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DECISION
This case involves the crime of illegal recruitment. At its bottom are the hapless citizens in search of a
better life who still fall victim to the false promise of employment in foreign lands and the inhumanity of
illegal recruiters who prey upon the misfortunes of the former and make a mockery of the law.
In an information filed on 28 February 1991 by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, and assigned to Branch 156 1 thereof, the accused
Baltazar de Leon and Marietta de Leon, alias "Benjie," who are husband and wife, were charged with "the
crime of Illegal Recruitment under P.D. No. 2018 (Large Scale)" in that: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph
". . . on or about the period comprised of the month of August and September, 1990 in the Municipality
of Tagig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
[for] employment abroad conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad [to] the following persons to wit: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment,
by falsely representing to the said persons that they were in a position to obtain overseas jobs from them
and in violation of the aforementioned law against Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale and
amounting to economic sabotage. chanrob les vi rtualaw lib rary c hanro bles. com:chan rob les.com. ph
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Only Baltazar de Leon was arrested. Marietta de Leon remains at large up to the present. The former
entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on 2 April 1991 3 and the trial on the merits proceeded
with respect to him.
In its decision promulgated on 7 April 1992, the trial court 4 found Baltazar de Leon guilty as charged and
decreed as follows: jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused BALTAZAR DE LEON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (in Large Scale) constituting economic sabotage and
hereby sentences said accused BALTAZAR DE LEON to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), to reimburse the complainant-victims, namely:
Francisco Beo through Flordeliza Beo in the amount of P6,380.00; Lourdes Raya-Bernabe in the amount
of P6,700.00; Cesar Cortez in the amount of P3,505.00; Eugenia Panganiban-Cruz in the amount of
P6,380.00; Alfredo Gutierrez in the amount of P3,500.00; Daniel and Lourdes Perez in the amount of
P5,000.00 plus P1,380.00 through Noeta Perez and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of accused MARIETTA DE LEON alias `Benjie, the same to be
served by the NBI, PNP/CIS and other national police agencies.
SO ORDERED." 5
The judgment of conviction is based upon the following findings and conclusion of the trial court: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"Clearly accused Baltazar De Leon is neither authorized nor licensed to recruit workers for overseas jobs
and yet he and his wife recruited workers, talked to the applicants and collected fees for requirements
that each applicant had to comply with in order that their applications may be processed. Although Mrs.
De Leon was more active in the recruitment, Accused Baltazar played an important part as both spouses
convincingly played out their roles resulting in the applicants reposing their trust and belief in them. It
is of little surprise that the complaining witnesses conclusively identified accused Baltazar as the man
who recruited them or their relatives. Said witnesses even gave in evidence the list of requirements and
fees that they were told to pay. Said lists clearly show that a great deal of money was involved and
received by the accused. The charade played by both accused show a unity of purpose and unity in
execution of their unlawful objective establishing the existence of a conspiracy for which both accused
must suffer the same penalty. (People v. Talla, 181 SCRA 133)." 6
The summary by the People of the prosecutions evidence concerning the recruitment activities of the
appellant is hereby adopted, it being fully supported by the testimonies of the complaining witnesses: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h
"Camila del Rosario, who was a neighbor of appellant, told Noeta Perez, Eugene Panganiban, Elvira
Alonzo, Lourdes Bernabe, and one Ador, all of whom were working for the same employer, that del
Rosarios daughter was able to work abroad through the efforts of appellant and his wife (TSN, N. Perez,
June 26, 1991, p. 4)
On September 16, 1990, del Rosario, together with Noeta Perez and the latters sister Lourdes and
brother Daniel, went to appellants house in Pateros, Rizal. Noeta Perezs purpose in going to appellants
house was to apply for overseas jobs for her brother Daniel and sister Lourdes. When del Rosario, Noeta
Perez and her brother reached appellants house, they met appellant and his wife who informed them
that they have already sent persons to Micronesia who were hired as chambermaids and roomboys.
Noeta Perez then asked her sister and brother to apply, and she gave P1,380.00 to appellants wife (Id.,
pp. 5-6).chanroble s virtual law lib rary
The following day, September 17, 1990, appellants wife asked Daniel to go back together with Lourdes
to file their application and to undergo medical examination. On the same day, Daniel and Lourdes gave
appellant and his wife P2,500.00 for the passport, and, in addition, they paid P5,000.00 to appellant. For
helping Daniel and Lourdes get jobs abroad, appellant demanded P6,380.00 from each of the applicants
allegedly for the processing of the papers, medical examination, pictures and passport. Noeta Perez was
able to give P3,000.00 to appellant for her sister Lourdes application, but she was unable to give any
amount for Daniels application (Id., pp. 6-9).
Sometime in November, 1990, Noeta Perez received a letter from the National Bureau of Investigation
(`NBI) saying that the applications for overseas jobs sent to Micronesia were sent to the NBI because
there were no such job orders from Micronesia. Upon getting this information, Noeta, together with her
sister Lourdes and brother Daniel, went to the NBI which then confirmed the information. Evidently,
Lourdes and Daniel could not have gone to Micronesia since the alleged jobs offered to them by appellant
never existed (Id., pp. 9-11).
Cesar Cortez suffered a similar fate as that of Daniel and Lourdes Perez. Cortez came to know appellant
through a friend, Alfredo Gutierrez, who applied with appellant for an overseas job in Micronesia.
Because his friend applied, Cortez also applied with appellant for a job as roomboy in Micronesia. When
Cortez filed his application, appellant immediately required him to give P680.00 for alleged medical fee,
which Cortez paid. After paying the medical fee, appellants wife asked Cortez to pay P175.00 as
transportation fee for securing the passport. Then appellant asked P1,000.00 as downpayment for the
passport, which amount was paid to and received by appellants wife. In addition, Cortez paid P1,650.00,
which was received by appellants wife in the presence of appellant, for full payment of the passport.
Cortez gave these amounts to appellant or his wife between the second week of August, 1990 and second
week of September, 1990. Appellant promised Cortez that he could leave for Micronesia in the month of
September, 1990, and when this did not materialize, appellant promised again that Cortez could leave by
November, 1990. Cortez, however, was unable to leave for Micronesia for it turned out that appellant had
no business partner in Micronesia (TSN, C. Cortez, October 29, 1991, pp. 2-4). chanrobles law lib rary
Alfredo Gutierrez, a friend of Cortez, also applied with appellant for the job of driver in Guam. Gutierrez
knew appellant because a certain Mila introduced him to appellant who represented that he could send
workers abroad. The introduction occurred at appellants house in the first week of August, 1990.
Appellant asked for P680.00 allegedly for medical fee and pictures, which Gutierrez paid. Gutierrez was
required to give additional amounts, and the total amount he paid reached P3,500.00. He paid this
amount to appellant for the promised job as driver in Guam. Gutierrez, however, was unable to leave for
Guam because it turned out that there was no such job order in Guam (TSN, A. Gutierrez, October 21,
1991, pp. 2-4)." 7
The prosecution further proved through the unrebutted testimony of Elisa Roque, Senior Officer of the
Licensure Division of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), that the appellant
does not have any license or authority from the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. 8
On the other hand, there is nothing in the appellants brief testimony except the denial of the separate
accusations of the complaining witnesses and the assertion that he does not know anything about the
transactions between the complainants and his co-accused as he was always out of his residence at
daytime. He declared that he was employed as a driver by Reymar Advertising, which is owned by Mr.
Reynaldo Bucsit. He served as such daily from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and oftentimes worked from 6:30
p.m. to midnight as a driver of a passenger jeepney. 9 Mr. Bucsit testified that the appellant was his
driver from July 1987 to 22 November 1990 and that the latter worked" [s]ometimes four or five days in
a week because he had to rest after driving the whole day." 10
Immediately after the promulgation of the judgment, Baltazar de Leon (hereinafter referred to as the
appellant) filed his notice of appeal 11 and, in his main brief 12 filed on 27 November 1992, raised this
sole error allegedly committed by the trial court: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BALTAZAR DE LEON FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Before proceeding any further, some observations on the information filed are in order.
The information charges the appellant with "the crime of Illegal Recruitment under P.D. No. 2018 (Large
Scale)." However, this decree merely further amended Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code 13 by making
large-scale illegal recruitment, i.e., committed against three or more persons individually or collectively,
a crime of economic sabotage and punishable with life imprisonment. More precisely then, the
information should have been for the violation of Article 38 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code, as
amended. Although this error seems to be innocuous since the body of the complaint recites the elements
of large-scale illegal recruitment, proof beyond reasonable doubt of which would sustain a conviction
under Articles 38 and 39 of the said Code, we, nevertheless, make these observations by way of advice
to prosecutors to exercise the greatest care in the preparation of informations. chanroble s.com:c ralaw:re d
The pertinent portions of Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, read as
follows: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
x x x
"ART. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:"
x x x
Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines recruitment as follows: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
While among the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the said Code is: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or
employment." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
In support of the assigned error, the appellant contends that: (a) he did not transact business with any
one of the complaining witnesses nor did he receive any monetary consideration from them; (b) granting
for the sake of argument that his wife was engaged in illegal recruitment, there is no sufficient evidence
to prove that he acted in conspiracy with his wife; (c) he had no opportunity to engage in recruitment
because he was then employed as a driver by one Reynaldo Bucsit with a work schedule from 8:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. and likewise worked as a driver of a passenger jeepney until midnight or the morning of the
following day; and (d) the complaining witnesses implicated him because he is the husband of Marietta
de Leon who allegedly recruited them but who is now at large.
Our own reading and evaluation of the testimonies of the complaining witnesses lead to no other
conclusion than that the appellant and his wife were co-conspirators in the illegal recruitment business
conducted in their residence with each contributing coordinative and cooperative acts to insure the
success of an enterprise that provided them with income for their mutual benefit and advantage. The
complainants separately came to the appellants residence on various dates because they were informed
by their co-workers that he and his wife were known to be recruiting for employment in Micronesia, Guam
and Singapore. In all the occasions when they came to his house, the appellant was always there.
Complainant Noeta Perez categorically declared that the appellant and his wife told her and her
companions that "they sent people abroad, in Micronesia, hired [sic] there as chambermaid and
roomboy" and that she gave the money demanded in connection with the application of her brother and
sister to Marietta in the presence of the appellant. 14 Complainant Eugenia Cruz declared that when she
and her companions, Elma Conde and Adelaida Cabungkay, were in the house of the appellant filling up
the papers in connection with their application for employment abroad, the latter "help [sic] us how to file
the papers given to" them and told them that they "would be receiving salary of $2.15/hour," and that
she gave P6,380.00 to Marietta in the presence of the appellant. 15 Complainant Flordeliza Beo testified
that when she accompanied her husband to apply for employment, the appellant explained to them the
terms of employment and was present when she gave the amount of P6,380.00 to Marietta. 16
Complainant Alfredo Gutierrez was directly introduced to the appellant by Mila and the appellant himself
asked from him various sums, amounting to P3,500.00, ostensibly in connection with his application for
employment, and personally received it from Alfredo. 17 Complainant Cesar Cortez was also directly
introduced to the appellant and paid the various sums demanded from him to Marietta in the presence of
the appellant. 18 Complainant Lourdes Bernabe testified that the appellant offered her the job of
domestic helper in Singapore, informed her of the requirements for her application, and, together with
his wife, received her payment of P2,500.00 purportedly for the processing of her papers. 19
All these acts of the appellant and his wife conclusively established a common criminal design mutually
deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated moves. chanrobles v irt ual lawl ibra ry
Such acts constitute enlisting, contracting or procuring workers for or promising them overseas
employment, which are among the acts of recruitment embraced in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended. The furnishing of the victims with certain documents which they were required to fill up
allegedly in connection with their overseas employment, which actually did not exist, also constitutes the
violation of paragraph (b), Article 34 of the same Code. Since the appellant does not have the license or
authority to recruit and he committed the said acts against at least three individuals, he is guilty of
large-scale illegal recruitment under Article 38, which offense is penalized with life imprisonment and a
fine of P100,000.00 in the succeeding Article 39.
