PART I: PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATION

Article 415

1. Meralco Securities vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Taxation; Civil Law; Property; Storage tanks although not embedded on land considered
as improvements and are subject to realty tax.We hold that while the two storage tanks
are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on
the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable
that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for
the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Oil storage tanks
were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl.
2nd 271.

Same; Same; Same; Real property, for taxation purposes, defined.For purposes of
taxation, the term real property may include things which should generally be regarded
as personal property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things
classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be
considered personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630,
633).

2. Lopez vs Orosa Jr.

PROPERTY; REAL ESTATE; MATERIALMAN'S LIEN; DOES NOT EXTEND TO

THE LAND; BUILDING SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM LAND.Appellant's
contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the
construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which the
construction was made is without merit, because while it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of
the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what constitute
real properties (Art. 415 of the New Civil Code [Art. 334 of the old]) could mean only
one thing, that a building is by itself an immovable property. (Leung Yee vs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644.)

ID.; ID.; ID.; BUILDING AS IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; IRRESPECTIVE OF

OWNERSHIP OF LAND AND BUILDING.A building is an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong
to the same owner.
PREFERENCE AND PRIORITIES; MATERIALMAN'S LIEN AND MORTGAGE
CREDIT ON LAND WHERE BUILDING CONSTRUCTED. - Materialman's lien
attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the
obligation was incurred and in the case at bar, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid
value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure
and to no other property of the obligor. Thus, the interest of the mortgagee over the land
is superior to and cannot be made subject to the said materialman's lien.

3. Benguet Corporation vs CBAA

 Civil Law; Taxation; Property; The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of
"real property".The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of "real
property" and simply says that the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as lands,
buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property." In the
absence of such a definition, we apply Article 415 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; The tailings dam of the petitioner does not fall under any of the
classes of exempt real properties enumerated under Section 2 of C.A. No. 470.Section
2 of C.A. No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides that the realty tax
is due "on the real property, including land, buildings, machinery and other
improvements" not specifically exempted in Section 3 thereof. A reading of that section
shows that the tailings dam of the petitioner does not fall under any of the classes of
exempt real property therein enumerated.

Same; Same; Same; Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of
an improvement because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value and
utility of petitioner's mine.The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the
definition of an "improvement" because it is permanent in character and it enhances both
the value and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam
defines its character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes
it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Court respects the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies
like the CBAA.It has been the long-standing policy of this Court to respect the
conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies like the CBAA, which, because of the nature of its
functions and its frequent exercise thereof, has developed expertise in the resolution of
assessment problems. The only exception to this rule is where it is clearly shown that the
administrative body has committed grave abuse of discretion calling for the intervention
of this Court in the exercise of its own powers of review. There is no such showing in the
case at bar.

4. Tumalad vs Vicencio

Remedial law; Answer; Nature of answer.The answer is a mere statement of the facts
which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence.

Same; In detainer cases; Claim of ownership is a matter of defense; Allegations in

complaint and the relief sought determine jurisdiction.When the question to be
determined is one of title, the Court is given the authority to proceed with the hearing of
the cause until this fact is clearly established. In the case of Sy vs. Dalman, L-19200, 27
Feb. 1968, wherein the defendant was also a successful bidder in an auction sale, it was
likewise held by this Court that in detainer cases the claim of ownership is a matter of
defense and raises an issue of fact which should be determined from the evidence at the
trial. What determines jurisdiction are the allegations or averments in the complaint and
the relief asked for.
Civil law; Contracts; Fraud or deceit renders contract void-able.Fraud or deceit does
not render a contract void ab initio, and can only be a ground for rendering the contract
voidable or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil Code, by a proper action
in court.

Same; Property; Status of buildings as immovable property.It is obvious that the

inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what
may constitute real properties (art. 415, New Civil Code) could only mean one thing
that a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

Same; Same; Same; Deviations from rule.Certain deviations, however, have been
allowed for various reasons. In the case of Manarang vs. Ofilada, No. L-8133, 18 May
1956, 99 Phil. 109, this Court stated that it is undeniable that the parties to a contract
may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property. Again, in the case of Luna vs. Encarnacion, No. L-4637, 30 June 1952, 91
Phil. 531, the subject of the contract designated as Chattel Mortgage was a house of
mixed materials, and this Court held therein that it was a valid Chattel mortgage because
it was so expressly designated and specifically that the property given as security is a
house of mixed materials, which by its very nature is considered personal property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason; Owner is estopped.The view that parties to a deed
of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for the purposes
of said contract, is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based,
partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a
rented land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so
stipulated in the document of mortgage. It should be noted, however, that the principle is
predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that
may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.

Same; Contracts; By ceding, selling or transferring house by way of chattel mortgage,

house is treated as chattel.In the contract, the house on rented land is not only
expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that the mortgagor . . .
voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property
together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and
participation. . . Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel
mortgage defendants-appellants could not have meant to convey the house as chattel, or
at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to
make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on
a rented lot to which defendants-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and
although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when
combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty.

Chattel Mortgage Law; Foreclosure of the mortgaged property.Chattel mortgages are

covered and regulated by the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act No. 1508. Section 14 of this Act
allows the mortgagee to have the property mortgaged sold at public auction through a
public officer in almost the same manner as that allowed by Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, provided that the requirements of the law relative to notice and registration
are complied with.

Same; Redemption of foreclosed property.Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended

provides that the debtor-mortgagor may, at any time within one year from and after the
date of the auction sale, redeem the property sold at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Same; Petition to obtain possession during period of redemption; Requirements.
Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended allows the purchaser of the property to obtain from
the court the possession during the period of redemption; but the same provision
expressly requires the filing of a petition with the proper Court of First Instance and the
furnishing of a bond. It is only upon filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond that the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course.
No discretion is left to the court. In the absence of such a compliance, the purchaser can
not claim possession during the period of redemption as a matter of right. In such a case,
the governing provision is Section 34, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court, which also
applies to properties purchased in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Same; To whom rentals receivable during redemption period belong.While it is true

that the Rules of Court allow the purchaser to receive the rentals if the purchased
property is occupied by tenants, he is, nevertheless, accountable to the judgmentdebtor or
mortgagor as the case may be, for the amount so received and the same will be duly
credited against the redemption price when the said debtor or mortgagor effects the
redemption. Differently stated, the rentals receivable from tenants, although they may be
collected by the purchaser during the redemption period, do not belong to the latter but
still pertain to the debtor or mortgagor. The rationale for the Rule, it seems, is to secure
for the benefit of the debtor or mortgagor, the payment of the redemption amount and the
consequent return to him of his properties sold at public auction.

Same; Mortgagor is entitled to remain in possession during period of redemption and to

collect rents.Since the defendants-appellants were occupying the house at the time of
the auction sale, they are entitled to remain in possession during the period of redemption
or within one year from and after 27 March 1956, the date of the auction sale, and to
collect the rents or profits during the said period.

Remedial law; Review by Supreme Court of palpable errors even when not assigned.It
will be noted further that in the case at bar the period of redemption had not yet expired
when action was instituted in the court of origin, and that plaintiffs appellees did not
choose to take possession under Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended, which is the law
selected by the parties to govern the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
Neither was there an allegation to that effect. Since plaintiffs-appellees right to possess
was not yet born at the filing of the complaint, there could be no violation or breach
thereof. Wherefore, the original complaint stated no cause of action and was prematurely
filed. For this reason, the same should be ordered dismissed, even if there was no
assignment of error to that effect. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to
review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision of the case.
5. Leung Yee vs F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson

CHATTEL MORTGAGE; REGISTRY OF MORTGAGE .COVERING REAL

PROPERTY.The sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide
for the registry of "chattel mortgages," and transfers thereof, that is to say, mortgages of
personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. Neither the
original registry in a chattel mortgage registry of an instrument purporting to be a chattel
mortgage of a building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that
registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the
building is concerned.

ID.; ID.A factory building is real property, and the mere fact that it is mortgaged and
sold, separate and apart from the land on which it stands, in no wise changes its character
as real property.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER; REGISTRY OF TITLE; GOOD FAITH.The rights

secured under the provisions of article 1473 of the Civil Code to that one of two
purchasers of the same real estate, who has secured and inscribed his title thereto in the
Land Registry,. do not accrue unless such inscription is made in good faith.

ID.; SEPARATE PURCHASERS; DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS.The respective

rights of two or more separate purchasers of the same real estate from the same owner in
case none of them has secured an inscription of his title in the land registry in good faith,
are to be determined in accord with the third, and not the second paragraph of that article.

ID.; GOOD FAITH.One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack
of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be
applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry
and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his
vendor.

ID.; ID.A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was
no defect in the title of the vendor.

ID.; ID.Good faith, or the lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but in
ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are
necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone
the inward motive may, with safety, be determined.

ID.; ID."Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or
touched but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or
fancied tokens. or signs."

6. Standard Oil Co. vs Jaramillo

 CHATTEL MORTGAGE; REGISTRATION; NOTICE.The efficacy of the act of
recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that registration operates as constructive
notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the instrument must be
discovered in the document itself, in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds
nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobody's rights
except as a species of constructive notice.

ID. ; ID. ; FUNCTION OF REGISTER.The duties of a register of deeds in respect to

the registration of chattel mortgages are purely of a ministerial character, and he is
clothed with no judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the-nature of the property,
whether real or personal, which is the subject of the mortgage. Generally speaking, he
should accept the qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the
instrument for registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of
the proper fee, leaving the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such
question should arise for legal determination.

7. Mindanao Bus Co. vs City Assessor and Treasurer of CDO

Property; Immovable Property by Destination; Two requisites before movables may be

deemed to have immobilized; Tools and equipments merely incidental to business not
subject to real estate tax.Movable equipments, to be immobilized in contemplation of
Article 415 of the Civil Code, must be the essential and principal elements of an industry
or works which are carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus, where the
business is one of transportation, which is carried on without a repair or service shop, and
its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in a shop belonging to another, the tools and
equipments in its repair shop which appear movable are merely incidentals and may not
be considered immovables, and, hence, not subject to assessment as real estate for
purposes of the real estate tax.

8. Caltex Phils Inc vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Taxation; Property; Courts; Jurisdiction; The Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and
not the Court of Tax Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the provincial or
city boards of assessment appeals.The Solicitor Generals contention that the Court of
Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over this case is not correct. When
Republic Act No. 1125 created the Tax Court in 1954, there was as yet no Central Board
of Assessment Appeals Section 7(3) of that law in providing that the Tax Court had
jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of provincial or city boards of assessment
appeals had in mind the local boards of assessment appeals but not the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals which under the Real Property Tax Code has appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the said local boards of assessment appeals and is. therefore, in the
same category as the Tax Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Certiorari; The Heal Property Tax Code does
not provide for Supreme Court review of decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. The only remedy for Supreme Court review of the Central Boards decision is
by Special Civil Action of Certiorari.Section 36 of the Real Property Tax Code
provides that the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals shall become final
 and executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the receipt of its decision by the
appellant. Within that fifteen-day period, a petition for reconsideration may be filed. The
Code does not provide for the review of the Boards decision by this Court.
Consequently, the only remedy available for seeking a review by this Court of the
decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals is the special civil action of
certiorari, the recourse resorted to herein by Caltex (Philippines), Inc.

Same; Same; Gasoline station equipments and machineries are subject to the real
property tax.We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the
gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and
which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas
station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the
meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.

Same; Same; Gasoline station equipments and machineries are permanent fixtures for
purposes of realty taxation.Here, the question is whether the gas station equipment and
machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement (which are
indubitably taxable realty) should be subject to the realty tax. This question is different
from the issue raised in the Davao Saw Mill case. Improvements on land are commonly
taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered personalty (84
C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property.

9. Sergs Products vs PCI

Civil Law; Property; The machines although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they
are essential and principal elements of petitioners chocolate-making industry.In the
present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. In that sense,
petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property
pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal.The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party
to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein.

Same; Same; The Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machinesin question are to
be considered as personal property; Under the circumstances they are proper subjects of
the writ of seizure.In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the
 machines in question are to be considered as personal property. x x x Clearly then,
petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as
personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of
Seizure.

Same; Same; That the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the
Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.It
should be stressed, however, that our holdingthat the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreementis good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement,
third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third
party would be adversely affected.

Remedial Law; Replevin; Policy under Rule 60 is that questions involving title to the
subject property should be determined in the trial; Remedy of defendants under Rule 60
is either to post a counterbond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond.
Indeed, in La Tondea Distillers v. CA, the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60
was that questions involving title to the subject propertyquestions which petitioners are
now raisingshould be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the
remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond. They were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to
the subject property.

10. Ago vs CA

Judgments; What constitutes rendition of judgment in courts of first instance.It is the

filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court, and not the pronouncement of the
judgment in open court, that constitutes rendition of a decision by a court of first
instance. Before such filing, the decision may still be subject to amendment and change
and may not yet be considered effective and binding.

Same; Notice by party of judgment dictated in open court not valid notice.The fact that
a party heard the judge dictating the judgment in open court, is not a valid notice of said
judgment, because it is the filing with the clerk of court of a signed decision that
constitutes the rendition of the judgment. Besides, Section 7, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Court expressly requires that final orders or judgments be served personally or by
registered mail.

Property; Immovables by destination; Installation of sawmill machineries in building of

sawmill company.By the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the
sawmill company, for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building, the same
became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same
was constructed, converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within
the meaning of Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

11. Berkenkotter vs CU Unjieng E Hijos

 MORTGAGE; IMPROVEMENT ON THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY, INCLUDED IN
THE MORTGAGE.The installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged
sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the
industrial functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a permanent
improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the
mortgage constituted thereon. (Article 1877, Civil Code.)

ID.; ID.; PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THE IMPROVEMENT.The fact that the

purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person
supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the latter's
credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the
permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the
central.

ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP OF THE IMPROVEMENT.The sale of the machinery and

equipment in question by the purchaser who was supplied the purchase money, as a loan,
to the person who supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged
sugar central, does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment
but simply with the right of redemption.

