Canadian Military Intelligence

and the Revolution of Military Affairs of 1914-1918

Robert Martyn
Queens University

The shock effect of modern artillery, coupled with machinegun and rifle bullets
penetrating trees and earthworks, killing those seeking shelter behind them
would mark a revolutionary change from warfighting of the past. The only escape
from this envisaged weight of fire would be that “every body of men…must
immediately entrench itself.”1 However, many contemporary military theorists
believed that technological advances favoured offence and defence equally; thus
in battle the victor would be the side best demonstrating élan and a disregard for
casualties.2

The major European combatants uniformly drew the lessons of national

mobilization and the superiority of massed offensives from the Continental
conflicts of late-nineteenth century. There were several struggles between 1870
and 1914 in which modernized technology played a great role. While these
should logically have had a more significant influence on doctrine and
combatants’ expectations going into World War I, they were largely ignored. Of
particular relevance was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 in that it featured
much of the same weaponry that would be used in Europe a decade later: high-
explosive air-burst artillery, magazine fed rifles, and machineguns. The main
Great War belligerents should have been drawn to lessons from this conflict in
that Russia, a principal European military force, was fighting against Japan, with
its British-trained navy and German-trained army.3 Despite the clear examples of
the destruction inherent in European-style doctrine employing modern weapons,
observers chose to emphasize that which confirmed their predisposition; morale,
within the army and the nation, is the significant factor.4

A Revolution in Military Affairs?

That the Great War marked a clear demarcation from previous conflicts became
equally apparent for Canada. In effect it was as striking a change in warfighting
as is presently being addressed by militaries throughout the world: a Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA). Current writings on the topic posit that the synergism
inherent in communications, computers and electronics are creating an
unprecedented upheaval, or revolution, in how armies conduct warfare.5 The
revolutionary nature of the conflict in 1914 was not less dramatic, in that the
armies had not fought, or even trained, in such unfamiliar circumstances. The
machinegun- and artillery-induced stalemate of trench warfare came as a shock
to the Canadian army whose military culture was largely British. Any modification,
or ‘Canadianization,’ favoured the sweeping manoeuvres experienced on the
open plains of Saskatchewan and South Africa. Conflict theory holds that

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revolutions begin when conditions are sufficiently intolerable to generate the
belief that change is possible. Within armies, openness to creative solutions is
most apparent upon defeat or when they believe they are in a position of
weakness.6 For the Canadian Army in the Great War, conditions of 1915 proved
sufficiently traumatic for tactical innovation to supercede established doctrine.
The successes attending latter battles stemmed not from any particular genius
for war, but rather through the pragmatic adaptation of technological, resourceful,
and occasionally unconventional options. One skill that stands out is use of
military intelligence within the Canadian Corps. Effective intelligence use proved
as vital to WWI victory as it is for today’s RMA “information dominance.” For, as
we shall see, by becoming an innovative and leading intelligence practitioner,
Canada led the way in adapting to the Great War’s Revolution in Military Affairs.

Perhaps pre-War attempts to ignore the realities of industrial-age warfare should

not be surprising, given that an army’s approach to war-fighting appears related
more to its culture than its official doctrine. Practical, and often dramatic,
experience is more influential than staff college debates to changing one’s
cultural mindset.7 For British military leaders whose thinking dominated Canadian
policies, the Franco-Prussian War was more traumatic, and hence made more of
an impression on strategic thought, than military observer or press reports from
Asia. Thus, it was generally held that offensive élan remained superior despite
what practical observation should have indicated was a very different way of war.
France provides the most stark example of the results of this belief: 385,000 of
France’s 1.5 million initial combatants, nearly one in four, become casualties in
the first six weeks of fighting; 110,000 fatally.8

In transforming itself into one of the most successful fighting forces in the First
World War, the Canadian Corps and its intelligence system had to shed some
pre-war habits and quickly absorb painful lessons of modern combat. The
changes tended to be evolutionary rather than dramatic. As such, the warfighting
advances introduced by the Canadian Corps are “more difficult for the casual
student of military history to discern.”9 Nevertheless, the Canadian way of war
was altered. Amongst those elements both leading change, and being changed,
was the conduct of the intelligence function. Forward-looking military theorists in
Europe saw technological advantages inherent in “field telegraphs and
telephones … photographic apparatus for the survey of positions from great
distances” and other means which would “do away with that insufficiency of
information which formerly prevented united and successful operations.” In 1914,
Canada had none of these ‘other means,’ merely obsolescent cavalry
reconnaissance.10

Enroute to the Great War

Canadian soldiers returned from the Boer War with a newfound pride in their
military capabilities, as well as some awareness of their shortcomings.
Canadians deemed their performance equivalent to that of their nominal

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superiors, the British, notwithstanding the greater percentage of Regular Army
soldiers in the British ranks. Any failing in Canada’s war record was attributed to
the weaknesses of British officers, rather than Canadian soldiers.11 Despite the
self-congratulations, problems acknowledged following the 1869 and 1885 North-
West Rebellions reasserted themselves during the Boer War, still unresolved.12
When the Boer War shortcomings were combined with perceived British political
intrigue, seen in the 1895 Anglo-American Venezuela Boundary Crisis or the
1898 Alaska boundary dispute, it proved sufficient to address Canadian military
concerns.13 There appeared a rare occasion in Canadian history when soldiers
and statesmen agreed on the need for an improved military. Desmond Morton
notes that there “was no precedent for the pace of military reform and militia
expansion between 1900 and 1914.”14

