Reply Brief of Appellants, Segovia v. United States

Case: 16-4240 Document: 55 RESTRICTED Filed: 06/30/2017 Pages: 36
No. 16-4240
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
____________________________________
LUIS SEGOVIA, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________
Appeal from an Order of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois
The Hon. Joan B. Gottschall, District Judge
District No. 1:15-cv-10196
____________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

____________________________________
Neil C. Weare Charles F. Smith

We the People Project Counsel of Record
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Lara A. Flath
Suite 500 John J. Schoettle
Washington, D.C. 20009 155 N. Wacker Dr.
(202) 304-1202 Chicago, Illinois 60606
nweare@equalrightsnow.org (312) 407-0700
charles.smith@probonolaw.com
Leevin T. Camacho
The Law Office of Leevin T. Camacho Geoffrey M. Wyatt
194 Hernan Cortez Avenue Michael A. McIntosh
Suite 216 Marisa B. Van Saanen
Hagta, Guam 96910 Brendan B. Gants
(617) 477-8894 1440 New York Avenue, N.W.
leevin@guahanlaw.com Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-7000
Semaj Johnson
Law Offices of K.A. Rames PC
Suite 3, 2111 Company Street
Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin
Islands 00820
(340) 773-7284
semaj.johnson@rameslaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Table Of Contents
Page
Table Of Authorities ............................................................................................ ii
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1
Argument ............................................................................................................. 3
I. Defendants Fail To Justify UOCAVA Or MOVEs Arbitrary

Treatment Of Former State Residents, Which Fails Under Any
Level of Scrutiny. ...................................................................................... 3
A. Federal defendants fail to identify a legitimate

government interest that is rationally advanced by
UOCAVAs discriminatory provisions. .......................................... 4
B. State defendants fail to identify any legitimate interest

that is rationally advanced by MOVEs favored treatment
of former Illinois citizens residing in American Samoa and
the NMI. ......................................................................................... 9
II. Defendants Arguments Against Heightened Scrutiny Fail. ................ 12
A. The district court improperly anchored its holding in an

unwarranted extension of the Insular Cases. ............................. 13
B. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

among similarly situated citizens by selectively extending
absentee voting rights.................................................................. 14
C. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

against a suspect class. ................................................................ 19
III. UOCAVA And MOVE Infringe Appellants Right To Interstate

Travel, And Defendants Arguments Do Not Show Otherwise............. 23
IV. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Appeal And Appellants
Have Standing. ....................................................................................... 26
Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 28
Certificate of Compliance Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g)(1) ...................... 29
Certificate of Service ......................................................................................... 30

Table Of Authorities
CASES
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008)............................................................................. 5, 19
Broyles v. Texas,
618 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ..................................................... 17
Califano v. Gautier Torres,

435 U.S. 1 (1978)............................................................................... 24, 26
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,

490 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)................................................................. 20
Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission,

844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016)................................................................. 13
Davis v. Guam,
No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) ..................... 14
Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972)........................................................................... 16, 25
Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores

de Otero,
426 U.S. 572 (1976)................................................................................. 19
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

383 U.S. 663 (1966)................................................................................. 15
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,

439 U.S. 60 (1978)............................................................................. 16, 17
Igarta De La Rosa v. United States,

626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010) ................................................................... 21
Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966)........................................................................... 10, 19
Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709 (1974)................................................................................. 15
Matsuo v. United States,

586 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2009)................................................................. 25
McDonald v. Board of Election Commioners of Chicago,

394 U.S. 802 (1969)................................................................................. 15
Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Johnson,

833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016)................................................................... 16
ii
Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)............................................................................. 21
Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982)................................................................................. 19
Printz v. United States,

521 U.S. 898 (1997)................................................................................. 27
Romeu v. Cohen,
121 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ............................................... 21, 27
Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999)........................................................................... 23, 24
Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017)............................................................................. 10
Shelby County v. Holder,

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)............................................................................. 10
Snead v. City of Albuquerque,

663 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.M. 1987) ........................................................... 17
St. Johns United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago,

502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007)................................................................... 23
Tuaua v. United States,

788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ................................................................... 5
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,

304 U.S. 144 (1938)................................................................................. 20
STATUTES
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-5.01 ............................................................................. 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1 .................................................................................. 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.1 ............................................................................... 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.2 ............................................................................... 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.3 ............................................................................... 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/20-4 ................................................................................... 11
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-5 .................................................................................. 11
iii
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-25 ................................................................................ 11
28 U.S.C. 1291 ................................................................................................ 26
52 U.S.C. 20301 .............................................................................................. 27
52 U.S.C. 20303 .............................................................................................. 11
52 U.S.C. 20304 ........................................................................................ 11, 27
52 U.S.C. 20306 .............................................................................................. 27
52 U.S.C. 20307 .............................................................................................. 27
OTHER AUTHORITIES
96th Illinois General Assembly, Senate Proceedings, April 29,

2010 ......................................................................................................... 11
Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States
of America ......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
Territorial Federalism,
130 Harv. L. Rev. 1632 (2017) ................................................................ 21
Welcoming America's Newest Commonwealth: The Second