We are not persuaded by the appellants contention that he could not have transacted business with the
complainants and participated in the activities of his wife because he was not in his residence during the
daytime in view of his employment at Reymar Advertising and his driving of a passenger jeepney after
working hours until midnight. He sets up, in effect, the defense of alibi. We have carefully searched for
a statement in his testimony in court as to the specific dates he was employed by Reymar Advertising. We
found none. Rather, it was his witness, Mr. Reynaldo Bucsit, who attempted to do so by claiming that the
appellant was his personal driver from July 1987 to 22 November 1990. 20 We then have a situation
where a party who claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed a crime because he was
somewhere else at the time of its commission did not even specifically and explicitly testify that the dates
when he was allegedly somewhere else coincided with the dates specified in the information and proven
by the evidence as the dates when the crime was committed. This is rather strange and only manifests
the weakness of his plea. In any case, the trial court disregarded the testimony of Mr. Bucsit. Settled is
the rule that a trial courts finding on the credibility of a witness is entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the said court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have
affected the result of the case. 21 But even if Mr. Bucsits testimony were to be given full faith, it discloses
that it was not at all impossible for the appellant to have met and transacted business with the
complainants or to have participated in the business of his wife since he drove for Mr. Bucsit for only four
or five days a week. The latter declared: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h
A Sometimes four or five days in a week because he had to rest after driving the whole day, sir." 22
Moreover, the appellant was positively identified by the complainants. It is axiomatic that alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 23
Appellants final argument that the complainants filed the case against him in order to harass him and
compel him "to answer their money claims, after failing to recover from the real culprit," 24 is nothing but
a flimsy excuse which we cannot accept. As previously discussed, the appellant is a co-conspirator in the
crime of illegal recruitment, and in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.25 cralaw:red
The decision appealed from is therefore fully supported by facts which established the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. chanroble s virtualawl ibra ry cha nrob les.co m:chan roble s.com.p h
We cannot end this case without some parting thoughts to conclude what we had stated at the beginning.
Something must be wrong somewhere if, in spite of the stiff penalties for illegal recruitment, some still
brazenly take advantage of the misery of others and profit from their misfortunes while many still fall for
the false promises of illegal recruiters despite the painful lessons the experiences of others have taught.
What is clear to us is that illegal recruiters cannot flout our laws and prey on the hard lot of others if the
Government had the will to resolutely enforce the laws against illegal recruitment and to be merciless
against the violators. They do not deserve any mercy. Large-scale illegal recruitment is a crime which is
not difficult to discover, prosecute and prove, for it cannot be done in absolute secrecy. That there must
be an end to illegal recruitment is a matter of public policy for not only must the State protect those who,
because of economic difficulties or lack of employment opportunities in the country, seek greener
pastures in foreign lands and from whose earnings the State itself benefits, it must also punish to the
fullest extent of the law illegal recruiters, especially those engaged in syndicated or large-scale illegal
recruitment, who continue to wreak havoc on our economy. It is thus earnestly wished that the
Government flex its muscles to eradicate this pernicious evil.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142981. August 20, 2002]
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the January 28, 2000 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93, in Criminal Case No.
Q-94-58179. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
The July 18, 1994 Information[3] was filed by State Prosecutor Zenaida M.
Lim. It charged Carmelita Alvarez with illegal recruitment committed in large
scale, under Article 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(a), 34 and 39 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as follows:
That sometime between the period from November, 1993 to March, 1994, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants, namely: JESUS
G. ESMA, JR., JOEL G. SERNA, ARNEL C. DAMIAN, ANTONIO C.
DAMIAN, RUBEN F. RIOLA, LORETA S. BOLOTAOLA, EDGAR R.
BARCENAS, DENO A. MANACAP, JERRY NEIL D. ABANILLA,
ROBERTO ALEJANDRO, ESTER S. BONDOC and JOSEPHINE
LOMOCSO as contractworkers in Taiwan for and in consideration of the
sum ranging from P12,300.00 to P48,600.00, as placement and processing
fees, and x x x which the complainants delivered and paid to herein accused
the said amount, without said accused first having secured the necessary
license or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.[4]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
Arnel Damian is one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that
he was introduced to appellant by Reynaldo Abrigo, who was then the
boyfriend of Teresita Gonzales (daughter of appellant Carmelita Alvarez) at
appellants house in 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. During said meeting, appellant convinced complainant that if
he could produce [t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00), he would
be deployed to Taiwan as a factory worker and would be receiving a salary
of $600.00.
Later, when Roberto was informed that he passed the medical examination,
appellant told him to bring [f]orty [t]housand [p]esos (P40,000) as
processing fee and other documentary requirements. A receipt was issued by
appellant for the payment of said amount.
After three (3) months of waiting and follow-up without any positive results,
complainant filed his complaint against appellant with the POEA.
In her Brief,[7] appellant submits her own version of the facts as follows:
SUR-REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:
MARITES ABRIGO testified that while she was in the living room and her
mother, accused Carmelita Alvarez, was in her room inside their house on
May 31, 1994, a group of persons arrived and asked where her mother
was. After telling them that her mother was inside her room resting, a
certain Major Umbao, together with some other persons, went straight to her
mothers room and knocked on the door.When her mother opened it and
peeped through the opening of the door, they immediately grabbed her. She
was not able to do anything also, other than to tell them that she has to
consult first her lawyer.When her mother was brought to the POEA office
she was told that they have to produce P30,000.00. (Citations omitted)
[8]
The trial court accorded full credibility to the prosecution witnesses. It held
that complainants had not been impelled by ill motives in filing the case against
appellant. They all positively identified her as the person who, without the
requisite license from the government, had collected from them processing
and placement fees in consideration of jobs in Taiwan.
The trial court was convinced that appellant had deceived complainants by
making them believe that she could deploy them abroad to work, and that she
was thus able to milk them of their precious savings. The lack of receipts for
some amounts that she received from them did not discredit their
testimonies. Besides, her precise role in the illegal recruitment was adequately
demonstrated through other means.
Further affirming her illegal recruitment activities was the entrapment
conducted, in which she was caught receiving marked money from a certain
Jerry Neil Abadilla, to whom she had promised a job abroad.
Her defense that she merely wanted to provide jobs for her son-in-law and
his friends was rejected, because she had subsequently retracted her
allegation implicating Director Wong of the POEA in her illegal recruitment
activities. As she victimized more than three (3) persons, the RTC convicted
her of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.
Hence, this appeal.[9]
Issue
Appellant submits this lone assignment of error:
Main Issue:
Bases for Her Conviction
Appellant denies that she engaged in any act of illegal recruitment and
claims that she only recommended, through Director Wong of the POEA, her
son-in-law and his friends for a direct-hire job in Taiwan.
We disagree. Prior to the enactment of RA No. 8042, the crime of illegal
recruitment was defined under Article 38(a) in relation to Articles 13(b) and 34
and penalized under Article 39 of the Labor Code. It consisted of any
recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Code, undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority.It is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no
valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders undertake
either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[11]
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers[;] and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms,
illegal recruitment is committed when a person, who is not authorized by the
government, gives the impression that he or she has the power to send
workers abroad.[12]
It is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant
recruited them. On direct examination, Arnel Damian testified thus:
Q When was that when Reynaldo Abondo introduced you to the accused?
A Last week of November. I cannot remember the exact date.
Q Where were you when you were introduced to the accused?
A At 25 V. West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, in the house
of Mrs. Alvarez.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you arrived at that place, whom did you see?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q What happened during your first meeting.
A We were recruited by her.
Q What did she tell you?
A That if we could come up with the amount of P25,000.00 but she was only asking
for P12,500.00 as processing fee.
Q What else did she tell you?
A That we were to act as replacement of three persons who backed out.
Q Did she tell you where were you going?
A We were told to go to Taiwan as factory worker.
Q Did she tell you how much salary will you receive?
A $600.00.[13]
Appellant had also recruited for a similar job in Taiwan, Joel Serna who
testified as follows:
Q Will you please inform the Hon. Court why do you know Carmelita Alvarez?
A I came to know her when her daughter became the girlfriend of my friend and I
was told that she is recruiting workers for Taiwan.
Q After knowing that she was recruiting workers for Taiwan, what did you do, if
any?
A I inquired from her and I was assured that the employment was not fake and I
was told to pay a processing fee.
Q When you said kanya or her to whom are you referring to?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
Q Do you still remember when was that?
A February 8, 1994.
Q Where did you meet?
A In her house at No. 25-B West Santiago St., SFDM, Quezon City.
Q What other things did she told you, if there was any?
A I would subject myself to a medical examination and after this, I would give her a
processing fee.
Q What was the purpose of that processing fee?
A So I could leave immediately for Taiwan.
Q Why are you going to Taiwan?
A I need a job.
Q If you give Mrs. Alvarez the processing fee, she will help you to go to Taiwan?
A Yes, sir.[14]
Antonio Damian, brother of Arnel, also testified to the same effect.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Will you please tell this Hon. Court the circumstances why you came to know
Carmelita Alvarez?
A I met Carmelita Alvarez on January 4, 1994.
COURT: (to the witness)
Under what circumstances did you happen to know her?
A I went to her house.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Why did you go to her house?
A Because I applied to her for work abroad.
Q Why did you apply for work abroad to her?
A Because of a brother who applied to her but failed the medical examination.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Arnel Damian applied for work abroad with Carmelita Alvarez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to leave for abroad?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he failed the medical examination.
xxxxxxxxx
Q What happened next after that?
A Because my brother failed with the medical examination, Carmelita Alvarez
cannot return the processing fee in the amount of P12,000.00 so she told my
brother to look for another applicant.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Did your brother look for another applicant as his replacement?
A He asked me to take my place to save the P12,000.00.[15]
Roberto Alejandro testified that appellant had also told him she could send
him to Taiwan to work.
Q When you reached that place whom did you see there?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q And what happened during that first meeting?
A She told me that she has the capacity of sending to Taiwan.[16]
More telling is Ruben Riolas testimony on appellants specific acts
constituting illegal recruitment.
Q Can you tell the Hon. Court what transpired with that first meeting of yours with
Carmelita Alvarez at Capiz District?
A When I got there, I was with two companions, because we were replacements of
the three others who backed out. We were asked by the mother if we were the
friends of her daughter and son-in-law who is from the church?
Q What was your answer?
A I said yes.
Q Was there anything that transpired during that meeting?
A We were asked by her if we were interested to work as Factory workers in
Taiwan.
Q What was your answer, if any?
A We said we are interested if it is true.
Q After knowing that you are interested to work as factory worker in Taiwan, what
did Carmelita Alvarez do if there was any?
A We were shown a document stating that such person was receiving $600.00
salary.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After knowing that you will be receiving the same amount if you work as factory
worker in Taiwan, what did you do, if any?
A We were told to immediately pay the processing fee.
Q Who told you to pay the processing fee?
A Mrs. Carmelita Alvarez.
Q This processing fee is for what?
A So that she could process the papers with the POEA, for the facilitation with the
POEA[,] so that we could be included in the first batch.[17]
Q What happened on that date after paying the tax of P1,500.00.
A We were promised to leave on February 23, 1993.
Q Will you please elaborate more on the promise, what kind of promise was it, if
you could remember?
A That would be the latest date that we could leave for Taiwan.
Q Would you somehow remember the words of Carmelita Alvarez?
xxxxxxxxx
A Na papaalisin niya kami.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Why did you celebrate a dispededa?
A Because we were about to leave.
Q Who told you?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Why were you celebrating this party?
A Because we will be leaving the following day.[18]
Furthermore, appellant committed other acts showing that she was
engaged in illegal recruitment. Enumerated in People v. Manungas Jr.[19] as
acts constituting recruitment within the meaning of the law were collecting
pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances and other necessary documents for
the processing of employment applications in Saudi Arabia; and collecting
payments for passport, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other
sundry expenses.[20]
In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant had received varying
amounts of money from complainants for the processing of their employment
applications for Taiwan. Arnel Damian paid to appellant P12,500 for the
processing fee,[21] P2,500 for the medical fee and P1,500 for his
passport.[22] Serna paid P12,000 for the processing fee,[23] P3,000 for his birth
certificate and passport,[24] P75 for a Departure and Orientation
Seminar,[25] P900 for the insurance fee and $50 for his visa. [26] Antonio Damian
paid P2,500 for the medical fee,[27] P900 for the insurance, P75 for the
Pre-Departure and Orientation Seminar (PDOS) fee, $50 for the processing
fee and P3,500 for his birth certificate.[28] Roberto Alejandro paid P40,000 for
the processing fee[29] and P5,000 for the insurance.[30] Riola paid P1,900 for his
passport, P12,500 for the processing fee, P900 for the insurance fee, P75 for
the PDOS fee, P1,500 for the insurance and $50 for travel tax.[31]
The trial court found complainants to be credible and convincing
witnesses. We are inclined to give their testimonies due consideration. The
best arbiter of the issue of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies
is the trial court. When the inquiry is on that issue, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter
was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Its finding thereon will not be disturbed, unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result
of the case.[32] We find no cogent reason to overrule the trial court in this case.