The Militia Act of 1904 was the most significant legislative measure, with its
efforts to increase army professionalization in several areas. At the top of the
military command structure, the Act provided for the replacement of the British
General Officer Commanding (GOC) with a Canadian Chief of the General Staff
(CGS), “subject to the superior authority of the Minister of Militia, advised by a
Militia Council.”15 This increased ‘Canadianization’ would also remove the long-
standing antipathy between Canadian politicians and those British GOCs not
responsive to a Canadian electorate.16

Militia Minister Frederick Borden made dramatic improvements in the army’s

operational effectiveness in the pre-war years through increased defence
expenditures providing for more training, ranges and armouries. In practical
terms, the Militia Act also expanded staff training. The stimulus came largely from
the British Imperial General Staff, which was established in 1906 officially to
standardize defence planning amongst the colonies. These standardization
efforts were aimed primarily at Canada and Australia, given the absence of
military formations larger than regiments in the other colonies.17 However, it was
readily apparent that its main purpose was to attempt to maintain some control
over the Dominion armies. The efforts in this regard included creating a
Canadian Headquarters Section of the Imperial General Staff in 1909. In order to
adequately prepare Canadian officers to function in these positions, the staff
officers required a higher military education. Providing this was accomplished
through completing the requisite courses at the British Staff Colleges at
Camberley of Quetta or through the attachment of Canadian officers to the British
War Office.18 Thus expanded training paid benefits when a voluntary Canadian
Expeditionary Force was created in 1914. The Militia’s earlier emphasis on
individual and small-unit training proved a blessing when the 1911 mobilization
plan was discarded in the rush to accommodate volunteers.19 Whatever flaws
may have been present, these improvements carried Canada through the first
months of the War. And it was as part of these rapidly evolving staffs that
Canadian intelligence officers were to make their mark during the war.

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Canadian Intelligence

Throughout Canada’s military history there have been men responsible for
scouting and gathering of information, in effect, providing the basis of
intelligence. Commanders had previously found natives or loyal traders adequate
to keep them informed during minor domestic disputes. More far-ranging
skirmishes, such as the 1885 Rebellion, indicated a requirement for more formal,
albeit ad hoc, units to actively acquire information. This need was addressed
through units such as “Dennis’s Scouts” or “Steele’s Scouts.” It is of interest to
note that Militia Orders officially designated Captain Dennis’s Scouts as the
“Intelligence Corps”; the first such identification in the British Empire.20 However,
it was the South African War that formalized a need for more adequately trained
and equipped specialists.

The British Army had deployed an intelligence staff of forty-four officers under
command of a Brigadier, Director of Military Intelligence.21 This staff was divided
between the Force Headquarters, the Railway staff and the field brigades. Its
operations proved so impressive that the GOC of the Canadian Militia, Major-
General R.H. O’Grady Haly, pushed to have a similar structure created in
Canada. His proposal was accepted, leading to the creation of the Corps of
Guides on 1 April 1903.22

Within military organizations the division between staff (planning and

administration) and line (operational) functions has been well established and
intelligence was to be no exception.23 The first Director General of Intelligence
(DG Int) at Militia Headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel William Denny, had served
as an Intelligence Officer on the British staff during the Boer War. An Intelligence
Staff Officer (ISO), with two branch Assistants (Information and Mapping), four
staff lieutenants and several NCOs supported the DG Int.24 The Information
Branch essentially collated a library consisting of details on foreign armies, such
as their structure and equipment. No single target country was designated, but at
the time, America provided the logical threat.25 The Mapping Branch, naturally,
collected maps and survey data. In addition to these headquarters staffs, the ISO
was responsible for the District Intelligence Officers (DIO), one for each of
Canada’s 12 Military Districts (MD). Training was conducted locally throughout
the year in such skills as horsemanship, military sketching, and fieldcraft.26
Practical experience was limited to various Aid to Civil Power crises. Amongst
the disturbances necessitating Militia deployments were strike interventions,
‘Orange’-Catholic riots, illegal prizefights and the guarding of a hanging.27

Corps of Guides personnel conducted the operational side of Intelligence. Each

Sub-District was to be allocated to Guides units comprised of “intelligent men and
capable of active work.” A typical Guides Company comprised a Major or Captain
commanding three subalterns, three sergeants, three corporals and 24 guides.
Four grooms, one cook and a transport driver formed the integral support.

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Eventually, the Signal Corps assigned an officer and six signalers to each
company.28 The intelligence role of the Guides can be determined by the
examination conducted at the annual summer manoeuvres, which included a
written test, equitation (horsemanship) and a practical test:

Sketch and report at a scale of 3 inches to one mile a road report of three
miles of road, without instruments, 1000 yards on either side, distances to
be estimated by eye, shape of ground…indicated by form (contour)
lines…two hours to complete.29

In effect, the Guides were to be primary collectors of information as a horse-

mounted reconnaissance force, with technology limited to a compass and a
sketchpad. When a MD received an operational task, the Commander would turn
to the DIO for maps and information. If the information was unavailable, it
doctrinally fell to the Guides to find the answers. For example, in 1913, the DIO
and elements of the Corps of Guides’ No. 11 Detachment spent a total of 366
days deployed to Cumberland and Nanaimo, B.C. on strike duty.30
Prior to 1914, the intelligence staffs and Guides expanded, putting greater
effort into training, as did the rest of the military. Much of the effort, however,
remained focused upon the conduct of mounted warfare, such as the
requirements for hay when deployed.31 Essentially, the intelligence function
endeavored to improve upon the lessons learned in the Boer War. By entering
the Great War with generally the structure and mind-set of 1903, the Canadian
Militia, and its intelligence arm, was prepared for the completely wrong war.