Interim Report of the Northern Mariana Islands
Commission on Federal laws to the Congress of the United
States (1985).............................................................................................. 7
iv
Introduction
Federal and state laws extend the right to vote absentee for President and
voting representation in Congress to former Illinois citizens residing nearly
everywhere outside the 50 states, including any foreign country and eleven of
fourteen U.S. Territories. But under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) and the Illinois Military and Overseas
Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE), former Illinois citizens who move to
Guam, Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) are excluded from
this otherwise global expansion of the franchise. Defendants justifications for
this discriminatory line-drawing are insufficient to withstand equal-
protection scrutiny under any level of review.
First, and most simply, defendants offer no plausible interest that this
discriminatory treatment was intended to serve or how UOCAVAs or
MOVEs provisions could advance any such interest. Federal defendants
position boils down to a posited congressional desire to treat the Northern
Mariana Islands (NMI) as more akin to a foreign country. But this
argument ignores the terms of the Covenant with the NMI, which
demonstrate an intent to treat it as part of the country for most purposes.
State defendants contend that MOVE was intended to mirror federal law,
but ignore that it has not done so for thirty years and that laws must be
justified in light of current circumstances. They alternatively contend that
MOVE furthers Illinoiss interests in enforcing a bona fide residency
requirement, but the very premise of MOVE is entirely contrary to that

interest. In short, none of these post hoc rationalizations are persuasive. The
distinctions imposed by UOCAVA and MOVE are arbitrary and thus violate
equal-protection rights under any standard.
Second, and in any event, UOCAVA and MOVE should be subject to
heightened scrutiny because they allocate the fundamental right to vote in a
discriminatory fashion and do so in a way that disadvantages residents in the
Territories, who are routinely excluded from the political process and should
be considered a suspect class. Defendants deny that the fundamental right to
vote is implicated because the Constitution does not guarantee the right to
representation in the Territories, but this is a red herring. Plaintiffs claim is
more limited: when the government expands voting rights, it cannot do so
without sufficient justification. Defendants also deny that a suspect class is
at issue, relying largely on the fact that no prior case has recognized such a
class. But these arguments fail to refute the facts showing that territorial
residents have all the characteristics of a suspect class, and the lack of
precedent should not be a barrier to deciding this question correctly in the
first instance.
Third, UOCAVA and MOVE violate plaintiffs right to travel. Defendants
contrary arguments rest on an unduly narrow construction of the right that
contravenes Supreme Court precedent.
Finally, a common thread running through defendants briefs is that
plaintiffs are seeking favorable treatment relative to other territorial
2
residents. Not so. Plaintiffs seek equal treatment with other former Illinois
citizens living around the world, including in the NMI and American Samoa,
who enjoy the right to vote absentee for President and voting representation
in Congress. Having created two classes of territorial residents some who
can vote in federal elections in former states of residence, and some who
cannot defendants should not shift blame for this state of affairs on
plaintiffs. Nor should plaintiffs be penalized for the political failure to resolve
the continuing structural disenfranchisement in U.S. Territories. Indeed,
their continued exclusion from the political process by UOCAVA and MOVE
realistically precludes them from attaining a political resolution of these
longstanding injustices.
Argument
I. Defendants Fail To Justify UOCAVA Or MOVEs Arbitrary

Treatment Of Former State Residents, Which Fails Under Any
Level of Scrutiny.
UOCAVA and MOVE fail equal-protection requirements under any level
of scrutiny because their distinctions between territorial residents are
arbitrary and, even assuming the governmental interests posited by
defendants in support of these laws are legitimate, the statutory distinctions
do not advance those interests. (AOB 16-25.) 1 Defendants do not dispute that
rational-basis review is not toothless, and that it demands an identifiable
1 Citations to plaintiffs opening brief, federal defendants brief, and

state defendants brief are AOB, FDB, and SDB, respectively. The
required short appendix to plaintiffs opening brief is cited as Short App.
3
government interest that is advanced by the discriminatory law. (AOB 16-17.)
Instead, they attempt to offer various justifications for the different lines
drawn by UOCAVA and MOVE between former state citizens residing in the
Territories. These arguments fail.
A. Federal defendants fail to identify a legitimate