12. Sanchez Jr. vs Marin

Social Legislation; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657);
Agricultural Lands; Fish Ponds; Words and Phrases; Under Section 166(1) of Republic
Act No. 3844, agricultural land was defined as a land devoted to any growth, including
but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned landunder
this law, fishponds were considered agricultural lands; Even as under Republic Act No.
6657 fishponds were still considered as agricultural land, Republic Act No. 7881, which
took effect on 20 February 1995, amended several provisions of R.A. 6657 and expressly
exempted or excluded private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds from the coverage of the R.A. 6657; By virtue of the amendments,
the operation of fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel of
land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land.The Court of
Appeals grounded its Decision on this Courts pronouncements in Romero v. Tan, 424
SCRA 108 (2004). In the said case, this Court traced the classification of fishponds for
agrarian reform purposes. Section 166(1) of Republic Act No. 3844 defined an
agricultural land as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands,
salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land. Thus, it is beyond cavil that under
this law, fishponds were considered agricultural lands. Even when Republic Act No. 6657
entitled, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, took effect on 15 June 1988,
fishponds were still considered as agricultural land. However, when Republic Act No.
7881 was passed by Congress on 20 February 1995, it amended several provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly
and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL.
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, now defines agricultural land as land
devoted to agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. As to what constitutes an agricultural activity is defined by
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, as the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products,
and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. By virtue of the
foregoing amendments, the operation of fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural
activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural
land.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 10 of R.A. 6657 explicitly provides that private lands
actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt
from the coverage of R.A. 6657, provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not
been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian
reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881, explicitly provides: SEC.
10. Exemptions and Exclusions.x x x x. b) Private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Vested Rights; The status of a party established as
a tenant and his right to security of tenure over the same in a final and executory decision
cannot be disregardedsuch party has a vested right over the same, which right and
interest has become fixed and established and can no longer be open to doubt or
controversy; Being in the nature of a substantive law, the amendments introduced by R.A.
No. 7881 to R.A. No. 6657 in the year 1995 cannot be given a retroactive application as
to deprive a person of his rights under the previous agrarian legislation.It bears
emphasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject fishpond and his right
to security of tenure were already previously settled in the Decision dated 20 July 1987 of
the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case No. 86-8, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated 11 September 1989. Having been declared as a tenant with
the right to security of tenure as provided in Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844 in
relation to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1199, the law enforced at the time of the filing
of the Complaint before the RTC of Lucena City, the petitioner has acquired a vested
right over the subject fishpond, which right or interest has become fixed and established
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Therefore, even if fishponds, like the
subject matter of this case, were later excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL
as expressly provided in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7881, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to the petitioner, the
same cannot defeat the aforesaid vested right already granted and acquired by the
petitioner long before the passage of Republic Act No. 7881. And being in the nature of a
substantive law, the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7881 to Republic Act
No. 6657 in the year 1995 cannot be given a retroactive application as to deprive the
petitioner of his rights under the previous agrarian legislation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DARAB); Jurisdictions; Even as cases involving fishponds and prawn farms are no
longer considered agrarian disputes as to make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the
 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) or its Adjudicators,
nevertheless considering that prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7881, the
present case was already pending appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), the aforesaid amendments then cannot be made to apply
as to divest the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of its
jurisdiction over the caseit is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court,
it remains with it until the full termination of the case.This Court likewise affirms that
the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case, contrary to the declaration
made by the appellate court in its Decision. Notably, the present case was instituted as
early as 1991 when the petitioner filed a Petition before the PARAD for the fixing of his
lease rental on the subject fishpond. Respondents subsequently filed a countercharge
against the petitioner for the accounting, collection of sums of money, and dispossession.
At such point, the law applicable was Republic Act No. 6657, wherein fishponds and
prawn farms were not yet exempted/excluded from the CARL coverage. Evidently, there
was an agrarian dispute existing between the petitioner and the respondents, cognizable
by the PARAD at the time it rendered its Decision on 2 March 1993 in favor of the
petitioner. On 20 February 1995, however, Republic Act No. 7881 came into being which
expressly exempted/excluded fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of the
CARL. In effect, cases involving fishponds and prawn farms are no longer considered
agrarian disputes as to make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB or its
Adjudicators. Nevertheless, considering that prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
7881, this case was already pending appeal before the DARAB, the aforesaid
amendments then cannot be made to apply as to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction
over the case. It is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains
with it until the full termination of the case.

13. Heirs of Proceso Bautista vs Barza

Land Registration; Public Lands; Until timber and forest lands had been properly
declared available for fishpond purposes, any application is ineffective because there is
no disposable land to speak of.Thus, even if Bautista were ahead of Barza by two years
in terms of occupation, possession and introduction of substantial improvements, he was
not placed in a better position than Barza. The priority rule under Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 14 applies only to public lands already released by the Bureau
of Fisheries. Until such lands had been properly declared available for fishpond purposes,
any application is ineffective because there is no disposable land to speak of.
Accordingly, Bautistas application was premature and the ruling of the Director of
Fisheries on this matter was, therefore, correct.

Same; Same; Matters involved in the grant, cancellation, reinstatement and revision of
fishpond licenses and permits are vested under the executive supervision of the
appropriate department head who in this case is the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.Although an administrative decision does not necessarily bind us, it is
entitled to great weight and respect. It should be stressed that the function of
administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by
law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. Matters involved in the grant,
cancellation, reinstatement and revision of fishpond licenses and permits are vested under
the executive supervision of the appropriate department head who in this case is the
 Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. As such, his discretion must be respected
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.

14. J.G. Summit Holdings Inc. vs CA

Courts; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court En Banc is not an Appellate Court to which
decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.Supreme Court Circular No. 2-
89 dated 7 February 1989 provides, among others that: * * * 2. A decision or resolution
of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of
the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). 3. The Court en banc
is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed. x x x x x x x x x 5. A resolution of the Division denying a partys motion for
referral to the Court en banc of any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the
Court en banc. 6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en
banc, the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take
cognizance of the same, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned to the
referring Division. 7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc
declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained.

Same; Same; Commercial Law; Estoppel; Right of First Refusal; Contractual obligations
arising from rights of first refusal are not new in this jurisdiction and have been
recognized in numerous cases, and estoppel is too known a civil law concept to require an
elongated discussion.We reject petitioners argument that the present case may be
considered under the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 23, 1984 which included
among en banc cases those involving a novel question of law and those where a doctrine
or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed.
The case was resolved based on basic principles of the right of first refusal in commercial
law and estoppel in civil law. Contractual obligations arising from rights of first refusal
are not new in this jurisdiction and have been recognized in numerous cases. Estoppel is
too known a civil law concept to require an elongated discussion. Fundamental principles
on public bidding were likewise used to resolve the issues raised by the petitioner. To be
sure, petitioner leans on the right to top in a public bidding in arguing that the case at bar
involves a novel issue. We are not swayed. The right to top was merely a condition or a
reservation made in the bidding rules which was fully disclosed to all bidding parties.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; There is no executive interference in the functions

of the Supreme Court by the mere filing of a memorandum by the Secretary of Finance,
which memorandum was merely noted to acknowledge its filingit had no further
legal significance.There is no executive interference in the functions of this Court by
the mere filing of a memorandum by Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro Camacho. The
memorandum was merely noted to acknowledge its filing. It had no further legal
significance. Notably too, the assailed Resolution dated September 24, 2003 was decided
unanimously by the Special First Division in favor of the respondents.

Bids and Bidding; Infrastructure Projects; There is nothing inherently illegal on a

corporations act in seeking funding from parties who were losing biddersthis is a
purely commercial decision over which the State should not interfere absent any legal
infirmity; A case involving the disposition of shares in a corporation which the
government seeks to privatize, in which the persons with whom it desires to enter into
business with in order to raise funds to purchase the shares are basically its business,
differs from a case involving a contract for the operation or construction of a government
infrastructure where the identity of the buyer/bidder or financier constitutes an important
consideration.We see no inherent illegality on PHILYARDS act in seeking funding
from parties who were losing bidders. This is a purely commercial decision over which
the State should not interfere absent any legal infirmity. It is emphasized that the case at
bar involves the disposition of shares in a corporation which the government sought to
privatize. As such, the persons with whom PHILYARDS desired to enter into business
with in order to raise funds to purchase the shares are basically its business. This is in
contrast to a case involving a contract for the operation of or construction of a
government infrastructure where the identity of the buyer/bidder or financier constitutes
an important consideration. In such cases, the government would have to take utmost
precaution to protect public interest by ensuring that the parties with which it is
contracting have the ability to satisfactorily construct or operate the infrastructure.

Same; Right of First Refusal; The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant the
right of first refusal to each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations; If the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is
not the foreign stockholders ownership of the shares which is adversely affected but the
capacity of the corporation to own landthat is, the corporation becomes disqualified to
own land. We uphold the validity of the mutual rights of first refusal under the JVA
between KAWASAKI and NIDC. First of all, the right of first refusal is a property right
of PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI and NIDC, under the terms of their JVA. This
right allows them to purchase the shares of their co-shareholder before they are offered to
a third party. The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to each other,
by itself, does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution limiting land
ownership to Filipinos and Filipino corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if
PHILSECO still owns land, the right of first refusal can be validly assigned to a qualified
Filipino entity in order to maintain the 60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not
amount to a violation of the Anti-Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent.
The transfer could be made either to a nominee or such other party which the holder of
the right of first refusal feels it can comfortably do business with. Alternatively,
PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings, in which case KAWASAKI, in exercising its
right of first refusal, can exceed 40% of PHILSECOs equity. In fact, it can even be said
that if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the
foreign stockholders ownership of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity
of the corporation to own landthat is, the corporation becomes disqualified to own
land. This finds support under the basic corporate law principle that the corporation and
its stockholders are separate juridical entities. In this vein, the right of first refusal over
shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains to the
corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of
their right of first refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the
law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
 Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Statutory Construction; The
prohibition under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution applies only to ownership of
landit does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of
the Civil Code.As correctly observed by the public respondents, the prohibition in the
Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real
property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a
strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and
growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations
only.

15. Rubiso and Gelito vs Rivera

SHIPPING; REGISTRATION OF THE PURCHASE OF A VESSEL.The requisite of

registration in the registry of the purchase of a vessel is necessary and indispensable in
order that the purchaser's rights may be maintained against a claim filed by a third
person; pursuant to article 573 of the Code of Commerce in connection with section 2 of
Act No. 1900, which Act, amending said article, provides that such registration, instead
of being made in the commercial registry, shall be entered in the registry of the Insular
Collector of Customs, who, since May 18, 1909, has been performing the duties of
commercial register.

ID.; ID.The legal rule set down in the Code of Commerce, subsists, inasmuch as the
amendment solely refers to the official who shall make the entry.

ID.; ID.Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain

extent, of the nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and
importance in the world commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the
Code of Commerce are nearly identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.

16. Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for
all acts of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rule 65 is applicable especially to
raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of
jurisdiction.Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65
is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting
in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that
there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

Election Contests; Appeals; Conditions in Order for the Supreme Court (SC) to Review
Orders and Decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Electoral Contests
Despite Not Being Reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc.Based on ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000), this court could review
orders and decisions of COMELEC in electoral contests despite not being reviewed
by the COMELEC En Banc, if: 1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice; 2) The issue
involves a principle of social justice; 3) The issue involves the protection of labor; 4) The
decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or 5) The need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is determined from the
allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and
is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its
powers.The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the
allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and
is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.
Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by respondents.
Nothing less than the electorates political speech will be affected by the restrictions
imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and
understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change
the contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we
protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the
message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of
COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We
protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will
define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.

Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the duty to
correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality.During elections, we have the power
and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with
unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes
actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts constitutional mandate to
protect the people against governments infringement of their fundamental rights. This
constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.

Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.The doctrine that
requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include
the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into
regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial
boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts
from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the
facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case
that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be
appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an appellate
court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature.The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in
nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions.
Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine
facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel
unless there are factual questions to determine.

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In a democracy, the citizens right to freely

participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is
recognized.In a democracy, the citizens right to freely participate in the exchange of
ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest
protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-building is a
fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free
expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.

Same; Same; The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of
influencing their votes.In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the
paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants
invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of
elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of
influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote
necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these
fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Same; Same; This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post
the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful
and weak, on their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to
freedom of expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are
noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right
of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question doctrine by
respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.
Same; Political Questions; What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.In
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), this court previously elaborated on the concept
of what constitutes a political question: What is generally meant, when it is said that a
question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to
some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power
to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not for this court to rehearse and reenact political debates
on what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the
creation of the text of the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances,
broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus,
the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights
of certain individuals, per se.

Same; Same; A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or
competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the
legislature.A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or
competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the
legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this
court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their respective
competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation,
presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless
the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Political Speeches; Sovereignty resides in the

people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement
of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners
speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech. Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In
Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), Justice Carpio in a separate opinion
emphasized: [i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression
would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the
subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top. Sovereignty resides in the
people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.

Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Suspension of the Rules; Time and again, we have held that
the Supreme Court (SC) has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case
from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice
requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.Time and again, we have held
that this court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their
operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it,
[and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of
the rules is discretionary upon the court. Certainly, this case of first impression where
COMELEC has threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the
elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the public in the manner they
feel would be effective is one of those cases.

Election Law; Fair Elections Act (R.A. No. 9006); Section 17 of Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the
Fair Elections Act, regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates
and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.Respondents considered the
tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the
posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and
petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on Lawful
Election Propaganda also states that these are allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party
list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions
subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . .
Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These
provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in
coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the
candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would
ensure that these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses
limitation.

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on
a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes
made in the passing of the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law). Thus, petitioners invoke
their right to freedom of expression.True, there is no mention whether election
campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of
the definition is that the act must be designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office. In this case, the tarpaulin contains
speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH Law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right
to freedom of expression.

Same; Same; The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of
speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic
manner of communication.Communication exists when (1) a speaker, seeking to
signal others, uses conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that such
actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions. [I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims
by . . . either accepting the speech acts claims or opposing them with criticism or
requests for justification. Speech is not limited to vocal communication. [C]onduct is
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as symbolic speech[,] such that
when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
the communicative element of the conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression]. The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the
entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to
inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.

Same; Same; Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and
political discontent, should be protected and encouraged.Proponents of the political
theory on deliberative democracy submit that substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue
is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity. This theory may be considered
broad, but it definitely includes [a] collective decision-making with the participation of
all who will be affected by the decision. It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone
of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in running
the states affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or
nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory
on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government
accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made
pursuant to governmental functions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or
airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy.Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to communicate
their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates. They argue that the
tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials
act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those who voted in its favor.
It was part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law, which was not paid for by
any candidate or political party. Thus, the questioned orders which . . . effectively
restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
unconstitutional and void. This court has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973), this court discussed the
preferred position occupied by freedom of expression: Property and property rights can
be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political,
economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.

Same; Same; Political Speech and Commercial Speech, Distinguished.We

distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech
both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,
foster[ing] informed and civic-minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

Same; Same; Election Propaganda; While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda.While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party list group.

Same; Same; Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of
expression and must be protected by the Supreme Court (SC).Speech with political
consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this
court. Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression is not the god of rights to
which all other rights and even government protection of state interest must bow. The
right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected
speech are still subject to some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on
whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can
either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.

Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content
of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based
regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and
present danger rule as measure. Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008): A
content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional
muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither
overbroad nor vague. (Citations omitted) Under this rule, the evil consequences sought
to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin
in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses
constitutional rights.

Same; Same; Content-Based Restraint and Content-Neutral Regulation,

Distinguished.Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.

Same; Right of Peaceful Assembly; In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125
SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow
which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public
place, and time of the assembly.In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which
include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place,
and time of the assembly. This would afford the public official time to inform applicants
if there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the
standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity to be heard.
This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, otherwise known as the
Public Assembly Act of 1985. Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa
Blg. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 226 (2006), this court discussed how Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 does not prohibit
assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner. In 2010, this court found in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 (2010), that respondent
Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording
petitioners the opportunity to be heard.