The Early War

The Canadian entry into the First World War was marked by the turmoil of Militia
Minister Sam Hughes’ mobilization, when he arbitrarily scrapped the 1911
Mobilization Plan in favour of his own scheme.32 The Corps of Guides was not
immune from the confusions of mobilization. From the Corps, 235 volunteers
arrived at Valcartier during the summer of 1914. Despite there having been six
complete Guides companies plus higher intelligence staffs in the 1911
Mobilization Plan, there was no establishment for Guides units in the 1914 CEF.
Thus, much pre-war intelligence training was lost as the Guides were
unceremoniously transferred to other Corps, predominantly infantry.33 So what
then, was combat like for these enthusiastic volunteers?

The First Canadian Division arrived in France in February 1915.34 They were
initially acclimatized by short experience in quiet sectors to learn some basic
realities of trench warfare. In April, Canadian soldiers took over a section of the
line at Ypres. The newly occupied positions were weakly developed and poorly
sited. Within days of their arrival, the Canadians were called upon to close the
gap where a French-Algerian Division had been destroyed; terror-stricken
survivors streamed rearward past the untried Canadians. The Germans then
focused their artillery, chlorine gas and waves of infantry on Brigadier Currie’s

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brigade. With Ross rifles seizing along the line, the two lead battalions were
destroyed. Despite the shelling and gas, remnants fought on. In addition to
holding their own sector, sections managed to deploy across the huge gap in the
recently vacated French line, providing the only, albeit weak, combat troops
between the German line and the now defenceless city of Ypres. More than six
thousand Canadian soldiers died.35 This introduction, however, was not atypical
of the fighting faced by the Canadians throughout the ensuing three and a half
years. With their technological and tactical innovation the German army made for
a substantially formidable adversary. For example, the firepower of a typical
German infantry battalion in 1914 consisted of 240 rifles only, with no additional
integral fire support. By 1917, each battalion’s 240 rifles were augmented by six
heavy machine guns, eight grenade launchers and four mortars.36 If the
Canadians could barely cope with this weaker early-war threat, it was obvious
that changes were needed to keep pace with German tactical evolution.

While the combat aspects of this Ypres example were generally representative of
fighting throughout the war, Canadians made several substantial improvements
as the war progressed. At Ypres, little time was spent reconnoitering the front
before the gas attack. Major-General Alderson, commanding 1st Canadian
Division, lacked control of his two lead Brigades. Brigadier Turner had no idea
what his subordinate battalions were doing throughout the battle. Brigadier Currie
was forced to spend part of the battle at the rear area gathering his troops.37
These all reflected the poor staff work being conducted by Division and Brigade
staffs at the beginning of the war. Yet this battle was deemed a success.

During the 1916 battle of St. Eloi Craters, roughly 13 months later, 2nd Canadian
Division demonstrated that from an intelligence perspective, painfully little had
been learned. When they took over the line from the withdrawing British, the
Canadians had only an unclear notion as to their location relative to the
Germans. Few could identify accurately their position on a map.38 During the next
several days’ attacks and counterattacks, 2nd Division never knew its positions;
continuously they reported holding specific ground, when in fact it was still very
much in German possession. Clearly no effective intelligence preparation had
been conducted prior to taking over the line.39 Several days into the operation
and still lacking aerial photography, Major-General Turner, commanding 2nd
Canadian Division, relied on his men for situational awareness; men “who had no
maps or any battlefield features in which to guide themselves.” German prisoners
telling their Canadian interrogators that 2nd Division held none of the craters were
disbelieved.40 Normally, as part of the intelligence assessment process all
information is of value for its potential illumination of other vague, or even
contradictory, reports.41 During this battle, however, neither Turner nor his staff
thought to verify the prisoners’ statements. The source of German attacks
remained puzzling. It was incomprehensible to the Canadians believing they held
Craters 4 and 5, that they were being attacked from Craters 4 and 5. More
significantly, this intelligence failure caused Canadian casualties. The Germans

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improved their defences within the Craters free from any artillery fire since their
positions were uniformly reported to be in Canadian hands.42

Within the various Canadian headquarters, the staff organization was still very
much a nascent establishment. Like the other Dominion allies, the Canadians
received operational level intelligence from the British. In 1914 the basic
intelligence on German tactics was based largely upon observations of their
1890s Imperial Manoeuvres, exercises in which densely packed bayonet and
cavalry charges were de rigueur. However, the Germans had learned lessons
from the intervening conflicts, notably the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars.
These conflicts provided the inspiration for the Schlieffen Plan, with its emphasis
on envelopment. While the indirect attack had been a staple of German tactical
doctrine since the Franco-Prussian war, the novel use of envelopment by
independent sub-units was lost upon the Allies. Thus the Canadians faced the
same problem, as did the British and the French, of using faulty, dated
information.43

As the stalemate of trench warfare deepened, it was apparent that innovation

throughout the Allied side was going to be an urgent requirement. Brigadier,
subsequently Lieutenant-General Sir, Arthur Currie proved to be equal to the
task. In the British Army it was not uncommon for officers to snub one “who
neglected hunting and polo in favour of maps and military history.”44 Currie would
certainly have been snubbed. He benefited by not having irrelevant tactical
preconceptions acquired in colonial warfare, such as arrogantly presuming the
enemy to be inferior. Rather he had been a real estate broker and part-time
artilleryman in the Militia, forced to learn though voracious historical reading and
the practical experiences gained in this type of industrialized warfare.45 As part
of this education process, the Canadian Corps commander, Sir Julian Byng sent
Currie to see what lessons could be gleaned from the French successes at
Verdun in 1916. The French emphasis on reconnaissance and information
gathering prior to engagement merely reaffirmed Currie’s own beliefs. One
particular concept that impressed Currie was the French doctrine of choosing
terrain features, such as hills or ridgelines as objectives. The British, and
therefore the Canadians, had previously aimed to capture the German trench
lines. These would have been sited to dominate the Allied approaches, therefore
once captured by the Canadians they were of little tactical use, since they would
be effectively facing the wrong direction.46 Choosing objectives other than the
enemy trench system forced the intelligence staff to expand their collection
efforts.