government interest that is rationally advanced by
UOCAVAs discriminatory provisions.
Federal defendants attempt to justify UOCAVAs different treatment of
NMI residents on the same grounds adopted by the district court stressing
the unique relationship between the NMI and the federal government.
(FDB 20, 32-39.) But these justifications do not identify a legitimate
government interest that is rationally advanced by UOCAVAs distinction.
(AOB 17-22.)
Tellingly, federal defendants do not dispute the legal proposition that the
general maintenance of unique treatment of the NMI cannot, by itself,
constitute a legitimate government interest because the government cannot
pursue differential treatment of a group of citizens as an end in itself. (AOB
18.) Nevertheless, federal defendants presume the legitimacy of such an
interest, repeatedly appealing to the unique relationship between the NMI
and the United States. (FDB 20, 32-39.) Because federal defendants fail to
defend the advancement of this unique relationship for its own sake as a
valid government interest, these arguments are fundamentally infirm.
Perhaps intending to address this problem indirectly, federal defendants
note that [f]ederal law has long distinguished between and among
4
Territories in myriad ways, in matters small and large (FDB 35) as if to
suggest that these other distinctions would be subject to challenge if
plaintiffs prevail here. But federal defendants do not take the additional step
of showing that each (or any) of the examples they identify lacks any purpose
other than to perpetuate unique and disparate treatment for its own sake.
Indeed, the only judicial decision they cite, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d
300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (FDB 35-36), did not address an equal-protection
challenge at all and had no occasion to opine on the legitimacy of distinct
treatment for its own sake.
At bottom, federal defendants argument has no limiting principle; it
reduces to a rule that Congress can discriminate between and among the
Territories for any reason or no reason at all that the Territories are an
equal-protection-free zone. But [t]he Constitution grants Congress and the
President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the
power to decide when and where its terms apply. Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
In any event, federal defendants fail to explain how UOCAVA advances
the purported interest in treating the NMI as unique or more akin to a
foreign country. They defend the four grounds identified by the district court
(FDB 32-39), but their arguments cannot sustain the result reached below.
First, the notion that UOCAVA advanced an interest in treating the NMI
like a foreign country is unsupported by the historical circumstances. As
5
plaintiffs explained in their opening brief, the NMI was near the end of a
decade-long journey to becoming a Territory when UOCAVA was enacted,
making it implausible that UOCAVAs distinct treatment of the NMI was
intended to preserve its status as something akin to a foreign country. (AOB
19-20.)
In response, federal defendants claim that the issue is not whether CNMI
is a Territory, but that Congress has historically treated CNMI as more
akin to a sovereign country and that UOCAVAs distinct treatment of the
NMI was consistent with this hands-off approach. (FDB 37-39.) This
argument fails to account for the fact that the decade-long trend at the time
of UOCAVAs enactment was toward further integration between the NMI
and the United States. (AOB 19-20.)
More fundamentally, however, federal defendants argument that,
regardless of the NMIs formal status as a Territory, Congress has in practice
treated the NMI as more akin to a sovereign country overgeneralizes and
contradicts the relevant terms of the same Covenant between the NMI and
the United States on which federal defendants extensively rely. Section 105
a provision that took effect on approval of th[e] Covenant in 1976, well in
advance of UOCAVAs enactment expressly provides for general application
of federal law to the Territory except as specifically otherwise provided by
other Covenant provisions. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of
6
America (Covenant) 105, 1003; see also Welcoming America's Newest
Commonwealth: The Second Interim Report of the Northern Mariana Islands
Commission on Federal Laws to the Congress of the United States, at 31-32
(1985). In other words, distinct treatment of the Territory was to be the
exception rather than the rule. Covenant 105. And notably, the referenced
exceptions to the general rule in Articles I, III, and III and sections 501 and
805 of the Covenant are silent with respect to absentee voting rights.
Second, federal defendants point out that the NMI did not obtain a non-
voting delegate in Congress until 2008 (FDB 38), but fail to explain how
UOCAVAs provision for absentee voting rights for former state citizens
residing in the NMI advanced any interest in denying such representation or
indeed how these matters have anything to do with one another. UOCAVA
was not amended after the appointment of such a delegate indeed,
Congress expressly considered but repeatedly chose not to enact such
legislation, demonstrating that Congress itself does not view these issues as
inextricably linked. (AOB 20-21.)2
Third, federal defendants primary example of Congresss treatment of the
NMI as a sovereign country is its essentially full control over its immigration
2 Federal defendants speculate that, by treating the NMI differently

under UOCAVA, Congress avoided imposing requirements on CNMIs
electoral process by not compelling it to accept absentee ballots from former
residents in federal elections. (FDB 38-39.) But as federal defendants
themselves explain, the NMI sent no one to Congress when UOCAVA was
enacted (FDB 8-9) and hence had no federal elections to administer, nor
would it for more than two decades.
7
laws until 2008, which they contend stemmed from Congresss intent to
ensure that the indigenous populations maintained local control. (FDB 37.)
But this explanation is self-defeating because it identifies a concrete federal
interest local control by indigenous populations that was expressly
enshrined in the Covenant with the NMI in provisions that (unlike absentee-
voting measures) fell within the exceptions to section 105 noted above.
Section 805, for example, ensured local control of property by individuals of
Northern Mariana Islands descent for a period of twenty-five years and
expressly underscores the importance of the ownership of land for the
culture and traditions of the people of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Covenant 805. Vesting local control over immigration arguably furthers this
interest; defining the absentee voting rights of former state citizens does not.
Fourth, defendants reiterate the district courts conclusion that the laws
rationally advance the government interest of avoiding a distinction of
questionable fairness within the Territories (FDB 32-34, SDB 22-23), but
both UOCAVA and MOVE already establish such a distinction in the NMI
and (in the case of MOVE) American Samoa (AOB 21-22). Only federal
defendants even attempt to respond to this fact, essentially arguing that
Congress could have concluded that it was more important to avoid such
distinctions in more populous Territories. (FDB 33-34.) But this attempted
rationalization still offers no reason why Congress would conclude that the
NMI should be treated differently why, if it was important to avoid creating
8
such distinctions, one would nevertheless be tolerated there. Defendants
must show how the purported government interest is advanced by the laws
discriminatory provisions (AOB 22), and no defendant has done that here.
Thus, UOCAVAs favored treatment of former state citizens living in the
NMI is arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to advancing any
legitimate interest. It thus fails rational-basis review, and the district courts
contrary holding was erroneous.
B. State defendants fail to identify any legitimate interest