Same; Freedom of Expression; Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting
the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and
violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. The COMELECs act of requiring
the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political
consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more
meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.

Same; Same; The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any

relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of
abuse by those seeking to be elected.The guarantee of freedom of expression to
individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage
by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be
underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates real levels of
expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an
effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a
remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better
and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental
freedom.

Same; Same; Satire; Words and Phrases; Satire is a literary form that employs such
devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies, and this may
target any individual or group in society, private and government alike.The twin
tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a literary form that employs such
devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies, and this may
target any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to
effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for political and social criticism
because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . .
Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and
spoofed. Northrop Frye, well-known in this literary field, claimed that satire had two
defining features: one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque
and absurd, the other is an object of attack. Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration,
analogy, and other rhetorical devices.

Same; Same; In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails

over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.In
an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,]
but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech. This view allows the
government leeway to redistribute or equalize speaking power, such as protecting, even
implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued
within societys ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant
political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have
capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a
developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.

Same; Same; Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by

candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be
regulated as to time, place, and manner.Clearly, regulation of speech in the context of
electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political parties or their
political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our
rulings in Osmea v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447 (1998) and National Press Club v.
COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992). Regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that
the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is
inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming
from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust
debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

Same; Same; Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it

reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members
of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative
speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate
only; The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message.Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be
constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression,
and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation
must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.
 In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For
this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.

Same; Same; Right to Property; Other than the right to freedom of expression and the
meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also involves ones right to
property.Other than the right to freedom of expression and the meaningful exercise of
the right to suffrage, the present case also involves ones right to property.

Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to
property.Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property.
There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELECs infringement upon petitioners property rights as in the present case also
reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

Same; Same; This caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are
running for public office. Their message may be construed generalizations of very
complex individuals and party list organizations. They are classified into black and white:
as belonging to Team Patay or Team Buhay. But this caricature, though not agreeable
to some, is still protected speech.

17. Marcelo Soriano vs Sps. Galit

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While it is a rule
that those who seek to avail of the procedural remedies provided by the rules must adhere
to the requirements thereof, failing which the right to do so is lost, it is, however, equally
settled that the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to
make litigation as inexpensive as practicable and as convenient as can be done.
Concededly, those who seek to avail of the procedural remedies provided by the rules
must adhere to the requirements thereof, failing which the right to do so is lost. It is,
however, equally settled that the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on
technical rules and to make litigation as inexpensive as practicable and as convenient as
can be done. This is in accordance with the primary purpose of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as provided in Rule 1, Section 6, which reads: Section 6. Construction.These
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only to help
secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim would be defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have
ample opportunity to prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to
technicalities.

Public Auction Sales; Certificates of Sale; Evidence; Public Documents; While it is true
that public documents by themselves may be adequate to establish the presumption of
their validity, their probative weight, however, must be evaluated not in isolation but in
conjunction with other evidence adduced by the parties in the controversy, much more so
where the contents of a copy thereof subsequently registered for documentation purposes
is being contested; While a public document like a notarized deed of sale is vested with
the presumption of regularity, this is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.
There are actually two (2) copies of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real
Properties issued on February 4, 1999 involved, namely: (a) copy which is on file with
the deputy sheriff; and (b) copy registered with the Registry of Deeds. The object of
scrutiny, however, is not the copy of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real
Properties issued by the deputy sheriff on February 4, 1999, but the copy thereof
subsequently registered by petitioner with the Registry of Deeds on April 23, 1999, which
included an entry on the dorsal portion of the first page thereof describing a parcel of land
covered by OCT No. T-40785 not found in the Certificate of Sale of Real Properties on
file with the sheriff. True, public documents by themselves may be adequate to establish
the presumption of their validity. However, their probative weight must be evaluated not
in isolation but in conjunction with other evidence adduced by the parties in the
controversy, much more so in this case where the contents of a copy thereof subsequently
registered for documentation purposes is being contested. No reason has been offered
how and why the questioned entry was subsequently intercalated in the copy of the
certificate of sale subsequently registered with the Registry of Deeds. Absent any
satisfactory explanation as to why said entry was belatedly inserted, the surreptitiousness
of its inclusion coupled with the furtive manner of its intercalation casts serious doubt on
the authenticity of petitioners copy of the Certificate of Sale. Thus, it has been held that
while a public document like a notarized deed of sale is vested with the presumption of
regularity, this is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents?

Same; Same; The issuance of a Certificate of Sale is an end result of judicial foreclosure
where statutory requirements are strictly adhered to, where even the slightest deviations
therefrom will invalidate the proceeding and the sale; The Certificate of Sale is an
accurate record of what properties were actually sold to satisfy the debt, and the strictness
in the observance of accuracy and correctness in the description of the properties renders
the enumeration in the certificate exclusive.It must be pointed out in this regard that
the issuance of a Certificate of Sale is an end result of judicial foreclosure where statutory
requirements are strictly adhered to; where even the slightest deviations therefrom will
invalidate the proceeding and the sale. Among these requirements is an explicit
enumeration and correct description of what properties are to be sold stated in the notice.
The stringence in the observance of these requirements is such that an incorrect title
number together with a correct technical description of the property to be sold and vice
versa is deemed a substantial and fatal error which results in the invalidation of the sale.
The certificate of sale is an accurate record of what properties were actually sold to
satisfy the debt. The strictness in the observance of accuracy and correctness in the
description of the properties renders the enumeration in the certificate exclusive. Thus,
subsequently including properties which have not been explicitly mentioned therein for
registration purposes under suspicious circumstances smacks of fraud. The explanation
that the land on which the properties sold is necessarily included and, hence, was
belatedly typed on the dorsal portion of the copy of the certificate subsequently registered
is at best a lame excuse unworthy of belief.

Real Estate Mortgages; While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in
the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself
may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built.The foregoing
 provision of the Civil Code enumerates land and buildings separately. This can only mean
that a building is, by itself, considered immovable. Thus, it has been held that. . . while
it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built. Such mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage
for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with
separately and apart from the land. (emphasis and italics supplied) In this case,
considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court
was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40785, which by themselves are real properties of
respondents spouses, the same should be regarded as separate and distinct from the
conveyance of the lot on which they stand.

Article 416

1. Sibal vs Valdez

ATTACHMENT; GROWING CROPS, REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY.Held:

Under the facts of the record, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 334
of the Civil Code, that growing sugar cane is considered personal property and not real
property and is subject to attachment and sale. Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law,
provides that all personal property shall be subject to mortgage. At common law all
annual crops which are raised by yearly manurance and labor and essentially owe their
existence to cultivation may be levied on as personal property. Paragraph 2 of article 334
of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
by Act No. 1508 in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution and for the
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal
property.

2. Laurel vs Abrogar

Criminal Law; Theft; Elements of theft.The elements of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.

Same; Same; Property; The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of
theft under the Penal Code is that it be capable of appropriation.The only requirement
for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable
of appropriation. It need not be capable of asportation, which is defined as carrying
away. Jurisprudence is settled that to take under the theft provision of the penal code
does not require asportation or carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful
owner of the thing. The word take in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended
to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through
the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access
device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the destination of the
property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering,
as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 380 (1961), use of a device to
fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper
to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v.
Carlos, and United States v. Menagas, 11 N.E. 2d 403 (1937).

Same; Same; The act of conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) operations by
illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent Philippine
Long Distance Telephones (PLDTs) telephone system, through which petitioner is able
to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephones (PLDTs) facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction
mentioned above.The acts of subtraction include: (a) tampering with any wire,
meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully
deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c)
using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently
obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service. In the instant case,
the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or
apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is
able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs
facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.

Same; Same; Telecommunication Industry; Property; The business of providing

telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the
object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.The business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the
object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be
appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object
of theft.

Civil Law; Property; Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties.Interest
in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in
force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared
to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the
enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things
which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or
personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the
Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the
ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, 44 Phil. 933 (1922), business should also be classified
as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real
properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property.

Same; Same; Electricity; Electricity is personal property under Article 416(3) of the Civil
Code, which enumerates forces of nature which are brought under control by
science.It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice
is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party
called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed
 Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article
416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.

Same; Same; Telecommunication Industry; It is the use of these telecommunications

facilities without the consent of Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business.While it may be conceded that international long distance calls, the matter
alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said
that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Same; Same; Same; The business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and the
act of engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) is an act of subtraction penalized
under said article.The business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under said article. However, the
Amended Information describes the thing taken as, international long distance calls,
and only later mentions stealing the business from PLDT as the manner by which the
gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this
case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the
services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one
of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and
sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.

3. US vs Carlos

ELECTRICITY; UNLAWFUL USE OF ELECTRIC CURRENT; LARCENY.A person

to whom an electric light company furnishes electric current for lighting purposes, and
who, by means of a "jumper," uses electricity which does not pass through the meter
installed f or the purpose of measuring the current used, thus depriving the company of
such electric current, is guilty of larceny.

4. Board of Assessment Appeals vs MERALCO

 Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Nature and purpose of remedy; Petition
for certiorari can be availed of to review the decision of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals in the absence of judicial review of the Boards decision provided for in the Real
Property Tax Code; Purpose of judicial review.We hold that certiorari was properly
availed of in this case. It is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions whereby the record of a particular
case is ordered to be elevated for review and correction in matters of law (14 C.J.S. 121-
122; 14 Am Jur. 2nd 777). The rule is that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-
judicial power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
the statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56). The purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties
affected by its decisions (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). The review is a part of the system of
checks and balances which is a limitation on the separation of powers and which
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Taxation; Property; Real Property Tax Code; Pipeline System of Meralco Securities
classified as real property and subject to tax they being machinery or improvements; And
does not fall within the classes of exempt real property.Meralco Securities insists that
its pipeline is not subject to realty tax because it is not real property within the meaning
of article 415. This contention is not sustainable under the provisions of the Assessment
Law, the Real Property Tax Code and the Civil Code. Section 2 of the Assessment Law
provides that the realty tax is due on real property, including land, buildings, machinery,
and other improvements not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof. It is
incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall within any of the
classes of exempt real property enumerated in section 3 of the Assessment Law and
section 40 of the Real Property Tax Code.

Same; Same; Same; Petroleum Law does not exempt Meralco Securities from payment of
realty taxes; Realty tax distinguished from local tax.Meralco Securities argues that the
realty tax is a local tax or levy and not a tax of general application. This argument is
untenable because the realty tax has always been imposed by the lawmaking body and
later by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking powers, as
shown in sections 342 et seq. of the Revised Administrative Code, Act No. 3995,
Commonwealth Act No. 470 and Presidential Decree No. 464. The realty tax is enforced
throughout the Philippines and not merely in a particular municipality or city but the
proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city, municipality and barrio where the realty
taxed is situated (Sec. 86, P.D. No. 464). In contrast, a local tax is imposed by municipal
or city council by virtue of the Local Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 231, which took
effect on July 1, 1973 (69 O.G. 6197).

5. Navarro vs Pineda

Chattel Mortgage; Subject-matter; House on land belonging to another treated as

movable property between the parties. Where a house stands on a rented land
belonging to another person, it may be the subject-matter of a chattel mortgage as
personal or movable property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in an
 action by the mortgagee for foreclosure, the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be
assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage.

Property; Immovable Property; House on land belonging to another; General rule and
exceptions.Although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been
considered as a chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between
them, has been recognized, it has been a constant criterion that, with respect to third
persons, who are not parties to the contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the
house is considered as immovable property.

6. Tsai vs CA

Appeals: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.Well
settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. This
rule is applied more stringently when the findings of fact of the RTC is affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Property; Mortgages; The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy,
bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged, does not make them ipso facto
immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code, as the parties intent has
to be looked into.Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e.,
that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX
to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New
Civil Code. This assertion, however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not
foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties intent. While it is true that the
controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and
Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the
case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCom and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as
chattels.

Same; Same; Estoppel; Even if the properties are immovable by nature, nothing detracts
the parties from treating them as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of
estoppel.Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by
nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation
under the principle of estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is
used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed
over it, as in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Where the facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the
parties intention is to treat the units of machinery as chattels, a fortiori, the after-acquired
properties, which are of the same description as the units referred to earlier, must also be
treated as chattels.In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled
as Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage
if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2)
attached to the said contract a separate LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT.
These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties intention is to treat
these units of machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired properties,
which are of the same description as the units enumerated under the title LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT, must also be treated as chattels.
Same; Same; Chattel Mortgage; A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the
property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the
mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged,
anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding.Accordingly, we find no
reversible error in the respondent appellate courts ruling that inasmuch as the subject
mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and
machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law applies, which provides in Section
7 thereof that: a chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described
therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and
placed in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the
mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding. And, since the disputed machineries were
acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the 1975 or 1979 chattel
mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject
machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.

Sales; Purchaser in Good Faith; Well-settled is the rule that the person who asserts the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value has the burden of proving such assertion.
Petitioner Tsai also argued that assuming that PBComs title over the contested
properties is a nullity, she is nevertheless a purchaser in good faith and for value who
now has a better right than EVERTEX. To the contrary, however, are the factual findings
and conclusions of the trial court that she is not a purchaser in good faith. Well-settled is
the rule that the person who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value
has the burden of proving such assertion. Petitioner Tsai failed to discharge this burden
persuasively.

Same; Same; A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of purchase, or before he has notice
of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.A purchaser in good faith
and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property. Records reveal, however, that when Tsai purchased the
controverted properties, she knew of respondents claim thereon. As borne out by the
records, she received the letter of respondents counsel, apprising her of respondents
claim, dated February 27, 1987. She replied thereto on March 9, 1987. Despite her
knowledge of respondents claim, she proceeded to buy the contested units of machinery
on May 3, 1988. Thus, the RTC did not err in finding that she was not a purchaser in
good faith.
 Same; Land Titles; Torrens System; The defense of indefeasibility of Torrens Title refers
to sale of lands and not to sale of properties situated therein; The mere fact that the lot
where a factory and disputed properties stand in a persons name does not automatically
make such person the owner of everything found therein.Petitioner Tsais defense of
indefeasibility of Torrens Title of the lot where the disputed properties are located is
equally unavailing. This defense refers to sale of lands and not to sale of properties
situated therein. Likewise, the mere fact that the lot where the factory and the disputed
properties stand is in PBComs name does not automatically make PBCom the owner of
everything found therein, especially in view of EVERTEXs letter to Tsai enunciating its
claim.

Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; The doctrine of stale demands would apply only
where by reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce
his legal rights.Petitioners defense of prescription and laches is less than convincing.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the consistent findings of both courts below that the
case for the reconveyance of the disputed properties was filed within the reglementary
period. Here, in our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply. Note that upon
petitioners adamant refusal to heed EVERTEXs claim, respondent company
immediately filed an action to recover possession and ownership of the disputed
properties. There is no evidence showing any failure or neglect on its part, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would
apply only where by reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party
to enforce his legal rights. Moreover, except for very strong reasons, this Court is not
disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner.