The increased emphasis on acquiring local information for planning demanded

increased initiative by the staff. While previously content to rely on higher British
headquarters, the staff now actively pursued information. This resulted in greater
tasks assigned down to subordinate units for reconnaissance patrols or acquiring
prisoners for interrogation as well as demands for aerial photographs. Rather
than merely assessing the information with which it was provided, Currie’s

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intelligence staff would go forward to collect information. In preparing for the
battle of Courcellette, for example, little was known about the strongly fortified
ruins of the sugar factory dominating the Canadian route of advance. Two
intelligence NCOs from “Int (b),” or Counter-Intelligence, were sent to find
refugees. Within two days, they found a former night watchman who was
extremely familiar with all of the buildings and “even had picture postcards of the
factory and the village.”47 In this manner, locating details on any German strong-
points became a priority task for the intelligence staffs. This became particularly
critical by early 1917 when German Divisions regularly fielded machinegun
companies on a ratio of 2:1 to rifle companies. These rifle companies, as has
been mentioned, already had significantly more firepower than inherent in their
1914 organization, with the increased devastating effect on attacking troops.48
However, it was not enough for the intelligence staff to concentrate on the
enemy’s front line troops.

Knowledge of the enemy’s reserve or follow-on forces was also a key information
requirement. The intelligence staff was to emphasize:

the position and strength of the enemy’s reserves, concentration

of force for attack, the approach of reinforcements, and signs
indicating the exhaustion of ammunition, inclination to retire, or
disinclination to attack.49

Understanding how the enemy plans on exploiting attacks, based on the position
of his reinforcements or logistic elements, provides valuable insight into potential
weaknesses. Therefore the Corps Headquarters created an Intelligence
Observation Section of one officer and 40 soldiers deployed across the Canadian
frontage. They were responsible for reporting on activity in the enemy rear areas,
with forward area details being left to the Brigade and Battalion Observers.50
Intelligence was becoming increasingly specialized as the war progressed.

The most common method by which information was collected for Brigade
intelligence was through reconnaissance patrols conducted by the forward
battalions. These patrols would determine the location and condition of enemy
wire obstacles, advance positions and main defensive lines. This was particularly
useful because barbwire sited in hedges or ditches, for instance, was virtually
impossible to detect in aerial photographs.51 Knowing this, the enemy machine-
gunners would try to protect this information by firing blindly against these
reconnaissance patrols. While they had little chance of hitting the patrolling
soldiers, the muzzle flashes in the dark allowed the patrols to confirm enemy
location and weapon type. By 1917 Currie refused to sanction patrols or raids
unless they could bring tangible results, rather than merely to attack Germans in
the hope of lowering their morale. Not only was the effect of raiding on enemy
morale difficult to gauge, their positions often contained maps and documents of
intelligence value which could be destroyed in a raid.52 Therefore, rather than
going out to subdue enemy positions, patrols were conducted for the single

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purpose of capturing prisoners and papers. Interrogation is often the most
effective means of determining an enemy’s Order of Battle, or operational
intentions. Quite often the most significant information will be acquired
immediately after capture, while the prisoner is still somewhat disoriented and
less likely to consider that small talk, believed inconsequential, may prove
tactically valuable when assessed collectively with other data.53 For example,
what the prisoner had for breakfast may provide clues as to their supply system,
morale, future operations, or the effectiveness of our interdiction efforts. Any
prisoners or information gathered by patrols would be passed rearward through
the intelligence officer, whose presence down at battalion level was yet another
innovation. In effect, by the latter years of the war, infantry patrolling was
conducted primarily for intelligence gathering purposes.

Aerial observation and photography were further technological improvements

feeding into the intelligence system. Non-specialized aircraft, requiring only a
vigilant aircrew, could conduct observation. However, contrasted with the results
obtained by aerial photography, there were clear limitations on the former
method. For example, soldiers moving across a broken field would likely be
observed only if the aircraft was flying below 1,000 metres. The lower the
observer to the ground, the more limited field of vision and the less time to
examine the ground as it passes by at approximately 100 km/h.54 There is
naturally another inverse correlation with altitude and likelihood of getting shot
down. For intelligence tasks, therefore, photo interpretation became a valued
craft.