that is rationally advanced by MOVEs favored treatment
of former Illinois citizens residing in American Samoa
and the NMI.
MOVE likewise fails rational-basis review because it was intended to
mirror a federal statute that itself violates equal protection. In any event,
MOVE does not mirror the federal statute because it also extends absentee
voting rights to former state citizens residing in American Samoa despite the
lack of any identifiable interest in advantaging these former state residents
over those residing in Guam, Puerto Rico, or the USVI. Although state
defendants notably concede that if UOCAVA is held unconstitutional, MOVE
must be held unconstitutional as well (SDB 11), state defendants argue that
MOVEs distinct treatment of American Samoa survives rational basis review
for two reasons: (1) MOVE was intended to model federal law and the fact
that the Illinois legislature failed to keep up with federal law does not render
9
it irrational; and (2) MOVE advances Illinoiss interest in restricting the
ballot to bona fide residents.3 These arguments lack merit.
First, state defendants argument that MOVE was intended to mirror
federal law is unavailing because it no longer mirrors federal law and has
not for three decades. State defendants argue that legislatures have no
obligation to update their laws to keep up with changing circumstances,
citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (SDB 18), but as discussed
below, Katzenbach addresses the obligations imposed on a legislature when it
chooses to act, not when it fails to act altogether. Under equal-protection
principles, a law that continues in effect must be justified under present facts
and circumstances; the fact that it might have been justified when it was
enacted (which is not conceded here) does not suffice. E.g., Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (explaining that the relevant
inquiry is whether a classification serves a governmental interest today
rather than when the law was enacted); Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that Congresss failure to update the Voting
Rights Act to conform to current conditions rendered it unconstitutional).
Furthermore, the Illinois Legislature has enacted new laws to conform
with other provisions of UOCAVA in recent years. Specifically, in 2011, the
Illinois legislature amended the state statute to conform to UOCAVAs
3 As noted in Section I.A, state defendants also argue that MOVE avoids
the establishment of a distinction of questionable fairness, but this
argument fails for the reasons set forth above.
10
provisions by allowing for special write-in ballots at primary elections, ballots
to be transmitted by fax or electronic transmission, and the Board of
Elections or a Governor to enact or impose extraordinary procedures
regarding voting requirements. See 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-5.01, 20-1, 20-2.1,
20-2.2, 20-2.3, 20-4, 20-5, 20-25; 52 U.S.C. 20303, 20304; 96th Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, Apr. 29, 2010, at 100 (statement of Senator
Link) (These changes are a request of the Federal Voting Absentee . . .
(Assistance) Program, within the Department of Defense, and coordinated
with the election laws and provisions of recently enacted Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.).
State defendants alternatively contend that the Illinois Legislatures
failure to update MOVE upon UOCAVAs enactment is defensible because it
resulted in more generous [absentee] voting rights than federal law
requires. (SDB 19-20.) But the special treatment of former Illinois citizens
residing in American Samoa must itself be justified a state is not free to
arbitrarily build on UOCAVAs floor by, for example, simply neglecting to
legislate, as is the case here. (AOB 24.)
Second, state defendants argument that MOVEs provisions advance a
state interest in restricting the ballot to bona fide residents (SDB 20) is
unpersuasive and was not adopted by the district court. MOVE does not serve
that interest because it permits voting by former Illinois residents who now
live in any of nearly 200 foreign countries or in American Samoa or the NMI.
11
State defendants argue that this arrangement is forced on Illinois by
UOCAVA, but federal law does not require Illinois to extend the vote to
former state citizens residing in American Samoa. State defendants do not
even attempt to explain how absentee voting from Guam, Puerto Rico, or the
USVI would threaten Illinoiss putative interest in maintaining bona fide
residency requirements in a way that allowing such voting from American
Samoa does not.
Accordingly, state defendants have failed to identify a legitimate state
interest that is advanced by disparate treatment of former state citizens
residing in the Territories, and MOVE therefore violates the Equal Protection
Clause even under rational-basis review.
* * *
Finally, no defendant disputes that the proper remedy in this case is to
extend the right to vote absentee for President and voting representation in
Congress to former Illinois residents living in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
USVI to place them on like footing with those who reside in the NMI,
American Samoa, and foreign countries. (See AOB 24-25.) Nor does any
defendant dispute that this remedy is proper because the stated purpose of
UOCAVA is to expand rather than contract absentee voting rights. (See id.)
Accordingly, the Court should fashion such relief here.
II. Defendants Arguments Against Heightened Scrutiny Fail.
As plaintiffs established in their opening brief, this Court should apply
heightened scrutiny to the discriminatory classifications drawn by UOCAVA
12
and MOVE. (AOB 25-47.) Defendants seek to salvage the district courts
flawed conclusion to the contrary, but their arguments fail.
A. The district court improperly anchored its holding in an

unwarranted extension of the Insular Cases.
Defendants make no attempt to defend the Insular Cases on appeal,
asserting that those Plessy-era relics have no connection to the merits of the
[district] courts conclusion. (FDB 27-28 (conceding that their position does
not require an extension, or even an application, of the so-called Insular
Cases).) But the district courts opinion makes clear that it relied on and felt
bound by the Insular Cases in ruling against plaintiffs. The district court
noted at the threshold that the current voting situation in the Territories
is at least in part grounded on the Insular Cases. (Short App. at 21.) It then
looked to the Insular Cases to derive principles that are generally applicable
to constitutional challenges involving territories. (Short App. at 30-31.)
Critically, the district court applied these principles from the Insular Cases
to conclude that United States citizens living in territories do not have the
same fundamental right to vote as United States citizens residing in Illinois.
(Short App. at 27.)
But this latter determination which helped drive the district courts
decision, but which defendants do not defend misstates the import of the
Insular Cases,. (AOB 26-29.) Other courts have repeatedly rejected efforts to
deny the fundamental nature of voting rights in the Territories in the name
of the Insular Cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commn, 844
13
F.3d 1087, 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 30,
2017) (No. 16-1437) (holding that NMIs restriction of voting in certain
elections to individuals of Northern Marianas descent violates the Fifteenth
Amendment and concluding that the Insular Cases doctrine does not apply
because the Fifteenth Amendment is fully applicable in the
Commonwealth); Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *14 (D.
Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (rejecting argument, based on the Insular Cases, that
Guam residents right to vote in a local election is not a fundamental right
because the right to vote does not necessarily mean the same thing in an
unincorporated territory as it does in a state (quotations omitted)). This
Court should do the same.
B. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

