13. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE vs.

CA

G.R. No. 82446 July 29, 1988

FACTS:

On September 30 and October 31,1977, Pedro 0. Valdez and Rudy H. Sales executed two Comprehensive Surety
Agreements to secure any and all loans of P.O. Valdez, Inc. not exceeding the sums of P500,000 and P4,934,000
from the petitioner State Investment House, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in quasi banking.

Four years later, on July 30, 1981, petitioner and P.O. Valdez, Inc. entered into an agreement for discounting with
the petitioner the receivables of P.O. Valdez, Inc.

When Pedro Valdez' two checks were deposited by the petitioner upon maturity, they bounced for insufficient
funds. Despite demands, respondent corporation failed to pay its obligations to petitioner amounting to
P6,342,855.70 as of April 11, 1985.

Petitioner foreclosed its real estate mortgage on the two lots in Benguet of Pedro and Remedios Valdez on April
11, 1985 and acquired them as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale.

Presumably because the proceeds of the foreclosure were insufficient to satisfy the debt, petitioner also filed a
collection suit, with a prayer for preliminary attachment. It was docketed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila as
Civil Case No. 8533050 entitled "STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. vs. P.O. VALDEZ, INC., PEDRO 0. VALDEZ and
RUDY H. SALES."

Issue: WON the impairment of the ff collaterals is sufficient for the issuance of a writ:

[1] shares of stock pledged as security and their subsequent decline in value ;

[2] parcels of land mortgaged to creditor who were worth less their supposed value ;

[3] postdated checks which bounced ;

Held:

[1] With respect to the shares of stock which the respondents pledged as additional security for the
loan, the decline in their value did not mean that the private respondents entered into the loan transaction in
bad faith or with fraudulent intent. For the private respondents could not have foreseen how the stocks would
fare in the market. And if the petitioner thought they were worthless at the time, it should have rejected them
as collateral.

[2] With respect to the two parcels of land which were mortgaged to the petitioner, the latter should
also have declined to accept them as collateral if it believed they were worth less than their supposed value.
 [3] With respect to the two postdated checks which bounced, the Court of Appeals observed that since
they were "sold" to the petitioner after the loan had been granted to private respondents, their issuance did not
fraudulently induce the petitioner to grant the loan applied for. They were "mere evidence of the private
respondents" standing loan obligation to the petitioner" or "mere collaterals for the loan granted by the
petitioner to the private respondents" State Investment failed to prove during the hearing of private
respondents' motion to lift the preliminary writ of attachment, that P.O. Valdez, Inc. received from it
independent consideration for the "sale" of Pedro Valdez' checks to it, apart from the loans previously extended
to the corporations.

14. ABOITIZ vs. COTABATO BUS COMPANY

G.R. No. L-35990 June 17, 1981

FACTS:

The instant petition stemmed from civil case in which a writ of preliminary attachment was issued ex-
parte by the Court on the strength of ana ffidavit of merit attached to the verified complaint filed by petitioner
herein, Aboitiz & Co., Inc., on November 2,1971, as plaintiff in said case, for the collection of money in the sum
of P155,739.41 which defendant therein, the respondent in the instant case, Cotabato Bus Co. owed the said
petitioner.

By virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment, the provincial sheriff attacjed personal properties of thr
defendant bus company consisting of some buses, machinery and equipment. He ground for the issuance of the
writ is, as alleged in the complaint and the affidavit of merit executed by the Assistant Manager of petitioner,
that the defendant has assets, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud its creditors.

Respondent company filed in the lower court an Urgent Motion to Dissolve or Quash Writ of
Attachment to which was attached an affidavit executed by its Assistant Manager, Baldovino Lagbao, alleging
among other things that the Cotabato Bus Company has not been selling or disposing of its properties, neither
does it intend to do so, much less to defraud its creditors; that also the Cotabato Bus Company, Inc. has been
acquiring and buying more assets.
 The Lower Court denied its motion stating in its Order that the testimony of Baldovino Lagbao, witness
for the defendant, corroborates the facts in the plaintiffs affidavit instead of disproving or showing them to be
untrue. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the defendant bus company but the lower court denied it
hence, the defendant wnt to court for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of herein
respondent Hon. Vicente R. Cusi Jr. on giving due course to the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a
restraining order restraining the trial court from enforcing further the writ of attachment and from proceeding
with the hearing of Civil Case No 7329.

ISSUE: Is insolvency a ground for the issuance of the writ?

