G.R. No.

186228 March 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-
year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.

The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA,
a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in
the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years
old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant.5 On
trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA;6 her brother BBB;7 and
one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9 AAAs father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbors place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when
appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.11 Her only brother BBB also went
out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid inside the
blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14 warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.16 He
proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out
late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmothers
house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.21 Upon reaching their
grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,22 after which, they
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.24 He invited appellant
to the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he
raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,
Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him
was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after
engaging in a heated argument,29and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He went further
to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.31 Shortly after,
AAA arrived.32She answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard
on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon.35 Finding
nobody at home,36he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy
Banting.38They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39 He later learned that he was
under detention because AAA charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and
minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.42 It also ordered him to
indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary
damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The appellate court found that appellant is not
eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of
appeal.47 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs,48 but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.49
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him
guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,50 because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother
BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53

Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and
the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for
under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be
deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January
2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x.
She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to
Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly
conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in
the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay
Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x
x x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case
at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the
private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a
"bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on
11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized
"to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay
level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa;
(4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or
neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his
community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without
ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of
the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified
that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought
her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,
and their story a mere concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could
not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident
since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of
Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the
help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of
AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts
that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is
likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.68 As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but
also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is
unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and
embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime
was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to
one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels
loving and lasting gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail
for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame.72 It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose
morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is
entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the
applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall be
imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the
penetration of appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.77 Further, when such testimony corresponds with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge
have been established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the
accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes
for violence and intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist
and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head.80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is
viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by
strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility."82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of
its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the
instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically
alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified
to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,
the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here,
the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto84 and P75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary damages should
have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu
of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant
would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.87 We further affirm the ruling of the
Court of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

Case Digest: People v. Tan

G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito
Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen
alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in
connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City.
During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in
the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the
motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the
motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a
guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he
had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not
only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In
the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not
inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did
he reduce the supposed confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon
invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD: No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy
the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary,
knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows
that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his
participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The
constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are
impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will
always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the
awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

PEOPLE V. PACITA ORDONO G.R. NO. 132154

November 27, 2010

Facts : On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in
Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old, who
three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by the NBI, revealed that
the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. The police
thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for
lack of evidence , they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the police station and
acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime.The police immediately conducted an investigation
and put their confessions in writing. They however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the
two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality.
Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken.Both accused were apprised
in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of
their choice. They assure that they understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, hence,
the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police, other police
officers and the suspects wife and mother, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary
statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.

Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-
recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events
surrounding their commission thereof

A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La
Union, for assistance and counseling. PAO lawyer apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and
explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them
to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second signature/
thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him
of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their respective
confessions. They assured that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance
that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the
accused to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the same
before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members
of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty.
The accused are now assailing their conviction on the ground that constitutional infirmities attended the
execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial
investigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence.

Issue: WON the confessions is inadmissible in evidence due to the lack of counsel assistance during custodial
investigation.

Facts: Yes, The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible. The presence of the
mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect.

confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements:

(a) the confession must be voluntary;

(b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(c) the confession must be express; and,
(d) the confession must be in writing.[6]

Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to
adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for
the commission of the offense.[7] Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any
statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent.[8]

Before persons can appear as substitute for counsel, two (2) conditions must be met:

(a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and,

(b) a valid waiver must be executed.

Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of
the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's
presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment
as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.[9] Consequently, any
admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.

Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission either.
It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements
were being taken.[10]

With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible in evidence, we are left with the
interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview likewise revealed
that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the
crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.[15] By analogy, statements made by herein
accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an
investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not
by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not
talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did
not violate their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, herein accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of rape with homicide on two
(2) counts as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.

Consti II case digest: PEOPLE VS CASIMIRO y Serillo

Signing of Acknowledgement Receipts
G.R. No. 146277. June 20, 2002

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City finding accused-appellant ALBERT
CASIMIRO guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

The information against accused-appellant alleged that on or about the 17th day of August 1999, the accused
(Casimiro), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2 DOROTHEO
SUPA, posing as buyer, about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form, in violation
of the aforecited provision of law.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Three witnesses testimonies (PO2 Supa, Alma Margarita D. Villaseor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.),
established the following:

On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of the 14th Regional Narcotics
Office in Baguio City and informed Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng and PO3 Piggangay that a certain
Albert Casimiro was engaged in the distribution or sale of marijuana. Police Chief Inspector Leleng then formed
a buy-bust team with PO2 Supa as poseur-buyer and PO3 Piggangay, Jr. as one of back-up men.