No License
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement
without first complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor
and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for
recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant.[33] Article 38(a)
clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially committed
by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any
person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid
license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license
or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the
labor secretary.[34] A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a
private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in
recruitment and placement activities.[35]
Likewise constituting illegal recruitment and placement activities are
agents or representatives whose appointments by a licensee or holder of
authority have not been previously authorized by the POEA. [36]
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C.
Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma.
Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch -- both of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration.[37] Yet, as complainants convincingly
proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.
Absence of Receipts
Appellant contends that the RTC erred when it did not appreciate in her
favor the failure of Complainants Serna and Antonio Damian to present, as
proofs that she had illegally recruited them, receipts that she had allegedly
issued to them.
We disagree. The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a
case for illegal recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has
engaged in illegal recruitment.[38] Such case is made, not by the issuance or the
signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority.[39]
In People v. Pabalan,[40] the Court held that the absence of receipts for
some of the amounts delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant
did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor
in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in
illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of
witnesses.[41]
Besides, the receipts issued by petitioner to Arnel Damian and Roberto
Alejandro already suffice to prove her guilt.[42]
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Since only two complainants were able to show receipts issued by
appellant, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove illegal
recruitment in large scale.
We disagree. The finding of illegal recruitment in large scale is justified
wherever the elements previously mentioned concur with this additional
element: the offender commits the crime against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.[43] Appellant recruited at least three persons. All the
witnesses for the prosecution categorically testified that it was she who had
promised them that she could arrange for and facilitate their employment in
Taiwan as factory workers.
As for the defense that appellant had only referred complainants to
Director Wong, her public apology and retraction[44] belied her denials. After
examining the transcripts, we concur with the RTC that her averment that she
was being prosecuted for her refusal to give grease money to Major Umbao in
exchange for her freedom does not disprove the fact that she was caught
in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation.
We find appellants conviction for the crime charged sufficiently supported
by evidence; therefore, it should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers
for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and
ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation
of said law.
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990,
in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of
gain, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY
MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the
place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended
party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for
overseas employment and that they could secure
employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said
misrepresentations, the offended party was later induced to give
accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and
far from complying with their commitment and despite repeated
demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud,
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in
the aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
SO ORDERED. [9]
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers,
whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group. [10]
Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not;
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that
the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in
unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly
established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny
Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as
factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their
papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such
representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to
accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain
hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that
accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of
Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The
absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of
accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.
Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he
never received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers.
Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the
complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo
de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier
went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon
City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that
complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who received the processing fees,
and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that
complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them their
passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such
as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage
contract.
Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by
clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward
and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified
accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money
upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for
them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses
were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]
The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to
complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged
with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of
the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing. [14] The absence of
receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused,
and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.[15]
Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment
officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are
issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is
specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. [16] Corrolarily,
a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity
which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment
and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has
been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary. [17] It also
bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a
holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized by
the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of
authority.[18] Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be
penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that
illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se,
meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction
in the former, but is required in the latter.[19]
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20] The trial court was
correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench.
Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that he could provide them with
work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their
damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized.
Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of
estafa is as follows:
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty
prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. [21]
Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon
accused-appellant:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded
Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional
amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall
be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision
mayor as maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya
P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall
also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00
by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
following modifications:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded
Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional
amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall
be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya
P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall
also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00
by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur
[Syllabus]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 114011-22. December 16, 1996]
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
It was sometime in October, 1991 that, through one Elsa Sta. Ana,
Vevina met Elisio Principe, Ramon Villanueva and Eduardo Gutierrez
at Villanuevas residence in Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan. Elsa knew that
the three were looking for jobs and that Vevina was also looking for
people interested in working abroad. Vevina explained that she could
send them to Japanwhere they could be factory workers with a
minimum salary of isang lapad or 10,000.00 yen a day. Having
manifested their interest in getting the job, the three were advised by
Vevina to raise right away the placement fee of P60,000.00 each in
order that they could leave for Japan in a weeks time. Vevina told
them to bring to her residence the placement fee and a prepared
receipt.
Because Vevina was leaving for Korea, she instructed each of the
three to give P1,500.00 to one Jenny who would secure their
passports. The three obliged but only Principe and Gutierrez were
given their passports. When Vevina arrived from Korea, she advised
Villanueva to secure his passport himself as there were some
problems. Villanueva did as instructed and personally secured his
passport. The three were then made to sign application forms for
Korean visas upon Vevinas guarantee that the onward visa
from Korea was necessary for them to reach Japan. Unfortunately,
the Korean Embassy denied their visa applications.
Nevertheless, to raise the placement fee, Principe borrowed the
title to the property of her sister-in-law and mortgaged the property
for P200,000.00 with P70,000.00 interest. On October 24, 1991,
Principe, together with Gutierrez and Villanueva, their respective
wives and Elsa Sta. Ana, went to Vevinas house and handed
her P90,000.00 representing half of the placement fee agreed
upon. The balance would be given to Vevina before their departure
for Japan. Vevina then signed the following typewritten receipt which
was prepared by Gutierrezs wife:
10/24/91
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
Received by:
(Signature over
printed name)
VEVINA N. BUEMIO
10-31-91
Received by:
(Signature over
printed name)
VEVINA N. BUEMIO
Received by
(Signature)
VEVINA BUEMIA [5]
The three thereafter went to Vevinas office to inquire why they still
could not leave for Japan. Again, Vevina told them that she still had
some documents to take care of but she assured them that they were
scheduled to depart on November 18, and some other
dates. However, Vevinas promises remained unfulfilled even after
those dates had passed. Thus, the three demanded their money back
and Vevina promised to return it to them.
Having failed to get their money back, the three reported the
matter to the NBI where they were instructed to verify from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) whether
Vevina was authorized to recruit job applicants for abroad. The POEA
accordingly issued a certification dated June 11, 1992 stating that
VEVINA BUEMIO, in her personal capacity was neither licensed nor
authorized x x x to recruit workers for overseas employment from Jan.,
1991 to the present. [6]
pleaded not guilty to the charges against her in Crim. Cases Nos.
92-0129 to 92-0140. The number of complainants, however,
[12]
Testifying in her own defense at the trial, Vevina swore that during
the first week of October, 1991 when she was in Korea, Principe,
Villanueva and Gutierrez went to her residence in Villamor Air Base
requesting for assistance in going to Japan. Jennilyn, her friend who
ran errands for her, accompanied the three who had learned from a
certain Baltazar, Vevinas former client, that Vevina could help them
because of her job as the field officer of the Continental Tour and
Travel Agency. From the telephone conversation with her husband
and Jennilyn, she learned that the three had relatives in Japan who
could provide them employment in that country.
The day after Vevina arrived from Korea on October 23, 1991,
Principe told her by phone that he and his companions would be
arriving at her residence at 6:00 p.m. Since she told them that she
had an appointment at 10:30 p.m., that day being her husbands
birthday, Principe told her that they would be coming to her place
instead at 12:00 midnight.
The three arrived at the appointed time. It was the first time for her
to met them. Principe, who would be shouldering the expenses of
Villanueva and Gutierrez, was the spokesman of the group. As the
three handed her P90,000.00, she emphasized to them that part of
the amount defray the expenses for her own ticket and hotel
accommodations as she would be travelling with them. She signed a
[14]
receipt prepared by the group but she did not read its contents
anymore nor did she count the money which she placed inside a
drawer, as she was busy attending to her husbands guest.
The three having given her their business registration papers,
income tax returns and calling cards, Vevina immediately processed
their travel documents and passports. She first proposed that the
three go to Thailand but the Thai Airline did not issue tickets for them
because they had not secured an onward visa. Thus, she next
[15]
reconsideration of said order which the trial court granted but still,
[21] [22]
the promulgation of judgment and to reopen the case but the [24]
present additional witnesses was within her power and that of her
counsel to avert. Verily, her failure to act with prudence and diligence
cannot elicit approval or sympathy from the Court. [28]
The last two requisites are present in this case. By appellants own
admission, she was a field officer of a travel agency who merely
assisted prospective travellers procure the necessary travel
papers. Her admission is proof that she was not a license recruiter per
the records of the POEA. Although some of the complainants
desisted from pursuing their cases against appellant, it is undeniable
that more than three persons raised claims that they had been
victimized by appellants recruitment activities. What remains to be
determined thereof is whether or not the acts committed by appellant
constituted illegal recruitment as defined by the Labor Code.
The prosecutions theory that appellant promised employment
abroad to the complainants has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt not only by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses but also by
the aforequoted receipts signed by appellant indicating that she
received placement fees. The term placement is defined in the same
way as recruitment under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code. Obviously, to
deflect the import of the use of the phrase placement fees in the
receipts when she signed them feigning tiredness and pointing to the
late hour of the night when she signed one of them. But her claim
crumbles in the face of her own admissions that as a field officer of a
travel agency, she was well aware of the importance of documents
and that it was not her practice to sign papers without reading
them. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that she had read them
before affixing her signature, but she did not object to the use of
placement fees in the receipts.
That appellants was prevaricating as regards the nature of the
amounts she received from the complainants is manifested by the fact
that while she testified that she demanded and accepted the amount
of P10,000 to solve the travel tax problems of some of he
complainants, the aforequoted handwritten receipt she signed shows
that the same amount was for plane tickets & hotel
accommodations. Moreover, if indeed it is true that the amount she
demanded and collected from the complainants were mere
processing fees needed to secure travel papers, then she would have
received them upon official receipts of the travel agency, in its office
and at the appropriate office hours. The evidence proven, however,
shows that two of the receipts were prepared by a complainants wife
while another appears to be in appellants own handwriting on a yellow
ruled pad paper, and that she received various amounts in places
other than her office including her own residence, and after office
hours. In one instance, a transaction even occurred at midnight in her
own home.
Appellant also claims that the visa applications of the
complainants she had presented in evidenced prove that they were
not as seekers for jobs overseas. This stretches judicial credulity to
the limits. The four complainants who testified for the prosecution
could not have afforded travel abroad, much more as tourist. Cecilia
Baas and the three, Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez, were all
unemployed. Neither was there proof that complainants had sources
of income which they could rely on even if unemployed or
low-salaried. Furthermore, as regards Cecilia Baas, the use of the
name Pacita Garcia in the passport given her was not even
satisfactorily explained by the appellant. It is of judicial notice,
however, that fake passports are the usual tools of illegal recruiters.
That appellant even accompanied some complainants abroad on
the pretext that she would secure their plane tickets there does not
help her case any. Instead of bolstering her claim that she was merely
helping the complainants secure travel papers, that story instead
undermines the alleged legality of her activities. She did not actually
have to go abroad to secure tickets and travel documents since these
may be obtained just as easily within this country. The rule, therefore,
that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can proved as
probable under the circumstances, finds meaning in this case.
[35]
explains why the trial court did not even mention the testimony of
Cecilia Baas in its decision. However, the records show that the only
the following executed affidavits of desistance: Lito B. Camora (Exh.
8), Roel B. Perez (Exh. 9), Magdalena P. Arizala and Fe P.
Domagtory (Exh. 10), and Eduardo P. Prudenciado, Leonilo D.
Arganda and Rose V. Flores (Exh. 11). Of these seven persons,
[37]
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
That during the period from January 1997 to June, 1997, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee,
recruit and promise employment as contract workers in Canada, to the
herein complainants, namely: Rommel Suni, Myrna Castro, Marilyn
Mariano, Bryna Paul Wong, Mary Grace Lanozo, Ana Liza Aquino, Marie
Purificacion Abenoja, Florence Bacoco and Lorna Domingo, without said
accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
That in March 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARILYN MARIANO by way of
false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, as follows; to wit: the accused knowing fully well
that he/she they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to
secure work abroad convinced said Marilyn Mariano and pretended that
he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration
of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the said
Marilyn Mariano deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed
by the accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00, in favor of the
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Marilyn Mariano in the
aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine Currency.
That on June 6, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARIE PURIFICACION
ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the
accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized job
recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Marie
Purificacion Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for
him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in
truth and in fact they could not; the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja
deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused
parted away the total sum of P36,500.00 in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja in the
aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine currency.