Held: No. The dwindling of respondent's bank account despite its daily income of from P10,000.00 to
P14,000.00 is easily explained by its having to meet heavy operating expenses, which include salaries and wages
of employees and workers. If, indeed the income of the company were sufficiently profitable, it should not allow
its buses to fall into disuse by lack of repairs. It should also maintain a good credit standing with its suppliers of
equipment, and other needs of the company to keep its business a going concern. Petitioner is only one of the
suppliers.

The several buses attached are nearly junks. However, upon permission by the sheriff, five of them were
repaired, but they were substituted with five buses which were also in the same condition as the five repaired
ones before the repair. This cannot be the removal intended as ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment
under section 1 (e), Rule 57, of the Rules of Court. The repair of the five buses was evidently motivated by a
desire to serve the interest of the riding public, clearly not to defraud its creditors, as there is no showing that
they were not put on the run after their repairs, as was the obvious purpose of their substitution to be placed in
running condition.

15. PEOPLES BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. SYVEL

G.R. No. L-29280 August 11, 1988

FACTS:

This is an action for foreclosure of chattel mortgage executed in favor of the plaintiff by the defendant
Syvel's Incorporated on its stocks of goods, personal properties and other materials owned by it and located at
its stores or warehouses. The chattel mortgage was duly registered in the corresponding registry of deeds of
Manila and Pasay City. The chattel mortgage was in connection with a credit commercial line in the amount of
P900,000.00 granted the said defendant corporation, the expiry date of which was May 20, 1966. On May 20,
1965, defendants Antonio V. Syyap and Angel Y. Syyap executed an undertaking in favor of the plaintiff whereby
they both agreed to guarantee absolutely and unconditionally and without the benefit of excussion the full and
prompt payment of any indebtedness to be incurred on account of the said credit line. Against the credit line
granted the defendant Syvel's Incorporated the latter drew advances in the form of promissory notes which are
attached to the complaint." In view of the failure of the defendant corporation to make payment in accordance
with the terms and conditions agreed upon in the Commercial Credit Agreement the plaintiff started to
foreclose extrajudicially the chattel mortgage. However, because of an attempt to have the matter settled, the
extra-judicial foreclosure was not pushed thru. As no payment had been paid, this case was even actually filed in
this Court.

On petition of the plaintiff based on the affidavits executed by Mr. Leopoldo R. Rivera, Assistant Vice
President of the plaintiff bank and Atty. Eduardo J. Berenguer on January 12, 1967, to the effect, among others,
that the defendants are disposing of their properties with intent to defraud their creditors, particularly the
plaintiff herein, a preliminary writ of attachment was issued. As a consequence of the issuance of the writ of
attachment, the defendants, in their answer to the complaint set up a compulsory counterclaim for damages.

After the filing of this case in this court and during its pendency defendant Antonio v. Syyap proposed to
have the case settled amicably and to that end a conference was held in which Mr. Antonio de las Alas, Jr., Vice
President of the Bank, plaintiff, defendant Antonio V. Syyap and Atty. Mendoza were present. Mr. Syyap
requested that the plaintiff dismiss this case because he did not want to have the goodwill of Syvel's
Incorporated impaired, and offered to execute a real estate mortgage on his real property located in Bacoor,
Cavite. Mr. De las Alas consented, and so the Real Estate Mortgage, marked as Exhibit A, was executed by the
defendant Antonio V. Syyap and his wife Margarita Bengco Syyap on June 22, 1967. In that deed of mortgage,
defendant Syyap admitted that as of June 16, 1967, the indebtedness of Syvel's Incorporated was P601,633.01,
the breakdown of which is as follows: P568,577.76 as principal and P33,055.25 as interest. Complying with the
promise of the plaintiff thru its Vice President to ask for the dismissal of this case, a motion to dismiss this case
without prejudice was prepared, Exhibit C, but the defendants did not want to agree if the dismissal would mean
also the dismissal of their counterclaim Against the plaintiff. Hence, trial proceeded.

ISSUE: How do you prove intent to defraud?

Held: Intent to defraud may be and usually is inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case; it
can rarely be proved by direct evidence. It may be gleaned also from the statements and conduct of the debtor,
and in this connection, the principle may be applied that every person is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his acts.

The act of debtor in taking his stock of goods from the rear of his store at night, is sufficient to support
an attachment upon the ground of the fraudulent concealment of property for the purpose of delaying and
defrauding creditors. The court is impressed "that not only has the plaintiff acted in perfect good faith but also
on facts sufficient in themselves to convince an ordinary man that the defendants were obviously trying to spirit
away a port;.on of the stocks of Syvel's Incorporated in order to render ineffectual at least partially any
judgment that may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

16. ADLAWAN vs. TORRES

G.R. Nos. 65957-58 July 5, 1994

 Petitioner Adlawan was indebted to Respodet company Aboitiz for construction projects the former
was awarded with. However, due to inability to pay, Aboitiz filed for collection of sum of money against
petitioner in the CFI Cebu. It also moved for preliminary attachment on some of Adlawans properties after filing
a bond.