among similarly situated citizens by selectively
extending absentee voting rights.
UOCAVA and MOVE confer the right to vote for President and voting
representation in Congress on nearly every former state resident living
outside the 50 states, excluding only an exceedingly narrow subset: those who
live in three of the fourteen Territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, and the USVI).
The statutes selective distribution of absentee voting rights must be
invalidated unless it can satisfy heightened scrutiny. (AOB 29-38.)
Defendants respond with four principal arguments, none of which is
persuasive.
First, defendants attack an argument plaintiffs are not making that
citizens have a constitutionally protected right to vote in a State in which
14
they do not reside. (FDB 25; see also SDB 25-26.) Plaintiffs claim instead is
that constitutional principles of equal protection bar legislative expansion of
absentee voting rights in a discriminatory manner, even absent an
underlying constitutional right. For example, there is no enumerated right to
vote for President while living in France; but having extended absentee
voting rights to the rest of the world under UOCAVA, Congress could not
craft an exception that selectively denies such rights to expatriates residing
in France without substantial justification.
The Supreme Court has expressly agreed with plaintiffs position that
discriminatory expansion of the franchise is inherently suspect. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Commrs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)
([O]nce the States grant the franchise, they must not do so in a
discriminatory manner.); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 (1966) ([O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not
be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause . . . .).
Indeed, the Court has emphasized that equal protection confers the
substantive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters
whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for determining who will
represent any segment of the States population. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709, 713 (1974). And where, as here, a challenged statute grants the right to
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, that statutory
classification will be struck down unless it is necessary to promote a
15
compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972)
(citation omitted).
These principles apply with full force here, even if plaintiffs would have no
claim to absentee voting rights had the federal government and Illinois not
enacted UOCAVA and MOVE. Although plaintiffs might have no federal
constitutional right to vote for President or voting representation in
Congress absent legislation, the fundamental quality of the right to vote
follows its expansion. E.g., Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson,
833 F.3d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that equal-protection principles
apply both to the allocation and exercise of the right to vote). Because
UOCAVA and MOVE expand the franchise to former state citizens living
almost anywhere outside the 50 states but single out three of the fourteen
Territories for exclusion, the statutes should be subject to heightened
scrutiny.
Second, defendants liken the classifications drawn by UOCAVA and
MOVE to garden-variety voting residency requirements (FDB 26; SDB 27-
28), relying principally on the Supreme Courts decision in Holt Civic Club v.
City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). But Holt is inapposite. In Holt, the
plaintiffs were residents of an unincorporated community (Holt) on the
outskirts of Tuscaloosa. Id. at 61-62. Because Holt was located within three
miles of Tuscaloosa, its residents were subject to the citys exercise of police
powers. Id. The plaintiffs argued that state statutes authorizing the citys use
16
of police power over them but failing to give them a right to vote equal to
those living within the city violated equal protection and due process. Id. at
62-63. The Supreme Court rejected the claims, observing that no prior
Supreme Court decision has extended the one man, one vote principle to
individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of the governmental
entity concerned and emphasizing that its precedent had uniformly
recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to
participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders.
Id. at 68-69.
Holt is irrelevant here because neither UOCAVA nor MOVE seeks to
restrict the right to participate in [Illinois] political processes to those who
reside within [Illinois] borders. See id. To the contrary, both statutes effect a
marked expansion of the right to participate in federal elections in Illinois far
beyond Illinois borders to places as far flung as Antarctica and outer space.
Thus, neither statute resembles a traditional residency requirement, and
neither can be defended through cases upholding such requirements.4
4 State defendants also rely on two district-court cases, Broyles v. Texas,

