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COMPLAINT
COMES NOW Plaintiff Rodney Grant, by and through undersigned counsel, to file this Complaint
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On July 2, 2000, Plaintiff Rodney Grant was arrested in New Orleans on suspicion of simple
burglary. He spent the next sixty-one days in Orleans Parish Prison without being charged with a crime.
He was released on September 3, 2000, because the District Attorney failed to file a bill of information
2. On October 30, 2000, the DA filed a Bill of Information for simple burglary.
3. On November 10, 2000, Rodney was due to be arraigned, but the court was closed that day. An
arraignment was reset for November 29, 2000, and a summons was mailed for him, but Rodney never
received it. Because he didnt receive the summons, he didnt know to appear for the arraignment but
the court nevertheless issued a warrant for his arrest and set a $112,000 bond.
4. Years passed. The Bill of Information expired by operation of law. Rodneys arrest warrant,
5. Between 2008 and 2015, Mr. Grant was incarcerated at Dixon Correctional Institute for a
different crime. While there, he achieved Class A trustee status and worked at the state mental hospital.
6. On June 25, 2015, Rodney was released from Dixon. He got his life back on track, got an
7. A year later, on June 27, 2016, Rodney was arrested while trying to obtain a drivers license
this time for the 2000 warrant, which was a decade and a half old by that time and predicated on a long-
expired charge.
8. On June 30, 2016, Rodney appeared for arraignment in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.
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Judge Camille Buras, seeing the injustice of his situation, allowed Rodney to plead guilty to a one year
sentence, with credit for time served for the seven years he had just served at Dixon.
9. Because he completed his sentence, Rodney should have walked free that day or the next.
10. To ensure he was released without delay, the Judge contacted an attorney at the Orleans Parish
Sheriffs Office and requested that the Sheriff expedite processing for Rodneys release. The Sheriffs
attorney then contacted several officialsincluding Sheriff Marlin Gusman, Chief of Corrections
Carmen DeSadier, Major Sidney Holt, and Sergeant Djuana Bierriaabout expediting processing,
stating that Rodney really shouldnt have to actually serve any time once DOC processes it and that
his sentence was one year DOC credit for time served from 2008-present.
11. But the Sheriff and his officials did not release Rodney.
12. He sat at the Orleans Parish Prison for another week and a half. On July 12, 2016, the Sheriff
handed Rodney over to the state Department of Public Safety & Corrections (DOC), who processed
13. Once they took custody of him, the DOC should have seen that his sentence was served and
14. But the DOC did not release Rodney. Instead, they sent him to the Madison Parish Correctional
Center (MPCC) in Tallulah, Louisiana, operated by the private prison corporation LaSalle
Corrections. At intake there, Rodney explained to an officer that his time was served and he should be
out. She looked at his sheet and agreed that it indicated no sentence.
16. Rodneys friend, Alfred, became concerned for his Rodney. Alfred spoke to Judge Buras, who
on or about July 15 called the Sheriff and Warden Stinson of LaSalle to ask why Rodney had not been
released.
17. On July 18, 2016, because Rodney still had not been released, Judge Buras held another hearing.
She vacated Rodneys one year, credit for time served sentence and replaced it with CREDIT FOR
TIME SERVED.
18. Despite having no legal authority whatsoever to hold Rodney, the DOC and LaSalle still did not
release him.
19. On July 25, 2016, Judge Buras called Irma Ray at the DOC. The Judge then called and emailed
20. Finally, several days later on July 27, 2016, Rodney was released. He was dropped off in
21. The law is clear: once a persons sentence is served, his jailors have a reasonable timenot
exceeding forty-eight hoursto process and release him. Any detention past that reasonable, less-than-
48-hour time is called overdetention and constitutes a violation of the persons constitutional rights.
See Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1354 (The Court has been unable to find any case,
whether within or outside of the Eleventh Circuit, in which the detainment of a properly identified
individual for days beyond his scheduled release date was held constitutionally permissible.)
