Labor Standards Cases

Labor Standards Cases
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

MATERNITY CHILDRENS HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO,
President, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE
REGIONAL DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X, Respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the respondent Secretary of
Labor dated September 24, 1986, affirming with modification the Order of respondent Regional
Director of Labor, Region X, dated August 4, 1986, awarding salary differentials and emergency cost
of living allowances (ECOLAS) to employees of petitioner, and the Order denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro
Womens Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The
hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per
month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De
Oro City government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are
given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-
78, Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions
filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for
underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-
86.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to
inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p.
98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May,
1986, were duly submitted for inspection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that
there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, deficiency on wage and ecola as verified and confirmed per review
of the respondent payrolls and interviews with the complainant workers and all other information
gathered by the team, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Regional Director, this office,
that Antera Dorado, President be ORDERED to pay the amount of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY SIX & 01/100 (P654,756.01), representing underpayment of
wages and ecola to the THIRTY SIX (36) employees of the said hospital as appearing in the attached
Annex F worksheets and/or whatever action equitable under the premises. (p. 99, Rollo)
Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated
August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and
ECOLAs to all the petitioners employees, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Maternity and Children Hospital is hereby ordered
to pay the above-listed complainants the total amount indicated opposite each name, thru this Office
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Thenceforth, the respondent hospital is also ordered to pay
its employees/workers the prevailing statutory minimum wage and
allowance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S.
Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that
deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the August 29, 1986 order is hereby MODIFIED in that the deficiency wages and
ECOLAs should only be computed from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986. The case is remanded to the
Regional Director, Region X, for recomputation specifying the amounts due each the complainants
under each of the applicable Presidential Decrees. (p. 40, Rollo)
On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit (p.
43Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The instant petition questions the all-embracing applicability of the award involving salary
differentials and ECOLAS, in that it covers not only the hospital employees who signed the
complaints, but also those (a) who are not signatories to the complaint, and (b) those who were no
longer in the service of the hospital at the time the complaints were filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of Labor, as
affirmed with modifications by respondent Secretary of Labor, does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which the award was based. In its Rejoinder to Comment, petitioner
further questions the authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to
private respondents, (relying on the case of Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-16883, March 27,
1961, 1 SCRA 860, as authority for raising the additional issue of lack of jurisdiction at any stage of
the proceedings, p. 52, Rollo), alleging that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the Labor
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if
so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and
enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. The matter of whether or not the decision
states clearly and distinctly statement of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes
relevant after the issue on jurisdiction has been resolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O.
No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and
regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare
benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). 1 Under the
present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor
standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, providedthere
still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not
contested by the employer concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional Directors authority
over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when
E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that stated in the case of Antonio Ong,
Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated December 21, 1987, thus:
. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128
of the Labor Code, has no authority to award money claims, properly falling within the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
. . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has violated certain labor standard laws,
then the regional director must order the necessary rectifications. However, this does not include
adjudication of money claims, clearly within the ambit of the labor arbiters authority under Article
217 of the Code.
The Ong case relied on the ruling laid down in Zambales Base Metals Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor,
et al., (G.R. Nos. 73184-88, November 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 50) that the Regional Director was not
empowered to share in the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters by Article
217. chanrobles virtual law library
We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had
enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975,
which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement
system.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To clarify matters, it is necessary to enumerate a series of rules and provisions of law on the
disposition of labor standards cases.
Prior to the promulgation of PD 850, labor standards cases were an exclusive function of labor
arbiters, under Article 216 of the then Labor Code (PD No. 442, as amended by PD 570-a), which
read in part:
Art. 216. Jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Labor Arbiters and compulsory
arbitrators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
xxx xxx xxx
(c) All money claims of workers, involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay, maternity leave and other money claims arising from employee-
employer relations, except claims for workmens compensation, social security and medicare
benefits; chanrobles virtual law library
(d) Violations of labor standard laws;
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of the Code as follows:
ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives,
including, but not restricted, to the labor inspectorate, shall have access to employers records and
premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to
copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be
necessary to determine violations or in aid in the enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or
regulation issued pursuant to this Code.
With the promulgation of PD 850, Regional Directors were given enforcement powers, in addition to
visitorial powers. Article 127, as amended, provided in part:
SEC. 10. Article 127 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 127. Visitorial and enforcement powers.
xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and
administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this
Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement
of their order.
xxx xxx xxx
Labor Arbiters, on the other hand, lost jurisdiction over labor standards cases. Article 216, as then
amended by PD 850, provided in part:
SEC. 22. Article 216 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 216. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidethe following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or
premium compensation, maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims
arising from employer-employee relations, except claims for employees compensation, social
security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127 of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as further amended by PD
850), there were three adjudicatory units: The Regional Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and
the Labor Arbiter. It became necessary to clarify and consolidate all governing provisions on
jurisdiction into one document. 2 On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 6 was issued, and
provides in part (on labor standards cases) as follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6chanrobles virtual law library
TO: All Concernedchanrobles virtual law library
SUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASES chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
1. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
a) Labor standards cases arising from violations of labor standard laws discovered in the course of
inspection or complaints where employer-employee relations still exist;
xxx xxx xxx

2. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of theConciliation Section of the
Regional Office:
a) Labor standards cases where employer-employee relations nolonger exist;
xxx xxx xxx

6. The following cases are certifiable to the Labor Arbiters:
a) Cases not settled by the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office, namely: chanrobles virtual law
library
1) labor standard cases where employer-employee relationsno longer exist;
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 (undated) was likewise subsequently issued, enunciating the
rationale for, and the scope of, the enforcement power of the Regional Director, the first and second
paragraphs of which provide as follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

TO: All Regional Directors chanrobles virtual law library
SUBJECT: LABOR STANDARDS CASES
Under PD 850, labor standards cases have been taken from the arbitration system and placed under
the enforcement system, except where a) questions of law are involved as determined by the
Regional Director, b) the amount involved exceeds P100,000.00 or over 40% of the equity of the
employer, whichever is lower, c) the case requires evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the
normal course of inspection, or d) there is no more employer-employee relationship.
The purpose is clear: to assure the worker the rights and benefits due to him under labor standards
laws without having to go through arbitration. The worker need not litigate to get what legally
belongs to him. The whole enforcement machinery of the Department of Labor exists to insure its
expeditious delivery to him free of charge. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights and benefits due him under
labor standards law need not litigate. The Regional Director, by virtue of his enforcement power,
assured expeditious delivery to him of his rights and benefits free of charge, provided of course, he
was still in the employ of the firm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After PD 850, Article 216 underwent a series of amendments (aside from being re-numbered as
Article 217) and with it a corresponding change in the jurisdiction of, and supervision over, the Labor
Arbiters:
1. PD 1367 (5-1-78) gave Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction overunresolved issues in collective
bargaining, etc., and those cases arising from employer-employee relations duly indorsed by the
Regional Directors. (It also removed his jurisdiction over moral or other damages) In other words,
the Labor Arbiter entertained casescertified to him. (Article 228, 1978 Labor Code.) chanrobles
virtual law library
2. PD 1391 (5-29-78) all regional units of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) were
integrated into the Regional Offices Proper of the Ministry of Labor; effectively transferring direct
administrative control and supervision over the Arbitration Branch to the Director of the Regional
Office of the Ministry of Labor. Conciliable cases which were thus previously under the jurisdiction
of the defunct Conciliation Section of the Regional Office for purposes of conciliation or amicable
settlement, became immediately assignable to the Arbitration Branch for joint conciliation and
compulsory arbitration. In addition, the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction even over termination and
labor-standards cases that may be assigned to them for compulsory arbitration by the Director of the
Regional Office. PD 1391 merged conciliation and compulsory arbitration functions in the person of
the Labor Arbiter. The procedure governing the disposition of cases at the Arbitration Branch
paralleled those in the Special Task Force and Field Services Division, with one major exception: the
Labor Arbiter exercised full and untrammelled authority in the disposition of the case, particularly in
the substantive aspect, his decisions and orders subject to review only on appeal to the
NLRC. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
3. MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 Because of the seemingly overlapping functions as a result of
PD 1391, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 was issued on October 7, 1978, and provided in part:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 37 chanrobles virtual law library

TO: All Concerned chanrobles virtual law library
SUBJECT: ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO LABOR ARBITERS
Pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1391 and to insure speedy disposition of labor
cases, the following guidelines are hereby established for the information and guidance of all
concerned.
1. Conciliable Cases.
Cases which are conciliable per se i.e., (a) labor standards cases where employer-employee
relationship no longer exists; (b) cases involving deadlock in collective bargaining, except those
falling under P.D. 823, as amended; (c) unfair labor practice cases; and (d) overseas employment
cases, except those involving overseas seamen, shall be assigned by the Regional Director to the
Labor Arbiter for conciliation and arbitration without coursing them through the conciliation
section of the Regional Office.
2. Labor Standards Cases.
Cases involving violation of labor standards laws where employer- employee relationship still
exists shall be assigned to the Labor Arbiters where:
a) intricate questions of law are involved; or chanrobles virtual law library
b) evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection by labor
regulations officers are required for their proper disposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
3. Disposition of Cases.
When a case is assigned to a Labor Arbiter, all issues raised therein shall be resolved by him
including those which are originally cognizable by the Regional Director to avoid multiplicity of
proceedings. In other words, the whole case, and not merely issues involved therein, shall be
assigned to and resolved by him.