As the war progressed both the quality of the photographs and the skill of the
photo interpreters improved. The photos provided artillery-targeting information
on immediate objectives and those in the depth of the enemy’s position. As
artillery improvements caused both sides to increase tunneling operations, aerial
photos proved capable of identifying tunnel openings.55 The photos therefore
augmented tunneling information acquired from prisoners and captured
documents. It was readily apparent, however, that acquiring photograph
interpretation skills required time and experience. As remains the case today, it
was impractical to train infantry soldiers planning and conducting operations in
the skills of a photo reader. Therefore, the photographs had to be annotated,
explaining what features were significant. Further detail, such as information
inferred from other sources, was added to the photographs prior to briefings and
distribution.56

Interpreting the photographs was only one half of the problem; there were
numerous impediments to be overcome in simply obtaining the photos. There
were innate difficulties in manoeuvring a large, multi-crew aircraft mounting a
heavy awkward camera. Given the inherent technical inferiority of British aircraft,
in contrast with more powerful and manouvreable German airplanes, these
reconnaissance aircraft made for inviting targets. For example, during their
support leading up to the Vimy operation, 16 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps

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would conduct photo operations with 18 aircraft, 15 aircraft to defend the three
aircraft actually taking photos.57

Once information was acquired from these disparate sources and analyzed, the
subsequent intelligence had to be provided in a usable form to the subordinate
commanders and combat troops. For those conducting the intelligence function
today, the seeds of future routines would be clearly visible. For example, in
March 1915 the first Daily Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) was issued by 1st
Division; no Allied formations had previously distributed INTSUMs.58 These are
now standard intelligence products in armies throughout the world. This attests to
the utility of distributing a uniform and concise assessment of enemy activity to
subordinate, higher and flanking units, thus allowing a common view of the battle
to inform decision making. In addition to INTSUMs and aerial photographs,
Currie instigated the use of full-scale models for ensuring the soldiers received all
necessary information. These models would be constructed on similar terrain,
back sufficiently from the front to preclude German discovery. They would be laid
out in cloth tape, mapping out trenches, strong points and distinctive features that
would be encountered by the attacking troops. This information would be based
largely upon aerial photographs, augmented with other sources. Interrogating
captured prisoners, for example, allowed the intelligence staffs to place correct
German-language signs throughout the models’ trenches and emplacements so
the attackers could orient themselves rapidly once into the real trench system.59

By late 1917, pre-offensive preparations by combat soldiers and the intelligence

staff followed a standardized practice. Battalion officers, NCOs and many of the
soldiers would go to Corps Headquarters to study the large relief maps and aerial
photographs of the objective area that had been produced by the intelligence
staff. When possible, aerial photos would be distributed to the units, sometimes
down to company level. An Intelligence File produced for operations (in this
example, Passchendaele) is illustrated below.

Intelligence File for PASSCHENDAELE Sector, issued 17 October 1917 to

Third
Canadian Division by Corps General-Staff “I” contained the following:

1. Resumé of Enemy Defences.

2. Facsimile of Sketch of captured map dated October 5th showing
Enemy dispositions at that date. Enemy dispositions at the time of the
assault were assumed to be on a similar basis.
3. Disposition sketch showing Order of Battle 17/10/17.
4. General resumé of Intelligence of that period indicating condition of
enemy morale and illustrated by extracts from Second Army
Summaries of the most recent date.
5. Log PASSCHENDAELE Sector. (See Annex A of this paper for Log
detail).

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 6. An aerial photo vertical mosaic covering objective and set of four
oblique photos covering the same area.
7. Maps of area concerned. This was critical, in order to ensure all
Canadian troops were using the same map information.
8. This is supplanted by additions from time to time, up to, and during the
actual operations.

Figure 1 - Sample Intelligence File60

After the planning and intelligence staffs briefed everyone on the objectives using
the Intelligence File, the battalion would go over the full-scale tape map. Once
the battalions had completed their rehearsals, the higher brigade staffs would go
through the tape map in order to work out any mutual support or flank concerns.
The Brigade Intelligence Officer, sometimes accompanied by the Bombing
Officer, would lead parties to the forward edge of the friendly lines and point out
the actual terrain features.61 The combination of rehearsing over the tape models
then moving forward to observe the actual terrain, were simple yet effective
advances in exploiting information for the combat soldiers. The 3rd Battalion’s
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Cooper noted, “you’ve gone over it
so often…I didn’t have to look at my maps, to tell you the location of where I was
at the time.”62 By 1917, intelligence was used regularly by the infantry for the
planning and conduct of their battles. The other Combat Arm benefiting
significantly from intelligence improvements was the artillery.

Most combatants entered the war with a vision of “a horse-drawn battery

galloping on to the field to deliver a few volleys into the ranks of a visible
enemy.”63 Reality held an onslaught of air-burst shrapnel such as “men and
horses are overwhelmed by this rain of lead and iron. Guns destroy one another,
batteries are mutually annihilated…”64 Counterbattery fire was an absolute
necessity, and the Canadian organization became the “envy of the British
Expeditionary Force.”65 In addition to technical improvements in mobility and gun-
laying, a major factor was, again, utilizing acquired knowledge. The Corps
Counterbattery Staff Office received information from a variety of sources. While
infantry or cavalry patrols historically reported information to higher headquarters,
scientifically innovative sound-ranging and aircraft support was now incorporated
into the information system.66 By 1917, fully 90 percent of counterbattery
observation was accomplished by aircrew using air-to-ground radios.67 All of this
data was plotted on the artillery-planning map, with any gaps appearing in the
data becoming taskings for the intelligence staff to answer. These skills had been
improving along the course of the war, but it was at Vimy in particular that
superior Canadian artillery became a war-winning tool. Artillery also provided the
means to consolidate tactical advances. It was determined that the German
tactics had shifted to an elastic defence, which emphasized counterattacking in
strength rather than strongly defending their leading trenches. This doctrine
appears wiser than holding a position that was sure to receive heavy artillery
bombardment prior to the actual attack. However, once the intelligence staff

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confirmed this tactic, the artillery plan included a deliberate Kill Zone beyond the
infantry objectives. Positioning some guns well forward, so as to strike those in-
depth positions where the enemy counterattack force would be forming up,
effectively neutralized this new German tactic.68 The Canadian Corps’ General
Officer Commanding Royal Artillery (GOCRA), General Andrew McNaughton, in
enumerating the reasons for the artillery success emphasized that intelligence
“had reached an advanced state, and that our lead over similar organizations
was maintained until the end of the war.”69