The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait for a call from Casimiro. True
enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he found that it
was accused-appellant Casimiro. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa as someone who wanted to buy
marijuana. Casimiro allegedly agreed to meet PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. at Anthonys Wine and Grocery
the following day. PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy one kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it
would cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants and a black leather jacket to their
meeting the following day.

On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the grocery store while SPO2 Madlon
and PO3 Piggangay waited secretly across the street, where they could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around 1:30
p.m., Casimiro arrived. Rose greeted him, O Bert, heto na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong
mag-usap. Aalis na ako. Rose then left the two men alone.

PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana. Casimiro gave the poseur-buyer a
paper bag, which contained an object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After determining from its
appearance and smell that the object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to
make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer gave the marked money to accused-
appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while the back-up team ran
from across the street.

After arresting Casimiro, the policemen took him to the Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and
PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The
policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory examination
of the confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a receipt of property seized, dated August 18, 1999.

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. The dried leaves were then examined
by forensic chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. The chemistry report dated
August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana.

During trial, the defense alleged that on August 17, 1999, Casimiro received a call from Rose, an acquaintance,
and offered to help him find a better job and asked that they meet at Anthonys Wine and Grocery. In the
past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or marijuana, but he refused to buy from her as he had no money. At
around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., he met Rose in front of the grocery store. While she talked to him about a job
opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted I-
handcuff, i-handcuff. Casimiro was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen, accompanied
by Rose.

At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted Casimiro about the marijuana allegedly seized from
him. Casimiro denied having carried the bag of marijuana, which he had seen Rose carrying earlier. After
taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him if he did not admit owning
the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release
Casimiro if he gave them money. When Casimiro replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you
have no money, then we will work on your papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took
accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of
property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report without explaining their contents or allowing him to read
them.

On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the evidence against accused-appellant is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect, the rule does not apply where it is shown that any fact of
weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. In this case,
several such circumstances stand out as having been overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which
entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.

First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does
not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance
with their standard operating procedure in a buy-bust operation to show what property was seized. The
receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.

Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was signed by
him without the assistance of counsel. The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered
by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as suspect/ owner. In
effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under
the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana
was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the Constitution to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical
of the atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.

PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while he was being arrested
outside the grocery:

Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?
A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our Narcotics office.

Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?
A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, You are under arrest for violation of
6425. You have the right to remain silent. You have the rights to call for a lawyer of your own
choice. Anything you say may be used as evidence in favor or against you. And we brought him to the
office, sir.

The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford counsel,
one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he
understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the
suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly,
intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for
Casimiro to say whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or
whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.

Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he points out, he could not have
been so careless as to call the telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to
the policemen there. Nor can we believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed
place, Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted to buy marijuana as if the latter were
buying something not prohibited or illegal. While drugs may indeed be sold to police officers, these
transactions are usually done face-to face.

Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related case.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. The prosecution
witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the brick
of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only
did so in their headquarters. The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was
likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked
by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.

Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a buy-bust operation. The
governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it is precisely when the
governments purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice
Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well meaning but without understanding. Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the
expense of constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.

The decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS TABOGA

FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which reads that with
intent to gain, and with violence against persons, entered the house of one Francisca Tubon, and
once inside, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attacked and stabbed
Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death of said
Tubon and took away several personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was likewise indicted
for Arson for setting the victims house on fire.
After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao confronted
Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing the
whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio
announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing
the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes charged
and interposed an alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and
forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi, he narrated that the
interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present
and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution. Thus, he had to admit the crimes
because he was afraid of the policemen.
The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.

ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a private person, can be
admitted as evidence against him.

HELD:
Yes.

There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything
on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the
police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even
asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the
information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what
was going on. The records also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio
reporter but to several others.

Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that he was
maltreated and compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the
officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence, on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as
factors indicating the voluntariness of the confession.
The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession. Such
confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but
to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that
accused-appellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the
victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman.

PEOPLE v. ENDINO
GR. No. 133026; Feb 20, 2001

The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin. Galgarin was arrested
and convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while on the other hand Endino remained at large.
HELD:
Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-
appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not
form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public.