Damages; In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions,
speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.Basic is the rule that to
recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must
actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. However, the allegations of
respondent company as to the amount of unrealized rentals due them as actual damages
remain mere assertions unsupported by documents and other competent evidence. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.

7. Valino vs Adriano

Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals; It is undeniable that the law simply
confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
the exclusion of ones common law partner.It is undeniable that the law simply
confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
the exclusion of ones common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA
425 (1990), a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late
Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly
took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the
common-law husband.

Same; Same; Same; The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.It is
clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she
being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately
from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While
there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was
still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens
the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is
an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino
for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adrianos death in the
morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents
immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their
request, but to no avail.

Same; Same; Same; Considering the ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is
the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have
been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty.
Adriano.Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless
prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty.
Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be
noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at
the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim.
Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of
Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true
wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a
long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.

Same; Same; Same; Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the
law favors the legitimate family.It cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was
unavailable to bury her husband when she died, he had already renounced her right to do
so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not
be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate
spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be
readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
 conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there
be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.
Here, Rosarios keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife
was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.

Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the
deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition.Even
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the
Civil Code provides: Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed
wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall
be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family. From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307
simply seeks to prescribe the form of the funeral rites that should govern in the burial
of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial
among those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is
generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself provides, the
wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as
from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It
bears stressing once more that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.

Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside
the commerce of man.It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is
outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion
of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its
final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that
persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

8. People vs Jumawan

Criminal Law; Rape; The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it
from the ambit of crimes against chastity.In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the
stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime
against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular
to the present case, and perhaps the laws most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph
of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz.: Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio. Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term
man in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without
regard to the rapists legal relationship with his victim.

Same; Same; Marital Rape; In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as marital rape due
to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of rape.The
explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of
the 10th Congress on the laws progenitors, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No.
650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as marital rape due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of rape.

Same; Same; Same; The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is
further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within marriage as a form of
sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the
family abode.The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further
affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual
violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family
abode, viz.: Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts: A. Physical Violence refers to acts that include bodily
or physical harm; B. Sexual violence refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to: a) rape, sexual
harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victims body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser; b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion; c) Prostituting the woman or child. Statistical figures confirm the
above characterization. Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal violence are the most
common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married
women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their
husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.

Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot
exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed.The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in
the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is
needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures is R.A. No.
8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes body and thus her consent to
every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. Another
important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was promulgated by the UN General
Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of
gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified
marital rape as a species of sexual violence.

Same; Same; Same; A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under
R.A. No. 8353.Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence,
exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under
R.A. No. 8353. A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A
husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is
fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he
accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage
in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on
its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on
marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society. It is true that the
Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection
and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not
the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

Same; Same; Same; The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a
husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.The delicate and reverent nature of
sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual
intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go
a long way in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil
marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wifes absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the courts intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy
from her coercively or violently.

Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; To treat marital rape cases differently
from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the
rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.To treat marital rape cases
differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime
and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws ordains that similar subjects should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws,
which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains
to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where
the victim is the perpetrators own spouse.As above discussed, the definition of rape in
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrators own spouse. The
single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the
law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike.

Same; Same; Same; A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity.The Court adheres to and hereby adopts the
rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-
appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own
body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in
case she refuses.

Same; Same; Same; The human rights of women include their right to have control over
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual
and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.The human
rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly
on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of
coercion, discrimination and violence. Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. In fine,
since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and nonmarital rape nor provide
for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply
what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or
stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of nonmarital
rape. Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the womans own legal
husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in
rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the
accused and his accuser.

Same; Same; Evidence; In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the
credibility of the victim.In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on
the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine
thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless,
duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victims testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with
human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.It is
settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity
to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with
arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.

Criminal Law; Rape; Prosecution of Offenses; In the prosecution of rape cases, the
essential element that must be proved is the absence of the victims consent to the sexual
congress.Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential
element that must be proved is the absence of the victims consent to the sexual congress.
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat
or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Same; Same; As an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may
be just enough to bring about the desired result.As an element of rape, force or
intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired
result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless
and hapless victim to bow into submission.

Same; Same; Medical Certificates; It is not the presence or absence of blood on the
victims underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is
dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.Contrary to the accused-
appellants allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKKs panties or the lack of a
medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the
victims underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is
dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not pertain to
the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will or without her consent.
Same; Same; It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation,
thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.The accused-appellants assertion that MMM and OOOs
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of
merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOOs testimonies rest not on
whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in
harmony with KKKs narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and
concurrent with, the rape incidents.

Same; Same; Marital Rape; Fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common
factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more
cumbersome in marital rape cases.Fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the
common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more
cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that
it is the wifes absolute obligation to submit to her husbands carnal desires. A husband
raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple
domestic trouble. Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing
marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family
had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are
acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.

Same; Alibi; Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail
and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable,
but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper
motive to testify falsely. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the
place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the
crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.

Same; Same; Denials; Between the accused-appellants alibi and denial, and the positive
identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must
give weight to the latter.Between the accused-appellants alibi and denial, and the
positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the
Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to
falsely testify against the accused-appellant.

Same; Rape; Penalties; Parole; Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of R.A.
No. 9346, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord
with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for
 parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation
because it is an abhorrence to a womans value and dignity as a human being.Rape is a
crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a womans value
and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social
status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they
seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Same; Same; Marital Rape; Husbands are reminded that marriage is not a license to
forcibly rape their wives.Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a
license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wifes body by reason of
marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive
autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her
consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wifes unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her
yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and
self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.

9. Strochecker vs Ramirez

CHATTEL MORTGAGE; INTEREST IN A BUSINESS.An interest in a business may

be the subject of mortgage, for it is a personal property, being capable of appropriation,
and not included among the real properties enumerated in article 335 of the Civil Code.

ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION; SUFFICIENCY OF.Where the description of the chattel

mortgaged is such as to enable the .parties to the mortgage or any other person to identify
the same after a reasonable investigation or inquiry, the description is sufficient. Thus, if
the thing is described as the half interest of the debtor in the drug business known as
Antigua Botica Ramirez (owned by a certain person therein named and the mortgagor)
located at Nos. 123 and 125, Calle Real, District of Intramuros, Manila, P. I., the
description meets the requirements of the law.

ID.; PREFERENCE; PURCHASE PRICE; POSSESSION.The vendor of a chattel,

who is a creditor for the purchase price, has no preference over a creditor holding a
mortgage on that chattel where the vendor is not in possession of the thing mortgaged.
 ID.; ID.; RETROACTIVITY; PERSONAL SECURITY.A junior mortgage can have no
preference over a senior mortgage by the mere fact that prior to said junior mortgage a
personal security had been stipulated between the junior mortgagee and the debtor,
because the second mortgage cannot be given effect as of the date the personal security
was stipulated.

10. Tufexis vs Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan

FRANCHISE; USUFRUCT IN MARKET BUILDING; TRANSFER TO THIRD

PERSONS.A concession granted by the late Spanish Government to a private person
with the right of usuf ruct in a building erected on a lot belonging to the municipality and
intended to be used as a public market thereof for a given number of years is a personal
one and can be transferred by an hereditary title; in no other manner can it be transferred
to a third person not a successor of the grantee without the knowledge and consent of the
Government officials under whose supervision and care the privilege is enjoyed and
exercised.

ID.; LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF GRANTEE.Even though a creditor

Is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's property, yet when among such
property there is included the special right granted by the Government of usufruct in a
building intended for a public service, and when this privilege is closely related to a
service of a public character, such right of the creditor to the collection of a debt owed
him by the debtor who enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a public market is
not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of a court of justice with
respect to the profits or revenue obtained under the special right of usufruct enjoyed by
debtor.

ID. ; ID.; ATTACHMENT.The special concession of the right of usufruct in a public

market cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would be to permit a
person who has contracted with the state or with the administrative officials thereof to
conduct and manage a service of a public character, to be substituted, without the
knowledge and consent of the adminis trative authorities, by one who took no part in the
contract, thus giving rise to the possibility of the regular course of a public service being
disturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the
public interests.

ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY MUST BELONG TO DEBTOR."In attachments of all kinds
it is an essential condition that the thing which is attached shall be the property of the
debtor, and from no provision of the Mortgage Law can any conclusion be drawn which
shall be contrary to this principle." (Lopez vs. Alvarez, 9 Phil. Rep., 28; Alvaran vs.
Marquez, 11 Phil. Rep., 263.)

FRANCHISE; USUFRUCT IN MARKET BUILDING; LIABILITY FOR DEBT OF

GRANTEE; ATTACHMENT.The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to
enjoy the usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor
of such person can recover his debt only out of the income or revenue obtained by the
debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege, in the same manner that the
rights of the creditors of a railroad company can be exercised and their credit collected
 only out of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has been made therefrom of the
operating expenses of the road. (Law of November 12, 1869, extended to the overseas
provinces by the royal order of August 3, 1886.)

Article 419

1. Ramos-Balalio vs Ramos

Public Lands; Regalian Doctrine; Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State; Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands.Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are classified
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.

Same; Same; Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, remains to be the general law governing the classification
and disposition of alienable lands of the public domain.Commonwealth Act No. 141
(1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977),
remains to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these
lands and prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect their
title to them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case before us.

Same; Same; Homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes.A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant
case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.
Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this
country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of
more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show
that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land
issituated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.

Remedial Law; Accion Publiciana; An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of
the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently of title.An accion publiciana is an
action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In
this case, the issue is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered
as having any right to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts for the
return of the possession thereof.

Same; Same; Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
 that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.Zenaida presented tax
declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana
Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held that although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.

Article 420

1. Villarico vs Sarmiento

Property; Ownership; Possession; Easements; Right of Way; Words and Phrases; A lot on
which stairways were built for the use of the people as passageway to the highway is
property of public dominion; Public use is use that is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.It is not disputed that the lot on which
petitioners alleged right of way exists belongs to the state or property of public
dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
follows: ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those
intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character. (2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. Public use is use that is
not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. Records show
that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to
the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Property of public dominion is outside the commerce
of man and hence cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.Property of public
dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased
or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription
against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easement. Considering that the lot on which the stairways
were constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by
mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for
himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it.

2. Domalsin vs Valenciano

Remedial Law; Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer; The admission of petitioner in his
Amended Complaint that respondents started constructing a building within the Kennon
Road road right-of-way belies his claim that the lot in question is his; Neither the
petitioner nor the respondents can own nor possess the subject property the same being
part of the public dominion.It must be made clear that the property subject of this case
is a portion of the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is located in front of a parcel
of land that petitioner bought by way of Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo
Binay-an. The admission of petitioner in his Amended Complaint that respondents started
constructing a building within the Kennon Road road-right-of-way belies his claim that
the lot in question is his. In light of this exposition, it is clear that neither the petitioner
nor the respondents can own nor possess the subject property the same being part of the
public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code
as follows: ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those
intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character. (2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Same; Same; As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use
of the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public dominion.Properties
of public dominion are owned by the general public. Public use is use that is not
confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. As the land in
controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, there can be
no dispute that same is part of public dominion. This being the case, the parties cannot
appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over
it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 530. Only things
and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.

Same; Same; The sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings is the question as to
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de
facto.Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title
is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.

Same; Same; Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him.The Court of Appeals erred when it
preferred the present and actual possession of respondents vis--vis the prior possession
of petitioner on the ground that the parties do not and cannot own the lot in question.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable, quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the
unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he
has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.

Same; Same; Fact that the parties do not and cannot own the property under litigation
does not mean that the issue to be resolved is no longer priority of possession; The main
thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was
lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth so that it behooves the court
 to restore possession regardless of title of ownership.The fact that the parties do not
and cannot own the property under litigation does not mean that the issue to be resolved
is no longer priority of possession. The determining factor for one to be entitled to
possession will be prior physical possession and not actual physical possession. Since
title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the Court of Appeals should have based its
decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action
for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless
of title or ownership.

Same; Same; An action for forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against
one in possession at the commencement of the action and not against one who does not in
fact hold the land.An action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only
against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who
does not in fact hold the land. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action
may be filed against persons unlawfully withholding or depriving possession or any
person claiming under them. Considering that respondents are the ones in present actual
possession and are depriving petitioner of the possession of the land in question, it is
proper that they be the ones to be named defendants in the case. The fact that Gloria
Banuca was supposedly the one who first committed forcible entry when she allegedly
demolished the house of petitioner does not make her the proper party to be sued because
she is no longer in possession or control of the land in controversy.

Same; Same; Where forcible entry was made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the time the person deprived of possession demanded that
the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof.As
regards the timeliness of the filing of the case for forcible entry, we find that same was
filed within the one-year prescriptive period. We have ruled that where forcible entry was
made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the
person deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from such
dispossession when the former learned thereof. As alleged by petitioner in the Amended
Complaint, he was deprived of his possession over the land by force, strategy and stealth.
Considering that one of the means employed was stealth because the intrusion was done
by respondents without his knowledge and consent, the one-year period should be
counted from the time he made the demand to respondents to vacate the land upon
learning of such dispossession.

3. Sps. Marandant and Fbereras vs CA

Land Registration; Land Titles; Public Lands; Rivers; Just as the old bed had been of
public dominion before the abandonment, the new riverbed shall likewise be of public
dominion.Rivers and their natural beds are undoubtedly properties of public dominion
(Art. 502 par. 1, Civil Code of the Philippines). Whether navigable or not, rivers belong
to the public and cannot be acquired by prescription (Com vs. Meneses, 38 O.G. 2839,
Paras, Civil Code, p. 328, Vol. II, 12th Edition). In fact, a stream located within private
land is still property of public dominion, even if the Torrens Title of the land does not
show the existence of said stream (Talion vs. Sec. of Public Works and Highways, L-
24281, May 16, 1967; Paras, supra). Correspondingly, Art. 462 of the same Civil Code
provides: Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new
bed through a private estate, this bed shall become of public dominion. The rule is the
same that even if the new bed is on private property. The bed becomes property of public
dominion. Just as the old bed had been of public dominion before the abandonment, the
new riverbed shall likewise be of public dominion (Hilario vs. City of Manila, L-19570,
April 27, 1967).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Exceptions; Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
and generally will not be reviewed on appeal.Prefatorily, it must be stated that in
petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and generally
will not be reviewed on appeal. Inquiry upon the veracity of the CAs factual findings and
conclusion is not the function of the Supreme Court for the Court is not a trier of facts.
While this Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, none of
these exceptions find application here.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reversion; A complaint for reversion involves a serious
controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the
government and it seeks the return of the disputed portion of the public domain.A
complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it seeks the return of the
disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of
registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of
title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
misrepresentation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The State, as the party alleging that fraud and
misrepresentation attended the application for free patent, bears the burden of proof.
The State, as the party alleging that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application
for free patent, bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud and
misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It assumes
different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways. Therefore,
fraud and misrepresentation are never presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence; mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Property of the public domain is incapable of registration and
its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a
title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of
the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally
included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and
its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.