(Emphasis supplied)
4. PD 1691(5-1-80) original and exclusive jurisdiction overunresolvedissues in collective
bargaining and money claims, whichincludes moral or other damages.
Despite the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters over money claims, however, the
Regional Director nonetheless retained his enforcement power, and remained empowered to
adjudicate uncontested money claims.
5. BP 130 (8-21-8l) strengthened voluntary arbitration. The decree also returned the Labor
Arbiters as part of the NLRC, operating as Arbitration Branch thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
6. BP 227(6-1- 82) original and exclusive jurisdiction over questions involving legality of strikes
and lock-outs.
The present petition questions the authority of the Regional Director to issue the Order, dated
August 4, 1986, on the basis of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 (formerly
Article 127) of the present Labor Code. It is contended that based on the rulings in the Ong vs. Parel
(supra) and the Zambales Base Metals, Inc. vs. TheMinister of Labor (supra) cases, a Regional
Director is precluded from adjudicating money claims on the ground that this is an exclusive
function of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the present Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On August 4, 1986, when the order was issued, Article 128(b) 4 read as follows:
(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and
administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this
Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement
of theirorder, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. 1691, effective May 1, 1980;
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, effective August 21, 1981; and Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, effective June 1,
1982, inter alia, provides:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after
submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases; chanrobles virtual law library
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment; chanrobles virtual law library
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits; chanrobles virtual law library
4. Cases involving household services; and chanrobles virtual law library
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ong and Zambales cases involved workers who were still connected with the company.
However, in the Ong case, the employer disputed the adequacy of the evidentiary foundation
(employees affidavits) of the findings of the labor standards inspectors while in the Zambales case,
the money claims which arose from alleged violations of labor standards provisions were not
discovered in the course of normal inspection. Thus, the provisions of MOLE Policy Instructions
Nos. 6, (Distribution of Jurisdiction Over Labor Cases) and 37 (Assignment of Cases to Labor
Arbiters) giving Regional Directors adjudicatory powers over uncontested money claims discovered
in the course of normal inspection, provided an employer-employee relationship still exists, are
inapplicable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, petitioner admitted the charge of underpayment of wages to workers still in its
employ; in fact, it pleaded for time to raise funds to satisfy its obligation. There was thus no contest
against the findings of the labor inspectors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Barely less than a month after the promulgation on November 26, 1986 of the Zambales Base Metals
case, Executive Order No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986, 5amending Article 128(b) of the
Labor Code, to read as follows:
(b) THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF THIS CODE TO THE CONTRARY
NOTWITHSTANDING AND IN CASES WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE STILL EXISTS, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing,
compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code AND OTHER LABOR LEGISLATION
based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their
orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and
raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable
in the normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)
As seen from the foregoing, EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an
employer with labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our
considered opinion however, that the inclusion of the phrase, The provisions of Article 217 of this
Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists in Article 128(b), as amended, above-cited, merely confirms/reiteratesthe enforcement
adjudication authority of the Regional Director over uncontested money claims in cases where an
employer-employee relationship still exists. 6 chanrobles virtual law library
Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and
37, it is clear that it has always been the intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers
immediate access (when still feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still exists) to
their rights and benefits, without being inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes that prove
to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long
run.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating that the transfer of labor
standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system is
. . to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him under labor standard laws, without having
to go through arbitration. . .
so that
. . the workers would not litigate to get what legally belongs to him. .. ensuring delivery . . free of
charge.
Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be
hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and
benefits received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social
justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This view is in consonance with the present Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the
Regional Offices 7 issued by the Secretary of Labor, Franklin M. Drilon on September 16,
1987.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection,
provide as follows:
Section 2. Complaint inspection. All such complaints shall immediately be forwarded to the
Regional Director who shall refer the case to the appropriate unit in the Regional Office for
assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO) for field inspection. When the field
inspection does not produce the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the parties for
summary investigation to expedite the disposition of the case. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. Where
employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been
severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the labor arbiters. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 to amounts
not exceeding P100,000.00 has been dispensed with, in view of the following provisions of pars. (b)
and (c), Section 7 on Restitution, the same Rules, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00). . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned amount shall be effected at the Regional Office or at
the worksite subject to the prior approval of the Regional Director.
which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money claims in excess of
P100,000.00; provided of course the employer does not contest the findings made, based on the
provisions of Section 8 thereof:
Section 8. Compromise agreement. Should the parties arrive at an agreement as to the whole or
part of the dispute, said agreement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the parties in the
presence of the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative.
E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the
Secretary of Labors decision upholding private respondents salary differentials and ECOLAs on
September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional
Director (Article 128-b) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos.
6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an
employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to
great respect. As held in Progressive Workers Union, et. al. vs. F.P. Aguas, et. al. G.R. No. 59711-12,
May 29, 1985, 150 SCRA 429:
. . The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to
great respect. We see no reason to detract from this rudimentary rule in administrative law,
particularly when later events have proved said interpretation to be in accord with the legislative
intent. ..
The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce, be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b)
as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986, this executive order to be considered in the
nature of a curative statute with retrospective application. (Progressive Workers Union, et al. vs.
Hon. F.P. Aguas, et al. (Supra); M. Garcia vs. Judge A. Martinez, et al., G.R. No. L- 47629, May 28,
1979, 90 SCRA 331).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We now come to the question of whether or not the Regional Director erred in extending the award
to all hospital employees. We answer in the affirmative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees whosigned the
complaint, as well as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital
at the time the complaint was filed (See Order, p. 33 dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director,
Pedrito de Susi, p. 33, Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint
is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and
exercisable over establishments, not over the individual members/employees, because what is
sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, such
firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting
from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire members/employees should
benefit therefrom. As aptly stated by then Minister of Labor Augusto S. Sanchez:
. . It would be highly derogatory to the rights of the workers, if after categorically finding the
respondent hospital guilty of underpayment of wages and ECOLAs, we limit the award to only those
who signed the complaint to the exclusion of the majority of the workers who are similarly situated.
Indeed, this would be not only render the enforcement power of the Minister of Labor and
Employment nugatory, but would be the pinnacle of injustice considering that it would not only
discriminate but also deprive them of legislated benefits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
. . . (pp. 38-39, Rollo).
This view is further bolstered by the provisions of Sec. 6, Rule II of the Rules on the Disposition of
Labor Standards cases in the Regional Offices (supra) presently enforced, viz:
SECTION 6. Coverage of complaint inspection. A complaint inspection shall not be limited to the
specific allegations or violations raised by the complainants/workers but shall be a thorough inquiry
into and verification of the compliance by employer with existing labor standards and shall cover all
workers similarly situated. (Emphasis supplied)
However, there is no legal justification for the award in favor of those employees whowere no longer
connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was filed, having resigned therefrom in 1984,
viz:
1.
1.
1. Jean (Joan) Venzon (See Order, p. 33, Rollo)
1.
1.
1. Rosario Paclijan
1.
1.
1. Adela Peralta
1.
1.
1. Mauricio Nagales
1.
1.
1. Consesa Bautista
1.
1.
1. Teresita Agcopra
1.
1.
1. Felix Monleon
1.
1.
1. Teresita Salvador
1.
1. Edgar Cataluna; and
10. Raymond Manija ( p.7, Rollo)
The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases of separated
employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as said
article is in aid of the enforcement powerof the Regional Director; hence, not applicable where the
employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim
is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Petitioner has likewise questioned the order dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director in that it
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award is
based.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We invite attention to the Minister of Labors ruling thereon, as follows:
Finally, the respondent hospital assails the order under appeal as null and void because it does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the awards were based. Contrary to the
pretensions of the respondent hospital, we have carefully reviewed the order on appeal and we found
that the same contains a brief statement of the (a) facts of the case; (b) issues involved; (c) applicable
laws; (d) conclusions and the reasons therefor; (e) specific remedy granted (amount awarded). (p.
40, Rollo)
ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all

persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED as
regards those employees no longer employed at that time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library

Subject to my opinion in G.R. Nos. 82805 and 83205.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library

I concur, with the observation that even as reconciled, it would seem inevitable to state that the
conclusion in the Zambales and Ong cases that, prior to Executive Order No. 111, Regional Directors
were not empowered to share the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters
over money claims, is now deemed modified, if not superseded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It may not be amiss to state either that under Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715, which amends
further the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442), Regional Directors have also been granted
adjudicative powers, albeit limited, over monetary claims and benefits of workers, thereby settling
any ambiguity on the matter. Thus:
SEC. 2. Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of any
interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the
duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and
after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary
claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic
or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations:
Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That
the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within
thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
Subject to my opinion in G.R. Nos. 82805 and 83205.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I concur, with the observation that even as reconciled, it would seem inevitable to state that the
conclusion in the Zambales and Ong cases that, prior to Executive Order No. 111, Regional Directors
were not empowered to share the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters
over money claims, is now deemed modified, if not superseded.chanrobles virtual law library
It may not be amiss to state either that under Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715, which amends
further the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442), Regional Directors have also been granted
adjudicative powers, albeit limited, over monetary claims and benefits of workers, thereby settling
any ambiguity on the matter. Thus:
SEC. 2. Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of any
interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the
duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and
after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary
claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic
or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations:
Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That
the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within
thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same.
Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Abella vs. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-71813, 152 SCRA 140 , July
Posted by Alchemy Business Center and Marketing Consultancy at 1:01 AM Labels: 152 SCRA
140, Abella vs. National Labor Relations Commission, July, No. L-71813, Political Law
Abella vs. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-71813, 152 SCRA 140 , July
G.R. No. 71813 July 20, 1987
ROSALINA PEREZ ABELLA/HDA. DANAO-RAMONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROMEO QUITCO
and RICARDO DIONELE, SR., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 8, 1985 Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment affirming the July 16, 1982 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which ruled in favor of
granting separation pay to private respondents.
On June 27, 1960, herein petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in Monteverde, Negros
Occidental, known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years, renewable, at her
option, for another ten (10) years (Rollo, pp. 16-20).
On August 13, 1970, she opted to extend the lease contract for another ten (10) years (Ibid, pp. 26-
27).
During the existence of the lease, she employed the herein private respondents. Private respondent
Ricardo Dionele, Sr. has been a regular farm worker since 1949 and he was promoted to Cabo in
1963. On the other hand, private respondent Romeo Quitco started as a regular employee in 1968
and was promoted to Cabo in November of the same year.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned
over the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the management,
cultivation and operation of the farm (Rollo, pp. 33; 89).
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry
of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages. After the parties had presented their respective evidence, Labor
Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982 (Ibid, pp. 29-31), ruled that the
dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation
pay. Pertinent portion of the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
In the instant case, the respondent closed its business operation not by reason of business reverses or
losses. Accordingly, the award of termination pay in complainants favor is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants separation pay at the rate
of half-month salary for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered one (1)
year. (Rollo pp. 29-30)
On appeal on August 11, 1982, the National Labor Relations Commission, in a Resolution dated April
8, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 3940), affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
On May 22, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid, pp. 41-45), but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated June 10, 1985 (Ibid, p. 46). Hence, the present petition (Ibid, pp. 3-8).
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1985, resolved to require the
respondents to comment (Ibid, p. 58). In compliance therewith, private respondents filed their
Comment on October 23, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 53-55); and the Solicitor General on December 17, 1985
(Ibid, pp. 71-73-B).
On February 19, 1986, petitioner filed her Consolidated Reply to the Comments of private and public
respondents (Ibid, pp. 80-81).
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated March 31, 1986, resolved to give due course to
the petition; and to require the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda (Ibid., p. 83). In
compliance therewith, the Solicitor General filed his Memorandum on June 18, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 89-
94); and petitioner on July 23, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 96-194).
The petition is devoid of merit.
The sole issue in this case is
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY.
Petitioner claims that since her lease agreement had already expired, she is not liable for payment of
separation pay. Neither could she reinstate the complainants in the farm as this is a complete
cessation or closure of a business operation, a just cause for employment termination under Article
272 of the Labor Code.
On the other hand, the legal basis of the Labor Arbiter in granting separation pay to the private
respondents is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending the Labor Code, Section 15 of which, specifically
provides:
Sec 15 Articles 285 and 284 of the Labor Code are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establisment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to
at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.1avvphi1
There is no question that Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is the law applicable
in this case.
Article 272 of the same Code invoked by the petitioner pertains to the just causes of termination. The
Labor Arbiter does not argue the justification of the termination of employment but applied Article
284 as amended, which provides for the rights of the employees under the circumstances of
termination.
Petitioner then contends that the aforequoted provision violates the constitutional guarantee against
impairment of obligations and contracts, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona on June
27, 1960, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay
to workers at the end of the lease.
Such contention is untenable.
This issue has been laid to rest in the case of Anucension v. National Labor Union (80 SCRA 368-369
[1977]) where the Supreme Court ruled:
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not
absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.
For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to
regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise
of that power. Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of
entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise maybe prohibited.
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract of obligations, no

unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of
each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted must be legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed
in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. (Citing Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la
Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas [FOITAF] [L-27113], November 19, 1974; 61
SCRA 93,102-113]).
The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment
is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law,
employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled
for the thirty three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco.
Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing
that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as
new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights of
the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as amended refers to employment benefits
to farm hands who were not parties to petitioners lease contract with the owner of Hacienda Danao-
Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect
the interest of the working class.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration. (Volshel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43
[1985]). It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that
all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the
law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection
to labor. (Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, 144 SCRA 422 [1986] citing Cristobal
v. Employees Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329; Acosta v. Employees Compensation
Commission, 109 SCRA 209).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the July 16, 1982 Decision
of the Labor Arbiter and the April 8, 1985 Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernando, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132564. October 20, 1999]