22. This is a civil action for injunctive, monetary, and other relief for the violation of Plaintiffs
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2 of the
23. Plaintiffs claim arises under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. This Court has
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims of federal rights violations, enforceable under the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343(a)(3). This Court has
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Louisiana false imprisonment claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1367.
24. The venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2). A
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Orleans Parish, Louisiana situated in
25. Plaintiff Rodney Grant is of suitable age and capacity to file this suit. At all relevant time
during this suit (aside from his false imprisonment in Baton Rouge and Tallulah), Plaintiff was a
Defendants
26. Defendant Marlin Gusman is the Sheriff for the Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office and a final
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policymaker. He is sued in his individual and official capacity. On information and belief, he is
27. Defendant Carmen DeSadier is the former Chief of Corrections for the Orleans Parish Sheriffs
Office. She is sued in her individual capacity. She is domiciled in Cook County in the North District of
Illinois.
28. Defendant Sidney Holt is Captain for the Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. He is sued in his
individual and official capacities. On information and belief, he is domiciled in Jefferson Parish in the
29. Defendant Djuana Bierria is Sergeant for the Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. She is sued in her
individual and official capacities. On information and belief, she is domiciled in Jefferson Parish in the
30. Defendant James LeBlanc is the Secretary for the Louisiana Department of Corrections and a
final policymaker. He is sued in his individual and official capacities. On information and belief, he is
31. Defendant Timothy Hooper is the Warden of Elayn Hunt Correctional Center for the Louisiana
Department of Corrections and a final policymaker. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
On information and belief, he is domiciled in Calcasieu Parish in the Western District of Louisiana.
32. Defendant Chris Stinson is the Warden of Madison Parish Correctional Center (MPCC) for
LaSalle Corrections and a final policymaker. He is sued in his individual capacity for monetary damages
and in his official capacity for injunctive relief. He is domiciled in Rapides Parish in the Western
District of Louisiana.
33. Defendant LaSalle Management Company, L.L.C. (d.b.a. LaSalle Corrections) is a Limited
Liability Company domiciled in Ruston, Louisiana and a final policymaker. It is sued in its individual
34. Defendants Does 1 to 10 are as-yet unknown individuals or entities involved in the overdetention
of Rodney Grant. They are sued in their official and individual capacities.
35. Defendants ABC Insurance Companies 1-10 are as yet unknown insurance companies, who,
upon information and belief, have issued and currently have in effect one or more policies of insurance
IV. FACTS
36. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
37. On October 30, 2000, the Orleans District Attorney charged Rodney in a bill of information with
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simple burglary.
38. On November 10, 2000, Rodney was due to be arraigned, but the court was closed that day. As a
result, an arraignment was reset for November 29, 2000. A summons was mailed for him, but Rodney
never received it. Because he didnt receive the summons, he couldnt appear for the arraignmentbut
39. Rodney was arrested on September 14, 2008. He served seven years at Dixon Correctional
Institute until June 25, 2015, when he was released subject to probation until 2023.
40. On June 27, 2016, while trying to obtain a drivers license, Rodney was arrested pursuant to the
nearly sixteen-year-old warrant. At his arraignment on June 30, 2016, Rodney pled guilty as charged to
one count of simple burglary, and the Judge sentenced him to one year with credit for the seven years he
previously served.
41. The same day of his arraignment, the Judge told the Sheriffs attorney, Blake Arcuri, to have
OPSO expedite processing for Rodneys release. On June 30, 2016, Arcuri emailed OPSO officials
including Defendant Marlin Gusman, Defendant Carmen DeSadier, Defendant Sidney Holt, and
Defendant Djuana Bierriaabout the Judges order, stating Rodney really shouldnt have to actually
serve any time once DOC processes it and that his sentence was one year DOC credit for time served
from 2008-present.
42. In less than an hour and a half, Defendant Gusman responded to Blake Arcuris email, stating
that once Rodney enters a plea and is sentenced, they could have DOC compute his time. That same
morning, Defendant Holt responded that he forwarded Arcuris email to DOC Classifications Deputy for
OPSO, Defendant Corey Amacker, and would have him contact DOC and see what can be done.