Aboitiz filed a notice of dismissal for the above mention case. When Adlawan moved for the
enforcement of the dismissal, it was denied by the court on account of the filing by Respondent Aboitiz an action
or delivery of personal property before the CFI Lapu-lapu and petitioner Adlawans filing for damages in the
same court for the seizure of his property by virtue of the preliminary attachment.

Respondent Aboitiz alleged that the voluntary dismissal of the previous case was without prejudice to
the institution of another action based on the same subject matter and that the issuance of the writ was
justified because the petitioners were intending to defraud Aboitiz by mortgaging 11 parcels of land to PCIB
thereby making PCIB a preferred creditor to the prejudice of Aboitiz.

ISSUE: WON the execution of mortgage of the debtor in favour of another

person constitutes fraud sufficient for the issuance of a writ?

Held: No. The execution of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the Rules as one
of the means of fraudulently disposing of one's property. By mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely
subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with. Furthermore, the inability to pay one's creditors is
not necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor an obligation.

17. CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS vs. PHIL ADVERTISING

G.R. No. L-37682 November 26, 1932

Respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation (agent) filed suit agains the petitioner (principal) in the
CFI Manila, claiming P300,000 as damages for alleged breach of the agency contract existing between the said
respondent and the petitioner. At the same time, respondent filed an application for the writ attachment duly
verified in which it is stated that the petitioner is a foreign corporation havng its principal place of business in
the City of Washington, District of Columbia. It is not alleged in said application that petitioner was about to
depat from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud its creditors or that it was insolvent or had removed or
disposed of its property or was about to do so with intent to defraud its creditors. The only statutory ground
relied upon is paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that plaintiff may have
the property of the defendant attached in an action against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.
 The petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the District of Columbia; it had complied
with all the requirements of the Philippine laws and was duly licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands on
the date said writ of attachment was issued.

CFI issued the writ of attachment and the sheriff has attached all the properties of the petitioner in the
Philippine Islands. CFI also appointed Manuel C. Grey as receiver of said properties of the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON petitioner, a foreign corporation, shall, in a metaphorical sense, be deemed as "not residing
in the Philippine Islands" in the sense in which that expression would apply to a natural person?

Held: No. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly
licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations. We think it would be entirely out of line
with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of
law made especially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic
corporations.

Corporations, as a rule, are less mobile than individuals. This is a specially true of foreign corporations
that are carrying on business by proper authority in these Islands. They possess, as a rule, great capital which is
seeking lucrative and more or less permanent investment in young and developing countries like our Philippines.

18. STATE INVESTMENT vs. CITIBANK

G.R. Nos. 79926-27 October 17, 1991

FACTS:

The foreign banks involved in the case are the Bank of America, Citibank, and Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corp., all of whom are creditors of Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI).

On December 11.1981, the three banks jointly filed with the RTC of Rizal a petition for involuntary
insolvency of CMI. Among the grounds alleged by the foreign banks is CMIS commission of specifc acts of
insolvency, i.e. that CMI suffered its property to remain under attachment for three days for the purpose of
hindering or delaying or defrauding its creditors and that CMI has defaulted in the payment of its current
obligations for a period of thirty days.

The petition for involuntary insolvency was opposed by herein petitioners State Investment House Inc.
(SIHI) and State Financing Center Inc. (SFCI). Both claimed among others, that court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for insolvency because the foreign banks are not resident creditors of CMI as required
under Insolvency Law.
 The RTC rendered judgment in favor of SIHI and SFCI for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
court ruled that the insolvency court could not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the debtor as insolvent because
the foreign banks are not residents of the Philippines.

On petition for review, the CA rendered order reversing judgment of the rtc. The CA ruled that the three
banks are residents of the Philippines for the purpose of doing business in the Philippines, and that Insolvency
Law was designed for the benefit of both the creditors and debtors. The CA also reiterated that authority
granted to the three banks by the SEC covers not only transacting banking business but also maintaining suits for
the recovery of any debt and claims. Hence, SIHI and SFCI brought their appeal before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether foreign banks licensed to do business in the Philipppines, may be considered
residents of the Philippine Islands as contemplated in Sec 20 of Insolvency Law. NO

HELD: A foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit ,
may not be considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a
defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands. In other words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied
for and granted solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do business
in the Philippines. In other words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on the
asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the Philippines. -- and is
consequently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may not be
considered as a party not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically,
it must be considered a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a resident of the country.

Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the
status of domestic corporations," subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in
the country.

19. PCIB vs. ALEJANDRO

G.R. No. 175587 September 21, 2007

Petitioner filed against respondent Alejandro a complaint for the sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Said complaint alleged that respondent, a resident of Hong Kong
executed in favor of the petitioner a promissory note obligating himself to pay P249,828,588.90 plus interest.

In view of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufficiency of the
deposits assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the later to put up additional
security for the loan.
 In praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Sec 1 paragraphs and (f) of Rule
57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits
notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice-president Corazon Nepomuceno not to withdraw the
same prior to their assignment as security for the loan; and (2) that respondent is not a resident of the
Philippines.

The trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte. Subsequently, respondent filed a
motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was
approved by the petitioner. He also alleged that petitioner knew that he maintains a permanent residence office
address here in the Philippines. In Both addresses, petitioner regularly communicated with him through its
representatives. The trial court issued an order quashing the writ. With the denial of PETs motion for
reconsideration, it elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari which dismissed the case.

ISSUE: WON a plaintiff suing an action in personam may be granted the issuance of the writ on the
premise that the defendant is temporarily out of the Philippines?

Held: Where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her
property in an action in personam, is not always necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear
the case.

In actions in personam against residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the court need not always
attach the defendants property in order to have authority to try the case. Where the plaintiff seeks to attach
the defendants property and to resort to the concomitant service of summons by publication, the same must be
with prior leave, precisely because, if the sole purpose of the attachment is for the court to acquire jurisdiction,
the latter must determine whether from the allegations in the complaint, substituted service (to persons of
suitable discretion at the defendants residence or to a competent person in charge of his office or regular place
of business) will suffice, or whether there is a need to attach the property of the defendant and resort to service
of summons by publication in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case and to comply with the
requirements of due process.

20. SIEVERT vs. CA

G.R. No. 84034 December 22, 1988

Facts

On 18 May 1988 petitioner Alberto Sievert a citizen and resident of the Philippines received by mail a
Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 32 in Civil
Case No. 88-44346. Petitioner had not previously received any summons and any copy of a complaint against
him in Civil Case No. 88-44346.

On the day set for hearing of the Petition for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment, petitioner's counsel
went before the trial court and entered a special appearance for the limited purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. He simultaneously filed a written objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear
or act upon the Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. In this written objection, petitioner
prayed for denial of that Petition for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (defendant therein)
upon the ground that since no summons had been served upon him in the main case, no jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner had been acquired by the trial court.

ISSUE: May the judge may issue a writ of preliminary attachment against defendant before summons is
served?

Held: No. There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff "at
the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter" in the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The critical time which must be Identified is, rather, when the trial court acquires
authority under law to act coercively against the defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment. We
believe and so hold that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the
defendant in the main case.

Valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in the court over
the defendant both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment. In
such case, notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in attachment.

Where, however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading,
such petition must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint,
or after jurisdiction over the defendant has already been acquired by such service of summons. Notice of the

separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action.

21. DAVAO LIGHT vs. CA

G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991

FACTS:

1. On May 2, 1989 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light) filed a verified complaint for
recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna (docketed as
Civil Case No. 19513-89). The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

2. On May 3, 1989 Judge Nartatez, to whose branch the case was assigned by raffle, issued an Order granting
the ex parte application and fixing the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37.

3. On May 11, 1989 the attachment bond having been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued.
4. On May 12, 1989, the summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy of
the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to the writ, the sheriff
seized properties belonging to the latter.

5. On September 6, 1989, defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for
lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3,
1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cause and over the persons of the defendants.

6. On September 14, 1989, Davao Light filed an opposition to the motion to discharge attachment.

7. On September 19, 1989, the Trial Court issued an Order denying the motion to discharge.

ISSUE:

Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition of
jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

HELD:

No principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.

Whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, as
above indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointments of
guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment
of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court and however valid and proper they
might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his
voluntary submission to the court's authority.

When the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential
that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the
order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said
defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also
explicitly directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

22. CUARTERO vs. CA

G.R. No. 102448 August 5, 1992

FACTS:
On August 20, 1990, petitioner Ricardo Cuartero filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against the private respondents, Evangelista spouses, for a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6471.

On August 24, 1990, the lower court issued an order granting ex-parte the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment.

On September 19, 1990, the writ of preliminary attachment was issued pursuant to the trial court's order dated
August 24, 1990. On the same day, the summons for the spouses Evangelista was likewise prepared.