618 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. Tex. 2009), and Snead v. City of Albuquerque, 663
F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.M. 1987), but neither is persuasive. In Broyles, the court
relied on Holt and rejected the plaintiffs argument that equal protection
requires that nonresident property owners be given the right to vote. 618 F.
Supp. 2d at 687. Here, of course, plaintiffs make the altogether different
argument that, once the government extends absentee voting rights outside
its borders, the selective distribution of those rights must satisfy heightened
scrutiny. Snead, for its part, is both distinguishable and wrongly decided for
the reasons set forth in plaintiffs opening brief (AOB 33-34), to which state
defendants offer no meaningful response.
17
Third, federal defendants maintain that the rule set forth in Katzenbach
v. Morgan compels the application of rational-basis review (FDB 29-30), but
this too is wrong, as plaintiffs previously explained. (AOB 36-38.) Unlike the
statute at issue in Katzenbach, which effected a limited expansion of voting
rights by waiving English-proficiency requirements for those citizens who
completed sixth grade in certain Puerto Rican schools, UOCAVA and MOVE
effect a near-total expansion of absentee voting rights to citizens living
outside the 50 states an expansion that covers citizens who live in 99.99
percent of the land area outside the 50 states and those who live in eleven out
of fourteen Territories. By targeting such a narrow group of former state
residents for disfavored treatment, UOCAVA and MOVE raise constitutional
concerns not present in Katzenbach and should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny.
Federal defendants assert that UOCAVA does not create a limited
exclusion[ ] of the right to vote because [i]t treats all individuals who move
within the United States including between and among States, the listed
Territories, and the District of Columbia identically. (FDB 29-30.) But this
description does little more than use the phrase listed Territories to mask
the fact that the effect of UOCAVA and MOVE is to extend absentee voting
rights broadly to state citizens who leave the states and move overseas or to
most Territories, while narrowly excluding those state residents who move to
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the USVI from this broad extension. Because this
18
case involves not an incremental expansion of rights but rather a broad
expansion that singles out particular groups for exclusion, Katzenbach is
inapposite, and heightened scrutiny should apply.5
Fourth, federal defendants suggest that the discriminatory classification
in UOCAVA need only be supported by a rational basis because Congresss
legislative discretion . . . is especially broad when it legislates pursuant to the
Territor[y] Clause. (FDB 24.) But Congresss purportedly broad power over
the Territories does not disarm equal-protection constraints, as even one of
federal defendants own authorities acknowledges. See Examining Bd. of
Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600
(1976); see also, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. Nor does the Territory
Clause apply in any manner to MOVE, which was enacted by a state, not the
federal government.
C. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

against a suspect class.
Territorial residents are a prime example of a group that has historically
been relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process, Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted), and should therefore be
5 Katzenbach is inapposite for the additional reason that no special

circumstances justify Congresss and Illinois unique treatment of NMI (and
American Samoa). Cf. 384 U.S. at 657-58.
19
considered a suspect class. (AOB 38-46.)6 No defendant disputes that this is
an issue of first impression. (See Short App. at 30.) Defendants likewise do
not deny that territorial residents are a politically powerless class. Instead,
defendants (1) claim that suspect status for Territorial residents lacks
precedent and is in tension with Supreme Court decisions; (2) argue that the
Constitution ordains disfavored status for Territorial residents; and (3)
essentially blame plaintiffs for bringing this status upon themselves by
moving to the Territories. These arguments lack merit.
First, state defendants argue at length that recognized suspect classes are
limited to sex, race, alienage, and nationality and that no court has
recognized Territorial residents as a suspect class. (SDB 31-37.) But this
argument merely confirms that the issue is one of first impression. As such,
the Court should apply first principles to ascertain whether territorial
residents are discrete and insular minorities who are excluded from the
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). No defendant
disputes that territorial residents are uniquely isolated and disempowered
6 Federal defendants brief includes one sentence claiming that this

argument is waived, though the footnote cited in the brief makes clear the
issue was addressed and decided by the district court. (FDB 30 (citing Short
App. at 50 n.3).) Because the district court decided the issue of Congresss
power to discriminate against territorial residents under a suspect-class
theory, the Court should decide the question against all defendants on
appeal. See, e.g., Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2007) ([E]ven if a party fails to raise an issue in the district court, we
generally will not deem the issue waived if the district court actually
considered it.).
20
from the majoritarian political process or offers any other cogent argument
against suspect status.
The fact that no court has previously decided this issue does not weigh
against this conclusion. The Supreme Court has cautioned that new insights
and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). And in recent years,
judges and commentators have noticed that territorial residents are citizens
uniquely excluded from the halls of federal power, Territorial Federalism,
130 Harv. L. Rev. 1632, 1644 n.90 (2017); have been subject to discrimination
historically; and are left today in an interminable unequal condition,
Igarta v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 614 (1st Cir. 2010) (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Federal defendants related argument that Supreme Court decisions have
applied rational-basis review in cases involving the Territories (FDB 31-32) is
off point. These cases involved government-paid monetary benefits,7 and laws
providing for such payments are entitled to a strong presumption of
7 State defendants also emphasize the district courts decision in Romeu

v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.
2001) (SDB 36-37), which ruled that even if heightened scrutiny applied, the
plaintiff in that case had failed to show a discriminatory purpose. See Romeu,
121 F. Supp. 2d at 282. But this conclusion erroneously placed the burden on
the plaintiff to identify the justification of the discriminatory law; where
heightened scrutiny applies, the burden is on the government to show a
sufficiently important interest to which the law is narrowly tailored, which
has not even been attempted here. (AOB 46-47.)
21
constitutionality (Short App. at 29-30), and none of these cases purported to
resolve the question whether Territorial residents constitute a suspect class.
Second, the Constitution does not compel unfavorable treatment of the
Territories under the laws at issue. As its decision to extend absentee voting
rights to foreign countries and the NMI makes clear, Congress had the
authority to extend the same rights to residents of Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the USVI but simply chose not to do so. So too under MOVE, as illustrated by
its further extension of absentee voting rights to American Samoa. Thus, the
disempowerment that plaintiffs seek to address in this lawsuit is not
compelled by any constitutional principle but results from discriminatory
legislative choices.
Third, federal defendants suggest that the suspect status of Territorial
residents is not at issue because plaintiffs injuries result from their status as
former state citizens who have moved to the Territories, rather than a
general animus toward the Territories. (FDB 31; see also SDB 32.) This
argument is formalistic and unpersuasive. Plaintiffs contention is that the
disfavored treatment of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the USVI under UOCAVA
and MOVE continues a pattern of historical and ongoing political neglect and
abuse of the Territories. The fact that plaintiffs did not sustain injury until
moving to the Territories highlights rather than undercuts the suspect status
of territorial residents. And as the law recognizes in other contexts,
discrimination against a suspect class does not escape heightened scrutiny
22
because the plaintiffs acquired membership in the class through some action
on their part; for example, legislation against a particular religion is not
saved from heightened scrutiny because a plaintiff may be a convert. Cf., e.g.,
St. Johns United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th
Cir. 2007) (noting that a suspect class need not be defined by an immutable
characteristic where the class is subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process, and religion may fit the bill).
For all these reasons, defendants arguments against suspect status fail,
and heightened scrutiny should apply on this ground as well.
III. UOCAVA And MOVE Infringe Appellants Right To Interstate