43. Defendant Amacker emailed Arcuri that he would work on getting Rodneys packet to the DOC
on July 1, 2016, which was the following day. It was not until July 7, 2016, however, that DOC sent
OPSO an inmate transfer request, containing Rodneys name with July 12, 2016, as the transfer date.
44. Rodney remained at Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) until July 12, 2016, when OPSO
relinquished authority to DOC. He underwent processing at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St.
45. During processing, Rodney explained he was granted credit for time served and should be
released. Rodney received confirmation from an official that his sheet indicated no sentence.
However, the same day of processing, DOC transferred Rodney to Madison Parish Correctional Center
46. Rodneys friend, Alfred Marshall, became concerned for Rodney. On or around July 15, 2016,
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Alfred spoke with Judge Buras, who then called the Sheriff and MPCC Warden Chris Stinson.
47. In further attempt to effectuate Rodneys release, Orleans Parish Public Defender Aaron Zagory
appeared in CDC on July 18, 2016, on Rodneys behalf. That day, the Judge vacated Plaintiffs previous
48. On July 25, 2016, the Judge called Corrections ARDC Specialist II Irma Ray regarding Rodneys
release. The Judge then called and emailed Kanedra Burton at the DOC.
49. Defendants finally released Plaintiff from MPCC on July 27, 2016. His release occurred twenty-
seven days after the Judge ordered OPSO to expedite processing with DOC. (See Fig. 1, infra.)
50. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
51. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is violated where a prisoner remains
incarcerated after the legal authority to hold him has expired. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th
Cir. 1980). No privilege enables a jailer to detain a prisoner beyond the period of his lawful sentence.
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1968); Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351 (N. D.
Ga. 2005) (detainee has constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should
52. Once a prisoners sentence has expired, his jailor has a reasonable amount of time to process and
release him. That reasonable time, however, must be well short of forty-eight hours. Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011) (In recognition of these facts, courts appear to agree that
the maximum permissible administrative delay in the overdetention context likely falls well short of the
48-hour horizon set out in McLaughlin.). That is because once a detainee is ordered released, the
publics interest in his prompt release is even greater, and the constitutional tolerance for "administrative
delay" is substantially less than in the context of arrestees awaiting probable cause determinations. See
Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2004); Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192,
1202 (9th Cir.2003); Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1353 (N.D.Ga. 2005).
53. Within the 48-hour period, however, it is often a question for juries what is reasonable or
unreasonable. See, e.g., Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2001) (resulting in $100,000
jury verdict (upheld on appeal) for plaintiff for 1 hour overdetention at court holding cell and 2 hours
at jail after release order); Barnes, supra, ("[E]ven a thirty-minute detention after being ordered released
could work a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Arline v.
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City of Jacksonville, 359 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1310 (M.D.Fla.2005) (two and a half hour detention
54. Here, the Judge clearly established Rodneys right to liberty on June 30, 2016, by sentencing him
to one year in prison, credit for the seven years he previously served.
55. The Judge reaffirmed this right when she asked OPSO to expedite processing for Rodneys
release.
56. For the third time, the Judge made his right to liberty unequivocally clear when the she called
Sheriff Gusman and Warden Stinson to ask why Rodney had not been released.
57. That right was made quadruply clear when the Judge vacated Rodneys sentence and replaced it
58. It was quintuply made clear when the Judge called and emailed Irma Ray and Kanedra Burton at
the DOC.
59. The fact that Rodney was not released for twenty-seven days after his sentence expired, after
factoring in the reasonable amount of time to effectuate his release, means that he was overdetained for a
60. As a result of the overdetention described in this Count, Rodney suffered loss of liberty, great
mental anguish, humiliation, degradation, physical and emotional pain and suffering, and other grievous
61. By depriving Rodney of his fundamental right to liberty, Defendants violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As Defendants were acting
under the color of state law, Plaintiffs claims are actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
63. Article One, Section Two of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 guarantees that [n]o person
64. By reason of the same conduct that violated Rodneys federal constitutional rights, Defendants
65. This conduct resulted in Rodneys overdetention and caused the physical, emotional and
66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
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67. Defendants intentionally detained Rodney when they held him in OPP from June 27,
2016, to July 12, 2016, and then from July 12, 2016, to July 27, 2016, in MPCC.
68. On June 30, 2016, legal authority to detain Rodney expired when the Judge sentenced
him to credit for time previously served. The time Rodney previously served exceeded the duration of
the sentence the Judge imposed. Several Defendants were put on actual notice that Rodney really
shouldnt have to actually serve any time once DOC processes it.
69. Defendants falsely imprisoned Rodney when they unlawfully detained him.
70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
71. Defendants conduct of overdetention described above caused Rodneys harms as described
72. Due to their professional roles as jailors, Defendants owed duties to avoid overdetention to the
73. These duties were breached by Defendants acts and omissions, including the failure to timely
74. The risks and harms that the Defendants caused were within the scope of protection afforded by
75. As a result of Defendants acts and omissions, Rodney suffered actual, forseeable harm.
76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
77. In the manner described above, during the constitutional violations described herein, one or more
of the Defendants stood by without intervening to prevent the violation of Rodneys constitutional
78. As a result of the Defendants failure to intervene to prevent the violation of Rodneys
constitutional rights, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional distress. Defendants had
79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
80. The misconduct described above was caused by the policies, practices, and customs of
Defendants, in that their employees and agents regularly overdetain persons who are subject to release.
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81. The above-described widespread practices, which were so well settled as to constitute the
de facto policy of the Defendants, were allowed to exist because policymakers with authority over these
acts exhibited deliberate indifference to the problem, thereby effectively ratifying it.
82. The policies, practices, and customs set forth above were the driving force behind the
numerous constitutional violations in this case that directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer the
83. Furthermore, the widespread practices described in the preceding paragraphs were
allowed to flourish because Defendants declined to implement sufficient training or any legitimate
84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
85. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, some Defendants
and others were employees, members, and agents of Sheriff Gusman, Secretary LeBlanc, or LaSalle
86. Defendants Sheriff Gusman, Secretary LeBlanc, and LaSalle Corrections are therefore
87. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
88. Louisiana law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for
compensatory damages for which employees are liable for actions taken in the discharge of their duties
89. While committing the misconduct alleged in the preceding paragraphs, some Defendants
and others were employees, members, and agents of Sheriff Gusman, Secretary LeBlanc, or LaSalle
90. Sheriff Gusman, Secretary LeBlanc, and LaSalle Corrections are therefore obligated by
91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates each and every foregoing paragraph.
92. Defendant ABC Insurance Companies 1-10, upon information and belief, have issued
and/or currently have in effect one or more policies of insurance covering one or more of the Defendants
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named herein. For valuable consideration received, these policies obligated Defendant ABC Insurance
Companies 1-10, jointly and/or severally, to pay on behalf of their insured Defendant(s) any sums the
insured Defendant(s) may become obligated to pay to Rodney or to indemnify their insured
Defendant(s) for any sums the insured Defendant(s) may become obligated to pay Rodney.
93. By reason of their illegal and unconstitutional acts, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for
all damages and injuries Rodney has suffered as a result. Upon information and belief, Defendant ABC
Insurance Companies 1-10 are contractually obligated to pay these sums on behalf of the insured
Defendant(s).
94. Upon information and belief, Defendant ABC Insurance Companies are liable to
Plaintiff for any and all damages incurred by reason of the insured Defendant(s) acts, up to their policy
limits, notwithstanding the fact that the insured Defendant(s) may themselves be able to assert claims of
95. Under Louisiana Revised Statute 22:655(B), Plaintiff brings a direct action against
Defendant ABC Insurance Companies 1-10 to recover any and all sums they are obligated to pay
96. Wherefore Plaintiff requests judgment be entered against Defendants and that the Court
a. Declaratory relief;
f. Award costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, 42 U.S.C. 12205, 28 C.F.R.
g. Order such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.