The following day, that is, on September 20, 1990, a copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the order dated
August 24, 1990, the summons and the complaint were all simultaneously served upon the private respondents
at their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto L. Sula levied, attached and pulled out the
properties in compliance with the court's directive to attach all the properties of private respondents not
exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the petitioner's principal claim in the
amount of P2,171,794.91.

Subsequently, the spouses Evangelista filed motion to set aside the order dated August 24, 1990 and discharge
the writ of preliminary attachment for having been irregularly and improperly issued which the lower court
denied for lack of merit.

Private respondents, then, filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
orders of the lower court dated August 24, 1990 and October 4, 1990 with a prayer for a restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the judge from taking further proceedings below.

In a Resolution dated October 31, 1990, the Court of Appeals resolved not to grant the prayer for restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, there being no clear showing that the spouses Evangelista were entitled
thereto.

On June 27, 1991, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and rendered the questioned decision.
The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Cuartero was denied for lack of merit in a resolution
dated October 22, 1991. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a proper ground existed for the issuance of the writ.

No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is required inasmuch as the time which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of
attachment issues. In such a case, a hearing would render nugatory the purpose of this provisional remedy. The
ruling remains good law. There is, thus, no merit in the private respondents' claim of violation of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
A writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we
have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that
the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained.

Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment,
service of summons should be simultaneously made.

23. SALAS vs. ADIL

G.R. No. L-46009 May 14, 1979

FACTS:

On September 10, 1976, respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu filed the afore-mentioned civil action with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo against herein petitioners Ricardo T. Salas and Maria Salas, the Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, in its capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the deceased Charles
Newton Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodge to annul the deed of sale of Lot No. 5 executed by administrators of the Hodges Estate in
favor of the Spouses Ricardo T. Salas and Maria Salas and for damages.

In a motion dated May 12, 1977, private respondents filed a Motion for Attachment, alleging, among others,
that the case was "for annulment of a deed of sale and recovery of damages" and that the defendants have
removed or disposed of their properties or are about to do so with intent to defraud their creditors especially
the plaintiffs in this case.

On May 13, 1977, respondent Judge issued ex-parte a Writ of Attachment "against the properties of the
defendants particularly Lots Nos. 1 and 4 of Psc-2157 less the building standing thereon upon the plaintiffs filing
a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 subject to the approval of this Court." After a surety bond in the amount
of P200,000.00, executed on May 11, 1977 by the Central Surety and Insurance Company as surety was filed, the
writ itself was issued by respondent Judge on May 16, 1977, directing the Sheriff to attach the properties above-
mentioned. On May 17, 1977, the Deputy Sheriff of Iloilo levied upon the aforesaid properties of petitioners.

Issue: May the judge issue an writ ex parte when the plaintiff-applicant alleges that fraud has been committed?

Held: No. Considering the gravity of the allegation that herein petitioners have removed or disposed of their
properties or are about to do so with intent to defraud their creditors, and further considering that the affidavit
in support of the pre attachment merely states such ground in general terms, without specific allegations of
lances to show the reason why plaintiffs believe that defendants are disposing of their properties in fraud of
creditors, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge to give notice to petitioners and to allow wherein evidence
is them to present their position at a to be received.

24. LA GRANJA vs. SAMSON

G.R. No. 40054 September 14, 1933

On July 5, 1932, the petitioner herein, La Granja, Inc., filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan,
against Chua Bian, Chua Yu Lee and Chua Ki, for the recovery of the sum of P2,418.18 with interest thereon at
the rate of 12 per cent per annum, which case was docketed as civil case No. 1888. The plaintiff at the same
time, also prayed for the issuance of an order of attachment against the aforementioned defendants' property
and accompanied said complaint with an affidavit of the manager of the aforesaid petitioner, La Granja, Inc.,
wherein it was alleged among other essential things, that the said defendants have disposed or are disposing of
their properties in favor of the Asiatic Petroleum Co., with intent to defraud their creditors. The respondent
judge, wishing to ascertain or convince himself of the truth of the alleged disposal, required the petitioner
herein to present evidence to substantiate its allegation, before granting its petition. Inasmuch as the petitioner
refused to comply with the court's requirement, alleging as its ground that was not obliged to do so, the
respondent judge dismissed said petition for an order of attachment.

Issue: Is the mere filing of an affidavit executed in due form sufficient to compel a judge to issue an order of
attachment?

Held: No! The mere filing of an affidavit executed in due form is not sufficient to compel a judge to issue an
order of attachment, but it is necessary that by such affidavit it be made to appear to the court that there exists
sufficient cause for the issuance thereof, the determination of such sufficiency being discretionary on the part of

the court.