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for
the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the
building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is
not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

HELD:
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends
to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated
by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as
incidental to education (residence of the director).

Case Digest: Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and Constantino Rosas
G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004

FACTS:

The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon
City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the
Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the
same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is
being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The
petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-
patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner
receives annual subsidies from the government.

Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million,
predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When
appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the
QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners
claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact
that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD:

The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and
articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its
character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying
patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object
which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are
not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes. (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions
as regards to:
income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and
supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the
Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion
alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

G.R. No. 146382. August 7, 2003.]

SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF CALOOCAN CITY, Petitioner,


v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY, MAMERTO MANAHAN,
ATTY. NESTOR D. FRANCISCO, as City Assessor and City Legal Officer
of Caloocan City, and ADORACION ANGELES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, Respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari assails the Resolution 1 of the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, dated December 29,
1999, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. C-595, and the
Order dated February 23, 2000 denying the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit


educational institution organized and established in 1997 with business
address at 141-143 10th Avenue, Caloocan City. As such, it enjoys property
tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on the
parcels of land which petitioner is renting for P5,000 monthly from its sister
companies, Consolidated Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated Assembly) and Pair
Management and Development Corporation (Pair Management).

On January 8, 1998, petitioner requested respondent city government of


Caloocan, through respondent Mamerto Manahan, City Assessor and
Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land claiming that
the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution 2
and other applicable provisions of the Local Government Code.

On February 5, 1998, respondent city government, on recommendation of


respondent Atty. Nestor Francisco, City Legal Officer, denied the request on
the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by Consolidated
Assembly and Pair Management which derived income therefrom in the form
of rentals and other local taxes assumed by the petitioner. Hence, from the
land owners standpoint, the same were not actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes. 3

On February 15, 1999, the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Consolidated
Assembly and Pair Management, on the other, entered into separate
agreements 4 which in effect novated their existing contracts of lease on the
subject parcels of land and converted them to donations of the beneficial use
thereof.

On February 19, 1999, the petitioner wrote respondent City Assessor


informing the latter of the new agreements and seeking a reconsideration of
respondents earlier denial of the application for tax exemption. 5 In this
connection, a duly notarized certification 6 jointly issued by Consolidated
Assembly and Pair Management to the effect that they no longer received
income by way of rentals from the subject properties, accompanied by the
corresponding board resolutions, 7 were submitted by the petitioner.
Nevertheless, on July 21, 1999, respondent city government again denied
the application for tax exemption, reasoning out as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Firstly, it may be reasonably implied from the above facts that SYSTEMS
COMPUTER COLLEGE is an agency for its sister corporations, particularly,
PAIR MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED
ASSEMBLY, INC. to evade payment of Real Property Taxes.

It bears stress (sic) that immediately after the denial by this Office of the
first request of SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE for Real Property Tax
Exemption of the properties then leased to it by its sister companies; PAIR
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CONSOLIDATED
ASSEMBLY, INC., the latter corporations donated the beneficial use of the
subject properties to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE, if only to evade
payment of Real Property Taxes.

The revenue officers, in proper cases, may disregard the separate corporate
entity where it serves as a shield for tax evasion. . . .

Secondly, the grant of exemption from taxation rests upon the theory that
an exemption will benefit the body of people, and not upon any idea of
lessening the burden of individual or corporate owners.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

Thirdly, while the beneficial use of the properties being sought to be exempt
from Real Property Taxes were donated to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER
COLLEGE, there is no showing that the same are "actually, directly and
exclusively" used either for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. 8

Twice debunked, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the


respondent Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, which,
however, dismissed it for being premature. Its timely motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari 9 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court when it ruled: (1) that mandamus does not lie against the public
respondents and (2) that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.

Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or


person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 10 Where administrative remedies are available, a petition for
mandamus does not lie. 11

Under Section 226 of RA 7160, 12 the remedy of appeal to the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the
provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of property,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person


having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of
the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property
may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of
assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or
city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose,
together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents
submitted in support of the appeal.

However, petitioner argues that it is not contesting any assessment made by


respondent City Assessor. Petitioners argument obviously proceeds from its
misunderstanding of the term "assessment." Under Section 199(f), Title II,
Book II, of the Local Government Code of 1991, "assessment" is defined as
the act or process of determining the value of a property, or proportion
thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification and
appraisal of properties. Viewed from this broader perspective, the
determination made by the respondent City Assessor with regard to the
taxability of the subject real properties squarely falls within its power to
assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals.

Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to enforce, through the petition for
mandamus, a clear legal right under the Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code granting tax exemption on
properties actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
But petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously
presumes the existence of the fact which it must first prove by competent
and sufficient evidence before the City Assessor. It must be stressed that the
authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification of properties for
taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is
appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, if necessary.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative
agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of
raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for
remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as
in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all
remedies provided therein. 13 Otherwise stated, before seeking the
intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first
avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. 14

Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the
exercise of his function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While
its duty to conduct assessments is a ministerial function, the actual exercise
thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus
may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the
exercise of either. 15

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Morales, JJ., concur.

G. R. No. 106440 - January 29, 1996


ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA
MANOSCA, Petitioners,v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES
CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled "Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon.
Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use"
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-
square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national
historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila,
with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January
1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of
1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an
event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine
history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who,
admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a
national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public
use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of the Government
charged with the maintenance and care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the
development of historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or
landmarks, may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring
the lot in question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of
the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted
a complaint for expropriation 3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the
NHI alleging, inter alia, that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical Institute issued
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite
of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark. The
plaintiff perforce needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit
it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989, 4 an order fixing the provisional market
(P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to
take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was
not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support ofIglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. 5 Petitioners
sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of
the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners'
motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to
dismiss. 6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990, 7 another order was issued by the trial court,
declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03
August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th
April 1991 order. 8
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its
now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground
that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the
petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional
competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was
denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation,
is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with
any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant
more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so
described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may
be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the
State. 9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to
meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive
form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional qualification is that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 11 This proscription
is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the
case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 12 to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b)
the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic
reform. 13 Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following
public uses, 14 i.e., the
. . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves,
piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian
wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under
Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller
home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of
the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant
to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be
understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. 15
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered
in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the
characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent
domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or advantage
to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to
use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit"
accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769,
772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property
in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from
particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such
use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or
exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692,
67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is
productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality,
but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the
public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A "public
use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions
of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of
government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new
modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d
579,586. 17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public"
has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 18 quoting from Berman
v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421,
424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is no for us to reappraise them. If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United
States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 that:
. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of constant
growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new
use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for "whatever is beneficially
employed for the community is a public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is
not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use. 20
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the
future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that
what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public
welfare." 22
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix
Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristowould benefit? This attempt to
give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of theIglesia ni Cristo than
by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental
and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. 23
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value
of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of
opportunity to be heard; 24 contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are replete
with pleadings 25 that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the
property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court's order
which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly.
The Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between theIglesia ni Cristo and
petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

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