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Third Division, Q.C. and PRISCILA
ENDOZO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari with application for a temporary
restraining order seeking to set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zaballa finding the termination of
employment of respondent Priscila Endozo as domestic helper in Taiwan as unwarranted and
ordering petitioner to pay her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract of employment of
eleven (11) months and (19) nineteen days amounting to NT$151,996.60, plus ten percent (10%)
thereof as attorneys fees.
The facts are as follows:
In June 1993, respondent Priscila Endozo applied to petitioner Sameer Overseas Employment
Agency, a local recruitment placement agency, for overseas employment in Taiwan as a domestic
helper. As she was initially found to have a minimal spot she was advised to rest for at least two (2)
months.
On April 6, 1994, petitioner told respondent Endozo that she would be finally deployed to Taiwan
and required her to pay the amount of P30,000.00, which she did, but petitioner did not issue any
receipt.
On April 8, 1994, respondent Endozo left for Taiwan. She was to be employed as a housemaid of
Sung Kui Mei with a monthly salary of NT$13,380.00 for a period of one year.
However, she stayed in Taiwan only for eleven (11) days as her employer terminated her services, and
sent her home on April 19, 1994 for alleged incompetence.
Immediately upon her return, she confronted petitioner agency and Rose Mahinay of said agency
told her that she was just unlucky and that she would be refunded the amount of P50,000.00.
On June 20, 1995, private respondent filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal, payment of salary corresponding
to the unexpired portion of her contract, illegal exaction, violation of the Labor Code, falsification of
contract of employment, attorneys fees and costs.
Meantime, on June 7, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8042, vesting jurisdiction over
claims of overseas workers with the National Labor Relations Commission (hereafter
NLRC). Consequently, respondents claim was transferred to the National Labor Relations
Commission, Arbitration Branch, in San Pablo City.
After position papers were filed, on May 28, 1997, Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zavalla rendered a
decision finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed and ordering petitioner to pay her
salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract of employment of eleven (11) months
and nineteen (19) days equivalent to NT$151,996.80, plus ten percent (10%) of the award equivalent
to NT$15,199.68 as attorneys fees.[1]
In time, petitioner appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission, Third
Division, Quezon City.
On November 28, 1997, the NLRC rendered decision affirming in toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.[2]
On December 23, 1997, petitioner filed with the NLRC a motion for reconsideration;[3] however, on
January 28, 1998, the NLRC denied the motion.[4]
Hence, this recourse.[5]
On May 14, 1998, we required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice.[6] On July 13, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment, submitting the proposition that
private respondent had been illegally dismissed by her foreign employer entitling her to payment of
her salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract.[7] However, private respondent
failed to submit her comment, and on February 1, 1999, we required her counsel to show cause why
she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.[8]
We now resolve to give due course to the petition. We consider private respondent to have waived
the filing of her comment and set aside the resolution of February 1, 1999.
The issue presented is whether the employer in Taiwan could lawfully terminate private respondents
employment as domestic helper for incompetence during the probationary period of her
employment.
Petitioner recruited private respondent for employment in Taiwan, and she executed a contract of
employment with her Taiwanese employer under which she was to serve as domestic helper for a
period of one year, with six months probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the
Taiwanese employer terminated private respondents employment for alleged incompetence.
It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that even a probationary employee is entitled to
security of tenure.[9] A probationary employee can not be terminated, except for cause.[10]
In this case, the employment contract was for a definite period of one (1) year, with six (6) months
probationary period. After only eleven days of work, the employer dismissed private respondent
without just cause.
Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, a probationary employee may be terminated on two
grounds: (a) for just cause or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement.[11] Under the contract of employment, the employer may terminate the services of
private respondent during the probationary period for being found losing ability to work. However,
the power of the employer to terminate a probationary employment contract is subject to limitations.
First, it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Secondly, the
dissatisfaction of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the
contract or the law; and thirdly, there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.[12] In
termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the
employer.[13] In this case, petitioner was not able to present convincing proof establishing respondent
Endozos alleged incompetence. Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the
conditions of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein.[14] Precisely, implicit in
Article 281 of the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by
the employer to the probationary employee at the time of his engagement.[15] Thus, the termination of
respondent Endozos employment was not justified[16] and hence, illegal.[17] Consequently, private
respondent is entitled to payment of her salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her
contract of employment for a period of one year.[18]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission adopted on November 28, 1997, in NLRC NCR CA No.
013114-97.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official business abroad.
Digest: People vs
Vera Reyes
By nutshellgirl Posted in General Tagged digest, labor Leave a comment
People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil 190
Subject: Labor Standards
Doctrine: Police Power (Basis of States power to intervene)
Facts:
The defendant was charged with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and
3958 The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time
after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines,
having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a
month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the
above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands.
The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional.
After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of
section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts
alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.
In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the said constitutional provision is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No. The last part of section 1 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so,
the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of
every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of the salary within the periods
specified is considered as a violation of the law.
The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary,
should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment.
The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12), Article III,
of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.
We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A close
perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will
show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or
refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so
circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both
cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation
of Act No. 3958, and the second isestafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the
offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
Another doctrine:
Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In the
exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No.
3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers
or employers in the specified periods of time.
Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of employers
who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus
causing them financial difficulties.
Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to
institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they
would receive in case of a decision in their favor.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA,
RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER
CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between
the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal, which assails
the March 12, 1997 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 57) in Criminal
Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged with
murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons who were
subsequently identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime was
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
[and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of
superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK
CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark
Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside, hitting him between
his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.[2]
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the
Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong. The trial
court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
[and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of
superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK
CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark
Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. firearm
of still undetermined make, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball
bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick
Capulong y Dizon.[3]
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera[4] and Roderick Garcia[5] pleaded not guilty. The
other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA and
RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and
they are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, including all its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
1. a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
2. b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
3. c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
4. d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
5. e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information until full
payment; and,
6. f) Costs of suit.[6]
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts:[9]
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino Cacao, a
resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street,
Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the
incident on June 28, 1992 in the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak
branch in Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the homeowners association.
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a car
passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers. He knew
the victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the
passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then he
heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a
circular road whose entrance and exit were through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking
[the] better part of him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car
already parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to
a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo
aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between the eyes. After the shooting, Florendo and
his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a sketch of the
crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative position at the time of the
incident. While testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the
companions of Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation Division,
Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the shooting incident from a
security guard of the subdivision. The officer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II,
composed of PO2 Armando Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate
and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the team to the corner
of Denver and Doa Justina Streets, site of the shooting, where they discovered blood stains
and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed them that the victim was rushed to the East
Avenue Medical Center by other security guards. The policemen then found a color red sports car
with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its doors opened. They recovered inside the car
several class cards and a license belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick
Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came upon a person
wearing muddied maong pants and white t-shirt standing and walking around near the clubhouse of
the subdivision. When asked his name, the person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein
appellant. Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of a hold-
up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to Station 5 and turned him over to
the desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989, was assigned to
investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2
Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other
police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving medical treatment. The victim
was unconscious. After conferring with the victims parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to
Station 5. On his arrival, the desk officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was told that
appellant was picked up near the crime scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked about
his participation in the shooting, he was reluctant at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3
Guspid told him that his conscience would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated the crime, and
implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group of policemen to the
residence of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doa Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding
Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He
was then invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the interview, Garcia
revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and black cap. According to Garcia,
Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3
Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to a
grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek
and about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly,
the policemen recovered a .22 caliber revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August
24, 1993). While there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect
the explanations and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As
identifying marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials OG (acronym for his first name and family name)
between the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner
lining of the black cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where SPO3 Guspid asked
them if they were willing to give their written statements, to which they assented. Consequently, they
were brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street,
Diliman, Quezon City. They were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the
Free Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time were appellants relatives, including his mother
and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty. Sansano, a competent
lawyer. They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two conferred with Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the suspects [i]n his
office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step outside the building in order to
assure that no pressure would be exerted on the suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6,
November 6, 1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes,
informing them of their rights under the constitution and inquiring from them if they indeed wanted
to give voluntary statements. To the query, the suspects answered positively. They also affirmed their
earlier declaration that they were willing to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised
them of their right during the investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which they
thought would incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty. Sansano requested
the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to determine any telltale signs of torture or
bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he then summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The
investigators readied two typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as
the lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that they did not
understand, and to seek xxx a clarification, if needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single separate room from
where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the two tables used by the investigators for
typing the questions and answers, involving himself from beginning to end of the investigation until
the signing of the statements. He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with [the]
standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then informed the
suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under the constitution, specifically, the
right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police would provide them with
one who would assist them; that they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The
investigators also asked him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects. They also asked the
suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel. They agreed expressly by saying: Oho.
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They conducted the
question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of appellant was marked as Exhibit O
and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the suspects and Atty.
Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking the statements of
the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of appellant in the presence of Atty.
Sansano. Before proceeding, he reminded appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four
(4) questions under the heading Paunawa, to which the latter gave positive answers. The statement
was signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned over
appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: both hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong
gave positive results [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y
Galamgam @ Deo gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates.
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the victim to get her
own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared a referral to the Quezon City
Prosecution Office which was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station
Investigation Division. During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory
questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his other companion,
Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had shot
the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and Florendo, who
was his friend, upon the latters request. A few hours after the shooting incident, appellant was picked
up by the police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him into signing his Statement regarding
the incident. The trial court summarized appellants evidence in this wise:[10]
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already close friends
for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latters house at No 106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His
own residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the
address of Elmer Castro, his and Kenneths friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneths house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went home at
7:00 am of June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by Edwins house to invite him back
to [the formers] house that morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his
girlfriend, and Deo, who were then with him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick
Garcia, was another friend of Kenneths.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneths house at 11:00 am. Kenneth, his girlfriend,
and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin
to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth
was going to see a friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him
to Filinvest, but the four of them Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n
Kenneths car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of them
alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and Elmer told
Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they were going to see a friend. At that point in time,
Edwin knew the person[,] whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him
personally before then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where
Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing (x x x x
parang nagtatalo sila). The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not before long,
Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was
shocked because he was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the
place. His singular thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 pm when he was already outside of Filinvest
subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4) persons in civilian attire
tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying his feet together and binding his hands
from his back with handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water
was poured little by little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his thighs. This
maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted him to admit something and to
name my companions but he refused to admit or to name anyone. They next took him outside to a
mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At one point during the torture, a
policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his temple, telling him to run as it was his
chance to escape, but he did not escape because he could see that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could xxx get a lawyer[;] instead, one of them, whose name
he [did] not know, told him that I should listen only to them and not to anyone else. He claimed that
he saw one [of] his tormentors in court, and he identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not
participate in his torture, because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not
drunk or under the influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the influence of drugs when
he took his statement because of his troubled appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his request to contact
his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation continued (x x x x puro pananakot and
ginawa nila sa akin). After his torture at the mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a
cell, where he remained until the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named Cesar
boxed him once in the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and brought to the
IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were Deo Garcia and two other
police officers. At the IBP office, the officers talked with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came
to know to be Atty. Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced (present) to him and Deo. That was
the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk or not. Edwin
could not make any comment because wala po ako sa sarili ko. Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin
substantially that: Alam nyo ba na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan, referring to
the statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 pm until 9 pm on the day before
(June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, and had no relatives present.
Guspid appeared to be like drunk or tipsy, when he took down Edwins statement that night.
At the IBP office, Edwins and Deos statement were taken separately by Guspid and Selvido,
respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from each other, but he could
hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked the questions and typed both the questions and his
answers, which were given in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was
about seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were situated. The office of Atty. Sansano
was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty. Sansano was doing at the time. After
the questioning, he signed a paper which he was not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign
the paper.
xxxxxxxxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng sinumpaang salaysay,
which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of recanting his
statements given at the precinct in the evening of June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992
on the ground that they were given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his
constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was indeed
Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted appellant as a
principal, however, because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and
substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth
Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia.[11]
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS BERNARDO
CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO- CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT O, ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED
FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.[12]
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2)
the admissibility of appellants extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his liability.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as a
principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellants Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be discussed
jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera, the trial
court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the
following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the victims car; the victim was
clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it
all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of
Florendos dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.[13] In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the
victim in the head moments later.
Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was
inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy.[14] Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not
on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy
must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacaos testimony does not
establish appellants culpability.
Appellants Extrajudicial Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Veras extrajudicial
statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendos malevolent intention.

