G.R. No.

L-56503 April 4, 1981

RAMON MITRA, JR., NAPOLEON RAMA, EMMANUEL T. SANTOS, ERNIE

RONDON, ANTONIO MARTINEZ, JEJOMAR BINAY, RODRIGO H. MELCHOR,
JOAQUIN (Titong) ROCES, RAFAEL YAP, and MEL LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled,
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.

This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and
Puerto Princesa City.

He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and

represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative),
Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased
to be a component city of the Province of Palawan.

The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto
Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan.

He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a

resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

 RULING:

Yes, Mitra is qualified to run for the position as Governor of Palawan.

The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met
the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.

The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome
Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of
his representation on this point in his COC.

Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to
conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a
misrepresentation."

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL
SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.

Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic
opposition in the Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila
area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely,
Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice
of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the above-
 entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the
supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence.

The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by
Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other
accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD
1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the
motion.

On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an

information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against
40 people, including Salonga.

The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are
the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that
no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of
an information against him.

He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the
Supreme Court

RULING:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent
Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to
drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
 Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one
of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by
the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative powers under martial law.

Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation

and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of
its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.