MANOTOC VS.

CA | MAY 30, 1986

FACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc
Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition
of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for
departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6
of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP
respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US
relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied
by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication
request denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him
bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right
to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD: NO.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional
right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well
as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He
never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

YAP VS COURT OF APPEALS DIGEST

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5
Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail
pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on
condition that he will secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He sought the reduction of the bail
but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA
that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we
cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and
function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not
prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

MIRASOL VS. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all motorized vehicles
created equal?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited
access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power
or function which it does not possess in the first place.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification
among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to
some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer
models.46 We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all
types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus
or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and
more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

CASE DIGEST : VILLACICENCIO VS LUKBAN

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent
and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and
the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their
secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing
his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation,
who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it
does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race.
These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the
opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For
this, Lukban etal must be severely punished

CAUNCA V SALAZAR (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) GR. NO. L-2690 JANUARY I, 1949

Liberty of abode and travel

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan
and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent
herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency.
Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before
she could be allowed to leave.

Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance
payment it gave?

Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to
keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be
lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an
imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may
curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts
of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents to obstruct, impede
or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would
not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power
to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business
bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to require or enforce
the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm
laborer."

Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving her
employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.