Travel, And Defendants Arguments Do Not Show Otherwise.
UOCAVA and MOVE also violate plaintiffs right to interstate travel by
penalizing and deterring travel to the three disfavored Territories in which
they now reside. (AOB 47-54.) In response, defendants (1) argue for an
unduly narrow fundamental right to travel limited to the three categories
mentioned in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (FDB 40; SDB 38); (2)
assert that plaintiffs seek treatment that is superior to other territorial
residents (FDB 40-41; SDB 38); and (3) contend that plaintiffs travel claim
merely restates their equal-protection claim (FDB 42). These responses are
not persuasive.
23
First, the right to interstate travel is not limited to the three categories
elucidated in Saenz. As Saenz itself made clear, the right embraces at least
those three. 526 U.S. at 500. Other Supreme Court precedent strongly
supports the conclusion that travel from a state to another location in the
United States is also protected, and that laws that punish or deter such
travel are unconstitutional. (AOB 48-49.) Defendants do not address this
precedent but simply assume without justification (and contrary to its
express language) that Saenzs taxonomy of the right to travel was
comprehensive. It was not, and the fact that the right asserted by plaintiffs
here does not fit neatly within it is therefore irrelevant.
Defendants contend that the Supreme Courts decision in Califano v.
Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) forecloses plaintiffs argument here (FDB
41; SDB 39). Not so. Consistent with its other travel cases, the Supreme
Court placed significant weight on the fact that Gautier Torres involved
claims to monetary benefits, which the Court noted was entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 5. Federal defendants contend that
the Supreme Courts concern was that any recognition that rights to benefits
travel with the citizen who leave a state would require a State to continue to
pay those benefits indefinitely to any persons who once had resided there
and that the same concern applies to absentee voting rights. (FDB 41.) This
argument overlooks the fact that Illinois already has this obligation with
respect to absentee voting rights for citizens who remain overseas or in the
24
NMI or American Samoa. The travel right asserted here is only that it is
unconstitutional to undertake that global obligation while selectively
disfavoring travel to three of fourteen Territories an entirely different
circumstance from Gautier Torres.
Second, plaintiffs plea is not for superior treatment to other territorial
residents but rather for equal treatment with fellow former Illinois citizens
who now reside in any of the other eleven Territories, all of whom enjoy the
right to vote absentee. Defendants contrary argument reiterates their claim
that the rights plaintiffs seek would create a distinction of questionable
fairness; but as outlined above, UOCAVA and MOVE are the source of this
distinction by virtue of their treatment of the NMI and American Samoa.
Third, plaintiffs right to travel is separate from their right to equal
protection, even if those rights are overlapping in scope in this case. Notably,
disparate treatment has been the central component of right-to-travel claims
in many Supreme Court cases, some of which also involved equal-protection
claims. For example, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court determined that both
equal-protection rights and the right to travel were violated when the State
of Tennessee applied its bona fide residency requirement in a disparate
fashion. 405 U.S. at 338. Thus, although sometimes overlapping, these claims
are conceptually distinct and are treated as such by the courts. E.g., Matsuo
v. United States, 586 F.3d 1180, 1185 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2009) (A claim based on
25
the right to travel is distinct from an equal protection claim. (citing Gautier
Torres, 435 U.S. at 3 n.4)).
Here, UOCAVA and MOVE violate the right to travel because they
reward travel to foreign countries and to eleven of fourteen Territories with
absentee voting rights but deter and penalize travel to Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the USVI by withholding such rights. For this reason, too, the district
court should be reversed.
IV. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Appeal And Appellants
Have Standing.
All parties agree that this Court has appellate jurisdiction because the
district court entered an order on October 28, 2016 disposing of all of
plaintiffs claims against all defendants, which constituted a final decision
under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Nevertheless, federal defendants argue that
plaintiffs lack standing to raise a claim as to UOCAVA because their injuries
stem more directly from MOVE. (FDB 21-23.) The district court properly
rejected this argument, and this Court should do the same.
Federal defendants assert that plaintiffs harm traces to decisions of the
Illinois legislature and not to UOCAVA because [n]othing in federal law
prohibits Illinois from accepting plaintiffs absentee ballots. (FDB 23.) They
contend that UOCAVA merely creates a statutory floor and states may
choose to accept ballots as they see fit. (FDB 21.)
Not so. Plaintiffs disenfranchisement is directly traceable to the
discrimination imposed by UOCAVA and MOVE. It is UOCAVA that requires
26
Illinois and other states to confer a benefit to former state citizens residing in
other countries or the NMI and other Territories, but does not require states
to confer the same benefit to former state citizens living in American Samoa,
Guam, Puerto Rico, or the USVI. The federal statute also offers protections to
those with voting status under UOCAVA, for example mandating federal
officials to prescribe the form of certain overseas ballots, set reasonable
deadlines for the submission of absentee ballots, ensure that states accept
early submitted registration applications, and enforce federal requirements
against states as necessary. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 20301, 20304, 20306,
20307. In short, even if it is Illinois law that ultimately governs the
administration of absentee voting, it is UOCAVA that sets the relevant
baseline. Accordingly, as the Court held in Romeu, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74,
plaintiffs have standing to challenge both UOCAVA and the state law at
issue.
Ultimately, the logic of federal defendants position is that federal law
that imposes a discriminatory standard is immune from review whenever a
state could adopt additional legislation to correct the standard but does not
do so. Such a rule would justify the enactment of federal laws requiring
states to guarantee voting rights for one group but not another based on
other clearly arbitrary classifications, such as the first letter of a persons
name, because the states could act more broadly if they desired. States have
no obligation to finish the federal governments work for it, cf. Printz v.
27
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997), and as such when a federal
standard contributes to a plaintiffs injury, federal defendants cannot avoid
suit on the ground that a state could have prevented it.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in appellants opening brief,
the Court should reverse the judgment below.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Charles F. Smith