One Hundred Days

It was during the final campaign of the war, “The Hundred Days” offensive, that
the Canadian tactical innovations, including the effective use of intelligence came
to the fore. The major feature of this period was in seeing the more wide-spread
application of these new found skills to address the difficulties of open terrain
warfare. For example, McNaughton’s promotion from Corps’ Counterbattery
Officer to GOCRA would see a proponent of intelligence maximize its potential
for the entire artillery battle, rather than merely the customary counterbattery
duels.70

Where the greatest change was made, however, was due to the rapid tempo of
operations. The operational pace following the initial breakthrough necessitated
the divisions establishing “Advanced Intelligence Headquarters” containing an
officer from each subordinate brigade conversant with their information needs.71
The information required, in addition to that acquired for the breakout, was
overwhelming. At the battalion level, the intelligence officer was further
responsible for following the unit’s forward progress and keeping in contact with
flank formations.72 In the After-Action Report following the operation to breach
the DROCOURT-QUÉANT line, Brigadier MacBrien (GOC 12th CIB)
recommended that “a longer pause be observed between the two phases…4
hours pause would have given time to bring up most of the Field Artillery and to
have appreciated the situation (author’s emphasis) before committing troops
detailed to the second phase.”73 An “appreciation” is the process within battle
procedure of estimating the enemy’s intentions (i.e. – intelligence), examining
courses of action, and producing the plan from which an operation is conducted.
From this appreciation, subordinates are briefed and the other aspects of battle
procedure are conducted.

This observation by MacBrien was echoed by the other brigade and division
commanders who saw that the method of defeating the Germans was no longer
the problem to be solved. The key issue had become getting the maximum
amount of available information to the soldiers in a minimum amount of time. This
proved difficult in the face of unreliable communications exacerbated by
inadequate doctrine and experience of exploiting rapid advances.

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Tied in with this passage of information to the soldiers was an equivalent need
for Counter-Intelligence and security. The security warning on Corps INTSUMs
routinely read, “This summary is of such a confidential character that it must not
be taken nearer the front than Battalion Headquarters, and its contents are not to
be communicated outside His Majesty’s Service.” For the regular soldier
however, security awareness involved pasting into each soldiers’ paybook, a
paper stating “KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!” 74 More complex deception plans
involved attaching Canadian 2nd and 3rd Division soldiers to the British Second
Army with the intent of having them “lose” identifying badges and signature
equipment while patrolling. In one of history’s early electronic deception plans,
Currie also sent a Canadian Corps headquarters’ signals detachment to the
British, to transmit false messages from this location.75

The Canadian Corps’ CI and deception efforts served the Allies well. When
considered along with the early tactical successes towards Cambrai, they
convinced German Intelligence that they were facing not four, but twelve
Canadian Divisions.76 The German leadership thus decided to strip away their
Reserve formations along the Hindenburg line to plug the Canadian-created gap.
The success of the plan, however, showed in the casualty figures. British 17
Corps, on Canada’s southern flank, sustained 86 officer and 1,840 other rank
casualties. During the same period, the Canadian Corps lost 707 officers and
12,913 other ranks killed, wounded or missing.77

During the breakout, the fledgling air force became a key factor in the intelligence
battle. The leading infantry elements would often lose contact with the
withdrawing Germans during the night. Air contact patrols would be flown to
provide near real-time intelligence on the enemy location and activities, but also
target acquisition information for the Artillery Intelligence centers.78 The British
contributed to the Canadian intelligence picture, in that they had withdrawn from
this very ground earlier in the war.79 In all, by these final operations of the war,
the Canadians had made outstanding progress in incorporating intelligence into
staff planning and subsequent conduct of the battles.

Early on, the Canadian Divisions and the Corps had suffered from leadership
problems attributable directly to the army’s pre-war condition. By November
1918, over 60,000 Canadians had died in this conflict. The Militia was not
equipped or trained for the type of battle it encountered in Western Europe.
However, in fairness, no fingers should be pointed at the military or political
leadership, except in that they chose to follow the British example. While the
British had greater prowess than the other European powers in colonial wars,
they were burdened with lessons garnered in Franco-Prussian-style warfare.
That Canada may have had a differing military culture, established by a rebellion
on the Canadian prairies and the South African veldt, is irrelevant. The Industrial
Revolution, in the form of modern artillery’s shock effect and the killing power of
massed machineguns marked a brutal landmark change from warfighting’s past.

13/13
Addressing such a revolutionary situation required a unique form of leadership.
That General Currie proved up to the task, while other, more highly decorated
officers were being removed begs further research. As we have seen, Currie and
his subordinate division and brigade commanders accepted, indeed encouraged,
the pragmatic adaptation of technological, original, and occasionally,
unconventional solutions. For the intelligence staffs, the evolutionary changes
they introduced to the collection and interpretation of information remain the
basis of intelligence methodology today. It was the willing and innovative
adaptation of technology that made the intelligence service key to Currie’s
triumphs throughout the war. The skill with which combat arms were combined
during the closing operations represented a real break with past warfare. The
Germans would exploit the shock and versatility of these combined formations
most successfully two decades later as blitzkrieg. Yet Canada led the world and
excelled, culminating in its application during the Hundred Days campaign. While
a greater relative percentage of Canadian casualties occurred during this phase
of the war, this must be attributed more to the pace and nature of the operations
rather than any particular leadership or methodological flaw. Key to this all-arms,
mobile warfare was the effective use of intelligence.