T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang
maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[15]
Second, appellants companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan of
the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,] sina
Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang baril
niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself at a
certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear from the
following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw ng June
08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po
kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may
sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni
Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang
kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay
sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin
daw ako at pagdating nila ay xxx lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si
Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo.
Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa
kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa
F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay
bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang
bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo. P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay sumunod
po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang tignan kung
mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at kasunod
noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong si
Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod noon ay
binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick
na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth
itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na
kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si
Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.[16]
Appellant an Accomplice, Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellants presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the
victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for
passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only
an accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[17] To prove conspiracy,
the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) that two or more persons came to
an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the
execution of the felony [was] decided upon.[18] Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it
must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.[19] The
Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established,
for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted
action and community of interest.[20]
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being
included in Article 17,[21] cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.[22] The Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal
and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime
would be committed just the same.[23] To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be
present: (1) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) the performance of previous
or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[24]
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on appellants
penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The act of one of
them is deemed the act of all.[25] In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than
that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime
should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts
not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,[26] the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that their concerted action in
going armed and together to their victims house, and there, while one stayed as a lookout, the other
two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together afterwards, admits no other
rational explanation but conspiracy. It may be noted further that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement
that the three of them, together with some others, had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a
P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,[27] the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for conspiring with
two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct before, during and after
the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their arrest, they disclosed that they
had intended to rob the victims store and that they did so in accordance with their plan. In that case,
it was clear that all three of them, including the lookout, were the authors of the crime.
In People v. Loreno,[28] the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they had
acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the other
conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crime
of robbery and rape.
Upon the other hand, in People v. Corbes,[29] the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the criminal
design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the vehicle to and
from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court
observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to look for a getaway
vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to commit a robbery. When his services
were requested, the decision to commit the crime had already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,[30] the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some appellants who
knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and distracting his attention. The
Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-conspirators, [i]n the absence of clear proof that
the killing was in fact envisaged by them.
In People v. Suarez et al.,[31] Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was merely an
accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he took part in the planning or
execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts
indicative of confederacy on his part.
In People v. Balili,[32] the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that in going with
them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the
others went inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with material and
moral aid, making him guilty as an accompliance. The Court noted that there was no evidence that he
had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the crime.
In People v. Doble,[33] the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when he
looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: Neither would it appear
that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the
robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms
and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which [was] not shown with respect to appellants
by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual
robbery.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at
the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill
Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after
the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na. This is
clear from his statement, which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang
maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[34]
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further
that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball
bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the conspiracy
to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made, after the decision to
kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as
principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor
the question, by holding x x x that they were guilty of the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as
mere accomplices.[35]
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was
given freely without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it
was consistent with the normal experience of mankind. [36]
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made in the
presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid Committee
purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial Statements,
appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time. Appellant adds that he
was tortured.
Appellants claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police insofar as
custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the rights of the
accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire interrogation.[37]
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera, and
Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were doing.
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself that no
pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers during my personal
interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of people brought before us[,]
we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing and sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to interview the
two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their own
statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against them for a [sic]
in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they were never threatened
by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements. Casually I asked the two boys to
raise their upper clothes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm committed on
the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal] assurances xxx, verbal
assurance that they were never hurt.[38]
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the use of
duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions.[39] In the present case, the
Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional mandate.
Moreover, appellants allegations of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture,
without any proof whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes
evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.[40] The
defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of
reward.[41] Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that [a]n extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti. In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements
of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven for example, a man has died; and (b) some
person is criminally responsible.[42] It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and that the
other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired with the other
accused to commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he
was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano
and the police officers testified to the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the
aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. [43]
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify
the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower court
explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with
deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design.
Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to
guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of
superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and
weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because
treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.[44] Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we
cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the
Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a
principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as compensatory
damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented, moral damages is also
warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court.
Furthermore, we affirm the payment of interest.[45] However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of
earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages,
which must be duly proven.[46] In this case, the trial court merely presumed the amount of Capulongs
earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence of the current income of the deceased, the
indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an
accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670
as compensatory damages and (c) interest of six percent per annum on these two amounts. The
award of moral damages is however REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning
capacity is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I share the ponencia of my colleagues in its affirmance of the conviction of appellants except, with all
due respect, insofar as it has concluded that appellant De Vera is guilty merely as an accomplice.
There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised penal Code when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy of, course, by
itself is legally inconsequential unless the criminal plot is, in fact, carried out. Once the offense is
perpetrated, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render, all of
them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being
deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony. An accomplice,
under Article 18 of the same Code, is one who, not being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in the
execution of the act, (b) directly forces or induces others to commit, (c) cooperates in the commission
of the offense by another act without which the offense would not have been accomplished (per
Article 17 of the Code), collaborates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
In the case at bar, De Vera, knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-
accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an
innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime
(ponencia).
I cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms to decide, on the one hand,
and to concur or to assent, on the other hand, in defining, i.e., whether as a conspirator or as an
accomplice, the specific criminal liability of the criminal offender. Where there is concurrence or
assent by one to a plan, even when previously hatched by another or others, to commit a felony
which concurrence or assent is made prior to the actual perpetration of the offense, and he then
actually participates in its commission, regardless of the extent of such participation, his liability
should be deemed, in my view, that of a conspirator rather than that of an accomplice. I would
equate the liability of an accomplice to one who, knowing of the criminal design, but neither
concurring nor assenting to it, cooperates in the execution of the crime short of taking a direct part
in, and short of taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the offense. In the last two
instances (taking a direct part in, or taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the felony),
his participation would be that of a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.
When appellant De Vera, aware of the plan to kill the victim, agreed to be lookout during the
commission of the crime which, in fact, so took place as planned, he rendered himself liable no less
than that incurred by his co-accused.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-6846. July 20, 1955.]
GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION, ETC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN,

ET AL., Respondents.
Enage & Beltran, for Petitioners.
Araneta & Araneta for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; LAY OFF; RETRENCHMENT
POLICY. The laying off of employees due to the retrenchment policy adopted by a company
in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses and as a consequence the
volume of business is considerably reduced particularly when it is not aimed at the Union or
any of its members for union or labor activities, is not an unfair labor practice.
DECISION
JUGO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
March 31, 1953.
Associate Judge Jose S. Bautista of said court, in his order of February 10, 1953, states the facts of the
case substantially as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., was established in 1947 with a capital of
P200,000. The total investment in that Division in 1953 was about P3,000,000. To reduce this
overcapitalization, the Board of Directors felt that it was necessary either to invite fresh capital from
outside or to adopt a retrenchment policy. When Heacock and Company refused the invitation to
invest in the enterprise, the Board took the alternative of retrenchment.
The Board decided not to import as much merchandise as usual. It also reduced credits. All these
plans required a reduction in the volume of business necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel
and caused the laying off of 17 employees. The selection of those to be laid off was made by a
technical man and approved by the Board. These employees were given one month separation pay,
except Nicolas Gonzalez who refused to receive it.
The reorganization of the Agricultural Division was adopted by unanimous resolution of the Board of
Directors as a consequence of the retrenchment policy. This was adopted even before the petitioner,
Gregorio Araneta Employees Union, was organized and; consequently, it was never directed
against the union. Judge Bautista adds: . . . Considering this fact and taking into account all the
circumstances of this case especially the actual reduction of business of said Division, the court fails
to find sufficient justification for altering the action of the Board of Directors regarding those
employees, who received their severance pay.
Judge Bautista, however, believed that Gonzales should not have been separated because his work
was shifted to another employee by the name of Augusto Achacoso, who was thus overburdened.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration with the court en banc. The latter
modified the decision of Associate Judge Bautista in its resolution of March 31, 1953, prepared by the
Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan and concurred in by Associate Judges Modesto Castillo and Juan
L. Lantin. The modification consists only in holding that the laying off of Gonzales was also legal.
Judge Bautista dissented with regard to the separation of Gonzales, giving the same reasons he gave
in his original opinion.
We find no reason for disturbing the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc. The
laying off of the 17 employees was due to the retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt
in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was
considerably reduced.
It should be noted that the retrenchment policy was adopted before even the organization of the
petitioning union. It was not, therefore, aimed at the Union or any of its members for union or labor
activities. It was not an unfair labor practice.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-14120. February 29, 1960.]
ASSOCIATED WATCHMEN AND SECURITY UNION (PTWO), Petitioner, v. THE HON. JUDGES
JUAN LANTING, ARSENIO MARTINEZ, EMILIANO TABIGNE, of the Court of Industrial Relations
and MACONDRAY AND COMPANY, INC., Respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for Petitioner.
Simen S. Andrs for respondent CIR.
Paredes, Balcoff & Poblador for respondent Macondray and Company.

SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; REFUSAL OF SHIPPING
AGENCY TO EMPLOY GUARDS UNLESS THEY FURNISH BOND AN EXERCISE OF A
LEGITIMATE RIGHT. The refusal of a shipping agency to employ guards affiliated with a
security or watchmen agency that does not furnish a bond to respond for any negligence,
misfeasance or malfeasance can not constitute an unfair labor practice. Such refusal is merely
the exercise by the shipping agency of a legitimate right to protect its own interests, especially
where the guards in question had previously abandoned a ship they were guarding without
notice and exposed the ship to losses due to theft and pilferage.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
The Republic Ships Security Agency is one of three agencies employed by certain shipping agencies
in the City of Manila and respondent Macondray and Company, Inc., in guarding ships or vessels
arriving at the port of Manila and discharging cargo on its piers. The other watchmen and security
agencies are the K. Tagle Ship Watchmen Agency and the City Watchmen and Security Agency.
Thirty-eight affiliates of the Republic Ships Security Agency belong to the petitioner labor union.
On or about February 18, 1956, petitioner union and its members declared a strike against 19
shipping firms in the City of Manila. The strike was certified by the President of the Philippines to
the Court of Industrial Relations and the latter court immediately took cognizance of the strike.
Attempts were made by the Court of Industrial Relations to settle the strike. At the hearing or
conference before the court on March 16, 1956, the strikers, through counsel, expressed their desire
to return back to work and maintain the status quo. Attorney for the respondents offered to see the
shipping companies concerned and to ask them to try to have the 47 watchmen, who claim to have
been discharged, to be reemployed. The strikers agreed to this proposal and on April 6, 1956, a
petition was filed before the Court of Industrial Relations asking for reinstatement of 47 strikers who
belong to the petitioner Associated Watchmen and Security Union (PTWO). The manager of
respondent Macondray and Company, Inc. expressed willingness to employ the strikers belonging to
the petitioner union under the condition that the agency to which they belong file a bond in the sum
of P5,000 in favor of Macondray and Company, Inc. to respond for any negligence, misfeasance or
malfeasance of any of the watchmen of petitioner (Exhibit 1, respondent). This requirement of
filing a bond was also demanded of the other two security agencies, the K. Tagle Ship Watchmen
Agency and the City Watchmen and Security Agency. However, the Republic Ships Security Agency,
to which most of the members of the petitioner union belonged, failed to comply with the demands
of Macondray and Company, Inc. that they furnish such a bond. The manager of the agency was one
by the name of Fernando Derupe. Because of the failure of the Republic Ships Security Agency to
furnish a bond, Macondray and Company, Inc. refused to employ watchmen from the said agency.
Some of the members of the agency transferred to the other two agencies that had furnished a bond
and after having joined the said agencies they were employed as watchmen by the respondent
Macondray and Company, Inc.
On November 15, 1956, Macondray and Company, Inc. was charged with unfair labor practice for
having dismissed and refused to employ 38 members of the petitioner herein. Macondray and
Company, Inc. answered the complaint alleging that the members of the petitioner union are not its
employees, but employees of the Republic Ships Security Agency; that the respondent had not
demanded a bond from the members of the petitioner union but from the Republic Ships Security
Agency; that it has not discriminated against members of the petitioner union.
The judge of the Court of Industrial Relations who tried the case was Judge Jose S. Bautista. The said
judge made the following findings of fact:red:chanrobles.com.ph
1. On February 18, 1956 there were three (3) watchmen agencies servicing the respondent company
with watchmen, namely, the City Watchmen and Security Agency, K. Tagle Ship Watchmen Agency
and Republic Ship Security Agency.
Of these three (3) agencies, only the members of the complainant union working under the Republic
Ship Security Agency, struck and abandoned vessels of the respondent company. (Testimony of
Gunner pp. 49-53, Hearing of November 2, 1957.) .
After the said strike of the complaining union on February 18, 1956, a bond of P5,000 was required
by the respondent company. No bond was required by the company before the strike. Whereas, K.
Tagle Ship Watchmen and the City Watchmen and Security Agency, which did not strike and
abandon vessels of the company, filed the required bond, the striking union Associated Watchmen
and Security Union refused to file said bond. Consequently, the company stopped giving vessels to
Republic Ship Security Agency, hence the watchmen working under said agency were refused
reinstatement.
2. It is an admitted fact that the said 38 individuals are members of the complainant union, working
under the Republic Ship Security Agency. (Testimony of Fernando Derupe pp. 42-43, Bearing of
September 16, 1957.) .
x x x
In other words, the 38 watchmen were compelled to join the other two agencies who had bonds and
resign from the complainant union. They had to do this or help Fernando Derupe to post a bond
(which Derupe himself did not want to post) or post the bond themselves, which they could not
afford to do.
By imposing the posting of the bond as a prerequisite for the reinstatement of the strikers, the
company could select agencies, which did not join the strike, could control Derupe, their checker and
employee, not to post a bond which in fact Derupe did not post.cralaw virtua1aw library
Judge Bautista, as a consequence, held that defendant-respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice in
view of the circumstances of the case. He reasoned that by imposing the condition of posting a bond
on the agency to which members of the petitioner are affiliated, and by the refusal of the owner of the
agency to post the bond, the latter as agent of respondent rendered it impossible for the strikers to go
back to work. He, therefore, ordered the members of the union to be reinstated with full back wages
from February 18, 1956 up to their actual reinstatement and prohibited the respondent from
committing further acts of unfair labor practice. The respondent appealed this decision to the court
in banc. On the appeal, three of the judges of the court, Judges Lanting, Martinez and Tabigne, voted
to reverse the decision of the trial judge and to dismiss the petition for lack of merit. The other two
judges voted for the affirmance of the decision.
From the majority decision a petition has been filed with us, alleging that the respondent judges
abused their discretion in making findings of fact without sufficient evidence. The majority decision
found that there never was a relationship between petitioner union and respondent Macondray and
Company, Inc., and that the agencies with which respondent had dealt with were the City Watchmen
and Security Agency, K. Tagle Ship Watchmen Agency and the Republic Ships Security Agency. The
majority further found that members of the petitioner union who had transferred to the two security
agencies which had furnished the bond, were admitted to work, notwithstanding the fact that they
continued to be members of the petitioner union; that if members of the petitioner union could not
be employed by the respondent, it is because the agency under which they worked, the Republic
Ships Security Agency, had not furnished the bond required of them, which bond was furnished by
the two other agencies. We believe that the above findings or conclusions are supported by the
evidence.
We also find that the demand of the respondent that the watchmen agencies furnish a bond had
become necessary in view of the fact that on or about March 18, 1956, three guards from the Republic
Ships Security Agency left the M/V Talleyrand, a ship of which respondent was an agent, without
notice, abandoning their work, and then went on strike without giving advance notice of their
intention or desire to do so. The requirement of a bond was, therefore, fully justified by the acts of
the members of the petitioner union who were affiliated with the Republic Ships Security Agency and
who struck without previous notice.
On the whole, therefore, we find that the majority decision is fully supported by the evidence and by
the documents and papers on the record, insofar as it declares that respondent has not been guilty of
unfair labor practice.
Judge Bautista, in his dissenting opinion, cites the cases of United States Lines, Et. Al. v. Associated
Watchmen and Security Union (PTWO), G.R. No. L-12208-11, May 21, 1958, and Maligaya
Shipwatchmen Agency, Et. Al. v. Associated Watchmen & Security Union (PTWO), 55 Off. Gaz. [52]
10681, 103 Phil., 920 in which we held that watchmen and security agencies are not contractors of
the shipping agencies or shipping companies, but are merely agents of the same in the recruitment of
guards, and that the relationship of employer and employee exists between the shipping lines and the
security guards themselves. Our decision in the above cases has no materiality or relevance to the
question at issue in the case at bar. The refusal of the respondent to employ guards affiliated with a
security or watchmen agency that does not furnish a bond can not constitute an unfair labor practice.
Such refusal is merely the exercise of respondents legitimate right to protect its own interests,
especially as the members of the petitioner had abandoned a ship they were guarding without
previous notice and exposed the ship to losses due to theft and pilferage. It is to be noted that the
requirement of filing of a bond was not demanded from any of the labor unions, or from the
petitioner union herein. We cannot conclude that because the respondent company refused to
employ the guards affiliated with the Republic Ships Security Agency, which affiliates are members
of the petitioner union, respondent committed an unfair labor practice or a discrimination against
petitioner union. As the majority of the court below says, respondent never had any contract or
agreement with the petitioner union; respondent secured security guards through the three
watchmen agencies above mentioned, without reference to the unions to which the different guards
may have pertained. The members of the petitioner union or of the shipping agencies are not
ordinary permanent and continuous employees, but merely casual guards who are employed only
when there is a ship to be guarded and during the stay of the ship in the port of Manila. Under the
above circumstances, the judgment of the minority to the effect that members of the petitioner union
be returned to their work and paid back wages is not justifiable.
Wherefore, we find no sufficient reasons for disturbing the findings of the majority of the judges of
the court below to the effect that the acts of the respondent Macondray and Company, Inc. do not
constitute an unfair labor practice, and we, therefore, affirm the decision of the said majority, with
costs against the petitioner herein.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutirrez
David,JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT FIRST DIVISION GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILS., INC., Petitioner, -versus-
G.R. No. 85668 August 10, 1989 THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
FELIX FRANCIS, Respondents. xx D E C I S I O N GANCAYCO, J.:
At issue in this Petition is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter
referred to as NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment
of backwages equivalent to six (6) months.[1] chanroblespublishingcompany As revealed by the
records, the background facts are as follows: Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an
auto mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. (herein-after referred to as GELMART)
sometime in 1971. As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and under chassis, as well as
trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and
spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him. chanroblespublishingcompany On April 11,
1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMARTs premises one
(1) plastic container filed with about 16 ounces of used motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to
cover the same as required under GELMARTs rules and regulations. By reason thereof, petitioner,
on April 13, 1987, was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of
company rules and regulations. Under the said rules, theft and/or pilferage of company property
merits an outright termination from employment. After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987,
private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services
were severed. chanroblespublishingcompany Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J.
Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latters
reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement.[2] The
ground relied upon by the labor arbiter in her decision is worth quoting hereunder, to wit: The most
important aspect that should be considered in interpreting this rule (referring to the companys rules
on theft and pilferages) is the deprivation of the company of property belonging to it without any
compensation. Hence, the property that must be stolen or pilfered must be property which has value.
chanroblespublishingcompany x x x In the respondent company, the used oil is thrown away by the
mechanics. In other words, the taking by complainant of the subject 16 ounces of used oil did not
deprive the respondent company of anything. As it appears, the said used oil forms part of the waste
that should be thrown away and the respondent company had no use for the same, hence, the
respondent company was not deprived of any property and, therefore, and (sic) it is the position of
this Labor Arbiter that there was no stealing or pilferage to speak of.[3] (Emphasis supplied.)
chanroblespublishingcompany From this decision, GELMART interposed an appeal with the NLRC.
In its decision dated October 21, 1985, the NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling of Labor
Arbiter Diosana,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the decision is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent-appellant is hereby directed to reinstate
complainant-appellee to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him
backwages equivalent to six (6) months. chanroblespublishingcompany SO ORDERED.[5] On
December 12, 1988, GELMART filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. chanroblespublishingcompany On January
18, 1989, this Court, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed decision. On the same date, this
Court required respondents to comment on the petition. Aside from the substantive issues raised in
their comment which will be discussed later on in this decision, public respondent pointed to a
procedural error allegedly committed by petitioner.[6] The Solicitor General contends that petitioner
failed to exhaust [t]he administrative remedies afforded by law before resort can be had to the
courts.[7] More specifically, our attention is called to the fact that no motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC decision was filed by petitioner. The Solicitor General then concludes that [s]ince
petitioners failed to avail of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy accorded to them in the
ordinary course of law, the instant petition for certiorari is prematurely filed, and hence, does not
state a cause of action.[8] chanroblespublishingcompany The legal provision pertinent to this issue
is found in Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides, in part: ART. 223. Appeal. x x x The
decision of the Commission shall be immediately executory even pending appeal. (Emphasis
supplied.) From this provision, it can be gleaned that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may
not prove to be an adequate remedy. For one, assuming that a motion for reconsideration is filed,
nowhere does it state that the filing thereof would automatically suspend the execution of the
decision. Second, although a motion for reconsideration has often been considered a condition
precedent for granting the writ of certiorari, this rule, however, finds exception in cases where
execution had been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent.[9]
chanroblespublishingcompany This Court is not unaware of Section 2, Rule XI of the Revised Rules
of the National Labor Relations Commission which provides in paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof: Sec.
2. Finality of Decisions of the Commission (a) The decisions, resolutions or orders of the
Commission shall become executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the same. (b) Should
there be a motion for reconsideration in accordance with Sec. 9, Rule X of these Rules, the decision
shall be executory after 10 days from receipt of the resolution on such motion.
chanroblespublishingcompany x x x However, this Court has already ruled against the validity of the
abovecited rule, particularly Section 2, Rule XI, paragraph (a)in Juan vs. Musgi.[10] Interpreting
the word immediately in Article 223 of the Labor Code to mean without interval of time or
without delay, this Court declared that the NLRC rules which provide that decisions, resolutions or
orders of the Commission shall become executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof
cannot prevail over Article 223 of the Labor Code. Further amplifying on this ruling, this Court
stated that administrative regulations under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provision of the law for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions.[11] Otherwise stated, no period of time need elapse before the decision of the NLRC
becomes executory. chanroblespublishingcompany From the foregoing, it will be seen that a motion
for reconsideration may not be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a petition for certiorari
with this Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is but a proper remedy
to forestall the immediate execution of the assailed decision. chanroblespublishingcompany The
Court will now look into the substance of this petition. In their petition, GELMART ascribes grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC for rendering a decision that is contrary to law and
existing jurisprudence. chanroblespublishingcompany We find no merit in this petition. Consistent
with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the under privileged workingmen and the more
affluent employers, the NLRC right fully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen and this
was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his
property. The NLRC went on to say as follows: chanroblespublishingcompany We do not fully
concur with the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Complainant-appellees suspension prior to
termination had sufficient basis. We disagree with the conclusion that complainant-appellee did not
violate respondent-appellants role requiring a gate pass for taking out company property as the used
motor oil was not really in a sense property considering that it was plain waste and had no
commercial value. Used motor oil is not plain waste because it had its use to respondent-appellants
motor pool. Besides, it is not for complainant-appellee to interpret the rule according to his own
understanding. Respondent-appellant had the right to interpret the role and to exact discipline in the
light of its policy to instill discipline on its 6,000 workforce. chanroblespublishingcompany We find,
however, complainant-appellees dismissal unwarranted. The penalty of preventive suspension was
sufficient punishment for the violation under the circumstances.[12] (Emphasis supplied) Thus,
without being too harsh to the employer, on the one hand, and naively liberal to labor, on the other,
the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is
patently a violation of company rules and regulations. chanroblespublishingcompany To reiterate, be
it of big or small commercial value, intended to be reused or altogether disposed of or wasted, the
used motor oil still remains, in legal contemplation, the property of GELMART. As such, to take
the same out of GELMARTs premises without the corresponding gate pass is a violation of the
company rule on theft and/or pilferage of company property. However, as this Court ruled in
Meracap vs. International Ceramics Mfg. Co., Inc., [w]here a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so
severe.[13] On this score, it is very difficult for this Court to discern grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in modifying the appealed decision. The suspension imposed upon private
respondent is a sufficient penalty for the misdemeanor committed. As stated earlier, petitioner
assails the NLRC decision on the ground that the same is contrary to existing jurisprudence,
particularly citing in support thereof Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Phil. vs. Lariosa.[14]
Petitioner contends that by virtue of this ruling they have the right to dismiss private respondent
from employment on the ground of breach of trust or loss of confidence resulting from theft of
company property. chanroblespublishingcompany We believe otherwise. There is nothing in
Firestone which categorically gives management an unhampered right in terminating an employees
services. The decision in Firestone specifically focuses only on the legality of a dismissal by reason of
acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property for what was involved in that case is theft of
sixteen (16) flannel swabs which were supposed to be used to clean certain machineries in the
company.[15] In fact, a careful review of the cases cited in Firestone[16] will readily reveal that the
underlying reason behind sustaining the penalty of dismissal or outright termination is that, under
the circumstances obtaining in those cases, there exists ample reason to distrust the employees
concerned. chanroblespublishingcompany Thus, in upholding the dismissal of a cashier found guilty
of misappropriating corporate funds, this Court, in Metro Drug,[17] made a distinction between
managerial personnel and other employees occupying positions of trust and confidence from
ordinary employees. On the other hand, in Dole Philippines,[18] this Court spoke of the nature of
participation which readers one absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the
position in upholding the dismissal of employee found guilty of illegally selling for their own benefit
two (2) drums of crude oil belonging to the company. Additionally, in Firestone, it clearly appears
that to retain the employee would [i]n the long run, endanger the companys viability.[19] The
Court rules that these circumstances are not present in this instant case.
chanroblespublishingcompany Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the ruling in Firestone does
not preclude the NLRC from looking into the particular facts of the case to determine if there is
ample reason to dismissal employee charged and subsequently found guilty of theft of company
property. The said decision cannot be deemed as a limitation on the right of the State in the exercise
of its paramount police power to regulate or temper the prerogative of management to dismiss an
erring employee.[20] Consequently, even when there exists some rules agreed upon between the
employer and the employee, it cannot preclude the State from inquiring on whether or not its rigid
application would work too harshly on the employee. chanroblespublishingcompany Considering
that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service
with petitioner GELMART, the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very
minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non dismissal of private
respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to
the companys interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of the State, as embodied in the
Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor. This is our ruling in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs.
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association[21] involving as it does essentially the same facts and
circumstances. At this point, this Court does not see any reason to deviate from the said ruling.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The restraining
order issued by this Court on January 18, 1989 enjoining the enforcement of the questioned decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
chanroblespublishingcompany SO ORDERED. chanroblespublishingcompany Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988

COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc., Petitioners, vs. HON. BLAS F. OPLE,
COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION, Respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and annul the Order of respondent Minister
of Labor and Employment (MOLE) directly certifying private respondent as the recognized and duly-
authorized collective bargaining agent for petitioners sales force and ordering the reinstatement of
three employees of petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the assailed
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union
officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and
restraining non-union members from joining the union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of
petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code,
Thereafter the case was captioned AJML-3-142-85, BLR-3-86-85 In Re: Assumption of Jurisdiction
over the Labor Dispute at Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. In its position paper, petitioner
pointed out that
(a) There is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused to bargain collectively with the
union considering that the alleged union is not the certified agent of the company
salesmen; chanrobles virtual law library
(b) The unions status as a legitimate labor organization is still under question because on 6 March
1985, a certain Monchito Rosales informed the BLR that an overwhelming majority of the salesmen
are not in favor of the Notice of Strike allegedly filed by the Union (Annex C); chanrobles virtual
law library
(c) Upon verification of the records of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, it appeared that a
petition for cancellation of the registration of the alleged union was filed by Monchito Rosales on
behalf of certain salesmen of the company who are obviously against the formation of the Colgate
Palmolive Sales Labor Union which is supposed to represent them; chanrobles virtual law library
(d) The preventive suspensions of salesmen Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante and Cornelio
Mejia, and their eventual dismissal from the employ of the company were carried out pursuant to the
inherent right and prerogative of management to discipline erring employees; that based on the
preliminary investigation conducted by the company, there appeared substantial grounds to believe
that Sayson, Reynante and Mejia violated company rules and regulations necessitating their
suspension pending further investigation of their respective cases; chanrobles virtual law library
(e) It was also ascertained that the company sustained damages resulting from the infractions
committed by the three salesmen, and that the final results of the investigation fully convinced the
company of the existence of just causes for the dismissal of the three salesmen;chanrobles virtual law
library
(f) The formation of the union and the membership therein of Sayson, Reynante and Mejia were not
in any manner connected with the companys decision to dismiss the three; that the fact that their
dismissal came at a time when the alleged union was being formed was purely
coincidental; chanrobles virtual law library
(g) The unions charge therefore, that the membership in the union and refusal to retract
precipitated their dismissal was totally false and amounted to a malicious imputation of union
busting; chanrobles virtual law library
(h) The company never coerced or attempted to coerce employees, much less interferred in the
exercise of their right to self-organization; the company never thwarted nor tried to defeat or
frustrate the employees right to form their union in pursuit of their collective interest, as long as that
right is exercised within the limits prescribed by law; in fact, there are at present two unions
representing the rank and file employees of the company-the factory workers who are covered by a
CBA which expired on 31 October 1985 (which was renewed on May 31, 1985) and are represented by
Colgate Palmolive Employees Union (PAFLU); whereas, the salaried employees are covered by a CBA
which will expire on 31 May 1986 represented by Philippine Association of Free Labor Union
(PAFLU)-CPPI Office Chapter. (pp. 4-6, Rollo)
The respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper, reiterated the issue in its Notice to
Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No.
10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen (nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen
presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of the
Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the
Union, leaving no doubt that the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the
Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The Union further alleged that the company is unreasonably
delaying the recognition of the union because when it was informed of the organization of the union,
and when presented with a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement, the company took
an adversarial stance by secretly distributing a survey sheet on union membership to newly hired
salesmen from the Visayas, Mindanao and Metro Manila areas, purposely avoiding regular salesmen
who are now members of the union; that in the accomplishment of the form, District Sales
Managers, and Sales Supervisors coerced salesmen from the Visayas and Mindanao by requiring
them to fill up and/or accomplish said form by checking answers which were adverse to the union;
that with a handful of the survey sheets secured by management through coercion, it now would like
to claim that all salesmen are not in favor of the organization of the union, which acts are clear
manifestations of unfair labor practices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:
(a) found no merit in the Unions Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by
petitioner as regards the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret
distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage unionism, chanrobles virtual law
library
(b) found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante & Cornelio Mejia not without
fault and that the company 1 has grounds to dismiss above named salesmen
and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective
bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three
salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first
offenders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by respondent Minister in his
assailed Order, dated December 27, 1985. Petitioner now comes to Us with the following:
Assignment of Errors
Ichanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when he directly certified the Union
solely on the basis of the latters self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the
sales force in petitioners company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when, notwithstanding his very own
finding that there was just cause for the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered
their reinstatement. (pp. 7-8, Rollo)
Petitioner concedes that respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case
assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified
respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the companys salesmen since this is not a
representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not pray for
certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition merits our consideration. The procedure for a representation case is outlined in Arts.
257-260 of the Labor Code, in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union registration
under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in ascertaining majority
representation. The requirements under the law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V, of
the Rules Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure that the certified bargaining
representative is the true choice of the employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate
that the State shall assure the rights of the workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work, should be achieved under a system of
law such as the aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes. When an overzealous official by-
passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law
will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded. When respondent Minister directly certified the
Union, he in fact disregarded this procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure
to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation.
Contrary to the respondent Ministers observation, the holding of a certification election at the
proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a compelling legal reason not to directly
and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending
cancellation case filed by certain concerned salesmen, who also claim majority status. Even in a
case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is
made does not warrant a direct certification. More so as in the case at bar, when the records of the
suit show that the required proof was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis
of the direct certification was the Unions mere allegation in its position paper that it has 87 out of
117 regular salesmen. In other words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion
of the respondent Union that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen, without
subjecting such assertion to the test of competing claims. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition,
what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of
the procedure provided under the law for representation cases because:
(a) He has created havoc by impliedly establishing a procedural short-cut to obtaining a direct
certification-by merely filing a notice of strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(b) By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged disrespect for the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect
arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the employees, to choose their collective
bargaining representative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose
majority representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union
enjoys the blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is
therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to
bargaining status has not been legally established. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of guilt on
their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt.
Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law
warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual
delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not
only the labor or workers side but also the management and/or employers side. The law, in
protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and Reynante
would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner
company involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated.
As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs. National Labor Union, 2an employer cannot
legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter
is patently inimical to his interest.chanrobles virtual law library
In the subject order, respondent Minister cited a cases 3 implying that the proximity of the dismissal
of the employees to the assumption order created a doubt as to whether their dismissal was really for
just cause or due to their activities. 4chanrobles virtual law library
This is of no moment for the following reasons: chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Respondent Minister has still maintained in his assailed order that a just cause existed to justify
the dismissal of the employees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Respondent Minister has not made any finding substantiated by evidence that the employees
were dismissed because of their union activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Order of the
respondent Minister, dated December 27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view of the
fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders, petitioner is hereby ordered to give them
separation pay. The temporary restraining order is hereby made
permanent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48926 December 14, 1987

