G.R. Nos.

170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA
FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast
station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan City, Isabela. Back
in 1996, New sounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and
transmitters on property located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that
petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayors permit
but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from
agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR
Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia,
City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the provision of Omnibus
Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period,
COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was
barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts
denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a
mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in
the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land
conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land
or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the
reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners
are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also,
petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without
objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the
fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of Cauayan City is not bound
by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and
mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound
by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.

Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or
agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation
of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not
play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the
government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the
State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is
absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City
government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial
use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the
previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the
Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which
they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It
is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from
prime agricultural land to commercial land.
Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have
been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have
favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and
merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the
latters voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to
immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for
a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the
President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the
provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October
1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree 991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to
the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which
will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The
Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad,
father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as It
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis .On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during
the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed
as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to
the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National
Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate
in an election. "Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of
transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with
that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly,
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance
with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life
of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all
the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all
the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.
The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the
incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of
the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the people
themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-
15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted
against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the
interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some
of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim Nationa
l Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had
already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is
not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided
for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of
the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between
constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of
any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.