Initially Canada entered the war burdened by a British command whose doctrine
was based on nineteenth century Continental warfare, attenuated, if at all, by
their experiences in colonial wars. Added to this mix was a Canadian military
culture of the enthusiastic militia amateur, emboldened by successes in the Boer
War. Against these odds, the CEF made unparalleled advances in the
exploitation of military intelligence in overcoming the horrific, industrialized
carnage associated with the Great War. This awareness of past
accomplishments against traumatic change may prove reassuring during the
present cybernetic-driven Revolution in Military Affairs: an event as potentially
destabilizing as machineguns and aircraft proved to a horse-mounted army
eighty-five years ago.

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Annex A to Military Intelligence and the RMA of 1914-1918
Sample Log PASSCHENDAELE Sector.

Example of the sector intelligence log is given below illustrates the detail
obtained, in this case for one square only: “D.4.”80 All other squares on the front
affected would be logged and issued in a similar manner. This would be included
in the Intelligence File (see Figure 1, page 17) produced by Corps Intelligence for
use by subordinate formations and units.81
SECRET
3rd Canadian Division
I.G.280.
LOG PASSCHENDAELE SECTOR 17th October 1917
D.4.

Date Nature Location Rptd. by Remarks

12.10.17 1 2 Pill Boxes d.50.50 II ANZAC Gave

much trouble during operation
10. 9.17 2 Dugout a.78.83 Cap. Map.
“ 3 Pill-box a.95.39 “
“ 4 Dugout a.90.28 “
“ 5 “ b.21.79 “
“ 6 “ b.40.70 “
“ 7 “ b.45.42 “
“ 8 “ b.12.15 “
“ 9 “ b.40.30 “
“ 10 “ b.50.00 “
“ 11 “ b.78.05 “
“ 12 M.G. d.95.39 N.Z. Div. M.G’s
firing during attack
14.10.17 13 Dugout concrete b.55.29 II ANZAC In use
“ 14 “ a.95.39 “ “
“ 16 [sic] Pill-box b.51.52 “
“ 17 Old Bty.Posn b.55.08 “ “
“ 18 “ b.65.99 “
“ 19 Dugout d.71.95 “
“ 20 “ d.81.82 “
“ 21 “ d.90.70 “
“ 22 “ d.63.40 “ Concrete.In
use.
“ 23 Pill-box d.55.20 “ Confirmed

“ 24 Dugouts d.68.33) “
“ 25 “ d.60.10 “ In use.
16.10.17 26 Blockhouse b.15.18 Photo 144
“ 27 “ b.36.00 “

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 “ 28 Post a.75.45 II ANZAC
“ 29 “ a.70.65 “
“ 30 Pill-box b.25.05 N.Z. Div.
“ 31 Dugout d.28.27 “
“ 32 “ a.70.80 “
17.10.17 33 Pill-box d.20.45 “

16/16
 Citations
1
Ivan Bloch, Modern Weapons and Modern War (London: G. Richards, 1900), p. 10-11, 321, 344-5.
Referring to a strike in which miners were fired upon, Bloch notes that ten shots fired killed seven and
wounded at least 25 people. p. 322.
2
Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” in Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986), p. 510-512.
3
Howard, “Men Against Fire,” p. 517.
4
Jay Luvaas, “European Military Thought, 1870-1914,” in The Theory and Practice of War. Essays
Presented to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart. Michael Howard, ed. (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 90-91.
5
David Jablonsky, “US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in Parameters, 24(3)
1994, p. 18-20.
6
Steven Metz, “The Next Twist of the RMA,” in Parameters, 30(3) 2000, p. 40.
7
Paul Johnston, “Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies,” in
Parameters, 30(3) 2000, p. 37.
8
Howard, “Men Against Fire,” p. 523.
9
Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. 2.
10
Bloch, Modern Weapons and Modern War, p. 10, 12.
11
Carmen Miller, Painting the Map Red, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993) p. 99-101,
271-275. Richard Preston, Canada and ‘Imperial Defence,’ (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967), p.
266-7.
12
J.H. MacBrien, “Development of the Canadian Militia,” in Canadian Defence Quarterly 4(4) 1927, p.
385-6. Preston, Canada and ‘Imperial Defence,’ p. 266-7.
13
Richard Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, (Montreal: Queen’s-McGill, 1977), p. 150. C.P.
Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940), p. 65.
14
Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada,(Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), p. 120.
15
Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 March 1904, p. 209. J. Castell Hopkins, Annual Review of
Public Affairs, 1904 (Toronto: Annual Review Publishing, 1905), p. 469.
16
See Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), passim., and Carmen
Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press,
1980), p. 138-142.
17
Canada, Parliamentary Sessional Papers, 1910, No. 29a.
18
James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, vol 1,(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 88-89.
Maurice Ollivier (ed.), The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937, vol II. (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1954), p. 16, 33. C.F. Hamilton, “Canadian Militia: Imperial Organization,” in Canadian Defence
Quarterly, 8(2), 1931, p.247.
19
Ronald Haycock, Sam Hughes (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986), p. 99-100. Canada,
Parliamentary Sessional Papers, No. 35, 1911-15, passim.
20
Stephen Elliot, Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army 1903-1963. (Toronto:
The Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981), p. 4-6. For the then unique “Intelligence
Corps” designation, Elliot cites Militia General Order 8(3), 19 Apr 1885.
21
Ibid., p. 11.
22
Canada, Report of the General Officer Commanding Militia, 31 Dec 1900, p. 20.
23
“Military Intelligence,” in ABC-CLIO Encyclopedia of Military History, (forthcoming), traces this
development to the Prussian General Staff of the early nineteenth century.
24
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 14. Denny was a RASC Brevet Major, appointed LCol of Canadian Militia.
The NCOs included a Staff-Sergeant clerk, draftsman and one other, “accustomed to Intelligence work.”
25
Ibid., p. 12-3.
26
Ibid., p. 14-5.
27
Desmond Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of the Social Order, 1867-
1914,” in Canadian Historical Review, 51(4), 1970, p.407-8.
28
Ibid., p. 18-9. Major V.D. Scudamore, “Aid to the Civil Power,” in Canadian Defence Quarterly, 9(2),
1932, p. 253-60.
29
Ibid., p. 15, citing Militia General Order 66, 19 Mar 1904.