MANUEL SOSITO, Petitioner, vs. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,Respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda on the
sole question of whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment
program of the private respondent.chanrobles virtual law library
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and
was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, 1when he went on indefinite
leave with the consent of the company on January 16, 1976. 2On July 20, 1976, the private
respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to
employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later
than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on
July 29, 1976, to avail himself of the gratuity benefits promised. 3 However, his resignation was not
acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the
Department of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. 4The company was ordered to pay
Sosito the sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the
National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner
was not covered by the retrenchment program. 5 The petitioner then came to us.chanrobles virtual
law library
For a better understanding of this case, the memorandum of the private respondent on its
retrenchment program is reproduced in full as follows:
July 20, 1976
Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES
Re: RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM
As you are all aware, the operations of wood-based industries in the Philippines for the last two (2)
years were adversely affected by the worldwide decline in the demand for and prices of logs and
wood products. Our company was no exception to this general decline in the market, and has
suffered tremendous losses. In 1975 alone, such losses amounted to nearly
P20,000,000.00.chanrobles virtual law library
The company has made a general review of its operations and has come to the unhappy decision of
the need to make adjustments in its manpower strength if it is to survive. This is indeed an
unfortunate and painful decision to make, but it leaves the company no alternative but to reduce its
tremendous and excessive overhead expense in order to prevent an ultimate closure.chanrobles
virtual law library
Although the law allows the Company, in a situation such as this, to drastically reduce it manpower
strength without any obligation to pay separation benefits, we recognize the need to provide our
employees some financial assistance while they are looking for other jobs.chanrobles virtual law
library
The Company therefore is adopting a retrenchment program whereby employees who are in the
active service as of June 30, 1976 will be paid separation benefits in an amount equivalent to the
employees one-half (1/2) months basic salary multiplied by his/her years of service with the
Company. Employees interested in availing of the separation benefits offered by the Company must
manifest such intention by submitting written letters of resignation to the Management not later
than July 31, 1976. Those whose resignations are accepted shall be informed accordingly and shall be
paid their separation benefits.chanrobles virtual law library
After July 31, 1976, this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer be available.
Thereafter, the Company shall apply for a clearance to terminate the services of such number of
employees as may be necessary in order to reduce the manpower strength to such desired level as to
prevent further losses.
(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT
President
N.B.chanrobles virtual law library
For additional information
and/or resignation forms,
please see Mr. Vic Maceda
or Atty. Ben Aritao. 6

It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who
were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner
was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the
said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent
although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of
indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to
those in the active service.chanrobles virtual law library
It seems to us that the petitioner wants to enjoy the best of two worlds at the expense of the private
respondent. He has insulated himself from the insecurities of the floundering firm but at the same
time would demand the benefits it offers. Being on indefinite leave from the company, he could seek
and try other employment and remain there if he should find it acceptable; but if not, he could go
back to his former work and argue that he still had the right to return as he was only on
leave.chanrobles virtual law library
There is no claim that the petitioner was temporarily laid off or forced to go on leave; on the
contrary, the record shows that he voluntarily sought the indefinite leave which the private
respondent granted. It is strange that the company should agree to such an open-ended
arrangement, which is obviously one-sided. The company would not be free to replace the petitioner
but the petitioner would have a right to resume his work as and when he saw fit.chanrobles virtual
law library
We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work
force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was
permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code, 7 which was in force at the time. To its
credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased
out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty
and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate
measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available
only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them.chanrobles
virtual law library
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of
labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has
inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and
doctrine.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2779 October 18, 1950

DANIEL SANCHEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION,
INC., ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for appellant Harry Lyons Construction, Inc.
Cecilio I. Lim and Antonio M. Castro for appellees.
MORAN, C. J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This case originated in the Municipal Court of Manila upon a complaint filed on March 9, 1948, by
the herein appellees as plaintiffs, against the herein appellants as defendants, for the sum of P2,210
plus interest, which plaintiffs claimed as one month advance pat due them. On April 28, 1948, the
parties entered into a stipulation of facts upon which said municipal court rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration of this judgment, the defendants filed an
appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein the parties submitted the case upon the
same facts agreed upon in the Municipal Court. On October 2, 1948, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered its decision holding for plaintiffs, as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore judgment is hereby rendered
1. Ordering defendant Material Distributors, Inc. to pay plaintiff Enrique Ramirez the sum of
P360 and plaintiff Juan Ramirez the sum of P250 with legal interest on each of the said sums
from the date of the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila until the date of
full payment thereof; andchanrobles virtual law library
2. Ordering defendant Harry Lyons Construction, Inc. to pay plaintiff Daniel Sanchez the sum of
P250, and plaintiff Mariano Javier, Venancio Diaz, Esteban Bautista, Faustino Aquillo,
Godofredo Diamante, Marcial Lazaro, Ambrosio de la Cruz, and Marcelino Maceda the sum of
P150 each, with legal interest on each of the said sums from the date of the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila until the date of full payment
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
One half of the costs is to be paid by Material Distributors, Inc. and the other half by Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc.
From this judgment, defendants filed an appeal with this court purely upon a question of law. The
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties on April 28, 1948, is as follows:
STIPULATION OF FACTS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Come now the plaintiffs and the defendants, by their respective undersigned attorneys and to this
Honorable Court, respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:chanrobles virtual law library
1. That the plaintiffs were respectively employed as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS,
INC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Name Date of Position Salary

employment
Enrique Ramirez .. 12/16/46 Warehouseman P450 a mo.
Juan Ramirez . do do 250 a mo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
NOTE. The salary of Enrique Ramirez was later reduced to P360 per month. This was the amount
he was receiving at the time of his dismissal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION,

INC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Daniel Sanchez . 1/1/47 Carpenter- P250 a mo.

Foreman
Mariano Javier .. .do Guard.. 5 a day
Venancio Diaz .. .do do.. 5 a day
Esteban Bautista .do do.. 5 a day
Faustino Aquillo .do do.. 5 a day
Godofredo Diamante .. .do do.. 5 a day
Marcial Lazaro . .do do.. 5 a day
Ambrosio de la Cruz .. .do do.. 5 a day
Marcelino Macada .. .do do.. 5 a daychanrobles virtual law library
as per contracts of employment, copies of which are attached to defendants answer marked Exhibits
1 to 11 inclusivechanrobles virtual law library
2. That in said contracts of employment the plaintiff agreed as follows:chanrobles virtual law
library
I accept the foregoing appointment, and in consideration thereof I hereby agree that such
employment may be terminated at any time, without previous notice, and I further agree that salary
and wages, shall be computed and paid at the rate specified up to the date of such
termination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Also in consideration of such employment I hereby expressly waive the benefit of article 302 of the
Code of Commerce and that of any other law, ruling, or custom which might require notice of
discharge or payment of salary or wages after date of the termination of such
employment.chanrobles virtual law library
3. That the plaintiffs were dismissed by the defendants on December 31, 1947 without one
months previous notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. That each of the plaintiffs demanded payment of one months salary from the defendants and
that the latter refused to pay the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment on the foregoing stipulation of facts be
rendered by this Honorable Court.
The points in issue herein are: first, whether plaintiffs, both those paid on a monthly and daily basis,
are entitled to the benefit granted in article 302 of the Code of Commerce; and secondly, if they are
so entitled, was their waiver of such benefits legal and valid?chanrobles virtual law library
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows:
ART. 302. In cases in which no special time is fixed in the contracts of service, any one of the parties
thereto may cancel it, advising the other party thereof one month in
advance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The factor or shop clerk shall be entitled, in such case, to the salary due for said month.
It is a clear doctrine, as gleaned from the provision of the law and settled jurisprudence, 1that in a
mercantile contract of service in which no special time is fixed, any one of the parties may cancel said
contract upon giving of a one-month notice, called a mesada, to the other party. The law gives an
added proviso that in the case of factors or shop clerks, these shall be entitled to salary during this
one month of standing notice. In any case, the one-month notice must be given to any employee,
whether factor, shop clerk or otherwise, so long as the two conditions concur, namely, that no special
time is fixed in the contract of service, and that said employee is a commercial employee. And when
such notice is not given under these conditions, not only the factor or shop clerk but any employee
discharged without cause, is entitled to indemnity which may be one months salary. 2 chanrobles
virtual law library
In the instant case, there lies no doubt that plaintiffs are commercial employees of appellant
corporations, rendering service as warehousemen, carpenter-foreman and guards. There is likewise
no doubt as can be seen from the contracts of employment submitted as exhibits, that no special time
has been fixed in the contracts of services between plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants.
The stated computation or manner of payment, whether monthly or daily, does not represent nor
determine a special time of employment. Thus, a commercial employee may be employed for one
year and yet receive his salary on the daily or weekly or monthly or other
basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appellants allege that the use of the word temporary in the contracts of services of some of the
plaintiffs shows that their employment was with a term, and the term was temporary, on a day to
day basis. The record discloses that this conclusion is unwarranted. The contracts simply say You
are hereby employed as temporary guard with a compensation at the rate of P5 a day . . . . The word
temporary as used herein does not mean the special time fixed in the contracts referred to in article
302 of the Code of Commerce. The daily basis therein stipulated is for the computation of pay, and is
not necessarily the period of employment. Hence, this Court holds that plaintiffs-appellants come
within the purview of article 302 of the Code of Commerce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Now, as the second question, namely, the validity of plaintiffs waiver of the benefits given them by
said article 302. This court holds that such a waiver, made in advance, is void as being contrary to
public policy. Granting that the mesada given in article 302 of the Code of Commerce, is for the
bilateral benefit of both employer and employee, nevertheless, this does not preclude the finding that
a waiver of such mesada in advance by the employee is contrary to public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Public policy, with regard to labor, is clearly stated in article II, section 5, of the Philippine
Constitution, which reads
The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State.
and article XIV, section 6, which reads

The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between land-owner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. . . .
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with these provisions of our
constitution. In the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands on
higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than demand for labor.
Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from vital and even desperate, necessity.
Consequently, the law must protect labor, at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in
bargaining relations with capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity for
survival. It is safe to presume therefore, that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any
benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through generosity but under the
forceful intimidation of urgent need, and hence, he could not have so acted freely and
voluntarily.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For all the foregoing, this court hereby affirms the decision of the lower court, with costs against
appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Bengzon and Reyes, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987

CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law
library
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent was removed by the petitioner and complained to the Ministry of Labor. His
complaint was dismissed by the regional director, who was, however, reversed by the public
respondent. Required to reinstate the separated employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner
has come to us, faulting the Deputy Minister with grave abuse of discretion. We have issued in the
meantime a temporary restraining order. 1
The public respondent held that Ramon Pilones, the private respondent, was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for
his removal, to wit, pulmonary tuberculosis minimal, was not certified as incurable within six
months as to justify his separation. 2 Additionally, the private respondent insists that the petitioner
should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the
termination of his employment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner for its part claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his
dismissal and so had no security of tenure. His dismissal was not only in conformity with company
policy but also necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the
processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public. It is also argued that the findings of the
regional director, who had direct access to the facts, should not have been disturbed on appeal. For
these same reasons, it contends, the employees reinstatement as ordered by the public respondent
should not be allowed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The original findings were contained in a one-page order 3 reciting simply that complainant was
employed on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months. After said period, he
underwent medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he
is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment
by respondent. The order then concluded that the termination was justified. That was
all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As there is no mention of the basis of the above order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll
authority 4 submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on
probation on February 16, 1978. Even supposing that it is not self- serving, we find nevertheless that
it is self-defeating. The six-month period of probation started from the said date of appointment and
so ended on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private respondents employment also
ended then; on the contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee. Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21,
1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct
such examination, it chose to wait until exactly thelast day of the probation period. In the light of
such delay, its protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would prejudice public health cannot
but sound hollow and hypocritical. By its own implied admission, the petitioner had exposed its
customers to the employees disease because of its failure to examine him before entrusting him with
the functions of a syrup man. Its belated concern for the consuming public is hardly persuasive, if
not clearly insincere and self-righteous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is proof in fact that the private respondent was first hired not on February 16, 1978, but earlier
in 1977. This is the 1977 withholding tax statement 5 issued for him by the petitioner itself which it
does not and cannot deny. The petitioner stresses that this is the only evidence of the private
respondents earlier service and notes that he has not presented any co-worker to substantiate his
claim. This is perfectly understandable. Given the natural reluctance of many workers to antagonize
their employers, we need not wonder why none of them testified against the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are satisfied that whether his employment began on February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he
claims, the private respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed on August 21,
1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution
and the Labor Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. Where the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or
ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask
the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position
immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. The medical certificate
offered by the petitioner came from its own physician, who was not a competent public health
authority, and merely stated the employees disease, without more. We may surmise that if the
required certification was not presented, it was because the disease was not of such a nature or
seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical
treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and unlawful
sanction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to terminate the employment of
the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days
after his dismissal. 6 As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which
was in force at that time) was not a trivial technicality. It required not just the mere filing of a
petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance but that the said clearance be obtained prior to
the operative act of termination. 7 chanrobles virtual law library
We agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the law by separating the employee after five
months service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then rehiring him on
probation, again without security of tenure. We cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to
the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other hand, we have also the health of the public and
of the dismissed employee himself to consider. Hence, although we must rule in favor of his
reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent
authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his
employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness
and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nations future.
It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will
determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry
weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we
must resolve to lighten the weight of centuries of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but
does not bow his head.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order of November 18,
1981, is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the
modification that the backwages shall be limited to three years only and the private respondent shall
be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return to
work. Costs against the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-75782. December 1, 1987.]
EURO-LINEA, PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

JIMMY O. PASTORAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the resolution of public
respondent, * NLRC, in Case No. RAB III-2-1589-84 entitled Jimmy O. Pastoral v, Euro-Linea
Phils., Inc. affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter ** which ordered the reinstatement of
complainant with six months backwages.
The facts as found by the Solicitor General are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 17, 1983, petitioner hired Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary basis for a
period of six months ending February 18, 1984. However, prior to hiring by petitioner, Pastoral had
been employed by Fitscher Manufacturing Corporation also as shipping expediter for more than one
and a half years. Pastoral was absorbed by petitioner but under a probationary basis.
On February 4, 1984, Pastoral received a memorandum dated January 31, 1984 terminating his
probationary employment effective also on February 4, 1984 in view of his failure to meet the
performance standards set by the company. To contest his dismissal, Pastoral filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioner on February 6, 1984 (Rollo, pp. 45-46).chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
On July 19, 1985, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal, the dispositive portion
of the decision reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
WHEREFORE all things considered the respondent or its President and or General Manager should
be as it is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant with six months backwages.
SO ORDERED.
San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, July 19, 1985.
EMILIO TONGIO
Labor Arbiter
(Rollo, p. 32).
Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC on August 5, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 33-39) but the appeal was
dismissed on July 16, 1986 (Resolution; Rollo, p. 41).
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following errors of the NLRC (Rollo, p. 7):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) The Labor Arbiter decide a question of law in a manner contrary to the spirit and purpose of the
law; and that
b) The Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion by ignoring the material and significant facts in
favor of employer.
In the resolution of October 29, 1986, the Second Division of the Court without giving due course to
the petition required the respondents to comment (Rollo, p. 42).
The Solicitor General submitted his comment on November 24, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 45-49), while
petitioner through counsel filed its reply to public respondent National Labor Relations
Commissions comment in compliance with the resolution of December 10, 1986 (Rollo, p. 50).
In the resolution of February 18, 1987 (Rollo, 58), the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
The only issue is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling against the dismissal of the respondent, a
temporary or probationary employee, by his employer (Petitioner).
Although a probationary or temporary employee has a limited tenure, he still enjoys the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. During his tenure of employment or before his
contract expires, he cannot be removed except for cause as provided for by law (Manila Hotel Corp.
v. NLRC, 141 SCRA 169 [1986]).
This brings us to the issue of whether or not private respondents dismissal was justifiable.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal is with cause, since respondent during his period of employment
failed to meet the performance standards set by the company; that employers should be given leeway
in the application of his right to choose efficient workers (Rollo, p. 6) and that the determination of
compliance with the standards is the prerogative of the employer as long as it is not whimsical; that it
had terminated for cause the respondent before the expiration of the probationary employment
(Rollo, p. 70, Petitioners Memorandum).
The records, however, reveal the contrary.

Petitioner not only failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate the cause of private
respondents dismissal, but likewise failed to cite particular acts or instances to show the latters poor
performance.
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General
There is no dispute that failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer is a ground to terminate an employee engaged on a
probationary basis (Art. 282, Labor Code; Bk. VI, Rule I, Section 6(c), Implementing Rules, Labor
Code). In this case, petitioner alleged that Pastoral was dismissed because he failed to meet its
performance standard. However, petitioner did not bother to cite particular acts or instances in its
position paper which show that Pastoral was performing below par. . . .
Petitioners performance as shipping expediter can readily be gauged from specific acts as may be
gleaned from his duties enumerated by petitioner to include processing of export and import
documents for dispatch or release and talking to customs personnel regarding said documents. (p.
2, Annex E Petition).
Furthermore, what makes the dismissal highly suspicious is the fact that while petitioner claims that
respondent was inefficient, it retained his services until the last remaining two weeks of the six
months probationary employment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
No less important is the fact that private respondent had been a shipping expediter for more than
one and a half years before he was absorbed by petitioner. It therefore appears that the dismissal in
question is without sufficient justification.
It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee must
be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioners position but also his
means of livelihood. (Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor, 135 SCRA 137 [1985]).
The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the
State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power (PAL, Inc. v. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489
[1974]). This is so because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State,
more vital than the preservation of corporate profits (Phil. Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC, 106
SCRA 444 [1981]; Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, supra).
Finally, it is significant to note that in the interpretation of the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the constitution and the labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the
constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has always adopted the liberal approach which favors the
exercise of labor rights. (Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR, 127 SCRA 268 [1984]).
In the instant case, it is evident that the NLRC correctly applied Article 282 in the light of the
foregoing and that its resolution is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction (Rosario Brothers Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 73
[1984]).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the resolution of the
NLRC is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, Respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement, 1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS, in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
discrimination against males or females; 2that it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills; 3and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law. 4Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the
absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charters non-
impairment clause, in addition to the great and irreparable injury that PASEI members face should
the Order be further enforced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged guidelines, the Solicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only
question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. 5As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property,
(2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. 6chanrobles virtual law library
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood
and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, 7refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State to govern its citizens. 8chanrobles virtual law library
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the law of overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society. 9chanrobles virtual law library
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.10Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties Even liberty itself, the greatest
of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to ones will. 11It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that
event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when
the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of
the power. 12 chanrobles virtual law library
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to female contract workers, 14but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that equality
before the law under the Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16 chanrobles virtual law
library
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered
by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Governments efforts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly
with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion
that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence
(that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some
fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the
same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference.
Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a
republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in
the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the
Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the
judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially
when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be
effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with
this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of
finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment
ban.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely
so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself (Pending review of the
administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . . 18), meaning to
say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the
ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on
the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:chanrobles virtual law library
10. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,chanrobles virtual law
library
11. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers.19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers. That it does not apply to all Filipina workers 20is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary.
For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is
the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To
apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would
obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what
Chase refers to as a law that takes property from A and gives it to B. 21 It would be an unlawful
invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22(Fernando
says: Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its
validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls
for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If
such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection. 23In the
case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the
contrary.) chanrobles virtual law library
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment.
From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated.
We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar

skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government; chanrobles
virtual law library
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and chanrobles
virtual law library
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international
organizations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLSVacationing

domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA
and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or
partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new
employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these
guidelines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon

recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
10. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,chanrobles virtual law
library
11. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers.24chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of public safety, as may be provided
by law. 25Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to afford protection to labor, 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labors rule-
making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.27The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise
of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. 28 chanrobles virtual law library
The petitionerss reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits 29is not well-taken. The right granted
by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of
regulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30chanrobles virtual
law library
Protection to labor does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.
It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is
duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the
petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its
duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on
deployment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority.
It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as
manifested by the Solicitor General.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. 31Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms,
is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully
accepted as a controlling economic way of life.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government
regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has
convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed
for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law library
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.
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G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

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xxx xxx xxx

POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 37 chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx

We invite attention to the Minister of Labors ruling thereon, as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all

chanrobles virtual law library

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

The sole issue in this case is

WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY.

Such contention is untenable.

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract of obligations, no

[G.R. No. 132564. October 20, 1999]

ISSUE: Whether the said constitutional provision is unconstitutional.

[G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999]

First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendos malevolent intention.

Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?

A: I never left the office to attend to anything.

Q: And what did they say?

A: They said yes, sir.

Q: What was your reaction to that?

A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.

Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?

GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION, ETC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN,

Paredes, Balcoff & Poblador for respondent Macondray and Company.

G.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988

The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:

IIchanrobles virtual law library

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-48926 December 14, 1987

The facts are as follows:

July 20, 1976

Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES

Re: RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM

(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT

N.B.chanrobles virtual law library

For additional information

and/or resignation forms,

please see Mr. Vic Maceda

or Atty. Ben Aritao. 6

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2779 October 18, 1950

Wherefore judgment is hereby rendered

STIPULATION OF FACTS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Name Date of Position Salary

EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION,

Daniel Sanchez . 1/1/47 Carpenter- P250 a mo.

Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows:

and article XIV, section 6, which reads

G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987