4. Manila International Airport Authority vs CA

Manila International Airport Authority; Taxation; MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings
are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments.We rule that MIAAs
Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second,
the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax.

Same; Same; While there is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled

corporation is not exempt from real estate tax, MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation; A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, of which MIAA is neither; MIAA is not
a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares.There is no
dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate
tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13)
of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-
owned or controlled corporation as follows: SEC. 2. General Terms Defined.x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) A government-owned or controlled corporation must be organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into
shares.

Same; Same; Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is not a non-stock

corporation because it has no members; Section 11 of the MIAA Charter which mandates
MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury
prevents it from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.MIAA is also not a non-stock
corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines a
non-stock corporation as one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to
its members, trustees or officers. A non-stock corporation must have members. Even if
we assume that the Government is considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not
make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock corporations cannot distribute any part
of their income to their members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to
remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents
MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.

Administrative Law; Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is a government

instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions.Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not
qualify as a government-owned or controlled corporation. What then is the legal status of
MIAA within the National Government? MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like
any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: SEC. 2. General Terms
Defined.x x x x (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Same; When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporationunless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.When the law vests in a
government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA
exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.

Same; When the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not
integrated with the department framework.Likewise, when the law makes a
government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part
of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department
framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a separate
and autonomous body will make its operation more financially viable.

Same; Manila International Airport Authority; Taxation; Local Government Code; A

government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, which provision recognizes the basic principle that local governments
cannot tax the national government.A government instrumentality like MIAA falls
under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states: SEC. 133. Common
Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: x x x x (o) Taxes, fees or charges
of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Section 133(o) recognizes the basic
principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically
merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution
now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local governments may
only exercise such power subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide.

Taxation; Local Government Code; Statutory Construction; When local governments

invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments, and when Congress grants an exemption to
a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed
liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.Section 133(o) recognizes
the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987
Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide. When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved
against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities. Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly
construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants
an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. As
this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.: The reason for the rule does not apply in
the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the government itself or its agencies. In
such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money
that has to be handled by government in the course of its operations. For these reasons,
provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in
favor of non tax-liability of such agencies. There is, moreover, no point in national and
local governments taxing each other, unless a sound and compelling policy requires such
transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another.

Same; Same; Taxation; Local Government Code; There is also no reason for local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public
services to inhabitants of local governments, the only exception being when the
legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential services for sound and compelling policy considerations.There is also no
reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering
essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when
the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be
express language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local
governments.
Manila International Airport Authority; The Airport Lands and Buildings of the MIAA
are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion
and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code
provides: ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2)
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property. ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

Same; Words and Phrases; The term ports in Article 420 (1) of the Civil Code includes
seaports and airportsthe MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
constructed by the State.No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.

Same; Same; The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are
used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation; The charging
of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of
public dominion or not.The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character
of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road,
either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those
among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the
road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the
public for the maintenance of public roads. The charging of fees to the public does not
determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article
420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for public
use. Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still intended for public use
if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public.
The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the
speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public
character of the road.

Same; Taxation; Users Tax; Words and Phrases; The terminal fees MIAA charges
passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges airlines, are often termed users
tax; A users tax is more equitablea principle of taxation mandated by the 1987
Constitution.The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees
MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations
of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those
among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public
including those who never use the particular public facility. A users tax is more equitable
a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.

Same; The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, as properties of public dominion, are
outside the commerce of man.The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted
to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of public
dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. The Court
has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man.
As early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas that
properties devoted to public use are outside the commerce of man, thus: According to
article 344 of the Civil Code: Property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public
waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or
provinces.

Same; Public Auctions; Property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of
man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale; Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public
policy.Again in Espiritu v. Municipal Council, the Court declared that properties of
public dominion are outside the commerce of man: x x x Town plazas are properties of
public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in
general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased
by the municipality to private parties. While in case of war or during an emergency, town
plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was
tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said
temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town officials should see to it that
the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or
illegal private constructions. (Emphasis supplied) The Court has also ruled that property
of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an
auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of
Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the
MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

Same; Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and
Buildings from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are
inalienable.Before MIAA can encumber the Airport Lands and Buildings, the President
must first withdraw from public use the Airport Lands and Buildings. Sections 83 and 88
of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, which remains to this day the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands, provide: x x x Thus, unless the President
issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use,
these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the
Airport Lands and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of public
dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the
Airport Lands and Buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Same; Trusts; MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust
for the Republic.MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in
trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic.

Same; The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air
Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets
from the Republic to MIAAthe Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport
Lands and Buildings.The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau
of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these
assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize a division in
the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic
remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned
solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse
to the Republic. The MIAA Charter expressly provides that the Airport Lands and
Buildings shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Philippines. This only means that the
Republic retained the beneficial ownership of the Airport Lands and Buildings because
under Article 428 of the Civil Code, only the owner has the right to x x x dispose of a
thing. Since MIAA cannot dispose of the Airport Lands and Buildings, MIAA does not
own the Airport Lands and Buildings. At any time, the President can transfer back to the
Republic title to the Airport Lands and Buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any
consideration. Under Section 3 of the MIAA Charter, the President is the only one who
can authorize the sale or disposition of the Airport Lands and Buildings. This only
confirms that the Airport Lands and Buildings belong to the Republic.

Taxation; Local Government Code; Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines.Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate
tax any [r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Section 234(a)
provides: SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied) This exemption should be read in relation with Section 133(o) of the same
Code, which prohibits local governments from imposing [t]axes, fees or charges of any
kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities x x x. The real
properties owned by the Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic itself or in
the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the National Government. The
Administrative Code allows real property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name
of agencies or instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties remain
owned by the Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.

Manila International Airport Authority; Local Government Code; The Republic may
grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or instrumentality of the national
government, an arrangement which does not result in the loss of the tax exemption;
MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of
the Local Government Code.The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real
property to an agency or instrumentality of the national government. This happens when
title of the real property is transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the
Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement does not result in the
loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that real
property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the beneficial use thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. MIAA, as a
government instrumentality, is not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that the Republic has granted to MIAA the
beneficial use of the Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make these real
properties subject to real estate tax.

Same; Same; Taxation; Portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to
private entities are not exempt from real estate tax.Portions of the Airport Lands and
Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For
example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is
subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such
land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to
real estate tax. In Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA 119, 138
(2004), the Court ruled: Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to
private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not
exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the
hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying,
are exempt from real property taxes.

Same; Taxation; By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local governments
cannot impose any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA.
By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local governments cannot impose
any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local
governments are devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. The taxing powers of local governments do not extend to the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, [u]nless otherwise provided in this
Code as stated in the saving clause of Section 133. The saving clause refers to Section
234(a) on the exception to the exemption from real estate tax of real property owned by
the Republic.

Same; Same; The determinative test whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not
whether MIAA is a juridical person, but whether it is a national government
instrumentality under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code.The minoritys
theory violates Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code which expressly prohibits
local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government
instrumentalities. Section 133(o) does not distinguish between national government
instrumentalities with or without juridical personalities. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 133(o) applies to all national
government instrumentalities, with or without juridical personalities. The determinative
test whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not whether MIAA is a juridical
person, but whether it is a national government instrumentality under Section 133(o) of
the Local Government Code. Section 133(o) is the specific provision of law prohibiting
local governments from imposing any kind of tax on the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities.

Taxation; The saving clause in Section 133 of the Local Government Code refers to the
exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) of the Code, which makes the national
government subject to real estate tax when it gives the beneficial use of its real properties
to a taxable entity; The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is the only instance
when the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are subject to any kind
of tax by local governments.The saving clause in Section 133 refers to the exception to
the exemption in Section 234(a) of the Code, which makes the national government
subject to real estate tax when it gives the beneficial use of its real properties to a taxable
entity. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 234. Exemptions
from Real Property Tax.The following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 234(a), real
property owned by the Republic is exempt from real estate tax. The exception to this
exemption is when the government gives the beneficial use of the real property to a
taxable entity. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is the only instance when
the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are subject to any kind of tax
by local governments. The exception to the exemption applies only to real estate tax and
not to any other tax. The justification for the exception to the exemption is that the real
property, although owned by the Republic, is not devoted to public use or public service
but devoted to the private gain of a taxable person.

Same; Statutory Construction; When a provision of law grants a power but withholds
such power on certain matters, there is no conflict between the grant of power and the
withholding of power.There is no conflict whatsoever between Sections 133 and 193
because Section 193 expressly admits its subordination to other provisions of the Code
when Section 193 states [u]nless otherwise provided in this Code. By its own words,
Section 193 admits the superiority of other provisions of the Local Government Code that
limit the exercise of the taxing power in Section 193. When a provision of law grants a
power but withholds such power on certain matters, there is no conflict between the grant
of power and the withholding of power. The grantee of the power simply cannot exercise
the power on matters withheld from its power.

Same; Words and Phrases; By their very meaning and purpose, the common limitations
on the taxing power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power.Since
Section 133 prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of local
governments, Section 133 logically prevails over Section 193 which grants local
governments such taxing powers. By their very meaning and purpose, the common
limitations on the taxing power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power. If
the taxing power of local governments in Section 193 prevails over the limitations on
such taxing power in Section 133, then local governments can impose any kind of tax on
the national government, its agencies and instrumentalitiesa gross absurdity.

Administrative Law; The Administrative Law is the governing law defining the status and
relationship of government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities.
The third whereas clause of the Administrative Code states that the Code incorporates
in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules
of governance. Thus, the Administrative Code is the governing law defining the status
and relationship of government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities. Unless a statute expressly provides for a different status and
relationship for a specific government unit or entity, the provisions of the Administrative
Code prevail.

Same; The government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters

are those that meet the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution, regarding their creation in the interest of common good and their being
subject to the test of economic viability.The government-owned or controlled
corporations created through special charters are those that meet the two conditions
prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. The first condition is that the
government-owned or controlled corporation must be established for the common good.
The second condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation must meet
the test of economic viability. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

Same; The test of economic viability applies only to government-owned or controlled

corporations that perform economic or commercial activities and need to compete in the
market placegovernment instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and
performing governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic
viability.The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create government-
owned or controlled corporations through special charters only if these entities are
required to meet the twin conditions of common good and economic viability. In other
words, Congress has no power to create government-owned or controlled corporations
with special charters unless they are made to comply with the two conditions of common
good and economic viability. The test of economic viability applies only to government-
owned or controlled corporations that perform economic or commercial activities and
need to compete in the market place. Being essentially economic vehicles of the State for
the common goodmeaning for economic development purposesthese government-
owned or controlled corporations with special charters are usually organized as stock
corporations just like ordinary private corporations. In contrast, government
instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform
essential public services for the common good, services that every modern State must
 provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the
government may even subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are not
the government-owned or controlled corporations referred to in Section 16, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

Manila International Airport Authority; Administrative Law; The MIAA need not meet
the test of economic viability because the legislature did not create MIAA to compete in
the market place.The MIAA need not meet the test of economic viability because the
legislature did not create MIAA to compete in the market place. MIAA does not compete
in the market place because there is no competing international airport operated by the
private sector. MIAA performs an essential public service as the primary domestic and
international airport of the Philippines.

Same; Words and Phrases; The terminal fees that MIAA charges every passenger are
regulatory or administrative fees and not income from commercial transactions.MIAA
performs an essential public service that every modern State must provide its citizens.
MIAA derives its revenues principally from the mandatory fees and charges MIAA
imposes on passengers and airlines. The terminal fees that MIAA charges every
passenger are regulatory or administrative fees and not income from commercial
transactions.

5. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs City of Lapu-Lapu

Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Tax Exemption; Mactan-Cebu International Airport

Authority (MCIAA) is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually,
solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal
building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not subject
to real property tax and respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner
over said properties.The petition has merit. The petitioner is an instrumentality of the
government; thus, its properties actually, solely and exclusively used for public purposes,
consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which
they are situated, are not subject to real property tax and respondent City is not justified
in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.

Same; Same; Same; In 2006, the Supreme Court (SC) En Banc decided a case that in
effect reversed the 1996 Mactan ruling.While it is true, as respondents allege, that the
1996 MCIAA case was cited in a long line of cases, still, in 2006, the Court En Banc
decided a case that in effect reversed the 1996 Mactan ruling. The 2006 MIAA case had,
since the promulgation of the questioned Decision and Resolution, reached finality and
had in fact been either affirmed or cited in numerous cases by the Court. The decision
became final and executory on November 3, 2006. Furthermore, the 2006 MIAA case
was decided by the Court En Banc while the 1996 MCIAA case was decided by a
Division. Hence, the 1996 MCIAA case should be read in light of the subsequent and
unequivocal ruling in the 2006 MIAA case.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) in the 2006 MIAA case cited Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) and held that said provision exempts from
real estate tax any [r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.The
Court held that MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust
for the Republic. [Under] Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code
[which] allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the
Republic. The Court in the 2006 MIAA case cited Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code and held that said provision exempts from real estate tax any [r]eal
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. The Court emphasized, however,
that portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are
not exempt from real estate tax. The Court further held: This exemption should be read
in relation with Section 133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits local governments
from imposing [t]axes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities x x x. The real properties owned by the Republic are
titled either in the name of the Republic itself or in the name of agencies or
instrumentalities of the National Government. The Administrative Code allows real
property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name of agencies or instrumentalities
of the national government. Such real properties remain owned by the Republic and
continue to be exempt from real estate tax. The Republic may grant the beneficial use of
its real property to an agency or instrumentality of the national government. This happens
when title of the real property is transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the
Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement does not result in the
loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that real
property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the beneficial use thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. MIAA, as a
government instrumentality, is not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that the Republic has granted to MIAA the
beneficial use of the Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make these real
properties subject to real estate tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the
land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real
estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such land area for a
consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax.
Government Service Insurance System; In Government Service Insurance System v. City
Treasurer and City Assessor of the City of Manila, 609 SCRA 330 (2009), the Supreme
Court (SC) found that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was also a
government instrumentality and not a government-owned or -controlled corporations
(GOCC), applying the 2006 MIAA case even though the GSIS was not among those
specifically mentioned by the Court as similarly situated as Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA).In Government Service Insurance System v. City Treasurer and City
Assessor of the City of Manila, 609 SCRA 330 (2009), the Court found that the GSIS was
also a government instrumentality and not a GOCC, applying the 2006 MIAA case even
though the GSIS was not among those specifically mentioned by the Court as similarly
situated as MIAA.

Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Tax Exemption; Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International

Airport Authority (MCIAA), with its many similarities to the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA), should be classified as a government instrumentality, as its properties
are being used for public purposes, and should be exempt from real estate taxes.All the
more do we find that petitioner MCIAA, with its many similarities to the MIAA, should
be classified as a government instrumentality, as its properties are being used for public
 purposes, and should be exempt from real estate taxes. This is not to derogate in any way
the delegated authority of local government units to collect realty taxes, but to uphold the
fundamental doctrines of uniformity in taxation and equal protection of the laws, by
applying all the jurisprudence that have exempted from said taxes similar authorities,
agencies, and instrumentalities, whether covered by the 2006 MIAA ruling or not. To
reiterate, petitioner MCIAA is vested with corporate powers but it is not a stock or non-
stock corporation, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is
deemed a government-owned or -controlled corporation. Like MIAA, petitioner MCIAA
has capital under its charter but it is not divided into shares of stock. It also has no
stockholders or voting shares.

Same; Same; Same; Public Dominion; Like in Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), the airport lands and buildings of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As
properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of
the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man.Like in MIAA, the airport lands
and buildings of MCIAA are properties of public dominion because they are intended for
public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the
Republic of the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man. This, unless petitioner
leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject
to real property tax; in which case, only those portions of petitioners properties which
are leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the
City of Lapu-Lapu.

6. Laurel vs Garcia

Civil Law; Property; Roppongi property is of public dominion.There can be no doubt

that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.

Same; Same; Same; As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man and can not be alienated.As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to
serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

Same; Same; Same; Roppongi property correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article
420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service.The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420
of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Same; Same; Same; A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.The fact that the Roppongi site has not
been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite.The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by
concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that
an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the governments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in
1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi propertys original purpose.A mere transfer
of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi
propertys original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in
Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and
conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but
did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does not authorize
the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property.Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No.
6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in
foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of
public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to
properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep.
Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the
Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment
(as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of
funds.

Administrative Law; Political Law; President can not convey valuable real property of
the government on his or her own sole will; Conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by Congress.It is not for the President to convey valuable
real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
 Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989 asking for the
deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from
public domain much less authorize its sale.Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June
8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw
the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is
not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In
fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.

7. Navy Officers Village Association Inc. vs Republic

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Question of Law and Question of Fact,
Distinguished.Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to
appeal from a judgment or final order of the CA shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence on a certain state of facts. The
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists
when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation. The rule
that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45 Petition before this Court,
however, has exceptions. Among these exceptions is when there is conflict between the
factual findings of the RTC and that of the CA.

Same; Same; Intervention; Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a

third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff
or defendant, or demanding something adverse to both of them.Intervention is a
proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding something adverse
to both of them. Its purpose is to enable such third party to protect or preserve a right or
interest which may be affected by the proceeding, such interest being actual, material,
direct and immediate, not simply contingent and expectant. As a general rule,
intervention cannot be made at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
governing interventions, provides that the motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. This rule notwithstanding, intervention
may be allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect some interest which
cannot otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose of preserving the
intervenors right to appeal. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice x x x
and aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Public Land Act; Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time
to time, classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their
administration and disposition.The classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain are governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the
countrys primary law on the matter. Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class
to another for purposes of their administration and disposition. Under Section 7 of C.A.
No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration and disposition
of alienable and disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under the Acts provisions. Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands
open to disposition or concession and the requirement that they have been officially
delimited and classified, and when practicable, surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by
implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which have been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the Government; or in any manner have
become private property, or those on which a private right authorized and recognized by
the Act or any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the President
to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition,
until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress. Lands
of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under
Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (3) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the President to make the classifications and,
at any time, transfer lands from one class to another.

Same; Same; Same; Public Domain; Words and Phrases; Section 83 of Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for public and
quasi-public uses as any tract or tracts of land of the public domain which the
President, by proclamation and upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, may designate as reservations for the use of the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof or for quasi-public uses
or purposes when the public interest requires it.Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines
public domain lands classified as reservations for public and quasi-public uses as any
tract or tracts of land of the public domain which the President, by proclamation and
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may
designate as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it. Under Section 88 of the same Act, these reserved tract or
tracts of lands shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of [CA No.
141] or by proclamation of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Within the class of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further classify public
domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural:
residential, commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for
townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands from one
class to the other at any time.Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the President may further classify public domain lands, according to the
use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential, commercial,
industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and for public
and quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any
time. Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its
classification as agricultural (under Section 9[a]), to residential, commercial, industrial,
or for similar purposes (under Section 9[b]) and declare it available for disposition under
any of the modes of disposition of alienable and disposable public lands available under
C.A. No. 141, as amended.

Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Modes of Disposition of Alienable and
Disposable Lands.The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available
under C.A. No. 141 include: (1) by homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by sale (Chapter
V), by lease (Chapter VI) and by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles (Chapters
VII and VIII) for agricultural lands under Title II of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2) by sale
or by lease for residential, commercial, or industrial lands under Title III of C.A. No. 141,
as amended; (3) by donation, sale, lease, exchange or any other form for educational and
charitable lands under Title IV of C.A. No. 141, as amended; and (4) by sale by public
auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant,
or other modes of disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public
domain and become, by operation of law, their private property.

Same; Same; Same; Public Domain; Until the parcels of land are actually granted to,
acquired, or purchased by private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which
the President, under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, may classify again
as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also, under Section 8
of C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition.Until the parcels of land are
actually granted to, acquired, or purchased by private persons, they remain lands of the
public domain which the President, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, may classify again
as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also, under Section 8
of C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition. If these parcels of land are
reclassified as reservations before they are actually acquired by private persons, or if the
President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared open for
disposition by proclamation of the President pursuant to Section 88 in relation with
Section 8 of C.A. No. 141. Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9(d) of C.A. No. 141 are still
non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general classification
under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific
declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as
reservations are non-alienable and non-disposable. In short, parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-disposable in
view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141 specifically declaring them
as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands
until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.

Same; Same; Property of Public Dominion and Patrimonial Property, Defined.

Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 defines property of the public dominion as those which are
intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are
intended for some public service. Article 421, on the other hand, defines patrimonial
property as all other property of the State which is not of the character stated in Article
420. While Article 422 states that public dominion property which is no longer intended
for public use or service shall form part of the States patrimonial property. Thus, from
the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are
intended for public use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public
uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain
reserved. As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-
public uses are outside the commerce of man. They cannot be subject to sale, disposition
or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or encumbrance of such property of the public
dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.

Same; Same; Public Domain; To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands
of the public domain designated as reservations must first be withdrawn, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public use for
which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to
patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code.To be subject to sale, occupation or other
disposition, lands of the public domain designated as reservations must first be
withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or
quasi-public use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have
been converted to patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141
and Article 422 of the Civil Code. Without such express declaration or positive
governmental act, the reserved public domain lands remain to be public dominion
property of the State.

Same; Same; Same; While Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of
land from the Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) and made the covered
area available for disposition in favor of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Officers
Village Association, Inc. (AFPOVAI), Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the
property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the Veterans
Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC).We agree with the respondents
that while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September 1965, removed from the FBMR a
certain parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No. 478, issued in October
1965, in turn segregated the property from the area made available for disposition under
Proclamation No. 461, and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. We find it clear that
Proclamation No. 478 was issued after, not before, Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while
Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and
made the covered area available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation
No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and
reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. With the issuance of Proclamation No. 478, the
property was transferred back to that class of public domain land reserved for public or
quasi-public use or purpose which, consistent with Article 420 of the Civil Code, is
property of the public dominion, not patrimonial property of the State.

Same; Same; Same; Public Dominion; Consistent with Section 88, in relation with
Section 8, of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
property which was classified again as reservation for public or quasi-public use or
purpose is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also remains property of the
public dominion; hence, non-alienable and non-disposable land of the public domain.
As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have validly
revoked Proclamation No. 478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation
No. 478 stands as the most recent manifestation of the States intention to reserve the
property anew for some public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus, consistent with
Section 88, in relation with Section 8, of C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code,
as discussed above, the property which was classified again as reservation for public or
quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also remains
property of the public dominion; hence, non-alienable and non-disposable land of the
public domain. As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the property
subject of this case, which does not fall among the areas specifically designated as
exempt from the laws operation was, by legal fiat, transferred to the BCDAs authority.

Same; Same; Public Dominion; Property which are intended for public or quasi-public
use or for some public purpose are public dominion property of the State and are outside
the commerce of man.As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is
outside the commerce of man. Property which are intended for public or quasi-public use
or for some public purpose are public dominion property of the State and are outside the
commerce of man. NOVAI, therefore, could not have validly purchased the property in
1991. We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or
quasi-public use or purpose are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other
disposition until again declared alienable by law or by proclamation of the President. Any
sale or disposition of property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law
and public policy. Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to
NOVAI is similarly void ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that registration under the
Torrens System does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring ownership;
that registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrants already
existing title.

Same; Same; Public Domain; Section 1 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only:
(i) of land of the private domain, not land of the public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not by the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
Director.Section 1 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the
private domain, not land of the public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, not by the LMB Director. Section 2 of the said Act, in fact,
specifically exempts from its coverage land necessary for the public service. As the sale
was executed by the LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of
the VRMTC, it, therefore, clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.
8. City of Lapu-lapu vs PEZA

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Under the Rules of Court, there are three (3)
modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court (RTC) decisions.Under the Rules of Court,
there are three modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court decisions. The first mode is
through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals where the decision assailed was
rendered in the exercise of the Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction. Ordinary
appeals are governed by Rule 41, Sections 3 to 13 of the Rules of Court. In ordinary
appeals, questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The second
mode is through a petition for review before the Court of Appeals where the decision
assailed was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for review before the Court
of Appeals. In petitions for review under Rule 42, questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law may be raised. The third mode is through an appeal by certiorari
before this court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised.

Same; Same; Same; Question of Fact and Question of Law, Distinguished.A

question of fact exists when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. On
the other hand, there is a question of law if the appeal raises doubt as to the applicable
law on a certain set of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 50, Section 2, an improper appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA) is dismissed outright and shall not be referred to the proper court.Under
Rule 50, Section 2, an improper appeal before the Court of Appeals is dismissed outright
and shall not be referred to the proper court: SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the
Court of Appeals.An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law
not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be
dismissed. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. Rule 50, Section 2 repealed Rule 50,
Section 3 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provided that improper appeals to the Court
of Appeals shall not be dismissed but shall be certified to the proper court for resolution:
Sec. 3. Where appealed case erroneously, brought.Where the appealed case has been
erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds
therefor.

Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review on Certiorari; With respect to appeals by
certiorari directly filed before the Supreme Court (SC) but which raise questions of fact,
paragraph 4(b) of Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990 states that the SC retains the
option, in the exercise of its sound discretion and considering the attendant
circumstances, either itself to take cognizance of and decide such issues or to refer them
to the Court of Appeals (CA) for determination.With respect to appeals by certiorari
directly filed before this court but which raise questions of fact, paragraph 4(b) of
Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990 states that this court retains the option, in the
exercise of its sound discretion and considering the attendant circumstances, either itself
to take cognizance of and decide such issues or to refer them to the Court of Appeals for
determination.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Jurisdiction; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Declaratory
Relief; The court with jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief is the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), the subject matter of litigation in an action for declaratory relief being
incapable of pecuniary estimation.The court with jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief is the Regional Trial Court, the subject matter of litigation in an action
for declaratory relief being incapable of pecuniary estimation. Section 19 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which
the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation[.] Consistent with the law,
the Rules state that a petition for declaratory relief is filed in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court. A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial
determination of any question of construction or validity arising from, and for a
declaration of rights and duties, under any of the following subject matters: a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation. However, a declaratory judgment may issue only if
there has been no breach of the documents in question. If the contract or statute subject
matter of the action has already been breached, the appropriate ordinary civil action must
be filed. If adequate relief is available through another form of action or proceeding, the
other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is required that the parties to the action for
declaratory relief be those whose rights or interests are affected by the contract or statute
in question.It is also required that the parties to the action for declaratory relief be
those whose rights or interests are affected by the contract or statute in question. There
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between the
parties. The issue between the parties must be ripe for judicial determination. An action
for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions cannot be filed for
our courts are not advisory courts.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.
There are several aspects of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong. It is conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution or a statute.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter means the nature of the cause of action and the relief
sought. Thus, the cause of action and character of the relief sought as alleged in
the complaint are examined to determine whether a court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Any decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action is void.

Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
indispensable in actions in personam or those actions based on a partys personal liability.
Another aspect of jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the person. It is the power of [a]
court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action. A court automatically acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff upon the filing of the initiatory pleading. With
respect to the defendant, voluntary appearance in court or a valid service of summons
vests the court with jurisdiction over the defendants person. Jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is indispensable in actions in personam or those actions based on a
partys personal liability. The proceedings in an action in personam are void if the court
had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the res is necessary in actions in rem or those
actions directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments
with respect thereto as against the whole world.Jurisdiction over the res or the thing
under litigation is acquired either by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
Jurisdiction over the res is necessary in actions in rem or those actions directed against
the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as
against the whole world. The proceedings in an action in rem are void if the court had no
jurisdiction over the thing under litigation.

Taxation; Assessment; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; In case of an erroneous

assessment, the taxpayer must exhaust the administrative remedies provided under the
Local Government Code (LGC) before resorting to judicial action.Once an assessment
has already been issued by the assessor, the proper remedy of a taxpayer depends on
whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal. An erroneous assessment presupposes
that the taxpayer is subject to the tax but is disputing the correctness of the amount
assessed. With an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer claims that the local assessor erred
in determining any of the items for computing the real property tax, i.e., the value of the
real property or the portion thereof subject to tax and the proper assessment levels. In
case of an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer must exhaust the administrative remedies
provided under the Local Government Code before resorting to judicial action.

Same; Same; Payment under protest and appeal to the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals (LBAA) are successive administrative remedies to a taxpayer who questions
the correctness of an assessment.Payment under protest and appeal to the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals are successive administrative remedies to a taxpayer who
questions the correctness of an assessment. The Local Board Assessment Appeals shall
not entertain an appeal without the action of the local assessor on the protest. If the
taxpayer is still unsatisfied after appealing with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals,
the taxpayer may appeal with the Central Board of Assessment Appeals within 30 days
from receipt of the Local Boards decision.

Same; Same; In case of an illegal assessment, the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial
action without paying under protest the assessed tax and filing an appeal with the Local
and Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).On the other hand, an assessment is
illegal if it was made without authority under the law. In case of an illegal assessment, the
taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action without paying under protest the assessed
tax and filing an appeal with the Local and Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Remedial Law; Injunction; Words and Phrases; Injunction is a judicial writ, process or
proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or
refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as incident in the main action. The essential requisites of a writ of
injunction are: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such
right.

Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may
be brought at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.Jurisdiction is the power to
hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only
with the court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought.
Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no jurisdiction
over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.

Same; Same; Venue; A partys objections to venue must be brought at the earliest
opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall
be deemed waived.Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought. In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural
law. A partys objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived.
When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio
dismiss the case.

Same; Same; Same; The venue of an action depends on whether the action is a real or
personal action.The venue of an action depends on whether the action is a real or
personal action. Should the action affect title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, it is a real action. The action should be filed in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. If the action is a personal action, the action shall be filed with the proper court
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Same; Same; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; Words and Phrases; A judgment on the
merits is one which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of the formal, technical or dilatory objections.Appeal is
the remedy to obtain a reversal or modification of a judgment on the merits. A
judgment on the merits is one which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of the formal, technical or dilatory objections.
It is not even necessary that the case proceeded to trial. So long as the judgment is
general and the parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective
claims and contentions, the judgment is on the merits.