That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and
promise employment as contract worker in Canada, to the herein
complainant ARACELI D. ABENOJA, without said accused having first
secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
That on or about the 11th day of June, 1997 in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating & mutually aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
ARACELI D. ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which are executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to
wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not authorized
job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said
Araceli D. Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for
him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P35,000.00, when in
truth and in fact they could not; the said Araceli D. Abenoja deceived and
convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the
total sum of P35,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Araceli D. Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00), Philippine currency.
by Gallardo.
Three months lapsed without any news on Maries deployment to
Canada. Her sister, Araceli, had already left for work abroad through
the efforts of their other town-mate. The weekly follow-ups made by
Marie to accused-appellant pertaining to her application and that of
Aracelis were to no avail. Accused-appellant just promised Marie that
she will return her money.Realizing that she had been hoodwinked,
Marie decided to file a complaint against the accused-appellant and
Gallardo with the National Bureau of Investigation. She no longer
verified the authority of both accused-appellant and Gallardo in
recruiting workers overseas because she was told by Gallardo that
she is a direct recruiter. [10]
her visa.
Marilyn was further made to accomplish a form, prepared by both
accused-appellant and Gallardo, at the residence of
accused-appellant in Baguio City. Thereafter, she was informed that
the processing of her papers abroad shall commence within the next
three months. She was also made to attend a meeting conducted by
both accused-appellant and Gallardo at the formers house in Baguio
City, together with other interested applicants.
After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment
abroad, Marilyn and the other applicants proceeded to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, of the
Cordillera Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned
that accused-appellant and Gallardo were not authorized
recruiters. Marilyn confronted accused-appellant about this,
[14]
II
III
IV
Baguio City as venue for a meeting with other applicants that she and
Gallardo conducted in connection with the purported overseas
employment in Canada. Accused-appellant, therefore, acted as an
[20]
latter from both Marie and Araceli Abenoja. The totality of the
evidence shows that accused-appellant was engaged in the
recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment
under the above-quoted Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Hence, she
cannot now feign ignorance on the consequences of her unlawful
acts.
Accused-appellants claim that the other private complainants in
Criminal Case No. 15320-R, for illegal recruitment in large scale, have
executed their individual affidavits of desistance pointing to Gallardo
as the actual recruiter, deserves scant consideration. The several
Orders issued by the trial court show that the dismissal of the
[22]
introduced Marie and Araceli to Gallardo when they went to the latters
house. Marie was the one who shouldered the placement fee of her
[35]
known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995, any person found guilty of
illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years
and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
The provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law are applicable,
as held in People v. Simon: [39]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination
of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court
and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
correccionalminimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty
prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in
the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, falsely
representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and
recruit workers for employment abroad did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, to wit: 1)
Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo, without
first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale, in
violation of the aforecited law.
[1]
Marasigan was never issued a visa. Neither was she given the
[11]
promised plane ticket. Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the
travel agency which issued the ticket and was informed that not only
was she not booked by appellant for the alleged flight, but that the
staff in the agency did not even know appellant.
Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of
appellant and was informed that appellant did not live there. Upon [12]
appellant so that she could meet her; however, she was not involved
in the transactions between her daughter and appellant. Neither
[15]
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be imposed if Illegal Recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein;
xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this
Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or
a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00, or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. x x x
[26]
xxx
xxx
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is
likewise found in the following provision of Rule 130:
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the
facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall
under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of
absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not
include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies
made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous
estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and
utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment
in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence,
may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a
crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a
[30]
recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is, the
offense is committed against three or more persons, individually or as
a group. [32]
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require
that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against
three or more persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the
evidence presented sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was
committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the same conclusion
cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as well.
The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del
Rosarios sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the
charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for illegal recruitment in
large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions
between appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses
claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del
Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as
they were not even present when Generillo and Del Rosario
negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third
element of illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly, that the
offense is committed against three or more persons, we cannot affirm
the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale. Nonetheless, we
agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant illegally recruited
Marasigan, for which she must be held liable for the lesser offense of
simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely
purchased a plane ticket for her is belied by the evidence as it is
undeniable that she represented to Marasigan that she had the ability
to send people to work as factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that
the fees paid to her were merely payments for a plane ticket is a
desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the charges and cannot
be sustained.
Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan
in charging appellant. The fact that Marasigan was poor does not
make her so heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against
appellant. She was a simple woman with big dreams and it was
appellants duplicity which reduced those dreams to
naught. Marasigan had no motive to testify falsely against appellant
except to tell the truth.[33]
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONINE B. SALEY
a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal
recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing forged
tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers.These
unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay exorbitant "placement"
fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they find themselves
unable to leave for their purported country of employment or, if they
are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This
Court once described their plight in a local proverb as
being naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala. [1]
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, appellant Antonine B.
[2]
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor
Code, five separate informations were also instituted against
appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of the
complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco
T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3)
Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these
indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at
Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment,
by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized
or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to be
false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were
completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from
the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the
damage and prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to Law. [5]
-0-
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had been submitted
to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case,
respectively, in -
appellant.
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the
complainants in applying for overseas employment with duly
accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a
commission. [21]
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to
see her again, this time asking for assistance in getting an
employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty
Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to
Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her tourist visa. For
Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant received from
Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt
therefor and delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours
which, in turn, issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in
Manila confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back
and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she did not like
the work she had in Korea. [23]
Korea but when someone informed the latter that she could have
a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her destination. Appellant
told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had already been
obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant
returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount to be
exchanged into dollars for her show money. Victoria issued a receipt
for the amount but appellant entrusted it to her former
lawyer.Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria. [27]
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline
Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was interested in securing a
tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for
her plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a
passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she was no
longer interested in going to Korea and that her passport application
should, instead, be diverted to Hongkong. In fact, Adeline was able to
leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because
when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the
agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of the P10,000.00 she
wanted. [28]
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision,
a Motion to Reopen Trial with an urgent motion to defer promulgation
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. In its order of 03 March
[34]
1995, the trial court, noting that the newly discovered evidence
consisted of affidavits of desistance of seven complainants, found no
merit in the motion. It held that presentation of the same does not give
valid ground for possible amendment of the decision as the private
complainants had already testified. It agreed with the prosecutor that
the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of satisfying the civil
liability.
[35]
The Judgment of the Trial Court. -
filed a notice of appeal. The trial court gave due course to the appeal
[40]
on 17 April 1995.[41]
avers that her transactions with the complainants have been limited to
her assisting them secure their respective travel visa specifically for
tourist and that her assistance to them (has been) only to refer them
to travel agencies such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the
Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts
solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to Maritess
Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions for bringing
in clients interested in getting tourist visas. [43]
appeal, which has been assigned only one docket number, involves
cases, although spawned under different circumstances could be said
to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the case for illegal
recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly
consolidated and heard jointly below. The appeal made directly to this
Court of the seventeen cases, each of which incidentally should have
been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is properly
taken.
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment
activity undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.
Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code
as referring -
x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and
2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34. [46]
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed,
violated the law against illegal recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that
appellant did represent herself as being in a position to get for the
aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs
abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and receive various
amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be briefed by
appellant on the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant
herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before
you were put to jail did you have any occupation?
"A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.
"Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any
other source of income?
"A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and
asked if I know some agencies who can assist them to go abroad.
"Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to
go abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas
employment?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q By whom?
"A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
"Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?
"A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International
is duly licensed by the government to recruit applicants abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where is that?
"A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is
licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go abroad.
"Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for
applicants going abroad what do you mean by applicants going abroad?
"A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for
abroad and they are being issued tickets.
"Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you remember some of them?
"A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan
and others. (Underscoring supplied.)[50]
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only
in acquiring for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On
cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made
referrals of job applicants to recruitment agencies. She evidently
[51]
knew all along that the persons she was dealing with were applicants
for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have
first been authorized by the POEA. Rule II, Book II, of the POEA
[52]
having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad. [54]
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry
Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in each of the
cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases
does not thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule
has always been that the testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not
that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not an uncommon
experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is necessary
[55]
only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness
has perjured himself or that his observations have veered from the
truth.
[56]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a
criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of
the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause.
As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible
testimonial evidence that the accused has involved himself in an act
of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be
justified.
[57]
imposing the penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for
each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted
correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated
against three or more persons "individually or as a group." Its
requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same
person does not have a license or authority to do that, and (3) the
questioned act is committed against three or more persons. The [61]
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person. Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been
[64]
so state that -
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be `that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed' under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be `within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed' for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty
is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case
exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the
imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws
should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months x x x."[66]
The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the maximum
term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum period
to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal
portions of time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one
period; hence -
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Quezon City[1] finding accused Rodolfo Navarra, Sr. and Job Navarra (hereafter
Rodolfo and Job, respectively) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in a large scale resulting to economic sabotage and sentencing each of
them to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos,
each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to return to
complainants the sums they received from them.
The Facts
Job and Rodolfo, along with Rodolfos wife[2] Corazon, operated an agency which
purported to have the authority to recruit and place workers for employment in
Taiwan. The agency[3] was named Rodolfo Navarras Travel Consultant and General
Services (RNTCGS),[4] which in the course of its operation was able to victimize
several hapless victims who never left Philippine soil, and in due time, filed
complaints with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (hereafter POEA)
against accused for illegal recruitment.
Neither RNTCGS nor Rodolfo, Corazon or Job in their personal capacities were
licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to
recruit workers for overseas employment.[5]
The trial court summarized the testimonies of complainants, thus:[6]
GLICERIA MARINAS singled out Job as the one who recruited her
for employment in Taiwan as a factory worker. She testified that she
was recruited by Job on April 24, 1992 at RNTCGS where she was told
that she and her co-applicants would leave for Taiwan two months after
they applied on April 24, 1992. She gave Job all the requirements the
agency asked for including her passport and birth certificate. She was
also required to pay a placement fee of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), although the receipt given to her was only for the amount
of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). She gave her passport to Job
and she handed the placement fee to Inday who gave it to Corazon in
her presence.[9]
LOIDA MACASO testified that she came to know Rodolfo when she
visited Inday on December 3, 1991, at Rodolfos house and Rodolfo and
Corazon recruited her to work as a factory worker in Taiwan. For this
purpose she paid the spouses ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
placement fee on January 8, 1992. She was never sent to Taiwan.[14]
On December 22, 1992, (PC) CIS agents arrested Inday Padawan after she
received placement fees from complainant Merlie Villesca.[15] The amount received
was one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) in one hundred peso (P100.00) bills, which were
dusted with ultraviolet powder.[16]
On February 26, 1993, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan Emily G.
Reyes, on detail with the Department of Justice, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 90, an information against accused for illegal recruitment
committed in a large scale. We quote:[17]
That on or about February, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto
in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement to MERLIE VILLESCA, GLICERIA
MARINAS, JOSE LLORET, BEINVENIDA AMUTAN, MELBA YACAS,
MARITES DE SAGUN, VILMA MARANA, ERNESTO AMUTAN,
FLORIE ROSE RAMOS, RONALD ALLAN SANTOS and HENRY
DELA CRUZ without first securing the required license and/or authority
from Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued for accused Corazon Navarra, said
warrants to be served by both the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Eastern Police District Command.
SO ORDERED. [20]
Economic Sabotage
Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P. D. No. 2018 provides that
illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any
of the following qualifying circumstances exists: First, when illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate. For purposes of the law, a syndicate exists when three or
more persons conspire or confederate with one another in carrying out any unlawful
or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme.[32] Second, there is economic sabotage
when illegal recruitment is committed in a large scale, as when it is committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group.[33]
The acts of accused-appellants showed unity of purpose. All these acts establish a
common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through
coordinated moves.[34]
Even assuming that there was no conspiracy, the record clearly shows illegal
recruitment committed in a large scale, since at least six (6) complainants were
victims, which is more than the minimum number of persons required by law to
constitute illegal recruitment in a large scale, resulting in economic sabotage.
Penalty Imposable
The penalty imposable on such offense is life imprisonment and a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).[35]
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 90 in Criminal Case No. 93-42592, dated December 29, 1994.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and
in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential
Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed
against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging
That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio
Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6)
Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos,
without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor. 1
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not
one of them was arrested. 2Hence, on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case
archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused. 3
Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties,
Rogelio Salado, requested on March 17, 1989 for a copy of the warrant of
arrest. 4 Eventually, at around midday of February 26, 1993, Nelly Agustin was apprehended
by the Paraaque police. 5 On March 8, 1993, her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and
requested that it be set for hearing "for purposes of due process and for the accused to
immediately have her day in court" 6 Thus, on April 15, 1993, the trial court reinstated the case
and set the arraignment for May 3, 1993, 7 on which date of Agustin pleaded not guilty 8 and
the case subsequently went to trial.
Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take
the witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987, he was
introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in
the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself
as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof
that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to
pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the
same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt. 9
Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his
relatives, went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila
where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency.
He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00,
instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at
the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance
that they could leave for abroad. 10
Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing
that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the
P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to
leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the
other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said
agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin
had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he
had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00. 11
Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo
Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to
see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in
Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and
her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to
give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of
P4,000.00. 12
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring
them to report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around
February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's
passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he
and his wife failed to leave for abroad. 13
As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on
June 7, 1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his
cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Paraaque. She informed him that "madalas
siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the
Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00. 16
On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to
Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time
in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad
before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to
follow up his application but to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money
he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin
about eight times, but he could no longer find her. 17
Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma
Goce were her neighbors at Tambo, Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters
and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was able to
send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned
complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce
couple, to which request she acceded. 18
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment
was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts
presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the
complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce
spouses. She failed to do so because in truth, so she claims, she does not know the
present address of the couple. All she knew was that they had left their residence in
1987. 19
Although she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and Alvarez, she
explained that it was entirely for different reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a
loan, while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that time. 20
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty
as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve
the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. 21
In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments: (1) her act of
introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the
Goce spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas
employment to the complainants. 22 These three arguments being interrelated, they will be
discussed together.
Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any
recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said
Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of these
qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a
syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large
scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case were not authorized
to engage in any recruitment activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia E.
Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, on November 10, 1987. Said certification states that Dan and
Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin are neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas
employment. 23 Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her counsel agreed to
stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit applicants for overseas
employment. Appellant, however, denies that she was in any way guilty of illegal
recruitment. 24
It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the
Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's
overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them, the complainants asked
her to introduce them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she
complied with their request. Such an act, appellant argues, does not fall within the
meaning of "referral" under the Labor Code to make her liable for illegal recruitment.
Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement. 25 On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an
applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a
selected employer, placement officer or bureau. 26
Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced
complainants to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that. The testimonial
evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially
approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned
about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after
they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement
agency.
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore
logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of
the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she
was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. 27
Despite Agustin's pretensions that she was but a neighbor of the Goce couple, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses paint a different picture. Rogelio Salado and
Dionisio Masaya testified that appellant represented herself as the manager of the Clover
Placement Agency. Ramona Salado was offered a job as a cutter/sewer by Agustin the
first time they met, while Ernesto Alvarez remembered that when he first met Agustin, the
latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis papunta sa Oman." 28 Indeed, Agustin played a
pivotal role in the operations of the recruitment agency, working together with the Goce couple.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a
worker abroad." 29 It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression
that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30
It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of
their applications. Her act of collecting from each of the complainants payment for their
respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry
expenses unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
In fact, appellant demanded and received from complainants amounts beyond the
allowable limit of P5,000.00 under government regulations. It is true that the mere act of a
cashier in receiving money far exceeding the amount allowed by law was not
considered per se as "recruitment and placement" in contemplation of law, but that was
because the recipient had no other participation in the transactions and did not conspire
with her co-accused in defrauding the victims. 31 That is not the case here.
Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were lost, hence only xerox
copies thereof were presented and which, under the circumstances, were admissible in
evidence. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses. 35
Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the prosecution as
secondary evidence are not allowable in court, still the absence thereof does not warrant
the acquittal of appellant. In People vs. Comia, 36where this particular issue was involved,
the Court held that the complainants' failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the
accused therein, as well as their consequent failure to present receipts before the trial court as
proof of the said payments, is not fatal to their case. The complainants duly proved by their
respective testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment process. Their
testimonies in this regard, being clear and positive, were declared sufficient to establish
that factum probandum.
Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting the version of the prosecution
witnesses, their statements being positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of
credit than the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The lame
defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence
presented by the prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 37
The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case essentially involves the
credibility of witnesses which is best left to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence
of abuse of discretion therein. The findings of fact of a trial court, arrived at only after a
hearing and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of
witnesses, certainly deserve respect by an appellate court. 38 Generally, the findings of fact
of the trial court on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 39
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate herself from conviction, appellant argues that there is no
proof of conspiracy between her and the Goce couple as to make her liable for illegal
recruitment. We do not agree. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly
establish that appellant confabulated with the Goces in their plan to deceive the
complainants. Although said accused couple have not been tried and convicted,
nonetheless there is sufficient basis for appellant's conviction as discussed above.
In People vs. Sendon, 40 we held that the non-prosecution of another suspect therein
provided no ground for the appellant concerned to fault the decision of the trial court convicting
her. The prosecution of other persons, equally or more culpable than herein appellant, may
come later after their true identities and addresses shall have been ascertained and said
malefactors duly taken into custody. We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule and
course of procedure should not apply in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Second
Division; HON. ERNESTO S.
DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor
Arbiter, NLRC; NCR, Arbitration
Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 25, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x
DECISION
against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the
employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months
and that she was underpaid.
On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper claiming that [4]
under her original one-year contract and the 2-year extended contract
which was with the knowledge and consent of Sunace, the following
amounts representing income tax and savings were deducted:
and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her, those
deducted in 1998 and 1999 were not. On even date, Sunace, by its
Proprietor/General Manager Maria Luisa Olarte, filed its Verified Answer
and Position Paper, claiming as follows, quoted verbatim:
[6]
3. Complainant could not anymore claim nor entitled for the refund of her 24
months savings as she already took back her saving already last year
and the employer did not deduct any money from her salary, in
accordance with a Fascimile Message from the respondent SUNACEs
employer, Jet Crown International Co. Ltd., a xerographic copy of
which is herewith attached as ANNEX 2 hereof;
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the complainant as the she
finished her one year contract and hence, was not illegally dismissed
by her employer. She could only lay claim over the tax refund or much
more be awarded of damages such as attorneys fees as said reliefs are
available only when the dismissal of a migrant worker is without just
valid or lawful cause as defined by law or contract.
The rationales behind the award of tax refund and payment of attorneys fees is
not to enrich the complainant but to compensate him for actual injury
suffered. Complainant did not suffer injury, hence, does not deserve to
be compensated for whatever kind of damages.
Divinas 2-year extension of her contract was without its knowledge and
consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom,
and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of
Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document
was annexed to said . . . ANSWER TO COMPLAINANTS POSITION PAPER.
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunaces claim that the extension of Divinas
contract for two more years was without its knowledge and consent in
this wise:
We reject Sunaces submission that it should not be held
responsible for the amount withheld because her contract was
extended for 2 more years without its knowledge and consent
because as Annex B[9] shows, Sunace and Edmund Wang have
not stopped communicating with each other and yet the matter
of the contracts extension and Sunaces alleged non-consent
thereto has not been categorically established.
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunaces argument that it is not liable on
account of Divinas execution of a Waiver and Quitclaim and an Affidavit
of Desistance. Observed the Labor Arbiter:
Via petition for certiorari, Sunace elevated the case to the Court
[15]
SO ORDERED.
review on certiorari.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker
to Sunace, the only basis of a finding of continuous communication,
reads verbatim:
xxxx
thus applies.
SO ORDERED.
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to protect the
poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In the case at bench, petitioner, a poor,
uncounselled entertainment dancer signed a contract with her Japanese employer calling
for a monthly salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later had
to sign an immoral side agreement reducing her salary below the minimum standard set
by the POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to collect her salary differentials, but incredibly
found public respondent straining the seams of our law to disfavor her. There is no greater
disappointment to the poor like petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the
beautiful rhetoric of laws. We will not allow this travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), 1 dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of public
respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N.
Sarmiento, dated February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid salaries
amounting to Six Thousand Dollars (US$6,000.00).
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the
honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena,
Jr.
(sgd. by petitioner) 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6)
months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months.
Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement
Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17,
1992. He ratiocinated, inter alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner herein) was
satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything regarding her employment in
Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant complaint on February
21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard Employment Contract on
December 1, 1988, she entered into a side agreement with the Japanese employer thru
her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion consenting to a monthly salary of US$750.00
which she affirmed during the conference of May 21, 1991. Respondent agency had no
knowledge nor participation in the said agreement such that it could not be faulted for
violation of the Standard Employment Contract regarding the stipulated salary. We cannot
take cognizance of such violation when one of the principal party (sic) thereto opted to
receive a salary different from what has been stipulated in their contract, especially so if
the contracting party did not consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant
(petitioner) cannot now demand from respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on)
the processed Employment Contract for she is now considered in bad faith and hence,
estopped from claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and agreeing to receive a
salary not in accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her self-imposed
silence for a long period of time worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed laches to
prevail which barred respondent from doing something at the outset. Normally, if a
person's right (is) violated, she/he would immediately react to protect her/his rights which
is not true in the case at bar.
The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in due
time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of action, thus, leading
another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This resulted in
placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . . Likewise, the
Supreme Court in one case held that not only is inaction within reasonable time to enforce
a right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of laches but such inaction evinces
implied consent or acquiescence to the violation of the right . . .
Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of the
Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if any, (it) not
being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers for abroad.
(Citations omitted.)
We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to the
respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the basis for Us to
arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable for her
claims.
The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between respondents
Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents Promotion.
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in
conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the
POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes
made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and
void; 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I,
Book VI of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, thus:
Book V, Rule II
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and review
employment standards in accordance with the market development and welfare
objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing market conditions.
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the minimum
requirements for contracts of employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for services rendered
beyond regular working hours in accordance with the standards established by the
Administration;
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance
with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus,
the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S.
Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment
standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is
a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless
overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10 There is
no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period
for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. 12 For this reason,
we hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate
Court . . . that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was more emphatic upholding the
rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore
cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than
the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd.
the agency's foreign principal are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages.
This is in accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract
which provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement
Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper implementation of the
terms and conditions in this Contract. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the poorest
sector of our society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in
suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in ill health, their
only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance
makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas,
endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work
under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do
is to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public officials who
should sympathize with the working class appear to have a different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA
Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER),
respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC,
dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held
jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On May 31, 2002, the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding that
the modification of respondents employment contract is not allowed
under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042);[5] thus, he
should have received the original contracted salary of US$370.00 per
month instead of the new rate given by SAAD. It was also noted that
respondent did not refute petitioners allegation regarding the
non-payment of placement and other processing fees prior to
deployment. The labor arbiter also found that there is no differential as
far as respondents overtime pay is concerned considering that he was
given overtime pay based on the new rate of SR 800.00. Since respondent
rendered one hour of overtime work per day for only 18 months, and not
the entire 24 months as claimed, the total overtime pay he received is
more or less equivalent to the amount he ought to have received if the
original contracted rate of US$370.00 was used. Finally, the labor arbiter
awarded respondent attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total
judgment award for being compelled to hire a counsel to protect his rights
and interests. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal by the petitioner, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, to wit:
SO ORDERED.[7]
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, this petition.
The labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
attorneys fees to respondent. It is settled that in actions for recovery of
wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to
protect his rights and interests, he is entitled to an award of attorneys
fees.[15] However, with regard to Unauthorized Deductions amounting to
P171,780.00;[16] we note that the appellate court did not state any basis
for its award, thus, the same is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, PERALTA, JJ.
INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC., Promulgated:
Respondents. March 24, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire
families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built
houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds
of businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting
ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided
the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and
economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not only
how much international migration impacts development, but how
smart public policies can magnify this effect.
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the
5 paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[2] to wit:
th
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.[6]
25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30, 1998) + 1,060.50[10]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal
of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner also appealed[16] to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA
erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[17] that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs
are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.[18]
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision,
to wit:
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[23] with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause.[24] After initially dismissing
the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed
by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the
case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme
Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker
back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor
Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to
decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the
Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues
raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for
back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of]
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in law in excluding from petitioners award the overtime pay
and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract
they form part of his salary.[28]
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition
as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary
award for his medical treatment and medication.[29] Required to comment,
counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution
of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the
constitutional question be resolved.[30]
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the
Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains
disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the
period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days
of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor
tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims
of illegally dismissed OFWs.Though there are conflicting rulings on this,
petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.[36]
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into
R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his
Memorandum, viz.:
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process
clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to
under his fixed-period employment contract.[39]
The Solicitor General (OSG)[41] points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took
effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was
not stipulated upon by the parties.[42]
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in
terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the
essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs
for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire
jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and
second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
[43] [44]
Commission and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, OFWs
are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status,
unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG
posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not
available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis
for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of
OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.[45]
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a
police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement
agencies for this redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare
the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies
helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and
are employed under decent and humane conditions.[46]
The Court's Ruling
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these
conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest
opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the
case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some
other ground.[51]
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly
involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the
CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months
only as provided under the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of
the subject clause.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive[57] is not tenable.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly
enacted have only a prospective operation,[58] and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected;[59] however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions
are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.[60] Thus, the non-impairment
clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be
enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties
thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995
preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly
the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather,
when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to
have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause
may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment
and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the
dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.[61] Police
power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally
applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for
all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare.[62]
Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members
of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection
of their rights and welfare.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress
to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1)
it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.[66]
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;[67] b)
the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that
the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;[68] and c)
strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[70] or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.[72]
xxxx
Further, the quest for a better and more equal world calls for
the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims equality as an
ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine
society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in all phases of national development, further explicitated
in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative
action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the
Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.
xxxx
xxxx
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at
two levels:
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his
10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and
6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court
made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and
Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division, October 1998),[81] which involved an OFW who
was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed after working
for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded
him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired
portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00
equivalent to his three months salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Period Applied in
Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired the Computation
Period Service Period of the Monetary
Award
Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Maguad[84]
Bahia Shipping 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
v. Reynaldo
Chua [85]
Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Transmarine v.
dela Cruz l[86]
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Falcon[87]
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
CA [88]
Oriental v. 12 months more than 2 10 months 3 months
CA [89] months
PCL v. 12 months more than 2 more or less 9 3 months
NLRC[90] months months
Olarte v. 12 months 21 days 11 months and 9 3 months
Nayona[91] days
JSS v. 12 months 16 days 11 months and 3 months
Ferrer[92] 24 days
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months 2 months and 23 2 months and 23
[93]
Adelantar and 7 days days days
Phil. Employ 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired portion
v. Paramio,
et al.[94]
Flourish 2 years 26 days 23 months and 4 6 months or 3
Maritime v. days months for each
Almanzor [95] year of contract
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 months 6 months or 3
Manpower v. months and and 28 days months for each
Villanos [96] 28 days year of contract
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs
into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The
second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary
award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims
were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied
by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The Court notes that the subject clause or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less contains the qualifying phrases
every year and unexpired term. By its ordinary meaning, the word term means a
limited or definite extent of time.[105] Corollarily, that every year is but part of an
unexpired term is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at
least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such
unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must
be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term
thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the
determination of when the subject clause for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less shall apply is not the length of the original
contract period as held in Marsaman,[106] but the length of the unexpired portion
of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired
portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires
that the original contract period be more than one year.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,[111] Article
299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and
other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot
leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment
of the contract.(Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan[112] read the disjunctive "or" in
Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers
who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This
interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de
France Company.[113] And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the
general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586,
local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount
stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On the computation
of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay[114] held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence,
and nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under
Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully
discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind
in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages
resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the
general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to
secure other employment of a like nature, and that other employment
of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an
employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment
his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled to
had he continued in such employment until the termination of the
period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark,
99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich.,
43.)[115] (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions
on fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3,
Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work),
Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.[116] Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for the
remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However,
it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,[117] the Court
carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying Article 1586
of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal
discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was
entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect.[118]
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure designed
to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the
liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting
hired by foreign employers. The limitation also protects the interest of local
placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos
in termination pay.[128]
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary,
shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction
over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the
foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement
agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are
unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To
protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in
deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep.
Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from
which the law originated;[130] but the speech makes no reference to the
underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for
none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision
on money claims, to wit:
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the
computation of money claims.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the
existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause
is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be
rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action
that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses
such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of
OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that
private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest
is odious.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration
of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the
clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,[131] Article XIII of
the Constitution.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow
on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with
the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through
executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional
agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then
Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial
precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection
-- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize
the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial
scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial
scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the
significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central
Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article
XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life
or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject
clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of
property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.[136]
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the
subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in
case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by
foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is
nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its
enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an
existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of
one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1,[137] Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work performed in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work
performed on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired
portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during
the actual service of the seamen.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, PERALTA, JJ.
INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC., Promulgated:
Respondents. March 24, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire
families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built
houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds
of businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting
ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided
the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and
economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not only
how much international migration impacts development, but how
smart public policies can magnify this effect.
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the
5 paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[2] to wit:
th
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.[6]
25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30, 1998) + 1,060.50[10]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal
of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner also appealed[16] to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA
erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[17] that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs
are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.[18]
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision,
to wit:
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[23] with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause.[24] After initially dismissing
the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed
by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the
case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme
Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker
back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor
Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to
decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the
Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues
raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for
back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of]
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in law in excluding from petitioners award the overtime pay
and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract
they form part of his salary.[28]
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition
as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary
award for his medical treatment and medication.[29] Required to comment,
counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution
of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the
constitutional question be resolved.[30]
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the
Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains
disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the
period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days
of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor
tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims
of illegally dismissed OFWs.Though there are conflicting rulings on this,
petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.[36]
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into
R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his
Memorandum, viz.:
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process
clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to
under his fixed-period employment contract.[39]
The Solicitor General (OSG)[41] points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took
effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was
not stipulated upon by the parties.[42]
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in
terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the
essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs
for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire
jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and
second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
[43] [44]
Commission and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, OFWs
are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status,
unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG
posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not
available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis
for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of
OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.[45]
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a
police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement
agencies for this redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare
the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies
helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and
are employed under decent and humane conditions.[46]
The Court's Ruling
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these
conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest
opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the
case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some
other ground.[51]
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly
involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the
CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months
only as provided under the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of
the subject clause.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive[57] is not tenable.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly
enacted have only a prospective operation,[58] and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected;[59] however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions
are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.[60] Thus, the non-impairment
clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be
enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties
thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995
preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly
the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather,
when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to
have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause
may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment
and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the
dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.[61] Police
power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally
applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for
all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare.[62]
Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members
of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection
of their rights and welfare.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress
to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1)
it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.[66]
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;[67] b)
the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that
the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;[68] and c)
strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[70] or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.[72]
xxxx
Further, the quest for a better and more equal world calls for
the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims equality as an
ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine
society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in all phases of national development, further explicitated
in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative
action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the
Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.
xxxx
xxxx
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at
two levels:
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his
10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and
6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court
made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and
Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division, October 1998),[81] which involved an OFW who
was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed after working
for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded
him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired
portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00
equivalent to his three months salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Period Applied in
Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired the Computation
Period Service Period of the Monetary
Award
Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Maguad[84]
Bahia Shipping 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
v. Reynaldo
Chua [85]
Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Transmarine v.
dela Cruz l[86]
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Falcon[87]
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
CA [88]
Oriental v. 12 months more than 2 10 months 3 months
CA [89] months
PCL v. 12 months more than 2 more or less 9 3 months
NLRC[90] months months
Olarte v. 12 months 21 days 11 months and 9 3 months
Nayona[91] days
JSS v. 12 months 16 days 11 months and 3 months
Ferrer[92] 24 days
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months 2 months and 23 2 months and 23
[93]
Adelantar and 7 days days days
Phil. Employ 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired portion
v. Paramio,
et al.[94]
Flourish 2 years 26 days 23 months and 4 6 months or 3
Maritime v. days months for each
Almanzor [95] year of contract
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 months 6 months or 3
Manpower v. months and and 28 days months for each
Villanos [96] 28 days year of contract
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs
into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The
second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary
award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims
were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied
by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The Court notes that the subject clause or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less contains the qualifying phrases
every year and unexpired term. By its ordinary meaning, the word term means a
limited or definite extent of time.[105] Corollarily, that every year is but part of an
unexpired term is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at
least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such
unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must
be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term
thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the
determination of when the subject clause for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less shall apply is not the length of the original
contract period as held in Marsaman,[106] but the length of the unexpired portion
of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired
portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires
that the original contract period be more than one year.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,[111] Article
299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and
other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot
leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment
of the contract.(Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan[112] read the disjunctive "or" in
Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers
who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This
interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de
France Company.[113] And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the
general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586,
local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount
stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On the computation
of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay[114] held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence,
and nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under
Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully
discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind
in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages
resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the
general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to
secure other employment of a like nature, and that other employment
of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an
employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment
his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled to
had he continued in such employment until the termination of the
period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark,
99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich.,
43.)[115] (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions
on fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3,
Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work),
Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.[116] Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for the
remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However,
it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,[117] the Court
carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying Article 1586
of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal
discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was
entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect.[118]
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure designed
to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the
liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting
hired by foreign employers. The limitation also protects the interest of local
placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos
in termination pay.[128]
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary,
shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction
over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the
foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement
agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are
unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To
protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in
deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep.
Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from
which the law originated;[130] but the speech makes no reference to the
underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for
none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision
on money claims, to wit:
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the
computation of money claims.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the
existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause
is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be
rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action
that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses
such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of
OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that
private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest
is odious.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration
of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the
clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,[131] Article XIII of
the Constitution.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow
on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with
the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through
executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional
agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then
Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial
precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection
-- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize
the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial
scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial
scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the
significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central
Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article
XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life
or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject
clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of
property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.[136]
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the
subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in
case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by
foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is
nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its
enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an
existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of
one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1,[137] Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work performed in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work
performed on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired
portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during
the actual service of the seamen.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
In his Medical Report[5] dated June 20, 1995, Dr. Hirst stated
that Aya-ay had a large central corneal perforation with
iris prolapse which appeared to be a result of a severe corneal
infection. He concluded that there was evidence of infection in the front of
the eye although the back of the eye was not grossly infected.[6]
After the parties had filed their respective position papers,[19] Labor
Arbiter Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz, by Decision[20] of July 4, 1997,
ordered Arpaphil to indemnify herein petitioners death benefits in the
amount of USD 50,000 and an additional USD 1,000 as burial assistance
for the death of their son.
xxx
After respondents and the NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed their respective Comments,[26] this Court referred the
petition to the CA by Resolution[27] of December 9, 1998, in view of its
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.[28]
xxxx
xxxx
c. In all cases, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries
of seamen the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
US$1,000 for burial expenses at exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment. (Underscoring supplied)
That a seaman died several months after his repatriation for illness
does not necessarily mean that: (a) he died of the same illness; (b) his
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which
caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some
reasonable basis to support otherwise.[44]
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
xxx
4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxx
c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he
leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the
seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he
is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician, but is [sic] no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman
shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return,
except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case the
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance
x x x.
We have gone into a judicious study and analysis of the arguments and
exhibits particularly the ones relied upon by the parties and find that of the
complainant worthy of consideration. Looking closely at Annexes D and E
of respondents position paper, there is hardly any clear affirmation that
complainant was fully fit to resume his work as radio operator. Although the
document alluded to, declares that complainant may be allowed to go back
to work, the tenor of the same seems uncertain that complainant is fit to
resume his work, and that assuming that such was the message, the words
may be can not be taken as overriding that coming from the Manila Doctor
Hospital which in the beginning handled the medical case of complainant
and to which respondents unconditionally referred him and by reason of
which six or seven medical especialists [sic] of the hospital took turn[s]
studying and reviewing his uncertain ailment after release by
respondents. Otherwise stated, unlike the message of annexes D to E of
respondents, annex C of complainant is clear and unmistakable and confirm
complainants partial permanent disability and his definite unfitness to go
back to his previous work due to his mental health. Some pronouncements
in this exhibit mentions also that when complainant was admitted an
emerging basis for drowsiness, behavioral change and off and on fever and
different procedures were resorted along his case, like emergency CT scan
on the brain and his admission in June 24, 1995 was catastropic, whereas,
more could be said in three document[s] issued by Dra. Victoria Florendo
Cayabyab.
On the basis of the above therefore, and convinced that complainants partial
permanent disability which was contracted in the course or on account of his
employment as radio operator in foreign principals vessel, he is entitled to
disability benefit in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in
Appendix 1 of the Contract, the maximum of which is US $50,000. But
since the amount prayed for is US$25,000.00 which we presume has a more
realistic basis, the same is hereby granted.
Concerning the sickness wage, respondents averred that the same had
already been paid. However, there is no evidence that the same has been
paid except the payment to the complainant of P49,546.00. Since
complainants salary as US$870 and a seamans sick wage entitlement is
fixed to a maximum of 120 days, his sickness wages would rest to a total
sum of US$3,480 or its peso equivalent. On this, complainant has been paid
only [P]49,546.00 (US$1,943), thereby leaving for complainant a balance of
US$1,537. Finally, it is also argued that as regards the balance, the same has
been paid citing as proof the Sickness Release and Quitclaim signed by
complainant (Annexes C & C-1). Complainant, on the other hand denied
this, and contended that the quitclaim and release is invalid. Considering
that there is no proof on record that this balance of US$1,537 was paid,
unlike the P49,546.00, the same is granted.
all in the aggregate of Twenty Six Thousand One Hundred Thirty Seven
Dollars (US$26,137.00) or its peso equivalent, the claim for damages being
hereby dismissed for lack of merit, plus ten (10%) percent attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
On 29 July 1998, the NLRC[3] affirmed the labor arbiters decision in toto and
declared that the latters findings and conclusions were supported by substantial
evidence.[4] After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC on 20 May
1999, petitioners repaired to the Court of Appeals.[5] The appellate courts assailed
decision was promulgated on 1 December 1999, upholding the decision of the NLRC,
with the modification that petitioners were ordered to pay private respondent
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00. The appellate court reasoned out its
decision,[6] thus -
The basic issue here is: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay private
respondents claim as awarded by the NLRC, and whether or not there was
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in affirming such decision on
appeal? To resolve this issue, this Court took time in looking closely at the
pertinent provision of the Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels,
particularly PART II, SECTION C, par. no. 4 (c), and par. no. 5, which
states as follows:
4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he
leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the
seaman is entitled to hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is
declared fit to work or his degree of permanent disability has been assessed
by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. x x x x
xxx...
The award of disability compensation has a clear and valid basis in the
Standard Employment Contract and the facts as supported by the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Nannette Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors
Hospital. Petitioners contention, that Dr. Domingo-Reyes is not company
designated is far from the truth. The designation of the Manila Doctors
Hospital by petitioners as the company doctor for private respondent cannot
be denied. Their very act of committing private respondent for treatment at
the Manila Doctors Hospital under the care of its physician is tantamount to
company designation.The very act of paying the hospital bills by the
petitioners constitutes their confirmation of such designation. Hence,
petitioners cannot resort to the convenience of denying this fact just to evade
their obligation to pay private respondent of his claims for disability benefit.
This Court also finds no basis on (sic) the petitioners contention that the
company-designated [physician] must also be accredited with the POEA
before he can engage in the medical treatment of a sick seaman. There is
nothing in the Standard Employment Contract that provides this
accreditation requirement, and even if there is, this would be absurd and
contrary to public policy as its effect will deny and deprive the ailing
seaman of his basic right to seek immediate medical attention from any
competent physician. The lack of POEA accreditation of a physician who
actually treated the ailing seaman does not render the findings of such
physician (declaring the seaman permanently disabled) less authoritative or
credible. To our mind, it is the competence of the attending physician, not
the POEA accreditation, that determines the true health status of the
patient-seaman, which in this instant case, is [sic] the attending physicians
from the Manila Doctors Hospital.
As to the award of the balance of wages, this Court is inclined not to disturb
the factual findings of the NLRC. The failure of the petitioners to present a
strong and credible evidence supporting the fact of alleged payment of the
balance of sickness justifies the award of such claim. The long standing
doctrine in labor cases that in case of doubt, the doubt is resolved in favor of
labor applies. For there are indications that the evidence presented by
petitioners appears to be of dubious origin as private respondent challenged
the petitioners to present the original copy of the quitclaim and the vouchers
in a motion demanding from petitioners to produce the original copy of
those documents purporting to show that he had received the alleged sum
of P39,803.30, which allegedly shows the payment of the balance of his
sickness wages. This motion was vehemently opposed by petitioners. To our
mind, such opposition only created more doubts and eroded the veracity and
credence of petitioners documentary evidence.
As to the award of attorneys fees, the same is justified by the fact that
private respondent actually hired the services of a lawyer to vindicate his
right to claim for his disability benefit which is being arbitrarily denied to
him by petitioners. Had it not been for the arbitrary denial of petitioners,
private respondent could not have been compelled to hire the services of a
lawyer to pursue his claims in court, for which he is presumed to have
incurred costs.
With respect to private respondents claim for damages, this Court finds that
the NLRC overlooked the attendance of negligence on the part of petitioners
in their failure to provide immediate medical attention to private
respondent. It further appears that negligence not only exists but was
deliberately perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal to commit the
ailing private respondent to a hospital in New Zealand or at any nearest port
deprived of his right to immediate medical attention by petitioners, which
resulted to the serious deterioration of his health that caused his permanent
partial disability. Such deprivation of immediate medical attention appears
deliberate by the clear manifestation from petitioners own words which
states that, the proposition of the complainant that respondents should have
taken the complainant to the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than
done. It is worthy to note that deviation from the route of the vessel will
definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars not only to the respondents but
likewise to the owners of the cargoes being shipped by the said vessel.
By petitioners own statement, they reveal their utter lack of concern for their
Filipino crew. This kind of attitude cannot be taken to pass by this Court
without appropriate sanction by way of payment of exemplary damages, if
only to show that the life of a Filipino crew must be accorded due attention
and respect by the petitioners. For after all, had it not been for the toils of
this crew, among others, petitioners would not be doing as good in their
business and making fortunes in dollars.
In affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, this Court finds that the
NLRC never abused its discretion nor exceeded its jurisdiction.
Hence, this Court finds no valid basis to disturb the findings of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 29 July 1998, and the Order
dated 20 May 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED, and in addition thereto,
petitioners are ordered to pay exemplary damages to private respondent in
the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of 11 February 2000. Hence, the present appeal.
Disability Benefits
Petitioners contend that the existence and degree of a seamans disability must be
declared by a company-designated physician who must be accredited with the
POEA. Following this line of reasoning, petitioners claim that private respondent is
not entitled to disability benefits because he was found fit to return to work by Dr.
Victoria Florendo Cayabyab, the designated physician of petitioners, who is also
accredited with the POEA.[7]
Disagreeing with petitioners stand, the labor arbiter ruled that, for purposes of
determining compensation benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, an
ailing seaman need not have his condition assessed by a doctor or hospital accredited
with the POEA. Consequently, the labor arbiter gave more weight to the opinion of
the specialists from the Manila Doctors Hospital who treated private respondent and
declared him as having sustained a partial permanent disability and unfit to go back to
his previous work.[8] Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners act of
committing private respondent for treatment at the Manila Doctors Hospital and of
paying his hospital bills therein is tantamount to company-designation, and therefore,
the certificate issued by Dr. Nanette Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital
describing private respondent as suffering from a partial permanent disability should
be construed as decisive in the matter of private respondents entitlement to disability
benefits. The appellate court also declared that nothing in the Standard Employment
Contract requires the company-designated physician or hospital to also be accredited
with the POEA.[9]
In the case at bar, the parties are at odds as to the proper interpretation of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino
Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract),
particularly Part II, Section C thereof, which provides that
xxx xxx xxx
4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:
a. The employer shall continue to pay the seaman his basic wages during the
time he is on board the vessel;
c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he
leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the
seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he
is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman
shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return
except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written
notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.
Failure of the seaman to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
Appendix 1
HEAD
APPENDIX 1-A
2 x 88.81%
3 x 78.36%
4 x 68.66%
5 x 58.96%
6 x 50.00%
7 x 41.80%
8 x 33.59%
9 x 26.12%
10 x 20.15%
11 x 14.93%
12 x 10.45%
13 x 6.72%
14 x 3.74%
Burr hole at the right parietal and drainage of the right thalamic abscess was
done on June 26, 1995. Repair of shallow fornix of left eye and biopsy was
done for culture studies thereafter.
Mr. De Lara stayed in the hospital for 33 days and was still in bedridden
state when discharge. He became ambulant on mid-August 1996 but his
cerebral functions (cognitive and behavioral) remain impaired.
This is his 18th month of illness. His admission last June 24, 1995 is
considered catastrophic. He now can be classified under partial permanent
disability and is not fit to go back to his previous work due to his mental
state.[16] (emphasis supplied)
Sickness wages
Petitioners assert that the award of $1,137.00, representing the balance of the
sickness wages owed to private respondent, is erroneous and in absolute disregard of
their documentary evidence - particularly the three check vouchers in the total amount
of P89,354.80, all issued in 1995 in favor of either private respondent or his wife, and
the Sickwages Release & Quitclaim - which, according to petitioners, taken together
would prove that they had paid private respondent the total amount of P89,354.80, or
$3,480.00, corresponding to the 120 days sickness wages as required under the
Standard Employment Contract.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the labor arbiter held that only P49,546.00
($1,943.00) was paid by petitioners and that private respondent is still entitled to the
balance of the sickness wages in the amount of $1,537.00. According to the labor
arbiter, petitioners failed to prove that they had paid this amount to private respondent,
notwithstanding the document entitled Sickness Release & Quitclaim introduced by
petitioners in evidence, which was not given credence.[17] The NLRC and the Court of
Appeals concurred with the labor arbiter on this issue. The appellate court held that
the documentary evidence of petitioners was insufficient to support their
contentions.[18]
The Supreme Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of
fact of the NLRC, particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when
supported by substantial evidence. The reason for this is that a quasi-judicial agency
like the NLRC has acquired a unique expertise because its jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters.[19] Whether or not petitioners actually paid the balance of the sickness
wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the absence of proof that the
labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abused their discretion, the Court shall deem
conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding.[20]
Damages
We affirm the appellate courts finding that petitioners are guilty of negligence in
failing to provide immediate medical attention to private respondent. It has been
sufficiently established that, while the M/V T.A. VOYAGER was docked at the port
of New Zealand, private respondent was taken ill, causing him to lose his memory and
rendering him incapable of performing his work as radio officer of the vessel. The
crew immediately notified the master of the vessel of private respondents worsening
condition. However, instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may
receive immediate medical attention at a hospital in New Zealand or at a nearby port,
the master of the vessel proceeded with the voyage, in total disregard of the urgency
of private respondents condition. Private respondent was kept on board without any
medical attention whatsoever for the entire duration of the trip from New Zealand to
the Philippines, a voyage of ten days. To make matters worse, when the vessel finally
arrived in Manila, petitioners failed to directly disembark private respondent for
immediate hospitalization. Private respondent was made to suffer a wait of several
more hours until a vacant slot was available at the pier for the vessel to dock. It was
only upon the insistence of private respondents relatives that petitioners were
compelled to disembark private respondent and finally commit him to a
hospital.[21] There is no doubt that the failure of petitioners to provide private
respondent with the necessary medical care caused the rapid deterioration and
inevitable worsening of the latters condition, which eventually resulted in his
sustaining a permanent disability.
In light of the foregoing, petitioners are liable for moral damages for the physical
suffering and mental anguish caused to private respondent.[22] There is no hard and
fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[23] In the present case,
the Court considers the amount of P50,000.00 in moral damages as proper.[24]
Meanwhile, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. They are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. While exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before
the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded.[25] In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.[26] Coming now to the case at bar, the appellate court
found that
Petitioners never denied making this statement. Given the prevailing circumstances,
the appellate courts award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is adequate, fair, and
reasonable.[27]
Although the labor arbiter awarded attorneys fees, which award was subsequently
affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the basis for the same was not
discussed in his decision nor borne out by the records of this case, and should
therefore be deleted. There must always be a factual basis for the award of attorneys
fees.[28] This is consistent with the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate.[29]
WHEREFORE, the 1 December 1999 Decision and 11 February 2000
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the modification that
petitioners must also pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages and the
award of attorneys fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
Present:
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
THE FACTS:
SO ORDERED.[13]
xxxxxxxxx
2. x x x x x x
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer
still requires medical attention arising from
said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at
cost to the employer until such time he is
declared fit or the degree of his disability has
been established by the company-designated
physician.