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30
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 15.
31
Ibid., p. 18, 22. On a reconnaissance ride, the officer could bring 75 pounds of kit and bedding, his
groom 50 pounds, the cook 300 pounds, including kettles, shelter and two days rations of oats and hay.
Ibid.
32
Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War, (Toronto:
Random House, 1993), p. 10-15. Note that in contrast to Hughes’ Valcartier chaos, the Canadian Boer War
contingent had been “recruited, equipped and dispatched” in only two weeks. See Morton, “’Junior but
Sovereign Allies’: The Transformation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918.” p. 57.
33
W.D. Ellis, Saga of the Cyclists (Hamilton: Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion Association, 1965), p. 10.
General Sir Arthur Currie, “Historical Resume of Canadian Corps of Intelligence,” in Major J.E. Hahn, The
Intelligence Service, p. xiv. Almost 1 in 6 Canadian men between 15 and 54 (232,968) volunteered for the
infantry. Morton, Military History of Canada, p. 136.
34
PPCLI had been in serving with a British Division since December 1914.
35
6,035. Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, (NY: Praeger, 1989), p. 38. Morton, When Your
Number’s Up, p. 39-43. Tim Travers, “Currie and the 1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres,” in Canadian
Military History, 5(2), 1996, p. 7, 9.
36
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, Illustrations 5 and 6, p. 95-6.
37
Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 42-5.
38
Tim Cook, “The Blind Leading the Blind: The Battle of the St. Eloi Craters,” in Canadian Military
History, 5(2), 1996, p. 26.
39
David Campbell, “Conflicting Intelligence – the Battle of St. Eloi Reconsidered,” Proceedings,
University of Calgary 1999 Military and Strategic Studies Colloquium, p. 2.
40
Tim Cook, “The Blind Leading the Blind, p. 29, citing NAC, Turner Papers, MG 30 E46, Vol. 1, Folder
9, “2 CD GS 592, Summary of Operations, 1-7 April 1916.”
41
Major J.E. Hahn, The Intelligence Service Within the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918. (Toronto: Macmillan,
1930), p. 40.
42
Tim Cook, “The Blind Leading the Blind,” p. 30-1.
43
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, p. 17, 20-5. Howard, “Men Against Fire,” p. 522.
44
Ibid., p. 175.
45
Schreiber, Shock Army, p. 17-8.
46
Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 88, citing NAC
RG 9, v.4142, folder 6, file 2, ‘Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December
1916,’ p. 3, 10.
47
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 31. [Jungbluth manuscript]
48
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, p. 95.
49
Canada, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918, p. 210.
50
Ibid, p. 273.
51
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 23.
52
Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 100-1, 103.
53
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 39-40. Canada, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of
Canada, 1918, p. 211.
54
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 17-8.
55
Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 106.
56
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 21-2.
57
Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 108.
58
Currie, “Historical Resume of Canadian Corps of Intelligence,” p. xvi.
59
G. W. L. Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, Official History (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer,
1962), p. 250. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 88.
60
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 213-5.
61
Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 33. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 156, 160.
62
NAC, RG 41, Interview Col. H.S. Cooper, v.7
63
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, p. 161.
64
Bloch, Modern Weapons and Modern War, p. 48.
65
Schreiber, Shock Army, p. 23, citing BGen Sir James Edmonds, Official History of the Great War:
Military History in France and Belgium: Vol 6, 1918. (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 624.

18/18
66
Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 88.
67
John English, Marching Through Chaos, p. 70, n58.
68
Schreiber, Shock Army, p. 12.
69
Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, “The Development of Artillery in the Great War,” in Canadian
Defence Quarterly, 6(2), January 1929, p. 162-3.
70
Schreiber, Shock Army, p. 23.
71
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 211.
72
Canada, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918, p. 226. Today this task
would fall outside the purview of the Intelligence Officer’s focus upon ‘enemy, weather and terrain’ and be
the responsibility of the Battalion Operations Officer.
73
Canada, NAC, RG 9, III, D, Vol 4797, File 82, “12 Canadian Infantry Brigade Report-Scarpe Operation-
Capture of the Drocourt-Quéant Line, 2 Sept 1918.” Author’s emphasis.
74
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 236. Schreiber, p. 37.
75
Schreiber, Shock Army, p. 36-7.
76
Ibid., p. 104.
77
Ibid., p. 107.
78
Ibid., p. 119. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 461-470.
79
Hahn, The Intelligence Service, p. 176.
80
D.4. is an abbreviated reference. "D" was a 1000 yard square and 4 was read as 4/10th easting. A full
map reference would be 28NE1 D4. This square is approx 1500 yards due west of Passchendaele.
(Source - J. Sweeney, blimey1915@aol.com, 6 December 2000).
81
Ibid.,. 214.

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