Same; Same; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; An appeal before the Supreme
Court (SC) raising pure questions of law is commenced by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.In our jurisdiction, the term certiorari
is used in two ways. An appeal before this court raising pure questions of law is
commenced by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. An appeal by certiorari, which continues the proceedings commenced before the
lower courts, is filed to reverse or modify judgments or final orders. Under the Rules, an
appeal by certiorari must be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final
order, or of the denial of the appellants motion for new trial or reconsideration.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, is an
independent and original action filed to set aside proceedings conducted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, on the other hand, is an independent
and original action filed to set aside proceedings conducted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari may only be filed if there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition must be
filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution.
Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Real property taxes are collected by the Local Treasurer,
not by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in charge of collecting national internal
revenue taxes, fees, and charges.The local tax cases referred to in Section 7, paragraph
(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, include cases involving real property taxes.
Real property taxation is governed by Book II of the Local Government Code on Local
Taxation and Fiscal Matters. Real property taxes are collected by the Local Treasurer,
not by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in charge of collecting national internal revenue
taxes, fees, and charges. Section 7, paragraph (a)(5) of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9282, separately provides for the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals over decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals involving the assessment or collection of real property taxes.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The
Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not the Court of
Appeals (CA), has the exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing
interlocutory orders issued by Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in a local tax case.We
have also ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of Appeals, has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by
Regional Trial Courts in a local tax case. We explained in The City of Manila v. Hon.
Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), that while the Court of Tax Appeals has no
express grant of power to issue writs of certiorari under Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended, the tax courts judicial power as defined in the Constitution includes the power
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the [Regional Trial Court] in issuing an
interlocutory order of jurisdiction in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court.

Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion of administrative

remedies under the Local Government Code (LGC) is necessary in cases of erroneous
assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed is assailed.Exhaustion of
administrative remedies under the Local Government Code is necessary in cases of
erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed is assailed. The
taxpayer must first pay the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30 days
from date of payment of tax. If protest is denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period to
decide the protest, the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
within 60 days from the denial of the protest or the lapse of the 60-day period to decide
the protest. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals has 120 days to decide the appeal.
Taxation; Local Board of Assessment Appeals; If the taxpayer is unsatisfied with the
Local Boards decision, the taxpayer may appeal before the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals (CBAA) within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Local Boards decision.If
the taxpayer is unsatisfied with the Local Boards decision, the taxpayer may appeal
before the Central Board of Assessment Appeals within 30 days from receipt of the Local
Boards decision. The decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals is appealable
before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. The appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals
shall be filed following the procedure under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Tax Appeals decision may then be appealed before this court through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising pure questions of law.

Assessment; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; In case of an illegal assessment

where the assessment was issued without authority, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action.In case
of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued without authority, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial
action. The taxpayer shall file a complaint for injunction before the Regional Trial Court
to enjoin the local government unit from collecting real property taxes. The party
unsatisfied with the decision of the Regional Trial Court shall file an appeal, not a
petition for certiorari, before the Court of Tax Appeals, the complaint being a local tax
case decided by the Regional Trial Court. The appeal shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the trial courts decision.

Taxation; Notice of Delinquency; Injunction; In case the local government unit (LGU)
has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction to
enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction.In case the local
government unit has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for
injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction. In case the
local government unit has already sold the property at public auction, the taxpayer must
first deposit with the court the amount for which the real property was sold, together with
interest of 2% per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of action. The
taxpayer may then file a complaint to assail the validity of the public auction. The
decisions of the Regional Trial Court in these cases shall be appealable before the Court
of Tax Appeals, and the latters decisions appealable before this court through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Real Property Taxes; Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property
such as lands, buildings, machinery, and other improvements not otherwise specifically
exempted under the Local Government Code (LGC).Real property taxes are annual
taxes levied on real property such as lands, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements not otherwise specifically exempted under the Local Government Code.
Real property taxes are ad valorem, with the amount charged based on a fixed proportion
of the value of the property. Under the law, provinces, cities, and municipalities within
the Metropolitan Manila Area have the power to levy real property taxes within their
respective territories. The general rule is that real properties are subject to real property
taxes. This is true especially since the Local Government Code has withdrawn
exemptions from real property taxes of all persons, whether natural or juridical.

Same; Same; Tax Exemptions; For persons granted tax exemptions or incentives before
the effectivity of the Local Government Code (LGC), Section 193 withdrew these tax
exemption privileges; Nevertheless, local government units (LGUs) may grant tax
exemptions under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary.For persons
granted tax exemptions or incentives before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code, Section 193 withdrew these tax exemption privileges. These persons consist of
both natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations: SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.Unless otherwise
provided in this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938,
non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn
upon effectivity of this Code. As discussed, Section 234 withdrew all tax privileges with
respect to real property taxes. Nevertheless, local government units may grant tax
exemptions under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary.

Same; Same; Same; In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 261
SCRA 667 (1996), the Supreme Court (SC) classified the exemptions from real property
taxes into ownership, character, and usage exemptions.In Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667 (1996), this court classified the exemptions
from real property taxes into ownership, character, and usage exemptions. Ownership
exemptions are exemptions based on the ownership of the real property. The exemptions
of real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, provinces, cities,
municipalities, barangays, and registered cooperatives fall under this classification.
Character exemptions are exemptions based on the character of the real property. Thus,
no real property taxes may be levied on charitable institutions, houses and temples of
prayer like churches, parsonages, or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and
nonprofit or religious cemeteries. Usage exemptions are exemptions based on the use of
the real property. Thus, no real property taxes may be levied on real property such as: (1)
lands and buildings actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purpose; (2) machineries and equipment actually, directly and exclusively
used by local water districts or by government-owned or -controlled corporations
engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of
electric power; and (3) machinery and equipment used for pollution control and
environmental protection.

Same; Philippine Economic Zone Authority; The Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) is an instrumentality of the national government. It is not integrated within the
department framework but is an agency attached to the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI).An instrumentality is any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Examples of instrumentalities of the
national government are the Manila International Airport Authority, the Philippine
Fisheries Development Authority, the Government Service Insurance System, and the
Philippine Reclamation Authority. These entities are not integrated within the department
framework but are nevertheless vested with special functions to carry out a declared
policy of the national government. Similarly, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the
national government. It is not integrated within the department framework but is an
agency attached to the Department of Trade and Industry.

Same; Same; Special Economic Zones; Congress created the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in
the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed or which have
the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial tourist/recreational,
commercial, banking, investment and financial centers.As an instrumentality of the
national government, the PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law.
Congress created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic
zones in the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed or
which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial
tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial centers.

Same; Same; Tax Exemptions; Real Property Taxes; Being an instrumentality of the
national government, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) cannot be taxed
by local government units (LGUs).Being an instrumentality of the national
government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by local government units. Although a body
corporate vested with some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a government-owned or
-controlled corporation taxable for real property taxes.

Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations; Under the Constitution, government-

owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs) are created in the interest of the common
good and should satisfy the test of economic viability.Government entities are created
by law, specifically, by the Constitution or by statute. In the case of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, they are incorporated by virtue of special charters to participate
in the market for special reasons which may be related to dysfunctions or inefficiencies of
the market structure. This is to adjust reality as against the concept of full competition
where all market players are price takers. Thus, under the Constitution, government-
owned or -controlled corporations are created in the interest of the common good and
should satisfy the test of economic viability. Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution
provides: Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
-controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest
of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

Government Instrumentality; When a government entity performs sovereign functions, it

need not meet the test of economic viability.Government instrumentalities, on the other
hand, are also created by law but partake of sovereign functions. When a government
entity performs sovereign functions, it need not meet the test of economic viability.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority; Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and developing special
economic zones to attract investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of
Filipino labor.The law created the PEZAs charter. Under the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the governmental function
of operating, administering, managing, and developing special economic zones to attract
investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor. Under its
charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some corporate powers.
However, it was not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the
PEZAs charter provides that the PEZAs capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also
has no members who shall share in the PEZAs profits.

Same; Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Real Property Taxes; The Supreme Court (SC) ruled
that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) is exempt from real property taxes
by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly
exempting the PEZA is unnecessary.We rule that the PEZA is exempt from real
property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property
exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66. Section 11 of the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated the EPZA to evolve into the PEZA in accordance
with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order issued for this
purpose. President Ramos then issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering the
PEZA to assume the EPZAs powers, functions, and responsibilities under Presidential
Decree No. 66 not inconsistent with the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contrary to the Philippine Economic Zone Authoritys
(PEZAs) claim, developers of economic zones, whether public or private developers, are
liable for real property taxes on lands they own.Contrary to the PEZAs claim,
developers of economic zones, whether public or private developers, are liable for real
property taxes on lands they own. Section 24 does not distinguish between a public and
private developer. Thus, courts cannot distinguish. Unless the public developer is exempt
under the Local Government Code or under its charter enacted after the Local
Government Codes effectivity, the public developer must pay real property taxes on their
land.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) cannot be
taxed for real property taxes even if it acts as a developer or operator of special economic
zones. The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government exempt from payment
of real property taxes under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code (LGC).At
any rate, the PEZA cannot be taxed for real property taxes even if it acts as a developer or
operator of special economic zones. The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national
government exempt from payment of real property taxes under Section 133(o) of the
Local Government Code. As this court said in Manila International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), there must be express language in the law
empowering local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt
whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.

Public Dominion; Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. These
properties are exempt from levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private
sale.Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. These properties
 are exempt from levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. As
this court explained in Manila International Airport Authority: Properties of public
dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
foreclosures and auction sale[.] On the other hand, all other properties of the state that are
not intended for public use or are not intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth are patrimonial properties. Article 421 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides: Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of
the preceding article, is patrimonial property. Patrimonial properties are also properties of
the state, but the state may dispose of its patrimonial property similar to private persons
disposing of their property. Patrimonial properties are within the commerce of man and
are susceptible to prescription, unless otherwise provided.

Same; Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Real Property Taxes; Freeport Area of Bataan; The
Freeport Area of Bataan, where the government allows tax and duty-free importation of
goods, is considered property of public dominion. The Freeport Area of Bataan is owned
by the state and cannot be taxed under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
(LGC).A port of entry, where imported goods are unloaded then introduced in the
market for public consumption, is considered property for public use. Thus, Article 420
of the Civil Code classifies a port as property of public dominion. The Freeport Area of
Bataan, where the government allows tax and duty-free importation of goods, is
considered property of public dominion. The Freeport Area of Bataan is owned by the
state and cannot be taxed under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. Properties
of public dominion, even if titled in the name of an instrumentality as in this case, remain
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. If property registered in the name of an
instrumentality is conveyed to another person, the property is considered conveyed on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority; Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Real Property Taxes;
Even the Philippine Economic Zone Authoritys (PEZAs) lands and buildings whose
beneficial use have been granted to other persons may not be taxed with real property
taxes; Under Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, no taxes, whether
local or national, shall be imposed on all business establishments operating within the
economic zones.Even the PEZAs lands and buildings whose beneficial use have been
granted to other persons may not be taxed with real property taxes. The PEZA may only
lease its lands and buildings to PEZA-registered economic zone enterprises and entities.
These PEZA-registered enterprises and entities, which operate within economic zones,
are not subject to real property taxes. Under Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, no taxes, whether local or national, shall be imposed on all business
establishments operating within the economic zones.

9. Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic

Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for
the first time.It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of
the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to
perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.It is clear
under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and
mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral
lands.

Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.There must be an
express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.
 Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public land is declared
patrimonial by law or proclamation, can the period of possession prior to such conversion
be reckoned in counting the period of prescription? No.The limitation imposed by
Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public
domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the
land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites
of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying
divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section
14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended
under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.

10. Remman Enterprises, Inc. Vs republic

Civil Law; Land Registration; Regalian Doctrine; Public Domain; The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the properties subject of the
application are alienable and disposable.The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the properties subject of the application are
alienable and disposable. Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the
petitioner cannot be admitted as evidence of the subject properties alienability and
disposability. Such notations do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject properties remain part of the inalienable public domain.

Same; Same; The petitioner had to sufficiently establish that: first, the subject properties
form part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, the possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.The dismissal of the
petitioners application for registration was proper. Under pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, the petitioner had to sufficiently establish that: first, the subject properties
form part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, the possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

11. Republic vs Bacas

Civil Law; Estoppel; It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.Granting that the
persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is
not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 (1980), it was written: In any case, even granting that the said
official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. It is a
well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents (Manila Lodge No. 761
vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano vs.
Estrella, 34 SCRA 769). Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the
title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of
the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be
invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas, supra).

Same; Land Registration; When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it

becomes inalienable and outside the commerce of man.As earlier stated, in 1938,
President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March
31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public domain
situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis
Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement or reserved
for military purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be. Such power of the
President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old Revised
Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the
President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative
Code. When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. It may not be the subject of a contract or of
a compromise agreement. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

Same; Public Domain; It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto
converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and occupation
by an individual over a long period of time.It is well-settled that land of the public
domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere
possession and occupation by an individual over a long period of time. In the case of
Diaz v. Republic, 611 SCRA 403 (2010), it was written: But even assuming that the land
in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there
was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and
her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x. x x x. A mere casual cultivation
of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock
over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures,
or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the
 occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; The Supreme

Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments, that nothing is
more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable.The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability
of judgments, that nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Such principle, however, must yield to the
basic rule that a decision which is null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court
is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never become final and executory.

12. Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz

Friar Lands; Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Friar lands are not public lands but
are patrimonial property of the Government.As specifically stated above, the said lands
are not public lands in the sense in which those words are used in the Public Land Act
Numbered Nine hundred and twenty-six and cannot be acquired or leased under the
provisions thereof. In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853, the
Supreme Court held that the so-called friar lands, to which the government of the
Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the
government.

Same; Same; Same; Intention of the government in the sale of friar estates.As held in
Lorenzo vs. Nicolas, No. L-4085, 30 July 1952, 91 Phil. 686, from the provisions of
sections 11, 12 and 16 of Act No. 1120, it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent
is to sell the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of
the same. In case of death of a holder of a certificate, which is only an agreement to sell,
it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the
Government. Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a
certificate if no widow survives him. The widow of a purchaser of Friar Estates land is
entitled to have patent issued to her for the lands purchased upon proper showing she has
completed payment of the purchase price, the right to complete such a purchase being
analogous to the homestead laws. The widows rights are governed by the law in force at
time of her husbands death, and are not affected by her remarriage (Jocson vs. Soriano
(1923), 45 Phil. 375). Attempted legacies in violation of this section, which grants the
widow of the purchaser the ownership of lands purchased and not transferred during the
purchasers lifetime, were void. (Arayata vs. Joya (1928), 51 Phil. 654).