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
II
III
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING PETITONERS
SEPARATE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.[22]
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for having been filed out of
[9]
time, it finding that per Registry Receipt address[ed] to [petitioners
counsel], copy of the Labor Arbiters decision was received by them on
July 12, 2005, hence, the ten (10) day reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal was up to July 22, 2005.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for, inter alia, failure
to show that Marcelo R. Raenes (Raeses), Vice President of petitioner
NYK-FIL Ship Management who signed the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, was authorized to sign for and in behalf of the
said company.[15] Petitioners filed a Motion for
[16]
Reconsideration, attaching a copy of the Board Resolution of NYK-Fil
Ship Management, Inc. authorizing Raeses to sign the required
verification and certification at any stage of the subject case. Their motion
was denied,[17] hence, the present Petition[18] raising the sole issue of:
II
III
IV
xxxx
xxxx
IMPRESSION:
Lumbar spondylopathy
Lumbar disc protrusion, L5-S1
xxxx
xxxx
respondent had a rating above AB and that his disability was assessed at
50% or more under Appendix B of the CBA to merit the award of 100%
compensation or $80,000 disability benefit and 10% thereof or $8,000
attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
JESUS B. BARRAQUIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x--------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Assailed via petition for review on certiorari is the Court of
Appeals[1] Decision of November 13, 2006 holding Virjen Shipping
Corporation, Capt. Renato Morente and Odyssey Maritime PTE. Ltd.
(petitioners) liable to Jesus B. Barraquio (respondent) for payment of
sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days, disability benefits, accrued
interest, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Before the contract was executed, respondent was made to undergo the
routine Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) at S.M. Lazo
Medical Clinic, Inc. and was found to be fit to work by the attending
physician Dr. Jose Dante V. Jacinto.
Twenty one (21) days later or on April 13, 2000, while the vessel was
docked in Korea, respondent requested medical attention due to chest
pains and hypertension and was brought to the Hyundai Surgical Center.
The attending physician made no pronouncement as to respondents
fitness for work but made the following diagnosis:
xxxx
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Where, as in the present case, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter arrived
at conflicting decisions and the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as partly
affirmed by the appellate court, appear to be contrary to the evidence at
hand, the Court finds the need to review the records to distill the facts.
B. x x x
Promulgated:
SILVINO A. NAZAM, October 11, 2010
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
SEPT 16 2004
__________(SGD)__________________
BOSUN SILVINO A. NAZAM
xxxx
3. upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the
seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one-hundred twenty (120) days.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
CORONA, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
CATALINO U. VILLAMATER and/or MENDOZA, JJ.
The Heirs of the Late Catalino U.
Villamater, represented herein by Sonia
Mayuyu Villamater; and NATIONAL Promulgated:
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents. March 3, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners received the June 15, 2004 resolution of the NLRC, denying
their motion for reconsideration, on June 16, 2004. They filed their
petition for certiorari before the CA only on August 9, 2004,[14] or 54
calendar days from the date of notice of the June 15, 2004
resolution. Considering that the above-mentioned 10-day period had
lapsed without petitioners filing the appropriate appeal, the NLRC issued
an Entry of Judgment dated June 28, 2004.
Moreover, by reason of the finality of the June 15, 2004 NLRC resolution,
the Labor Arbiter issued on July 29, 2004 a Writ of
Execution.[15] Consequently, Leonis voluntarily paid Villamaters widow,
Sonia M. Villamater (Sonia), the amount of P3,649,800.00, with Rizal
Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) Managers Check No.
0000008550[16] dated August 12, 2004, as evidenced by the
Acknowledgment Receipt[17] dated August 13, 2004, and the Cheque
Voucher[18] dated August 12, 2004.Following the complete satisfaction of
the judgment award, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[19] dated
September 8, 2004 that reads
SO ORDERED.
However, petitioners argued that the finality of the case did not render the
petition for certiorari before the CA moot and academic. On this point,
we agree with petitioners.
Further, a petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into
the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as
distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a
special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon
petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously
and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will
lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must
be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that
the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse
of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot
make this determination without looking into the evidence of the
parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the materiality
or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in
relation to all other evidence on record.[22] Notably, if the CA grants the
petition and nullifies the
decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or
resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab
initio; hence, the decision or resolution never became final and
executory.[23]
RULE VIII
xxxx
Second. We also agree with petitioners in their position that the CA erred
in dismissing outright their petition for certiorari on the ground of
non-joinder of indispensable parties.It should be noted that petitioners
impleaded only the then deceased Villamater[26] as respondent to the
petition, excluding his heirs.
We disagree.
It is true that under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Contract, only
two types of cancers are listed as occupational diseases (1) Cancer of the
epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder); and (2) cancer,
epithellematous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the
eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound
products or residues of these substances. Section 20 of the same Contract
also states that those illnesses not listed under Section 32 are disputably
presumed as work-related. Section 20 should, however, be read together
with Section 32-A on the conditions to be satisfied for an illness to be
compensable,[31] to wit:
DECISION
This Petition for Review assails the January 31, 2005 Decision[2] and the April
4, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No.
85584. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed before it assailing the
May 7, 2003 Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
ordering petitioners to pay to Evelyn J. Navarra (Evelyn), the surviving spouse
of deceased Federico U. Navarra, Jr. (Federico), death compensation,
allowances of the three minor children, burial expenses plus 10% of the total
monetary awards as and for attorney's fees.
Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 1998, Federico arrived back in the Philippines. On April 21,
1998 the specimen excised from his neck lymph node was found negative for
malignancy.[5] On June 4, 1998, he was diagnosed at the Philippine General
Hospital to be suffering from a form of cancer called Hodgkin's Lymphoma,
Nodular Sclerosing Type (also known as Hodgkin's Disease). This diagnosis
was confirmed in another test conducted at the Medical Center Manila on June
8, 1998.
During the pendency of the case, on April 29, 2000, Federico died. His widow,
Evelyn, substituted him as party complainant on her own behalf and in behalf
of their three children. The claim for disability benefits was then converted into
a claim for death benefits.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On May 7, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision reversing that of the Labor
Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which provides:
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA found that the claim for benefits had not yet prescribed despite the
complaint being filed more than one year after Federico's return to the
Philippines. It also found that although Federico died 17 months after his
contract had expired, his heirs could still claim death benefits because the cause
of his death was the same illness for which he was repatriated. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision states:
SO ORDERED.[8]
After the denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed
the present petition for review.
Issues
I
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY DESPITE THE LATE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT
FEDERICO U. NAVARRA, JR.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT HODGKIN'S DISEASE IS A COMPENSABLE
ILLNESS.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF THE RESPONDENT AS SUCH DEATH WAS
DURING THE TERM OF HIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.[9]
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners contend that the factual findings of the CA were not supported by
sufficient evidence. They argue that as can be seen from the medical report of
Dr. Salim Marangat Paul, Federico suffered from and was treated for Acute
Respiratory Tract Infection, not Hodgkin's Disease, during his employment in
March 1998. They further contend that Federico returned to the Philippines on
March 30, 1998 because he had already finished his contract, not because he
had to undergo further medical treatment.
They also insist that the complaint has already prescribed. Despite having been
diagnosed on June 4, 1998 of Hodgkin's Disease, the complaint was filed only
on September 6, 1999, one year and five months after Federico arrived in
Manila from Qatar.
They also posit that respondents are not entitled to the benefits claimed because
Federico did not die during the term of his contract and the cause of his death
was not contracted by him during the term of his contract.
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents on the other hand contend that the complaint has not prescribed
and that the prescriptive period for filing seafarer claims is three years from the
time the cause of action accrued. They claim that in case of conflict between
the law and the POEA Contract, it is the law that prevails.
Respondents also submit that Federico contracted on board the vessel the
illness which later caused his death, hence it is compensable.
Our Ruling
Prescription
The employment contract signed by Federico stated that "the same shall be
deemed an integral part of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers,"
Section 28 of which states:
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Article 291 is the law
governing the prescription of money claims of seafarers, a class of overseas
contract workers. This law prevails over Section 28 of the Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers which provides for claims to be brought
only within one year from the date of the seafarers return to the point of
hire. Thus, for the guidance of all, Section 28 of the Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers, insofar as it limits the prescriptive period within which
the seafarers may file their money claims, is hereby declared null and void. The
applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code, it being more favorable
to the seafarers and more in accord with the States declared policy to afford full
protection to labor. The prescriptive period in the present case is thus three
years from the time the cause of action accrues.
In the present case, there is no exact showing of when the cause of action
accrued. Nevertheless, it could not have accrued earlier than January 21, 1998
which is the date of his last contract.Hence, the claim has not yet prescribed,
since the complaint was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on
September 6, 1999.
In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised, the
only exceptions being when the factual findings of the appellate court are
erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, or contrary to the
findings culled by the court of origin. Considering the conflicting findings of
the NLRC, the CA and the Labor Arbiter, we are impelled to resolve the
factual issues in this case along with the legal ones.[15]
Moreover, there is no showing that the cancer was brought about by Federico's
stint on board petitioners' vessel. The records show that he got sick a month
after he boarded M/V George Mcleod. He was then brought to a doctor who
diagnosed him to have acute respiratory tract infection. It was only on June 6,
1998, more than two months after his contract with petitioners had expired, that
he was diagnosed to have Hodgkin's Disease. There is no proof and we are not
convinced that his exposure to the motor fumes of the vessel, as alleged by
Federico, caused or aggravated his Hodgkin's Disease.
While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in
construing the Standard Employment Contract, we cannot allow claims for
compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates
compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause
injustice to the employer.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer there may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but
never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to the employer.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 31, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85584 holding that the
claim for death benefits has not yet prescribed
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are not liable to pay
to respondents death compensation benefits for lack of showing that Federicos
disease was brought about by his stint on board petitioners vessels and also
considering that his death occurred after the effectivity of his contract.
SO ORDERED.
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
WALLEM MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., and WALLEM Promulgated:
SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD.,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
On December 5, 1997, Rodolfo claimed his leave pay and one day
travel allowance from Wallem Shipping.[8]
On July 26, 1999, Lourdes filed a claim for death benefits, burial
assistance, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The case was
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. OFW (M)99-07-1152.[13]
For their part, the respondents alleged that the complaint stated no
cause of action. They pointed out that in response to the
complainants pro-forma Complaint dated July 19, 1999, they filed a
Motion for Bill of Particulars, to which the complainant failed to respond,
much less appear at the scheduled hearings of the case. When she
appeared on October 13, 1999, she manifested that the parties be required
to simultaneously file their respective position papers.
SO ORDERED.[18]
SO ORDERED.[20]
The petitioner now comes before the Court on the following sole
issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim the death benefits
under the POEA Contract which arose from the death of seafarer
Rodolfo Rivera and what amount of evidence is required from the
petitioner to prove her entitlement thereto.[21]
For their part, the respondents claim that the instant petition
involves a pure question of fact, outside the scope of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the CA
are supported by evidence sufficient to justify the decision. The
respondents also point out that the petitioner received a copy of the CA
Decision on May 13, 2003, and filed the Motion for Reconsideration only
on May 29, 2003; thus, the requisite motion for reconsideration initiated
by the petitioner before the CA was filed out of time (one day late).
Consequently, the instant petition for review was, likewise, filed out of
time.
The respondents also point out that the deceased seafarer died more
than one year after the termination of the employment contract. They
allege that death benefits claims will only prosper if the seafarer died
during the term of the contract. Assuming that the instant claim had been
anchored on a disability or ailment acquired during the term of the
contract, the ailing seaman is still required to report for a medical
check-up within three working days from the date of arrival, otherwise,
benefits under the POEA standard employment contract would be
nullified. The respondents point out that in this case, the deceased seaman
failed to report within the said period. Thus, the respondents pray that the
instant petition for review be dismissed for utter lack of merit and for
being filed out of time.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find any basis to
grant private respondents claim for disability benefits. Rivera was
repatriated after the completion of his contract and not because he was
ill. The procedure provided for under Paragraph 3, Section 20(B) was
not also complied with. Moreover, the Medical Certificate submitted
by private respondent does not sufficiently prove Riveras sickness was
work-related. As such, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it
reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.[32]
SO ORDERED.
ATCI OVERSEAS G.R. No. 178551
CORPORATION, AMALIA
G. IKDAL and MINISTRY Present:
OF PUBLIC
HEALTH-KUWAIT CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J.,
Petitioners, BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
- versus - SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 11, 2010
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent.
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DECISION
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of
the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.[9] Verily,
to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign
principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and
solidary liability inutile.
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SO ORDERED.