Neil C. Weare Charles F. Smith
We the People Project Counsel of Record
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Lara A. Flath
Suite 500 John J. Schoettle
Washington, D.C. 20009 155 N. Wacker Dr.
(202) 304-1202 Chicago, Illinois 60606
nweare@equalrightsnow.org (312) 407-0700
charles.smith@probonolaw.com
Leevin T. Camacho
The Law Office of Leevin T. Camacho Geoffrey M. Wyatt
194 Hernan Cortez Avenue Michael A. McIntosh
Suite 216 Marisa B. Van Saanen
Hagta, Guam 96910 Brendan B. Gants
(617) 477-8894 1440 New York Avenue, N.W.
leevin@guahanlaw.com Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-7000
Semaj Johnson
Law Offices of K.A. Rames PC
Suite 3, 2111 Company Street
Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin
Islands 00820
(340) 773-7284
semaj.johnson@rameslaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
28
Certificate of Compliance Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g)(1)
This document complies with the type-volume limit of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) as modified by 7th Cir. R. 32(c) because, excluding the parts of the
document exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), this document contains 6,745
words.
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) (as modified by 7th Cir. R. 32(b)) and the type-style requirements of
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a
proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word version 14 in 12-point
Century Schoolbook.

Charles F. Smith
155 N. Wacker Dr.
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 407-0700
29
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on June 30, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all
participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be
accomplished by the CM/ECF system.
Dated: June 30, 2017

Chicago, Illinois
Respectfully submitted,

Charles F. Smith
30

Reply Brief of Appellants, Segovia v. United States

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Reply Brief of Appellants, Segovia v. United States

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Case: 16-4240 Document: 55 RESTRICTED Filed: 06/30/2017 Pages: 36

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

LUIS SEGOVIA, et al.,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Appeal from an Order of the United States District Court

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Neil C. Weare Charles F. Smith

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Table Of Authorities ............................................................................................ ii

I. Defendants Fail To Justify UOCAVA Or MOVEs Arbitrary

A. Federal defendants fail to identify a legitimate

B. State defendants fail to identify any legitimate interest

II. Defendants Arguments Against Heightened Scrutiny Fail. ................ 12

A. The district court improperly anchored its holding in an

B. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

C. The classifications in UOCAVA and MOVE discriminate

III. UOCAVA And MOVE Infringe Appellants Right To Interstate

Certificate of Compliance Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g)(1) ...................... 29

Certificate of Service ......................................................................................... 30

Califano v. Gautier Torres,

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,

Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission,

Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,

Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,

Igarta De La Rosa v. United States,

Matsuo v. United States,

McDonald v. Board of Election Commioners of Chicago,

Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Johnson,

Printz v. United States,

Shelby County v. Holder,

Snead v. City of Albuquerque,

St. Johns United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago,

Tuaua v. United States,

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-5.01 ............................................................................. 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-1 .................................................................................. 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.1 ............................................................................... 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.2 ............................................................................... 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-2.3 ............................................................................... 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/20-4 ................................................................................... 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-5 .................................................................................. 11

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/20-25 ................................................................................ 11

28 U.S.C. 1291 ................................................................................................ 26

52 U.S.C. 20301 .............................................................................................. 27

52 U.S.C. 20303 .............................................................................................. 11

52 U.S.C. 20304 ........................................................................................ 11, 27

52 U.S.C. 20306 .............................................................................................. 27

52 U.S.C. 20307 .............................................................................................. 27

96th Illinois General Assembly, Senate Proceedings, April 29,

Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern

Welcoming America's Newest Commonwealth: The Second

voting representation in Congress to former Illinois citizens residing nearly

Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE), former Illinois citizens who move to

this otherwise global expansion of the franchise. Defendants justifications for

this discriminatory line-drawing are insufficient to withstand equal-

protection scrutiny under any level of review.

discriminatory treatment was intended to serve or how UOCAVAs or

MOVEs provisions could advance any such interest. Federal defendants

position boils down to a posited congressional desire to treat the Northern

Mariana Islands (NMI) as more akin to a foreign country. But this

demonstrate an intent to treat it as part of the country for most purposes.

justified in light of current circumstances. They alternatively contend that

MOVE furthers Illinoiss interests in enforcing a bona fide residency