Same; Same; Same; The Piedad Estate in barrio Culiat, Quezon City and Lot No. 671
were parts of the friar lands located in Laguna, Bulacan, Cavite, Bataan, Cebu, Rizal,
Isabela and Mindoro which was purchased by the Government. Friar lands are not public
lands.The principal issue in controversy is the question of ownership of Lot 671,
admittedly an original part and parcel of the Piedad Estate. For its resolution, the basic
and fundamental precept to be followed, in Our view, is the rule and doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court in Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926), 49 Phil. 853 that the so-
called friar lands, to which the Government of the Philippines holds title, are not public
lands but private or patrimonial property of the government. The Piedad Estate was
among the friar lands which the government of the Philippines purchased from the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Limited, La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Limited, and the Recoleto Order of the
Philippine Islands for the sum of $7,239,784.66 on December 23, 1903, as indicated in
the Preamble to the Friar Lands Act, Public Act No. 1120 enacted on April 26, 1904,
hereinbefore quoted in this decision. These properties consisted of about 164,127 hectares
of land situated in the provinces of Laguna, Bulacan, Cavite, Bataan, Cebu, Rizal, Isabela
and Mindoro. These lands are not public lands in the sense in which these words are used
in the Public Lands Act, numbered nine hundred and twenty six and cannot be acquired
or leased under the provisions thereof. (See last paragraph, Preamble to PA 1120).

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Sale; In the absence of proof that Policarpio de la Cruz
(petitioners predecessors-in-interest) applied for or purchased Lot No. 671 of the Piedad
Estate pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act 1120) said Policarpio de la
Cruz acquired no right or title thereto.The ruling of the appellate court that definitely
there was no co-ownership of Lot 671 among the heirs (or descendants) of Policarpio de
la Cruz because it was impossible, factually and legally, for Policarpio to be the owner,
for the entire Piedad Estate (of which Lot No. 671 was then a part) had been since March
12, 1912, registered in the name of the Philippine Government, is correct, and We affirm
the same, considering the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and the doctrine laid down by
this Court that said Friar lands are the private and patrimonial property of the Philippine
Government. And there being no evidence as to how Policarpio acquired ownership over
the land, no document of any kind presented, and no testimony or proof whatsoever that
Policarpio had ever purchased or applied with the government for the purchase of Lot
No. 671, We reject petitioners repeated pretensions that Policarpio de la Cruz was the
owner of Lot 671. He may have been an actual settler or occupant in the land at the time
said lands were acquired by the government and was given the preference to lease,
purchase or acquire his holding, which preference, however, is in disregard of the
settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the land but absent
any showing, proof or evidence that he applied to purchase or acquire the holding,
Policarpio de la Cruz acquired no title, right or interest whatsoever which he could have
transmitted by succession to his children and heirs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Admission by Lucia de la Cruz respondents

(predecessor-in-interest) that she inherited the Lot No. 671 from Policarpio de la Cruz is
unavailing to respondents in the absence of evidence to sale of the lot to the latter under
the Friar Lands Act.The admission by respondent Lucia de la Cruz that she inherited
the property from her father, Policarpio de la Cruz; that Policarpios possession from time
immemorial was in concept of owner; the allegation of the parties that the government
has expressly recognized the right of Policarpio to the land in litigation and that even the
trial and appellate courts decisions assume such express recognition by the government
to Policarpio s claim to the propertyall these are unavailing and of no effect in the face
of the precedent-setting doctrine of this Court that the land is private and patrimonial
property of the government and the specific provision of the Friar Lands Act that the
actual and bonafide settler should he desire to purchase the land occupied by him shall
pay to the government the actual cost thereof, granting to him 15 years from the date of
the purchase in which to pay the same in equal annual installments, should he so desire,
paying interest at the rate of 4% per annum on all deferred payments. When the cost
thereof shall have been ascertained which included the cost of surveys, administration
and interest upon the purchase money, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands then gives
the said settler and occupant a certificate setting forth in detail that the government has
agreed to sell such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so
fixed, and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest, the government will convey to such settler and occupant the land so held by him
by proper instrument of conveyance which is then issued and become effective in the
manner provided in Section 122 of the Land Registration Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Action; Philippine Government, cannot be bound to the
results of an action or admissions by parties therein, where it is not a party to said
proceeding.More than that, the Government of the Philippines is not a party to this
proceedings and it cannot be bound by any act, allegation, declaration, or admission by
either or both parties relating to the disposition and ownership of the private and
patrimonial property of the government such as the Friar land herein involved. Even the
assumption of both courts, the trial and appellate court, that the government has expressly
recognized Policarpios claim to the property in question, is erroneous.

Trust; No trust relationship can be created in favor of the heirs where deceased
predecessor had no title to the property in question.We have affirmed the appellate
courts ruling that Policarpio had no title to the land, and the legal consequence thereof is
that no trust relationship existed over the land in favor of the petitioners as beneficiaries
and the respondent Lucia de la Cruz as the supposed trustee. This is so because in the first
place, the land is the private and patrimonial property of the government and in the
second place, it has not been shown or established that the land had been sold by the
government to Policarpio de la Cruz. If he had the preference to purchase the land but he
failed to exercise said preference or avail the benefits thereof, the same must have been
abandoned or had lapsed through inaction, neglect or omission up to the time of his death
in 1920.

Land Registration; Friar Lands; Mother title of Lot 671 is O.C.T. 614 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal.The mother title of Lot 671 is OCT No. 614 of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Rizal registered on March 12, 1912 in the name of the Philippine
Government. When Lot 671 was segregated, the original title was partially cancelled and
TCT 40355, T-201 was issued to Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz by virtue of
Entry No. 3241 which reads: x x x

Same; Same; Court of Appeals did not err in not declaring that reconstituted title of Lucia
de la Cruz was Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate in barrio Culiat, Q.C. is not void, as proper
judicial proceedings were held in the reconstitution of said title.But these are factual
issues to which We may not properly address Ourselves in the instant petition for
certiorari. Moreover, the petition for reconstitution was duly published and proper notices
posted in accordance with law, and after due hearing, was granted by the court in the
exercise of its authority and jurisdiction. It must be assumed that official duty was
likewise duly and properly exercised in the premises. Hence, We reject petitioners
assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the reconstituted
title of Lucia de la Cruz is absolutely null and void.
Same; Same; While reconstitution of the title of Dorotea and Eugenia de la Cruz over
portions of the land at bar is void for non-publication, the fact remains that they were
registered owners of Lot 671 and can legally sell the same.It may be true that the order
granting reconstitution was null and void by reason of the failure to cause the necessary
publication of the petition, and, therefore, the reconstituted title was ineffective. More
than that, it is established that Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz had previously
sold the land to Lucia de la Cruz executed on November 29, 1941 as indicated in Entry
No. 258 so that Dorotea de la Cruz was no longer the owner at the time she petitioned for
reconstitution. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Dorotea de la Cruz together with
Eugenia de la Paz were the registered owners of Lot 671 under TCT 40355, T-201 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, and they could legally transfer the same to Lucia de la Cruz
who thereafter sold in favor of respondent Iglesia ni Kristo.

Same; Same; Policarpio de la Cruz (petitioners predecessor) owned other lands during
his lifetime.The argument lacks factual basis. Analyzing the answer of the witness, it is
self-evident that it is not responsive to the question. It is hazy, ambiguous, and not
categorical. The testimony does not prove that Policarpio de la Cruz had no other
property aside from Lot 671. And while petitioners bank on the circumstance that the
witness Gomez was a Lucia witness no less and quotes testimony given in the
reconstitution case, petitioners conveniently ignore documentary exhibit presented by
them showing that Policarpio de la Cruz had owned 65 hectares of land.

Same; Same; Registration of Piedad Estate in Rizal Province published in the Official
Gazette of 1911.Indeed, the most telling and revealing piece of documentary evidence
among the voluminous records of this case is the copy of the Official Gazette of 1911
when the registration of the Piedad Estate was published as mentioned in paragraph 1
above. The copy of the Official Gazette of 1911 is marked Exhibit N-1-A, Exhibit 3-
Cruz being pp. 152, 153 and 154 of the Gazette.

Same; Same; Notice of publication in the Official Gazette of registration of Lot 671
under O.C.T. 604 indicates that Policarpio de la Cruz has other lands, and is the owner of
lands adjoining the land in question.Properly understood, the above notice in the
Official Gazette clearly indicate that the properties of the Piedad Estate which include Lot
671 subject of the application of the government and which eventually were registered
under OCT No. 604 in the name of the Government, were outside, in fact separated from
other lands occupied by Hugo Lingat, Tomas Mandaba, Gregorio Eugenio, Mamerto
Cruz, Jacinto Diaz, Policarpio Cruz and others. In other words, Policarpio Cruz was one
of the adjoining owners on the South separated by the Culiat River. It further indicates
that Policarpio de la Cruz had lands other than the property in litigation which is Lot 671.
In passing, We note from the notice that Mamerto Cruz was also an adjoining owner.
Land Registration; Sale; Iglesia ni Kristo is purchaser in good faith of Lot No. 671
forming part of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City.With respect to the alleged error of
the Court of Appeals in holding that respondent Iglesia ni Kristo was an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith, We hold and rule that under the law and
jurisprudence and in view of the historical facts recited earlier, respondent Iglesia ni
Kristo cannot be faulted in taking care to protect its interests in acquiring Lot 671,
confronted as the Iglesia was by the conflicting titles of Lucia de la Cruz and Dorotea de
la Cruz over the same land. By procuring and effecting the settlement of the case for
 Quieting of title filed by Nieves Paz Eraa before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, Civil Case No. Q-16125 under a compromise agreement and executing the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Segregated Portion of Registered Land and the Deed of Assignment
made by the Eraas in favor of both Lucia de la Cruz and Iglesia ni Kristo, respondent
Iglesia did what a prudent, careful and cautious vendee would do under the
circumstances, considering the purchase price paid and invested and the vast area of the
property acquired. For while indeed, two (2) titles crop up under different names for the
same land, the purchaser is not necessarily obliged to be so naive and innocent and
require the title holder to clear their rights first before buying the property he is interested
in acquiring.

Same; Same; Same; Same.True it is that a would-be purchaser of property known to

have two titles would certainly have the duty to inquire about the validity of those two
titles against each other, which would necessarily involve examining their validity per se
against any other title. (Brief of Petitioners, p. 61). But the better part of prudence,
caution and wisdom would be to satisfy and pacify both title-holders together with their
assignees or transferees. This is what respondent Iglesia did to clear and quiet its own
acquisition of the property under litigation. And assuming that there were adverse
claimants such as petitioners herein, respondent Iglesia was not duty-bound as purchaser
for value to respect their claims and interests for after all, the same have been found and
ruled to be false and frivolous.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners are guilty of neglect in assisting their rights.There is
justification in the appellate courts observation that petitioners moved no finger when
Lucia disposed smaller portions of the lot to Juana de los Reyes, Basilisa T. Ramos and
Maximo A. Argana and their eyes opened wide only when they heard of the negotiations
leading to and the eventual sale of the lot by Lucia to her co-appellant, the Iglesia ni
Kristo, the transaction involving as it did millions of pesos. It took them 32 years to
assert their claim to Lot 671 when they filed the case for reconveyance on August 14,
1975, which is a clear case of inaction and neglect, thereby converting whatever interest
petitioners had into a stale demand. (Mejia vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277; Miguel vs.
Catalino, L-23072, 26 SCRA 234). Otherwise, there is no meaning to the maxim
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (The laws serve the vigilant, not those
who sleep.)

13. Solid State Multi- Products Corp. vs CA

Land Titles and Deeds; Friar Lands Act; Bureau of Lands; Sales; The certificate of sale
issued by the Bureau of Lands is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject
only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is
not paid for in full.It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were
purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate
stating therein that the government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant.
The latter then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and
in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate. The conveyance
executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called certificate of sale, is a
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that
 the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser
becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to
the cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No.
L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture is indispensable for
the validity of the sale of such friar lands.Upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interests, the government shall then issue a final deed of
conveyance in favor of the purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid
only if approved by the Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws,
however, required that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. In short, the approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
indispensable for the validity of the sale.

Land Registration; Certificate of Title; Registration does not vest title, it is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property.The issuance of a certificate of title in
favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate
the alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been held
that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than that what
he actally has (De Guzman, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-46935, December 21,
1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).

Same; Same; Quieting of Title; Prescription; An adverse claimant of a registered land

who is in possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from bringing an
action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a
registered owner relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or wrongfully acquired.
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the certificate of title
was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the government, said title
does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the acquisition of the property
was in violation of law. Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in
dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is imprescriptible (Coronel vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, No. 70191, October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA 270). In one case, this Court
ruled that an adverse claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long
period of time is not barred from bringing an action for reconveyance which in effect
seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title
which was illegally or wrongfully acquired (Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 718). In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the
conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would
be unavailing (Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97 Phil. 722; Agne vs. Director of Lands,
G.R. L-40399, February 6, 1990; 181 SCRA 793). Being null and void, the sale made to
Mabini Legaspi and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal
effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum (Agne vs. Director of
Lands, supra). There being no title to the land that Mabini Legaspi acquired from the
government, it follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the former to
respondent Virata.

14. Silverio Sr. vs Marcelo

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Unlawful detainer is an action
to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one
who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any
of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right
to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is a deplorable practice of

litigants consisting of resort to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same
relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.Forum shopping is a
deplorable practice of litigants consisting of resort to two different fora for the purpose of
obtaining the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. The
grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. In Chua v. Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company, 596 SCRA 524 (2009), the Court enumerated the ways by which
forum shopping may be committed: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is
res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with
different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata). Common to these types of forum shopping is the
identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.

Civil Law; Public Domain; Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains
part of the public domain, and its occupation, in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.A case with parallel factual milieu
is Modesto v. Urbina, 633 SCRA 383 (2010). Like the spouses Marcelo, the respondents
in said case relied on a MSA and tax declarations to substantiate their claim of possession
over the contested land therein. In ruling for the petitioners in said case, the Court
stressed that the mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not constitute
possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the claimants actual
possession. We explained that unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains
part of the public domain, and its occupation, in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. This finds support in Section 88 of
the Public Land Act, which provides: Section88. The tract or tracts of land reserved
 under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be
subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable
under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President.

15. Alonso vs Cebu Country Club, Inc.

Civil Law; Property; Reconveyance; In an action for reconveyance based on fraud, he

who charges fraud must prove such fraud in obtaining a title.Imputations of fraud must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of
fraud. In an action for reconveyance based on fraud, he who charges fraud must prove
such fraud in obtaining a title. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. The
strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity.
The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder
or compass.

Same; Same; Same; Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
strong evidence of ownership.Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of
the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax
declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. This
Court has ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.

Same; Same; Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar
lands is indispensable for its validity.Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of
Appeals, the Court has ruled categorically that approval by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its validity, hence, the
absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be
no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.

Same; Attorneys fees; The award of attorneys fees as damages is the exception rather
than the rule, it is not given to the defendant every time the latter prevails.An award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is proper under the circumstances provided for
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered and when the
civil action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith.