New Perspectives on South-East Europe Series

Series Editors: Spyros Economides, Senior Lecturer in International Relations

and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Kevin Featherstone, Professor of Contemporary Greek Studies, London School
of Economics and Political Science, UK
Sevket Pamuk, Professor of Contemporary Turkish Studies, London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK

Series Advisory Board:

Richard Crampton, Emeritus Professor of Eastern European History at
St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford
Vladimir Gligorov, Staff Economist specialising in Balkan countries, The Vienna
Institute for International Economic Studies, Austria
Jacques Rupnik, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre dtudes et de recherches
internationales of Sciences Po, France
Susan Woodward, Professor, The Graduate Programme in Political Science at
The City University of New York, USA.

South-East Europe presents a compelling agenda: a region that has challenged

European identities, values and interests like no other at formative periods of
modern history, and is now undergoing a set of complex transitions. It is a region
made up of new and old European Union member states, as well as aspiring ones;
early democratising states and new post-communist regimes; states undergoing
liberalising economic reforms, partially inspired by external forces, whilst coping
with their own embedded nationalisms; and states obliged to respond to new
and recurring issues of security, identity, well-being, social integration, faith and
secularisation.

This series examines issues of inheritance and adaptation. The disciplinary reach
incorporates politics and international relations, modern history, economics and
political economy and sociology. It links the study of South East-Europe across
a number of social sciences to European issues of democratisation and economic
reform in the post-transition age. It addresses ideas as well as institutions;
policies as well as processes. It will include studies of the domestic and foreign
policies of single states, relations between states and peoples in the region, and
between the region and beyond. The EU is an obvious reference point for current
research on South-East Europe, but this series also highlights the importance of
South-East Europe in its eastern context; the Caucuses; the Black Sea and the
Middle East.

Titles in the series include:

Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyrek and Umut zkirimli (editors)
NATIONALISM IN THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey
William Bartlett, Jadranka Bozikov and Bernd Rechel (editors)
HEALTH REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE
Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, James Ker-Lindsay and Denisa Kostovicova (editors)
CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis,
Georgios Niarchos
THE LAST OTTOMANS
The Muslim Minority of Greece 19411949
Alexis Heraclides
THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT IN THE AEGEAN
Imagined Enemies
Markus Ketola
EUROPEANIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
The Impact of the EU Accession Process on Turkish NGOs

New Perspectives on South-East Europe

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Civil Society and
Transitions in the Western
Balkans
Edited by

Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic
Senior Research Fellow, Department of International Development, London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK

James Ker-Lindsay
Senior Research Fellow, European Institute, London School of Economics and
Political Science, UK

and

Denisa Kostovicova
Senior Lecturer in Global Politics, Department of Government,
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Selection and editorial matter Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, James Ker-Lindsay
and Denisa Kostovicova 2013
All other chapters their respective authors 2013
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-0-230-29289-5
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication
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First published 2013 by
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Contents

List of Tables vii

Notes on Contributors viii
Acknowledgements xi
List of Acronyms xii

Introduction: Civil Society and Multiple Transitions Meanings,

Actors and Effects 1
Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic
Part I State-Building
1 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil
Society in the Western Balkans 29
John OBrennan
2 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia: An Assessment of EU Assistance and
Intervention 47
Adam Fagan
3 Contesting the Rule of Law: Civil Society and Legal
Institutions 71
Iavor Rangelov
4 A Practitioners Perspective 85
Giulio Venneri
Part II Democratisation
5 Democratisation through Defiance? The Albanian Civil
Organisation Self-Determination and International
Supervision in Kosovo 95
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers
6 Nationalism and Civil Society Organisations in
Post-Independence Kosovo 117
Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica

v
vi Contents

7 The Diaspora Dilemma: CroatianAmerican Civil Society

Institutions and their Political Role in the Democratisation
of the Homeland 135
Anita Brkanic
8 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia 155
Nenad Markovic
9 A Practitioners Perspective: Post-Conflict Civil Society
Development in the Balkans 170
Joanna Hanson
Part III Post-Conflict Reconstruction
10 Civil Society and the Bosnian Police Certification Process:
Challenging the Guardians 177
Gemma Collantes-Celador
11 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor:
Build-Up and Stand-Down of the KPC in Kosovo 196
Jens Narten
12 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space: NGOs,
the Public and Coming to Terms with the Past 210
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
13 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present? Human
Rights NGOs and Truth-Telling in Post-Miloevic Serbia 230
Mladen Ostojic
14 A Practitioners Perspective 248
Florence Hartmann
Conclusion 257
James Ker-Lindsay

Index 265
List of Tables

0.1 Civil society in multiple transitions 12

2.1 Human resources 57
2.2 Organisation established 57
2.3 Duration of the project 59
2.4 Size of grants 59
2.5 First application to the EU? 61
2.6 Location of organisation 61
2.7 Does the project involve you working with state/
government? 62
2.8 Does the project involve you working with other
organisations? 63
5.1 World view and juxtapositions as extracted from Lvizje
VETVENDOSJE!s publications 100
8.1 Attitudes of young people towards certain social groups 160

vii
Notes on Contributors

Editors

Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic is Senior Research Fellow at the Civil Society

and Human Security Research Unit in the Department of International
Development and the European Institute at the London School of
Economics and Political Science. She is the co-editor of Transnationalism
in the Balkans (2008) and Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age
(2009).

James Ker-Lindsay is Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the

Politics of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School
of Economics and Political Science. His publications include Kosovo: The
Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (2009) and New Perspectives on
Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (co-edited, 2010).

Denisa Kostovicova is Senior Lecturer in Global Politics in the

Department of Government at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. She is the author of Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and
Space (2005) and the co-editor of Transnationalism in the Balkans (2008),
Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age (2009) and Bottom-Up Politics:
An Agency-Centred Approach to Globalization (2011).

Contributors

Anita Brkanic is a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics

and Political Science. Her research focuses on Diaspora mobilisation
processes. She also works at the International Secretariat of Amnesty
International on human rights concerns in the Balkans.

Gemma Collantes-Celador is Lecturer in International Politics at City

University London. She researches the reform of police forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the European Unions involvement in security sector reform
and the concept of human security.

Adam Fagan is Professor of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.

His research focuses on the Europeanisation of the post-conflict former
Yugoslav states. He is the author of Europes Balkan Dilemma: Paths to
State-Building or Civil Society? (2009).

viii
 Notes on Contributors ix

Joanna Hanson is Research Analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office where she has worked mainly on the Western Balkans, in par-
ticular Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. She has also covered the Polish
portfolio in Research Analysis.
Florence Hartmann served as spokesperson (20006) for the Chief
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. Previously, she was Balkans correspondent for
Le Monde.
Nenad Markovic is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department
of the Law Faculty Justinian I in Skopje, where he also works as a teach-
ing assistant/lecturer. He researches political theory, civil society and
political philosophy.
Jens Narten is a research fellow at the Institute for Peace Research
and Security Policy in Hamburg, and works for the Gesellschaft fr
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Timor-Leste. He previously
served with the OSCE in Kosovo.
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik is Lecturer in Politics and International
Relations at Aston University. She is the author of Ethnic Conflict and
War Crimes in the Balkans: The Narratives of Denial in Post-Conflict Serbia
(2011).
John OBrennan is Lecturer in European Politics and Society at the
National University of Ireland, Maynooth. He is also the Director of the
Universitys Centre for the Study of Wider Europe, an interdisciplinary
research unit focusing on Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe.
Mladen Ostojic obtained his Ph.D. from Queen Mary, University of
London. His research subjects include the concept of transitional justice
and the relationship between justice, truth-telling and democratisation.
Iavor Rangelov is Global Security Research Fellow at the Civil Society
and Human Security Research Unit in the Department of International
Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science,
and is Co-Chair of the London Transitional Justice Network (LTJN).
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers is Senior Research Fellow at University
of Roehampton and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Bologna.
Previously, she served as the first Alex Nash Fellow for Albanian Studies
at University College London (19972003).
Ervjola Selenica is a PhD candidate at the School of International
Studies, University of Trento. Her research focuses on the ways in
x Notes on Contributors

which international actors shape national education systems in states

that have emerged from armed conflicts.

Francesco Strazzari is Associate Professor of Political Science and

International Relations at the SantAnna School of Advanced Studies,
Pisa, and Adjunct Professor at the Bologna Center of the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Giulio Venneri is Desk Officer for Justice, Freedom and Security in Unit
C1 (BosniaHerzegovina) at DG Enlargement, European Commission.
He is also Lecturer at the School of Government, LUISS University,
Rome.
Acknowledgements

This book emerged from a conference, For Better or For Worse? Civil
Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans, which was held at the
London School of Economics and Political Science in May 2010. The
editors would like to acknowledge the support for the event provided
by the Open Society Faculty Development Programme in South East
Europe and the National Bank of Greece.
We would like to express our deepest thanks and appreciation to Sasha
Jesperson for all her help in preparing the manuscript and to Amber
Stone-Galilee and Liz Holwell at Palgrave Macmillan for their guidance
and patience.

xi
List of Acronyms

AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

AED Academy for Educational Development
AHRC Arts and Humanities Research Council
APPK Employment Promotion Agency in Kosovo
ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network
BCSDN Balkan Civil Society Development Network
BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina
BIRN Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
CAA Croatian American Association
CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilisation
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CG Contact Group
CoE Council of Europe
CSF Civil Society Facility (EU)
CSO Civil society organisation
CWA Croatian Worldwide Association
CWC Croatian World Congress
DfID UK Department for International Development
DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS Democratic Party (Serbia)
DSS Democratic Party of Serbia
EAR European Agency for Reconstruction
ECtHR European Court for Human Rights
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights
ESI European Stability Initiative
ESM Electricity Production and Distribution Company
EU European Union
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPM European Union Police Mission
FOSM Foundation Open Society Macedonia
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
GDR German Democratic Republic
HCHR Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union
xii
 List of Acronyms xiii

HLC Humanitarian Law Centre

ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICO International Civilian Office
ICR International Civilian Representative
ICRS Information Counselling and Referral Service
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia
IDP Internally displaced person
IFI International financial institution
IGO Intergovernmental organisation
IMP International Military Presence
INGO International non-governmental organisation
INPO Initiative for Progress
IOM International Organisation of Migration
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPTF International Police Task Force
JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure (Kosovo)
JNA Yugoslav Peoples Army
KAN Kosovo Action Network
KDF Kosovo Defence Force
KDI Kosovo Democratic Institute
KFOR NATO Kosovo Force
KISSR Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army (or UK in Albanian)
KMDLNJ Council for the Defence of Human Rights and
Freedoms
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPCRP Kosovo Protection Corps Resettlement Programme
KPCTP Kosovo Protection Corps Training Programme
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KSF Kosovo Security Force
KWN Kosova Womens Network
KYN Kosovo Youth Network
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
MASSO Macedonian Association for Free Sexual Orientation
MOST Citizens organisation in Skopje, Macedonia
MTA Association Mother Teresa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFCA National Federation of Croatian Americans
xiv List of Acronyms

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NFCSD National Foundation for Civil Society Development
OHR Office of the High Representative
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSI Open Society Institute
P2P People to People Programme
PDK Democratic Party Kosovo
PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring
their Economies
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
POS Political Opportunity Structure
RECOM The Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts
about War Crimes and other Serious Human Rights
Violations in former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001
RMAU Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unity
RS Republika Srpska
RrOSh Rrjeti i Organizatave Shqiptare (Network of Albanian
Organisations)
SAP Stabilisation and Association Process
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS Serbian Radical Party
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TACSO Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG UN Secretary-General
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
YIHR Youth Initiative for Human Rights
YUCOM Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
Introduction: Civil Society and
Multiple Transitions Meanings,
Actors and Effects
Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic

The overthrow of Communism by peoples revolutions in Eastern and

Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s testified
to the power of civil society against the totalitarian Communist state.1
The result of the demonstrable political power of the people was an
intellectual rediscovery of the concept of civil society, alongside its
escape from the constraints of national borders and its reconceptualisa-
tion as a global civil society. At the same time, a triple transition from
Communism, as Offe described it famously, constituted by political
and economic liberalisation, alongside in many cases from the Balkans
to the Caucasus, violent reconstitution of nation states,2 shed light on
the complexity of political change, and, with it, on multiple functions
of civil society. Furthermore, the process has been transnationalised
both within the scope of progressive and regressive globalisation. Civil
society actors, especially in post-conflict zones the world over, have
been intertwined in multidimensional partnerships, including inter-
national organisations, international NGOs (INGOs), international
financial institutions, foreign governments as well as national and mul-
tilateral development agencies, and so on. Meanwhile, other segments
of local civil societies have also linked up with global networks, often
either as purveyors of illiberal identities or as partners in global crimi-
nal enterprise. Despite the complexity of transformation in states and
communities emerging from the illiberal regime and conflict, the faith
in civil societys constructive contribution to political change was not
dampened.
In the early scholarship on the subject, reflected in policy prescrip-
tions focused on civil society building and promotion programmes, civil
society was viewed as a necessary corrective, not just a complement,

1
2 Introduction

to the workings of an otherwise illiberal, fragmented and weak

post-Communist and post-conflict state. Scholars pointed to the criti-
cal role of civil society beyond initiating the democratic change, and
its importance in consolidating and maintaining democracy.3 In the
post-conflict stage marked by ethnification of the state and society,
civil society was viewed as an alternative to an institutional route for
building and restoring cross-ethnic trust and coexistence. The bottom-
up perspective on external state-building as a critique of top-down,
state-centred approaches to external intervention in post-conflict areas
has been of a similar incline.4 Twenty-odd years on, the premise of the
emancipatory role of non-state actors has come under scrutiny both in
theory and practice. The re-examination of civil society itself along with
its contribution to the political change has, in turn, reopened questions
relevant for understanding dynamics of post-conflict democratisation,
reconstruction and state-building, including their implication for out-
side interventions in these processes.
The civil society perspective that this volume embraces encounters
analytical complexity, stemming, above all, from definitional pluralism
rooted in the intellectual history of the concept. Different definitions
of the concept largely map onto different types of civil society actors,
whose diversity has much too often been sacrificed for the sake of
analytical parsimony. Secondly, the focus on understanding civil in
civil society has further diversified the picture of civil society actors as
well as civil society effects along a normative axis. Thirdly, the existing
scholarship has engaged with a diversity of civil society from struc-
tural/organisational and normative perspectives. Critical insights were
thus generated into the contribution of civil society to the processes
of change, albeit largely constrained to a single aspect of an otherwise
multifaceted transformation. This volume starts from the premise that
the complexity and ambiguity of civil societys contribution to political
change ought to be understood in relation to the multiple nature of
transition or, as we put it in the title of this volume, transitions. This
is the case in the Western Balkans, where the transition unfolds along
several tracks, including post-Communist and post-conflict democratisa-
tion, state-building and reconstruction in the global context. Such per-
spective reveals a range of, often unanticipated, effects that civil society
in the Western Balkans has had, not only in a discrete area of change
but also in other dimensions of multiple transition. Addressing the com-
plexity of both civil society and the transitional context is the starting
point in understanding and, arguably, reclaiming the emancipatory role
of civil society.
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 3

What is civil society and who are its actors?

As Chandhoke points out, the narrative of civil society in contemporary

discourse has become non thinker-specific or tradition-specific but, in
essence, refers to an entire tradition of political thought which has dealt
with the issue of human emancipation.5 Choosing a working definition
of civil society is ultimately an arbitrary enterprise. Nonetheless, under-
standing civil societys contribution to political change is critically con-
tingent upon the adopted or, put differently, prioritised, understanding
of the concept amidst plurality of definitions. The clarity about the
definitional choice or choices is critical because of the political project
that each interpretation of civil society entails.
The rich history of theorising civil society, which informs and com-
pounds its contemporary understanding, cannot be summarised easily.
The concept of civil society is ambiguous, notes Kaldor, due to the
changing content of the term, its normative versus descriptive, idealistic
versus empiricist, subjective versus objective implications, alongside the
relative emphasis on the private and the public or the individual and
the social.6 Furthermore, explanations of the emergence of civil society
in its modern form continue to be debated by scholars, writing in the
political theory and the political economy traditions. These are framed
by their disparate, although not entirely unrelated, preoccupations with
the evolution of freedoms and rights of an individual and with the
material determinants of political change.7
The multiple transformation as a context in which this volume exam-
ines the role of civil society in the Western Balkans warrants a closer
examination of historical conceptualisation of the separation between
the state and society. The autonomy of civil society from the state is
one of its central features, retained in different variations and shifts in
the meaning of civil society since the eighteenth century.8 Historically,
the evolution of civil society has been linked to state formation, and
therefore needs to be understood in terms of delineation and limitation
of state power. The issue of the statesociety relations is particularly
relevant because scholars of contemporary conflict and post-conflict
reconstruction have pointed to the blurring of the boundaries between
the public and private as well as the state and society.9

Tracing statesociety distinction

Initial conceptualisations of civil society in antiquity do not distinguish

between the society and the state. For both ancient Greeks and Romans,
4 Introduction

civil society as a translation of Aristotles koinona politik and Ciceros

societas civilis was synonymous with the state or a political society.
It was governed by law and civility and marked by citizens active
participation in public life (although not all were considered citizens).10
According to Taylor, such civil society lacked a principle of resistance
to the invasive force of sovereign political authority.11 The crisis of
the social order with the political authority vested in God or King, along-
side the beginning of commercialisation of land, labour and capital, and
the emergence of market economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries brought a need for a new moral order based on the principle
of rational self-interest.12 Nonetheless, the idea of civil society as the
only proper way of constituting the state13 persisted into the seven-
teenth century, when Thomas Hobbes and John Locke contrasted civil
society with the state of nature. It is the eighteenth century Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers and political economists Adam Smith and Adam
Ferguson who departed from the conceptualisation of civil society as
political society by proposing that it is not a political but an economic
society that is natural to man.14
Ultimately, Hegel, who was influenced by Smith and Ferguson, distin-
guished civil society from the family and from the state, in his writings
at the turn of the nineteenth century. Hegel was the first to elaborate
modernity as a distinct sphere, thus initiating modern theories that
separate civil society from the state.15 This distinction, according to
Taylor, is important for differentiating civil society from the state, as
well as for capturing the public nature of civil society, and not just a
congeries of private enclaves.16 Hegels understanding of civil society as
brgerliche Gesellschaft or a bourgeois society is a historically produced
phenomenon.17 It is linked to the emergence of capitalism and the pre-
condition of private property on which the pursuit of private interest
depends. However, the existence of Hegels civil society is distinct from
the economy, even though it is constituted by the logic of capitalism
and also reflects the ethos of the market.18
By contrast, like Keane,19 Taylor, too, is opposed to the conventional
property-centred view,20 and prioritises political explanations of intel-
lectual antecedents to Hegel, with particular references to John Locke
and Montesquieu writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
respectively. Locke was a harbinger of a contrastive understanding of
civil society, with his idea of society having its identity outside the politi-
cal dimension, which ought to be respected by the political authority,21
while Montesquieus understanding of civil society as being constituted
by non-political associations, in addition to it being a politically organised
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 5

society, reflects its diversity.22 The emphasis on associational life was, in

turn, taken up by Alexis de Tocqueville in the first half of the nineteenth
century, who observed American democracy and the role played by vol-
untary associations in generating solidarity and overcoming isolation
and atomisation of individuals, as well as preventing the tyranny of the
majority over minorities, as a consequence of a democratic system.23
Writing in this tradition of thought in the twentieth century, in his
works first on Italy and then on the US, Robert Putnam stressed trust,
social capital and solidarity as a product of thick associational life.24
The political economy perspective illuminates Karl Marxs under-
standing of civil society in the nineteenth century, which, according to
him, is a Hobbesian nightmare of isolated and aggressive individuals,
bound together precariously by a cash nexus.25 Civil society is associ-
ated with a class conflict that involves the state because it represents
particular interests of the dominant class masquerading as that of a
society as a whole.26 Therefore, considering the state as a part of the
criticism of civil society, the Marxist resolution lies in the removal of
the distinction between the public and the private, and reunification
of state and society.27 It marked departure from the liberal claim that
the distinction of the two spheres is a condition of freedom,28 while
its enactment in practice was the totalitarianism of the twentieth cen-
tury. Antonio Gramscis take on civil society in the 1920s and 1930s
divorced the concept from economic interactions to include a range of
social interactions, which in turn provided the basis for the contempo-
rary understanding of civil society as between the individual, the state
and the market.29 Not unlike Marx, Gramsci considered civil society as
a site of struggle against hegemony, because it was used by dominant
classes to subdue the working class.
While Hegel introduced the distinction between the society and the
state, the distinction should not be conflated with their absolute separa-
tion. Edwards describes the relationship between the state and society
as that of interdependence: state provides the regulatory framework for
democratic civil society to function, while civil society holds the state
accountable for its actions.30 In other words, they are bound both by
obligations and rights vis--vis each other.31 The consequence of their
coexistence is ultimately the limitation both of the power of the state
and of the civil society, despite the fact that the boundary between the
state and civil society autonomy remains contested (e.g. by questions
whether political parties or businesses are part of civil society).32 It does
not have a single correct or fixed position, but moves with contingencies
of history, tradition, culture, and politics; still, its position is nonetheless
6 Introduction

constrained, as Post and Rosenblum put it: Push the boundary too far in
the direction of government, and civil society will wither away. Push the
boundary too far in the direction of civil society, and the government
can collapse into anarchic disorder.33
Using a post-Communist and post-conflict transition as a vantage
point for the exploration of civil society in this volume, one of the key
questions concerns civil societys dependence on the state: Must its
independence rest simply upon the disinterested benevolence of the
state a most insecure basis,34 asks Kumar in reference to the specific
trajectory of the post-Communist transformation, and concludes that
the institutions of the state and the reconstitution of functioning politi-
cal society are a central problem, and not those of civil society.35 Such
conclusions reflect the Hegelian perspective on the ethical role of the
state to resolve the conflicts within civil society,36 or the Tocquevillean
perspective of the state as a guarantor of associational life. Waltzer, too,
assigns a critical role to the state and, specifically, to the liberal state to
establish a chief playing field for associational commitment.37
However, the transition from Communism and conflict entails a simul-
taneous reconstruction: both of state and civil society, as well as re-
establishing the boundary between the state and society. At the same
time, a weak and fragmented, often along ethnic and sectarian lines,
post-conflict state is ill-suited to act as a guarantor for the development
of civil society. This, in turn, underscores a unique conceptual and prac-
tical dilemma about the extent to which both the state and civil society
can play a corrective role in respect of each other in the process of such
a deep-reaching transition.

Civil society: Meanings, roles and actors

A cursory intellectual history of the term from the perspective of state

society distinction paves way for a multi-perspective view of the role of
civil society in the processes of political, economic and social transition
in the aftermath of totalitarian regime and armed conflict. Regardless
of whether the resistance was conceptualised in terms of Havels living
with truth (1985),38 Michniks autonomy and self-organisation,39 Bendas
parallel polis (1988)40 or Konrds antipolitics (1984),41 common to all
these approaches to civil society by the Communist-era thinkers is their
opposition to the state. In this respect they are close to Gramscis think-
ing on civil society as a space for (re)production and contestation of
hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic discourses. In turn, the onset
of democratic transition brings into focus a Tocquevillean understanding
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 7

of civil society in terms of a vibrant sphere populated by a multitude

of associations as a bulwark against mild despotism.42 The impact of
the conflict on the fabric of society invokes the relevance of Putnams
conceptualisation of social capital, and the importance of trust as a
means to overcome ethnic and sectarian divisions. The reconstruction
of post-conflict states by a plethora of external actors, in the context
of global governance arrangements which are not directly accountable
to beneficiaries of external state-building efforts, makes the discursive
strategies in the Habermasian sense of civil society as a communica-
tive sphere critical for their legitimation.43 Meanwhile, transnational
involvement of human rights organisations in local settings marked by
human rights violations invokes the Kantian notion of striving towards
perpetual peace and the role of global civil society therein.44
The diversity of actors becomes more complex with European and
global expansion of civil society.45 The Western tradition in theoris-
ing civil society, through a particular trajectory of the emergence of
the modern state and market, has proven ill-suited to capture complex
political and cultural realities, as the concept of civil society travelled to
non-Western contexts both historically, as Goody demonstrates,46 and
contemporaneously. Local political and social organisations elude being
slotted neatly into categorisation of civil society actors modelled on
those in the West, despite their role in delineating a sphere of autonomy
in relation to political authority. Parekh directs his criticism to a built-
in bias against non-voluntary organisations, such as those associations
that rest on traditional allegiances, blood ties or dependent on birth
like castes, clans, tribes, ethnic and religious groups, etc.47 He points
out that these organisations have performed critical functions to good
society, such as encouraging social obligation, mutual commitment
and spirit of sacrifice. Therefore, he argues they cannot be dismissed as
all being inherently bad, just as not all voluntary associations are inher-
ently good.48
In addition, the global context of multiple transitions in the Western
Balkans has enabled inclusion of local groups into transnational and
global networks and movements. The global context has also altered
the strategies of traditional opposition to the state, the original target
of civil society activism via transnational networks.49 At the same time,
by directing their activism toward the institutions of global governance,
civil society groups have turned their attention away from the nation
state, but with an expected ultimate local effect of more democratic
global arrangements, as can be illustrated by the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
8 Introduction

In sum, diversity of civil society actors is underpinned by conceptual

and empirical richness of civil society. It presents a methodological
challenge to students of civil society in operationalising this diversity
to capture comprehensively the many ways in which a range of non-
state actors shape political change. Scholars have approached this chal-
lenge by focusing on the functions of civil society rather than actors,50
transactional capacity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rather
than NGOs themselves,51 or from the perspective of discourse and prac-
tices.52 Still, the normative dimension of civil society further compounds
its conceptual and empirical pluralism.

Civility versus civil society

Civil society is a normatively loaded concept. Its desirability rests on

the understanding of civility as a norm and effect. According to Kumar,
civil society sounds good; it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a
fine old wine, full of depth and complexity.53 It is shorthand for the
kind of society in which we want to live.54 Civility as a property of civil
society, and as a consequence of its existence, requires closer analytical
inspection since one of the goals of transition is precisely to produce
civility and good life, which in many cases has remained elusive.
Associated with politeness and good manners, Shils elaborates:
Civility works like a governor of civil society. It limits the intensity
of conflict. It reduces the distance between conflicting demands: it
is a curb on centrifugal tendencies. Civility, by the attachment of its
individual bearers to the society as a whole, places a limit on the irrec-
oncilability of the parochial ends pursued.55 Historically, the emphasis
on civility, both in terms of politeness and the self-disciplining effects
of living in society, has to be understood in relation to the anxieties
stemming from the wars across Europe of the seventeenth century.56
According to Anheier, civility made more diverse societies with chang-
ing interests and power relations possible, by enabling the creation of
violence-free zones, which allowed for political and economic develop-
ment.57 Understanding civility as a possibility of mediation of conflict
that may otherwise engulf the political and social order gives civil soci-
ety its emancipatory quality. This view is of particular relevance in the
context of post-totalitarian and post-conflict democratisation, at whose
very heart lies the introduction of conflict owing to pluralisation of
interests of all kinds, including political, economic and ethnic.
Keane has focused on the inner contradiction within civil society, as
a peaceful haven of incivility, contending that all known forms of civil
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 9

society are plagued by endogenous sources of incivility.58 Civility, premised

on the existence and tolerance of pluralism, raises the question of its
limits. Shils accepts diversity in civil society, but not by all and any
means whatsoever.59 The reinvigoration of the concept of civil society,
accompanied by probing empirical evidence across political and cul-
tural contexts in different historical periods, has led to debates whether
uncivil, albeit non-state, groups or transnational networks can be con-
sidered part of civil society, be it local, national or global civil society. In
its most contentious form, the question of inclusion of uncivil actors in
civil society concerns their normative outlook and ideas. Kopeck and
Mudde made the case for the inclusion of uncivil society as a subset of
civil society by questioning the civility of non-state actors considered
civil, such as their internal workings or holding a moral high ground in
their attitudes, including counter-intuitive consequences, such as civil
outcomes of uncivil actors.60 However, civility is also understood as a
by-product of civil society. In particular, civil effect of associational life,
celebrated in the neo-Tocquevillean rendering of civil societys contri-
bution to democratisation, has also come under scrutiny.
Edwards points out that, on the one hand, the correlation between
associations and the creation of trust and cooperation is weaker than
supposed, and, on the other, that civil society alone cannot be depended
on to produce just and effective policy.61 Even a vibrant civil society
can contribute to political fragmentation and undermine democracy
and state-building.62 Similarly, social capital produced by informal net-
works as a response to a weak rule of law does not in itself result in the
democratic state-building, as is the case in post-Communist Russia, for
example.63 Furthermore, civil society, especially the one organised along
ethnic and sectarian lines, can instigate and contribute critically to the
outbreak of violence.64 Last but not least, massive expansion of NGOs
as a result of the Western democracy promotion programmes, notably
(but not only) in the post-Communist space, has at best had a dubious
civil impact.
The expansion of civil societies is reducible to the boost in the NGO
count, because, as Howell and Pearce put it, external donors operate with
a narrower slice of the civil society cake.65 Consequently, a variety of
traditional grass-roots institutions, networks, practices and actors, with
a potentially more constructive input towards aims of post-conflict
transition have been overlooked. The projectisation of civil society,66
alongside its dependence on external funding, has directly affected its
ability to hold the state to account.67 Seen as being in the pockets of
international donors, NGOs have been dismissed as peace-profiteers,
10 Introduction

while their multi-ethnic activism has been attributed to financial motives

rather than value orientation.68 To compound the picture, the flourish-
ing of civil society in post-conflict contexts, as in Kosovo, has been eth-
nically segmented.69 Ultimately, dependence of civil society on external
funding has tended to result in the instrumentalisation of civil society.
Howell and Pearce note civil society is reduced to a technical exercise
of coordination, cooperation and joint effort, depoliticised and neutral-
ised.70 It becomes a means to an end, which can be democratisation,
economic growth and so on, rather than an end in itself.71 At the same
time, donor funding can present opportunities for corruption and unac-
countability in the NGO sector. The result is, as Ishkanian points out, a
negative impact not only on how NGOs are perceived, but also how the
ideas they promote are received.72
In sum, misplaced adulation of social groups derives from antistatist
conceptualisation of civil society, says Hall, cautioning that powerful
social self-organisation does not equate with civil society.73 Therefore,
pluralism inherent in the concept of civil society, defined in terms of
actors positioned between the state, the family and the market, can
be turned on its head, and denote the presence of extreme, illiberal
and exclusive ideas and interests by non-state actors. In other words,
civil society too can be an obstacle to post-conflict reconstruction and
democratisation.74 The space for such a potential uncivil role of civil
society opens up in the absence of a strong state that acts as an impar-
tial arbiter and regulator. Noting that threats to civil society can come
from many and often multiple sources, Whitehead says that it may
face encroachments from above (the state) and from below (illiberal
civil society),75 which precisely captures the fate of civil society in the
Western Balkans.76
The historically enabling role played by the state and the market for
the flourishing of civil society is absent, or at least, distorted, in this
region. The Balkan states are persistently weak. They continue to suffer
from the problem of stateness, which Linz and Stepan define as a lack
of consensus on territorial boundaries of the state and entitlement
to citizenship in that state,77 as is the case of Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and to an extent Macedonia. They also falter in terms of
effective and equitable public goods provision owing to the enduring
impact of the war economies in the region.78 Special interests have been
entrenched through the privatisation process, which itself is shaped
by the Communist legacy. The result is the distortion in the markets
role to provide the basis for unimpeded diversification of interests, free
of political and/or ethnic interference. Therefore, the key question is
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 11

whether civil society in the Western Balkans and, specifically, its liberal
segments can produce civility in spite of the state and the market,79
and, it should be added, in spite of uncivil society. Contributors to this
volume address the challenge of civil society to navigate the political
and economic context that constrains rather than supports its activism
and contribution to good life, while at the same time engaging the
weaknesses, structural and normative, of civil society from within.
Table 0.1 maps dimensions of multiple transition onto multiple con-
ceptualisation of civil society, in order to capture the salient role of civil
society actors by type in relation to a specific aspect of transformation,
alongside civil and uncivil effects of civil society. None of the boxes
should be understood as either exclusive or comprehensive; their sepa-
ration in the table is to allow analytical disaggregation of complexities
related both to civil society and ongoing transitions, while providing a
template for understanding diversity in the ways that civil society shapes
the transformation of states, societies and economies in the Western
Balkans.

The challenge of multiple transitions

A critique of the assumed emancipatory role of civil society to advance a

democratic change finds firm conceptual and empirical ground in recent
scholarship on civil society in a range of country contexts. This scholar-
ship tackles this assumption in two ways. On the one hand, it begins by
problematising the concept of civil society from the perspective of its
internal constraints that may be organisational and normative.80 On the
other hand, it examines the role of civil society in relation to a discrete
form of political change, such as democratisation, transitional justice,
post-conflict transformation and so on.81 While these may be compre-
hensive accounts of the role of civil society, they nonetheless restrict
their purview to a single and, arguably, incomplete snapshot of change,
and the role of civil society therein. By contrast, this volume is prem-
ised on the inseparability of transitional processes in societies emerging
from illiberal rule and conflict in a globalised context.
The legacy of violent conflicts which dissolved the former Yugoslavia
is central to understanding the profile, the predisposition and the role
of contemporary civil society in the Western Balkans. Wars leave behind
spare space in terms of many elements which are commonly ascribed to
the notion of vibrant civil society, namely trust, tolerance, social capi-
tal, a sense of citizenship, and participation and engagement in associa-
tional life. Furthermore, they entail a profound shift in individual and
 12

Table 0.1 Civil society in multiple transitions

Transition Resistance Democratisation Marketisation Reconciliation State-building Post-conflict

reconstruction

Conception Ideology Pluralism Market Social capital Public sphere Realm of

of civil (e.g. Gramsci) (e.g. Tocqueville) (e.g. Hegel) (e.g. Putnam) (e.g. Habermas) cosmopolitan
society rights
(e.g. Kant)
Type of Citizens, Associations, Companies, Community Media and Peace and
actors workers NGOs corporations groups and communication human rights
networks organisations,
humanitarian
NGOs and
INGOs
Civil effects Overthrow of Watchdog Basis for Confidence- Accountability, Respect for
illiberal regime advocacy, diversification of building, debate, human rights,
monitoring interests, good mediation legitimacy empowerment
governance
Uncivil Demobilisation, Projectisation, Organised Rise of groups Substitute for Functions as a
effects disengagement, instrumentalisation criminal groups, with exclusive local ownership, surrogate state,
disinclination special interest ideologies, expression of marginalisation
to join groups ethnic/ special political/ of local cultural
voluntary sectarian economic/ values
organisations segmentation, sectarian
corruption interests
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 13

social values against which civil society grows, reconfigures and sustains
itself. And, in somewhat more mundane but nevertheless equally rel-
evant aspects, physical destruction of war such as that of infrastructure
stunts opportunities for communication and contact among people
and organisations, and deprives individuals of economic self-sufficiency
without which necessary autonomy of civil society actors from the state
is unattainable. In that sense the armed conflicts in the Western Balkans
which gave rise to seven new states (Kosovo included) against the com-
peting nationalist projects, and in some cases accompanied by mass
atrocities and economic devastation, have turned post-conflict recovery
into a uniquely complex and complicated process of transforming pol-
ity, economy, society, culture and institutions across the region.
Post-conflict transition subsumes several overlapping processes through
which stabilisation of the Western Balkans has been pursued. Peace-
building, state-building and post-war reconstruction each to a various
degree concerns individual, society and the state, and operates on mul-
tiple scales from the local, to national and regional, involving numer-
ous actors and institutions, both domestic and foreign. At the core of
those three inter-related trajectories of post-conflict transition is strife
towards institutionalisation of democracy and development as a way
to achieve stable peace, and arguably as its condition, in line with the
liberal peace paradigm framing the external engagement in the paci-
fication of the region.82 Unlike in most former Communist countries
where transition from one party polity and centrally planned economy
of Communism progressed in the absence of armed violence, giving
rise to a distinct set of concerns, issues and considerations, and hence
determining the particular role of civil society in that context, post-
Communist and post-conflict transitions in the Western Balkans have
unfolded simultaneously. As a result of the twin and deeply intertwined
dynamics of post-Communist and post-conflict transition, an extraordi-
narily challenging environment with many contradictions, tensions but
also opportunities for civil society activism has emerged, accommodat-
ing its various arenas and their diverse range of actors and interests.
Insofar as a degree of analytical distinction among various elements of
multiple transitions in the Western Balkans holds, each in itself denotes
complex and often contradictory processes in terms of actors, timing/
sequencing and the coherence of the purported goals, and poses a
number of dilemmas both conceptually and practically.83 Although the
agency of civil society is most strongly associated with democratisation,84
civil society is attributed an important role in all elements of post-conflict
transition. The relations between civil society in its various meanings
14 Introduction

as a social value, a space for contestation and dialogue, a historical

moment, an anti-state and anti-hegemony force,85 on the one hand; and
peace-building, state-building and post-conflict reconstruction, respec-
tively, on the other (and not unlike in the case of democratisation)86
are far from straightforward. A further level of complexity characteristic
of those ambiguous relations stems from inherent tensions between
and among various aspects of transition, with far-reaching implications
for the evolution in civil society and the nature of its engagement.
Burnell,87 among others, commenting on the relation between peace-
building and democratisation, has argued that democratisation in a
post-conflict context permeated by fear, mistrust and economic vulner-
ability may in fact rekindle divisiveness that led to the war in the first
place. Against the conflict background, democratic elections can reaf-
firm the parties and individuals active in war-time violence as observed
most explicitly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Peace-building in
turn, particularly in its short-term outlook, tends to reinforce elite poli-
tics at the expense of democratisation as essentially a long-term process,
which is attested across the region despite some country variation. Post-
conflict reconstruction in its economic domain can strengthen vested
interests of particular groups that benefited from the war economy,
fuel corruption and enfeeble economic recovery. It can produce socially
polarising growth characterised by social exclusion and poverty,88 and
consequently aggravate poor participation in democratic process despite
constitutional guarantees of political rights put in place as one of the pri-
orities in democratic transition. Again, regional evidence in this respect
is abundant. The goals of peace and democracy are likely to be under-
mined as a result.
At the same time, all those dynamics can combine to erode state-
building efforts. State-building can be strained further when, for exam-
ple, incentives to seek access to public office for personal gain prevail as
in the context when economic reconstruction fails to generate adequate
livelihoods and secure social welfare, where peace-building and post-
war reconstruction do not lead to significant improvement in the mate-
rial base of the state given the neoliberal flavour of policies supported
through international aid, and where peace- and democracy-building
agendas are unsuccessful in their quest to forge a sense of allegiance to
the new state. In turn, weak state institutions in terms of quality, scope
and access to public services provision, from security, health, education
to social protection, not only stifle peace-building outcomes but equally
also affect democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction. The chan-
nels through which this happens are many: through increasing citizens
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 15

susceptibility to extremist politics in the face of insecurity in its various

manifestations as the peace dividend fails to permeate throughout
society, through reinforcing social autism and withdrawal from public
life at the individual and community level, through cementing com-
munal divisions established in the course of war, through an individu-
als distancing from the state and its institutions and so on, ultimately
leading to increased animosity towards and the resentment of participa-
tion and the forms of associational life supportive of democratic peace.
At the same time, as much as the incoherence and the contradictory
nature of multiple transitions work to suppress and distort many a
precondition deemed key for civil society to unleash its agency, those
dynamics, and in particular the importance attached to civil society
development by the international donors, open a range of opportuni-
ties for civil society to assert its role. How then is civil society situated
in such a context and what role does it play? What role should it play
and how given the existing constraints? The aim of this volume is to
capture the ambiguity of civil society, while accepting plural definitions
of civil society, as an agent in multiple transitions as well as a variety of
outcomes of its agency.

Book outline

The book is divided into three parts organised around three dimensions
of transformation in the Western Balkans: state-building, democratisa-
tion and post-conflict reconstruction. Each section contains academic
contributions and concludes with a practitioners perspective, both as a
reflection and a perspective in its own right, albeit from practice, on chal-
lenges attendant in vesting civil society with the emancipatory role in
the context of a simultaneous post-Communist and post-conflict trans-
formation. The first section examines the way in which civil society has
played an integral role in the process of state-building in the Western
Balkans. In Chapter 1, John OBrennan examines the relationship between
the European Commission (the EUs principal actor within the enlarge-
ment process) and civil society in the Western Balkans region. He does
so with the aim of understanding how the Commission engages with
civil society and what, if any, role civil society has played within the
unfolding Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and EU enlarge-
ment. He argues that the EUs engagement with the Western Balkans
replicates the earlier patterns of the eastern enlargement process. Torn
between the often mutually exclusive objectives of advancing the qual-
ity of enlargement and SAP-rooted local reforms versus encouraging
16 Introduction

a meaningful and substantive civil society participation in those reforms,

the Commission has all too often favoured an elite-oriented, narrow,
technocratic approach. Legitimisation of the EU integration process in
the Western Balkans thus remains partial and incomplete.
Following on from this, Adam Fagan, in Chapter 2, examines the
way in which the European Union has played a role in developing civil
society in the region, specifically exploring the impact donor assist-
ance has had in terms of environmental NGOs in post-conflict Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia. The chapter argues that donor funding seems to
be exerting a positive longer-term impact on the transactional capacities of
a small core of environmental NGOs in both locations. While this does
not necessarily prove a positive relationship between donor funding
and transactional capacity, it nevertheless challenges some of the more
negative assessments that have been put forward about donor funding
in existing literature, which have tended to take the view that many new
NGOs were disconnected from indigenous networks, lacked sustainable
resources and capacity, and were accountable to donors rather than citi-
zens and governments. It is also suggested that much depends on the
type of assistance delivered by donors: block grants and the combina-
tion of various sources of donor revenue, rather than short-term funding
tied to a specific project, enable NGOs to develop networks and facilitate
interaction between state, non-state and economic actors.
Chapter 3, by Iavor Rangelov, explores the relationship between civil
society and the rule of law in the Western Balkans in the new century.
In particular, it investigates how civil society has shaped a range of legal
institutions that tackle some of the most difficult issues inherited from
the 1990s, such as citizenship, human rights protection and account-
ability for war crimes committed in the course of the conflicts. The
analysis focuses on a series of civil society contestations and interactions
with the legal domain in Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia, and suggests that
civil society has served both to undermine and reinforce the rule of law
in the region. It concludes by highlighting the ambivalent normative
and substantive contribution of civil society to the rule of law, as well as
the role of civil society as an arena where the legitimacy of legal institu-
tions is produced and contested.
The section concludes with an essay by Giulio Venneri, in which he
examines and defends the European Unions engagement with civil soci-
ety. Arguing that it is more extensive than previous enlargement efforts,
he notes that there has in fact been a high degree of emphasis placed
on lessons learned. In addition, civil society is given a major role in the
assessment process that all accession countries undergo.
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 17

The second part of the book examines the role of civil society in democ-
ratisation. Chapter 5, by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, examines the
controversial youth movement, VETVENDOSJE! (Self-Determination),
and its charismatic leader, Albin Kurti. In 2010 charged with crimi-
nal actions for a demonstration that turned violent in 2007, they have
always defined themselves in terms of non-violence and as promoters of
human rights and democracy in Kosovo. They have also rejected formal
registration as an NGO but have turned into a political party. This con-
tribution seeks to trace the varied ideological inspirations, mobilisation
strategies and aims of the group as well as to identify the roots and lim-
its of both its domestic appeal and its wider contestations. While both
political and philosophical ideas from the far right and left are found to
underpin the groups ideology, it is argued that the movements appeal
cannot be understood without paying attention to shared Albanian expe-
riences of subjective disempowerment before, during and after the 1999
war. Most significantly, the contribution debates the implications and
perspectives of the groups defiance strategy (identified as inspired by
Gene Sharps methodological guidance for non-violent warfare against
dictators). It concludes by querying the causes of the international agen-
cies discomfort with the movement and outlining the structural basis
of their vulnerability to accusations of being a new form of dictatorship,
anti-democratic and neo-colonialist.
Chapter 6 continues on this theme by asking what civil society means
in Kosovo after years of underground socio-economic and political mobili-
sation, and after almost a decade of international assistance and moni-
toring. Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica delve into the ambivalence
that characterises civic society and civic activism in post-independence
Kosovo, noting that, on the one hand, it is a self-portrayed and avant-
garde progressive movement. However, it is also a thriving non-
transparent phenomenon that has developed and evolves in proximity
with existing interest groups, political clienteles and parties. While
wholeheartedly embracing Western-liberal principles of participation,
citizenship, individual and minority rights, even radical expressions of
civic activism do not appear to distance themselves from the broader
nationalist discourse that permeates Kosovos political life, and that has
important consequences for the sustainability of regional geopolitical
processes and for the European perspective of Kosovo.
In Chapter 7, Anita Brkanic explores whether diasporic organisations
serve as catalysts or impediments to democratisation processes in their
home countries. As is shown, Croatian NGOs, associations and chari-
ties in the Diaspora generally pride themselves in working to promote
18 Introduction

democratic values and principles in the homeland, believing that they

are fulfilling their goal of serving the best interests of both Croatians
at home and their compatriots abroad. Nevertheless, the chapter high-
lights some of the conflicting interests of these organisations, shedding
light on the many controversies associated with the Croatian Diaspora,
including the violation of one of the key principles of democracy fair
elections and voting rights. It also touches upon the role of the Diaspora
in some current issues and debates regarding human rights, justice and
accountability in the context of Croatias EU accession path.
As far as civil society is concerned, the Republic of Macedonia is
not an exception when it comes to the general development of post-
Communist societies. As Nenad Markovic shows in Chapter 8, despite
facing a number of formal and substantial weaknesses, civil society
organisations in Macedonia started flourishing after the improvement of
the legal framework, and in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in 1999,
and the ethnic conflict in the country in 2001. However, the develop-
ment of civil society in the last five years has taken a turn for the worse.
Besides the formal problems present in all post-Communist societies,
civil society in Macedonia has displayed forms of incivility in the last
half decade, gradually shifting towards uncivil society. Although sud-
den, this occurrence has its roots in the general political attitudes of civil
society, the attitudes towards marginalised groups of society (especially
sexual minorities), as well as the ethnic and religious barriers and stereo-
types rooted in the social order. Thus, phenomena such as the politi-
cal instrumentalisation of civil society, inadequate activism as well as
ethnic/religious agency occur, changing the nature of the Macedonian
civil society from post-Communist to uncivil, for the most part. Moreover,
violence, the ultimate form of incivility, has also emerged.
The second section concludes with an essay by Joanna Hanson. As she
argues, the process of transition in the Western Balkans follows on from
the process of transition that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe
following the fall of Communism. There is therefore a considerable
wealth of experience open to policymakers as they seek to engage with,
and lead, civil society actors even if the process is complicated by
the legacy of conflict in the region and the lack of what can be termed
transition brokers.
The third section examines the role of civil society in post-conflict
reconstruction. In Chapter 10, Gemma Collantes-Celador presents a case
study of the UN certification process, which aimed at downsizing and
cleaning the Bosnian police forces of war criminals and others guilty of
illegal or criminal activities. Officially concluded at the end of 2002, this
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 19

process has been kept alive in recent years by the activities of certain
associations, such as the Federation Association of Decertified Policemen
and the RS Association of Decertified Policemen, which have contested
the outcome of the process on the grounds that it was conducted in
an undemocratic manner. These two associations have successfully
waged both legal and political battles to change the policy and the
legislation. This episode is remarkable for what it teaches us about the
process of democratising police forces in a post-conflict setting, but also
the capacity of civil society to question the legitimacy of this process
and ask for accountability from the international community for their
wrongdoings.
The next contribution also examines the role of civil society in secu-
rity sector reform. In Chapter 11, Jens Narten scrutinises the process
by which the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) came into being and was
later dissolved after a period of ten years of international peace-building
in Kosovo. Although the KPC was widely understood to be the demo-
bilised successor organisation to the former Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), and therefore as an army in waiting, it was officially established
as a civil society actor tasked with humanitarian disaster relief and
emergency response. Following on from this, after Kosovos declaration
of independence from Serbia, the KPC was itself demobilised through a
special socio-economic reintegration programme that was implemented
by a local NGO. What is of special interest about this case from a civil
society perspective is the process whereby a civil protection actor is
developed in order to demobilise an armed group, and then this actor
is forced to demobilise and resettle its members once again. Aside from
the security implications of this process, as will be seen, this programme
also highlights the ambiguous role and impact of a civil protection actor
in the post-conflict environment in Kosovo.
The last two chapters explore issues relating to transitional justice and
the role of civil society. In Chapter 12, Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik exam-
ines the claim that Serbia has been unsuccessful in confronting its past with
regard to war crimes committed in the 1990s in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo. As is shown, civil society groups have come to the fore by
these efforts, setting the benchmarks for the process. The problem is
that the approach adopted by these groups assumes that individuals and
groups not replicating the NGO-led discourse about the past are also
failing to confront it. As this chapter argues, though, confronting the
past does take place in private spheres. However, these voices were largely
excluded from the general dialogue in the past, because they often reject
civil society initiatives and external transitional justice mechanisms such
20 Introduction

as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Thus coming to terms with the past in Serbia is not quite an open dia-
logue as yet. Rather, it remains an elite, NGO-led project.
In Chapter 13, Mladen Ostojic also examines the role of domestic
human rights groups in promoting truth-telling in Serbia since 2000.
It considers transitional justice as a policy that seeks to enforce interna-
tional standards of accountability in post-authoritarian and post-conflict
states. The imposition of this policy on reluctant states through inter-
national judicial intervention renders transitional justice potentially at
odds with domestic political arrangements. In situations where it faces
opposition from domestic political elites, the international community
often has to rely on civil society organisations in order to advance the
transitional justice agenda at the national level. In the case of Serbia
specifically, human rights organisations have been a domestic vector
for transitional justice policy implemented through The Hague tribu-
nal (ICTY). This contribution looks at these organisations attempts to
advance transitional justice on the domestic political agenda. It focuses,
in particular, on the strategies deployed by human rights groups to pro-
mote the process of coming to terms with the past and their repercus-
sions on truth-telling in Serbia.
Finally, the third section concludes with an essay by Florence Hartmann.
She argues that the failures of civil society to play a full part in post-
conflict reconstruction must be weighed against the failures of a range
of domestic, regional and international actors. Civil society is just one
part of the equation, albeit a part that must necessarily play a crucial
role in holding these other actors to account for their actions or for
lack of action.
In the conclusion, James Ker-Lindsay summarises contradictory impacts
of civil society in the Western Balkans in disparate national contexts
underpinned, nonetheless, by a common multiple transition in each
case. He reflects on constraints located in the civil society as well as those
located in the fragile and fragmented post-conflict state as the enabling
framework for civil societys development and impact on the course of
transition.

Notes
1. The authors thank Sabine Selchow and Mary Kaldor for useful comments on
an earlier draft of this chapter.
2. C. Offe (1991) Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory
Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe, Social Research, 58(4),
pp. 865982.
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 21

3. L. Diamond (1994) Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy,

5(2), pp. 417.
4. P. M. Pickering (2007) Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground
Floor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); R. Belloni (2007) Statebuilding
and International Intervention in Bosnia (London and New York: Routledge).
5. N. Chandhoke (1995) State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory
(New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications), p. 33.
6. M. Kaldor (2003) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity),
p. 16.
7. J. Keane (1988) Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development
of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State 17501850, in
J. Keane (ed.) Civil Society and the State: New European Perspective (London:
The University of Westminster Press), pp. 3571.
8. E. Shils (1991) The Virtue of Civil Society, Government and Opposition, 26(1),
pp. 320, see pp. 67.
9. D. Kostovicova and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009) Conclusion: Persistent State
Weakness and Issues for Research, Methodology and Policy, in D. Kostovicova
and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (eds) Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age
(Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 197205; H. Zinecker (2009) Regime-Hybridity in
Developing Countries: Achievements and Limitations of New Research on
Transitions, International Studies Review, 11(2), pp. 30131.
10. K. Kumar (1993) Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an
Historical Term, The British Journal of Sociology, 44(3), pp. 33667, pp. 37595;
P. Hallberg and B. Wittrock (2006) From Koinona Politik to Societas
Civilis: Birth, Disapperance and First Renaissance of the Concept, in
P. Wagner (ed.) The Languages of Civil Society (Berghahn Books: New York and
Oxford), pp. 2851.
11. C. Taylor (1990) Modes of Civil Society, Public Culture, 3(1), pp. 95118, see
p. 102.
12. A. B. Seligman (2002) Civil Society as Idea and Ideal, in S. Chambers and
W. Kymlicka (eds) Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press), pp. 1617.
13. B. Parekh (2004) Putting Civil Society in its Place, in M. Glasius, D. Lewis
and H. Seckinelgin (eds) Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts
(London and New York: Routledge), pp. 1525, see p. 16.
14. Chandhoke (1995), op. cit., p. 92.
15. J. Ehrenberg (1999) Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York and
London: New York University Press), p. 124.
16. Taylor (1990), op. cit., p. 111.
17. Kaldor (2003), op. cit., p. 8.
18. Chandhoke (1995), op. cit., p. 117.
19. Keane (1988), op. cit.
20. Kumar (1993), op. cit., p. 337.
21. Taylor (1990), op. cit., p. 107.
22. Taylor (1990), op. cit., p. 114.
23. N. Deakin (2001) In Search of Civil Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan),
p. 869.
24. R. D. Putnam (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); R. D. Putnam (2000) Bowling
22 Introduction

Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon &
Schuster).
25. J. Femia (2001) Civil Society and the Marxist Tradition, in S. Kaviraj and
S. Khilnani (eds) Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), p. 13146, see p. 135.
26. Parekh (2004), op. cit., p. 18.
27. Chandhoke (1995), op. cit., p. 138.
28. Ehrenberg (1999), op. cit., p. 143.
29. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (2001) Introducing Global Civil
Society, in Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), pp. 321, see p. 13.
30. M. Edwards (2009) Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 245.
31. Shils (1991), op. cit.
32. Edwards (2009), op. cit., pp. 2430.
33. R. C. Post and N. L. Rosenblum (2002) Introduction, in N. L. Rosenblum
and R. C. Post (eds) Civil Society and Government (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press), pp. 125, see p. 11.
34. Kumar (1993), op. cit., p. 386.
35. Kumar (1993), op. cit., p. 391. For an overview of a distinction between
civil and political society and its implications, see J. L. Cohen and A. Arato
(1994) Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press),
pp. 7782.
36. Ehrenberg (1999), op. cit., pp. 12432.
37. M. Waltzer (2002) Equality and Civil Society, in S. Chambers and W. Kymlicka
(eds) Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press), pp. 3449,37; cf. Parekh (2004), op. cit., p. 23.
38. V. Havel (1985) The Power of the Powerless, in J. Keane (ed.) The Power
of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (London:
Hutchinson).
39. A. Michnik (1985) Letters from Prison and Other Essays (Berkeley: University
of California Press).
40. V. Benda, Milan imecka, Ivan M. Jirous, Jir Dienstbier, Vclav Havel,
Ladislav Hejdnek, Jan imsa and Paul Wilson (1988) Parallel Polis, or an
Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe: An Inquiry, Social
Research, 55(12), pp. 21146.
41. G. Konrd (1984) Antipolitics: An Essay (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovic).
42. Taylor (1990), op. cit., p. 115.
43. J. Steffek (2003) The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse
Approach, European Journal of International Relations, 9(2), pp. 24975.
44. M. Kaldor (2003) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity),
pp. 368.
45. J. A. Hall and F. Trentmann (2005) Contests over Civil Society: Introductory
Perspectives, in J. A. Hall and F. Trentmann (eds) Civil Society: A Reader in
History, Theory and Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 125,
see p. 3; J. Keane (1998) Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Cambridge:
Polity Press), p. 37.
46. J. Goody (2001) Civil Society in an Extra-European Perspective, in S. Kaviraj
and S. Khilnani (eds) Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 14964.
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 23

47. Parekh (2004), op. cit., p. 22.

48. Parekh (2004), op. cit., p. 23.
49. M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks
in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
50. C. Spurk (2010) Understanding Civil Society, in T. Paffenholz (ed.) Civil
Society and Peacebuilding (Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers),
pp. 327, see pp. 206.
51. A. Fagan (2010) Europes Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-Building?
(London: I. B. Taurus).
52. M. van Leeuwen (2009) Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of
Peacebuilding (Farnham: Ashgate).
53. Kumar (1993), op. cit., p. 376.
54. Edwards (2009), op. cit., p. 46.
55. Shils (1991), op. cit., p. 15.
56. Hall and Trentmann (2005), op. cit., pp. 34.
57. H. K. Anheier (2011) Civility in Global Civil Society: The Missing Link, in
D. Kostovicova and M. Glasius (eds) Bottom-Up Politics: Agency-Centred Approach
to Globalisation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 5060, see p. 55.
58. Keane (1998), op. cit., p. 135.
59. Shils (1991), op. cit., p. 10.
60. P. Kopeck and C. Mudde (2003) Rethinking Civil Society, Democratisation,
10(3), pp. 114; cf. Per Mouritsen, Whats the Civil in Civil Society? Robert
Putnam, Italy and the Republican Tradition, Political Studies, 51(4), pp. 65068,
see pp. 65861.
61. Edwards (2009), op. cit., pp. 489.
62. S. Berman (1997) Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,
World Politics, 49(3), pp. 40129; A. Ikelegbe (2001) The Perverse Manifestation
of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria, The Journal of Modern African Studies,
39(1), pp. 124; K. M. Dowley and B. D. Silver (2002) Social Capital,
Ethnicity and Support for Democracy in the Post-Communist States, Europe
Asia Studies, 54(4), pp. 50527.
63. R. Rose (2001) When Government Fails: Social Capital in an Antimodern
Russia, in B. Edwards, M. W. Foley and M. Diani (eds) Beyond Tocqueville:
Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective (Hanover/
London: Tufts University), pp. 5669; M. Lagerspetz (2001) From Parallel
Polis to The Time of the Tribes: Post-Socialism, Social Self-Organisation
and Post-Modernity, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,
17(2), pp. 118.
64. Edwards (2009), op. cit., pp. 524; M. Kaldor, D. Kostovicova and Y. Said
(2006) War and Peace: The Role of Global Civil Society, in M. Kaldor,
H. K. Anheier and M. Glasius (eds) Global Civil Society 2006/7 (London:
Sage), pp. 94119.
65. J. Howell and J. Pearce (2001) Civil Society and Development: A Critical
Exploration (Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 114.
66. S. Sampson (1996) The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to
Albania, in C. Hann and E. Dunn (eds) Civil Society: Challenging Western
Models (London: Routledge), pp. 12142.
67. P. Jones Luong and E. Weinthal (1999) The NGO Paradox: Democratic Goals
and Non-Democratic Outcomes in Kazakhstan, EuropeAsia Studies, 51(7),
pp. 126784.
24 Introduction

68. Kaldor, Kostovicova and Said (2006), op. cit., p. 111.

69. A. Devic (2008) Civil Society in the Focus of Foreign Aid in Kosovo: Exports
of Peace and Multiculturalism to Nation-Building Sites, in D. Kostovicova
and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (eds) Transnationalism in the Balkans (London/New
York: Routledge).
70. Howell and Pearce (2001), op. cit., p. 117.
71. Howell and Pearce (2001), op. cit., p. 118.
72. A. Ishkanian (2007) Democracy Promotion and Civil Society, in M. Albrow,
M. Glasius, H. K. Anheier and M. Kaldor (eds) Global Civil Society 2007/8:
Communicative Power and Democracy (London: Sage), p. 72.
73. J. A. Hall (2003) Reflections on the Making of Civility in Society, in
F. Trentmann (ed.) Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German
and British History (New York and Oxford: Berghan Books, 2nd edition), p. 51;
cf. Kumar (1993), op. cit., p. 388.
74. B. Pouligny (2006) Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local
People (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press).
75. L. Whitehead (2004) Bowling in the Bronx: The Uncivil Interstices between
Civil and Political Society, in P. Burnell and P. Calvert (eds) Civil Society in
Democratisation (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass), p. 32.
76. D. Kostovicova (2006) Civil Society and Post-Communist Democratisation:
Facing a Double Challenge in Post-Miloevic Serbia, Journal of Civil Society,
2(1), pp. 2137.
77. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 16.
78. D. Kostovicova and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (eds) (2011) Persistent State Weakness
in the Global Age (Aldershot: Ashgate).
79. Alvarez makes this point in relation to the Andean region in Latin America.
L. Alvarez (2004) Civil Society in Latin America: Uncivil, Liberal and
Participatory Models, in M. Glasius, D. Lewis and H. Seckinelgin (eds)
Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts (London/New York:
Routledge), p. 58.
80. M. Abdelrahman (2008) Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt
(London/NewYork: Routledge); A. Oluwakayode Adekson (2004) The Civil
Society Problematique: Deconstructing Civility and Southern Nigerias Ethnic
Radicalisation (London/New York: Routledge); M. Morje Howard (2003) The
Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); D. N. Gellner (ed.) (2009) Ethnic Activism and Civil Society
in South Asia (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage); J. Shefner (2008) The Illusion of Civil
Society: Democratisation and Community Mobilisation in Low-Income Mexico
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University); A. Ogawa (2009) The
Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press); V. Beittinger-Lee (2009) Civil Society and Political
Change in Indonesia: Dangerous Diversity (London: Routledge).
81. van Leeuwen (2009), op. cit.; Burnell and Calvert (2004), op. cit.; T. Paffenholz
(ed.) (2010) Civil Society and Peacebuilding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers); W. Benedeck (ed.) (2006) Civil Society and Good Governance in
Societies in Transition (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights); A. Uhlin
(2006) Post-Soviet Civil Society: Democratisation in Russia and Baltic States
 Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 25

(London: Routledge); P. Baert, K. Sokratis, G. Procacci and C. Ruzza (eds)

(2010) Conflict, Citizenship and Civil Society (Abingdon/New York: Routledge);
H. Strang and J. Braithwaite (eds) (2001) Restorative Justice and Civil Society
(New York: Cambridge University Press).
82. For the most recent debates on liberal peace and the role of civil society,
see for example S. Tadjbakhsh (ed.) (2011) Rethinking the Liberal Peace
(Abingdon/New York: Routledge) and O. Richmond (2011) A Post-Liberal
Peace (Abingdon/New York: Routledge).
83. See R. Paris and T. Sisk (eds) (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting
the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (Abingdon/New York: Routledge);
T. Paffenholz (ed.) (2010) Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers); E. Chenoweth and A. Lawrence (eds)
(2010) Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press); van Leeuwen (2009), op. cit.; C. T. Call with V. Wyeth (eds)
(2008) Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers);
V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002) The World Bank, NGOs and Private Sector in
Post-War Reconstruction, International Peacekeeping, 9(2), pp. 8198.
84. A. Clayton (ed.) (1996) NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy
in Transitional Societies (Oxford: Intrac).
85. This overview of the various meanings in which the literature uses the
notion of civil society is provided in A. van Rooy (ed.) (1998) Civil Society
and the Aid Industry (London: Earthscan).
86. J. Snyder (2000) From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist
Conflict (New York/London: W. W. Norton and Co.).
87. P. Burnell (2009) The Coherence of Democratic Peacebuilding, in T. Addison
and T. Bruck (eds) Making Peace Work: The Challenges of Social and Economic
Reconstruction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
88. V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009) Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Reflections on the
Development-Democracy Link, in R. Paris, O. Richmond and D. Newman
(eds) New Perspectives on Liberal Peace (New York: WIDER).
Part I
State-Building
1
The European Commission,
Enlargement Policy and Civil
Society in the Western Balkans
John OBrennan

The European Unions enlargement policy is universally recognised as

contributing decisively to the transformation of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) in the two decades following the end of Communism. With
the historic enlargements of 2004 and 2007 the EU extended its borders
to the east and to the southeast. As a result, the EU is now a neighbour
of the Western Balkans. Utilising the different templates employed in
the design of the successful eastern enlargement policy, the EU is now
engaged in a similar process of negotiations with the Western Balkan
states. This is intended to lead to membership and full incorporation in
the institutional and policy regimes of the EU.1 However, this process
has developed along a separate and very different trajectory to CEE. As
CEE drew closer to the EU, the Western Balkan region was inflamed by
a series of conflicts that splintered the old federal state of Yugoslavia.
Since the Dayton Agreement in 1995, EU engagement with the region
has been fashioned, if fitfully and unevenly, through a familiar mix of
political, economic and institutional instruments. Gradually the EU has
become the most important point of reference for the countries of the
region as they recover from the conflicts of the 1990s and seek to inte-
grate into the EU. Indeed, just as the countries of CEE sought to return
to Europe in the 1990s, the EUs gravitational pull has been the most
important factor in the reconstitution of economic, political and civic
life in the Western Balkan region over the past decade.
This chapter examines the relationship between the European Com-
mission, the EUs principal actor within the enlargement process, and civil
society in the Western Balkans. It aims to understand how the Commission
engages with civil society, and what, if any, role civil society has played
within the unfolding Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and EU
enlargement. The Commissions engagement with civil society stems from
29
30 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

an understanding that the enlargement process, although principally an

elite-driven process, derives at least some measure of legitimacy from
the input of non-state actors and groups which are closer to the citizens
of prospective member states. Civil society support has been part of the
EU accession framework since the mid-1990s and has developed in quite
specific ways as a result of different but quite purposeful types of engage-
ment on the part of both EU and other external actors. The Commissions
approach to enlargement and SAP is highlighted as the most important
element of the EUs Europeanisation strategy for enlargement candidate
states, which has seen an effort to modernise, democratise, pluralise
and transform the most fragile part of Europe and progressively connect it
to the mainstream landscape of EU politics. The chapter argues, however,
that the Commissions approach to the Western Balkans, consistent with
that employed during eastern enlargement and the output legitimacy
model of EU governance, has ultimately been a top-down one, with a
preference for engagement with state actors and hierarchical rather than
horizontal modes of communication and decision-making. Although civil
society has featured strongly in Commission rhetoric about the trans-
formative potential of an EU-oriented Western Balkans, EU policy has in
fact helped to neutralise any meaningful contribution by civil society actors
as a substantive partner in governance. And although the Commission has
at least broadened out the circle of participation in enlargement/SAP to
include civil society as a stakeholder, the Commissions engagement with
the Western Balkans has been accession driven rather than community
centred. This means that civil society has continued to play a subordinate
part in transforming landscape within the region.

Civil society and European integration

Although the EU is often identified as an elitist structure of power,

scholarship has increasingly focused on transnational advocacy net-
works centred on the EU, and both the horizontal and vertical inter-
actions provoked by civil society activity. The concept of civil society
entered the debate on EU governance comparatively late and largely as
a result of the EUs extended legitimacy crisis from the early 1990s on.2
The EU here is understood as a transnational and multilevel political
opportunity structure (POS), which acts to structure patterns of civil
society mobilisation and access to decision-makers.3 One of the most
sophisticated recent contributions to the literature comes from Beate
Kohler Koch4 who analyses the multiple functions performed by civil
society organisations (CSOs) across the European Union. In particular
 John OBrennan 31

she identifies a performative function centred on the formation and

reformation of civil society through discourse and interaction in the
public sphere. Accompanying this there is a representative function,
which involves making civil society visible and giving societal interests
a voice. Here CSOs are understood as mediators between the local and
the supranational centre in Brussels, echoing local points of view and
policy concerns, bringing a diversity of views to the policymaking table,
and thus contributing both to input and output legitimacy. Civil society
actors face considerable constraints, however, when seeking to influence
EU policy. They are constrained by the significant level of resources
required to cultivate relations, prepare policy submissions and attend
meetings. Although the European Commission has consistently held to
a pluralist understanding of civil society, which includes all voluntary
and non-profit organisations that give voice to the concerns of citizens
in addition to market-related actors, the evidence from the integration
process suggests that this pluralism is a highly qualified and narrowly
interpreted one. Research indicates that there is a significant gap between
the official EU discourse about its relationship with civil society and its
actual practice of consulting citizens and their representatives. Civil dia-
logue, for example, has seen a tendency on the part of the Commission
to avoid interaction with civil society on controversial issues.5
The Commissions preference for working with and through elites
within civil society organisations has been well documented. Thus EU
NGOs, despite achieving visibility and prominence in carrying out their
performative and representative functions, have also been categorised
as lacking the critical distance required to mobilise for a radical shift
in EU policy and of participating in consensus-oriented consultation
processes devoid of substantive opportunities for deliberation. EU social
NGOs in particular have been characterised as elite focused with weak
links to grass-root constituents. Scholars have also demonstrated that
EU funding and project support to NGOs has often proved both con-
ditional and highly selective.6 For sceptics of civil society efficacy, this
provides evidence of civil society co-optation and an inability to main-
tain independence from EU policy imperatives. Eriksen and Magnette,
for example, both point to the insufficiency of output legitimacy within
EU structures and highlight the need for substantive societal autonomy
from EU decision-making authorities.7 This implies the need for more
genuinely authentic forms of participation than those encouraged by
the Commission and a move towards governance by the people.8 Cullen9
also argues that many Commission officials remain sceptical of NGO
claims to represent the public interest and rather view them as primarily
32 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

lobbyists representing narrow constituencies and as sources of expert or

technical information which can be fed into the policy process and
in output terms as vehicles to sell EU policy to its citizens. Broader
research also supports this interpretation of the Commission viewing
civil society as one of Communicating Europe. For Eriksen this is prob-
lematic because the democratic division of labour between the state and
civil society is endangered when voluntary associations are used as mere
instruments of EU policy implementation. In this view, the Commissions
approach does not involve stakeholders in any meaningful or robust way.
Rather, civil society is conceived as occasional consultations and cheer-
leaders for European integration, or service providers as Armstrong10
put it. NGOs and civil actors become vehicles for pronouncements on
the positive projects being overseen by Brussels. Thus the Commissions
approach to civil society has been at the same time open and pluralist
and yet deliberately constructed as limited and utilitarian. This is not
to argue that civil society has proved incapable of exerting pressure for
policy change within the integration process. Rather the environment
in which it operates is one which overwhelmingly favours the structural
preferences of insider institutional actors like the Commission.
The nature of the EUs political influence is now widely discussed. It
constitutes a given in the analysis of EU external relations, even if the
claims made for the nature and reach of that influence are contested.
Scholars have focused on the EUs soft power, civilian power and
power of attraction in arguing for the impact of the normative content
of EU policy and politics.11 This, it is argued, is especially evident within
the enlargement process where the asymmetric nature of the regime
provides ample opportunity for social learning and socialisation, or
the effectiveness of EU rule transfer through conditionality norms and
practices. For our purposes the important element of this is how, and
under what circumstances, membership political conditionality demands
convert into Europeanisation of domestic political structures and arrange-
ments in candidate states. Within that context, how does conditional-
ity and Europeanisation impact on civil society and what role does the
European Commission play in encouraging a substantive civil society
contribution to enlargement politics and policies?

The Commission and enlargement

The EUs effort to successfully enlarge to the Western Balkans involves

a complex division of labour (internally) among the EU institutions.
Although the Commission plays a central bureaucratic role in the
 John OBrennan 33

enlargement process this is balanced by the (territorial) input of both the

Council and the (representative) functions of the European Parliament.
The Commissions influence within enlargement politics stems prin-
cipally from two sources. The first is its formal power to initiate policy
proposals, which helps it to set and shape the enlargement policy agenda.
Although, as in the general integration framework, it seeks to anticipate,
incorporate and adjust for the specific concerns of member states, and
increasingly the European Parliament, it has often found itself to be,
almost by default, the sole policy entrepreneur and thus the best-placed
EU actor within the enlargement process. It is important to understand
that much of the Commissions power within the contemporary enlarge-
ment process evolved out of the early (uncertain) response by the EU to
events in CEE in the early 1990s.
The extraordinary challenge that confronted the European Commission
when it took on the task of managing EU relations with the new democ-
racies of CEE was quite unlike anything the Commission had pre-
viously faced in EU enlargement history. Although at many levels the
Commission acted in conformity with Article 49 of the treaties and
thus as a classic bureaucratic agent of the member states of the EU it
seems clear that the Commission also managed to carve out for itself a
very significant independent role within the eastern enlargement. In
the first place it is responsible for most of the important formal policy
proposals that shape the deepening of relations with candidate and pro-
spective candidate states. The Commission is both able and willing to
act as an agenda setter and so frame the parameters of EU policy towards
the Western Balkan states. And although more often than not its choice
is to operate through coalitions within the Council, it also frequently
drives the EU agenda on key parts of the process.
Where formal prerogatives are absent, the Commission uses what
scholars term customary enlargement practice to carve out an informal
agenda-setting role, framing problems and urging consensus where diffi-
culties arise. Individual commissioners such as Gnter Verheugen and Olli
Rehn frequently acted as political entrepreneurs, and proved to be both
proactive and integral to enlargement outcomes. And the Commission
itself, through its capacity-building and compliance functions within
the process, is the EU institutional actor closest to the candidate states
throughout the process, providing advice, urging broader and deeper
transposition of EU norms, and actively socialising candidate state public
representatives into EU practice.
Viewed by the candidate states as ever-demanding and frequently
unreasonable in its insistence on full and unconditional implementation
34 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

of the acquis, viewed by the member states as too accommodating of

candidate state preferences, the Commission often treads a thin line
between process manager and political entrepreneur. In its engage-
ment with the candidate states, imaginative framing of policy proposals
within the EU, and not inconsiderable diplomatic skill in pushing the
sometimes reluctant member states towards completion of the nego-
tiations, the Commission performs the type of role which, if indeed
unglamorous and hidden from the European public, is integral to the
success story that enlargement has proved. It is thus quite certain that
the Commission acts as a key driver or motor of the enlargement
process. A role that developed out of the vacuum created by the fall of
the Berlin Wall has evolved into a functional, normative and agenda-
setting role that now dominates the enlargement framework in the
Western Balkans.
The eastern enlargement was the first such accession process to exhibit
any kind of official role for civil society. The process of including civil
society was, however, slow and evolutionary, and not without contradic-
tions. In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions in CEE civil society played
an important, if often neglected role, in providing an early legitimising
rationale for the EUs eastern enlargement process.12 Indeed in some
respects the prominence of civil society actors in toppling Communist
regimes in the late 1980s may have led to unrealisable expectations
about the potential reach and influence of civil society in reconstructing
and consolidating democratic institutions and associational life in post-
Communist Europe. In the developing enlargement framework it was the
EU aid regime that provided the first opportunity structure for civil soci-
ety participation in the political context. And crucially this participation
developed out of specific interaction with the European Commission,
as the latter took on the role of enlargement process manager on behalf
of the EU.
In 1991 it was simply stated that PHARE (the French acronym for
Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies) assistance
contained a general commitment to recognise the value of NGOs while
implementing PHARE projects. In 1992, a special PHARE democracy pro-
gramme was launched on the initiative of the European Parliament in
order to counter the exclusive emphasis on market-based reforms. The
programme aimed to support the establishment of political and civil insti-
tutions crucial for the achievement of political consensus and stability.
Later studies would show that most of this support went into the develop-
ment of NGOs. The objectives of PHAREs civil society programmes were
to strengthen the capacity of leading institutions and to assist them in
 John OBrennan 35

expanding the range of their activities, increasing their self-reliance and

enhancing their participation in society and their support of NGOs.13 The
key here is that this engagement evolved as an element of Commission
policy and was increasingly linked to the Commissions priorities rather
than local civil society actors priorities. Adaptation to EU norms and
effective compliance with the acquis framed the Commissions approach
to civil society. Thus it was accession driven rather than demand driven;
Commission driven rather than locally driven. This would set the pattern
for civil society participation in EU enlargement programmes which has
continued to this day within the Western Balkans (and Turkey).

The Commission and civil society

The role of civil society in legitimising EU governance has attracted

growing attention within the EUs developing relations with the Western
Balkans. The Commissions goal has been to engage both state and non-
state actors in policy reform premised on ideas about good governance
and building local capacity to cope with the EU acquis. It is crucial,
however, to understand that the European Commissions engagement
with civil society should be understood as a form of output rather than
input legitimacy, where dialogue with specialised publics takes place
as a form of deliberation by specialist actors according to Eriksen.14
Here policy consultations take the form of institutionalised contacts
by which the Commission seeks to obtain information covering both
the subject issue and their position on proposed legislation from stake-
holders and civil society groups.15 Civil society acts as an intermediary
between the citizen and the state, making at least some contribution to
reducing the so-called democratic deficit in the enlargement domain,
but nevertheless from a position which is distinctly subordinate to state
actors. Civil society groups have been increasingly active in lobbying
the EU over the last decade, but this involvement, even when success-
ful, often fails to match the regularised and favoured input of private
interest groups. And as Warleigh16 points out, the EUs approach to civil
society groups in the past has been open to question; the Commission
in particular has been guilty of trying to limit consultation to favourite
NGOs which will essentially defend the Commissions policy prefer-
ences, and sometimes even its role in the institutional process itself.
This has led, as Fagan17 points out, to a rather audacious conflation of
democratic civil society with externally funded professional NGOs.
The Commission clearly orientates consultation with civil society
actors towards output legitimacy, however, by framing the boundaries
36 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

of discussion and room for compromise available to participating actors.

It is clear that in the design of the consultative fora the members are
invited as experts, and in principle not on behalf of their organisations
in any specific representative capacity. A characteristic feature is that
they are easily turned into specialised spaces where knowledge of a
policy field is more important than input legitimacy criteria.18 In this
kind of environment it is easy to see why different forms of cognitive
dissonance arise between the representatives of many civil society groups
in Brussels and their constituency: they are effectively co-opted as experts
and parts of an epistemic community by the Commission.
The Commission, however, does not hold officially to such a thin def-
inition of civil society. In its own website summary it states: the policy
of consultation does not make a distinction between civil society organi-
sations or other forms of interest groups. The Commission consults
interested parties, which comprise all those who wish to participate
in consultations run by the Commission. Over time the Commission
has elucidated a discourse about the role of civil society in the govern-
ance of the EU and has tried to present its institutionalised relations
with civil society as part of a new mode of governance that would
increase the legitimacy of the EU through the participation and hence
empowerment of citizens organisations. Indeed the 2001 White Paper
on governance indicates an effort to translate these relationships into
complimentary sources of legitimacy. The document refers explicitly
to a transnational public sphere as one in which consultation becomes
part of a discourse on relegitimisation from complementary models of
(representative) democracy.19 The defeat of referendums in France, the
Netherlands and Ireland in recent years, not to mention the fallout
from the financial crisis and the unfolding in 2011 of the Arab Spring
in close geographical proximity to EU territory, has only refocused think-
ing about engaging civil society as a supplement to the normal modes of
(hierarchical) decision-making which dominate the EU.

The Commission and civil society in the Western Balkans

Civil society has played its part in reconstituting associational life and
community in the Western Balkans since 1990, just as it did in CEE.
Organisations such as the George Soros sponsored Open Society and the
media group Balkan Insight have made a significant contribution to edu-
cation and other spheres of public activity across the region and aimed
to strengthen civil societys autonomous position in relation to state
power. But this is in a context where civil society during the Communist
 John OBrennan 37

years had been firmly subordinated to the state and the Communist
party. In the vacuum that followed the collapse of the Communist system,
civil society and participatory politics was further constrained by war,
conflict and displacement. Thus the challenge of civil society in the
Western Balkan region has been incomparably greater than anywhere
else in Eastern Europe after 1989. This weakness manifests itself espe-
cially in glaring failures of governance, overt corruption, porous legal
regimes and inability to redistribute resources in either an efficient or
equitable manner. The corrosive legacy of divisive nationalism as well
as lingering irredentist claims made the task of carving out a pluralistic
and genuinely common public space that much more difficult than it
was in Poland or Hungary, for example. The Commissions activity in
the civil society realm has been both encouraged by and weakened by
the fragility of local democratic models in the Western Balkans. But it
seems clear that the relative weakness of the state has made it more dif-
ficult for civil society to play a full and proactive part in the reconstitu-
tion of civic and associational life in the Western Balkans.
The Commissions approach to civil society in the region can be sum-
marised as a contradictory mix of rhetorical support and good intentions,
offset by a familiar penchant for employing civil society in a utilitarian
capacity as a means of more efficiently carrying out enlargement policy.
The value of civil society for the Commission lies in its ability to pro-
vide local ownership over EU aid projects and efforts to communicate
Europe; to act as a catalysing force for necessary local adaptation to EU
norms; to act as a mediator between state and society within individual
states and beyond at regional level; and to provide a legitimating ration-
ale for EU policy. The Commissions conception of the role of civil soci-
ety in the Western Balkans is laid down in the 2010 Enlargement Strategy
Paper. It asserts:

Civil society activities are essential for a mature democracy, the respect
for human rights and the rule of law. Such activities enhance political
accountability, stimulate and expand the space for discourse on soci-
etal choices and strengthen the consensus for a pluralistic society. By
contributing to a more open, participatory and dynamic democracy,
a lively and vibrant civil society is also conducive to tolerance and
reconciliation.20

The emphasis on tolerance and reconciliation is clearly an acknowl-

edgment that EU policy in the region has not to date produced the
more benign, cooperative and pluralistic inter-communal environment
38 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

that was hoped for in the aftermath of the Dayton settlement in 1995.
This is especially the case in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina where
borders, status and sovereignty remain contested by a range of actors.
While suggesting the EU possesses considerable power to influence local
trajectories of development, it also qualifies this by asserting that this
is usually subject to local interpretation and contestation. At a more
concrete and practical level the Commission21 suggests:

A culture of acceptance and appreciation of the role played by civil

society needs to be in place to allow civil society organisations to
engage in an effective policy dialogue. Public consultation on policy
initiatives and draft laws should become the general principle. The
access of civil society to government support is frequently hindered
by a lack of transparency and poorly developed allocation criteria.

The Commission again alludes strongly to the fundamental weak-

nesses of civil society in the region when stating that a key EU aim is to
strengthen their capacities and professionalism, allowing them to engage
in an effective dialogue with public and private actors and to monitor
developments in areas such as the rule of law and respect for fundamental
rights.22 Consistent with previous enlargement rounds, the Commission
has implicitly linked civil society empowerment in the Western Balkans
to the provision of accession-related aid programmes. This assistance,
provided through instruments such as the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and more recently the Instrument
for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), is located firmly within the SAP frame-
work and geared towards augmenting the capacity of the state through
partnership with civil society and other non-state actors.23
Beginning with Croatia and Turkey in 2005, and extending it to the
whole of the Western Balkans in 2006, the EU began to not only sup-
port increased communication and cooperation between EU member
states and the candidate countries (civil dialogue), but it also began
paying much more attention to the role of civil society in the democra-
tisation and reconciliation process taking place within these countries.
These new priorities were spelled out in the Enlargement Strategy in
2007, in which the Commission made the development of civil society
and civil dialogue one of the priority areas within the EU enlargement
policy. The EU thus increased support within this context by a factor of
three comparing 20057 (a27 million) to 200810 (a79 million) in the
form of the Civil Society Facility (CSF) introduced into the operating
 John OBrennan 39

framework of the IPA. It is the CSF initiative that made the Commission
the biggest financial supporter of civil society in the region.24 The Balkan
Civil Society Development Network, an amalgam of the most influential
civil society groups in the region, has produced the most substantive
analysis of the Commissions civil society engagement to date. It asserts
that the aim of the CSF is threefold: to support the development of
civil society, including capacity building; to expose civil society repre-
sentatives to EU institutions and procedures; and to support partnership
between civil society and other sectors as well as with counterparts in
other countries of the region and the member states.25 It argues that
the CSF represented the concretisation of the prioritised support to
civil society development and civil dialogue on the part of the EU.26
Additionally and for the first time, the Partnership principle (borrowed
from the existing approach within EU regional policy) was enshrined in
the IPA instrument, which envisaged the inclusion of civil society actors
in the programming, implementation and evaluation practices within
the Commissions policies and programmes. Both the financial support
and the establishment of a formal obligation to consult civil society
significantly raised expectations among the local actors in the Western
Balkans regarding the importance and value of the new IPA instru-
ment.27 For the European Commission, however, the most important
frame of reference remained the drive for accession: EU funding and
aid constitute a key vehicle supporting efforts to transpose and imple-
ment the accession acquis. Funding has to contribute to and underpin
the most significant priorities attached to the reform programmes; if it
also delivers a boost to the position and influence of civil society, that
is a welcome additional positive result. But this goal remains second-
ary to the states adaptation of law and administration to the acquis
communautaire.
Alongside an enhanced role for civil society within the unfolding
EU aid regime, a second key priority for the Commission has been to
encourage and facilitate a more substantive framework of regional coop-
eration among CSOs. Although regionalism has tended to be resisted
by state actors within the enlargement framework, the Commission sees
it as a positive vehicle supporting interstate reconciliation and acceler-
ated cross-border economic cooperation. Although the Commission
has encouraged the transnational approach, some CSOs have resisted
such activity, for more or less the same reason as state actors (the fear
that regionalism will dilute the bilateral relationship with Brussels).
CSO transnationalism is especially evident in the groups which focus
40 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

on human rights across the Western Balkans; these tend to be more

universalistic and outward looking in their aims and modus operandi
than other groups. In this sense they act or have the potential to act
as a healthy counterweight to local actors which focus on a narrow
range of particularistic, localised and sometimes patently chauvinistic
demands. The damage wrought by particularism based on a perennial-
ist conception of ethnic relations runs very deep in the Western Balkan
region; civil society offers a channel for independent, moderate and
cooperative ideas in a context where state elites still tend to fall back
on familiar nationalist tropes manifested in different forms of paranoia
and groupthink. Thus the opportunity for reconciliation and engage-
ment of previously warring ethno-national subunits can be facilitated
by civil society dialogue with external sponsorship of the European
Commission. A key aim here is a form of socialisation of such actors,
not so much into a uniform or universalist way of thinking, but rather
away from extremes of thinking and behaviour.
This applies both to the traditional approach of insideoutside nego-
tiations and the more day-to-day informal practices at the regional level:
civil society has a role in both but is much more visible in the latter
than the former. It is important to acknowledge here that CSOs do
not faithfully replicate the Brussels line and policy agenda within the
enlargement process; they provide a crucial independent, non-state
voice and pressure on both domestic actors and the external actors
within the framework. At times the very independence of local civil
society actors is an asset for the Commission as it faces down domestic
contestation of EU norms and the implementation of accession-driven
legislation. Civil society can thus act as a more acceptable (internal)
channel of representation and norm diffusion than any external agency
or body. Turning somewhat on its head the traditional enlargement
maxim that the Commission is the friend who tells the truth very
often CSOs can act as the friends who tell the Commissions truths in
a divisive local political context. For the Commission, where EU policy
is expected to attract significant domestic policy costs and thus prove
thoroughly contested by local actors, civil society provides an impor-
tant alternative channel of exercising influence, countering negative
publicity, providing local voices of support and mobilising coalitions
of the willing for action. Where the domestic costs of adaptation to EU
norms is high, CSOs can and do act in ways that elected local officials
find difficult if not impossible. CSOs can thus take ownership over a
process for EU-sponsored reforms/legislation and push domestic actors
towards compliance. There is much evidence for this activity within the
 John OBrennan 41

eastern enlargement process. Environmental CSOs in particular proved

very effective in changing the contours of domestic policy debate along
cosmopolitan (over particularistic) and universalist lines favoured by
the Commission.28
Notwithstanding these positive developments in the role played by
civil society in the Western Balkans, the evolution in Commission think-
ing about and managing the enlargement process places civil society
within a very truncated operational space. Perhaps the most important
lesson drawn from the eastern enlargement process by the bureaucracy
was the need for consistent oversight of accession-driven reforms in
candidate states. The introduction of benchmarks and a much more
interventionist model of engagement by the Commission on rule of
law issues and administrative reforms in candidate and SAP states has
acted to reinforce the existing tendency towards elite-centred interac-
tion: the default structural landscape of an accession-driven relation-
ship between the Commission and candidate and SAP states effectively
marginalises all local actors outside the core executive and responsible
ministries engaged in transposing and implementing the accession acquis.
This applies as much to parliamentarians as it does to civil society; in
both cases it acts to reduce the democratic legitimation of the enlarge-
ment process and further distance citizens from political engagement.
The Commission, while paying lip service to the goal of civil society
inclusion, often acts in a functional capacity to curtail or reduce the
actual input of CSOs as it seeks substantive results from candidate/
SAP states which will advance the accession process. The argument
most frequently proffered in defence of this approach is that the most
important priority is reform along a defined EU trajectory and that suc-
cess will empower civil society indirectly through better quality public
administration and a more transparent and structurally secure criminal
justice system.
Guided by this Janus-faced approach, the Commission has consistently
exhibited a tendency towards hierarchical differentiation and conference-
centred rather than community-centred activity on the part of so-called
elect civil society groups. The professionalisation of community work
and what has been termed NGO-isation appears as a significant problem
here. These groups are part of or over time become socialised into an elite
transnational community centred on European integration practices:
elites talk to themselves and do little to reduce the democratic deficit
said to characterise EU institutional politics. At its most extreme this is a
world where civil society is not part of society but substitutes for society;
organisations are essentially co-opted into an elite world of privilege and
42 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

access and as such voluntarily dislodge themselves from their previous

anchor in society.
In the Western Balkans this separation of civil society from society
takes the form of international versus local, where many NGOs
are staffed by foreign nationals; such organisations often maintain a
two-track salary scale whereby the internationals get paid a Western
salary leaving their local employees to be paid in significantly lower
amounts of local currency. This leads to the charge of professional NGOs
masquerading as civil society while failing to engage adequately with
local actors and their concerns.29 Granted this international NGO sector
represents just one part of the civil society sphere in the region but it
remains a crucially important one. The impression here is of a process
of co-optation of favoured civil society groups, which increasingly tend
towards elite engagement in Brussels and in the process lose touch with
their roots in local society in the Western Balkans. The Commissions
overriding priority of facilitating accession-driven capacity-building
and governance reforms thus drives it to both co-opt and marginalise
civil society while offering rhetorical blandishments centred on inclusion
and participative democracy.

Conclusions

The civil society input into enlargement decision-making in the Western

Balkans is significant because, as Mavrikos-Adamou30 puts it, values
such as trust, tolerance and cooperation are important for both the
democratisation process and for reconciling differences among diverse
ethnic groups in post-conflict societies, and civil society can be the
space where they are cultivated. Given the tormented contemporary
history of the Western Balkan region, this broad understanding of
the potential contribution of civil society to the region seems wholly
appropriate. More broadly still, the Western Balkan region since the
end of the Bosnian War in 1995, might be viewed as an extended
laboratory for thinking about a wide constellation of phenomena such
as post-conflict statesociety relations, peace-building, nation-building
and external intervention. The strength or weakness of the civil soci-
ety sphere at the very least emerges as an important indicator of the
degree to which reconciliation and democratic consolidation have been
taking place.
Assessing the role played by civil society in the Western Balkans one
can undoubtedly point to some positive developments. It seems clear
 John OBrennan 43

that since at least the Thessaloniki summit meeting in 2003 civil society
actors have become both more visible on the ground and marginally
more influential in policy circles. This generalised observation undoubt-
edly conceals widespread variations in visibility and power. Nevertheless
the trend has been moving in a positive direction. Some of this is
undoubtedly connected with the wider patterns of democratic consoli-
dation in the region. But some of it also derives from the pressure placed
on state actors by civil society organisations with European Commission
support (rhetorical, financial and organisational). Such civil society groups
have articulated and represented various ideological interests and political
demands voiced by different segments of society as well as impressing
on central government and otherwise stratified political elites the need
for effective governance. The most visible among such organisations
have been womens organisations and human rights organisations,
growing from grass-roots level as voluntary associations and gradually
attaining both visibility and some degree of influence. Adam Fagans
work on Kosovo31 demonstrates at least some success for EU policy in
encouraging the advocacy activities of grass-roots organisations and
a more substantive focus on building independent capacity among
local NGOs.
It seems clear that the European Commission faces a real dilemma in
its approach to engagement with the Western Balkans in the accession
context. One valuable academic source that might help us understand
that dilemma is to examine it through the lens of Samuel Huntingtons
Political Order in Changing Societies.32 Huntingtons chief concerns here
were with the relationship between state capacity and legitimation of
the political process. He asserted that the two in fact could be separated:
a country could grow and consolidate its institutions and stateness inde-
pendent of their basis for legitimation. At the core of the Commissions
approach to the enlargement and SAP framework is this desire to balance
the capacity of Western Balkan elites to provide effective governance and
an administrative and juridical system capable of adapting to the EUs
legal norms while underpinning these efforts with a substantive role
for civil society. Where civil society could and normatively speaking
should bridge the gap between state action and citizen empowerment,
the Commission has usually sided (following Huntingtons precepts)
with the imperative of achieving legal and administrative state compli-
ance over any meaningful legitimation of those processes. Thus to some
extent the enlargement/SAP regime has not just exacerbated existing
tendencies towards elite capacity; it has also contributed to a growing
44 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

problem of a specifically local and regional democratic deficit, familiar

from the European Union and its political process. The demands of the
accession process in both CEE previously, and later, the Western Balkans
has, for example, taken power away from national parliaments as the
Commission sought speedy adaptation to EU norms and engaged heavily
with executive actors rather than parliament and civil society. National
parliaments have thus been convincingly depicted as victims of the
enlargement process in the same way as patterns of deepening within
the existing EU have also disempowered legislatures.33 The evidence from
the Western Balkans suggests that something similar is happening to civil
society. Although the Commission, as the lead EU actor in the region,
has aided and facilitated the civil society sector and sought to include
it in public consultations and regional dialogue, these efforts have been
accompanied by a sustained attachment to a top-down, elite-driven
enlargement model: participation by the people is envisaged as indirect
and partial rather than direct and substantive. Thus the advance by civil
society in the Western Balkans continues to exhibit a stopstart quality
and the meaningful legitimation of the EU accession process remains a
doubtful proposition.

Notes
1. At the EUWestern Balkans Summit meeting at Thessaloniki on June 2003, the
EU stated that the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European per-
spective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within
the European Union. See European Commission (2003) Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Western Balkans
and European Integration, Brussels, 21 May, COM (2003) 285. The Thessaloniki
promise was reiterated at the EUWestern Balkans ministerial meeting at
Sarajevo on 2 June 2010 where the EU provided an unequivocal commit-
ment to the European perspective of the Western Balkans and reiterated that
the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU.
2. B. Finke (2007) Civil Society Participation in EU Governance, Living Reviews
in European Governance, 2(2), p. 4.
3. P. Cullen (2010) The Platform of European Social NGOs: Ideology, Division
and Coalition, Journal of Political Ideologies, 15(3), p. 320.
4. B. Kohler-Koch (2010) Civil Society and EU Democracy: Astroturf
Representation? Journal of European Public Policy, 17(1), p. 106.
5. Cullen (2010) op. cit., p. 322.
6. Cullen (2010) op. cit., p. 3223.
7. E. Eriksen (2001) Governance or Democracy? The White Paper on European
Governance, in C. Jorges, Y. Meny and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) Mountain or
Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance
(New York: Jean Monnet Centre for International and Regional Economic Law
and Justice), pp. 6172; P. Magnette (2001) The White Paper on European
 John OBrennan 45

Governance, in C. Jorges, Y. Meny and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) Mountain or

Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance
(New York: Jean Monnet Centre for International and Regional Economic
Law and Justice), pp. 114.
8. Finke (2007) op. cit., p. 14.
9. Cullen (2010) op. cit., p. 323.
10. K. Armstrong (2001) Civil Society and the White Paper Bridging or
Jumping the Gap? in C. Jorges, Y. Meny and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) Mountain
or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance
(New York: Jean Monnet Centre for International and Regional Economic
Law and Justice), pp. 95102.
11. H. Grabbe (2006) The EUs Transformative Power: Europeanisation through
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan);
I. Manners (2002) Normative Power Europe, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40(2), pp. 23558; J. OBrennan (2006) The Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union (Abingdon: Routledge).
12. M. A. Vachudova (2005) Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration
after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press); A. Dimitrova (2003) Driven
to Change: the EUs Enlargement Viewed from the East (Manchester: Manchester
University Press).
13. European Commission (2010) Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010
2011, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and Council, COM (2010) 660, Brussels, 9 November.
14. Eriksen (2001) op. cit.
15. L. Bouza Garcia (2009) Can Segmented Publics Foster a General Public
Sphere in the EU? An Example from the Consultation Process Practices of
the European Commission, Observatorio Journal, 9, p. 170.
16. A. Warleigh (2003) Civil Society and Legitimate Governance in a Flexible
Europe: Critical Deliberativism as a Way Forward, in S. Smismans (ed.)
Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar), pp. 6888.
17. A. Fagan (2011) EU Assistance for Civil Society in Kosovo: A Step too Far for
Democracy Promotion? Democratization, 18(3), pp. 70730.
18. Bouza Garcia (2009) op. cit., p. 177.
19. Bouza Garcia (2009) op. cit., p. 174.
20. European Commision (2010) op. cit., p. 13.
21. Ibid., p. 14.
22. Ibid.
23. Fagan (2011) op. cit., p. 708.
24. Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN) (2009) The Successes
and Failures of EU Pre-Accession Policy in the Balkans: Support to Civil Society,
9 November (Skopje: BCSDN), p. 3.
25. Ibid., p. 14.
26. Ibid., p. 5.
27. Ibid., p. 5.
28. C. Soitu and D. Soitu (2010) Europeanisation of the EUs External Borders:
The Case of Romanian-Moldovan Civil Society Cooperation, Journal of
European Integration, 32(5), p. 495.
29. Fagan (2011) op. cit., p. 710.
46 The European Commission, Enlargement Policy and Civil Society

30. T. Mavrikos-Adamou (2010) Challenges to Democracy Building and the Role

of Civil Society, Democratization, 17(3), p. 515.
31. Fagans work on Kosovo (2011) op. cit.
32. S. P. Huntington (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven/
London: Yale University Press).
33. J. OBrennan and T. Raunio (eds) (2007) National Parliaments in an Enlarging
European Union: From Victims of Integration to Competitive Actors? (Abingdon:
Routledge).
2
Civil Society and Good
Governance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia: An
Assessment of EU Assistance
and Intervention
Adam Fagan

European Union assistance to the so-called potential candidate countries

of the Western Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro,
and Kosovo) is designed to engage non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), the private sector, civil society actors, and other formal and
informal networks within the process of policymaking, implementation
and compliance. Through short-term project grants on themes ranging
from Roma rights to environmental education and protection, and
support for victims of torture to the provision of employment training in
marginalised communities, the fundamental aim of the Commission is to
engage state and non-state actors in the construction and implementation
of EU-compliant policy frameworks and processes, and to build institu-
tional and administrative capacity.
The chapter is based on research undertaken during 20078 in Bosnia
and Serbia on EU assistance channelled through NGOs and civil soci-
ety organisations (CSOs) as part of CARDS (Community Assistance for
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) and EIDHR (European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) financial assistance pro-
grammes. The research focused on the process of allocating project grants,
the focus of assistance, the outcome and sustainability of short-term
projects, and the impact of grants on recipient domestic NGOs/CSOs.
The core objectives of the chapter are, first, to explore and evaluate the
impact of such assistance on domestic NGOs and civil society networks
in Serbia and Bosnia and to consider what the EU is actually achieving as
a consequence of its various financial initiatives for these states. Second,
and more precisely, to consider the extent to which such assistance is in
47
48 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

fact contributing to the building of governance, or indeed good govern-

ance. The final objective is to offer explanation as to why, despite nearly
a decade of EU intervention, the weakness of both the state and non-
state sectors remains a critical development issue, with little evidence
that the functional capacity of the state or civil society is increasing in
either country.

Governance: Locating power beyond the state

Prior to presenting and analysing the research data on EU assistance in

Bosnia and Serbia, it is necessary to consider the concept of governance
in some detail, with particular reference to civil society and the interac-
tion between state and non-state actors. Not surprisingly, the ubiquity
of the term governance generates a high degree of contestation. Most
development aid channelled through NGOs by bilateral and multilat-
eral donor agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) for
example, the World Bank, USAID, DfID and the EU is framed in the
language of building good governance and strengthening civil society.
Conceptual and theoretical contradiction tends to focus on why gov-
ernance is being used instead of government, whether as an explanatory
tool governance helps to locate or further obfuscate power, and the
extent to which as purposive activity governance adequately identifies
the deployment of power between politically engaged actors.1
There is, however, a consensus among scholars on the ascribed value
of engaging civil society within governance networks. Indeed, insofar as
the defining feature or common denominator of all interpretations of
the concept, the emphasis placed on multiple locations of power, both
institutionalised and informal, the transfer of power to civil society and
non-state actors is pivotal. However, it is important to recognise that
implicit within all conceptualisations of governance is the embedded
neoliberal notion that the dispersal of power involves both the retrac-
tion and reconstitution of state power vis--vis the market and civil
society.
The key difference between government and governance appears,
therefore, to be in terms of scope: the latter is more encompassing, both
in terms of actors involved in control or regulation, and in the sense of
the number of activities being regulated. Rosenau provides perhaps the
clearest illustration of the multiplicity of actors and the potential role
of civil society actors when he describes governance as encompass[ing]
the activities of government, but also includ[ing] the many other
channels through which commands flow in the form of goals framed,
 Adam Fagan 49

directives issued and policies pursued.2 In a similar vein Kooiman defines

governance as all those activities of social, political and administrative
actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control and
manage societies.3 Governance implies simultaneous regulation and
control of various overlapping issues. However, while there is flexibility
and variation, governance also involves order plus intentionality, with
order consisting of routinised arrangements.4 There is therefore within
a model of governance significant scope for fluidity and diversity, for
new actors, issues and institutions, but within established procedures
and boundaries.
A further important aspect of governance, identified by all scholars, is
that relations between the various actors, whether international or sub-
national, governmental or non-governmental, dependent or coerced,
formal or informal, institutional or non-institutional, are temporary,
ad hoc, conceived under pressure of events and voluntary.5 Not only
is political power portrayed as being widely dispersed across disparate
formal and informal agents, such interactions are fluid and continually
renegotiated. In this sense the architecture of governance, in contrast
to that of government, is far less fixed and may not be institutionalised
or formalised.

Power, hierarchies and new modes of governance

While the plurality of actors and the coordination of diversity are largely
uncontested components of the governance concept, grasping the con-
figurations of power and the interaction between actors particularly
the dynamics of power between civil society and the state and the
contexts in which governance as a mode of coordination and deci-
sion-making is likely to occur, are critical and generally under theorised
concerns. Indeed, for some critics the problem with using governance
is that it is a concept of limited analytical value that can only be used
objectively to describe the diversity and variation in political decision-
making and control.6 If it is employed as a prescriptive model for state
and policymaking reform, its objective value rapidly diminishes: it can-
not convincingly or effectively interpret the roles of actors, nor provide
commentary on the asymmetries of power without either embedded
neoliberal assumptions coming to the fore, or a normative premise that
effectiveness is possible and that an issue (can) be managed, a problem
resolved (through) an accommodation of mutual interests.7 It is argued
that attempts to use governance prescriptively as a means to fashion
actor or policy networks in development contexts either fail to unmask
50 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

the asymmetries of power, or implicitly suggest that the power of cer-

tain actors normally the state should decline vis--vis that of others
usually the market or NGOs.
Such concerns have encouraged scholars to distinguishing between
three broad ideal types of institutionalised rule structures: hierarchy,
competition (market) systems and negotiation systems.8 The interaction
between dominant and subordinate actors is referred to in the literature
as coupling: in hierarchies a relationship of domination in which the
power and influence of subordinate actors is constrained is referred to
as tight coupling.9 It is immediately apparent that potential for any
significant deliberation and the involvement of non-state or civil soci-
ety actors is possible only in the context of competition or negotiation
systems; political hierarchies will restrict access to all but public actors.
A further distinction is made in the literature between the actor con-
stellations occurring in negotiation systems and the level at which such
negotiation is, or is not, likely to occur: transgovernmental negotiation
systems (high-level diplomacy between states around, for example, inter-
national treaties or bilateral cooperation) tend to engage public actors
in conventional, classic diplomacy; intermediate negotiation systems
(interstate policy development and sectoral cooperation) are most likely
to engage non-state actors, including business and civil society repre-
sentatives, and is thus the most probable location of governance, or new
modes of governance.10

The statenon-state nexus in post-socialist states

Recent scholarly analysis looking at the changing dynamics of the

statecivil society nexus in post-socialist states acceding to the EU have
used the governance concept more prescriptively, both to locate power
and to theorise the interaction between state and non-state actors,
while acknowledging the diffusion of power between the two. Rather
than endorse neoliberal assumptions regarding the need for the state
to relinquish control and authority, or for NGOs to simply gain more
power, they identify the determinants of new forms of interaction that
potentially empower both state and non-state actors.11 Whereas much
of the governance beyond the state analysis emphasises the extent
to which such non-hierarchical decision-making and coordination (or
new governance) has increasingly become the norm,12 recent studies
focusing on the Europeanisation of post-socialist states have questioned
whether such non-hierarchical modes of governance do indeed deliver
better public policy, and if not, why this is so.13
 Adam Fagan 51

The persistence of conventional hierarchical patterns of decision-

making in the new EU member states of CEE has been explained in
terms of an absence of governance capacity on the part of both state
and non-state actors.14 What has been observed in the acceding states
is low levels of cooperation between the sectors that rarely extends
beyond superficial consultation, and if it does occur at all, does so only
in the context of EU policy, where public or civil society participation
is mandatory or a requisite for funding and assistance.15 Drawing on
Mayntz and Scharpfs notion of the shadow of hierarchy, Brzel16
argues that the critical driver for closer and more effective participation
between state and non-state actors is the capacity of policymakers to
hierarchically impose outcomes in contradiction, if necessary, to pri-
vate actors and civil society. In other words, non-hierarchical delibera-
tion and the open exchange of opinion is most likely to occur within
a framework in which compliance will ultimately be pursued by state
actors or a policymaking elite, who are able to exercise their authority
to impose outcomes. Building non-hierarchical modes of governance in
which state and non-state actors interact on an equal footing is there-
fore dependent on the fundamental capacity of the elites.
While measures to strengthen the capacity of non-state actors (NGOs
and CSOs) are certainly worthy, the critical driver of new modes of gov-
ernance is mutual resource dependency: state actors need to become
increasingly dependent on the resources of non-state actors to effect
policy change and implementation, and vice versa.17 Thus, establish-
ing such interaction in transitional and post-conflict states, where state
capacity is likely to be limited by depleted resources, is particularly cru-
cial insofar as it will encourage the emergence of webs of relatively stable
and ongoing relationships which mobilise and pool dispersed resources
so that collective (or parallel) action can be orchestrated toward the
solution of a common policy.18 In other words, the greater the involve-
ment in decision-making of affected non-state actors, the more likely the
implementation and acceptance of policy outcomes, even if the interests
of civil society actors have not been fully accommodated or are reflected
in the final piece of legislation.19
Drawing on transaction cost and principal-agent theories,20 it might
be assumed that governments and state actors in post-socialist and
post-conflict states, with depleted state capacity, may be more inclined
to engage non-state actors because of the additional value (knowledge,
expertise) they can bring to decision-making and policy implementa-
tion. However, the flaw in this argument is essentially that when the
state is too weak, and the capacity of the non-state/NGO sector is also
52 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

undeveloped, neither side is provided with sufficient incentive to engage

the other. Indeed, what is likely to emerge is agency capture or problem
shifting whereby authority becomes shared between state and non-state
actors with both lacking sufficient capacity.21 This raises a fundamental
concern regarding the propensity of donor intervention to build the
capacity of non-state, civil society and private actors to the point at
which they have greater capacity and authority than state actors. The
risk here being, first, that weak states are unlikely to recapture regulatory
capacity once authority and power have been transferred to NGOs or the
market, and second, over-empowering non-state or private actors, who
are likely to bear the costs of compliance, can lead to lowest common
denominator policy decisions and solutions.
Under circumstances in which there is parity in the low level of
capacity held by both state and non-state actors, donor-driven attempts
to introduce and to stimulate new modes of governance can actually
encourage the transfer of authority away from already demoralised and
depleted states instead of fostering reform and effective public manage-
ment. However, it is not simply a question of donor assistance needing to
focus instead on building the capacities of both state and non-state actors
in situations where there is an absence of sufficient mutual resource
dependency to stimulate new modes of governance. The capacity of
the state to enforce policy outcomes is paramount and the outcome
of intervention should not be to equate, or level, the capacity of both
actors. Rather, the state needs to command a shadow of hierarchy over
non-hierarchical deliberations if policy effectiveness is to be augmented.
If state actors perceive their role to be ephemeral and to be engaging with
non-state actors from a position of weakness, then they are unlikely to
engage positively in new modes of governance. Equally, if there is a sense
on behalf of state actors that interaction will result in loss of their agency
and autonomy, this will equally act as a disincentive for new modes of
governance.22 Moreover, if non-state actors distrust the capacity of state
actors to be ultimately able to enforce a mutually agreed decision, then
this will also act as a disincentive for partnership and governance engage-
ment. While the shadow of hierarchy will generate a desire on behalf of
non-state actors to cooperate and engage in new modes of governance,
and the degree to which state actors are capable of resorting to hierarchi-
cal modes of governance will increase such willingness, the reverse is also
true for state actors: the greater their capacity for hierarchical policymak-
ing, the less impetus there will be for cooperation with non-state actors.23
This assertion is based on the rationalist claim that state actors seek to
maximise or at least maintain their autonomy and capacity within policy
 Adam Fagan 53

processes, and will only relinquish a degree of autonomy to non-state

actors if this delivers additional capacity. In other words, for state actors
there has to be additional value derived from new modes of governance
compared to the value obtained from hierarchical and more conventional
forms of governance.24 In sum, as Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner
note, state actors have to possess sufficient capacities in terms of both
resources and autonomy in order to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy
so that non-state actors have an incentive to cooperate, and state actors
are not afraid of being captured. But these state actors must not be too
strong in order to provide an incentive for state actors to seek cooperation
with non-state actors.25
In terms of understanding why new modes of governance may not
occur or flourish, scholars such as Migdal, Weiss and Evans have argued
that resources and autonomy are not sufficient explanatory variables;
much will depend on the specific political culture and dominant atti-
tudes towards statesocietal interaction.26 As Brzel notes, this is partic-
ularly true for countries with an authoritarian legacy and no sustained
tradition of institutionalised statesociety relations.27 In post socialist
states the emergence of new modes of governance is also constrained
by the fact that NGOs and other non-state actors are perceived by both
the elite hierarchies and the masses to be unaccountable and therefore
non-democratic and illegitimate policymakers and enforcers.28 In post-
conflict situations (such as Bosnia) or in cases in which state formation
and sovereignty remain in their infancy (Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia),
the prospects for new modes of governance are even more remote.

EU assistance to Bosnia and Serbia

During the period 20047, the Delegation of the European Commissions

in Sarajevo and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) field
office in Belgrade funded local NGOs to undertake a wide variety of
projects that fell broadly within the CARDS priorities (strengthening
democratic institutions and the rule of law, reform of public adminis-
tration, promotion of human rights and gender equality, sustainable
development and poverty reduction, development of civil society and
regional cooperation). Projects were also funded as part of EIDHR, with
a specific emphasis on civil society development. This paper is based on
empirical research undertaken during 2007 in Bosnia and Serbia on EU
assistance channelled through local NGOs during that period.29
Under both programmes the majority of funded projects included an
education, training or employment skills component, usually targeting
54 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

a specific marginalised community, or working specifically with internally

displaced persons (IDPs) in a particular area.30 Several projects provided
training for key workers such as prison guards, teachers or social workers.31
There were also several projects in both locations focusing on some
form of human rights32 or environmental education for high school
students or younger children and their parents.33 Only one project, pro-
viding election monitoring and training for officials in Bosnia, related
directly to strengthening democratic institutions.34 A small number of
projects focused on developing NGO networks in particular sectors.35
Several projects involved the provision and collection of data for
example, gathering employment data and statistics on IDPs36 or pro-
viding social and medical services to sections of the community for
example, psychosocial support for victims of torture and the rehabilita-
tion of concentration camp victims.37 Other projects involved NGOs
either providing public services (such as recycling facilities) or helping
municipalities to construct policy plans or gather data (development of
waste management plan for the municipality of Sarajevo).38 Apart from
a project designed to promote the EU among young people,39 there were
no projects funded that were overtly political. Indeed, the vast major-
ity can be described as providing either policy- or social welfare-related
services in communities. The majority involved some form of bureau-
cratic interaction with state agencies and government officials, but in
not a single case was there a partnership between a recipient NGO and
a private company.
Typical outputs from the funded projects in both states during this
period include: training seminars in local communities, plans and other
reports delivered to local ministries and state agencies to be used as part
of the preparation of strategic plans and poverty reduction strategies,
the production of booklets and training manuals, codification of best
practice with regard to teaching, protecting the environment, sustain-
able tourism and dealing with victims of domestic violence, and the
provision of advice and support to Roma communities, IDPs and other
marginalised sections of society.
To evaluate the governance impact of such assistance, and to examine
the interaction between EU-funded NGOs and government/state agen-
cies, four hypotheses are constructed. These are derived largely from
the theoretical literature on the institutionalisation of social movement
organisations, and the work of Van der Heijden40 in particular.
The focus of this research is not, of course, specifically to measure the
institutionalisation of NGOs. However, the nature of the interaction
between state agencies and the organisations funded by the EU the
 Adam Fagan 55

degree of cooperation, proximity and shared objectives between the

actors is undoubtedly a reflection of a critical component of govern-
ance and the distribution of power between the two core actors. The
literature on the institutionalisation of social movements thus offers an
entirely relevant theoretical framework for hypothesising the interac-
tion. Indeed, Meyer and Tarrows description of institutionalisation as
the routinisation of conflict and the adherence to conventional and
legitimised rules of engagement by movement actors41 reflects the con-
cern of scholars of collective action to explain and theorise the increas-
ing proximity between once-radical anti-systemic social movements, and
the evident interdependence of government and non-governmental civil
society actors. In an attempt both to examine the transformation within
social movement organisations that facilitate such proximity with the
state, and to characterise the nature of the interaction, Van der Heijden
distinguishes between internal and external institutionalisation.
Internal institutionalisation is defined in terms of professionalism and
centralisation. In essence, to be part of governance networks, NGOs
and social movement organisations have to become more professional
and develop their internal management capacity to meet the chal-
lenge of cooperation within policy networks. Measures of internal
institutionalisation would therefore be the extent to which an organi-
sation develops its bureaucratic structures, its internal management
structures, and the professionalism of its operations. The centralisation
aspect refers to the emergence of a core office or centre of operations
emerging with managerial and bureaucratic capacity. The more profes-
sional an organisation becomes the greater the role played by career
professionals, and particularly those with specific skills and knowledge,
such as management and financial expertise. There will be less reliance
on volunteers, campaigners and casual staff. A critical component of
internal institutionalisation, according to Van der Heijden, is an increased
capacity to mobilise resources. Thus, if EU aid is strengthening the capac-
ity of NGOs to interact with the state, then we would expect recipient
organisations to be developing their internal organisational capacity
and professionalising their operations as a consequence of the assist-
ance they receive. We would anticipate evidence of increased organi-
sational sustainability, which in effect means a developed capacity to
raise revenue.
The key feature of external institutionalisation is an increasingly
important role played by non-governmental actors within governance
networks and within policy arenas42 and that this should correspond
to those working in organisations come increasingly to speak the
56 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

same language as government and business [with] informal contact

between specialists in the civil service and those with similar expertise in
organisations based on shared technical and professional norms.43
From the theoretical framework of institutionalisation four hypoth-
eses emerge around which the data gathered is presented and analysis of
EU assistance is constructed. The hypotheses are as follows:

1) EU assistance channelled through NGOs in Bosnia and Serbia helps

to professionalise the organisation (developing the capacities of their
central offices and increasing the number of professional paid staff
with specific expertise).
2) EU micro and macro projects engage recipient organisations in policy
and governance networks.
3) EU assistance channelled through NGOs serves to strengthen gov-
ernmental capacity by enabling state agencies to develop skills and
to facilitate the provision of services separately from, or in conjunc-
tion with, NGOs beyond the tenure of the specific project.
4) EU assistance helps foster and strengthen the long-term sustainabil-
ity of recipient organisations.

Professionalisation and sustainability of recipient NGOs

(hypotheses 1 and 4)
With regard to the first hypothesis, a series of observations can be drawn
from the data relating to the development of professionalism among
recipient organisations. Those NGOs receiving EU grants in Serbia and
Bosnia are more long established than might have been assumed: only
2.9 per cent were established less than 6 months ago, and the vast major-
ity, 78.3 per cent, were established more than 5 years ago (Table 2.2).
However, while recipient organisations are quite long established, they
are, and have remained, small operations with little evidence of inter-
nal expansion and particularly developed capacity. The number of staff
they employ (Table 2.1) is relatively small, with 40 per cent of organi-
sations employing less than five full-time members of staff, with only
11 per cent (eight respondents) having a staff of more than ten. During
semi-structured interviews with a sample of organisations from both states
(40 in total) respondents were asked whether the size of their organisation
had altered over the past four years. In 86 per cent of the cases the number
of employees in 2007 was similar to or the same as in 2003.
However, the data gathered as part of the semi-structured interviews
revealed that in the majority of organisations that have successfully man-
aged at least one EU project, staff are employed and recruited specifically
 Adam Fagan 57

Table 2.1 Human resources

How many people work for the organisation Per cent

full time and part time?

F/T employees 0 4.3

Less than 5 people 40.6
Between 5 and 10 33.3
More than 10 11.6
More than 20 10.1

P/T employees Less than 5 33.3

Between 5 and 10 47.0
More than 10 19.7

Table 2.2 Organisation established

Organisation established Frequency Per cent Cumulative per cent

Less than 6 months 2 2.9 2.9

More than 12 months 2 2.9 5.8
Within the last 5 years 11 15.9 21.7
More than 5 years ago 54 78.3 100.0
Total 69 100.0

for their professional or specialised expertise, which is usually the ability

to complete project applications, knowledge of logic frameworks and
financial management, competent English language skills. For exam-
ple, The Bosnian organisation, Mozaik, which has been the recipient
of four CARDS/EIDHR-funded project grants since 2004, has a team of
three designated staff members working on project applications and the
organisation has recruited staff with financial management and account-
ing expertise.44 The low number of full-time or part-time employees may
not necessarily reflect the capacity and size of the organisation; several
of the organisations interviewed claimed that they were able to quickly
recruit professional staff to work on funded projects and thus tempo-
rarily expand the size of their organisations. For example, while the
Sarajevo-based organisation CTVMost, which runs EU-funded projects
providing psychosocial therapy and support for victims of torture and
violence, has less than five full-time members of staff, the grant fund-
ing enables them to employ various health professionals on a part-time
contractual basis.45
The funding situation within an organisation is obviously a critical indi-
cator of its development, professionalism and long-term sustainability.
58 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

The EU provides a maximum of 80 per cent funding for successful

project applications; the remaining 20 per cent, which has to be secured
prior to the start of the project, must be obtained either from another
international or local donor, from the state, or from internal resources
of the organisation. It is this aspect of the application process that less
well-established organisations find restrictive. In the projects analysed
for this research, match funding was obtained either from other inter-
national donors (usually small European or American bilateral donors)
or from the organisations existing resources. In the case of the Bosnian
organisation Fondacija lokalne demokratije, match funding was provided
by the state on the basis of the organisation providing various services
for victims of domestic violence. Dependency on both the EU and
various smaller donors was the norm among both Serbian and Bosnian
NGOs, with the availability of smaller non-EU grants declining as small
donors withdraw from both locations.46
Growth in the number of passive fee-paying members of an organi-
sation is widely recognised as being indicative of a shift towards insti-
tutionalisation and increased professionalisation, and as a sustainable
strategy for reducing dependency on transient donor funding.47 Of the
69 organisations surveyed as part of this research, only 10 per cent (six
organisations) had a registered membership of more than 200 people; in
80 per cent of cases (55 organisations) the number of registered members
was less than 50. Overall there was not a single organisation that gener-
ated more than 10 per cent of its income from membership fees. Of the
40 organisations interviewed, none reported that it invests resources
(including staff time) in the development of fee-paying membership,
whereas in all cases significant resources are directed towards obtaining
foreign donor (predominantly EU) income. In practically all cases (38
organisations of the 40 interviewed) the percentage of overall revenue
from foreign donors had remained more or less constant since 2004; in
all cases there was a reported increase in EU-derived revenue as a propor-
tion of overall income, and a prediction of greater dependency on EU
funding in the future.
In light of the growing dependency of environmental organisations in
both locations on EU project grants, a relevant indicator of sustainabil-
ity is therefore the length of these projects how secure and long-term
the funding is on which organisations are increasingly coming to rely.
The majority of organisations (52.2 per cent) have received, or are in
receipt of, projects lasting for 12 months (Table 2.3); the vast majority
(91.3 per cent) run for no more than 18 months; and only a fraction
 Adam Fagan 59

Table 2.3 Duration of the project

Duration of project Frequency Per cent Cumulative per cent

Less than 12 months 18 26.1 26.1

12 months 36 52.2 78.3
18 months 9 13.0 91.3
24 months 5 7.2 98.6
36 months 1 1.4 100.0
Total 69 100.0

Table 2.4 Size of grants

Size of grant Frequency Per cent Cumulative per cent

Less than a10k 2 2.9 2.9

a1020k 15 21.7 24.6
a50100k 37 53.6 78.3
a100250k 8 11.6 89.9
More than a250k 7 10.1 100.0
Total 69 100.0

(less than 10 per cent) are tenable for two years or more. The majority
of projects (78.3 per cent) receive grants of up to a100,000 (Table 2.4).
This usually corresponds to a maximum of 80 per cent of the total cost
of the project (all recipients are, under EU rules, required to obtain match
funding of 20 per cent as a condition of the award). Only 10 per cent
of Bosnian or Serbian organisations that have received EU project
grants have been awarded funds in excess of a250,000; the vast major-
ity of awards are for what the Commission defines as micro projects
(a50,000100,000).

Professionalism and a focus on policy

The objective of becoming a professional organisation rather than a
campaigning or community group, and a greater emphasis placed by
an organisation on influencing government policy, seems as tangible
evidence of the external institutionalisation of recipient organisations.
While it is acknowledged here that many successful organisations in
Western-liberal democracies combine such a focus with radical activism
(e.g. Greenpeace, Amnesty International), the importance attached to
influencing elites is used in this study as a measure of institutionalisa-
tion and the potential construction of governance networks. Recipient
60 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

organisations were asked as part of the questionnaire: how would you

describe the aims of your organisation? They were given the following
choices, which they were instructed to rank in order of importance:

We want to be a professional organisation.

We want to influence government policy.
We want to change public opinion.
We want to defend our community.
We want to influence decision-making in the EU.

The percentage of organisations ranking first the objective of be a

professional organisation was 40 per cent, with 30 per cent (20 respond-
ents) ranking it either fourth or fifth. Over half (54 per cent) of the
organisations ranked influence government policy either first or second.
Nearly a quarter (24 per cent) of respondents ranked defend our com-
munity as first or second. This suggests that an overwhelming majority
(94 per cent 65 respondents) specified either becoming a professional
organisation, or influencing government policy as a key priority (first or
second).
Respondents were also asked as part of the questionnaire: how would
you describe the impact that EU funding has had on your organisa-
tion? The vast majority of recipients across both states (95 per cent
62 respondents) acknowledged that EU funding has strengthened our
organisation. As a measure of their dependency on EU project fund-
ing and thus their overall weakness as an organisation, recipients were
also asked to agree or disagree with the statement we would not exist
without EU funding: only 7.7 per cent (five respondents) confirmed this
statement to be accurate and not a single recipient organisation felt that
engagement with the EU had weakened their organisation.
One of the most significant findings is that in both Serbia and Bosnia
the same few organisations tend to receive project grants in each bian-
nual project round.48 Nearly two-thirds (60.9 per cent 42 respondents)
of organisations in receipt of a project grant during the research period
has previously been awarded EU funding (Table 2.5). In 2006, both
CARDS and EIDHR project grants were allocated by the Local Delegation
in Sarajevo to the same five organisations,49 referred to by the delegation
as our clients.50 This suggests that the EUs aim to diffuse capacity-
building know-how widely among NGOs and other civil society organi-
sations is perhaps proving unsuccessful. Such a claim is reinforced by
the fact that 75 per cent (51 respondents) of recipient organisations
are based in large cities (Mostar, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Novi Sad), with
 Adam Fagan 61

Table 2.5 First application to the EU?

Frequency Per cent

No 42 60.9
Yes 23 33.3
Total 65 94.2
Missing 4 5.8
Total 69 100.0

Table 2.6 Location of organisation

Frequency Per cent Cumulative per cent

Sarajevo or Belgrade 32 46.4 47.1

Mostar, Tuzla or Banja Luka 19 27.5 75.0
Other 17 24.6 100.0
Total 68 98.6
Missing 1 1.4
69 100.0

47 per cent (32 respondents) based in the capital cities of Sarajevo and
Belgrade (Table 2.6). Moreover, while in 90 per cent of cases funded
projects involved the city-based NGOs working with regional or local part-
ner organisations, the grantee and the dominant partner are always the
larger organisation based in a large urban area, usually the capital city.51
In all cases in which such partnerships exist, the local partner organisa-
tions is not a local chapter of the dominant organisation, or formally
part of the larger organisations internal structure. There was also no
evidence of amalgamations occurring; rather, evidence gained from
interviews suggested that cooperation between city-based and local
(weaker) NGOs is simply for the purposes of the former obtaining EU
project grants (partnerships with smaller local organisations is identified
as a desirable criteria by the Commission).

Engagement in governance networks (hypotheses 2 and 3)

As potential candidate countries the focus of EU assistance for Bosnia and
Serbia, delivered through the framework of the CARDS programme, has
been to strengthen each countrys capacity to meet the Copenhagen polit-
ical criteria, enhance administrative and judicial capacity and encourage
some alignment with the Acquis.52 This immediately orients assistance
to the democratisation of political elites and the process of government,
administrative reform of state bureaucracies, judicial and market reform.
62 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

It is not surprising therefore that in its calls for proposals, however

large or small, the Commission (via the local delegation in Bosnia or
the EAR in Serbia) places overt emphasis on building good govern-
ance, inter-sectoral partnerships between government and NGOs, some
aspect of service provision and a contribution of the project to policy
development as tangible desired outcomes. According to the Delegation
in Bosnia, successful project applications typically involve three compo-
nents: working with the government on some legislative aspect, a pro-
posal to engage in practical work in the field with target communities
and a demonstrable capacity to undertake such activities.53
From analysis of the questionnaire data it appeared as though the sec-
ond hypothesis (EU micro and macro projects engage recipient organi-
sations in policy and governance networks) would be proven partially
correct. The extent of NGOgovernment interaction (either at national,
regional or local level) was initially tested by asking the organisation
whether the EU-funded project required them to work with govern-
ment or state agencies (Table 2.7), to which 75.4 per cent of respondents
replied that their projects did involve interaction with government. The
data also suggested that the majority of projects involved NGOs work-
ing with other organisations and thus contributing to the strengthening
of networks and the general infrastructure of the non-governmental
sector (Table 2.8).
However, this was followed up during semi-structured interviews with
questions regarding the nature of this interaction. It was revealed that in
the vast majority of cases this did not actually involve NGOs playing an
active role in policy development or deliberation, but typically involved
them having gained a letter of support from relevant state agencies or
government ministries as part of the application process for the project,
gaining some kind of data to the project (e.g. lists of schools, prisons, unem-
ployed persons), or being granted permission to undertake the project
in public institutions. Interviews with five out of the 11 organisations

Table 2.7 Does the project involve you

working with state/government?

Frequency Per cent

No 11 15.9
Yes 52 75.4
Total 63 91.3
Missing 6 8.7
Total 69 100.0
 Adam Fagan 63

Table 2.8 Does the project involve you

working with other organisations?

Frequency Per cent

No 14 20.3
Yes 50 72.5
Total 64 92.8
Missing 5 7.2
69 100.0

that had claimed their project did not involve them working with gov-
ernment or state agencies revealed that in all but two cases the project
involved the same level or type of interaction with government minis-
tries or state offices as projects being undertaken by organisations that
had claimed there was interaction with the government.
A typical example is the project run by the Sarajevo-based organisa-
tion DUGA in 2004 to provide support for teachers working with chil-
dren with special educational needs. While the project was apparently
successful in providing training to over 300 teachers in six communities,
involving parents, social workers and community leaders, the involve-
ment of the municipality and the education authorities was minimal. In
the end the only contact with government involved obtaining written
permission from the Sarajevo canton education ministry to organise the
project and to work in schools, and the participation of a junior minis-
ter at a round-table discussion at the start of the project.54
Of all the projects analysed for this research, only two cases provide
evidence of significant involvement of an NGO in policy development
or interaction with government agencies. The first case concerned two
projects undertaken concurrently by the Sarajevo-based NGO Fondacija
lokalne demokratije. This small organisation received two small grants
to run a project on support for female victims of war crimes, and the
second to improve the provision of support for victims of domestic
violence. Though in both cases the projects appear to be providing a
social or public service in lieu of the state, in the first project the NGO
actually engaged political and legal authorities in changing the law to
protect victims of rape during the war. The database of testimonials
prepared by the NGO as part of the project was presented as evidence to
the Federal Assembly and their recommendations have been accepted.
In the second project the Ministry of Social Affairs for the Sarajevo
canton has now taken over part of the provision, providing 70 per cent
funding for safe houses and has worked closely with Fondacija lokalne
64 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

demokratije to improve the coordination of service provision across the

public, private and NGO sectoral divide.
The second example is a project run by the environmental organi-
sation Ekotim. This Sarajevo-based organisation is helping the local
municipality in the town of Kresovo, 35 km from Sarajevo, to construct
an environmental action plan. The a88,000 project, obtained in con-
junction with a larger separate organisation, involves Ekotim undertak-
ing research and liaising with local businesses, local utility companies
and the public in order to prepare a plan for reducing waste, which will
then be adopted by the municipality.55 However this is just one aspect
of the EU-funded project; the main focus is to engage school children
in recycling activities in the town with the aim, through an education
campaign, to reduce the use of plastic bags. This component engages
government only insofar as reducing waste is a priority within Kresovo
municipalitys strategic development plan.

Analysis and discussion

EU assistance channelled through NGOs, regardless of the specific project

focus, prioritises the building of good governance. In terms of the Stability
and Association process (SAP), this essentially means fostering partner-
ships between the state and the non-governmental/civil society sector in
the context of policy development, implementation and service provi-
sion. For the Commission, it would seem that good governance is code
for all aspects of regime change: economic liberalisation, building insti-
tutional capacity, the formation of new laws and policy, compliance and
implementation, as well as public service provision. In essence, govern-
ance is conceptualised as purposive activity with the aim of transforming
norms, values and behaviours.56
This chapter set out to examine the extent to which CARDS and
EIDHR assistance for Bosnia and Serbia has contributed to the develop-
ment of governance by successfully engaging state and non-state actors
in the context of project grants. From the perspective of recipient NGOs,
the aim was to evaluate the degree to which organisational capacities
are being augmented, to consider the types of skills and knowledge
being obtained as a consequence of EU assistance, and the impact of
assistance on the internal management and resource deployment of the
recipient organisation. In addition, the intention was to examine, as an
indicator of governance, whether partnerships are being built between
state agencies and the non-governmental sector, and the exact nature
of such interactions.
 Adam Fagan 65

The research revealed that a narrow core of NGOs has become more
professional and gained project management know-how; these organi-
sations are undoubtedly wedded to EU-development aims and processes.
However, in terms of how many organisations benefit and whether the
assistance extends across both countries, the impact of CARDS and
EIDHR grants is limited: most recipients (75 per cent) are located either
in capital cities or large urban areas and although the actual projects
take place across both countries, the spread of know-how is narrowly
focused. Indeed, the most discernable and tangible outcome of assist-
ance is an increased capacity of between ten and 15 organisations in
Serbia and Bosnia to manage small project grants. These organisations
dominate each call for proposals and work closely with either the EU
delegations or the EAR. While there has clearly been a transfer of knowl-
edge and expertise from the EU to recipient organisations, the size of
organisations has not generally altered. In sum, the knowledge transfer
is limited and the assistance has helped augment quite specific capaci-
ties. For example, there is little or no evidence of the ability of recipient
organisations, as a consequence of EU assistance, to mobilise political
resources, to extend campaigns within civil society, or to raise addi-
tional revenue.
In terms of building closer policy interaction between state and non-
state actors the research revealed virtually no evidence that this was
occurring as a consequence of EU assistance. State agencies cooperated
with NGOs within the confines of specific short-term projects, but at
the most basic and often arbitrary level (granting a permit, providing a
letter of approval, supplying data). Where there was interaction between
the sectors around policy or service provision, this tended to involve the
state agency effectively subcontracting research or development tasks
to an NGO. The short-term nature of the EU-funded projects, and the
lack of provision for extending initiatives into other localities, widen-
ing the focus or remit, or renewing the contract at the end of the grant
period, is of particular concern as it has obvious implications for the
building of sustainable governance. Initiatives to develop employment
skills in marginalised communities, or the provision of training for
school teachers simply stopped once the project came to an end, along
with the cooperation or interaction between the NGO and the par-
ticular state agency. Apart from a local municipality taking over partial
responsibility for the running of a safe house established initially by an
NGO,57 there was no instance revealed whereby engagement with an
NGO as part of an EU project resulted in a sustainable partnership being
established. The overriding sense is that government offices and state
66 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

agencies were prepared to cooperate with NGOs as part of small discreet

projects where there was some mutual benefit (the provision of a service
or a training scheme), but only within the confines of the project and
at a low level of interaction.
Such findings would appear to partially explain why, despite nearly a
decade of EU intervention, the weakness of both the state and non-state
sectors remains a critical development issue in both countries. However,
the persistent weakness of the Bosnian and Serbian states and the evident
political marginalisation of civil society actors is symptomatic of a far
more deep-seated structural reality, which cannot be explained simply in
terms of the limited impact of EU intervention assistance. Efforts to build
good governance and to build and engage NGOs in policy networks are
thwarted by the persistence of what Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic
refer to as transnational networks that thrive upon and reinforce weak
state capacity.58 According to the authors, these networks are hard to
define and are the product of a combination of legacies: the informal dis-
tribution and parallel economy networks of the socialist period, the wars
of Yugoslav secession during the 1990s and the (contested) reconfigura-
tion of state borders, international intervention and liberal economic
reforms. These opaque networks prosper in the unregulated economic
and political spaces and thrive on state weakness and bureaucratic
inertia; they comprise a melee of nationalist elites and state bureaucrats,
criminal gangs, diasporas and ordinary trades people.59 While their
contemporary efficacy is in a sense the product of globalisation these
transnational networks prosper in the confusion surrounding national
versus international, formal versus informal, state versus non-state the
forces of globalisation have merely intensified and enabled processes
deeply embedded within the recent history of Yugoslavia and the suc-
cessor states. International assistance both during and since the wars
has been incapable of dislodging the power of these networks; the EU,
now the dominant source of development aid, has, it would seem, also
failed to penetrate and bring forth a decline in their influence and their
control over both the state and the economy. Instead, as suggested by
this research, assistance serves to reinforce, or at least not challenge,
the status quo; development aid channelled through local NGOs com-
pensates for the failings in state provision and low levels of market
penetration. While project grants do enable citizens to access services
that would otherwise not be provided, this inadvertently legitimises and
at times empowers the transnational networks and corrupt elites intent
on sustaining state weakness and a pervasive climate of poor regulation
and compliance. Reduced to building low-level interaction between state
 Adam Fagan 67

agencies and a handful of NGOs, there is little prospect that the good
governance initiatives of the EU will challenge structural realities and
usurp the entrenched power of elites.

Notes
1. J. Rosenau (1995) Governance in the Twenty-First Century Global Governance,
1(1), pp. 1343; J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds) (1992) Governance without
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); M. Barnett and R. Duvall (2005) Power in Global
Governance, in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds) Power in Global Governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 132.
2. Rosenau (1995) op. cit., p. 14.
3. J. Kooiman (1993) Modern Governance (London: Sage).
4. J. Rosenau (1992) Governance, Order and Change in World Politics, in
J. Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel (eds) Governance without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 5.
5. H. Yanacopulos (2005) Patterns of Governance: The Rise of Transnational
Coalitions of NGOs, Global Society, 19(3), p. 251.
6. M. C. Smouts (1998) The Proper Use of Governance in International
Relations, International Social Science Journal, 50(155), p. 81.
7. Smouts (1998) op. cit., p. 88.
8. T. A. Brzel (2007) State Capacity and the Emergence of New Modes of
Governance, NEWGOV Deliverable 12/D8, p. 4.
9. F. W. Scharpf (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in
Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. 3650.
10. R. Mayntz (2003) New Challenges to Governance Theory, in H. P. Bang (ed.)
Governance as Social and Political Communication (Manchester: Manchester
University Press), pp. 2740; R. A. W. Rhodes (1996) The New Governance:
Governing without Government, Political Studies, 44(4), pp. 65267.
11. T. A. Brzel, A. Buzogany and S. Guttenbrunner (2008) New Modes of
Governance in Accession Countries: The Role of Private Actors, Paper pre-
sented at the NEWGOV Cross-Cluster Workshop on Civil Society, New Modes
of Governance and Enlargement, Berlin, 35 July 2008.
12. S. Hix (1998) The Study of the European Union II: The New Gover-
nance Agenda and its Rival, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1),
pp. 3865; E. Swyngedouw (2005) Governance Innovation and the Citizen:
The Janus Face of Governance-Beyond-the-State, Urban Studies, 42(11),
pp. 19912006.
13. Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner (2008), op. cit.
14. Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner (2008), op. cit.
15. Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner (2008), op. cit., p. 2.
16. Brzel (2007), op. cit.
17. Rhodes (1996) op. cit.; Scharpf (1978), op. cit.
18. P. Kenis and V. Schneider (1991) Policy Networks and Policy Analysis:
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox, in B. Marin and R. Mayntz (eds)
Policy Network: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press), p. 36.
68 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

19. A. Heritier (2003) New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political

Capacity and Policy Effectiveness? in T. A. Brzel and R. Cichowski (eds)
The State of the European Union, 6: Law, Politics, and Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 10526.
20. Transaction cost theory (cf. Heritier, 2003, op. cit.; D. Eppstein and
S. OHalloran, 1999, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Approach,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) argues that delegation and coop-
eration between state and non-state actors takes place to reduce the costs
imposed by lengthy negotiations and discussions, thus providing an incen-
tive for both sides to cooperate. Principal-agent theory argues that the lack
of time and expertise on behalf of policy elites and government officials
(principal) to deal with increasingly complex problems acts as an incen-
tive to engage non-state actors who will provide knowledge and expertise
(cf. T. M. Moe, 1987, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional
Dominance, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12(4), pp. 475520).
21. J. S. Hellman, G. Jones and D. Kaufmann (2000) Seize the State, Seize the Day:
State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition (Washington, DC: World
Bank).
22. Ibid.
23. Mayntz (2003), op. cit.
24. B. Kohler-Koch (1996) The Strength of Weakness: The Transformation of
Governance in the EU, in S. Gustavsson and L. Lewin (eds) The Future of the
Nation State: Essays on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration (Stockholm:
Nerenius & Santerus), pp. 93117.
25. Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner (2008), op. cit., p. 6.
26. J. S. Migdal (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States: StateSociety Relations
and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press); L. Weiss (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State (Oxford: Polity Press);
P. B. Evans (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
27. Brzel, Buzogany and Guttenbrunner (2008), op. cit.
28. B. Sissenich (2007) Building States Without Society: European Union Enlargement
and the Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books); M. M. Howard (2003) The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-
Communist Europe (Cambridge, UK/New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press); A. Fagan (2005) Taking Stock of Civil Society Development in Post-
Communist Europe: Evidence from the Czech Republic, Democratization,
12(5), pp. 52847.
29. The research was funded by the British Academy (SG-45257) and the
Nuffield Foundation (SGS/33624). The data were obtained from quantitative
analysis of an electronic questionnaire completed by 69 organisations, 44 in
Bosnia and 25 organisations in Serbia, that had received, or were currently
in receipt of, an EU micro or macro project grant to work on a CARDS- or
EIDHR-related project. The organisations were identified using information
obtained from the EC Delegations and the EAR. The questionnaire was
designed to illicit basic information on the size, capacity and origins of
the organisation, the objectives and focus of the organisation, applications
and projects funded by the EU, and attitudes of the organisation to the EU.
Qualitative analysis of data obtained from semi-structured interviews with a
 Adam Fagan 69

55 per cent (40 organisations) sample of organisations provided additional

information. The research also included semi-structured interviews with rep-
resentatives from the EC Delegation to Bosnia, the EC Delegation to Serbia,
and the EAR.
30. Srpski demokratski forum and International Aid Network (Belgrade).
31. Grupa 484 (Belgrade); CTVMost (Sarajevo).
32. BCHR Belgrade; Fondeko (Sarajevo); DUGA (Sarajevo); Step-by-Step; Grupa
484 (Belgrade).
33. The Bosnian organisation Fondeko received a61,000 to produce and dis-
tribute an environmental handbook to college students in Tuzla, Doboj
and Zenica; the environmental NGO Ekotim used a micro grant to improve
recycling facilities and eco-labelling in the Sarajevo municipality.
34. AEOBosnia (Sarajevo).
35. Civil Society Promotion Centre (Sarajevo).
36. International Aid Network and Srpski demokratski forum (Belgrade).
37. Fondacija lokalne demokratije and CTVMost (Sarajevo); International Aid
Network (Belgrade).
38. Ekotim (Sarajevo).
39. European Movement (Belgrade).
40. H. A. Van der Heijden (1997) Political Opportunity Structures and the
Institutionalisation of the Environmental Movement, Environmental Politics,
6(4), pp. 2550.
41. D. S. Meyer and S. Tarrow (1998) The Social Movement Society: Contentious
Politics for a New Century (Lanham/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield),
p. 19.
42. C. Rootes (ed.) (2003) Environmental Protest in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), p. 3.
43. B. Doherty (2002) Ideas and Actions in the Green Movement (London:
Routledge), p. 134.
44. Information obtained from questionnaire completed by the organisation
and also from an interview with Zoran Puljic, Mozaik, 13 February 2008,
Sarajevo.
45. Interview and questionnaire with Azra Nuhic, CTVMost, 10 April 2007,
Sarajevo.
46. For example, the Danish Embassy, which has provided match funding to
organisations such as the Serbian Refugee Council (Srpski savet za izbeglice),
no longer offers such assistance from 2008.
47. Van der Heijden (1997) op. cit.
48. Usually around 20 organisations are awarded grants in each round.
49. The organisations awarded both EIDHR and CARDS grants during 2006 were
Fondacija lokalne demokratije, Zdravo da ste, Vesta, Crveni kri Tuzlanskog
Kantona and Bospo. All are based either in Sarajevo or Tuzla.
50. Interview with Vlado Pandurevic, 13 February 2008, Sarajevo.
51. For instance, the Serbian organisation Pomoc deci runs support projects
for Roma citizens and IDPs across the country. The organisation operates
entirely from Belgrade, and field offices and local partner organisation coop-
erate only to facilitate the provision of services within communities.
52. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/enlargement_en.htm (accessed on
6 March 2008).
70 Civil Society and Good Governance in Bosnia and Serbia

53. Interview with Vlado Pandurevic and Gordana Suvalija, EU Delegation,

9 February 2007, Bosnia.
54. Information obtained from interview with Anka Izetbegovic (Executive
Director), DUGA, 12 April 2007, Sarajevo.
55. Interview with Rijad Tikvesa (Director), Ekotim, 7 February 2007, Sarajevo.
56. Rosenau (1995) op. cit.
57. The example being the Sarajevo-based NGO, Fondacija lokalne demokratij.
58. D. Kostovicova and V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2006) Europeanising the Balkans:
Rethinking the Post-Communist and Post-Conflict Transition, Ethnopolitics,
5(3), pp. 22341.
59. Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2006) op. cit., p. 232.
3
Contesting the Rule of Law: Civil
Society and Legal Institutions
Iavor Rangelov

The breakdown of the rule of law in the Western Balkans during the
1990s can be understood not only as a consequence of the disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia and the ensuing armed conflicts on the territory of
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo, but also
in light of the uneven relations of power that emerged at that time
and often became further entrenched in the period of transition. These
power relations often reflected the advent of political, economic and
coercive elites organised along national and ethnic lines, as well as
the blurring boundaries between law, politics and crime in the post-
Yugoslav space. Despite the divergent experiences of violence and
histories of transition of specific countries, the retreat of the rule of law
across the region was associated primarily with the related forces of
politicisation and criminalisation. In particular, the legal domain was
subjected to encroachment from a range of political and illicit actors
pursuing particular projects and interests and, in some cases, it appeared
to be hijacked by such actors and purposes to the point of becoming
indistinguishable.1
It is not surprising that this legacy has presented formidable chal-
lenges for the process of (re)constructing the rule of law in the new
century, despite significant involvement and support provided by vari-
ous external actors with stakes in the Balkans. Some of the challenges
have concerned rebuilding the infrastructure of the legal system and
implementing judicial reform, adopting a large body of new legislation,
training judges and prosecutors, dealing with the backlog of cases, or
extending due process and access to justice to citizens. Much interna-
tional assistance has been channelled to address such problems, espe-
cially from the European Union (EU) in the context of the Stabilisation
and Association process (SAP) for the Western Balkans, as all countries
71
72 Contesting the Rule of Law

eventually launched bids for EU membership. Even more difficult, how-

ever, has been the struggle to assert the independence of the judiciaries
in the face of continuing political pressures, corruption and bias in the
administration of justice, and to ensure respect for key rule of law prin-
ciples, such as equality before the law and human rights. Such questions
have been central to the politics of EU conditionality in the region and
over the years have implicated a range of other international institu-
tions, from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The distinction between formal and substantive concepts of the rule
of law made by legal theorists is critical for understanding these continu-
ing challenges. Formal understandings of the rule of law are preoccupied
with the sources and forms of legality, while substantive conceptions are
also concerned with the spirit and content of law.2 Theories of formal
legality start from the proposition that laws must be general, prospec-
tive, clear and stable, and add further requirements such as access to
courts and restraints on discretion,3 congruence between official action
and declared rule,4 and avoidance of arbitrary distinctions between vari-
ous groups of citizens circumscribed in the law.5 Substantive theories of
the rule of law incorporate formal legality but go further by elaborating
key principles for the content of law, such as the primacy of human
rights,6 democratic legitimacy7 and equal citizenship.8 In the context of
the Western Balkans, both formal and substantive principles have been
invoked to inform the (re)construction of the rule of law over the past
decade. Nevertheless, the most contentious and difficult to implement
have been the substantive aspects of the rule of law that relate to issues
of equality, rights and justice; indeed, where such issues have been at
stake, they have sometimes entailed the suspension of formal legality
as well. It is the rule of law in this substantive sense that has been the
subject of much contestation and controversy in the civil society arena
across the region.
This contribution explores the evolving relationship between civil
society and the rule of law in the Western Balkans over the past decade.
It adopts a broad empirical understanding of civil society to incorpo-
rate the multiplicity of non-state actors that in various ways seek to
shape political and legal institutions: from formal organisations such as
NGOs, civic associations and media, to more loosely organised move-
ments and key individuals involved in public debate. In particular, it
investigate how civil society actors have engaged with a range of legal
 Iavor Rangelov 73

institutions in the region that tackle some of the most difficult issues
inherited from the 1990s, such as equal citizenship, human rights pro-
tection and accountability for war crimes committed in the course of
the armed conflicts. The analysis focuses on a series of civil society con-
testations and interactions with the legal domain in Slovenia, Croatia
and Serbia, and suggests that civil society mobilisation has served both
to strengthen and weaken the rule of law in the region. I conclude by
highlighting the ambivalent impact of non-state actors on the rule of
law in normative and practical terms, as well as the role of civil society
as an arena where the legitimacy of legal institutions is produced and
contested.

Citizenship and human rights in Slovenia

Slovenia has been widely seen as the only success story that emerged
from the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY). It avoided sliding into protracted war and repressive rule, which
affected other former Yugoslav republics, and made rapid advances to
membership in European and trans-Atlantic structures. This image was
actively pursued internationally by its post-independence elite, as evi-
dent in the recollections of Dmitrij Rupel, Slovenias minister of foreign
affairs between 1991 and 1993: After persistent and tiresome lobbying
with the European and other governments, Slovenia managed to project
the image of a peaceful and cooperative country, distinct from the rest
of the former Yugoslav republics.9 Faced with sustained scrutiny from
the international community and desperate to obtain its recognition, at
the time of independence Slovenias new political class was particularly
careful to demonstrate respect for international human rights stand-
ards and democratic principles in handling the sensitive question of
citizenship.
The first step involved issuing a Statement of Good Intent, on
6 December 1990, which guaranteed the constitutional rights of Hungarian
and Italian minorities and reassured migrants from the other Yugoslav
republics that they could acquire citizenship of the new state, if they so
desired, and that their cultural rights would be respected. The Statement
was seen as an important confidence-building measure ahead of the
imminent referendum, which included ethnic and national minorities
in the vote and provided the basis for declaring Slovenias independ-
ence. The following year the Citizenship of Slovenia Act enabled more
than 200,000 residents from other republics of the SFRY (10 per cent of
the population) to apply for citizenship within a period of six months.
74 Contesting the Rule of Law

Approximately 171,000 of them became Slovenian citizens, while another

11,000 left the country. At the same time, however, the law had placed
a large group of residents in a legal limbo, by failing to guarantee their
permanent residence or afford a procedure for acquiring citizenship
after the six-month deadline. The only provision in place was Article 81
of the Aliens Act, which stipulated that the Act applied to all citizens of
other Yugoslav republics who had not applied for citizenship or whose
applications had been rejected.
When the deadline for filing citizenship applications expired, on 26
February 1992, the Ministry of the Interior secretly erased from the
registry of residents the names of at least 27,671 individuals, who had
not obtained Slovenian citizenship through the available procedure,
and transferred them to the registry of foreigners.10 Some of the erased
had failed to apply for citizenship for various reasons (e.g. assuming
that their residence status was secure and sufficient) or had applied and
been rejected; in other cases their applications were not accepted, they
applied but did not receive any answer, or the authorities initially issued
positive decisions but later reversed them.11 Among those affected were
ethnic non-Slovenes from other former Yugoslav republics, children of
mixed marriages, as well as a number of Roma. They were rendered de
facto illegal foreigners or stateless persons and many of them faced years
of abuse and arbitrary treatment from the authorities that had covertly
suspended their rights and status.12 Another affected group included
officers of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) who, after the Ten-Day
War in Slovenia in JuneJuly 1991, were barred from acquiring citizen-
ship based on amendments to the Citizenship Act and the so-called
list of 800 dangerous persons, which depicted them as aggressors or
enemies of the new state.13
The complex motivations behind the act of the erasure have been
examined by a growing number of scholars in recent years. The litera-
ture highlights the role of factors such as the consolidation of Slovenian
ethno-nationalism since the late 1980s,14 the logic of a nationalising
state,15 the social construction of citizenship at a time of intense national
homogenisation16 and the rise of state-sanctioned forms of discrimina-
tion against minorities.17 What is striking about the erasure is that
it remained hidden from the public for a decade and even when the
media directed attention to the issue, successive Slovenian governments
and legislatures appeared to be reluctant to resolve it in an adequate and
decisive manner. Some information about the erasure started to appear
in reports of the Human Rights Ombudsman in the mid-1990s and a few
individual cases were taken up by the courts, leading to the first ruling
 Iavor Rangelov 75

of the Constitutional Court on the issue in 1999. The Court declared the
measure itself illegal and established that the authorities had acted in
breach of the principles of rule of law and legal certainty. Furthermore,
the judges ruled that Article 81 of the Aliens Act was unconstitutional
and created a legal void for the affected individuals, and demanded
from the Slovenian authorities to reinstate the permanent residence of
the erased.18 A series of legislative and policy initiatives over the next
ten years appeared to be geared to avoid implementing the decision
of the Constitutional Court and addressing the problems faced by the
erased, as noted by the ECtHR in its decision from July 2010.

[The Court] found that the Slovenian authorities had persistently

refused to regulate the applicants situation in line with the Cons-
titutional Courts decisions. In particular, they had failed to pass
appropriate legislation and to issue permanent residence permits to
individual applicants and had thus interfered with their rights to
respect for their private and/or family life, especially where the appli-
cants were stateless.19

That persistent refusal provides the background for understanding

the interactions between civil society and legal institutions in Slovenia
since February 2002, when the Association of the Erased broke the silence
with a press conference on the tenth anniversary of the erasure. In the
ensuing discussions and debates over the issue in the public domain,
the cause of the erased has been advanced by human rights groups and
NGOs, such as the Peace Institute and the Legal Information Centre for
Non-Governmental Organisations, as well as by journalists, academics
and public intellectuals, most notably the former constitutional judge
Matev Krivic, who played an active role in the legal representation of
the erased and engaged in public advocacy on their behalf. These cur-
rents in civil society have been successful in keeping the issue on the
agenda in Slovenia and internationally through a combination of public
pressure and legal action, and eventually managed to secure a favourable
decision at the ECtHR in Strasbourg.
The public contestations over the erased in Slovenia, however, have
revealed certain deep-seated tensions and cleavages that cannot be grasped
in terms of a straightforward opposition between civil society and the
state. These tensions became more apparent in the public domain in 2003,
when the Constitutional Court rejected an act of legislation adopted in
1999 to regulate the status of former Yugoslav citizens. The Court ruled
that the legislation was unconstitutional because it did not recognise
76 Contesting the Rule of Law

these individuals permanent residence in Slovenia since 1992; further-

more, the judges requested retroactive measures and a resolution of the
status of those who had been forced to leave Slovenia as a result of the
erasure. The nationalist opposition, led by Janez Jana, launched an
attack against the constitutional judges and demanded a referendum
on the issue. The rhetoric that was unleashed in parliament and the
media at the time led the Council of Europe to express concerns that
intolerance, and even xenophobia, are sometimes found among politi-
cians and representatives of public authorities, and that some media
contribute to the development of such attitudes.20 The other figure
consistently attacked by these currents during his term in office was the
Human Rights Ombudsman, Matja Hanek. His critical statements on
issues such as the erased, the rise of xenophobia and the treatment of
minorities in Slovenia, had turned him into a target of sustained attacks
by influential sections of the political class and the media. In one of
the controversies sparked by the case of the erased, Janez Jana, by
then prime minister, described Hanek as a traitor of the nation and
demanded that he apologise to the Slovenian people.21
The conflict involving the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights
Ombudsman, as well as the parliament, government and opposition,
suggests how the question of the erased in Slovenia has played out in
the public domain as a series of contestations in which different sections
of civil society have been enmeshed alongside political actors and legal
institutions on different sides of the controversy. Increasingly, such con-
testations over the erased appeared as a conflict between politics and law,
and between different positions that cut across civil and political society,
and the role of civil society actors should be understood as strengthening
both of these forces and positions. The epilogue to Slovenias citizenship
debacle depends on whether and how the government implements the
decision of the ECtHR in Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, which ruled in
favour of the erased and demanded retroactive redress from the state.22
At the time of writing, it seems that continuing recourse to European
structures and supervision may allow those currents in civil society that
have advanced the cause of the erased and institutions such as the
Constitutional Court, which have struggled to uphold the rule of law
over the past decade, ultimately to prevail.

War crimes trials in Croatia and Serbia

The challenge of (re)building the rule of law in the shadows of mass vio-
lence and atrocity is often associated with judiciaries that are unwilling
 Iavor Rangelov 77

or unable (or both) to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, crimes

against humanity and genocide. Overcoming this problem has been
one of the drivers of the growth of international justice in the post-Cold
War period, starting with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for
Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) and culminating with the per-
manent International Criminal Court. In the case of Croatia, the break-
down of the rule of law, associated with the 19915 Homeland War,
has been compounded by a particular form of judicial activism that
emerged around the start of the hostilities and continued in the period
of post-conflict transition. Since the early 1990s, a large number of
Serbs have been indicted with war crimes and genocide and prosecuted
in absentia by Croatian courts, and the ensuing proceedings have often
been marked by suspension of due process principles and pervasive
ethnic bias in the administration of justice.23 Some cases have involved
prosecuting the entire Serb population of certain villages, encouraging
arguments that the courts were used to pursue wartime policies by other
means and to obstruct the post-war process of refugee return and reinte-
gration.24 In Serbia, reminiscent of these judicial processes was the series
of trials of Kosovo Albanians charged with terrorist activities in the late
1990s and the mass trial of 144 Albanians from akovica (Gjakova in
Albanian) after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.
The start of the new century represented a turning point for Croatia
and Serbia, marked by the end of the repressive regimes of Franjo
Tudman and Slobodan Miloevic and a reorientation of both countries
towards Euro-Atlantic institutions. In this new environment, the ques-
tion of cooperation with the ICTY (in particular, the arrest and transfer
of high-ranking suspects to The Hague) emerged as a benchmark for
assessing the European commitments of these states and one of the
most divisive issues in debates involving civil society and the politi-
cal classes.25 At the same time, the question of accountability for mass
atrocity was increasingly raised as well internally as a test for the rule
of law and the process of judicial reform. Civil society actors have
shaped the domestic prosecution of war crimes in Croatia and Serbia in
a variety of ways and in that process civil society has served both as an
impediment and a catalyst for the (re)construction of the rule of law.
The ambivalent implications of civil society mobilisation and interac-
tion with the legal domain are illustrated next with the trial of General
Mirko Norac in Croatia and the Podujevo case in Serbia.
Throughout the 1990s members of Croatias police and armed forces
enjoyed de facto immunity from prosecution for abuses committed dur-
ing the Homeland War, even as hundreds of ethnic Serbs were being
78 Contesting the Rule of Law

prosecuted for war crimes in absentia. The justification from the top
echelons of the judiciary at that time was that war crimes could not
be committed in a defensive war.26 The arrival of the government of
Ivica Racan in 2000, shortly after the death of Tudman, marked a shift
in that position: the courts were now free to prosecute war crimes per-
petrated on all sides of the armed conflict. General Norac became the
first in a series of high-ranking Croatian military and police officers to
be prosecuted by the ICTY and Croatias national courts in trials that
have depicted some of the founding fathers of independent Croatia,
celebrated as heroes of the Homeland War, as war criminals. By the time
the county court in Rijeka issued an arrest warrant for General Norac
in early 2001, charging him with war crimes committed against Serb
civilians in Gospic a decade earlier, his name was already embroiled in
public controversy: one of the key witnesses in the investigation had
been killed, while President Stipe Mesic had moved to retire Norac and
several other generals, over their accusations that the government was
falsifying the record of the Homeland War by putting members of the
Croatian armed forces on trial.
The scale of public mobilisation in opposition to the trial, both in the
media and on the streets of Croatian cities, took the government and
the courts by surprise. Associations of war veterans and other civil soci-
ety actors organised demonstrations and roadblocks across the country,
mobilising more than 100,000 people at the biggest rally in Split in
February 2001. These groups depicted the trial of General Norac as an
assault on the memory of the Homeland War and the Croatian nation
itself, expressing their solidarity with the defendant with slogans like
We are all Mirko Norac and Hands off our Holy War. The leadership
of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), now in opposition, played a
prominent role in the protests, in particular the future Prime Minister
Ivo Sanader. Other groups in civil society, however, insisted that the
government should uphold the independence of the judiciary and
allow the trial to proceed. At a counter-demonstration in Zagreb, around
10,000 people rallied behind the slogan Our voice for the Rule of Law.
The contestations occasioned by the proceedings against General Norac
had become a test for Croatias new democratic politics and commit-
ment to the rule of law:

On 9 February, two days after the warrant was issued, Racan told parlia-
ment that the government would not give in to pressure from those
forces that wanted to undermine the legal order. To Racan, the crisis
was a defining moment and a test for a democratic and law-abiding
 Iavor Rangelov 79

Croatia. The opposition to the Rijeka courts investigation of Norac,

Racan said, constituted an attack on the state from those forces that
were lodging a serious attack on the democratic legal order of the
country. Pressure, he added, would not force the government to inter-
fere with the independence of the judiciary and risk isolating Croatia
internationally.27

If the trial of General Norac in Croatia conveys the power of civil society
actors and their political allies to challenge the courts, the Podujevo case
in Serbia suggests the emergence of new synergies between civil society
and legal institutions that pull in opposite directions. The defendant in
that case was Saa Cvjetan, a member of the notorious Scorpions reserve
unit of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, charged with the killing of 19
Albanian civilians children, women and elderly in the Kosovo town of
Podujevo at the time of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The efforts of
the Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) in Belgrade and its executive direc-
tor, Nataa Kandic, managed to secure a decision of the Supreme Court
of Serbia to transfer the case to Belgrade District Court, where the trial
began in March 2003. The trial was accompanied by open intimidation
of witnesses by members of the Scorpions unit and sustained anonymous
threats directed at the presiding judge, Biljana Sinanovic.28 The HLC rep-
resented the victims in the proceedings and cooperated with the police
authorities in order to secure protection for key witnesses, including one
insider witness (a former member of the Scorpions) and four children
who had survived the massacre and subsequently relocated to the United
Kingdom. This is how Kandic relates her efforts to secure the participa-
tion of Albanian witnesses:

It took a long while to persuade Kosovo Albanians to come to testify

in Serbia, which for them is the epitome of all their pain and suffering.
The four children remember well the uniforms of the Serbian police-
men who shot their mothers and siblings lining them up against the
wall Over several months, I talked with [their] fathers about truth
and justice, and gradually they came around to my view that the
courts and public in Serbia should hear the truth about what hap-
pened to their loved ones.29

On 17 March 2004, Cvjetan was found guilty of war crimes against the
civilian population and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The judge-
ment at Belgrade District Court represented the first acknowledgment
of the wartime suffering of Albanian civilians made by the institutions
80 Contesting the Rule of Law

of the Serbian state, which have tended to portray the Kosovo campaign
as an anti-terrorist operation and emphasise criminal acts committed
on the Albanian side of the conflict.
The experience of the HLC in the Podujevo case provided a model
for civil society interventions aimed at strengthening the courts from
within, which has been reproduced and developed in subsequent
war crimes trials in Serbia, such as the high-profile Ovcara case con-
cerning wartime atrocities in Vukovar. The model of Victim/Witness
Counselling and Representation, pioneered by the HLC, involves iden-
tifying victims and witnesses in war crimes cases; encouraging witnesses
to testify and ensuring witness protection; serving as a victims advocate
counsel in order to represent victims in the proceedings; and facilitating
the families of victims and survivors from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Kosovo to come to Serbia in order to monitor the trials.30 These civil
society efforts have been geared to address some of the key challenges
facing war crimes trials in the region: lack of political will to prosecute
members of ones own military and police units, weak judicial capac-
ity and absence of witness protection, and reluctance of witnesses and
survivors to cross the border and seek justice from institutions that they
often see as unreformed and hostile.
As in Slovenia, the role of civil society actors in shaping the rule of
law in Croatia and Serbia has often reflected their shifting alliances with
political actors and judicial institutions, and their ability to harness
the discursive and political opportunities that these alliances afford.
One such opportunity emerged in 2007, at a time when the EU had
suspended accession negotiations with Serbia over its failure to arrest
Ratko Mladic and other major war criminals indicted by the ICTY. Three
different civil society coalitions issued open letters to Brussels, putting
forward alternative arguments and positions on the issue of whether the
EU should resume the talks, and their interventions were taken up by
the media.31 The ensuing discussions raised important questions in the
public domain about the meaning of the rule of law and the purposes of
European integration, the balance of legal and political considerations
in war crimes trials, and the tensions between dealing with the past and
focusing on the future.
An interesting example of the dependence of civil society actors on
political allies, and the dynamic nature of such relationships, is the mobi-
lisation sparked by the indictment of three Croatian generals by the ICTY
in 2004. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac were charged
with crimes against humanity committed during Operation Storm, the
final chapter of the Homeland War that secured Croatias victory, and
 Iavor Rangelov 81

participation in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at the forcible and

permanent removal of the Serb population from the Krajina region.32
Depicting Operation Storm as a campaign for ethnic cleansing was
bound to create a nationalist backlash in civil society. And yet, the abil-
ity of key actors, such as the war veterans associations, to mobilise the
public and political class appeared to be more limited on this particular
occasion. Ivo Sanader, who three years earlier had spearheaded the
protests against General Norac, was now a prime minister in a govern-
ment more committed to Croatias European future than its wartime
past. When the fugitive Gotovina was arrested in the Canary Islands,
Sanaders measured public statements suggested important changes in
his own politics and the HDZ: It is in Croatias interest to establish
the full truth in the case of General Gotovina, as well as in the cases
of Generals Mladen Markac, Ivan Cermak, Rahim Ademi, and the six
Bosnian Croats indicted by the Tribunal.33 Without their former politi-
cal allies, the war veterans groups were able to attract 50,000 people at
the biggest rally in Split, but in most places only very small crowds were
turning up to protest. These elements in civil society appeared to be
attacking from the margins the entire mainstream of Croatian politics,
calling them traitors, including Sanader himself.34

Conclusion

The complex relationship between civil society and the rule of law in
the Western Balkans has been marked by a series of civil society con-
testations and interactions with key legal institutions, which are either
new or have assumed new roles related to the substantive aspects
of the rule of law, international law and human rights standards.
Some of these structures are newly established, including human rights
ombudsman and anti-discrimination bodies, the special chambers
for organised crime and war crimes of Belgrade High Court, and the
war crimes chamber of the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other
institutions have been called upon to uphold new principles and serve
new purposes for example, constitutional courts across the region or
the four county courts that have been endowed with extraterritorial
jurisdiction to prosecute the most serious war crimes cases in Croatia
(Osijek, Rijeka, Split and Zagreb). Non-state actors in the countries of
the former Yugoslavia have become increasingly involved with these
structures and preoccupied with the difficult questions they raise in
the public domain. In the course of the ensuing public debates and
controversies, such as those described in this contribution, civil society
82 Contesting the Rule of Law

has emerged as an arena where the legitimacy of legal institutions is

produced and contested.
The discussion of citizenship and human rights in Slovenia and war
crimes trials in Croatia and Serbia has underscored the ambivalent nor-
mative orientation and impact of civil society on the (re)construction
of the rule of law in the post-Yugoslav space. This ambivalence suggests
that civil society mobilisation and engagement with the legal domain
has signalled both the advent and retreat of the rule of law over the
past decade of uneven transition and democratisation. Especially when
it comes to contentious and sensitive questions such as citizenship,
human rights and accountability for war crimes, civil society actors
play a number of different roles that sometimes pull in opposite direc-
tions. These roles cannot be understood in terms of a simple opposition
between civil society and the state or a clear direction with respect to
the rule of law; rather, they reflect the multiple positions adopted by
civil society actors in struggles over the rule of law and their shifting
alliances with diverse political actors and legal institutions.

Notes
1. Actors and networks implicated in criminal activities (or even forged for
such purposes) often go back to the war, but their persistence within state
structures has continued to blur the boundaries between politics and crime
in the Western Balkans in the years of transition. Although this essay does
not discuss issues such as security sector reform and vetting in the police and
judiciary, the role of such actors in holding back reform of law-enforcement
institutions has been salient in the region. See, for example, T. Memievic
(2009) EU Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Police Reform and the
Legacy of War Crimes, in J. Batt and J. Obradovic-Wochnik (eds) War Crimes,
Conditionality and EU Integration in the Western Balkans, Chaillot Paper No.
116 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies), pp. 4966; V. Pavlakovic (2005)
Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Miloevic Era and After, in
S. P. Ramet and V. Pavlakovic (eds) Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under
Miloevic and After (Seattle: University of Washington Press), pp. 1354.
2. B. Tamanaha (2004) On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 912; P. P. Craig (1997) Formal and
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, Public
Law, 21, pp. 46787.
3. J. Raz (1979) The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
4. L. L. Fuller (1969) The Morality of Law, 2nd rev. edn (New Haven: Yale
University Press).
5. F. A. Hayek (1960) The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press).
6. R. M. Dworkin (1978) Political Judges and the Rule of Law, Proceedings of the
British Academy, 64, pp. 25987.
 Iavor Rangelov 83

7. J. Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse

Theory of Law and Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press).
8. T. R. S. Allan (2001) Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
9. D. Rupel (1994) Slovenias Shift from the Balkans to Central Europe, in
J. Benderly and E. Kraft (eds) Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects
(New York: St Martins Press), pp. 1934.
10. When the measure first became public knowledge, the authorities suggested
that 18,305 individuals had been erased in this way. After a recount in 2009,
however, the official figure was revised to 25,671.
11. N. Kogovek and R. Pignioni (2007) The Erased People of Slovenia: Peace
Institute Report on Discriminatory Practices in Slovenia concerning Legal
Statuses of Citizens of Other Republics of Yugoslavia, submitted to the
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs at the European
Parliament, Brussels, 26 June.
12. T. Deelan (2011) Citizenship in Slovenia: The Regime of a Nationalising or
a Europeanising State? CITSEE Working Paper 2011/16 (Edinburgh: CITSEE),
pp. 1620; J. Dedic, V. Jaluic and J. Zorn (2003) The Erased: Organised
Innocence and the Politics of Exclusion (Ljubljana: Peace Institute).
13. J. Dedic (2003) Discrimination in Granting Slovenian Citizenship, in
J. Dedic, V. Jaluic and J. Zorn (eds) The Erased: Organized Innocence and the
Politics of Exclusion (Ljubljana: Peace Institute), pp. 601.
14. J. Zorn (2011) The Erased of Slovenia, in C. Sawyer and B. K. Blitz (eds)
Statelessness in the European Union: Displaced, Undocumented, Unwanted
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195229.
15. T. Deelan (2011) Citizenship in Slovenia: The Regime of a Nationalising or
Europeanising State? CITSEE Working Paper 2011/06, 1 April 2012, available
at www.law.ed.ac.uk/citsee/workingpapers/
16. B. K. Blitz (2006) Statelessness and the Social (De)Construction of Citizenship:
Political Restructuring and Ethnic Discrimination in Slovenia, Journal of
Human Rights, 5(4), pp. 45379.
17. Dedic (2003), op. cit.
18. Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, U-I-284/94, 4 February 1999.
19. European Court of Human Rights (2010) Slovenian Authorities Failed to
Comply with Constitutional Court Decisions Concerning Erased People,
Press Release 562, Kuric and Others v. Slovenia (Application No. 26828/06),
13 July 2010, available at www.echr.coe.int (accessed on 1 April 2012).
20. Council of Europe (2005) Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on
Slovenia, adopted on 26 May 2005, ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)005, Strasbourg,
1 December 2005.
21. Matja Hanek, in interview with the author, Ljubljana, 21 June 2007.
22. Kuric and Others v. Slovenia (Application No. 26828/06), Council of Europe:
European Court of Human Rights, 13 July 2010, available at www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/4c3f01312.html (accessed on 1 April 2012). In 2010, an
official apology was issued to the erased by the speaker of the Slovenian
parliament, Pavel Gantar.
23. These developments have been documented by the OSCE in a series of
reports on war crimes trials in Croatia, available at www.osce.org/zageb.
84 Contesting the Rule of Law

See, for example, OSCE, Report of the Head of OSCE Office in Zagreb
Ambassador Jorge Fuentes to the OSCE Permanent Council, Zagreb, 6 March
2008.
24. I. Rangelov (2012) The Republic of Croatia, in L. Stan and N. Nedelsky
(eds) Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Transitional Justice (New York: Cambridge
University Press); J. Miric (2002) Zlocin i kazna: Politoloko-pravni ogledi o ratu,
zlocinu, krivnji i oprosti (Zagreb: Srpsko kulturno drutvo Prosvjeta).
25. I. Rangelov and R. Teitel (2011) Global Civil Society and Transitional Justice,
in M. Albrow and H. Seckinelgin (eds) Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and
the Absence of Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1689.
26. I. Josipovic (2005) Implementation of International Criminal Law in the
National Legal System and the Liability for War Crimes: Example of Croatia,
in I. Josipovic (ed.) Responsibility for War Crimes: Croatian Perspectives (Zagreb:
University of Zagreb Faculty of Law), pp. 185233.
27. V. Peskin and M. P. Boduszynski (2003) International Justice and Domestic
Politics: Post-Tudman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, EuropeAsia Studies, 55(7), p. 1127.
28. The author monitored the proceedings at Belgrade District Court.
29. N. Kandic (2006) How to Protect Witnesses Seen as Traitors by Public and
Police? in Podujevo 1999: Beyond Reasonable Doubt (Belgrade: Humanitarian
Law Center), p. 199.
30. Humanitarian Law Center (2007) Victim/Witness Counselling and
Representation: A Model of Support, Project Implementation Report, 1 April
2012, available at www.hlc-rd.org.
31. See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Press Release, Belgrade,
1 April 2012, available at www.helsinki.org.rs; Humanitarian Law Center,
Press Release, Belgrade, 1 April 2012, available at www.hlc-rdc.org; European
Movement in Serbia, Press Release, Belgrade, 5 April 2012, available at
www.emins.org (accessed on 1 April 2012).
32. Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-01-45-I, Amended Indictment,
19 February 2004, para. 7.
33. Quoted in OSCE, Mission to Croatia, Spot Report: Reaction in Croatia to the
Arrest of Ante Gotovina, Zagreb, 13 December 2005, available at www.osce.
org/zagreb (accessed on 1 April 2012).
34. Ibid. For an intriguing account of Sanaders political evolution, see J. Subotic
(2009) Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press).
4
A Practitioners Perspective
The EU and Civil Society Promotion in the
Western Balkans: Moving Slowly Towards
a 2.0 Modus Interagendi?
Giulio Venneri

The consolidation of an active civil society throughout the countries

of the Western Balkans has been declared a strategic objective of the
European Union (EU) since the enlargement perspective was formally
extended to the region.1 For some aspects related to reconciliation and
socio-economic stabilisation, the attention to civil society promo-
tion dates back as far as the immediate aftermath of the conflict in
ex-Yugoslavia and the earliest stages of the EU presence. However, it
is since the EU formalised the membership perspective of the Western
Balkans, at the Thessaloniki Summit, in 2003, that the development of
civil society has consistently been labelled as a key priority that should
be given the same importance as the other (only apparently) more
articulated structural objectives that are pursued in the region, such as
the entrenchment of the rule of law, the promotion of good govern-
ance practices, the reform of the national judicial systems in line with
EU and international standards, capacity-building in the law enforce-
ment sector, as well as restructuring of public administrations. To some
extent, the idea that an active civil society shall have a role in, so to
speak, monitoring and accompanying all the aforementioned reforms,
as well as the legislative and institutional changes necessary in all other
sectors, has become a deep-rooted conviction in Brussels.
The European Commission has been paying attention to civil society
development. It has produced a yearly assessment of progress in this area
within the context of its Enlargement Package documents, which have
been regularly published every autumn since 2002. At the same time,
EU leaders have openly tried to encourage constructive engagement
with civil society, stressing on all relevant occasions that interest groups,
associations, civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental
85
86 A Practitioners Perspective

organisations (NGOs) are considered to be undisputed partners in the

EU enlargement process. As is often pointed out, this commitment to
a partnership approach is valid for all groups and organisations, but it
applies even more so to those that, beyond any party affiliation, are
genuinely representative of the interests of the various local communi-
ties. This latter category of potential partners is equally important, if
not more so, than the local branches of larger international groups or
networks, which more easily have their voice heard in Brussels and ben-
efit from long-established communication channels with the European
Commission, as well as with the development agencies of EU member
states that are still active in the region. Messages from EU leaders on the
importance of civil society promotion have consistently been passed on
to the political elites in the countries of the Western Balkans. In doing
so, particular emphasis has often been attached to the following ideas:
that civil society should systematically be recognised as a key interlocu-
tor by all governments in the region; it should be allowed to contribute
to policymaking and legislative developments through institutionalised
consultations; whenever relevant, it should be given a role in advising
and monitoring the alignment of the national systems to EU and inter-
national standards.
In order to facilitate such an active role for civil society in the context
of an inclusive partnership with both Brussels and the national govern-
ments, in which opportunities are granted to all relevant civil stake-
holders, dedicated programmes with constantly updated objectives and
increased financial resources have been refined by the EU over the past
few years. As a result, civil society promotion is no longer considered
a secondary or marginal component of EU assistance in the Western
Balkans region. On the contrary, the EU has approached the issue in a
sophisticated way, accompanied by dedicated budgetary lines since the
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) was established.
If one compares the emphasis on civil society promotion that charac-
terises the EU commitment to the Western Balkans, with the relevance of
the same objective in the countries that were the focus of the last 20047
waves of enlargement, it becomes clear that the EU has slowly started to
take on board the peculiar complexity of its different historical responsi-
bilities. On paper, the key terms of reference that form the basis of the EU
enlargement process are for the most unchanged. On the one hand, the
enlargement methodology continues to be hinged on the Copenhagen
criteria. On the other hand, the performance of enlargement countries
is still assessed on the basis of their respective alignment to the EU
acquis as well as to the set of standards developed by the EU in areas
 Giulio Venneri 87

that are not formally disciplined by common legislation. However, two

additional elements should be taken into due consideration. Firstly, the
EU acquis has continued to develop: the post-Lisbon reorganisation of
the Union and the progressive sophistication of EU laws and standards
have induced Brussels-based policymakers to reorganise the chapters
of the acquis. There are now 35 chapters. Secondly, account is taken
of the structural differences among the current group of target states
compared with the previous ones.
Enlargement to incorporate the countries of South East Europe presents
both qualitatively and quantitatively different challenges as compared
to the process that occurred between 1993 and 2007, and which led to
the integration of the states of the former USSR sphere of influence.
In addition to other structural and socio-economic differences, most
of the countries of the Western Balkans region with the exception
of Croatia, which has recently signed the Accession Treaty and is there-
fore expected to soon become the 28th member of the Union, and to
some extent Serbia can still be described as states in-the-making.
Despite their relatively small size, these countries require comparatively
greater efforts across a wide range of areas, such as capacity-building and
institutional restructuring, the achievement of long-term political and
socio-economic stabilisation, the consolidation of regional cooperation,
and the development of financial sustainability. Moreover, internally,
some of those countries have not yet fully addressed their domestic
reconciliation challenges. Some still remain vulnerable to residual inter-
nal sovereignty struggles among competing ethno-religious elites, face
complex issues related to the effective participation and integration of
national minorities and other vulnerable groups, and have not yet man-
aged to secure the independent exercise of their governing prerogatives.
Against this complex backdrop, and the aforementioned challenge
of post-war normalisation, the EU has naturally looked at civil society
as a factor of potentially greater value in the Western Balkans than in
Central Eastern Europe. In a sense, the more complex stabilisation proc-
ess in the former scenario has produced a higher level of sophistication
in the relationship between the EU and civil society groups from the
region, or that are active in the region, than has been seen before. Such
complexity, and the varying effectiveness of EU policies for this sector,
have been well highlighted in each of the three chapters in this section.
In order to complement the analysis and perspectives offered in the
previous chapters, some additional reflections on current EU praxes and
assistance in the area of civil society promotion can be made. It is indeed
possible to demonstrate that Brussels, both in terms of its headquarters
88 A Practitioners Perspective

as well as through its regional field office network (formerly known as

Commission Delegations, but now called EU Delegations, following
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), has been trying to achieve a
2.0 modus interagendi with civil society. In other words, it has been seek-
ing a more systematic and sophisticated modality of interaction. This
encompasses, for instance, a more structured dialogue with civil society
representatives, increased inclusiveness through better opportunities
for smaller and peripheral interest groups, the promotion of initiatives
focused on a more systematic transfer of know-how, as well as a com-
mitment to try to guarantee the overall long-term sustainability of CSOs
and local NGOs.
Three main elements can be identified to support the idea that EU
programmes and policies are eventually trying to move towards a better
articulated relationship with civil society in the Western Balkans: the
involvement of CSOs and NGOs in the consultative phases that pave
the way to the preparation of the Progress Reports for each enlarge-
ment country; the rationale underpinning the outreach efforts by the
European Commission; the overall calibration of financial support to
the sector with initiatives that, as has been pointed out, are increasingly
oriented to capacity-building in CSOs and NGOs.
The Progress Reports represent a very important instrument of for-
eign policy for the EU. Covering a 12-month time span, institutional
and legislative reforms in the enlargement countries receive a detailed
technical assessment against the backdrop of EU standards and the
acquis. Strategic and political aspects are equally addressed. The draft-
ing exercise preceding the final adoption of the reports by the European
Commission, which takes slightly over six months, is composed of a
series of structured consultations and an analysis of numerous written
contributions prepared by different local and international partners. As
practice provides, these are submitted to the European Commission by
the governments of each enlargement country, as well as by regional
and international organisations and institutions. This information is
complemented by reports, policy briefs and statistical data submitted
by international and local CSOs or NGOs. Their contribution is also
received via individual or collective consultations, which are convened
for the preparation of the Progress Report, in addition to other meetings
periodically organised with civil society representatives. Consultations
with civil society representatives are organised by the EU Delegations
in each enlargement country when the drafting process begins each
spring. In addition, invitations also come directly from the Commission
headquarters, in Brussels, where civil society representatives meet and
 Giulio Venneri 89

engage with the relevant desks from each geographical unit at the
Directorate General for Enlargement, as well as with those officials who
serve as Chapter Desks and therefore follow horizontally the various
fields covered by each Chapter of the acquis.
It is worth noting that the European Commission has tried in these
consultations not to give in to the temptation of selectivity. The qual-
ity of the input given to the Progress Report from civil society is of the
utmost importance to the final outcome, especially since it allows for
a comparison of different points of view on the same policy, legislative
or institutional issue. Inputs from civil society representatives often
guarantee interesting perspectives on all of the issues on which national
governments provide their detailed self-assessment or technical infor-
mation update. For some complex or delicate items that are dealt with
in the Progress Report, common sense would probably suggest that
targeted consultations with key interlocutors should be prioritised.
However, the trend over the past number of years demonstrates that,
especially in the field offices, there is a genuine attempt to maintain
a level of engagement with civil society that is as inclusive as possible
and to avoid cherry picking when invitations are first sent out. EU
Delegations in each of the countries concerned regularly update their
detailed lists of NGOs, CSOs and interest groups, for each policy area.
Based on their attentive screening of civil society, the EU Delegations
tend to systematically invite all potential stakeholders to the vari-
ous thematic consultations. There is interesting data to support this.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the current list of civil actors
involved in the peace-building network encompasses over 50 organisa-
tions, and almost 60 are regularly contacted by the EU Delegation in
Sarajevo in the context of consultations in the justice sector. In both
cases, only half of the invited interlocutors are based in the capital.
Data on NGO networks is also indicative of the ongoing dynamism
and development of civil society in the region. Various national and
multinational platforms have been established over the past few years
and, in some cases, cooperation frameworks focused on cross-cutting
issues have grown to such an extent that they now group together 500,
or more, members.
Civil society representatives in the Western Balkans have thus gradu-
ally achieved the status of systematic interlocutors for the EU and
particularly for the European Commission. As part of the desired 2.0
modus interagendi, consultation sessions and periodic dialogue are not
just limited to the preparation of the Progress Report or other strategic
documents. This is demonstrated by the increase in resources regularly
90 A Practitioners Perspective

allocated to the People to People (P2P) Programme, which is run by the

Commisisons Directorate General for Enlargement for outreach pur-
poses. Statistics related to P2P reveal that over 60 study tours have been
organised in Brussels since such an initiative was officially inaugurated
in June 2008. P2P initiatives have involved over 2000 participants, the
vast majority of whom came from the Western Balkans countries (with
others coming from Turkey and Iceland). Interactions between civil
society representatives and EU officials cover a wide variety of topics,
ranging from rural development to the fight against corruption. Most
participants represent different organisations, further confirmation of
the commitment of the European Commission to maintaining as wide
a consultation process as possible, as is also the case during preparation
of the Progress Reports, and ensuring an inclusive non-elitist approach
when structuring its dialogue with civil society.
Among other objectives, one of the stated purposes of the P2P
Programme is to allow beneficiary CSOs to familiarise themselves with
EU policies, institutions, decision-making processes and legislation. As
mentioned by John OBrennan in his chapter, external observers often
have the impression that the approach by the European Commission to
civil society is limited and utilitarian. Initiatives like the P2P Programme
certainly do have unstated utilitarian objectives. For instance, by engag-
ing in a direct dialogue with civil society representatives, the expectation
is that by developing a better understanding of the principles at the basis
of the European integration process they also become to a certain extent
ambassadors of the EU integration process in their home countries. By
organising opportunities to explain further the European integration
process to civil society representatives, EU institutions indirectly hope
to broaden the number of those who remain committed to Europe and
are also Communicating Europe in their home countries, as OBrennan
puts it, and reach citizens from enlargement countries with additional
EU-minded messages.
However, while this is undoubtedly one of the ambitions of the hypo-
thetical 2.0 modus interagendi between the European Commission and
civil society representatives from the Western Balkan region, it would be
unfair to presume that civil society representatives passively accept the
procedures, praxis, strategic choices and modus operandi of the European
Commission and are uncritical of the way in which relevant EU offices are
actually handling the EU integration and enlargement processes. First-
hand experience over the past number of years seems to clearly indicate
that, once in Brussels, most invitees of the P2P Programme tend to be crit-
ical not only of the weaknesses and inefficiencies of their governments
 Giulio Venneri 91

at home, but also critical about the perceived shortcomings, or allegedly

short-sighted policies, on the part of EU policymakers.
To conclude this overview with a comment on the strategic priority
attached to the current financial support for NGOs and CSOs, it can be
argued that the European Commission has substantially increased its
focus on capacity-building of civil society. The data collected by Adam
Fagan on the advocacy capacity and the sustainability of CSOs suggest
that the impact of EU assistance is difficult to measure properly. However,
looking at previous financial instruments, such as assistance channelled
through the CARDS programme, some lessons can be learned. In gen-
eral, as has been pointed out, the competition generated by EU calls
for funding has, on some occasions, resulted in the marginalisation of
small CSOs and in the overall predominance of urban-based partners.
The European Commission has taken stock of these and other criti-
cisms, which were acknowledged in various regional and country-based
needs assessments. As a result, in 2008, the Civil Society Facility (CSF)
Programme, also financed under the IPA framework, was launched with
revised procedures, modalities and objectives.
One of the most interesting peculiarities of this relatively new pack-
age is that both national and multi-beneficiary initiatives are financed
with the strategic objective of building capacity in CSOs. The transfer
of knowledge and experience is also facilitated by the development
of networks between CSOs, which is also envisaged as one of the CSF
pillars. The emphasis on networks can be traced back to the European
Commissions objective of reducing unproductive competition between
CSOs and also to facilitate the creation of new synergies among them. As
part of this new package, the European Commission has also financed
an initiative the Technical Assistance to Civil Society (TACSO) with a
view to strengthening the role of CSOs by devoting specific attention
to their sustainability. The European Commission is planning to con-
tinue financing initiatives under the CSF framework. With the closure
of the first budgetary triennium, the procedures for the disbursement
of prospective financial resources under this programme are currently
being debated, again with attention being paid to lessons learned. In
particular, it has been recognised that access to EU funds for CSOs that
are small or have limited financial resources should be facilitated by
revising certain aspects of the formal implementation arrangements. At
the same time, it has been acknowledged that additional incentives for
CSO networking and partnerships should be created.
These, and other, objectives will be reflected in the management of
future EU financial assistance to civil society in the Western Balkans.
92 A Practitioners Perspective

Quite possibly, there are still going to be considerable strategic and

operational obstacles on the path leading to the consolidation of the
desired 2.0 modus interagendi. What is encouraging, however, is that
developments in this sector have been systematically studied. At the
same time, it should be welcome news that the process of building a
partnership with civil society is not treated by EU officials as a marginal
aspect of cooperation in the Western Balkan region. Quite the contrary,
an awareness of the complexity of the current enlargement project has
led EU policymakers to deal with CSOs and NGOs in a better articu-
lated and more systematic way than was the case in past enlargement
projects.

Notes
1. The views and opinions expressed herein are the authors only and do not
necessarily represent those of the European Commission.
Part II
Democratisation
5
Democratisation through
Defiance? The Albanian Civil
Organisation Self-Determination
and International Supervision
in Kosovo
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers

It has long been suggested that civil society, at least in those cases where
its underlying ideas and structures are imported into a given country,
may be of limited impact in producing an active citizenry that would
counteract authoritarian regimes and allow the building of social capital
beyond traditional family structures.1 In Kosovo, as elsewhere in the wider
region,2 such an importation has occurred. NGOs have mushroomed after
the war in 1999,3 responding to UN democratisation policies and Western
donor-driven priorities underpinned by universalist paradigms of civil
society. According to critical observations, this process has resulted in the
production of a bureaucratic and elitist project culture detached from
locally rooted concerns, aspirations and identifications.4 According to
social anthropologist, Steven Sampson, this imported culture features its
own unique structures, activities and jargon, lifting its privileged local
employees away from the rest of society.5 Given wider debates within
social anthropology about cultural imperialism, local practices of sub-
version and resistance to universalist importations and political agency
of those marginalised by such processes,6 the focus must shift to
home-grown initiatives and its cultural resources.
As partly also indicated in the chapter by Strazzari and Selenica,7
Albanian society in Kosovo has a long history of grass-roots activism. This
heritage has included non-violent strategies of political defiance in resist-
ance to severe abuses of state power as well as social mobilisation beyond
individual and family interests in the name of national solidarity since,
at least, the late 1960s. During times of war (19989), however, activ-
ists aimed to suspend internal frictions over passive, activist or militant
95
96 Democratisation through Defiance?

forms of resistance to Serb state hegemony and violence.8 Large parts

of contemporary society in Kosovo continue to identify proudly with
the victorious militant resistance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),
internally presented as the Albanian peoples army.9
In Kosovo this local legacy of collective agency in resistance to state
violence is celebrated through an emotive orbit of symbols, language
and ritual practices that exists in parallel and opposition to the imported
bureaucraticuniversalist culture and its language.10 It is this local herit-
age (often uncomfortable for outsiders) through which Kosovos cur-
rently most popular grass-roots organisation, the civil initiative, Lvizje
VETVENDOSJE! (Self-determination Movement), aims to authenticate
itself to internal audiences, justify its defiance of any external interven-
tions and denounce those internal opponents who are construed as
betraying the local legacy inasmuch as they do not fit within the dichot-
omy of oppressors versus the people.
Although explicitly non-violent, this initiative has managed to chan-
nel the emotive potential of Kosovos militant historical legacy into
an effective political discourse of anti-colonialism and creative, post-
modern, practices of resistance that are directed against the contem-
porary power holders in Kosovo, whether of domestic or international
origins. The movement thereby exposed, widened and made political
use of the legitimacy gap faced by the international administration in
Kosovo.11 Perhaps not surprisingly, external state-builders and admin-
istrators have responded in a contradictory and rather helpless manner
to this form of grass-roots resistance. It can be argued that by ignoring
VETVENDOSJE!s historical and cultural basis of self-authentication
they contributed to undermining their own legitimacy in the eyes of
significant local constituencies and affirmed the claims and expecta-
tions of the ideological leaders of this civil protest movement in a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
The movements continuous, and originally university student-driven
publications and protest activities (see further below),12 appealed to large
parts of Kosovos (often transnationally) educated youth. Simultaneously,
it has also attracted many of the older generation, including some of
Kosovos most disadvantaged rural populations, ordinary and prominent
KLA veterans, ex-political prisoners and members of formerly persecuted
Albanian families who enjoy a high reputation as patriots within soci-
ety. The best indication of its appeal was signalled when it participated
as a civil initiative, not as a political party, in the elections of December
2010.13 Despite severe problems of election fraud, for which the ruling
parties were held responsible, VETVENDOSJE! managed to become the
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 97

third strongest political force in power, collecting about 13 per cent of

the votes (Thais PDK received 32 per cent, the LDK 25 per cent, and
Haradinajs AAK about 11 per cent). Although there had been months of
internal debates, and some early followers left the movement because it
entered the power structures, which it had always opposed,14 it officially
insists that there is no change of identity and that [p]articipating in elec-
tions is [just] an additional method of its resistance strategies.15
VETVENDOSJE! publications, including a weekly newsletter, weekly
journal and activist theoretical contributions to radical philosophy, pro-
liferate both on the Internet and in print. They have provided the basis
for the following anthropological analysis.16 This chapter will aim to iden-
tify, firstly, the core structure of VETVENDOSJE!s world view, including
a summary scheme of the symbolic opposites that underpin the structure
of its ideology and identity construction; secondly, to describe its resist-
ance strategies; and, thirdly, to explore the cultural and historical webs
of significance and internal meaning that underpin these. Lastly, it will
return to the international unease in coping with this movement and, in
conclusion, suggest that local concerns and their cultural expressions
cannot simply be ignored, even if these reflect deeply nationalist con-
victions in the wider society in Kosovo as evident in VETVENDOSJE!s
popularity.

VETVENDOSJE!s world view

VETVENDOSJE! has always understood its mission explicitly as political.

According to its most prominent activist, Albin Kurti, politisation
[sic] of civil society is the only way forward; a politisation [sic] of civil
society in order to make it have political stands and political actions17
and active citizenship is the basis of just political power.18 This most
influential civil society organization in todays Kosovo advocates domes-
tic policies which some might find reminiscent of state socialism. For
example, it opposes the privatization of public enterprises and the
strategic assets of Kosova,19 while advocating the nationalisation of
the energy sector, telecommunication and transport infrastructure.20
It is inspired by left-wing and anti-colonialist philosophy (references
include Adorno, Althusser, Badiou, Fanon, iek, and many others), yet
its platform is, simultaneously, deeply nationalist, forfeiting any easy
categorisation as a left or right political force. This is generally indicative
of populism, here revealed, and as will be explored later, in the ways in
which VETVENDOSJE! pitches us against them that is, the people
or citizens against the corrupt elites or any dangerous others.21
98 Democratisation through Defiance?

As Albanian anthropologist, Armanda Hysa, observed in her analysis of

VETVENDOSJE! and its predecessor, Albanian resistance organisations,
nationalist and Communist ideology are compatible in that they both
rely on transcendental notions that celebrate the primacy of a collective
cause over individual interests and tend to ideologically homogenise
the masses, whether in the name of ethnicity or class.22 Similarly, politi-
cal scientist, Gzim Visoka, identifies the movements populist power
politics as resulting in exclusionary attitudes and practices towards
Kosovos ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups.23
VETVENDOSJE!s nationalism is not a secret. As Kurti explained to a
reporter of The New York Times in 2007, Our nationalism is a reaction to
oppression by Milosevic and war with the Serbs Milosevic said there
were no good Albanians, so our Albanian identity became our identity,
it was a sign of defiance.24 Defiance has been the core strategy of non-
violent Albanian resistance all along. By entering the formal institutions
of government, it aspires to changing parts of Kosovos 2008 constitu-
tion, which the movement rejects as Ahtisaariane (Ahtisaarian),25 from
within the system.26
VETVENDOSJE!s world view is based on a clear distinction between,
on the one side, the community of natural citizens of Kosovo, in major-
ity Albanians,27 whose will should be consulted through direct forms of
democracy, namely referenda, and who have a right to full sovereignty,
self-determination and unification with the motherland; and, on the
other, those forces which represent and impose foreign rule and policies
on the people of Kosovo and are, in consequence, labelled undemo-
cratic, (neo)colonialist and oppressive. Moreover, in VETVENDOSJE!s
view, Serbia continues to be our enemy for entertaining parallel struc-
tures and thereby challenging territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Kosovo.28 While rejecting positive discrimination of Serb citizens over
other minorities, it grants all of these universally standard minority rights,
yet rejects the decentralisation and negotiation process as favouring
Belgrades hostile agenda.29 VETVENDOSJE! has described the inter-
national organisations, which have administrated supervised inde-
pendence, partial sovereignty and multi-ethnicity in Kosovo since
1999, first UNMIK and, since 2008, EULEX and ICO, as perpetuating
previous Serb colonialism and oppression.
VETVENDOSJE! also denounces those Albanian functionaries who
fit neither of its opposed categories (oppressors versus the people), but
who are situated in between as international locals, a species that differs
from their compatriots in Kosova.30 They include, firstly, rival Albanian
politicians, denounced as collaborators with the international regime
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 99

of neocolonialist supervision and described as corrupt profiteers; and,

secondly, representatives of internationally supported domestic NGOs
which do not subscribe to a nationalist platform.31 VETVENDOSJE!
explicitly asserts its identity as authentic defender and representative of
the peoples will by distancing itself from the happy marriage of inter-
est between local internationals and the international locals, such as
NGOs and their internationalised members, who overcrowd Kosovo.32
In contradiction to the existing constitution, VETVENDOSJE!s polit-
ical agenda foresees a referendum to decide on unification with Albania,
and it propagates majority rights. These imply that the envisaged
[s]overeign state will recognize in the constitution the historical strug-
gle of the Albanian people in Kosova for freedom.33 It further rejects
the constitutionally foreseen multi-ethnic symbols of the state as a
violation of the symbolic expressions of the peoples will. The new flag,
anthem and national independence day, as well as the constitution and
international policy, are all form without substance,34 void of meaning
and without historical base, hypocrisy and empty phrases,35 which in
VETVENDOSJE!s terms do not assure true sovereignty for the people
who fought for this independence. As the movement puts it, We do
not recognise imposed symbols, which have not undergone verification
by the people. Our intention remains to undertake work and engage
ourselves both within and outside the institutions in order to return the
national symbols to the people.36 As the next section will show, the bat-
tle over political symbols in the public space is VETVENDOSJE!s key
tactic, both in terms of expressing resistance as well as authenticating
its identity as representative of the people of Kosovo.
The scheme beginning on the next page aims to summarise, based
on a review of VETVENDOSJE!s literature, the movements world view
by juxtaposing the identity and ideology which it has ascribed to itself,
the ruling Albanian politicians and the representatives of international
governance in Kosovo.

Symbolic actions and performances

VETVENDOSJE! voices and visualises concerns regarding alien domi-

nation and colonialist intervention, as well as a complicit and corrupt
government in Kosovo, in creative and often spectacular, postmodern
ways. Vetvendosje! has become a brand in civil society disobedience
through radical visibility-seeking tools.37 On 12 June 2005, graffiti pro-
claiming No negotiations Self-determination was first spray-painted
on the wall surrounding the UNMIK headquarters. It has since become
100
Table 5.1 World view and juxtapositions as extracted from Lvizje
VETVENDOSJE!s publications
Lvizje VETVENDOSJE!
stands for:
National sovereignty
Dignity and self-
determination of Kosovos
people
Kosovos people are citizens;
democracy to be promoted
through active citizenship
Democracy as representing
majority will; majority
granting minority rights and
guaranteeing human rights
of every citizen
Greater Albanian unification
as a natural right
Unification with Albania
Kosovo as a development
problem; primacy of
economic and social
problems
Decentralisation as threat
to territorial integrity of the
nation
Nationalisation of natural
resources and social and
public service institutions
Justice for Albanian war
victims; recognition of the
past
KLA as a proud heritage,
a legacy to be cherished,
including its militant
symbolism
Kosovo International policy
Government stands for:
stands for:
Lackeys of the Supervised independence
internationals
Patronising; assuming
immaturity of, and need
of guidance for, Kosovos
people
Kosovos people are
residents, categorised
along lines of ethnicity
Multi-ethnicity; primacy
of securing minority
rights and appeasing
Serbia
Greater Albanian
unification as a security
threat
Negotiations with Serbia
Kosovo as a stability/
security problem
Decentralisation as
chance to appease Serbia
and Serb minority rights
Corrupt profiteers Privatisation of natural
of privatisation resources and social and
process public service institutions;
sell-out
Individual and Reconciliation between
clan interests Serbs and Albanians;
only forgetting and ignoring
the past
Thai as traitor of KLA as a dangerous and
the KLA fight and violent heritage, a legacy
its legacy to be interrupted;
militant symbolism to be
suppressed in order not to
irritate Serbia
(continued)
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 101

Table 5.1 Continued

Lvizje VETVENDOSJE! Kosovo International policy

stands for: Government stands for:
stands for:

KSF should be a proper KSF should be status-

army, the heir of the KLA
No negotiations or
compromises with Belgrade
before recognition of
sovereignty of Kosovos
people
Cultural authenticity
Ethno-national political
symbolism with deep
historical resonances;
collective obligations to
those who lost their lives
for collective liberation;
a lesson to detect patterns
of repetition such as of
colonialist oppression, and
therefore not to be forgotten
Nationalism as both an
effective defiance and
modernisation strategy;
a promise of liberation
neutral, professional,
based on values of multi-
ethnicity; no KLA legacy
to be accepted
Diplomacy aimed at
reconciling Albanian and
Serb interests
Artificial, imported and
imposed culture
Newly invented political
symbolism, discontinuity
of a dangerous past
marked by interethnic
hatred
Traitors of the Nationalism as cause
national cause of the Balkan wars and
violence

a ubiquitous sign on house walls and street signs all over Kosovo, both in
anticipation of, and during, the diplomatic negotiations over Kosovos
future status that took place in Vienna in 2006 and 2007 (under the
chairmanship of Ahtisaari). Cars of the UN mission in Kosovo, UNMIK,
found additional letters sprayed to their logo, making it read TUNG
(farewell) or FUND (end). Graffiti read UNMIKOLONIALISM or
12:44, Times Up/ UNMIK go home in reference to UN resolution 1244,
which legitimised UN governance in Kosovo following the end of the
war in June 1999. When the UN scaled down and EULEX, the European
Rule of Law Mission, entered the arena in 2008, EUmik/lex, spray
painted in black and crossed out in red (mik, means friend in Albanian
and Latin lex stands for law) extended the message of rejection from
102 Democratisation through Defiance?

UNMIK to EULEX. In 2009, large wall texts such as, EULEX Made in
Serbia, identified the EU as successor of the previous hegemonic Serb
regime. Skilfully designed posters and caricatures in VETVENDOSJE!s
many publications called for a boycott of Serb products. When EULEX
and KFOR tried to boost their image through a poster campaign,
VETVENDOSJE! added graffiti, which cleverly subverted the meaning.
When Romanian EULEX officers were caught smuggling large quantities
of cigarettes and alcohol out of Kosovo, in April 2010, the movement
produced posters suggesting that EULEX stood for European Union
Illegal Exports.38 In response to back-door negotiations determining
Kosovos new president in early April 2011, VETVENDOSJE! produced
posters replacing the shape of Kosovo in the new flag with a bunch of
bananas and a caption, congratulations, bananas without a republic.39
Several performative actions were more problematic inasmuch as they
appeared designed to incite tensions, sometimes by focusing attention on
specific individuals. These included throwing red paint not just at gov-
ernment buildings but also those seen as servants of the regime, includ-
ing the director of Pristina University (in relation with raised student fees)
in February 2011;40 or by forcing parliamentarians to step through pud-
dles of red paint. Red is not only the colour of the national Albanian flag
but also symbolises the blood shed in sacrifice by those who fought for
liberation.41 It also indicates shame if thrown at someone. Similar sym-
bolic actions included a cow driven through Pristinas streets, in 2008,
with the name of Sadri Ferati, the then minister in charge of the decen-
tralisation process, painted on its side in order to denounce and shame
him. In 2009 VETVENDOSJE! posted wall banners denouncing 117
members of the illegal Serb structures with their names and positions.42
The movement has also not shied away from causing material damage.
As Kurti explained, We have always been non-violent, we have never
injured anyone with our actions, but several times we have damaged the
property of the regime Creativity emerges as necessity in resistance.43
The greatest amount of damage was caused in August 2009 in response
to EULEX signing a protocol for police cooperation with Serbia, when
several EULEX cars were overturned.44
VETVENDOSJE! also effectively attacks internationally invented polit-
ical symbolism in Kosovos public space through both visual and perfor-
mative means.45 It has thereby not just aimed to re-appropriate space and
territory, but also time and history. Actions and performances, which
have made explicit use of specific historical and cultural references, have
not only expressed resistance to external respondents but also served,
internally, to assert identity. For example, the movement organised
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 103

demonstrations in resistance to the constitutional decision to change

the municipal coat of arms of the southeastern town of Prizren in June
2010. The previous coat of arms displayed the house that hosted the
meetings of the League of Prizren, where the Albanian national move-
ment was founded in 1878. VETVENDOSJE! explained that [t]he court
ruled that it was not a multi-ethnic symbol and thus not in accordance
with Ahtisaaris principles In response, on Constitution Day, activists
threw black paint at the Court buildings.46
This category of self-authenticating actions also includes the impres-
sive annual mass demonstrations on flag day, the national day of
neighbouring Albania, on 28 November. VETVENDOSJE! has regularly
organised the ubiquitous display of the ethno-national Albanian flag
(black on red double-headed eagle) in defiance of both the official new
flag of Kosovo and the new national celebration day on the date of its
declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. All Albanian nation-
alists consider 28 November a mythic date. It not only relates to a key
incident in the life of Skanderbeg, the fifteenth century national Albanian
hero of resistance and liberation, it also marks Albanias independence
declaration in the port town of Vlora, in 1912, as well as the birth date
of the most prominent KLA martyr, the legendary commander Adem
Jashari, in 1952.47
Not surprisingly, as part of its public performances, VETVENDOSJE!
has made regular appearances at KLA commemoration ceremonies, such
as, most prominently, when its leading representatives pay homage at the
graves of Jashari and his extended family. According to VETVENDOSJE!,
Jashari led the ordinary people of Kosovo in their liberation fight,48
before being massacred by Serb forces with his entire extended family
in the Drenica village of Prekaz in March 1998. Jashari is an important
model of patriotism in that he sacrificed his life and family for the col-
lective cause. At Prekaz, according to Kurti, it was made known that
freedom is more important than life and that true freedom is only when
it is complete and freedom for all.49
VETVENDOSJE!s locally meaningful political symbolism clearly seeks
association with the vernacular KLA veterans martyr cults in Kosovo,
which celebrate those Albanian individuals who gave their lives for the
collective cause of liberation.50 In print publications, reference to the
KLA fighters military oath, modelled on the Albanian military oath and,
in 1999, enacted in front of the ethno-national black on red Albanian
flag, calls for ethnic unity in the name of besa, a traditional Albanian
cultural concept of faithfulness intended to assure social solidarity and
mutual support on the basis of both individual and group honour, and
104 Democratisation through Defiance?

denounces all traitors to the cause. VETVENDOSJE!, now present in a

parliament operating under a blue, EU-inspired flag, still claims in 2011
that [t]he oath before our [black on red] national flag is our duty for all
endeavours for freedom which the Albanian people have undertaken
until now, and to all those who fell after giving their oath to this flag.
Their testament/pledge [amaneti] continues to oblige us.51 At the same
time, it denounces its rivals who compete over such identifications,
most prominently incumbent PDKs Prime Minister, Hashim Thai, as
having betrayed the KLAs besa and, by participating in such martyrs
commemoration ceremonies, abusing these as hollow justification for
their rule.52 In the internal struggle over political power and moral
superiority, the movement thus claims to be the only legitimate, uncor-
rupted and authentic heir of the peoples liberation fight.

Inspirations and trajectories of defiance

Creative strategies of radical, yet physically non-violent, confronta-

tions and visually powerful actions, such as those described above for
VETVENDOSJE!, have been described in Gene Sharps post-modern and
universalist bible for political activists of non-violent resistance, From
Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation, as part
of systematic political defiance strategies.53 Kurti was a guest at Gene
Sharps Albert Einstein Institution in the late 1990s,54 when he was still
a student leader and an activist in VETVENDOSJE!s predecessor organi-
sation, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), and he affirmed having been
inspired by Sharps work at that time.55 Perhaps it is for this reason that
some of the classic critiques of Sharps work help sharpen the focus on
problems, such as a dichotomous world view, and related internal socio-
morale pressures for ideological homogeneity, that are also evident with
VETVENDOSJE!. However, before addressing such selected critiques in
the conclusion, it is worth briefly discussing the internal history of the
movements political defiance strategies and thereby highlighting some
of its home-grown inspirations, both of its identity and methods, as well
as describing some of the problematic responses of the international
executive powers in post-war Kosovo to VETVENDOSJE!.
On 12 April 1964 under the leadership of the Revolutionary Movement
for Albanian Unity (RMAU) founded by the famous political activist
Adem Demai,56 99 Albanian flags were raised across Kosovo. Wall
graffiti read Long live Albania, our mother. This was an enormously
daring act at that time that ended in mass arrests and long prison
sentences for many.57 Subsequent student demonstrations in resistance
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 105

to state oppression and in favour of self-determination, with which

VETVENDOSJE! explicitly identifies, occurred in 1968, 1981, 1989, 1997,
1999 and 2007.58 Todays movements print and protest activities, includ-
ing internal group discussion processes and reading assignments, are
reminiscent, in many respects, of previous Albanian student activism
in Kosovo. VETVENDOSJE! situates itself within a tradition in which
Kosovas students have been the vanguard of the national movement
and social change.59
Kosovo of 1968 is one of VETVENDOSJE!s particular axiomatic refer-
ence points.60 Although the first mass student demonstrations of 1968
were broadly in line with worldwide left-wing student protests at the time,
this and all other Albanian student demonstrations in Kosovo differed
from their counterparts in their explicitly ethno-nationalist character
and demands. At the time, Kosovo experienced an educational revolution
when university studies suddenly became available in Albanian, allowing
the integration and participation of students originating from monolin-
gual villages, as part of the Yugoslav modernisation project. However, in
Kosovo, internal modernisation efforts meant overcoming fragmented,
kinship-based identities as well as traditional village suspicions against
state education, particularly for women.61 Here, Albanian nationalism
provided the platform for civil solidarity and an ideological vehicle for
modernisation and emancipation. It also allowed for the re-appropriation
of dignity after years of violent state suppression,62 which remains an
outspoken aim of VETVENDOSJE! after the experiences of war victimisa-
tion as well.63 As critics have noted, the concept of non-violence of the
Albanian civil resistance of the pre-1999 war decades was a nationalistic
one. Rallying behind the national cause created a narrow moral climate
that made ambiguous allegiances and loyalties increasingly impossible.64
Yet, within the Albanian community, as part of internally driven mod-
ernisation processes, it was through appeals to nationalist solidarity
that patriarchal authority structures based on age and gender could be
challenged in 1968. Suddenly female student activists acquired enough
respect to be allowed to report on the demonstrations and discuss politi-
cal ideas in the oda, the reception room of the men in the extended fam-
ily houses of Kosovos traditional village communities.65 VETVENDOSJE!
continues this tradition as an internal social and political moderniser
in the name of nationalism while negotiating cultural traditionalism. It
has regularly organised folklore events, peoples meetings (tubime) and
discussion events (tribune) to ensure bottom-up participation as well as to
spread its message. In its internal, three-tier process of electing representa-
tives in early 2011, a message was sent out that the process, whether on
106 Democratisation through Defiance?

grass-roots, municipal or central tier, such as in public environment or in

the oda, [the elections] are particularly important because in the oda also
women and girl activists of the Movement will be elected.66 The images
of participants at VETVENDOSJE!s mass demonstrations continue to
visibly unite university students and villagers (the latter recognisable for
wearing the typical plis, the traditional white felt hat). And yet, perhaps
because of the risk of violence, they rarely show any female participants.
VETVENDOSJE!s credibility also builds on the personal history of
its charismatic leader, Albin Kurti, born 1975 in Pristina. As a student
leader he was responsible for anti-Miloevic demonstrations in 1997.
Following his arrest by the Serbs, in April 1999, he defied Belgrades
authority by giving a nationalist speech in the court of Ni. His follow-
ers admired such daring in the service for the greater cause, because this
courage put his own well-being at risk. He was also directly associated
with Adem Demai, the then top political representative of the KLA,
when serving as his translator during the war. Demai still enjoys great
popular veneration in Kosovo for his personal sacrifices in the name
of nationalist ideals.67 From 1997 Kurti had been the leader of KAN,68
which aimed to promote civil society in Kosovo through active citizen-
ship. It also lobbied on behalf of Albanian prisoners of war and the
families of missing persons and called for the investigation and prosecu-
tion of war crimes. KANs history explains much of VETVENDOSJE!s
affinities to the different KLA war veterans and ex-political prisoners
associations. It may also explain much of VETVENDOSJE!s populist
appeal among non-elite strata of society, particularly those who suffered
most during the 19989 war.
In preliminary summary for its deep cultural and historical embed-
dedness in domestic society the movement evidently appeals to a con-
siderable number of Albanian followers in contemporary Kosovo. What
they have in common is that they do not see themselves as belonging
to those ambiguous locals who, in Steven Sampsons term, have lifted
themselves away from authentic local identities and thereby possibly
betrayed ethno-nationalist concerns. To them, international engage-
ment in Kosovo is not one of benevolent colonialism.69 Instead, it
is felt as deeply patronising and offensive; seen as standing in direct
continuity with the previous Serb hegemonic regime.

An international quagmire

International attitudes and reactions towards VETVENDOSJE! have been

ambiguous and contradictory, if not outright helpless or even defamatory.
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 107

A UN report of 2007 labelled the movement as radical and dangerous,

as exploiting political uncertainties and endangering a peaceful politi-
cal process.70 More partisan sources even identified it as terrorist in
nature.71 But VETVENDOSJE! has never claimed to reject foreigners per
se. It states that political collaboration must be based on full sovereignty
of Kosovos people first and can only be based on equal partnership.72 It
has reacted particularly sensitively to remarks perceived as patronising,
refuting them as illegitimate interventions. For example, it responded
when UN police spokesperson, Neeraj Singh, allegedly tried to explain
VETVENDOSJE!s 28 November demonstrations of 2006 as reflection
of a low mentality on a part of the population which does not under-
stand the processes.73 Likewise, it reacted when the US ambassador,
Christopher Dell, in a TV interview, patronisingly described the rela-
tionship of the US and Kosova as that of parent and newborn child.
He then described this newborn child, as devoid of ideology.74 In
contrast, veteran US diplomat William Walker, who headed the Kosovo
Verification Mission, in 1998 and 1999 (and famously first reported on
the contested massacre of Raak in January 1999), actively participated
in VETVENDOSJE!s pre-election rally in autumn 2010, supporting its
platform; an intervention that was welcomed internally.75
From their beginning VETVENDOSJE!s actions and demonstrations,
although intended as provocations, have often met with exaggerated
police violence. This has provided fresh arguments to support its inter-
nal discourse and has even created martyrs for the movement, which
has boosted the movements internal legitimacy.76 The darkest chapter
of international responses to VETVENDOSJE! occurred during dem-
onstrations on 10 February 2007, when two demonstrators were shot
dead with outdated rubber bullets by Romanian UN police and up to
80 demonstrators seriously injured. It seems that only such external
violence could justify any future turn to violence, for according to a
speech at a commemorative event for these victims, in the words of a
VETVENDOSJE! activist:

Each time a hero falls, we hope there will be no need for other
martyrs. But for a country to be free there is always a need for new
martyrs. Send our regards to the other martyrs and tell them that our
goal of self-determination has still not been achieved, but tell them
also that our march forwards continues with more momentum, with
more determination, because as we said that day [of the demonstra-
tions]: we are not going to stop until we reach self-determination,
until self-determination.77
108 Democratisation through Defiance?

The sense of injustice is compounded by the fact that Albin Kurti

was arrested and tried as responsible for organising the demonstrations,
while the UN police officers responsible for the death of the two demon-
strators were simply sent home to Romania. This underscored the cred-
ibility of Kurtis claim that EULEX, which to its detriment had inherited
the court case from UNMIK, describe themselves as a rule of law mis-
sion, while being above the law. They are rulers of law.78 The fact that
Kurtis last arrest occurred during his participation at the funeral of an
ex-political prisoner and patriot, Ali Aliu, thereby violating the tradi-
tion of the sacredness of the funeral,79 removed any legitimacy of this
arrest in the view of internal audiences. Subsequently, VETVENDOSJE!
collected nearly 150,000 signatures in the wider region demanding
Kurtis immediate release. In an apparent attempt at international dam-
age control, in June 2010 Kurti was released immediately in considera-
tion of the time already spent in detention, even though he had been
given a sentence of nine months for obstructing officials.80

Conclusion

As critics of Gene Sharps theory of power have pointed out, the suc-
cess of political defiance strategies rely on positing a rulersubject (or
oppressorsdemocrats) dichotomy,81 which simplifies the wider social
struggles and structures in which power relations are usually embedded.
To achieve this, a sufficient civil consent of a perception that the rulers
are the oppressors has to be generated. The governing actors themselves,
by their conduct and performance, are important accomplices in this. In
other words, excessive presence (or, worse, the use) of police or military
forces against demonstrators, and generally any display of undemocratic
features, legitimises resistance in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Provocation
of such display of hegemonic power is therefore a promising choice
of action. In short, there has to be a dictator, or a system displaying
dictatorial features, in order for political defiance to work as a strategy
of resistance, because any form of violent suppression of civic activ-
ism only exposes the ruling forces as oppressive or colonialist. Police
violence that produces martyrs for a resistance movement strongly
legitimises the movement, while delegitimising the system of govern-
ance that it represents.
In 2008 EULEX entered the arena with a commitment to cultural
sensitivity in order to avoid UNMIKs previous mistakes of alienating
considerable parts of the local population.82 However, there has been no
debate regarding what this culture was that it needed to be sensitive
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 109

towards.83 A reflection on the differences in cultural concepts of

nationalism might be a first step. While, in the Western international
view, nationalism has been seen as the root of all evil in the Balkans
and has therefore been rejected outright, to an internal Albanian under-
standing, based on living memory, it has meant modernisation and
emancipation, civil solidarity beyond the family, a promise of salvation
and liberation. What, then, might be learned from the perspectives pre-
sented here? Is a more subtle and sensitive understanding of local cultural
constructions required, even if these are expressed as ethno-nationalism?
Perhaps, but not without thinking about who creates these cultural
constructs and for what purposes.
According to Kurti, [t]he international rule in Kosova promotes diver-
sity at the cost of solidarity and difference at the cost of universality.84
Yet even though VETVENDOSJE! claims to promote citizenship over
ethnicity, its ideological certainty and internal construction of moral
superiority in the name of nationalism generate internal homogenisa-
tion pressures.85 In theory, these are likely to exclude those who are not
able to identify, in unambiguous ethnic terms, with the national libera-
tion fight of the Albanians of Kosovo, for those identities and allegiances
might be more heterogeneous, multiple, ambiguous or divided. As critics
of Gene Sharps political defiance theory have pointed out, there exists
such a risk, in general, when generating solidarity and consent for resist-
ance within the populace becomes an aim in itself, existing in parallel
with that of resistance to the oppressor.86 In particular the denunciation
of collaborators or traitors if this targets individuals who are not
organised or powerful, or simply voice another opinion can become
an autocratic tool of social repression and privatised justice. The greatest
risk faced by a grass-roots organisation based on a narrow populist ideol-
ogy, such as VETVENDOSJE!, thus might be that of itself appearing as
dogmatic and undemocratic even to some of its own (former) members
or the people who it claims to represent.
Cultural sensitivity, from a social anthropological perspective, entails
a serious and unprejudiced engagement with local specificity from
within, without necessarily sympathising with it or becoming its advo-
cate. Much of contemporary anthropology defines culture not as a fixed
entity, but rather as continuously negotiated, a fluid and modern out-
come of both past and present circumstances and problems, and not as
a causal explanation of these factors.87 Where nationalism is identified
as a domestic cultural product, intervening internationals embedded in
wider, external frameworks of power and driven by ideas detached from
the local concepts might be advised to recognise their own situatedness
110 Democratisation through Defiance?

within unequal structures of power, as well as the cultural roots of their

own concepts, in order to understand the success of adverse local popu-
list appeals and resistance potentials. Local experiences, memories and
cultural legacies that shape grass-roots webs of significance and mean-
ing cannot simply be undone by being ignored. They might include, for
example, stories precisely differentiating between individual and collec-
tive responsibilities regardless of ethnic divisions.88 Such local memories
and knowledge of interethnic support and coexistence deserve atten-
tion and respect and may offer locally rooted models of humanity for
sustainable democratisation projects. Where a lack of legitimacy and
credibility with local populations is identified as an obstacle to success
in international policy aims, perhaps this approach to cultural sensi-
tivity might have value beyond the particular case, presented here, of
Kosovo.

Notes
1. For example, see F. Fukuyama (2001) Social Capital, Civil Society and
Development, Third World Quarterly, 22(1), p. 18; for an early collection of
anthropological contributions to the debate see C. M. Hann and E. Dunn
(eds) (1996) Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London; New York:
Routledge).
2. C. M. Hann (2003) Is Balkan Civil Society an Oxymoron? From Knigsberg
to Sarajevo, via Przemysl, Ethnologia Balkanica, 7, pp. 6378.
3. See Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenicas chapter in this volume.
4. S. Sampson (2002a) Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs:
Benevolent Colonialism in the Balkans, in S. Resic and B. Tornquist-Plewa
(eds) The Balkans in Focus: Cultural Boundaries of the Balkans (Lund, Sweden:
Nordic Academic Press), pp. 2744; S. Sampson (2003) From Kanun to
Capacity Buidling: The Internationals, Civil Society Development and
Security in the Balkans, in P. Siani-Davies (ed.) International Intervention in
the Balkans since 1995 (London: Routledge), pp. 13657.
5. S. Sampson (2002b) Beyond Transition: Rethinking Elite Configurations in
the Balkans, in C. Hann (ed.) Postsocialism. Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in
Eurasia (London: Routledge), p. 306.
6. For example see P. Chatterjee (2004) The Politics of the Governed
(New York: Columbia University Press); M. M. Eastmond (2010) Introduction:
Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Everyday Life in War-Torn Societies,
Focaal Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 57, pp. 316; R. A.
Rubinstein (2005) Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach
to Peace Operations, Security Dialogue, 36(4), pp. 52744; R. A. Wilson and
J. P. Mitchell (2003) Introduction: The Social Life of Rights, in R. A. Wilson
and J. P. Mitchell (eds) Human Rights in Global Perspective: Anthropological
Studies of Rights, Claims and Entitlements (London: Routledge), pp. 115. In
policy analysis such results would be described as unintended outcomes and
low efficacy of externally promoted civil society development.
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 111

7. Strazzari and Selenica employ a particular focus on the 1990s and post-war
years; here a historically much deeper legacy is suggested.
8. G. Pula (1996) Modalities of Self-Determination: The Case of Kosova as a
Structural Issue of Lasting Stability in the Balkans, Sdosteuropa, 45(45),
pp. 380410; G. Pula (1996) The Albanian National Question: The Post-
Dayton Pay-Off, War Report, 41, pp. 2550. See also S. Troebst (1999) The
Kosovo War, Round One: 1998, Europe and the Balkans: Occasional Papers, 16,
pp. 910; H. Clark (2000) Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press); and
J. Brown (1998) Kosovo Peaceniks Hear Call: Guerrilla Army Needs You,
The Christian Science Monitor, 24 June.
9. For example, see P. Bajraktari (2011) Mos e prekni luftn e UK-s Gazet,
289(4), p. 3.
10. While broadly following a Weberian distinction of types of authority, here
the juxtaposition of bureaucratic versus emotional or emotive is neither
of any normative content nor supposed to indicate that emotions would not
be rational or genuine. See W. M. Reddy (1997) Against Constructionism:
The Historical Ethnography of Emotions, Current Anthropology, 38(3),
pp. 32751.
11. D. Kostovicova (2008) Legitimacy and International Administration:
The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective,
International Peacekeeping, 15(5), pp. 63147; N. Lemay-Hbert (2009)
State-Building from the Outside-In: UNMIK and its Paradox, Journal of
Public and International Affairs, 20, pp. 6586; S. Schwandner-Sievers (2010)
Bridging Gaps between Local and Foreign Concerns? Communication across
Symbolic Divides in the Transformation of the Security Forces in Kosovo,
in L. Montanari, R. Toniatti and J. Woelk (eds) Il Pluralismo nella Transizione
Costituzionale dei Balcani: Diritti e Garanzie (Quarderni Del Dipartimento di
Scienze Giuridiche) (Trento: Universit degli Studi di Trento), pp. 14569;
G. Visoka (2011) International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo:
The Thin Line between Ethnical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics,
Irish Studies in International Affairs, 22(1), pp. 99125.
12. Starting in June 2005 as a monthly paper, from autumn 2005 a weekly news-
paper (VETVENDOSJE! Gazet Javore, cited in the following as Gazet, and a
one-page weekly Newsletter in English (VETVENDOSJE! Newsletter from the
Movement of SELF-DETERMINATION), edited by US activist Alex Channer and
cited in the following as Newsletter). In 2005 the Albanian Gazet published
with a print-run of 10,000 copies for distribution by activists across Kosovo;
there were also Tuesday columns in Kosovos dailies, Kosova Sot and Epoka
e Re. Online hits (since autumn 2005 all publications are available at www.
vetevendosje.org) exceeded half a million during the month of November
2005 only (see Lvizja n Vitin 2005, Gazet no. 16, 27 December 2005,
p. 2); in June 2008 the movement also started a monthly video emission
called Zgjohu (Awake) on its website and on YouTube Lvizja n Vitin
2008, Gazet no. 173, 31 December 2008, p. 4. Generally, all the movements
public relation activities are based on contemporary design and skilful use
of the Internet.
13. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), chapter IV, article 64/2(1)
and (2) and election law no. 03/L-073 of 5 June 2008, allows a Citizens
Initiative to become an electoral subject as a group of persons who voluntarily
112 Democratisation through Defiance?

associate on the basis of a common idea, interest or viewpoint with the

objective of having their candidates elected, but who do not wish to form
a Political Party.
14. Decision to Participate in Elections, Newsletter no. 202, 11 June 2010; For
example debates following a swearing in ceremony at the new Kosovan flag,
otherwise rejected by Vetvendosje, see Vetvendosje: Presidente, betohemi!,
Indeks, 19 April, 2011, available at http://www.indeksonline.net (accessed on
20 April 2011); and the movements response, Ne u betuam mbi flamurin
kuqezi, Gazet no. 284, 28 February 2011, p. 4.
15. Why has Lvizja VETVENDOSJE! Decided to Participate in Elections?
Newsletter no. 204, 25 June 2010.
16. Apart from the evaluation of VETVENDOSJE!s literature this study is also
a by-product of an ongoing ethnographic and historicalanthropological
research project on Ilegalja: The Social Organization of Resistance in Kosovo
during the 1980s, funded by Thyssen Foundation, Germany, and hosted at
the Osteuropa Institute, Free University Berlin. I am grateful for the inspira-
tions and critical comments received from several colleagues, students and
friends on earlier versions of this chapter, which was first presented under
the title Democratisation through Political Defiance? The Albanian Youth
Organisation Self-Determination in Kosovo on 7 May 2010, at the inter-
national conference For Better or Worse? Civil Society and Transition in the
Western Balkans at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
17. A. Kurti (2009) Civil Society: Bringing Down Regional Walls, VETVENDOSJE!
(speech at the Regional Conference of the School of Political Studies), Prishtina,
6 November.
18. A. Kurti (2010a) Address to Students of the American University of Kosovo,
Newsletter no. 221, 22 October.
19. The deliberate use of the original Albanian term Kosova in English texts
indicates patriot Albanian convictions or sympathies.
20. The Manifesto: Principles and Priorities of Lvizja VETVENDOSJE!:
100 Points Joined Together by the Changes Necessary for Kosova,
VETVENDOSJE! Key documents 2010.
21. D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell (2008), Twenty-First Century Populism: The
Spectre of Western European Democracy (New York/London: Palgrave Macmillan),
p. 3. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for making me develop
these points.
22. A. Kodra Hysa (2010) The Motif of National Renaissance and the
Contemporary Political Mythology among Albanian Nationalist Groups,
unpublished paper presented at the international conference Common Issues
and Recent Trends in Balkan Historiography I: Towards a Comparative Review
of the Awakening/Renaissance Discourse, organized by EHESS (Paris), Istanbul
Bilgi University and IFEA (Istanbul), Istanbul: 24 July.
23. Visoka (2011), op. cit.
24. D. Bilefski (2007) A Difficult Question for Kosovars: Who Are We?
The New York Times, 9 December.
25. Finnish diplomat, Martti Ahtisaari was the author of the Comprehensive
Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, better known as the Ahtisaari Plan,
which resulted from almost two years of internationally facilitated negotia-
tions between the Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo in Vienna (20067) and
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 113

became the foundation of Kosovos constitution ratified in 2008. Built on com-

promise and within the legacy of UN resolution 1244, it aimed to reconcile
Serb and Albanian interests in Kosovo and advocated the paradigm of multi-
ethnicity at the expense of any political symbolism favouring mono-ethnic
Albanian majority identifications or alluding to the fight of the KLA.
26. Decision to Participate in Elections, op. cit.; Why has Lvizja VETVENDOSJE!
Decided to Participate in Elections?, op. cit.; The State as Subject and
a State for All (excerpt from our political program), Newsletter no. 226,
26 November 2010; FER Unites with VETVENDOSJE!, Newsletter no. 244,
1 April 2011.
27. A. Kurti (2010b) Together, its Possible, Newsletter no. 222, 28 October.
Visoka (2011), op. cit., p. 122, notes that the movements advocacy for a
common civic identity denies implicitly the rights of minorities to manifest
their ethnic, cultural and political identity.
28. Lvizja n Vitin 2008, Gazet no. 173, 31 December 2008, p. 2; Newsletter
no. 209, 30 July 2010.
29. For example, Pakica absolute, Gazet no. 115, 3 December 2007, p. 2.
30. A. Kurti (2011) JISB Interview: Kosova in Dependence: From Stability of
Crisis to the Crisis of Stability, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1),
pp. 8997, see p. 92 (and earlier version in ReArtikulacija #6, 26 January).
31. Ibid., for example, see also V. Ymeri (2006) Ne panik! Gazet no. 64,
5 December, p. 2.
32. Kurti (2009), op. cit.
33. Kurti (2010b), op. cit.
34. A. Kurti (2009) All Form and No Substance, VETVENDOSJE! (articles), 17
February.
35. For example, Lvizja 2009, Gazet no. 225, 28 December 2009, p. 3; Lvizja
n Vitin 2008, Gazet no. 173, 31 December 2008, p. 2.
36. Ne u betuam mbi flamurin kuqezi, Gazet no. 284, 28 February 2011, p. 4.
37. A. Tornitori (2010) German Left Party Protests Vetvendosje-Style?, tornitori
(blog), 26 February 2010, available at tornitori.wordpress.com (accessed on
26 April 2010).
38. EULEX Officers Caught Smuggling out of Kosovo, BalkanInsight, 21 April
2010, available at http://www.balkaninsight.com (accessed on 3 May 2010);
see also Kontrabanduesit e kontrabanduar, 23 April 2010, available at
http://www.vetevendosje.org (accessed on 3 May 2010).
39. Newsletter no. 245, 8 April, 2011.
40. P. Collaku (2011) Pristina University Director Painted Red in Protest,
BalkanInsight, 16 February, available at www.balkaninsight.com (accessed on
29 April 2011).
41. Lvizja n Vitin 2005, Gazet no. 16, 27 December 2005, p. 2.
42. Lvizja 2009, Gazet no. 225, 29 December 2009, p. 2.
43. Kurti (2011), op. cit., p. 94.
44. The Law of Capital: Histories of Oppression Vetevendosja, ReArtikulacija
#8, December 2009.
45. I. Strhle (2012), Re-Inventing Kosovo: Newborn and the Young Europeans,
in D. uber and S. Karamanic (eds) Retracing Images. Visual Culture after
Yugoslavia (Leiden: Brill), pp. 223250.
46. Review of 2010, Newsletter no. 231, 31 December 2010.
114 Democratisation through Defiance?

47. For example, Nntori i katrt, Gazet no. 63, 27 November 2006; B. Kodra,
Vetohimi i qenies kombtare: 28 Nntori, Gazet no. 115, 3 December 2007.
48. Stealing and Corruption are not Values, Newsletter no. 230, 24 December
2010.
49. Homage at Graves of Jashari Family, Newsletter no. 240, 9 March 2011.
50. For a deeper analysis of this post-war phenomenon, see A. Di Lellio and
S. Schwandner-Sievers (2006) The Legendary Commander: The Construction
of an Albanian Master-Narrative in Post-War Kosovo, Nations and Nationalism,
12(3), pp. 51329.
51. Ne u betuam mbi flamurin kuqezi, Gazet no. 284, 28 February 2011, p. 4.
52. Hashim Thai and the KLA are not the same thing. The KLA was a liberation
army of ordinary people, fighting to protect their homes and families, led by
Adem Jashari, see Stealing and Corruption are not Values, op. cit.; cf. see
S. Pireva (2011) Kujtimi pr dshmort dhe duart e pastra, Gazet no. 281,
7 February 2011; Dshmort nuk negociuan, Gazet no. 285, 7 March 2011,
p. 2; and, in conjunction with the accusations of Dick Marty: if some indi-
viduals misused the war for their private interests, this sould be dealt with
by legal institutions and should not be used to criminalize our just struggle
for survival and freedom, Council of Europe Resolution, Newsletter no. 229,
17 December 2010.
53. G. Sharp (2002) From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for
Liberation (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution).
54. Albert Einstein Institution (2000) Report on Activities 19931999 (Boston:
AEI), p. 21.
55. Personal clarification before and after Albin Kurtis presentation on Kosova:
21st Century International Protectorate, University of Westminster, London,
30 June 2011.
56. Demai spent 28 years in prison both before and after this event; S. Gashi
(2010) Adem Demai: Biography (Prishtina: Rokullia).
57. Gashi (2010), op. cit., pp. 434.
58. See A. Kurti, Krkesa pr Vetvendosje m 1968 dhe sot, academic con-
ference The Demonstrations of 1968, organised by the Instituti i Historis,
Instituti Albanologjik and Shoqata e t Burgosurve Politik e Kosovs,
245 November 2008, programme available at http://lajme.dervina.com/
archive/8053-1891:421/PROGRAMI-I-KONFERECES-SHKENCORE.htm
(accessed on 3 May 2010).
59. Newsletter no. 225, 19 November 2010 cf. 19682010 Gazet no. 273,
29 November 2010, p. 4.
60. For example, wall graffiti 1968 2010 / VETVENDOSJE!, see also,
Gazet no. 273, 29 November, 2010, p. 4.
61. See S. Schwandner-Sievers (forthcoming) Beyond the Family? Making
Modernity and New Social Capital in Yugoslav socialist Kosovo, K.
Clewing and V. Dihic (eds) Eigenstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und Europa in
Kosovo: Analysen und Perspektiven [Sovereignty, Democracy and Europe in
Kosovo: Analyses and Perspectives], Sdosteuropische Arbeiten (Munich:
Oldenbourg Verlag); see also, D. Kostovicova (2005) Kosovo: The Politics
of Identity and Space (London/New York: Routledge), p. 44; Clark (2000),
op. cit., pp. 3441.
62. Clark (2000), op. cit., p. 40.
 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 115

63. For example, Debate about Transitional Justice, Newsletter no. 211,
13 August 2010.
64. Clark (2000), op. cit., p. 69; on pressures for internal cohesion, see
Kostovicova (2005), op. cit., pp. 11820.
65. Research result, ethnographic interviews, 2009 (see note 16).
66. Bashk n organizim bashk n drejtim, Gazet no. 293, 9 May 2011,
p. 4.
67. Gashi (2010), op. cit.
68. KAN was founded in December 1997 under leadership of international activ-
ist Alice (James) Mead to support the Independent Students Union of the
University of Prishtina. From 1999 to 2000 it ran A-PAL (Albanian Prisoner
Advocacy List) to free the war prisoners. From July 2003 it became based
inside Kosova and created a network of activists; A. Kurti, Status of Kosova
and Self-Determination! Movement, 24 November 2005, available at http://
www.diplomacia.dk/anglisht/anglisht.php; cf. also http://www.alb-net.
com/pipermail/kan-info/2003-October/000005.html (both sites accessed on
31 May 2011); see also History of Lvizja Vetvendosje! available at http://www.
vetevendosje.org/ (accessed on 28 April 2010).
69. Sampson (2002a), op. cit.
70. For example, United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2007/134,
9 March 2007, available at http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/
YSAR-6Z9Q5W?OpenDocument (accessed on 30 April 2010).
71. For example, D. Abdiu, Kosovo Radicals Draw a Blank in Macedonia,
BalkanInsight, 2 March 2007; Incidents During Attempted Kurti Arrest, B92:
News Crime & War Crimes, 27 April 2010. Labels such as terrorist or crimi-
nal organisation can be found, for example, at W. Oschliess, Albin Kurti: Mit
wohlbekannten Methoden auf dem Weg nach Grossalbanien, Eurasisches
Magazin, 30 July 2006.
72. For example, How will Lvizja VETVENDOSJE! Work with the International
Community? Newsletter no. 221, October 2010.
73. Ymeri (2006), op. cit.
74. The Interventions of Ambassador Dell, Newsletter no. 188, 4 March 2010.
75. For example, Newsletter no. 226, 26 November 2010.
76. Note Albanian comments on YouTube footage of Kurtis arrests, identifying
Kosovo police as traitors and equating the show of police force with previous
Serb violence, while celebrating Kurti as true patriot; for example, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCD48aoUqJI; cf. also http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=dH-vLxCaaKo&feature=related, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=13-pupTbOzw&NR=1; etc. (accessed on 30 April 2011). Also note
that public opinion appeared divided after riots against Kosovo police on
the occasion of the formal visit of Serb lead negotiator, Borislav Stefanovic,
to Prishtina on 12 May 2011, when more police officers than demonstrators
were injured.
77. Commemoration of 10 February 2007, Newsletter no. 237, 11 February
2011.
78. The Law of Capital: Histories of Oppression Vetevendosja, ReArtikulacija
#8, December 2009.
79. Arrest Attempt at Funeral of Ali Aliu, Newsletter no. 196, 30 April 2010.
116 Democratisation through Defiance?

80. Verdict in Albin Kurti Case, 14 June 2010, available at http://www.eulex-kosovo.

eu/en/pressreleases/0067.php (accessed on 2 May 2011).
81. For example, B. Martin 1989, Gene Sharps Theory of Power, Journal of Peace
Research 26(2), pp. 21322.
82. Unpublished training needs assessments, TNA 2007; own participant
observation.
83. However, there have been plenty of stereotypical and generalised assump-
tions identifying the entire Albanian population of Kosovo with historical
customary law, kanun; my own observations and, cf. Pula, B. (2006) Is it
True that Kosova is a Clannish Society still Regulated by the Kanun, or the
Customary Law, and Does Not Belong to the West? in A. Di Lellio (ed.)
The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence (London/New York: Anthem),
pp. 17983.
84. Kurti (2011), op. cit., p. 91.
85. Beyond Visokas (2011) excellent theoretical discussion of similar issues,
published when this contribution was still under review, here I wish to high-
light homogenisation pressures that potentially extend into the resistance
organisation itself.
86. Martin (1989), op. cit.
87. Cf. A. Kuper (2001) Culture: The Anthropologists Account (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press), p. xi.
88. For preliminary examples, see S. Schwandner-Sievers (2009) Emotions and
Transitional Justice: On the Restorative Potentials of Symbolic Communication
in Kosovo, in D. Kostovicova (ed.) The European Union and Transitional
Justice: From Retributive to Restorative Justice in the Western Balkans (Belgrade:
Humanitarian Law Centre), pp. 99104.
6
Nationalism and Civil
Society Organisations in
Post-Independence Kosovo
Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica

In his study on state collapse and reconstruction in and around Yugoslavia,

Jens Stilhoff Sorensen claims that the idea of promoting and building
civil society as a precondition for, and safeguard of, democracy and
modern liberal values has become pivotal in aid policy towards so-called
transitional countries as well as in post-conflict reconstruction mis-
sions.1 Over the past few years the clich of a vibrant civic society that
is devoted to the mission of constructing Kosovos brave new democracy
has been noted by many international and local officials. Underlying
such a stereotype is not only a bureaucratic culture imbued with the
wish to report positive developments, but also a genuine expectation
that, in a post-conflict scenario, civil society works both as an effective
tool for aid delivery and as an antidote against existing power brokers.
In other words, it represents the best long-term investment against
the risk of state capture by warlords and provides a solid foundation for
building a liberal democracy that can eventually contribute to peace and
prosperity in the region.
In reality, civil society organisations (CSOs) often prove not to be
subject to the very same acrimonious divisions and collusive relation-
ships that permeate politics. This chapter illustrates and reflects upon
the transformation of Kosovos CSOs over the past two decades. It
sheds light on how, far from being disconnected from nationalism,
Kosovos civil society has been consistently and intimately linked with
it, even though the nature of this linkage has changed over time. To
the extent that nationalism can be considered part of the problem,
expectations concerning the role of civil society as part of the solution
need to be revised.

117
118 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

Defining civil society in the Kosovo context

According to the 2008 UNDP Report on Civil Society in Kosovo, civil

society is an arena of voluntary collective action around shared inter-
ests, purposes and values distinct from family, state and profit-seeking
institutions. It is a particular space in a society where people come
together to debate, associate and seek to influence the broader society.2
Writing in 2005, Besnik Pula, a former leading staff member within the
NGO Registration and Liaison Unit established by UNMIK, affirmed
that a set of institutions and fields of practice that embody that which
is traditionally understood as civil society have developed strongly
in Kosovo.3 But what does civil society mean in the context of Kosovo?
According to Chelikowski, to understand post-Communist transitions
one needs to refer to civil societies, rather than civil society. In his own
words, after 1990, differences in the development paths between vari-
ous countries began to surface. Some pursued democratisation, others
turned towards authoritarianism, and yet others saw wars. Civil societies
developed everywhere within the space available, adjusting themselves
to these different environments.4
As in other post-Yugoslav contexts where there had been armed
conflict, Kosovos CSOs grew out of the interaction with various forms
of international and transnational assistance. Like elsewhere, their
emergence has to do with the reconfiguration of an urban middle
class. However, while elsewhere this process tended to favour anti-
governmental NGOs that were critical of their own nationalists, in the
specific situation of Kosovo one could find a Serbian state confronted
by a cohesive, increasingly self-organised Albanian society.
The emergence of a civil society autonomous from the state in Kosovo
dates back to the 1990s, during the phase commonly known as civic
resistance. The internationalisation of the conflict along the road to
war (and above all during its aftermath) saw Kosovos civil society
undergo major transformations. First of all, Kosovos CSOs understood
that the West was not willing to heed grievances resting on historically
or demographically defined ethno-territorial rights, where it saw a risk
of instability and ethnic cleansing: therefore, a rearticulation that would
put human rights, humanitarian concerns and democracy as priorities
was needed. Secondly, CSOs were to become NGOs, also through the
adoption of a new terminology within the sphere of public policy. Civil
society was to be seen as agent and entity rather than as processes or
social relations: NGOs would become agents representing civil society
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 119

and homology with Western partners would facilitate internationalisa-

tion, bringing ideational and material support.
These transformations soon solidified. While theoretically civil soci-
ety can be considered both as a practice and a sphere that incorporates
a large variety of organisations, movements and actors such as the
media, religious foundations, sport groups, cultural centres, labour
unions the civil society that everyone refers to in Kosovo today is the
one embodied by NGOs. If the latter constitute the prevalent form of
organisation that has blossomed during the post-war period, this is also
due to the eligibility (and exclusion) criteria adopted by donors while
transfusing to Kosovo, at least nominally, an unprecedented amount of
post-conflict aid per capita.
Irrespective of their differences, the main international actors active
in Kosovo have been converging around the promotion of a relatively
homogeneous image of civil society: one characterised by sector, theme
or task-related objectives and activities. The image propagated by the
international community has been one of a civil society based on con-
sent and consensus, paralleled by the idea of individuals and citizens
intent on building a democratic Kosovo. This image, however, is not
necessarily entirely congruent with the reality that one finds at the
origins of Albanian resistance in the country, where the element of con-
vergence and unity is first of all nationalism that is, the ideology that
mobilises dense social networks and promises emancipation through
the securing of state sovereignty and independence.

From parallel force to a base for liberal democracy?

According to Pula, the exploration has to begin from the last days of the
socialist regime.5 It was at this time that nationalism rose in Serbia, leading
to the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation through the transforma-
tion of Kosovo into a space of interethnic animosity. It is in this context
that the concept of civil society, which was spreading throughout other
faltering socialist states in Eastern Europe, enters the political discourse
in Kosovo. By the beginning of the 1990s a limited number of non-state
controlled organisations had been set up. These included the Council
for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (KMDLNJ), the Kosovo
Helsinki Committee and the Union of Independent Trade Unions.
Forms of pluralism took shape in a climate of soaring ethno-national
polarisation. Kosovo Albanians rallied around those newly formed inde-
pendent organisations that denounced the attack on Kosovos autonomy,
120 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

while Kosovo Serbs remained supportive of state institutions that were

increasingly identified with the rise of nationalism in Belgrade. This
dynamic created the conditions for the creation of parallel societal and
institutional structures on the part of Kosovo Albanians. Following the
newly born independent organisations, a political party, the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK), was formed in 1989 by a group of intellectuals
spearheaded by Ibrahim Rugova. By challenging state institutions without
confronting them, the LDK promoted mass-based non-violent defiance
and resistance. At this point Belgrade ceased forcing young Albanians into
its army ranks, while an Albanian-led para-state system took shape.
Back then nobody would deny the distinctive political nature of these
dynamics and the role of ethno-national identity therein: the LDK was
a party de facto leading the process of independence of a shadow state
called Republika e Kosovs, which was endowed with a parliament and
a government in exile. Yugoslavias death came after a long economic
agony, and Kosovo was one of the poorest regions in Yugoslavia. Social
tensions were immediately coloured by politics. When the autonomous
province lost its autonomy, large numbers of Kosovo Albanians emp-
loyed in public administration, media and education systems were
sacked. While the concept of civil society entered the public discourse,
other definitions came to the spotlight. Borrowing slogans from the
large transnational movement that had emerged against the racist
South African regime, LDK activists denounced the situation in Kosovo
as apartheid. Meanwhile, students were secretly discussing the pros-
pect of an intifada.
The gradualist strategy adopted by Rugova envisaged growing self-
organisation in every aspect of social life until the costs of the status quo
for Belgrade would become exceedingly high. At that point parallel insti-
tutions would replace the colonial apparatus and eventually Kosovos
independence could be recognised. An impressive system of parallel
schools, hospitals and other social service providers was therefore cre-
ated. These institutions were financed by self-imposed taxation among
expatriates that rested upon trust-based, LDK-controlled mechanisms.6
As a result, this self-organisation became highly pervasive, touching
virtually all levels of the demographically preponderant Albanian-
speaking society. Under the weight of their own ideological reading of
post-socialist transitions, Western observers and agencies such as USAID
saw the LDK-led, ethnically separated mix of para-state and parallel
society as civil society.7
Writing about the role played by LDK in defining the structures of
Kosovo civil society Llamazares and Reynolds Levy stress that, in order
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 121

to provide the considerable organisation and social discipline needed

for the parallel institutions to operate, the LDK drew on the traditional
clan hierarchy of Albanian society, as well as on the structures and
authority of the now-defunct Communist Party.8 It is worth under-
lining that, in historical terms, Albanian nationalism appears to be
indebted towards community-centred dynamics (extended families
fis and family alliances), and its characterisation as a state-guided
process of modernisation is less pronounced than in other cases in
the region. In this sense, the military revolt of the League of Prizren
(1878) works as a Tillyan repertoire for national mobilisation. Political
mobilisation during the 1990s was built along these lines. This began,
in 1991, with a mutual collective oath on the part of prominent
families, which was orchestrated by Rugova, to suspend all vendettas
so as to capitalise political energies against the common threat from
Belgrade.
The priority on social and economic solidarity as part of the national
struggle for survival and independence meant that internal political dis-
sent was increasingly stifled. LDK leaders used simultaneously the hat of
a resistance movement, of civil society and of one-party state bureauc-
racy. Notwithstanding pressures to preserve unity, several significant
volunteer or non-governmental organisations were founded during
the years of resistance although many of them were strict emana-
tions of the LDK, albeit enjoying a relative margin of autonomy.
By and large, service provision activities took place firmly within the
parameters of a national struggle of resistance by the Kosovo Albanian
population, led by the cohesive structure of the national political party,
thus in a highly ethnicised and politically polarised climate. As Bekaj
observes, this close collaboration meant that the delineating line
between the political movement and civil society was often blurred.9
An illustration of this can be found in the aforementioned KMDLNJ.
This organisation played a major role in monitoring and document-
ing human rights violations and police abuse throughout the 1990s,
making an effort to inform the outside world. In the words of Ibrahim
Makolli, one of its leaders, the KMDLNJ was part of the general resist-
ance but not part of politics; however, the circumstances were such that
it could not be indifferent to politics around it In theory, it was
also open to Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic communities, but in fact
it became a civic body through which Kosovo Albanians could express
their grievances.10
Another important organisation was the Catholic Association Mother
Teresa (MTA), which was set up in 1990. It represented the backbone
122 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

of the Kosovo Albanian parallel welfare, health care and humanitarian

system and tried to remain above party politics, operating through a
dense network of support and social solidarity across Kosovo. During
the 1990s other two prominent CSOs emerged. Since 1995, the Instituti
Riinvest (Institute for Development Research) has been promoting an
economic vision based on open market and entrepreneurial values; and
since 19989 the Fondacioni Kosovar pr Shoqri Civile (Kosovo Civil
Society Foundation) has been providing support and assistance to civic
initiatives with a view to strengthening civil society.
In sum, throughout the 1990s the development of civil society had
to do with resistance, self-reliance and emancipation; its coordination
followed lines of ethno-national mobilisation that envisioned state
independence.

After war, towards independence

While before the 1999 war the boundaries that defined civil society
would fluctuate depending on the observers viewpoint, the post-war
period saw the differentiation between groups that were emerging as
political parties within a new competitive political system and organi-
sations that were intended to act as independent CSOs. Thus, the end
of open hostilities coincides with the creation of a space that redefined
civil society.11
To the international community, civil society was a category that,
as with everything else in Kosovo, needed to be (re)constructed from
scratch.12 Meanwhile, in a landscape saturated by international pres-
ence and clear of Serbian forces, civil society faced the major challenge
of redefining its role from being part and parcel of the politics of resist-
ance to acquiring a new, distinct profile that would allow a contribution
to reconstruction and state-building.
The separate but complementary relationship between governmental
and non-governmental actors and sectors were not part of the organisa-
tional culture of local CSOs. The historical conditions in which Kosovo
Albanian civil society was born were such that distrust and non-
cooperation with state structures had deep roots, which generated an
admixture of subalternity and diffidence vis--vis hierarchical state
structures. Several local NGOs had inherited a culture of hierarchical
management. What was at this point expected of them was the rapid
development of capacity in implementing provisional services, by
effectively engaging with governmental authorities.13 The legacy of the
1990s, however, did assure a modicum of autonomy. According to Pula
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 123

diversity and plurality were not and did not have to be invented in
June 1999, only reconfigured and expanded in a new context.14
Even though during the pre-war years the definition of civil society
proved to be elusive, there existed a widespread perception that it had to
do with a bottom-up, voluntary, transversal movement, born, moulded
and grown following the authentic needs of society, and therefore iden-
tified with the latter. Now a new perception came to be associated with
civil society: that of a corrupted, business-like world, ruled by ambitious
individuals and sharp private interests. In other words, as social activ-
ist Linda Gusia puts it, Kosovars witnessed, the privatisation of civil
society.15 The very concept of civil society became narrower and equated
to an area characterised by its elite make-up. Its protagonists were some
associations, foundations, think tanks and individuals. Most NGOs
that were considered successful had, on closer inspection, failed to
develop constituencies. They did not voice civic concerns, nor did they
campaign for a more participative and pluralistic political process.
During the construction of an open economic and political system
under the supervision of UNMIK, Kosovos civil society changed dra-
matically. Along with the considerable number of international govern-
mental organisations (IGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs) that set
foot in Kosovo, the number of local NGOs began to grow. International
(non-)governmental organisations needed local counterparts to per-
form duties and tasks such as provide humanitarian aid, assist with
refugee settlement and help reconstruction. Project funding and train-
ing programmes were the instruments through which INGOs typically
participated in the founding of local NGOs, which, in absence of solid
and functioning state institutions, were seen as efficient vehicles for aid
delivery. Local NGOs worked as service providers performing similar
state tasks in several areas. The key objectives, the practical tasks and,
ultimately, the very raison dtre of Kosovos NGOs were shaped accord-
ing to the reading of the context, the expectations and the priorities
of key international actors, which soon found themselves intent on a
major social engineering experiment.16
The following date may help to show the magnitude of the NGO
boom in Kosovo: out of an estimated 65 NGOs operating in Kosovo in
the period 198998 only five were international. By early 2004, there
were nearly 2300 officially registered domestic NGOs. By 2008, this
number had risen to more than 4000. As of December 2010, the number
of NGOs officially registered with the Ministry of Public Services had
skyrocketed to 5954 NGOs, out of which 481 were foreign organisa-
tions.17 This number includes sports clubs or similar organisations for
124 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

which the only way to register as a legal entity is as an NGO. Moreover,

only a limited portion (possibly 500 NGOs) can be considered to be
active, and most of them are concentrated in Pristina.
This number is extremely high even in comparison to other data in
the region. For instance, in 2001, Albania had an estimated 400 to 800
registered NGOs; Bosnia-Herzegovina, similarly placed under an interna-
tional administration, had 1300 registered NGOs, whereas Bulgaria had
1900 NGOs. Reflecting on how NGOs had sprung up overnight, Elton
Skendaj, a UNDP consultant in 2008, observes, UNMIK enacted a per-
missive regulation in 1999 Since self-government institutions started
to be built after 1999, civil society organisations have engaged in many
activities that are often the prerogative of central and local government
institutions, such as reconstruction of houses, welfare services, publication
of books for the education system, and waste collection.18
During the first years of its mandate UNMIK incorporated civil soci-
ety representatives within advisory boards that constituted Kosovos
complex governance system. An Interim NGO Council was established
by the Democratisation Department of the OSCE, which invited all
NGOs registered with UNMIK to attend.19 One civil society representa-
tive sat as an observer in the Interim Administrative Council, the most
important joint advisory body in Kosovo, a sort of embryonic executive
body. Upon informal recommendation by the OSCE, independents and
representatives of civil society20 were appointed by the Head of UNMIK
to participate in the Transitional Council, a forum with mere consulta-
tive powers that was set up as a parliament in statu nascendi.21 Moreover,
persons appointed by UNMIK to represent civil society interests were
included in UNMIKs Administrative Departments. Through this prac-
tice, UNMIK drew a line distinguishing between political organisations,
such as the LDK and the parties stemming from the Kosovo Liberation
Army, and civil society, whose voice was considered necessary for sound
representation and future developments.
This season of transitory participation and direct consultation came
to an end with the legislative elections held in 2001, following which
Kosovos Provisional Institutions of Self-Government were established,
and Kosovos Assembly, government and presidency came into exist-
ence. CSOs representation quotas were removed. The new expectation
was that CSOs would strengthen and sharpen their advocacy, monitor-
ing and lobbying profile, thus contributing to policymaking and to the
success of democratic changes.
According to a Freedom House report issued in 2009, Kosovos civil
society had been expanding along a development trajectory that allowed
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 125

it to adapt and address the needs of distinct political phases. Thus, at the
time independence was unilaterally proclaimed, it presented agendas
organised around specific issues. In this picture, in which one may detect
teleological undertones, the post-independence phase would coincide
with the first time that civil society efforts would take a thematic
approach. The report read that this accomplishment could strengthen
the sectors role in the future.22
Another two general aspects in this period are worth attention. First,
while the levels of international participation and donor contributions
to Kosovar civil society have progressively declined, there has been no
decrease in the number of registered NGOs. Secondly, the focus has
shifted from humanitarian relief to the support of Kosovo public insti-
tutions. Related to this, one can identify a significant trend: next to
NGOs promoting civic participation and involved in institutional part-
nerships, some CSOs have progressively moved towards watchdogging
state performance. Several new NGOs and NGO clusters, such as the
Organisation for Democracy, Anti-Corruption and Dignity ohu (stand
up), FOL 08 as well as a few older ones such as the Kosovo Democratic
Institute (KDI) and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN),
stepped up their criticisms of government both at the municipal and
national levels. One may observe that while anti-corruption becomes
a recurrent word, this may well reverberate with priorities identified by
international donors.
In summary, the way in which civil society has been involved in
state-building after 1999 can hardly be cast as successful in terms of
promoting democratisation, multi-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation.
A top-down approach to assistance undermined the bottom-up forms
of civil society dynamics that characterised the previous decade of
resistance. As a result, the position of most international organisations
was viewed sceptically by large portions of the population, while local
NGOs were considered as either inexperienced organisations unable to
perceive the manipulative interests of these foreign donors, or oppor-
tunist groups that had learned the rules of the new game in town. As
the Pristina-based Advocacy Training and Resource Centre concluded in
2008, when Kosovo proclaimed its independence the NGO sector was
unable to exert any influence over public policy.23

After state independence

Over the past few years several NGOs have embarked upon new modes
of cooperation, giving birth to networks and coalitions. Typically, they
126 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

cluster around specific platforms, declaring as goals the strengthening

and the improving of the representation of civil society.24 According
to the 2008 UNDP report on civil society there exists no exact formula
that governs the process of network and coalition creation in Kosovo.25
While only a few alliances appear to be sustainable over time, several
partnerships are issue driven (e.g. on environmental and energy policy).
In some cases the process of convergence is more explicitly donor and
project-driven. It lacks a legal basis, and the existence of the partner-
ship is usually signalled by the signing of a mere memorandum of
understanding.
At the beginning of 2009, a domestically generated legal framework
for CSOs was created by the newly independent state, thus overcoming
the aforementioned UNMIK regulations.26 In this new phase, which was
characterised by the deep reconfiguration of international governance
in the country, and by a renewed emphasis on local ownership at all
levels, other issues and concerns came to the surface: for example, the
question of corruption within the local political elite and among UN
and international officers,27 the process of decentralisation, territorial
integrity in the presence of defiant northern districts governed by paral-
lel Serbian structures, the meaning of Kosovos European perspective,
and, related to all this, the socio-economic problems that the country
had been facing during the post-war decade. This stage marks yet
another development for a distinct group of NGOs that have gradually
left their watchdog function behind in favour of voicing criticism of
the political sphere; contesting existing domestic political practices
and structures. Moreover, their critiques are addressed towards the
international community, which is sometimes rhetorically referred to
as a colonial presence that keeps the country in a state of dependency.
Some thematic-driven networks have become increasingly politicised.
Common declarations, joint actions, coordinating platforms have taken
shape on the spur of the moment, linking group to group. Albin Kurtis
VETVENDOSJE! movement, which lies at the edge of a traditional
definition of civil society,28 seems to have been a catalyst for much of
this political restlessness. For instance, on 19 November 2008, 20 dif-
ferent CSOs organised a protest in Pristina which gathered some 20,000
demonstrators demanding a referendum on the UN Secretary Generals
proposal (known as Ban Ki-Moons six-point plan). According to the
organisers, the plan aimed at dividing Kosovo, and was to be consid-
ered part of ongoing attempts to obstruct Kosovos sovereignty. While
VETVENDOSJE! had always refused to legally register and to comply
with existing regulations, most of the other CSOs were registered as
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 127

NGOs. These have included, among others, Cohu, KWN, KYN, FOL 08,
CBM-Mitrovice and the Ferizaj-based Initiative for Progress (INPO). On
this occasion, however, they showed a reluctance to call themselves
NGOs, preferring the use of definitions such as social organisations,
movements and civic platforms. Following on from this, another, even
more successful, demonstration was organised a month later. The call
was similar, but this time the organisers openly targeted EULEX as it
was setting foot in the country, along with what remained of UNMIK.
Although some NGOs that were there reported to be among the organis-
ers explained that this had not been the case, it is a fact that new patterns
of operation were developing.29 Then, in August 2009, VETVENDOSJE!
organised another street initiative against EULEX. The action ended
with an assault on EULEX cars, 20 of which were damaged, reaching
international headlines. A few weeks later, in September 2009, 24 social
organisations headed by VETVENDOSJE! gathered some 3000 demon-
strators to contest the police protocol signed between EULEX authorities
and Serbia.
At the same time, a new potential transnational actor emerged: Rrjeti i
Organizatave Shqiptare (RrOSh, or Network of Albanian Organisations).
This is the name of a transnational network composed of ethnic Albanian
organisations, groups and movements based in Kosovo, Albania,
Macedonia and Montenegro. Started by VETVENDOSJE! a few months
after the declaration of independence, RrOSh can be seen as an experi-
mental attempt to renew transborder collaboration among Albanian
organisations, articulate a common agenda, and play the national
card in a broader context. The network was established in Tirana on
28 August 2008. It is composed of 20 different social organisations,
mostly youth organisations, from territories where Albanians are (or
were) demographically strong, seeking recognition and status,30 and it
is based on the idea that the power of collective identity can sustain
collective action. Its activities include initiatives where the national
character of focal issues takes centre stage, thereby developing a com-
mon awareness and sensitising the wider public towards the national
question. Among the organisations and movements that joined RrOSh
later, one finds a myriad of names from across the radical-intellectual
youth spectrum, including those with left leanings, liberal-populists
and nationalists.31
Such a heterogeneous network meets every few months, signs a com-
mon declaration and promotes public initiatives. However, according to
some of its activists, the significance of RrOSh should not be overstated.
The network is not an achievement per se, but it is instrumental for
128 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

promoting public debates and stimulating large mobilisations.32 The

nationalist arguments that RrOSh puts forward have little originality.33
They speak of unsolved historical issues, a revival of national feelings,
the celebration of the Albanian flag (as opposed to Kosovos blue flag),
and the organisation of public campaigns, such as buy Albanian or
we are one, referring to Albanians living in different states. Not sur-
prisingly RrOSh enjoys some backing in the university circles of Tirana,
Pristina and Tetovo, where Albanian nationalism has been historically
incubated. Albanian academics such as Hysamedin Ferraj, Elvis Hoxha
and Enis Sulstarova participate in RrOSh conferences, and are con-
sidered intellectual reference points for the national reawakening.
More interesting is perhaps the attention that RrOSh members and
pan-Albanian arguments have gained in the Albanian media, such as
on Top Channel and Klan TV. Thus, while the governments of Kosovo,
Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro discuss and negotiate accession to
the EU, a nebulous yet vocal segment of CSOs, dissatisfied with social
and political clientelism, discusses historical rights and virtually articu-
lates the vision of Greater Albania,34 mixing concepts such as national,
civic and public.
More generally, a process of gradual politicisation has affected part
of Kosovos CSOs. This process has culminated with the formation of
two new political parties that stem from civil society and which ran for
Kosovos parliament at the snap general elections (the first since inde-
pendence), held in December 2010. The first of these is VETVENDOSJE!.
Its decision to run for elections in June 2010 saw its left-wing, anti-
globalisation, civic activism intertwined with nationalist and even pan-
Albanian tones. The new party characterised itself as a challenge to the
post-war, political party system. Thus at the same time as it contests
privatisation and calls for the nationalisation of public assets, it also
calls for a referendum on the unification of Albania and Kosovo in the
name of the right of self-determination. The other new entry in Kosovos
political arena was called FeR (the new spirit). Although it eventually
failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation,
FeR emerged from a group of prominent local NGOs that characterise
themselves as think tanks concentrating on public policy issues. Created
with the intention of bridging the gap between official politics and citi-
zenship, FeR is considered to be EU-friendly, and is mostly composed
of young, liberal, technically competent intellectuals and professionals
educated in the West.
To some extent, the trajectory followed by FeR reminds the one of the
Partia Reformiste ORA,35 which was set up by Veton Surroi, the founder
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 129

of the newspaper Koha Ditore, in the run up to the 2004 elections. Surroi
had been among the independents involved in both the pre-war nego-
tiations and in post-war consultative bodies, gaining a strong reputation
in the West in the process. ORA had seven parliamentary representa-
tives, who sat in opposition to the government suffering episodes of
intimidation in the process. Held on the verge of independence, in a
climate of national(ist) euphoria, the elections of 2007 marked the end
of its parliamentary representation. Surroi resigned and what remained of
the party eventually merged with the LDK, formally ceasing to exist in
2010. In March 2011, a few months after the elections, FeR announced
that it would join forces with VETVENDOSJE!.

Conclusion

Kosovos post-war civil society has an ambiguous relationship with

the nationalist political discourse. First and foremost, one can speak of
civic activism in Kosovo only after specifying that the vast majority of
grass-root forms of mobilisation, even at a local level, follow rigid ethno-
national lines. In spite of the six stars that symbolise Kosovos main
ethnic groups in the official flag of the new state, virtually no civic activ-
ism takes place under this flag. Smaller minorities have been living for
a couple of decades under heavy pressure either to take the side of one
of the two main groups (Albanians or Serbs) or to leave. While external
state-builders and state authorities have contributed to institutionalis-
ing ethnicity through the adoption of quotas, inter- and multi-ethnicity
does not resonate within the local society.36 In this Kosovo is certainly
no exception. In their work on civil society in post-Dayton Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Belloni and Hammer observe that local organisations
are not necessarily more progressive, democratic and non-nationalist
than the government they are expected to challenge.37 NGOs that are
committed to reconciliation in Kosovo often struggle to survive on the
margins of the public discourse.
Secondly, civil society in Kosovo is not entirely divorced from the fail-
ure of democratisation that accompanied (and followed) the collapse of
the Yugoslav system. With Miloevic in power, uncompromising mass
boycott of institutional life was the norm among Kosovo Albanians.
The fear of damaging the national cause prevented any tactical conces-
sions, even in those moments in which Miloevics grip on power was
faltering. Against this background, in post-war and post-independence
Kosovo, little evidence can be found that the generously funded dra-
matic expansion of CSOs has strengthened the participatory profile of
130 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

democratic life. To give just one indicator, electoral turnout remains

quite low, not even reaching 50 per cent even in the first elections
after the independence.
During the years of the UNMIK administration, Kosovos NGOs main-
tained weak relationships with citizens. Although a change became
visible on the eve of independence, up until this point the perceived
need to keep a united stance on Kosovos status was such that civil soci-
ety, very much like political parties, was inhibited from raising critical
voices. The status question, which nationalism loaded with talismanic
implications, crowded out other issues upon which civil society typi-
cally has a say, and which, at that point, were considered a distraction
from the national effort. According to USAID, the issue of status
led to prioritising security and stability over democratisation. Political
expediency became of highest priority, which limited discussion on
policy questions with the public.38
It is not possible to understand Kosovos civil society without consid-
ering the broader Albanian national question, which unfolds today in a
landscape that is moulded by liberal state-building. Albanian national-
ism has always pointed to arbitrary border demarcations and the lack of
status recognition as causes of social vulnerability and economic stagna-
tion. In this, narrative democratisation and socio-economic reforms do
not take centre stage, even though a number of political parties have
emerged over the past two decades. The difficulty of democratisation
suggests a possible line of interpretation of the relative weakness of
Kosovos civil society. Kosovos political system is made up of hierarchal,
close-knit structures of power, which are strongly entrenched in nation-
alism and have a small and fluctuating ideological basis. Clientelistic
and corruption practices, as well as extra-legal structures, remain per-
vasive. The rule of law is not yet consolidated and Kosovos economic
performance is far from encouraging.
In these circumstances, those segments of civil society that are less
docile than most nevertheless find it difficult to challenge existing
power structures. The moment they seek to measure social consent and
bring about change, they end up being marginalised. The power block
they see is represented by the meshing of interests in stabilisation
between the (omni)presence of internationals and the opportunist
local cliques, embellished by a plethora of NGOs most of which are
just shadow organisations that are not operational, but are boosted
by international money, thus amplifying dependency patterns. The
search for strength drives politicisation and legitimisation in nationalist
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 131

terms, especially as the local establishment is being forced to downplay

this as Kosovo moves towards the European Union, where signifi-
cant quotas of national sovereignty are to be relinquished. A strong
ambivalence remains regarding the meaning of civic in an ethnically
divided country. The resulting blend of rhetoric and action, which also
draws on anti- and postcolonial notions, appears rather incongruous to
external eyes.
The elections held in December 2010 have demonstrated how politi-
cal movements like VETVENDOSJE!, which have roots in civil society
activism and receive support from different quarters, can capture the
corruption and dependency debate. It became the third largest political
party, securing 12 per cent of the national vote, while newly released
pro-European, liberal parties such as FeR, originating from legally regis-
tered NGOs, failed to gain popularity and did not secure parliamentary
representation. Rather, as already noted, it was eventually absorbed
by VETVENDOSJE!, which had gained popularity not only by target-
ing flawed privatisations, corruption and the way in which external
actors including the European Union have steered Kosovo, but
also by wholeheartedly embracing nationalism, showing intransigence
on the Serbian question, and even rejuvenating the dying idea of
pan-Albanianism.
The resulting situation is rife with challenges for the European Union,
which in the past few years resolutely promoted a neoliberal redefini-
tion of Kosovos economy and civil society. It is now being criticised by
a vital segment of social activism at a time when it needs to promote
rule of law reforms and politico-institutional change. EU field officers
are aware of this problem, and tend to see Kosovo civil society divided
into two factions: one showing varying degrees of hostility against
EULEX, and a second one keeping a neutral attitude. Investing on the
latter, it would appear that simply trying to isolate the former may be
a mistake. Divisions are ambivalent. Former rivals can become allies
under the banner of national imperatives.
A large number of international reports present the promotion and
consolidation of Kosovos local civil society as the solution to Kosovo
problems. Civil society has become a cornerstone of the strategy aimed
at addressing democratisation, improving state-society relations and
promoting good governance. This analysis illustrates that such an expec-
tation is partly flawed. Investing massively in one-dimensional redefini-
tions of civil society through the straightjacket of an NGO template that
follows (neo)liberal principles is no antidote to ethnicisation, not least
132 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

of all because several nationalist movements have learned to operate

through NGOs.

Notes
1. J. Stiffhoff Sorensen (2009) State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery
(New York: Berghahn Books), p. 256.
2. UNDP Kosovo (2008) Civil Society and Development (Kosovo: Human
Development Report), p. 19.
3. B. Pula (2005) A Changing Society, a Changing Civil Society: Kosovos NGO
Sector after the War, Policy Research Series Paper, 3 (Pristina: KIPRED), p. 1.
4. J. Chelikowsky. (2004) Civil society in Eastern Europe: Growth Without
Engagement, in M. Glasius, D. Lewis and H. Seckinelgin (eds) Exploring Civil
Society: Political and Cultural Contexts (London: Routledge), p. 73.
5. Pula (2005), op. cit.
6. M. Vickers (1998) Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York:
Columbia University Press).
7. See, among others, Stilhoff Sorensen (2009), op. cit., p. 259.
8. M. Llamazares and L. Reynolds Levy (2003) NGOs and Peacebuilding in
Kosovo Working Paper 13 (Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution), p. 3.
9. A. Bekaj (2008) The History of Civil Society in Kosovo, in UNDP Kosovo,
op. cit., p. 36.
10. Ibid.
11. Pula (2005), op. cit., p. 7.
12. Until 2008 all expressions of civil society and civic activism in Kosovo have
operated under the legal framework established by UNMIK in 1999, through
Regulation 1999/22, and a series of corollary Administrative Directives. The
Regulation established a distinction between domestic and international
NGOs, which were all expected to operate on a not-for-profit basis, but were
further differentiated in associations and foundations: the former were defined
as membership organisations, whereas the latter were treated as private
groups of individuals formed for either mutual or public benefit. In 2010 the
overwhelming majority of NGOs were registered as associations.
13. Llamazares and Reynolds Levy (2003), op. cit., p. 4.
14. Pula (2005), op. cit., p. 7.
15. Authors interview with Linda Gusia, Pristina, 25 November 2010.
16. Incidentally, it is worth noting that the parallel institutions and the local
organisations that were set up by those Kosovo Serbs who remained
in Kosovo were not viewed by foreign donors as civil society, nor was a
positive potential attached to them.
17. Authors interview with Lirije Ajeti, Head of Department of NGOs Registration,
Pristina, 20 December 2010.
18. E. Skendaj (2008) Creating Mechanisms for Cooperation between Civil
Society and the Government, in UNDP Kosovo, op. cit., p. 87.
19. OSCE (2000) Registered NGOs in Kosovo Invited to General Meeting, Press
Release, Pristina, 24 February.
20. UNMIK, Kosovo Transitional Council, UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet, available at
www.unmikonline.org (accessed on 26 November 2010).
 Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica 133

21. M. Brand (2003) The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of
Authority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government (Geneva: Center for Applied
Studies in International Negotiations).
22. I. Deda. (2009) Kosovo Final Report, in Freedom House, Nation in Transit
2009 (New York: Freedom House), pp. 2823.
23. Advocacy Training and Resource Center (2009) Third Sector Development
in Kosovo: Challenges and Opportunities, Pristina, available at www.
euclidnetwork.eu (accessed on 20 December 2010).
24. The phenomenon is not without precedents: some of the first independent
CSOs, such as the KMDLNJ, were in fact large-scale network organisations.
Among those set up after the war, one may remember the Kosova Womens
Network (KWN) and the Kosovo Youth Network (KYN). More recent exam-
ples are advocacy coalitions such as FOL 08, KDI and Cohu.
25. D. Tafallari. (2008) Civil Society Coordination in Kosovo, in UNDP Kosovo,
op. cit., p. 99.
26. See Assembly of Kosovo, Law No. 03/L-134 on Freedom of Association in
Non-governmental Organisations, available at www.assemblyofkosovo.org
(accessed on 23 December 2010).
27. G. Symonds. (2010) Trust me, Im an International: On the Relationship
between Civil Society and International Community in Kosovo, Discussion
Paper (Pristina: FOL Levizja).
28. See the chapter by Stephanie Schwander-Sievers in this volume.
29. Authors interview with EULEX officers, Pristina, 20 October 2009.
30. Besides VETVENDOSJE!, there are the Kosovo-based Cohu, INPO and Zgjohu,
the Albanian Mjaft!, the Presevo-based KDNj, the Montenegrin Unitas and
then a host of organisations such as Klubi Kombetar Shqiptar, Shoqata
Cameria, Albanian Students Abroad Network (ASAN), Ne Dobi te Gruas
Shqiptare, Qendra Shqiptare per Zhvillim dhe Integrim, Levizja Studentore e
Vlores, Rrjeti Rinor i Kosoves and Une Gruaja.
31. For example, the Tirana-based Instituti Antonio Gramshi, the Skopje-
based cultural circle Sindikata, the Klubi i Patrioteve te Rinj, the Tifozat
Kuq e Zi.
32. Authors interviews with Avni Zogiani and Arber Zaimi, Pristina, 26
November 2010.
33. For instance, on 11 October 1991, the Coordination Council of all the
Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia, grouping delegations of 11 parties
from Kosovo, Macedonia and Sandjak, met in Pristina to adopt a declaration
envisaging political options that were contingent on the unpredictable out-
come of the Yugoslav spasms. The arguments put forth in that declaration
do not differ considerably from those that one can find in some declara-
tions by RrOSh. See Dclaration Politique, Kosova: Bullettin du Ministre de
lInformation de la Republique de Kosove, 1, 10 December 1991.
34. According to polls, a significant part of public opinions in Kosovo and
Albania is at ease with the idea of the union between Kosovo and Albania.
See GALLUP Balkan Monitor 2010, available at http://www.balkan-monitor.eu
(accessed on 26 November 2010).
35. ORA could be considered a political formation with social-democratic
leanings. Its agenda was centred on rule of law, employment and youth
problems, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration.
134 Nationalism and CSOs in Post-Independence Kosovo

36. J. Narten (2009) Dilemmas of Local Ownership. The Case of Post-War

Kosovo, in R. Paris and T. Sisk (eds) The Dilemmas of Peacebuilding: Confronting
the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge), p. 273.
37. R. Belloni and B. Hammer (2009) Bosnia Herzegovina: Constructing Civil
Society under a Semiprotectorate, in T. Paffenholtz (ed.) Civil Society and
Peacebuiling: A Critical Assessment (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), pp. 12952.
38. USAID (2008) Kosovo Civil Society Program, Final Evaluation Report
(Washington, DC: USAID), p. 6.
7
The Diaspora Dilemma: Croatian
American Civil Society Institutions
and their Political Role in the
Democratisation of the Homeland
Anita Brkanic

Increasing democratisation in social and economic processes is often

defined as key for the growth and sustainability of civil society. Likewise,
a strong and well-developed civil society is seen as the basis for democ-
racy.1 But are civil society and democratisation two sides of the same
coin? Do civil society organisations (CSOs) serve as catalysts or do their
activities function as impediments to democratisation? This chapter will
give an insight into the answer to this question by looking at Croatian
CSOs formed in the Diaspora and their contributions in the area of
democratisation in the homeland (for purposes of clarity, Diaspora is
used to refer to the Croatian Diaspora specifically, while diaspora is used
as the more general term). It will briefly introduce Croatias civil society
sector and then move into analysing political roles of Croatian Diaspora
organisations in the post-Tudman era. Drawing upon experience from
the Croatian Diaspora, the chapter seeks to take a more critical view of
the cross-border role of diasporic CSOs in the democratisation processes
in their homeland. By doing so it also recognises the importance of
spatiality in the process of democratisation acknowledging the intricate
networks that exist between an increasingly transnational civil society
and the state.
There is a growing recognition among scholars that free and fair elec-
tions alone are far from enough to sustain a stable democracy. They need
to be accompanied by equally vital principles important for democracy
consolidation such as the rule of law, a party system and property rights
enforced by an independent judiciary, an efficient and transparent
bureaucracy as well as institutions promoting and safeguarding human
rights.2 Diaspora politics may affect these elements of democracy in dif-
ferent ways, either by moving the process of democratisation forward
135
136 The Diaspora Dilemma

or by standing in its way. This chapter seeks to shine empirical light on

this phenomenon, using post-1990 Croatia as its point of focus, sup-
porting the claim that diasporas role is not always straightforward3 and
that they can often act as a hindrance to democratisation processes. The
chapter focuses on the activities and rhetoric of Diaspora organisation
in conflict with some of the key principles of democracy, including the
continuous controversies associated with the Croatian Diaspora in rela-
tion to fair elections and voting rights. In relation to this, the chapter
will also examine the role of the Croatian Diaspora in current issues and
debates regarding human rights, justice and accountability in the con-
text of Croatias EU accession path. This chapter will argue that, due to
the often pernicious ethnic feelings that persist in some Diaspora organi-
sations, diasporic CSOs in general and Croatian Diaspora organisations
in particular, through following their principles and guidelines, often
slow down the process of democratisation in their home country.
The prevailing argument in political science has long been that eth-
nic diversity and strong ethnic nationalisms serve as obstacles to stable
democracy.4 Although this chapter does not claim that ethnicity has a
direct influence on democracy, it does support the argument that it can
affect democracy in an indirect way, by influencing other aspects such as
the strength or weakness of civil society, economic growth, government
performance, the levels of instability and violence, as well as institutional
design. Previous research suggests that ethnic diversity can interfere
with the levels of aggregate economic growth rates and that it is linked
to poorer governmental performance and weakened provision of public
goods.5 The Croatian case demonstrates that the presence of strong
ethnic feelings ultimately shapes the activity of some Diaspora organisa-
tions, even in the context of Europeanisation, another parallel external
element of democratisation.
As context for this chapters analysis of Croatian Diasporas recent
role in the politics of its homeland and its impact on democratisa-
tion, the following two sections will provide a summary of Croatias
civil society sector development and a concise and targeted outline of
Croatian Diasporas political engagement in the 1990s.

Civil society sector in Croatia

Civil society in Croatia, a post-war and transitional country, is a rela-

tively new phenomenon, obstructed largely by Croatias half a century-
long exposure to Communism and undemocratic political climate. In
2009, there were more than 37,000 registered CSOs in Croatia, including
 Anita Brkanic 137

non-governmental organisations (NGOs), sports and religious organisa-

tions.6 Croatian civil society started evolving during the war in the early
1990s, encouraged largely by the support of foreign institutions and
donors. The development of civil society in Croatia also depended on
transforming the climate of compliance and apathy into civil engage-
ment and improving access to one of the fundamental human rights
freedom of association.7 The literature on civil society in late 1990s
Croatia identifies a number of problems of civil society development,
some of which are still relevant today. These included inadequate funds
for sustainable development, lack of professionalism and trained leader-
ship, limited organisational transparency and membership levels, poor
networking, and a low level of cooperation between the organisations
themselves and with the population.8 In 2001, the main negative aspects
facing the development of civil society in Croatia included the space in
which CSOs operated as defined by the legislative, political and socio-
cultural framework. This was caused by negative attitudes on the part of
government, low respect for the contribution of CSOs in the policy-
making process and a lack of real corporate social responsibility.9
The legal framework for the civil society sector in Croatia underwent
improvements as a result of the progress achieved in the countrys EU
accession process.10 Although citizen participation was on the rise in
2004, the lack of widespread and active membership of CSOs and the
low levels of civic engagement was still a key concern. Another criti-
cal issue was a low level of trust among CSOs (reflecting the situation
in the Croatian society as a whole) often resulting in poor networking
and insufficient cooperation among them. Specific CSO networks and
groups often aligned with political parties, with almost no cooperation
existing across party lines.11 Further hindrances included uneven geo-
graphical distribution of CSOs, continued lack of financial resources,
and fragmented and unsystematic dialogue between the state and
the CSOs.12
The future of civil society in Croatia depended on the development
of an overall strategy for strengthening CSOs in Croatia, which would
boost the level of trust among them as well as increase their legiti-
macy as relevant stakeholders in the developmental processes of the
country,13 including democratisation. The adoption of policy docu-
ments such as the National Strategy for the Creation of an Enabling
Environment for Civil Society Development (2006), the Operational
Plan for Implementation of the Civil Society Strategy (20072011), and
the Code of Good Practices in Public Financing of NGOs (2007) were
the first systematic steps towards the formation of an institutional and
138 The Diaspora Dilemma

legal outline with an aim to strengthen CSOs in Croatia. This reform

aimed to help develop a democratic society based on participative
democracy.14 To this end, the introduction of the Code of Consultation
(2009) further advanced the legal, institutional and financial structures
for CSOs in Croatia and improved the transparency of government
grant making.15 One of the main objectives of this reform was to further
enhance civic participation through a systemic civil dialogue between
all relevant partners.16
After a decade of supporting Croatias civil society, focusing on grant
making and advocacy, organisational capacity, financial sustainability
and the legislative framework, the Academy for Educational Development
(AED) finally ended their project in 2007 stating that the civil society
sector in Croatia matured from nascent to sustainable.17
Two decades into the emergence of civil society in Croatia, financial
viability, although greatly improved since the early 1990s, continues
to be one of the main obstacles to sustainability of CSOs in Croatia.18
Geographical disparity is also still visible today as most Croatian CSOs
continue to operate from Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek. Low level of
membership and distrust towards CSOs by both the government and
the public remain some of the weaknesses of Croatias CSOs today.19
The current New Model of the Organisational Structure for the Civil
Society Development in Croatia, which governs the relationship between
the government of Croatia and civil society today, is made up of the
Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs, which was set up in
1998; the Council for Civil Society Development, which serves as an
advisory body to the government; and the National Foundation for Civil
Society Development (NFCSD). The NFCSD is a public foundation estab-
lished in 2003 that acts both as a capacity-building and a grant-making
facility to CSOs. It is funded mainly by the state lottery, but also from
the Croatian state budget and some foreign donors.20 However, as result
of the EU pre-accession process, Croatia underwent an important shift in
the international scene with regards the development cooperation. As of
January 2012 Croatia is no longer just the recipient of overseas develop-
ment assistance. It is also an official donor; although, as a relatively small
country, it is for the time being identified as a small player with only a
limited number of resources available for development cooperation. This
transition process from recipient to donor is assisted by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), which provides support to Croatia for
building national capacities for development and cooperation.21
In light of these changes, Beovan and Matancevic identify a number
of strengths of CSOs in Croatia today. These include the availability
 Anita Brkanic 139

of a diverse and multi-annual financing, which contributes to the

sustainability of organisations and a gradual, though still insufficient,
strengthening of volunteer networks in major CSO hubs. Additional
positive steps include an increased level of cooperation between local
authorities and CSOs and regular, albeit superficial, reports on the work
of Croatian civil society by the Croatian media. Also, the fact that a lot
of emphasis has recently been put on the importance of civil society by
various EU programmes further contributes to strengthening the role of
CSOs in Croatia.
As stressed by Beovan and Matancevic, a key next step for future positive
changes is to strengthen the civil society volunteer networks by developing
sustainable programmes that encourage the participation of volunteers.
There is also a need to further strengthen the cooperation between CSOs
and local as well as regional actors, including the EU, in order to increase
the level of CSO influence on both local and regional scenes.22
The focus of this chapter are organisations formed in the Diaspora
and triggered by the advent of Croatian independence in the early
1990s when, prompted by the events taking place at home, the Croatian
Diaspora representatives in the US stressed the importance of creating
a united Croatian front. The united front was formed in January 1994
through the founding of the National Federation of Croatian Americans
(NFCA), an umbrella organisation linking ten major Croatian American
organisations and several hundred individual members. It defines its aim
as strengthening the many cultural, educational, humanitarian, public
relations, social and political activities important to the Croatian com-
munity in the US. The NFCA was instrumental in ensuring the US sup-
port for Croatias eventual membership of NATO through lobbying for
the enactment of the so-called Croatian Amendment the Amendment
to the 1997 Foreign Appropriations Bill. The organisation defines itself
as a non-governmental, non-profit entity, and engages in political and
lobbying activities.23 The international Croatian World Congress, also
the focus of this chapter, was formed in 1993 as a non-profit, non-
governmental and non-party international organisation, and according
to its mission statement aims to unite and network Croatian associations
and institutions throughout the world so as to assist in their successful
functioning and to promote Croatian heritage worldwide.24

Croatian diasporas political role in the 1990s

Croatia has played an important role in all forms of emigration flows

in almost all periods of the last few centuries. It is often stressed that
140 The Diaspora Dilemma

Croatia had the greatest emigration rate in the world, after Ireland.25
According to a number of demographic estimates, more than one-third
of Croatians live abroad the majority of them having settled in the
United States. Transnational engagement of Diaspora communities
has played an important political role in the creation of independent
Croatia their engagement significantly helped the electoral campaign
of Franjo Tudman, the late founder and first president of the Republic of
Croatia.26 For their efforts they were awarded an unparalleled position of
privilege, including unique voting rights and leading political positions.
A number of Croatian emigrants, many of them former political migrs,
assumed key political roles in the new Croatian government. Their
influence was most evident in the early days of the Croatian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, one-fifth of which was composed of Diaspora representa-
tives. Dozens of ambassadors, ministers and their advisors (including the
Ministry of Information; the Ministry for Return and Immigration; the
Ministry of Defense; the Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Transportation
and Communications; and the Ministry of Environment), MPs, political
secretaries, directors of Croatian Homeland Foundation and political
party leaders, to list only a few, were also former members of the Croatian
Diaspora. Further, the Diaspora was given an unprecedented represen-
tation in the Croatian Parliament, with as many as 12 parliamentary
seats (out of 127), more than what was given to Croatias own ethnic
minorities. The number has since gradually been reduced to three,
but the voice of the Croatian Diaspora, albeit controversial, remains
influential.27

Diaspora civil society organisations: For better

or for worse?

Transnational networks of civil society groups, including organisations

formed by diaspora members, are growing in size, number and influ-
ence across the globe. The increasingly vocal political role played by
the Croatian Diaspora organisations detailed in this chapter illustrates
the growing impact of cross-border diasporic networks and campaigns
aimed at influencing both global as well as home-country politics. The
increased influence is due to the creation of more sophisticated organi-
sations, improved communication links between diaspora members
settled in various host countries as well as the ever increasing contact
between the institutions of the various national groups.28 Through
their trans-state networks they have an increased potential not only
to affect political life in their home countries more generally but also
 Anita Brkanic 141

democratisation processes in particular. Unfortunately, despite numerous

important empirical studies on these subjects, a more detailed analysis
of the role of diasporas is yet to be included into the larger body of
democratisation literature. This is consistent with the fact that external
involvement in democratisation processes is the least theorised dimen-
sion in the transition literature. The literature on such external fac-
tors has flourished since Huntingtons introduction of the third wave
metaphor where he defines democratisation as a global process that has
evolved over three, long-term successive waves, the third one starting
in the mid-1970s and continuing through the 1990s with the end of
the Cold War.29 Whitehead observes that, while political conditional-
ity can also be found as linked to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), the Commonwealth, the Pacific Island Forum and the United
Nations, the most compelling example of external conditionality in the
last 20 years has been provided by the EU.30 In its bid to join the EU,
Croatia, like any other aspiring EU member country, must satisfy the
Copenhagen criteria which require that a state has stable institutions
guaranteeing democratic governance and human rights, a functioning
market economy and that it accepts the obligations and intent of the
EU.31 In view of the legacy of the 1990s, ensuring respect for fundamental
human rights has proven to be the most complex element of the EU
accession process throughout the Balkan region.
Recent literature on Diaspora Politics challenges the reactionary nature
of diaspora communities. In his observations, Lyons goes as far as defin-
ing diasporas as peacemakers, stating diaspora politics plays increasingly
important roles in promoting lasting stability and sustainability of the
peace process.32 Zunzer observes that there is no evidence that diaspora
communities structurally develop a more conservative perspective on
politics in general or on the state of affairs in their home country.33
Further, it is claimed that, by preserving livelihoods and maintaining
vital services in countries emerging from or still experiencing conflicts
(e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Somalia,
Liberia, Congo, Cote dIvoire, West Bank and Gaza, Haiti and others),
remittances can be seen as a sine qua non for peace and rebuilding.34
However, the Croatian case demonstrates that deep-rooted suspicion
and widespread negative perceptions about diasporas continue to be
very well represented in societies.35 These views include arguments high-
lighting a more radical side of diaspora communities, emphasising those
that support insurgent movements and engage in, long distance nation-
alism.36 As noted by Werbner, diasporas freely, endorse and actively,
support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements.37
142 The Diaspora Dilemma

Despite the plethora of work on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, there

are very few sustained attempts at identifying external factors that
played a role in the violent conflicts that tore it apart. The power
and influence of diaspora communities, for example, remains under-
researched. However, works by Stacy Sullivan and Paul Hockenos expand
our understanding of the Balkan Wars in that they recognise the impact
of long-distance nationalism as a crucial part of Balkan Wars dynamics.
They expose the degree to which diaspora communities can boost radi-
cal nationalist feelings by supporting and spreading political ideologies,
providing financial assistance, and often the supplies of weapons to
bolster the conflict at home.38
With their political, financial and humanitarian support, the Croatian
Diaspora was critical to the unfolding of the events in Croatia during
the early 1990s and played a crucial role in influencing the international
community and its policy towards the region. Without the absolute
and unreserved support of a large number of members of the Croatian
Diaspora, the independent Croatian state would not have been estab-
lished. Following the declaration of Croatian independence on 25 May
1991, Diaspora Croats organised rallies advocating and urging the recog-
nition of their country. Among the organisers were the Croatian Fraternal
Union, the Croatian Catholic Union as well as the newly formed Croatian
American Association.
Given the nationalist roots of the politically active core of the Croatian
Diaspora, they were the best potential ally for right of centre, anti-
Communist parties. Ever since its beginnings in 1989, in a humble shack
near the Jarun Lake in Zagreb, Tudmans Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ) had strong sympathisers within the Diaspora. Many of them were
political migrs longing for a lost homeland, still affected by their tragic
exile and wishing to redress their historic grievances. HDZ was an openly
nationalist party, the first to discard the official socialist logos and use the
traditional Croatian emblem, outlawed under the Yugoslavian regime.39
The prominence of Diasporas role in Tudmans political agenda becomes
evident as early as late 1980s when he embarked on his visits to the
Diaspora in Canada, the United States of America and Europe, gradually
expanding the HDZ network. In February 1990 the Diaspora united in
their support for the HDZ at the HDZs first party congress in Zagreb.
By that time Tudmans party reportedly had 250,000 followers in the
former Yugoslavia and another 30,000 overseas.40 Like fire or wind
on the savannah, the HDZ spread throughout the world.41 Trans-state
engagement of the Croatian Diasporic communities in the United States
 Anita Brkanic 143

lead to $4 million being collected for Tudmans electoral campaign. The

conflict further generated an unparalleled boost in financial support and
humanitarian activity, with the Diaspora making significant donations
in an effort to help the situation in their homeland. Croatian cultural,
educational as well as political organisations jointly participated in the
humanitarian campaign, sending millions of dollars to Croatia as direct
monetary contributions. The Croatian National Bank records show that,
through the Croatian Investment Fund alone, the Croatian Diaspora
invested approximately $151 million. An additional amount between
$300 and $600 million was invested through individual investments and
investments into Croatian banks in the 1990s. Further, Croatian organi-
sations engaged in sending hundreds of tons of food, medicine, uniforms
for the Croatian soldiers, and help for children who had lost their fathers
in the war. Young men and women, who had previously never been to
Croatia, left their homes in the US, Canada, Australia, South America and
Europe to defend their homeland. In 1990 approximately 100 New York
Croatians arrived in Croatia and joined the Croatian Army as volunteers.
A great number of them also took up positions at the Croatian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.42 Former Croatian members of French Foreign Legion
(including Ante Gotovina, a former Croatian Army general who is cur-
rently standing trial at The Hague Tribunal) contributed to the advance-
ment of the Croatian military and police forces.
Often perceived by their co-ethnics in Croatia as right-wing fanatics
and foolish idealists dwelling on romanticised ideas of their ancestral
homeland, Diaspora Croats report encountering resentment, ambivalence
and hostility at home.43 Croats in the Diaspora point out the unfriendly
attitude of the Croatian government towards potential returnees as well as
the current Croatian electoral law, which prevents the Croatian Diaspora
from participating in Croatian elections and politics in any mean-
ingful way.44 In an interview for the Croatian Radio show Bridges,
Homeland and Diaspora, Niko oljak, the President of the Croatian
World Congress, warns that the prevailing feeling today among the
Diaspora is that they are largely alienated, even more so today than
before the 1990s. Members of the Diaspora find it hard to accept that
they are, discarded by the country that they helped so much, the coun-
try that would perhaps never be here today had there not been for the
Diaspora.45 At home, Diaspora Croats are often portrayed in unfavour-
able light and referred to by some Croatian media as hard-core nation-
alists, political/economic opportunists or high-minded idealists out
of touch with modern Croatia.46 It is often stressed in the homeland,
144 The Diaspora Dilemma

particularly by those critical of the HDZ, that despite the political frag-
mentations within the Croatian Diaspora, Diaspora Croats have histori-
cally been loyal to only one political party and have consistently voted
for the HDZ both during and after Tudman.
The literature on democratisation has traditionally characterised strong
ethnic feelings as one of the main obstacles to democracy, highlight-
ing the unsettling potential of ethnic passions and thus arguing that
civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, is the basis for stable
democracy.47 The third wave of democratisation48 brought to the fore
the role of ethnicity in democratisation, as democratic processes spread
to countries more substantially divided along national lines. The stand-
ard view, formulated well before the third wave emerged and reflected
in the works of John Stuart Mill, was that ethnic diversity and strong
ethnic nationalisms constitute major obstacles to the construction of
stable democracies. Rabushka and Shepsle49 argued that the two were
irreconcilable while Dahls view was more moderate but still supported
the argument that ethnic cleavages posed a threat to democracy. Others
linked strong ethnic feelings to extremist ideologists of the right, inter-
preting them as intrinsically anti-democratic, often resulting in milita-
rism and violence.50
The Croatian case demonstrates that potentially harmful outbursts
of ethnic passions and strong ethnic feelings, evident from Croatian
Diasporas voting preferences and their views regarding particular politi-
cal debates in Croatia, can indeed pose as obstacles to democratic proc-
esses in the home country. The following sections will focus on the
political activities and rhetoric of Croatian Diaspora organisations that
often clash with some of the key principles of democracy, including the
ongoing controversy in relation to fair elections and voting rights. The
chapter will also examine the role of the Diaspora in a number of recent
debates regarding human rights, justice and accountability in the context
of Croatias path towards the EU, and its impact on democratisation.

Diaspora and key principles of democracy

Voting rights and fair elections

Croats, no matter where they live in the word, have the right to vote in
Croatian elections. After the establishment of the independent Croatian
state, the newly adopted Constitution and Citizenship Law entitled
a great number of Croats to Croatian citizenship. A special Diaspora
Constituency was created allowing Croatian citizens residing outside
Croatia to vote in the elections.51 Political activity of the Croatian
 Anita Brkanic 145

Diaspora has been a contested topic since the beginning of the 1990s,
spurring heated political debates among both Croatian politicians and
Diaspora representatives, particularly with regards to Diaspora voting
preferences. It is a well-known public secret that most of the Diaspora
vote for the HDZ the party founded in 1989 by late President Tudman.
Consequently, Tudmans party has won every parliamentary seat from the
Diaspora Constituency in every election since Croatias independence. The
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observes
that in October 1995 elections for the lower house of parliament
90.02 per cent of participating Diaspora voters supported the ruling
HDZ.52 Research suggests that the absolute Diaspora support for HDZ was
the result of a powerful political mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora
by Tudman and his supporters, ensuring Diaspora loyalty, support and
long-term commitment.
The OSCE also expressed serious concerns in connection with the 1995
elections, noting, the inability of election monitors, including political
party representatives, to oversee out-of country voting. There is strong
concern, therefore, about the lack of transparency and potential for
manipulation of the out-of-country vote.53
In their Special 2007 Report on Croatia, the National Endowment for
Democracy observes that

the Diaspora Constituency has become politically controversial. The

challenge ahead lies in balancing several competing factors: As citi-
zens of Croatia, Diaspora voters have a legitimate claim to a vote in
Croatian elections. As a community, they made substantial sacrifices
in the wars leading to Croatian independence. As such, they main-
tain a strong and recent link to Croatia. On the other hand, their
citizenship is based entirely on their ethnicity, not on their current
or former residence, as many have never lived in what is Croatia
today.54

The aforesaid controversy remains one of the most heavily debated

issues in Croatian politics that is, the fact that the citizenship of many
current Diaspora voters is based on their ethnicity, rather than their
current or former residence. The majority of those granted Croatian
citizenship is based in Bosnia-Herzegovina and many are also citizens
of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have never resided in Croatia proper. The
HDZ, heavily supported by the Diaspora, continues to shield the exist-
ing electoral regulations, emphasising the equality of all Croatian citi-
zens before the law. In return, this solidified HDZs political capital and
146 The Diaspora Dilemma

maintained their electoral advantage. For instance, Croatian Diaspora

voters are concentrated in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was
often emphasised by the opposition that the 400,000 strong Croatian
Diaspora eventually decided the very tight race in the 2007 elections in
favour of the HDZ and Ivo Sanader who served as the Prime Minister of
Croatia from 2003 to 2009.
Overseas Croatian Diaspora organisations continue to urge the Croatian
government to consider introducing reforms to the present allocation of
seats to Diaspora representatives in the Parliament. Their main concerns
are caused by the fact that the current electoral law consolidates the votes
of the Diaspora, effectively giving preference to Croats living in Bosnia,
who are the most numerous. Consequently, Croats living outside Croatia
and Bosnia are left without representation in the Parliament. This has
been voiced on numerous occasions by the NFCA.55
Diaspora Croats, having wielded considerable political and economic
influence in Croatia, see the Diaspora as a co-founder of independent
Croatia and no less a constituent part of the Croatian nation than their
co-ethnics in Croatia. For these reasons they feel entitled to full voting
rights, a representation in the Croatian Parliament that mirrors that of
the 1990s and a strong voice in the political life of Croatia. The senti-
ments expressed by Croatian Diaspora organisations examined in this
chapter are an example of the increasingly vocal role transnational
actors can play through their continuous cross-border influence on
the political life in their homeland in general and democratisation in
particular.

Diasporas influence on Croatias current human rights record

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, together with the
principle of holding periodic and genuine elections by universal suf-
frage are essential elements of democracy. The next part of the chapter
will illustrate how Diasporas political influence in Croatia direct
and indirect through voting, campaigning, financing and lobbying,
can in certain instances put some of these key democratic principles
at risk.
One of the Copenhagen EU membership criteria requires the candi-
date country to achieve, stability of institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities.56 It is important to stress that Croatia is the first country
in the process of accession to the EU which has to address the prob-
lem of impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The way
the problem is approached by the Croatian authorities and the EU will
 Anita Brkanic 147

set a precedent for other former Yugoslav countries and could serve as
a constructive model on how to deal with the war crimes legacy in other
post-conflict countries. And if the battle against impunity for war crimes
fails in Croatia, then in other countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the battle will be lost before it has even started.
A number of international and local NGOs are concerned that the
lack of political will in Croatia to deal with the legacy of the war creates
an atmosphere in which prosecution of war crimes cases is unpopular.
Unfortunately, a number of Croatian Diaspora NGOs support and advo-
cate the status quo. Croatia has had to extradite several of its citizens to
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
an issue that was often contentious in domestic politics and one that
has raised heated debates with the Diaspora. The human rights debate
in the Diaspora has mostly been centred around Ante Gotovina, former
Lieutenant General of the Croatian Army who served in the 19915 war
in Croatia, and was indicted for war crimes in 2001 by the ICTY. In April
2011, Gotovina was given a 24-year sentence by the UN war crimes
tribunal in The Hague. Despite the conviction, he remains a hero to a
number of umbrella organisations in the Diaspora.
The foreign policy of the Croatian government, especially the issue of
cooperation with the ICTY, has deeply divided Croats in the USA. On
one side are organisations such as the Croatian American Association
(CAA), the Croatian Worldwide Association (CWA) and the Croatian
Catholic Union of the USA, who openly express dissatisfaction, while
on the other side are the Croatian Fraternal Union and the NFCA who
work well with the Government and its diplomatic representatives in
the US.
The CWA describes itself as a non-party, non-profit organisation
that strives to promote democratic values and principles in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, working for truth, justice and peace. CWA
defines its mission as profoundly democratic and patriotic. Their task
is defined as working towards a democratic and free Croatia, protect-
ing Croatias national sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Croatian
War of Independence, as well as sponsoring domestic reform in order
to create a viable, strong and prosperous democratic republic.57 CWAs
current and rather controversial goal is to display support for Croatian
Generals, to show the world we have not forgotten these brave heroes
who so graciously defended Croatia from aggression and occupation
of the Yugoslav/Serbian army. This includes expressing solidarity and
support for the release of Croatian General Ante Gotovina and all other
148 The Diaspora Dilemma

Croatian generals indicted at The Hague at the time. Their 2005 public
statement reads:

We cannot and must not wait a minute longer for others to rewrite
our proud history. It has been well over four years since the Generals
indictment and we must join together and defeat the bogus policies
implemented by the U.S. State Department, the European Union and
the United Nations.58

One year after the arrest and extradition of General Gotovina the CWA
held a rally in support of him at The Hague. More than 12,000 Croats
around the world signed the Free Ante Gotovina Internet petition.59
The Croatian World Congress (CWC), which presents itself as, the
authentic voice of the Croatian Diaspora, is defined as a non-profit,
non-governmental and non-party international organisation that enjoys
advisory status as a member of the United Nations. According to the
CWC mission statement, the Congress works in the interests of both the
Croatian Homeland and its Diaspora.60 The Croatian World Congress
was also particularly outspoken in the Gotovina case in their unfailing
support of the Croatian General. In 2002, in their letter to Carla Del
Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY at the time, they expressed their
deep dismay at his indictment, further stating that the CWC firmly
believes that General Gotovina is innocent of the charges [that] have
[been] levelled against him but believes that if the ICTY Prosecutor
insists on Gotovinas prosecution, the US officials should be prosecuted
as well. The letter urges Del Ponte to open a criminal investigation into
President Clinton and other top officials of his administration for aiding
and abetting the indicted Croatian General.61
Another vocal political debate within the Diaspora involves another
key Croatian figure, General Branimir Glava, also a Member of the
Croatian Parliament from 1995 to 2010. Branimir Glava was one of the
founding fathers of Tudmans Party and was present at the secret meeting
in Zagreb in 1989 at the founding of the HDZ, the same party Croatian
Diaspora has been loyal to for nearly two decades. In 2009 the Zagreb
District Court found him guilty of torture and murder of Serbian civilians
and sentenced him to ten years in prison. When the criminal case against
him was initiated in 2006, Glava lost his political immunity and was
detained due to the possible risk of tampering with witnesses. The CWA
(jointly with Croatian Radio Melbourne Australia) immediately started an
online petition for his release.62
 Anita Brkanic 149

The Free Branimir Glava Petition, the preamble of which describes

him as a hero, stated: We the undersigned Citizens of the republic of
Croatia and Croatians Worldwide plead to prevent the death of one
more of our Croatian war veterans. However the outcome of the courts,
General Branimir Glava should be freed to prepare his defense. After his
release, the Petition website stated: As a result of all our voices around
the world General Glava has been freed from jail and is in Hospital.
It goes to show that if we yell loud enough from every corner we will
be heard.63
On May 2009, the day the verdict was announced, the accused fled to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the citizenship of which he acquired in the mean-
time and where he has been residing since. In 2010, when the sentence
for Glava was confirmed by a court in Bosnia-Herzegovina, upholding
a Croatian courts earlier verdict, he was ejected from the Croatian
Parliament, stripped of his wartime medals and rank, and subsequently
jailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
No state can claim to be a democracy without respect for and protec-
tion of fundamental rights and freedoms of people. The lack of political
will to end the culture of impunity and bring justice and accountabil-
ity for past crimes and human rights abuses cannot be allowed in any
democratic society. Ante Cuvalo points out that there are no significant
efforts on the part of the diaspora to put pressure on the ruling elite in
the homeland to steer the national ship in a different direction. The
Diaspora voices that do get heard are not visible witnesses to the higher
ideals of democracy and civil society.64

Conclusion

The influence of external actors to democratisation processes is con-

siderable. After six years of preparations marred by slow democratic
reforms, Croatia is to join the EU in 2013. The role of the European
Union and the Copenhagen EU membership criteria insisting on stabil-
ity of institutions guaranteeing democracy has been significant. But we
have seen that political roles of other transnational networks, including
civil society groups and diaspora organisations, are also growing both in
the ongoing global and regional spheres. Some research suggests that, by
nature, diasporas are neither innocent nor subversive political actors,
almost always directing their energy at positive enterprises and serve as
bridges between cultures, societies, and states.65 A number of Croatian
Diaspora NGOs pride themselves in working to promote democratic
150 The Diaspora Dilemma

values and principles in the homeland, with a goal of serving the best
interests of both Croatians at home and their co-ethnics abroad. But
are civil society development and democratisation indisputably parallel
processes? The aim of this chapter was to present a more balanced view
of diaspora engagement in homeland affairs and to show that, while
diasporas are often a vital factor in the complex political transformation
of their homelands, their role cannot always be viewed as beneficial to
democracy. Fiona Adamson points out, Diasporas, ultimately, are politi-
cal constituencies. As such, they are open to political mobilisation by
a variety of actors, both state and non-state.66 The aim of this chapter
was to expose the contested nature of Croatian Diaspora politics and
offer examples of how diaspora CSOs, while presenting their objectives
as pro-democratic, can often serve as roadblocks in some of the most
problematic areas of the democratic process at home. The legacy of the
past, and of the 1990s in particular, including a strong emphasis on
ethnic belonging, is still a major influence in some Croatian Diaspora
organisations political decisions, including voting preferences, lobby-
ing, advocacy, advising and media work in their attempts at influencing
politics at home as well as putting pressure on other external actors. We
have seen that, in some particular instances, diaspora organisations can
act as democracy wreckers as opposed to democracy builders.
The correlation between ethnic identity and democratisation, as
evidenced by the Croatian case, has somewhat been complicated in
the third wave democratisation processes in that these developments,
on the one hand, sharpened the notion of stateness evident from the
spread of separatist nationalism and the break-up of states in mainly
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, ethnic nation-
alism was seen as a mobilisation tool and a way to escape foreign
domination (as was the sentiment in 1990s Croatia), paving the way
to democracy.67
Strong ethnic feelings, observed in several diasporic entities, do not
affect democratisation directly but do so through their interaction with
other elements crucial to democratic processes, including the strength
or weakness of civil society but also other factors detailed earlier such
as economic growth, government performance, levels of violence and
institutional design.68 Certain Croatian Diaspora groups are identified
as still harbouring the strong passions of the 1990s which continue to
shape the aims and objectives of their CSOs. These continue to have
a damaging effect on democracy in the homeland.
Undeniably, building and developing democracy in societies where
conflict has left a tangible mark is a long and intricate process. Heated
 Anita Brkanic 151

political debates and controversy are inevitable when these marks include
systematic and flagrant violations of human rights, many of them still
unresolved. Croatian Diaspora overseas has often used the cannot see
the forest from the trees metaphor in their claims that participating in
Croatian political life from afar enables them to do it from an unbiased,
fair and balanced perspective a privilege, according to them, unavail-
able to Croats in Croatia or those in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the
controversy that overshadows some of their political actions confirms
Adornos observation that distance is not a safety zone, but a field of
tension.69 Further research is needed to explore how to tap the enormous
potential diasporas possess and turn them into agents for democratic
reform in their home country where they can help assist in building the
foundations of a stable and functioning democracy.

Notes
1. R. D. Putnam (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 258.
2. S. OHalloran, D. Epstein and B. Leventoglu (2004) Minorities and
Democratization, Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Meetings
(New York: Columbia University), p. 22.
3. T. Lyons (2004) Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming
Hawks into Doves (Washington, DC: Institute of Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, George Mason University).
4. M. R. Beissinger (2008) A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratisation,
Journal of Democracy, 19(3), pp. 8597.
5. Beissinger (2008), op. cit., p. 1; W. Easterly and R. Levine (1997) Africas
Growth Tragedy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 120350.
6. USAID (2010) The 2009 NGO Sustainability Index, available at www.usaid.gov
(accessed on 18 September 2010).
7. G. Beovan (2001) Croatian Civil Society: On the Path to Becoming a
Legitimate Public Actor. A Preliminary Report on the CIVICUS Index on Civil
Society Project in Croatia, CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper
Series, 1(4), pp. 121.
8. D. Shimkus (1996) Development of the Non-Governmental Sector in Croatia.
16th Organisational Development (Cairo: World Congress); S. Baric (2000)
Pravni sustav suradnje neprofitnih organizacija s vladom i tijelima lokalne samou-
prave i uprave u Republici Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: B.a.B.e.); Beovan (2001), op. cit.
9. Beovan (2001), op. cit., p. 3.
10. USAID (2010), op. cit.
11. CIVICUS (2005) Executive Summary: Civil Society in Croatia: Gaining
Trust and Establishing Partnerships with the State and other Stakeholders,
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Croatia, available at http://www.
civicus.org/new/media/Croatia_country_report_English.pdf (accessed on
8 December 2009).
12. Ibid.
152 The Diaspora Dilemma

13. Ibid.
14. EPHA (2008) European Public Heath Allowance, available at www.epha.org
(accessed on 15 January 2010).
15. USAID (2010), op. cit.
16. EPHA (2008), op. cit.
17. AED (2010) Civil Society: Croatias NGOs Flourishing as CroNGO Program
Ends, available at http://test.aed.org/News/Stories/crongo.cfm (accessed on
9 March 2009).
18. USAID (2010), op. cit.
19. G. Beovan and J. Matancevic (2011) Building Identity: Future Challenges
for CSOs as Professionals in the Societal Arena, CIVICUS Civil Society Index
in Croatia, available at http://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/
croatia%20csi%20analytical%20country%20report.pdf (accessed on 8 May
2012).
20. Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN), available at http://
www.balkancsd.net/policy-research-analysis/civil-dialogue/national-level/
croatia/420-ii22-state-funding-central-local.html (accessed on 9 May 2012).
21. UNDP (2012) United Nations Development Programme, available at http://
www.undp.hr/show.jsp?page=86021 (accessed on 8 May 2012).
22. Beovan and Matancevic (2011), op. cit.
23. NFCA (2011) National Federation of Croatian Americans, available at www.
croatianworld.net/NFCA/index.htm (accessed on 11 July 2011).
24. CWC (2010) Croatian World Congress, Letter to The Hague, available at www.
studiacroatica.com (accessed on 15 January 2010).
25. I. Cizmic (1996) The Republic of Croatia Mediterranean and Central
European States Emigration and Emigrants from Croatia between 1880
and 1980, GeoJournal: An International Journal on Human Geography and
Environmental Sciences, 38(4), pp. 4316.
26. I. uric (2003) The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic
Solidarity, and the Formation of a Transnational National Community,
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 17(1), pp. 11330.
27. Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (1999)
Article 44, Official Gazette, CXVI.
28. G. Sheffer (2003) Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), p. 207.
29. S. P. Huntington (1993) The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press).
30. L. Whitehead (2001) International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and
the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
31. Europa (1993) Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, available
at www.europarl.europa.eu (accessed on 15 January 2010).
32. Lyons (2004), op. cit., p. i.
33. W. Zunzer (2004) Diaspora Communities and Civil Transformation,
Occasional Paper 26 (Berghof: Research Centre for Constructive Conflict
Management), p. 8.
34. P. W. Fagen and M. N. Bump (2006) Remittances in Conflict and Crises:
How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises and Transitions to Peace
(New York: International Peace Academy), p. i.
35. R. Cohen (1997) Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington Press), pp. 1934.
 Anita Brkanic 153

36. B. Anderson (1998) The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia

and the World (London/New York: Verso).
37. P. Werbner (2002) The Place which is Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion and
Gender in the Making of Chaordic Transnationalism, Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies, 28(1), pp. 11933.
38. S. Sullivan (2004) Be not Afraid for You have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn
Roofer Helped Lure the US into the Kosovo War (New York: St Martins Press);
P. Hockenos (2003) Homeland Calling, Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars
(Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press).
39. Hockenos (2003), op. cit.
40. S. Fisher (2006) Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From
Nationalist to Europeanist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
41. Dalje (2011) If Militia Burst in, We Consider HDZ Founded, available at
www.dalje.com (accessed on 18 July 2010).
42. I. Cizmic, M. Sopta and V. akic (2005) Iseljena Hrvatska (Zagreb: Golden
Marketing Tehnicka Knjiga), p. 464.
43. D. N. Winland (2007) We are Now a Nation: Croats Between Home and
Homeland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 132.
44. NFCA (2005) Newsletter (The Croatian American Advocate, Summer 2005),
available at http://www.nfcaonline.com/NFCA%20Summer%202005%
20VERSION%201.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2009).
45. Croatian Radio (2010) Interview with Niko oljak, Bridges, Homeland and
Diaspora, available at www.hssd.hr (accessed on 18 June 2010).
46. Winland (2007), op. cit.
47. M. R. Beissinger (2007) Ethnic Identity and Democratisation Lessons from
the Post-Soviet Region, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 3(2), pp. 7399. There
are, however, some examples demonstrating that ethnic nationalism is not
necessarily incompatible with liberal democracy as demonstrated by the Baltic
states which relied heavily on ethnic nationalism as their motivating force.
48. Huntington (1993), op. cit.
49. A. Rabushka and K. Shepsle (1972) Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of
Democratic Instability (Columbus, OH: Merrill).
50. H. Kohn (1945) The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan); J. Plamenatz
(1973) Two Types of Nationalism, in E. Kamenka (ed.) Nationalism: The
Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National University
Press), pp. 2236; M. Lipset (1963) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books).
51. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2001) Article 45, Official
Gazette, XLI.
52. OSCE (1997) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Observation Delegation to the
Croatian Presidential Elections 1997, available at www.osce.org (accessed on
15 January 2010).
53. OSCE (1997), op. cit.
54. NED (2007) National Endowment for Democracy, New Borders and Anomalies
in the Balkans: Croatias Diaspora Constituency, available at www.ned.org
(accessed on 18 January 2010).
55. NFCA (2005), op. cit.
56. Europa (2010) Secretariat-General of the European Commission, available at
ec.europa.eu (accessed on 2 March 2010).
154 The Diaspora Dilemma

57. CWA (2010) Croatian Worldwide Association, available at www.croradio.net

(accessed on 28 February 2010).
58. Lijepa Naa Domovina Hrvatska (2005) Home Page, available at www.
lijepanasadomovinahrvatska.com (accessed on 15 January 2010).
59. CroRadio.net (2010a) Free Ante Gotovina Petition, available at http://croradio.
net/gotovina/viewtopic.php?t=7 (accessed on 19 December 2009).
60. CSO Net (2010) Civil Society Network, available at esango.un.org (accessed on
15 February 2010).
61. CWA (2010), op. cit.
62. CroRadio.net (2010b) Petition for General Branimir Glava, available at http://
www.croradio.net/gotovina/viewforum.php?f=21 (accessed on 14 June 2010).
63. CWA (2010b) Croatian Worldwide Association, Petition for General Glava,
available at www.gopetition.com (accessed on 15 January 2010).
64. A. Cuvalo (1999) Triangular Relations: Croatian Diaspora, the U.S.A., and
the Homeland, Conference Paper Croatian Diaspora in the U.S.A. on the Eve
of the Third Millennium (Chicago: The Association for Croatian Studies sym-
posium at Xavier University).
65. Sheffer (2003), op. cit., p. 216.
66. F. Adamson (2007) Diaspora Mobilisation and International Security,
Conference Paper Migration, International Relations, and the Evolution of World
Politics (Centre for Globalization and Governance, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University).
67. Beissinger (2007), op. cit.
68. Beissinger (2007), op. cit.
69. T. W. Adorno (1974) Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London:
Verso), pp. 1267.
8
From Post-Communist to Uncivil
Society in Macedonia
Nenad Markovic

The concept of civil society in post-Communist countries is a prominent

subject in contemporary political science. As well as being drawn to spe-
cific cases of the development of post-Communist civil society, scholars
are also exploring common patterns of behaviour that exist in all post-
Communist countries. Arguably, Macedonia1 fits the emerging picture
of a democratic deficit in the civil sphere in the transitional period. This
democratic deficit can be attributed to a normative interpretation of the
functioning of the NGO sector. However, this only partially explains
the recent development in Macedonias civil society. The analysis of
three main factors general political attitudes, the relation towards mar-
ginalised groups (especially sexual minorities) and the ethnic/religious
barriers and tensions is used here to support the following proposi-
tion: civil society in Macedonia has lately developed intrinsic forms of
uncivil behaviour that prevent it from achieving its role as a promoter
of civil values and dialogue between ideologically opposed political
actors. This occurrence leads to a condition where a part of civil society
in the Republic of Macedonia is moving away from its role as a median
ground for political dialogue and instead moving towards uncivil forms
of behaviour, such as political manipulation, inadequate civil activism
and ethnic or religious agency.
This chapter broadens the scope of the classic understanding of the
term uncivil society, whereby uncivil society implies a type of social
order torn apart by extreme forms of violence.2 It argues that certain
forms of political manipulation, inadequate civil activism and prioritis-
ing as well as ethnic/religious agency, as illustrated by empirical exam-
ples drawn from Macedonia, are also manifestations of uncivil society
as much as violence is. The analysis of these forms of uncivil behaviour
in the past five years identifies the shift to incivility in the Macedonian
155
156 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

civil society behaviour but also tries to redefine the meaning of the term
uncivil society, especially in post-Communist societies. More subtle
and discreet forms than violence, which is in no way excluded, should
be taken into account when assessing the contribution of civil society
to democratisation.

The post-Communist syndrome

Ever since civil society became a widespread catchphrase on both sides

of the Iron Curtain, scholars have tried to explain the shortcomings
of civil society in the (post-)Communist world. The situation seemed
much simpler when Communist elites were still in power due to the
obvious oppressive state/struggling civil society dichotomy. However,
once the situation changed in favour of liberalisation and democratisa-
tion, problems of explication and theory emerged in both a theoretical
and practical sense. A primary reason for this was the diversity of cases
suitable for analysis. A second reason was the diversity of theories and
approaches to civil society as a concept. Regardless of the respective
cases and their particularities, all post-Communist (civil) societies faced
a common problem inasmuch as they have failed to bring about a qual-
itative change in the way politics is conducted.3 A change of regime
obviously did not instantly spur a democratic mindset.
As in other cases, the sudden emergence of the new democratic
regime did not mean an instant revival of the idea of civil society in the
Republic of Macedonia. Ever since its independence from the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in 1991, Macedonian civil society has
struggled to promote itself as a serious political actor. The assertion
of civil society in the country followed independence mostly due to
organisational and financial factors. The Law on citizens associations
and foundations, adopted in 1998, provided a functional and relatively
liberal framework for the functioning of the NGOs in the country, even
though this was by no means a sufficient factor for the development
of the civil society scene.4 Additional push factors were the Kosovo
crisis in 1999, which was managed by international organisations
mostly based in Macedonia, as well as the interethnic armed conflict
in the country in 2001. These events diversified the donors operat-
ing in Macedonia, which included everybody from the Foundation
Open Society Macedonia (FOSM) to United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and covered a much wider range of issues, from
conflict resolution to environment issues. Ever since, civil society in
Macedonia has grown in quantity and quality.5 However, it has also
 Nenad Markovic 157

been accompanied by all respective problems one expects in a post-

Communist environment, such as donor-dependency, weak ties to
other social actors (such as local authorities or the business sector) and
unstable human resources.
This rapid growth of (CSOs) and the social energy they produced
brought with it phenomena all too familiar to other democratising
societies. One of the most comprehensive studies undertaken about
the challenges faced by CSOs in Macedonia was prepared in 2007. The
Study on Transparency, Accountability and the Democratic Capacity of the
Civil Sector in the Republic of Macedonia,6 among many other conclu-
sions, showed that the biggest problem of the civil sector in Macedonia
is sustainability. However, problems such as donor dependency, lack of
public responsibility, a crude and inflexible practice of elite circulation, as
well as very weak human resource capacity do not lag far behind on the
list of challenges in the civil society sector. One point that summarises
the general picture is that the NGOs cannot perceive any instrumental
value in improving their transparency and accountability due to the lack
of public interest.7 Without denying the functional and positive aspects
of civil society activism in Macedonia (good networking, solid financial
working, interest for training and improvements, etc.), the plethora of
challenges that civil society faced, and still faces, highlight the teething
problems associated with organising civil society and civil activism in
Macedonia.
These findings were supported by, and overlapped with, the, Strategy
for Cooperation of the Government and the Civil Sector,8 in which gov-
ernmental experts examined the positive and negative aspects of the
civil sector in the country. Besides the positive findings such as good
representation of different social groups; good networking and support;
awareness on topics such as peace, gender equality and sustainable envi-
ronment; solid dynamics in communication, coordination and coop-
eration; strengthening of human capital the study also raised similar
shortcomings as the previous study. These included the existence of an
urbanrural divide, with extensive concentration of NGOs in the urban
areas; limited self-regulation within the NGO sector; a lesser degree
of internal democracy within the NGO sector; insufficient efforts to
eradicate poverty; a small number of big NGOs with a well-developed
internal structure; insufficient transparency in the work of the NGOs,
especially in financial matters; insufficient and inadequate financial
resources for achieving objectives; foreign donor dependency; and ad
hoc or ambivalent relations between civil sector and other social actors,
especially the business sector.
158 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

It is obvious that both studies have essentially agreed on the main

bottlenecks and challenges in the development of the civic sector in
the Republic of Macedonia. What adds further weight to these findings
is that the studies were prepared by two institutions coming from dif-
ferent segments of society: the government and the non-governmental
sector itself. While these findings are by no means final, recent devel-
opments within the Macedonian civil sector have in fact raised a new
problem: the high potential of both incivility and violence. Neither of
the reports on the weaknesses of civil society captures the emerging
problem of uncivil discourse and practices in the civil society sector in
Macedonia, primarily, as will be shown, because incivility is concen-
trated on violence. Naturally, the question arises as to how this could
possibly occur in the context of a civil society that previously appeared
to be faced with a relatively standard set of structural and organisations
problems.

Roots of incivility

Although Macedonia was a part of the most liberal Communist regime

the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the attitudes of civil soci-
ety in the transitional period displayed the democratic deficit typical in
post-Communist societies. Arguably, in some cases, the manifestation of
the deficit was even more extreme than that found in societies that had
been subject to far more oppressive regimes.9 Many indicators, as will be
shown, support the claim that there has always been the potential for
incivility within Macedonian civil society across a range of issues. This
has been demonstrated by the recent public discourse across at least
three different spheres since 2000: the specific political attitudes of civil
society (political culture); relations and attitudes towards the human
rights of marginal and marginalised social groups; and the attitudes and
toleration shown towards other ethnic and religious communities.
The general political orientations of civil society in Macedonia reflect
a political culture that is caught halfway between the two poles of sub-
missive and fully participatory. According to a public opinion poll exam-
ining the problems of political culture among civil society members,
69 per cent of respondents would choose a good economy over good
democracy, whereas only 21 per cent would choose good democracy
over a good economy.10 Similarly, 41 per cent of people would rather
rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve the countrys problems,
as opposed to the 39 per cent that would rely on a democratic form of
government. Additionally, 47 per cent of people believe that people that
 Nenad Markovic 159

do not succeed in life should blame society, as opposed to 32 per cent

who believe that it is the individuals fault. These indicators clearly
show that the political culture and values of civil society still lean
towards the Communist heritage in at least three different respects. On
the one hand people are ready to trade the quality of democracy for
a better economic standard. This is typical individual/political rights
versus economic well-being trade-off of the Communist regimes. On
the other hand, they would rather invest their political capital in one
person than in building a stable democratic system. This is the Titoistic
legacy in terms of the shadow of a strong leader. Additionally the lack of
individual responsibility for ones actions only supplements the picture
of a political culture still not mature enough to demonstrate personal
accountability. This type of political culture is certainly a good pre-
requisite for a submissive civil society prone to subservient behaviour
vis--vis political elites.
Another point of concern is the attitude of civil society towards cer-
tain vulnerable and marginalised social groups. This was highlighted in
a report, the Youth Aspiration Survey, published in 2006,11 which exam-
ined the attitudes of young adults (aged 18 to 30), and was based on the
presupposition that the young population should be the most liberal
part of the social milieu.12 If that is truly the case, one has to express
severe unease at the results (Table 8.1).
Although some aspects of the social attitudes of the young popula-
tion deserve to be welcomed, especially speaking of social solidarity
towards the handicapped and the poor, other figures highlight a wor-
rying situation. For example, in the case of the gender equality, a vast
proportion of young people believe that women have sufficient rights
(40.6 per cent). Some even support a lessening of the scope of womens
rights (6.1 per cent). The authors of the study explained that this was
due to strongly defined gender roles within the family and society, as
well as a dose of inherited prejudices.13 However, of greater concern is
the fact that a large portion of young Macedonian citizens (22 per cent)
believe that homosexuals have sufficient rights. Although homosexu-
ality has been decriminalised in the country, no further rights have as
yet been promulgated. Furthermore, almost half of the respondents
(49 per cent) would support decrease in the scope of rights of the
homosexual population. This hardly emphasises the liberal capacity of
Macedonian youth or society as a whole. Indeed, it was this very topic
(the rights of sexual minorities), which created one of the main friction
points in the current public discourse, not just in relation between civil
society actors but also between the state and parts of civil society.
160 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

Table 8.1 Attitudes of young people towards certain social groups

Rights Have Rights Dont

should be enough should be know/No
improved rights reduced answer

Rights of women 50% 40.6% 6.1% 5.3%

Rights of minorities 21.5% 47.4% 25.6% 5.6%
Rights of the homosexual 12.6% 22% 49% 16.5%
population
Rights of the handicapped 90% 7.4% 0.9% 1.7%
Rights of the poor 89.2% 6.3% 1.4% 3%

Source: IDSCS and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2006), p. 21, available at http://www.fes.org.
mk/pdf/TheYouthInRM_eng.pdf

The third source of uncivil capacity is the most sensitive one: inter-
religious and interethnic relations in Macedonian society, especially
between the two biggest ethnic groups, the ethnic Macedonians and the
ethnic Albanians. Without wishing to lessen the impact of the armed
conflict that occurred in 2001, the ethnic barriers in the country have
always posed a high risk in terms of instigating uncivil behaviour on all
sides of the ethnic divide. The very fact that ethnic barriers actively exist
in the Macedonian public discourse is easily visible in the public opin-
ion polls that are regularly conducted by the UNDP Office in Skopje.
The statistical indicators included in the Early Warning Report, and its
successor, the People-Centred Analysis, indicate that the two biggest eth-
nic groups have always lived in parallel societies with the occasional risk
of interethnic tension. As the 2009 report stated:

The survey data indicate that ethnic prejudices are widespread

throughout the country. At the same time, as a result of the religious
divide, ordinary citizens from different communities know only a
little of the religious practices of the other community. The situation
is even worse in ethnically unmixed towns in the East and Western
parts of the country, where ethnic groups do not even have a basic
knowledge about one another. That generates many prejudices and
stereotypes between the communities which are barriers to improved
interethnic relations.14

These types of conclusions are based on substantial and extensive

datasets that have been continually produced by the UNDP over the
last decade regarding interethnic relations in the country. From the very
start, some of these indicators have shown a constant trend of ethnic
 Nenad Markovic 161

parallelism.15 This is continuing even after almost a decade since the

interethnic conflict.16 For instance, in the two mixed regions, Polog
(northwest) and Skopje, where Macedonians and Albanians live side by
side, statistics show the highest level of ethnic parallelism in everyday
life. In the Polog region over 70 per cent of the respondents say that
they have very few friends from different ethnic groups. In Skopje this
indicator is over 60 per cent.
Another increasing source of concern is the growing impression across
civil society that there is a risk of renewed interethnic conflict. The data
regarding the perception on the possibility of interethnic conflict would
appear to indicate a very serious situation.17 In some of the ethnically
mixed regions, such as Skopje, close to one quarter of the respondents
say that there is a high risk of ethnic conflict in the country. In some
ethnically homogeneous regions, such as the Vardar region, this number
approaches 30 per cent. In the eastern region, which is also ethnically
homogeneous, the number of respondents who perceive a high prob-
ability of ethnic conflict in the country reaches over 30 per cent.
With these sorts of figures, it is not hard to understand why ethnic
and religious matters can be an explosive issue in Macedonia. Given the
long lasting experience of ethnic parallelism and prejudice, civil society
in the country continues to display a lack of capacity to deal with ethnic
or religious tensions with constant overspill between the two types of
identity tensions.

Uncivil society Beyond violence

Defining the scope of uncivil society seems even harder than defining
the scope of civil society. This is mostly due to the ambiguity of the very
concept of civil society itself. But it is also due to the broad scope of
what uncivil means. Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus that the
concept of uncivil society, according to John Keane, is primarily per-
ceived through presence of violence as the unwanted physical interfer-
ence by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others, which are
consequently made to suffer a series of effects [...].18 Furthermore Keane
notes that all known forms of civil society are plagued by endogenous sources
of incivility [.].19 Although supportive of Keanes argument, Kopeck
sheds new light to this understanding of (un)civil society, arguing that it
is derived from four factors: (a) many social movements, groups of associ-
ations claim to represent the only legitimate or at least the best solution;
(b) the often heralded liberal-democratic values such as tolerance and
civility are rather ambiguous; (c) there is no guarantee that organisations
162 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

with liberal-democratic goals will also espouse liberal-democratic values in

their internal organisational life; and finally (d) the argument that groups
can be considered part of a civil society only if they obey the legal and
pre-established rule that can be valid only in a democratic context.20
How does this translate into a post-Communist context? Although
most of the political philosophers, from Thomas Paine, who stated that
government is nothing more than a national association adding on the
principles of society,21 to Cohen and Arato, two centuries later, who
restated Lockes position that explaining civil society needs a breaking
up of the old formula by retaining the identity of political and civil
society but distinguishing both from the state,22 they agree that civil
society and political society (political elites) should be separated and
have their own logic of functioning: one of the sources of uncivil
behaviour of civil society groups in the post-Communist context lies
exactly in the vague line between civil and political society. This natu-
rally requires broadening the definition of what uncivil society means
to include all cases where the hidden agendas of political parties are
promulgated through civil society actors. Going further, therefore, one
could freely claim that the scope of uncivil society could be broadened
(especially in a post-Communist environment) not just to cover physical
violence, but also political violence. By this, I mean advocating ideas of
political parties through any form of manipulation of both CSOs (as a
subject) and the general public (as an object).
Since the fall of Communism, it has become evident that civil society
groups are often either under the control of, or intensively affected by,
political centres of power. Intentionally or unintentionally the interest of
civil society groups often overlaps with the interest of political parties. For
example, one could highlight the class example of the structural overlap
between the FOSIM and the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia.23
Another blatant example where a CSO was used as pressure group hap-
pened in 2006 when an NGO named Glasot na svetlinata (Voice of light)
protested against the privatisation of the single state-owned Electricity
Production and Distribution Company (ESM). Journalists immediately
discovered the links between this organisation and the biggest opposi-
tion party, VMRO-DPMNE.24 However, in this case, the activities of the
pressure group were greeted with odium by the general public, which
turned against the government and led to a change of power later that
same year in 2006. (A change of power that in fact saw the leaders of this
obscure NGO employed in state institutions!)
One would expect a decrease in the trend of political manipulation of
the civil sector as society democratises. However, this has not happened
 Nenad Markovic 163

in Macedonia. Rather, the trend has risen to a degree of stupefying obvi-

ousness. The number of both ad hoc and renowned NGOs that serve
a political purpose has grown to a level that completely prevents the
possibility of delimiting the civil sector and these advocates of political
parties much to the detriment of the standing of NGOs in the public
perception. Denica (Northern Star), Sarisa (Spear), Zdravi ivotni stilovi
(Healthy lifestyles), Cekor plus (Extra step), Hristo Uzunov, Oko (Eye),
Pravda za pravednite (Justice for the righteous), to name just some
examples, are simply a few of the NGOs serving the political causes of
both the political left and right.25 Freedom House has noted this situa-
tion in its country reports on Macedonia since 2003.26 Addressing the
matter rather diplomatically, it has stated that many international
development agencies fail to recognise discrepancies between their ide-
als of civil society (mediating between government and citizens) and
local socioeconomic realities,27 further adding that Macedonia is no
exception, having neither of the two preconditions required for a thriv-
ing civil society sector: a socioeconomic environment that stimulates
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to emerge and function and
the presence of NGOs that reinforce the vitality of civil society. Many
Macedonian NGOs are vestigial Yugoslav-era organisations that were
of, but not for, citizens.28
Political manipulation should therefore be treated as a category of
uncivil behaviour. The completely unnecessary fabrication of consent
and popular support by political parties through NGOs only breeds a
negative stance towards the civil sector, sabotaging its credibility and
undermining its efforts to become a serious social actor. This incivil-
ity is certainly connected to the aforementioned submissive political
culture (as one of the roots of incivility), which results in diminished
credibility, and an unclear role and future, for the civil sector in the
contemporary Macedonian political discourse.

Love is love Or is it?

The second form of uncivil behaviour by civil society groups arises not
only from the general attitudes towards the marginalised groups in
society, such as sexual minorities, but also, and even more so, from the
inadequate response and insufficient activism of CSOs in this field. A first
effort of several Macedonian NGOs to organise the so-called March
of Tolerance, under the motto Love is Love, happened in November
2009. It was a rather low-key affair, which was accompanied by the
democratic dcor of a police escort.29 Public pressure on the organisers
164 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

of the march, the Helsinki Committee and the Macedonian Association

for Free Sexual Orientation (MASSO), as well as the open threats by
formal and informal pressure groups directed against them increased
the symbolism of the whole event which eventually passed without
violence.
However, the negative atmosphere led to an even more serious con-
sequence inasmuch as the new legal framework on anti-discrimination
prepared by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, in 2010,
does not include sexual orientation as a basis for discrimination. Given
the attitudes of the public towards sexual minorities in the Republic of
Macedonia, it is little wonder why no government would risk losing
political points by including sexual orientation as a basis for discrimina-
tion. What is still a mystery is why the civil sector did not try to exert
even more pressure on the government concerning this issue. While
a degree of pressure was certainly exerted, it is curious that protest-
ers who were willing to support sexual minorities in expressing their
sexual identity were not so willing to protest in defence of the basic
human rights of the same group when endangered by the state. In this
respect one could not help but wonder whether insufficient activism
is also a form of uncivil society? Maybe not per se, but how can one
call the phenomenon where CSOs exert pressure to promote general
ideas (such as free sexual orientation), but do not sufficiently chal-
lenge the state when the state fails to protect free sexual orientation in
anti-discrimination policy?

Civil society and religious agency Public space

The third example, and the most blatant, of uncivil conduct relates
to religious and ethnic agency. This situation is characteristic of many
multi-ethnic post-conflict societies where the ethnic and religious bal-
ance appears to be fragile. Macedonia is certainly in a precarious position
in this regard as was again highlighted when the government unveiled
a plan to construct a church at the main square in Skopje, the coun-
trys capital. Started in 2009, this initiative was later transferred to the
Municipality of Centar, at which point an organisation emerged calling
for a mosque to also be built in the main square of the city, replacing
one that had previously stood there. The so-called Initiative committee
for resurrection of the Burmali mosque claimed that it does not oppose
building of the church in the main square if the Burmali mosque
is reconstructed as well.30 However, this initiative was intercepted
 Nenad Markovic 165

by another ethnic Macedonian NGO named Denica, which claimed

that this mosque had in fact been built close to the remains of an old
Christian church, and so the call for it to be rebuilt was unacceptable.31
In the acrimony that has ensued, the issue has even found its way to
the courts. This has highlighted not only the degree to which public
spaces can become key battlegrounds for ethnic and religious tensions,
it has also served to emphasise the extent to which these issues are
viewed in zero-sum terms. The gains and losses of one side have to be
exactly balanced by the gains and the losses of the other participant.
However, for all the tensions that have emerged, neither the church
nor the mosque has yet been built, and the public debate continues in
high tension.
A similar situation happened during the latest efforts of the Macedonian
government to introduce the Macedonian language as a mandatory
course in predominantly Albanian schools for pupils starting in the first
grade in 2010. A number of Albanian NGOs immediately reacted nega-
tively to the idea.32 Although this is a pending issue, it further high-
lights the very core of the problem, namely that a large portion of the
NGOs engaged in the Macedonian public discourse would rather stand
in defence of particular ethnic/religious interests than advocate for
dialogue, reasonable argumentation and compromise solutions. Again,
civil society has proven to be capable of uncivil behaviour.

Violence

Trying to identify new forms of uncivil society in a post-Communist

ambience is a task that requires unorthodox benchmarks of what is
considered uncivil. However, if political manipulation, inadequate
activity, prioritising religious/ethnic agency is supplemented by the more
classical benchmarks of uncivil behaviour, such as violence, then one
can clearly argue that parts of civil society in Macedonia have shifted
from post-Communist to uncivil. In this regard violence is the culmina-
tion of incivility of the CSOs in the Republic of Macedonia, especially
if one takes into consideration that it occurred between opposing civil
society groups.
A clear example of this can again be seen from the previously men-
tioned initiative of the Government of Macedonia for the construction
of a church in the main square. In addition to opposition from Albanian
organisations, the decision drew protests from two other groups. The
core of the first group was made up of the students of the Faculty of
166 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

Architecture in Skopje Prva arhibrigada (First Archi-brigade). The second

group consisted mostly of people close to the FOSIM named Plotad
Sloboda (Freedom Square). On 28 March 2009, and after having noti-
fied the police, the protesters gathered at the main square with placards
to engage in a peaceful demonstration.33 At one point, however, a large
group of religious fundamentalists appeared in the square to launch
a counter-protest, without having told the authorities, and physically
attacked the members of two groups.34 Not only did the police do little
to calm the fighting, there was no condemnation from the Macedonian
Orthodox Church. For its part, the Public Prosecutors Office found a
Solomonic solution to the issue. It brought charges against both the
protesters and the counter-protesters (although the charges against the
members of Prva arhibrigada and Plotad Sloboda were later dropped),35
even though all the television footage clearly showed that the religious
zealots were the ones attacking the protesters. This in turn led many to
wonder how and why the counter-protesters spontaneously appeared
at the main square in such large numbers.36
The March 2009 events not only showed the inability of civil soci-
ety to prevent violence and stimulate dialogue but also the inability of
the state to react adequately. The display of violence where dialogue
should have taken place supports the argument that civil society in
Macedonia has gone to a point beyond civilised behaviour. The simul-
taneous existence of other, subtler forms of uncivil behaviour raises the
risk that it will undermine its own integrity for the foreseeable future.
Regardless of whether one speaks of violence, ethnic and religious
agency or any other form of uncivil behaviour of CSOs, one obvious
inference stands tall both the behaviour of CSOs and the general atmos-
phere in the civil sector in the Republic of Macedonia has to undergo
a serious transformation for the better. Although there needs to be
wider social engagement, the greatest area of change needs to occur
in the relationship between CSOs and the major political actors in the
country. Firstly, most civil society actors have to understand that the
short-term benefits of their dubious relations with the political parties
leads to a long-standing damage to the democratic environment of the
country. It also damages the legitimacy of the civil sector itself. Political
parties, for their part, have to recognise the potential of CSOs as part-
ners, and not as latent agents of the political structure. This change
would be beneficial for the political elites and the civil sector in terms
of both legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of the general public.
After two decades of democratic transition, the general public can read-
ily detect unacceptable relations between the political elites and civil
 Nenad Markovic 167

society actor, which in turn damages the reputation of both CSOs and
political parties.
Finally, a cooperative atmosphere between civil society actors and
political elites could be beneficial in many respects, not least by creat-
ing a more constructive atmosphere for bridging ethnic and religious
gaps. Perhaps more importantly, it would lead to a transformation of
what is at the core, and is indeed the very origin, of the uncivil forms
of civil society the political values and attitudes of the population in
the country. By nature, this is the hardest sphere to transform as politi-
cal attitudes usually change over the years, if not decades. However, this
should serve as stimulus for the gradual change of the relation between
civil society actors and political elites, and not as an impediment. If civil
society actors and political parties would really like to see a social trans-
formation, as they often claim in their programmatic documents and
public addresses, then they should maybe set an example by setting
clear and fair rules in their own dealings with each other.

Conclusion

The characteristics of civil society in Macedonia reflect the challenges

of democratic development in post-Communist countries, especially
when one takes into account the multi-ethnic and post-conflict nature
of the state and society. It encompasses both positive and negative ele-
ments common to civil society after the fall of the Communist regimes.
The first part of this chapter analysed the weaknesses of civil society in
Macedonia that can be attributed to the Communist legacy. However, by
refocusing the analysis to look at social categories such as political atti-
tudes (culture), attitudes towards sexual minorities or other ethnic and
religious groups, a rather different picture emerged of Macedonian civil
society two decades after the beginning of democratisation. Although
one would expect to see a more democratic and liberal civil society, this
chapter has shown the opposite: a substantive part of civil society in
Macedonia has shifted towards uncivil behaviour instead of approximat-
ing a fully democratic civil society. As a result, it is possible to make a
more general theoretical point that all of the forms of behaviour of civil
society analysed here, and not just violence, might be considered as
forms of uncivil society. The articulation of political interests through
civil society manipulation, insufficient activity on vital social issues, reli-
gious/ethnic intolerance and barriers, as well as violence, all capture the
uncivil side of civil society. Violence as the sole measure of the uncivil
in civil society is too narrow.
168 From Post-Communist to Uncivil Society in Macedonia

Notes
1. Macedonia and the Republic of Macedonia are used interchangeably.
2. J. Keane (2004) Violence and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), p. 46.
3. J. Celichowski (2004) Civil Society in Eastern Europe: Growth without
Engagement, in M. Glasius, D. Lewis and H. Seckinelgin (eds) Exploring Civil
Society: Political and Cultural Contexts (London/New York: Routledge), p. 67.
4. An integral version of the Law on citizens associations and foundations
from 1998 is available at http://www.pravo.org.mk
5. On the progress in the civil society sphere in the Republic of Macedonia,
please see the reports of Freedom House on the country within the Nations
in Transit edition, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/2012/macedonia (accessed on 23 November 2012).
6. FORUM Center for Strategic Research and Documentation (2007) Study on
Transparency, Accountability and Democratic Capacity of the Civil Sector in the
Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: FORUM CSRD), pp. 301.
7. Ibid., p. 30.
8. Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2007) Strategy for Cooperation
of the Government with the Civil Sector (Skopje: General Secretariat of the
Government of the Republic of Macedonia), p. 15.
9. For qualitative and quantitative data supporting this claim, see the exten-
sive research on civil society in post-Communist Europe by M. M. Howard
(2003) The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p. 77.
10. Ohrid Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs (2007)
Presentation of Poll Conducted in March 2007 (Skopje: Ohrid Institute), slides
1820.
11. Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis Skopje and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
(2006) Youth Aspiration Survey (Skopje: IDSCS and FES).
12. Ibid., p. 22.
13. Ibid., p. 21.
14. United Nations Development Programme (2009) People-Centered Analysis
(Skopje: UNDP), p. 54.
15. See www.ewr.org.mk for more comprehensive data on ethnic barriers and
relations.
16. United Nations Development Programme (2009) op. cit., p. 57. The data on
attitudes on mixed marriages show even greater divide and prejudice.
17. Ibid., p. 56.
18. John Keane (1998) Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Cambridge: Polity
Press), p. 138.
19. Ibid., p. 135.
20. P. Kopeck (2003) Civil Society, Uncivil Society and Contentious Politics,
in P. Kopeck and C. Mudde (eds) Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-
Communist Europe (London/New York: Routledge), pp. 1213.
21. T. Paine (177992) The Rights of Man (collected and edited by M. D. Conway),
p. 68.
22. J. L. Cohen and A. Arato (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge,
MA/London: MIT Press), p. 87.
 Nenad Markovic 169

23. The director of the FOSIM has previously been a member of the Executive
Committee of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, one of the two
biggest political parties in the country.
24. For more information on this topic, see Forum Plus (2006) Who is the Voice
of Light? (Koj e glasot na svetlinata?), available at http://magazin.forum.com.
mk/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=172&EditionID=68&ArticleID=
1839&Page=1
25. An extensive analysis on political connections of CSOs can be found in the
daily newspaper Nova Makedonija. Vlasta i opozicijata vo vojna preku nev-
ladinite (The government and the opposition at war through the NGOs),
Nova Makedonija, Number 21909, 13 February 2010.
26. See Freedom House (2003) Nations in Transit: Country Report Macedonia,
available at www.freedomhouse.org
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Gragjanski mar za tolerancija (Citizens march for tolerance), Sitel TV
(online news edition), 16 November 2009.
30. IVZ: Ako ima crkva mora da ima i damija (IRC: If there is a church there
must be a mosque). Utrinski vesnik, Number 3188, 21 January 2010, available
at www.utrinski.com.mk
31. NVO Denica kje podnese inicijativa za izgradba na crkva na plotadot
Makedonija (The NGO Denica will submit an initiative to resurrect a
church on the Macedonia Square), time.mk, 16 February 2010, available at
http://www.time.mk/read/ae50a52267/7c5ec879e5/index.html (accessed on
23 November 2012).
32. For a more detailed insight in the case, see Razbudi se go razbudi Todorov
(Wake up wakes up Todorov), Vreme, Number 1876, 23 January 2010,
available at www.time.mk
33. Osloboditelna presuda za clenovite na Plotad Sloboda (Release ver-
dict for the members of Plotad Sloboda), Utrinski vesnik, Number 3445,
30 November 2010, available at www.utrinski.com.mk
34. For a comprehensive account of the incident, see Tepaj go bliniot svoj
(Kick thy brethren), Utrinski vesnik, Number 2949, 30 March 2009, available
at www.utrinski.com.mk
35. Osloboditelna presuda za clenovite na Plotad Sloboda (Release ver-
dict for the members of Plotad Sloboda), Utrinski vesnik, Number 3445,
30 November 2010, available at www.utrinski.com.mk
36. See, for instance, the media reaction of the NGO Transparency-Macedonia.
Krstonosen udar vrz demokratijata (A crusaders punch to democracy),
31 March 2009, available at http://www.transparentnost-mk.org.mk/
novsajt/?p=1338 (accessed on 23 November 2012).
9
A Practitioners Perspective:
Post-Conflict Civil Society
Development in the Balkans
Joanna Hanson1

Post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans has been very much the effort
of the international community which largely authored the Dayton
agreement, UNSCR 1244 and the Ohrid Agreement. Without its involve-
ment and pressure the in-country ownership of these agreements may
have been limited, if not far worse. Moreover, arguably, it is not recon-
struction that is taking place because what existed previously is not
being reconstructed, except perhaps physically but is instead a delayed
transition, the further creation of rule of law states. There is a problem
of the balance of power or dualism within the civil society development
in the process of transition. This not only between the NGOs, civil soci-
ety and domestic government, but also the latter and the international
community, providing the EU accession path which is surely the heart,
perhaps implanted, keeping the transition ticking over.
The international community in its current institutional composition
has already had experience in helping the Central European and Baltic
countries transition from political systems and conflicts more repressive
and brutal than the system that existed in socialist Yugoslavia. In those
cases, however, the transition process was from a non-democratic and
centrally directed economic system to a free market and democratic one.
The Western Balkans, with the exception of Albania, which emerged
from a far more stringent totalitarian system than any of the Central
European countries, had the challenge of violent conflict thrown into
the equation. Post-conflict issues exacerbate the transition environment
and the transition itself.
Post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans has therefore focused on sta-
bility as well as wide-ranging democratic and economic reform. This has
involved the EU Stabilisation and Association Process, NATO Membership
Action Plans, the Stability Pact, as well as Council of Europe and OSCE
170
 Joanna Hanson 171

activity. The role of the international community, whether in its entirety

or bilaterally, has largely been one of leadership. It has been about provid-
ing solutions and processes. Moreover, in Central Europe there had been
more initial thinking about reform, change and pluralism from within
than there was in the Western Balkan countries, which were mired in
violent conflict. Dissidents and their movements were belligerent, but
were not armed combatants. The role the international community took
on in the former Yugoslavia was greater and their resources far larger.
There was certainly a firm commitment to act, even if its implementa-
tion is seen as failing and wrong at times. There was no real contestation
from the other side, even though there have been problems with politi-
cal will and commitment to the process.
This lack of contestation should not be read to mean that there were
no other views among the people of these countries. It may have meant
that they were still too embryonic in the new systems that were emerg-
ing in these countries to become either visible or audible. This betrays
perhaps a failure of the democratic system the understanding of
accountability, the failure of the citizens to understand their role and
rights, or the strength of often unacceptable practices that in turn
hampers its evolution. This does not mean to say that there were not
some attempts to change the situation. However, it seems as if they may
have lost their energy and sustainability. For example, one might con-
sider Mjaft! in Albania. Vetvendosje has transformed itself into a political
movement but so far has not lost its influence. Other groups, such as
the citizens association MOST in Skopje and the Kosovo Democratic
Institute in Pristina, which have not been so visible on the streets, have
shown resilience and professionalism and have had important impacts.
As a practitioner more an observer in this case working in the
Western Balkans, I have primarily followed developments in Kosovo,
Albania and Macedonia over the last 15 or so years. I have been left with
the strong impression that not only does the international community
lead but also that democracy and democratic society is still so young
that other views regarding reconstruction and democratisation, while
often verbally expressed, are not brought to the fore. History has left
a difficult legacy. Hence, one can understand the importance of civil
society. Its role should not be underestimated, as European Commission
reports indicate.
In the preceding contributions it is argued that a specific approach
to addressing the past can complicate the process and reach of democ-
ratisation and democratic reform. Governments are seen as being too
nationalistic. This can, however, be compared to the transition process
172 A Practitioners Perspective

in other post-authoritarian states, such as those in the Baltics, where

nationalism has arguably detracted from transition. We also need to
remember that some transition countries, like Poland where a new
tradition of pluralism and civil society was developed, which is an EU
member and which has a free media playing its fourth estate role
has had one of the most destructive transition processes in relation to
coming to terms with the past. These countries have not escaped the
nationalism evolving in the post-Communist period.
There are questions and conclusions thrown up in these chapters
which need to be highlighted in order to avoid looking at them pre-
dominantly, let alone exclusively, in a post-conflict framework. The
conclusions are that they reveal an imperfect evolution of civil society
which is still floundering to some degree. The post-conflict situation,
and the layered role of authority, partly caused by the international
presence, forms a more complex theatre within which civil society
has to work. Despite this, however, it is clear progress has been made,
lessons have been learned and valuable experience gained. After all,
we are talking about a period of only ten to 15 years. This means that
this activity is still young. It must be given time and space to evolve.
Thinking and consciousness cannot change overnight through donor
funding.
Moreover, there may be a tendency to forget not least of all because
the horrendous Balkan conflicts veil our memory and transfer peo-
ples sensitivities and awareness on the ground that we are looking at
states which have emerged from an authoritarian system. They have
few historical democratic reference points. This is difficult territory on
which to create civil society, especially when there is the dependency
on external funding and given the service-orientated nature of many of
their activities. The vision driving NGO development is a model based
on a simplified representation of a Western reality or on an idealised
aspiration of what NGOs should be and do.
One of the key questions these chapters throw up is the role of the
international community in civil society development. It is at times
seen as hampering the process because it is too structured and delivery
focussed. This is perhaps an angle that needs greater consideration and
analysis. Is the international community helping or is it hindering? Or
is it disenfranchising? Is it even forming a replacement? Does it push
the political reconciliation at the cost of the societal, estranging the
process? There is probably not a clear answer to any of these questions.
It may well do all. It is difficult to measure the development factor
against the disenfranchisement one.
 Joanna Hanson 173

Working on the Western Balkans can throw up situations where the

lack of neutral brokers becomes apparent. This is particularly the case
in the southern states of the region. When a crisis occurs this becomes
visible: for example, the 2001 Macedonian conflict or the political insta-
bility and violence in Albania in 2011. These brokers can be individu-
als or organisations. They can provide a local voice and authority in
other words, ownership. The concept of transition brokers, which for
example worked quite effectively in South Africa in the transition from
apartheid,2 does not seem to appear to be developing in the Western
Balkans. Or at least it is not visible. This is arguably because of history,
their current and past socio-economic systems and perhaps because of
the pressures of EU enlargement. The latter may even be a counter-
active influence.
Civil society in its totality is made up of various groupings, organi-
sations and institutions, such as the Church, trade unions, business
organisations and so on. These can have specific personalities who
provide leadership, in rather the way that the Protestant Church did
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Their lack of visibility in
the southern Balkan civic panorama may also say something about this
lack of neutral brokers or transition brokers. The media has difficulty in
playing, or is just not able to play, an intervening and civic role because
of the environment in which it has had to develop. This is such an
ongoing issue that it can easily be overlooked or forgotten. It is perhaps
worth bearing in mind that it was in 2004 that the Polish prime minis-
ter was forced to resign in the so-called Rywin Affair, which centred on
high-level corruption, following good investigative journalism in Gazeta
Wyborcza.
The lack of transition brokers or perhaps at times truly home-grown
NGOs which have not been externally structured can hamper the
international communitys attempts to resolve some of these post-
conflict, transitional reconstruction issues in the Balkans. This can mean
the international community has nowhere else to turn except to its
own institutions, especially the EU, and that this activity may in effect
replace, or block, any nascent indigenous local civil society that is evolv-
ing. Many issues have to be resolved immediately and speedily, partly
because of the demands of the EU accession process itself, and this
situation may be inadvertently preventing or hampering the evolution
of more classic civil society. The EU accession process, although it may
be seen as a catalyst for these processes, may not allow a more gradual
and rooted evolution from taking place. Others may argue this is not
the case. They may see it as at least allowing the putting down of roots.
174 A Practitioners Perspective

It can also be argued, by using the counterfactual, that international

involvement facilitates development. But perhaps greater balance needs
to be found. This thesis requires further research and consideration. Can
these neutral brokers be created or encouraged? Does it require a specific
socio-economic situation? Is this quite simply a natural consequence or
continuation of Europeanisation? There may also be something anach-
ronistic about these questions. This is no longer how individuals func-
tion in this so-called post-historic age.
Post-conflict reconstruction does, however, have important home-
grown elements which play a significant role in developing activities
specifically related to post-conflict and transitional situations. There is a
plurality that is not always visible, and can be difficult to assess. There
are small civil society organisations often doing local work. In doing so,
they reveal personalities who can start to gain local trust. One example
is the OSCE ethnic desegregation activities in schools in Macedonia,
about which little is heard. These are the more organic components
creating the wider and lower base of civic society. It is this slower, but
nevertheless important, component which needs also to be remembered,
supported and given its place in the democratisation of the European
process. Civil society development must be encouraged not to remain
horizontal.

Notes
1. This chapter is written in a personal capacity and the views expressed do not
necessarily reflect those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
2. C. Charney (1999) Civil Society, Political Violence, and Democratic
Transitions: Business and the Peace Process in South Africa, 1990 to 1993,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41(1), pp. 182206.
Part III
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
10
Civil Society and the Bosnian
Police Certification Process:
Challenging the Guardians
Gemma Collantes-Celador

This chapter focuses on a very particular aspect of the democratic

reform of police forces that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of
the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.1 It provides an account of
the certification process or vetting of all police officers, carried
out by the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the
International Police Task Force (IPTF). This process, which officially was
completed at the end of 2002 when the United Nations (UN) mission
left the country, was kept alive at least in part by the activities of
two groups (Association of Decertified Policemen of the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska Association of Decertified
Policemen), which contested the outcome of the process on the basis
that it suffered from operational and, more importantly, structural
shortcomings. In other words, they considered that the process had been
undemocratic and its outcomes were having adverse repercussions for
the rights of decertified police officers. The two associations engaged in
a legal battle, and a political fight, for the policy and related legislation
to be changed. Their efforts failed to yield the desired response from
national actors due to the powers enjoyed by the UN during its mission
in Bosnia. However, the matter was referred to the UN Security Council,
which ultimately was forced to overrule its policy of UN decisions being
final and binding, and reach a negotiated solution.
This episode is remarkable for what it tells us about the process of
democratising police forces in post-conflict settings. Civil society actors
play an important role in advancing and consolidating aspects related to
the demilitarisation and accountability of police forces, by strengthen-
ing civilmilitary relations while making the process more inclusive and
legitimate. As Marina Caparini points out, it reminds us that in the final
analysis the client of state security institutions is the individual citizen.2
177
178 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

Civil society performs this role through three types of actions. First, it
can be the source of information and knowledge on security and defence
matters for both the public and policymakers and, thereby, can contrib-
ute to the shaping, implementation and acceptance of policies. Second,
it can promote and facilitate wider participation in the process through
public debate on security and defence matters (newspaper reporting,
public meetings and so on), which also contributes to the development
of reforms that are locally owned and sustainable. Third, civil society
can hold security actors accountable for wrongdoing and malpractice by
performing an external oversight role.3 It is this third type of action that
best describes what was achieved by the two Associations of Decertified
Policemen. In Bosnia this oversight was directed at both the Bosnian
authorities and the UN, whose extensive powers drove the process
of certification of police officers. Thus, the case study in this chapter
sheds light on the ability of civil society in protectorate-style contexts
to guard the guardians4 by holding them answerable for their actions
using the values advocated in their original reforms. The analysis in
this chapter contributes to the study of civil society activism in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts by including in the statecivil society
equation the relationship of the latter with international actors. At the
same time, in evaluating the significance of what the two Associations
of Decertified Policemen achieved by their actions, we consider also the
unintended, but still potentially negative, consequences that these
actions might or could have had on the legitimacy of the state-building
project in Bosnia and the sustainability of other reforms introduced by
the international community.5
The chapter begins with an overview of civil society developments in
Bosnia. The assessment focuses on Bosnian non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), reflecting the tendency in the majority of the literature
to centre on this category when discussing civil society more generally.6
However, the author understands civil society as a much wider concept
encompassing other types of non-state actors that, as explained in the
Introduction to this edited volume, shape political change through
social activism. The two Associations of Decertified Policemen are not
a typical example of civil society associations if we take into account
that their members were private citizens who until decertification were
part of a key institution in the state administration. Moreover, they
were assisted at various points in their political and legal campaigning
by police trade unions. However, exploring the social activism of these
two associations contributes to the existing literature on civil activism
in Bosnia, and in post-conflict scenarios more generally, by focusing on
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 179

a non-NGO example where the outcomes of the process speak directly

to the roles that have been associated with civil society promotion in
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Moreover, due to the background of
the members of these associations as noted previously this case study
allows us to reflect on what has been described, in the Introduction to
this edited volume, as the blurred boundaries between state and society,
public and private in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The chapter
also provides a brief overview of the certification process (goals, ration-
ale, modus operandi) with particular attention to the operational, but
more importantly the structural problems used by the two associations
as arguments to mobilise, politically and legally, post-2002.

Civil society in Bosnia

The number of NGOs registered in Bosnia in 2008 is estimated at 12,189

a remarkable figure if we take into account that Bosnias population at
the time was approximately 4.5 million people.7 However, one should
be cautious about drawing conclusions on the basis of these figures.
First, as Adam Fagan noted, there have been discrepancies between the
official figures and actual numbers of active NGOs.8 Moreover, there
seems to be no direct correlation between the number of NGOs and
the consolidation of civic and democratic politics.9 Although the posi-
tion and role of the NGO sector seems to have improved gradually in
Bosnian society, this follows more than a decade of at best mixed and at
worst gloomy assessments. NGOs were meant to be at the forefront of
the peace-building efforts in Bosnia, acting as advocacy channels for the
introduction of a locally owned new culture of interaction and politi-
cal engagement based on compromise, tolerance and participation that
would help delegitimise nationalist forces.10 Their advocacy role was
based on the assumption that, if provided with the necessary support
in the areas of sustainability and capacity-building, NGOs would facili-
tate economic and political activity.11 Notwithstanding huge variations
across the country, several shortcomings can be identified that have
worked against the implementation of this vision of NGOs in Bosnia.
These limitations include the sectors dependence on external/foreign
funds, the service-oriented nature of much of its activities, and its impact
on the Bosnian state. An additional, more fundamental stumbling block,
which Steven Sampson highlights, is that the vision driving NGO devel-
opment is a model and, thus, a simplified representation of a Western
reality or an idealised aspiration of what an NGO should be and do.12
Roberto Belloni argues along similar lines, pointing out that an idealised
180 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

understanding of civil society becomes the more problematic when

viewed against the actual structural, institutional and legal conditions
(e.g. ethnic divisions, corruption and cronyism, political fragmentation,
the overarching powers of the international community and so on)
that delimit how Bosnian civic groups and organisations can work, a
point endorsed by Florian Bieber. In other words, the development of
a properly functioning civil society is inextricably intertwined with the
creation of a responsive, accountable, and transparent state structure.13
We return to this issue later in the chapter when discussing the impact
of the two Associations of Decertified Policemen on the state-building
process in Bosnia.
One of the most common criticisms attracted by evaluations of the
NGO sector in Bosnia is its huge dependence on external funds for its
survival. To some extent, such dependence is not unreasonable given
the economic precariousness of the country since the end of the war.
It is undeniable that foreign funds have been crucial for keeping alive
many of these NGOs. However, judging from evaluations of the NGO
situation in Bosnia, this dependence carries a high cost. It has led to
a number of perverse anomalies in the role, functioning and posi-
tioning of NGOs in Bosnian society. Florian Bieber describes this as a
credibility gap in relation to local NGOs vis--vis local constituencies.14
For instance, NGOs becoming more preoccupied with meeting the expec-
tations of foreign donors than with prioritising the needs of the popula-
tion, or those areas where there is capacity and willingness to establish
governance partnerships with government offices and state agencies to
continue with similar activities beyond the end of the project.15 The
latter type of activity is more conducive to developing sustainable,
locally owned processes of political, economic and social reconstruc-
tion. Vanessa Pupavacs analysis of international gender policies in
Bosnia, for example, shows that womens NGOs reflect a pattern that
has characterised other local NGOs; they are essentially oriented towards
the international community and reliant on its continuing sponsor-
ship for their survival, and they evidence a rather weak relation to the
population [These] NGOs have failed to galvanise popular support
among women and have moreover no formal accountability to the popu-
lation, unlike elected representatives.16 The alternative dependence on
public revenues from local authorities could be equally problematic.
According to the 2010 NGO Sustainability Index issued by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), it seems that
only politically non-threatening NGOs receive local financial support,
a finding that begs the question of whether NGOs faced with decreasing
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 181

funding from external donors might be forced to become para-state

organisations.17
The apparent disconnect between NGOs and Bosnian society is
explained by many analysts within a service provision approach
encouraged by a pattern of foreign funding. The net result is NGOs that
are technical, project-driven and apolitical, rather than being advo-
cacy actors engaged in mobilising the population according to non-
nationalist political agendas.18 In this context, the approach of the
European Union (EU) is considered problematic in prioritising the capacity
of NGOs to organise and manage projects.19 In addition to affecting
the NGOsociety relationship, this reality has impacted negatively the
Bosnian state. It has been pointed out that donors emphasis on service
provision has meant that NGOs have often substituted for the state
(or market) in a range of socio-economic areas where the state (or
market) could not deliver. However necessary in the short term, this has
prompted accusations that the social contract between Bosnian citizens
and the nascent post-conflict state has been undermined. Two reasons
are given. Firstly, the siphoning off valuable personnel attracted by the
higher salaries and better working conditions in the NGO sector and,
secondly, the appropriation of key services and functions normally
associated with the state (or market).20
Nevertheless, there is evidence of a gradual attenuation of the effects
arising from the problems discussed so far. Cynthia Simmons points
to several victories from 2000 onwards that on the basis of citizens
initiatives have afforded some local NGOs a greater monitoring pres-
ence in municipal council meetings and, in the case of Tuzla Canton,
at the parliamentary level. She also refers to their cumulated actions
for electoral reform and the inclusion of courses on political conscious-
ness into public school curricula.21 Similarly, the 2010 USAID NGO
Sustainability Index finds evidence of NGOs capacity to interact and/or
demand participation in decision-making at the legislative level in part
perhaps due to the introduction of the 2006 rules on consultation during
legislative drafting.22 However, the USAID report adds that this consult-
ative and advocacy capacity is insufficiently developed and ad hoc. The
report highlights the exclusion of NGOs from crucially important politi-
cal decisions such as the 2009 Butmir constitutional process between
Bosnian political elites and the international community.23 NGOs were
also unable to contribute to the Police Restructuring process (20048),
a major international effort to improve the transparency, accountability
and cost-effectiveness of the police by tackling the fragmentation of the
law enforcement system. This police process has been described by many
182 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

analysts as top-down or as seeking grand deals among party bosses

behind closed doors with no meaningful room for the involvement of
NGOs or any other civil society actors.24 This is emblematic of a much
wider trend in Bosnia of a generally limited involvement of civil society
actors in police matters during both the UN and EU phases.25

The police certification process

In the period 1996 to 2002 the UNMIBH Human Rights Office and IPTF
conducted a countrywide screening of all Bosnian police officers. Those
not meeting requirements were deauthorised (or decertified) from
membership of the police ranks that is, they received a lifetime bar
on holding any position within the Bosnian law enforcement agencies.
Against the background of significant police involvement with various
aspects of the conduct of the war, the aim of this certification process
was to assist the democratisation of law enforcement by removing any
military and criminal elements and ensuring the polices professionalism
and accountability.26 This new image of the police in a new Bosnia
was intended to bolster the process of reconciliation among communi-
ties and also between the state and society. The need for reform became
clear during the immediate phases of the post-Dayton period when
the police by and large continued to operate favouring their particular
ethnic group, failing to respond to incidents of violence, intimidation
and/or discrimination involving citizens from another ethnic group, or
even perpetrating such acts.27 There was also an economic rationale.
In the aftermath of the war there were too many police officers. Some
downsizing was required to achieve reasonable numbers that would be
more representative of policepopulation ratios and financially sustain-
able over the long term for an impoverished Bosnian state.
The vetting process developed out of a range of agreements forged
separately with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska
(RS) and Brcko District authorities, during 19968, and the gradually
acquired institution-building and restructuring powers of the UN pres-
ence in Bosnia. The UNMIBH/IPTF also had recourse to the Office of
the High Representative (OHR) Bonn Powers in the effort to downsize
the police force. The process was conducted in three stages, during
which all police officers were checked against a range of criteria that
constituted grounds for dismissal. The criteria included absence of
valid education credentials and completion of UNMIBH/IPTF training,
war crimes convictions and criminal proceedings in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or domestic courts,
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 183

human rights violations prior to or during the screening process,

violations of property laws, evidence of obstruction of IPTF policies
and the responsibilities and obligations arising from the Dayton Peace
Accords.28 Local authorities, in theory, were obliged to take action upon
receiving the recommendations on screened police officers issued by
UNMIBH/IPTF, including, where necessary, commencement or continu-
ation of criminal investigations based on domestic criminal codes and
laws on internal affairs.29
There are no precise data on the number of officers who were decerti-
fied. The final UN Security Council report on UNMIBH, published in
December 2002, refers to 481 decertifications and 228 cases pending.
The corresponding OHR figures are 687 with 37 cases pending, and the
European Stability Initiative (ESI) evaluation of the process quotes 793
decertified officers including 150 pending cases.30 Added to this, techni-
cal problems during the certification process have called into question
the reliability of the official Police Registry database where UNMIBH/
IPTF stored the records and evidence required for the certification proc-
ess.31 The quality of this database is one of the possible explanations
for the fact that, even after the vetting process was officially concluded,
the ranks of Bosnian police forces still included officers who fitted the
criteria for decertification.32 There are still instances, even at the time
of writing, of police officers investigated, arrested and/or prosecuted for
war crimes and other crimes committed in the period prior to the police
certification process.
Of course, given the sheer numbers of officers to be inspected (44,000
according to the UN) and difficulties during the data gathering stages,
the certification process was bound to be a very complex endeavour,
with room for misjudgements and error. There were also a number of
operational difficulties that added to the already complex nature of
the process, including lack of preparation of some IPTF officers for the
investigative tasks, and under-utilisation of domestic (including civil
society) actors in the data-gathering stages. To this can be added the
attempted politicisation of the process by local authorities who used
it sometimes to wage war against opposing political factions. However,
the main source of contention surrounding the certification process is
related to its structural shortcomings, which contravened the spirit and
the letter of the UNMIBH/IPTFs assignment in Bosnia. Some police
officers were decertified without explanation and unaware that they
had been/were being investigated, or were denied the opportunity to
appeal against the UNMIBH/IPTF charges (see further), or were in limbo
with appeals unanswered when the UN mission departed. There were
184 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

even more problematic cases of police officers that fell in the middle
[that is they] did not show up in any list.33 In other words, their names
were not on the list of certified officers issued by the UNMIBH/IPTF to
the police authorities, but they also had not received a notice of decer-
tification. Because the certification process was not based on a Bosnian
legal mechanism, but relied on UN Chapter VII authorisation, it was
unclear how Bosnian law enforcement authorities should deal with
this category of police officers, which left the final decision to their
discretion.
Starting in mid-2002, decertified police officers were given eight days
(down from 14 in earlier stages of the process) from the date the final
decertification order became effective, within which to apply in writing
for reconsideration of the order. If the request for reconsideration was
accepted by the UNMBIH Appeals Commission (composed of UN per-
sonnel, but independent of the IPTF Commissioner), the corresponding
Bosnian law enforcement agencys obligation to terminate the officers
employment was automatically suspended until further notice.34 Cases
accepted for review were submitted to the IPTF Commissioner for recon-
sideration of his decision, but these were recommendations only and
the Commissioner had the final word.35 The decertified police officers
were required to prepare their appeals without access to the IPTF files
or other evidence, and could not appear either in person or through a
representative to give evidence to the Appeals Commission. Certification
decisions were being issued up to the last day of the UNMIBH/IPTF
mandate (31 December 2002), evidence of the haste to complete the
process, but resulting also in there being no grace period or less than
the eight days allowed for unfavourable decisions to be challenged.36
The incoming European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took the posi-
tion that it could take no action in this area because of its very different
mandate and responsibilities. Its view was that the certification process
was over this despite the letters received by decertified police officers
in December 2002 that appear to have stated that in case of an appeal
the applicant should contact UNMIBH/IPTF or EUPM.37 There are
some very interesting questions to be asked about the agreement
between UNMIBH/IPTF and EUPM on the follow-up to this issue. One
such question relates to the fate of the official Police Registry database
managed by UNMIBH/IPTF during the certification process. It is claimed
that post-2002 there was no access to those UN records, which were
taken to New York at the end of the Mission. However, it seems that,
despite the EUPMs stated determination not to become involved in this
matter, UNMIBH/IPTF left an unofficial copy of the database with the
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 185

EUPM. The database albeit with amendments and updates was used
by EUPM from 2004 to 2009 as a source of background information
for some of its policies (ethnic and gender recruitment, career progres-
sion policies, etc.) and for the downsizing process foreseen by the Police
Restructuring Process (20048). It was also used to monitor certain
police appointments, sometimes at the request of the OHR, the EU-led
military operation EUFOR Althea, and other international actors.38
The August 2004 UN report on the rule of law and transitional jus-
tice mentions, crucially, that vetting of the police and prison services,
the army and the judiciary, such as was carried out with UN assistance,
should include elements that would distinguish the processes from
wholesale purges. These official vettings should include notification of
the allegations against the parties under investigation with reasonable
notice, provision of an opportunity to respond to or appeal against the
allegations before the body carrying out the vetting process, and the
right to appeal an adverse decision in front of a court or any other
independent body.39 Also, drawing on lessons learnt from previous
missions, this UN report highlighted that legitimate vetting processes
must be respectful of the sensitivities of victims and of the human
rights of those suspected of abuses.40 These UN guidelines were issued
over one and a half years after the end of the police certification proc-
ess in Bosnia, but their marked contrast to the Bosnian case highlights
the nature of the problem and questions the position adopted by the
UN Security Council in the post-2002 period. This is not to say that all
decertified police officers in Bosnia were innocent from the charges that
led to their removal from the police ranks. Nor is one trying to under-
estimate the huge endeavour that providing every individual police
officer with the right to recourse would have meant for the UN mis-
sion in Bosnia. It would have rendered a time-consuming and complex
process even more difficult. However, adopting a modus operandi that
denied individuals a reasonable amount of time, and access to infor-
mation, to gather the data necessary to contest any allegations, and the
right to a fair trial, cast a shadow over the intended contribution of the
vetting process to the development of democratic police forces.

The associations of decertified policemen

Soon after UNMIBH/IPTF left Bosnia, a number of decertified police

officers took their cases to the local courts (in March 2004 they num-
bered 150 and in 2006 were around 262).41 More importantly (and
notwithstanding the debate over whether these courts had jurisdiction
186 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

on the matter), as early as 2003 some domestic courts had ruled that
some decertified police officers should be reinstated into the police
ranks. One of the arguments made by the courts at the time was that
the dismissals were unlawful because Bosnian law did not include IPTF
decisions as acceptable reasons for dismissals and also the police offic-
ers in question had not been given the right to seek legal remedy. The
UN Security Council responded in June 2004 by calling on the Bosnian
authorities to

ensure, including through the adoption or amendment of domestic

legislation, that all IPTF certification decisions be fully and effec-
tively implemented, that employment of persons who were denied
certification by IPTF be terminated, and that such persons be pre-
cluded from employment, either now or in the future, in any posi-
tion within any law enforcement agency in BiH.42

A variety of reasons have been offered to explain this response,

including the potential impact of this episode on the sustainability of the
UN reform period in Bosnia as a whole, and fears of setting a precedent
that might affect similar questions related to other previous missions
and might damage the UNs reputation. An alternative reading is to
look at the possible bureaucratic and financial impulses within the UN
had a different position been taken on this issue.43 Regardless of what
motivated this position, and even if UN Security Council Presidential
statements are not legally binding, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
instructed all relevant authorities in the country to act in accordance
with UNMIBH/IPTF certification decisions.44
The Federation Association of Decertified Policemen and the RS
Association of Decertified Policemen were founded, respectively, on
2 February 2004 and 31 January 2005. These two associations resembled
in many ways pressure groups that mobilised to defend the rights of
the 281 former police officers they represented. Their ultimate objec-
tive was a review of the UNMIBH/IPTF decisions and reinstatement of
police officers judged unjustifiably disqualified. These associations con-
ducted legal and political battles lobbying for policy change and gained
increasing sympathy from the Bosnian public. Their efforts in Bosnia
(mainly focused in Sarajevo) included a range of actions from peace
protests, demonstrations and hunger strikes, to letters and petitions,
media campaigns, meetings with international and Bosnian officials
and the coordination of at least 157 applications to the European Court
of Human Rights, according to ESI data from 2007.45
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 187

It would be far-fetched to argue that the two Associations of Decertified

Policemen, on their own, could have been successful in bringing about
change. The OHR mainly, but also the Human Rights Commissioner
of the Council of Europe, played significant mediating roles.46 Neverthe-
less, these associations were important in providing the initial drive.
Among their successes at national level was the decision in 2006 by
the Bosnian authorities to form a State Commission to investigate the
claims of those decertified police officers who had taken their cases to
Bosnian courts. While being careful not to undermine the authority
of the UN, the Bosnian state was nevertheless enacting its responsibil-
ity to protect the human rights of Bosnian citizens. However, from its
inception, the State Commission came under intense pressure from the
OHR and certain Peace Implementation Council members, on the basis
of concerns about the impact it could have on the UN legacy in Bosnia
and other reform processes (to which we turn later in the chapter).47
Some local courts, the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Commission
of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina joined in calls ques-
tioning whether the dismissals during the UN period complied with the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. Similar criti-
cisms emerged at the European level. The Council of Europes Venice
Commission expressed concern about the lack of transparency and the
integrity of the appeals system and recommended that the UN not the
Bosnian authorities should set up an individual review process to look
into the claims of the Associations of Decertified Policemen, without
questioning the legitimacy of the whole process. This was supported by
the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, but rejected by the UN.
The Venice Commission emphasised that the certification process was
for life and the socio-economic consequences for affected individuals
were considerable (in terms of employment and also reputation and
standing in society especially if decertified on the grounds of war crimes
or human rights violations). It freed the Bosnian state from any blame
stating that it was bound to implement the UNMIBH/IPTF decisions
as part of the powers granted by the Dayton Accords and subsequent
UN decisions.48
The cumulative effect of these critical voices forced the UN Security
Council, in April 2007, to find a negotiated solution to their initial
policy that UN decisions on this matter could not be challenged. The
solution arrived at referred to improvements in the legal standards
and practices for the recruitment and selection of police officers within
BiH49 and, thus, allowed officers denied certification to apply as new
recruits (not to be reinstated) for police job vacancies in accordance
188 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

with existing Bosnian police laws. The only other condition was that
they disclose their decertified status in any application. There has been
much debate over the compromise implied in this decision, which
does not call into question the validity of the decision-making process
during the certification process, does not acknowledge UN wrongdoing
and uses very conservative language, perhaps in order to avoid setting
a precedent. Some Bosnian political authorities namely the then
Minister of Human Rights and Refugees tried to contest the April 2007
UN decision and proposed reinstatement of all those officers, but this
effort came to nothing. The response from members of the Associations
of Decertified Policemen ranged from optimism to what a long-standing
observer of Bosnian affairs described as cautious satisfaction.50 There
were also some whose response reportedly was immediate application
for a police job, although the ongoing downsizing of the police forces
to financially sustainable numbers casts some doubt as pointed out
by the ESI as to the number of vacancies that have become available
since then.51
This triumph has been overshadowed somewhat by the delay in
implementing the decision. Some commentators have blamed this on
the confusion among Bosnian and international organisations about
how to effectively implement the new Security Council decision.52 The
Associations of Decertified Policemen, therefore, continued to act
although less intensively, by organising peace protests and hunger
strikes with the support of the police trade unions to demand from the
OHR, but also EUPM, a prompt resolution of this new obstacle. For the
OHR, the problem lay with the State, Entity, Canton and Brcko District
authorities as responsible actors, in relation to the legislative changes
required to accommodate the new UN position. The OHR believed that
the two associations should be meeting with these Bosnian authori-
ties.53 Draft model amendments were nevertheless prepared by OHR
and EUPM to assist local authorities with the implementation of the
UN Security Council Presidents letter of April 2007, but it took over a
year for the relevant authorities (with the RS taking longer) to complete
the process.54
The Associations of Decertified Policemen played a role in the achieve-
ment of what had seemed impossible, forcing the UN to revise its posi-
tion vis--vis an issue that had serious socio-economic repercussions for
a specific group of Bosnian citizens. At the same time, not all the lessons
from this success story of civil society activism are positive. The manner
in which the process evolved raises several still unanswered questions
about the nature of the state-building process in Bosnia. Having the
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 189

Bosnian authorities meet the original demands of the two Associations

of Decertified Policemen (i.e. reinstatement of officers judged unjustifi-
ably disqualified) could have further politicised police reform at a time
when fresh attempts were being made to restructure Bosnias police sys-
tem (the 20048 Police Restructuring Process). One cannot forget that
there were instances, particularly in the early days, when local authori-
ties did try to politicise the certification process in order to protect their
own, while waging war against opposing political/ethnic factions
in other words, for reasons other than the goal of strengthening the
state-building process in Bosnia. Accusations of political manipulation
emerged as late as June 2008 from Raffi Gregorian, the then Principal
Deputy High Representative, who described as shameful the attempt
by politicians to feed false information about the OHR to these two
associations to mask their failure. One could interpret their failure as
referring to the compromise solution offered by the UN Security Council
or the difficulties in implementing the new policy.55
The activities of the two Associations of Decertified Policemen could
have set a dangerous precedent and/or reinvigorated challenges to other
areas of the international state-building project that were bringing much
needed change to the country, but on the basis of a similar exercise of
very extensive powers (i.e. OHRs Bonn Powers). In July 2006, Bosnias
Constitutional Court reached a judgement that the use of Bonn Powers
whereby elected officials could be dismissed by the High Representative
with no right to appeal, and with a consequent deprivation of a number
of civic rights, went against the countrys constitutional commitment
to uphold the right of all persons in Bosnia to protection under the
European Convention of Human Rights. The Court reminded all
affected parties that Bosnias international obligations to the OHR and UN
cannot determine the constitutional rights of people who are within
the jurisdiction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.56 The Bosnian authorities faced
a conundrum similar to the problems that surfaced during the certi-
fication process, of a collision course57 involving either the Bosnian
population or the international community. To return to the certification
process, irrespective of whether the Bosnian legal and political institu-
tions at the time had the capacity to review all contentious cases, solving
the conundrum by curtailing the ability of those institutions to respond
to the demands of the former police officers represented by the two asso-
ciations (as well as others who were not members of these associations)
may have satisfied claims about the countrys international obligations
and fears of unravelling the whole certification process.58 However,
it raises important questions about the essence of the post-Dayton
190 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

Bosnian state. It questions the legitimacy of the contractual relationship

between state and society introduced by the international community.
The Bosnian state had very limited capacity to fulfil the basic roles nor-
mally associated with stateness that is, to guarantee universal rights
to its citizens, provide public goods, and implement coherent decisions
despite potential competing interests.59 In fact, the activities of the two
associations and the mediating role played primarily by the OHR and
also the Council of Europe, rather than the actions of the Bosnian state,
were crucial for obtaining concessions in New York.

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that the certification process was a much needed

reform in post-Dayton Bosnia given the role of the police forces during
the war and in the immediate post-settlement phases.60 At the same
time, the use of non-democratic means to achieve democratic progress
within the institution of the police brought into play a number of
disturbing dynamics to quote Marcus Cox that were used by the
two Associations of Decertified Policemen to mobilise legally and politi-
cally.61 From a civil society point of view, the Associations of Decertified
Policemen are a case study with important lessons, even if the material
interests that motivated their actions were very narrow in scope. These
associations are a good example of the role that civil society activism
can play as a form of external oversight to ensure transparency and
accountability from decision-makers, whether national or international,
when wrongdoing is committed in the design and implementation of
top-down policies. It illustrates also that despite the short-termism,
projectmania62 and service-orientation that seems to have predomi-
nated among NGOs in Bosnia, there is room for more engaged civil
society actors in pursuit of inclusive and legitimate democratic reforms.
At the same time, the fact that these associations were in some respects
substituting for the state in defending the rights of a specific group of
Bosnian citizens reveals uncomfortable truths about the complexity
of state-building in a context of a strong international presence and
power, and weak local institutions. Referring to the situation as a choice
between human rights or the wishes of international bureaucrats63
may be an exaggeration. However, it does capture the dilemma during
the certification process. The Bosnian state had a duty to respond to the
needs of these citizens, but its exercise of that duty was hampered by
the protectorate-style approach introduced since Dayton. This is what
Bieber describes as the disempowering effects of overly interventionist
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 191

methods.64 At the same time, that very protectorate-style approach has

shielded many of the much needed reforms from the politicisation that
could ultimately undermine nascent institutions in Bosnia. There seem to
have been no substantive repercussions for the legitimacy of the Bosnian
state arising from the post-2002 police certification events perhaps,
in part, due to the small size of the affected group.65 Nevertheless
this episode of civil social activism raises important questions about
the sustainability of the state-building process as introduced by the
international community.

Notes
1. Bosnia is used throughout the chapter to refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
expression in the subtitle of the chapter is taken from R. Caplan (2005) Who
Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia, International
Peacekeeping, 12(3), pp. 46376. The author is indebted to the editors of this
volume and the anonymous reviewers, to participants in a seminar held
in May 2010 at the London School of Economics and Political Science and
in May 2011 at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain), and to
Christopher McDowell and Cynthia Little for comments and suggestions
that helped to improve the arguments developed in this chapter. The author
is also particularly grateful to the many interviewees in Bosnia who prefer
to remain anonymous but have provided invaluable assistance during the
research process for the themes developed here. All errors and omissions are
the authors responsibility alone.
2. M. Caparini (2004) Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector:
A Preliminary Investigation, Working Paper 132 (Geneva: DCAF permission to
cite received from the institution and the author), p. 25.
3. T. Edmunds (2007) Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia,
Serbia and Montenegro (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 334.
4. Caplan (2005), op. cit., p. 46376.
5. For a detailed exploration of the meaning and impact of unintended con-
sequences in security governance, see C. Daase and C. Friesendorf (eds)
(2010) Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences
(London: Routledge). This volume focuses primarily on the gap between
intentions and outcomes observed during the implementation of interna-
tional policies.
6. An explanation of the motivation for this NGO focus is beyond the scope of
this chapter. For a discussion of this issue, see R. Belloni (2001) Civil Society
and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Journal of Peace Research,
38(2), pp. 16380; C. Simmons (2007) Womens Work and the Growth of
Civil Society in Post-War Bosnia, Nationalities Papers, 35(1), pp. 17186;
D. Chandler (1999) Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto
Press), pp. 13553; A. Fagan (2010) Europes Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil
Society or State-Building? (New York: I. B. Tauris), pp. 117.
7. USAID (2010) The 2009 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe
and Eurasia, 13th edition (Washington, DC: USAID), p. 74.
192 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

8. A. Fagan (2005) Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton, International
Peacekeeping, 12(3), p. 410.
9. R. Belloni (2007) State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia
(London: Routledge), p. 112.
10. Fagan (2005), op. cit., p. 407. According to Yannick du Pont, OSCE sup-
port for civil society development in Bosnia was based on the assumption
that, in part due to its universal citizenship, it would act as a counterforce
to nationalist authorities. Y. du Pont (2000) Democratisation through
Supporting Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Helsinki Monitor,
11(4), p. 8.
11. An analysis of the motivations for this role attributed to civil society is
beyond the scope of this chapter. Roberto Belloni relates them to failures in
other international political, economic and social strategies. Belloni (2001),
op. cit.
12. S. Sampson (2003) From Forms to Norms: Global Projects and Local
Practices in the Balkan NGO Scene, Journal of Human Rights, 2(3), p. 334.
13. Belloni (2001), op. cit., p. 178. See also Chandler (1999), op. cit., pp. 1523;
F. Bieber (2002) Aid Dependency in Bosnian Politics and Civil Society:
Failures and Successes of Post-War Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatian International Relations Review, JanuaryJune, p. 27.
14. Bieber (2002), op. cit., p. 28.
15. Fagan (2005), op. cit., p. 417; Fagan (2010), op. cit., pp. 77110, 18291.
16. V. Pupavac (2005) Empowering Women? An Assessment of International
Gender Policies in Bosnia, International Peacekeeping, 12(3), p. 397.
17. USAID (2010), op. cit., p. 74. For similar observations on the relationship
between NGOs and Bosnian authorities, see du Pont (2000), op. cit., p. 15;
Fagan (2005), op. cit.
18. Note here that civil society organisations can also become advocacy actors
on nationalist platforms, reinforcing the existing situation.
19. A. Fagan (2008) Global-Local Linkage in the Western Balkans: The Politics
of Environmental Capacity Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Political Studies,
56(3), p. 648; Fagan (2010), op. cit., p. 189.
20. For a more detailed explanation, see Fagan (2005), op. cit., p. 409; Bieber
(2002), op. cit., pp. 278.
21. Simmons (2007), op. cit., pp. 1767.
22. USAID (2010), op. cit., pp. 74, 78.
23. Ibid.
24. Centre for European Perspective and EUPM (2009) Seminar on Police Reform
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 46 June 2008 (Ljubljana: Centre for
European Perspective), p. 23.
25. Anonymous interview with a senior member of a Bosnian civil society
organisation, Sarajevo, September 2010. See also M. Fittipaldi (2006) Security
Sector Reform and the Media in Bosnia, February (Sarajevo: Centre for Security
Studies BiH); M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite (2005) ESDP Police Missions:
Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges, European Foreign Affairs
Review, 10(2), p. 232.
26. For an elaboration of this point, see G. Collantes-Celador (2005) Police Reform:
Peacebuilding through Democratic Policing? International Peacekeeping,
12(3), p. 370.
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 193

27. For examples, see M. Berdal, G. Collantes-Celador and M. Zupcevic Buzadzic

(2011) Post-War Violence in Bosnia, in M. Berdal and A. Suhrke (eds) The
Peace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding (London: Routledge),
pp. 7982, 87.
28. UNMIBH/IPTF internal policy documents issued in the period 20002.
29. For an elaboration of this point, see Collantes-Celador (2005), op. cit.,
p. 371; G. L. Naarden (2003) Nonprosecutorial Sanctions for Grave Violations
of International Human Rights Law: Wartime Conduct of Bosnian Police
Officials, The American Journal of International Law, 97(2), pp. 34252.
30. ESI (2007) On Mount Olympus, Berlin/Brussels/Istanbul, 10 February, execu-
tive summary; Council of Europe (Commissioner for Human Rights) (2006)
Issue of Decertified Police Officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Mission
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 202 December, para. 24; UN Security
Council (2002) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Document No. S/2002/1314, New York, 2 December,
para. 11.
31. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009.
32. Other explanations include the narrow definition of police officer adopted
to decide on who within law enforcement agencies had to be screened.
Collantes-Celador (2005), op. cit., p. 371.
33. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009.
34. UNMIBH/IPTF internal policy document, 2002.
35. According to Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, the appeals panel was set up following
a legal opinion from the UNs Office of Legal Affairs in New York. A. Mayer-
Rieckh (2007) Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police,
Courts and Prosecutors Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in A. Mayer-
Rieckh and P. de Greiff (eds) Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in
Transitional Societies (New York: Social Science Research Council), p. 16.
36. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009.
37. Ibid.
38. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009;
Anonymous phone interview with EUPM official, November 2011. The police
personnel downsizing efforts in the post-UN period were independent from,
and driven by a different set of motivations to, the certification process.
39. UN Security Council (2004) The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies Report of the Secretary-General, Document No.
S/2004/616, New York, 23 August, paras 523.
40. Ibid.
41. ESI (2007), op. cit., p. 16.
42. UN (2007) Letter from Emyr Jones Parry, President of the Security Council, to His
Excellency Mr Milos Prica, Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the United Nations, New York, 30 April, p. 1.
43. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009.
44. ESI (2007), op. cit., p. 22 and 24. Interestingly this ESI report notes that the
police legislation at the time ended up going further than the original decer-
tification sanctions by adding that those police officers could not work for or
establish private security companies and could not stand for election (if their
dismissal had been confirmed by the UN). The UN 2007 letter does mention
that there is no prohibition on employment in private security companies.
194 Civil Society and Bosnian Police Certification

45. Ibid., p. 27.

46. Consult ESIs 2007 report On Mount Olympus (pp. 1625) for a detailed
account of the role played by former High Representative Paddy Ashdown.
His successor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, made it a priority during his time
at the OHR.
47. Ibid., pp. 2830. The Peace Implementation Council comprises 55 countries
and agencies that provide international support to the peace process, includ-
ing political guidance to the OHR.
48. Council of Europe (2005) Opinion on a Possible Solution to the Issue of
Decertification of Police Officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Opinion No. 326/2004,
Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 64th Plenary Session, Strasbourg,
24 October; Council of Europe (2006) op. cit.
49. UN (2007), op. cit., pp. 12.
50. N. Ahmetasevic (2007) Sacked Police Hope for Justice at Last in Bosnia,
BalkanInsight, 9 May.
51. Ibid.
52. BalkanInsight (2008) Sacked Bosnia Policemen End Hunger Strike, 23 June.
53. OHR (2007) OHR Statement on Todays Demonstration by Police Officers
who Failed to Secure Certification by the UN/IPTF, Press Release, Sarajevo,
10 December.
54. OHR (2008) Protest in Front of a Wrong Address, Press Release, Sarajevo,
10 December.
55. OHR (2008) Manipulation of Former Police Officers Shameful, Press Release,
Sarajevo, 12 June.
56. Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006) Decision on
Admissibility and Merits in the Case Milorad Bilbija and Dragan Kalinic,
Document No. AP-953/05, 8 July (published in mid-February 2007), para. 68.
57. ESI (2007) Legal Dynamite: How a Bosnian Court may Bring Closer the End of
the Bosnian Protectorate, Berlin/Brussels/Istanbul, 12 March, p. 3. See also
B. Topic (2007) Decertified Police Officers: A State Caught Between Human
Rights and International Obligations, Puls Demokratije, 15 May, http://www.
pulsdemokratije.ba/index.php?a=print&l=en&id=385 (accessed on 19 June
2007). The removal from office of Bosnian officials using Bonn Powers is not
necessarily permanent as High Representatives have in the past repealed the
ban for those individuals where the reasons for removal no longer applied.
An example of this is the repeal decision taken by High Representative
Valentin Inzko on a number of banned Bosnian officials following Mladics
arrest and extradition to The Hague. Decisions to repeal bans have always
been carefully worded to ensure they are not used to question the original
removal decision, and are not interpreted as requiring compensation or
restoration to the position held before the removal. Bosnian and interna-
tional courts may nevertheless, as outlined by Matthew Parish, face several
years adjudicating compensation claims for breaches of the affected
individuals human rights. M. Parish (2011) The Silent Passing of Europes
Proconsulship in Bosnia, BalkanInsight, 15 June.
58. In this regard, as noted by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the interna-
tional community has expressed concerned over a law passed in the RS in July
2011. The RS Minister of Internal Affairs at the time, Stanislav Cado, claimed
that this law complies with the 2007 UN Security Council Presidential letter,
 Gemma Collantes-Celador 195

while EUPM officials fear that it will be used as a faade to quietly promote
police officers denied certification. ICG (2011) Bosnia: What Does Republika
Srpska Want? Europe Report No. 214, 6 October, p. 10.
59. B. Bliesemann de Guevara (2008) Material Reproduction and Stateness in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in M. Pugh, N. Cooper and M. Turner (eds) Whose
Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (London:
Palgrave Macmillan), p. 375.
60. This was emphasised by a senior Bosnian police official and a senior mem-
ber of a Bosnian civil society organisation during anonymous interviews,
Sarajevo, September 2009 and September 2010, respectively.
61. M. Cox (2003) Building Democracy from the Outside: The Dayton Agreement
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in S. Bastian and R. Luckham (eds) Can
Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn
Societies (London/New York: Zed Books), p. 272.
62. Simmons (2007), op. cit., p. 174.
63. Topic (2007), op. cit.
64. Bieber (2002), op. cit., p. 25.
65. Anonymous interview with police expert, Sarajevo, September 2009.
11
The Paradox of Demobilising a
Civil Protection Actor: Build-Up
and Stand-Down of the KPC
in Kosovo
Jens Narten

This chapter scrutinises the process by which the Kosovo Protection

Corps (KPC) came into being and was later dissolved, after a period
of ten years of international peace-building in Kosovo from 1999 to
2009. It was the establishment of the KPC that prepared the ground on
which Kosovo society which took action to protect its own survival
as a people during the war could transform itself successfully into a
democratic and rather non-violent post-war civil society. Absorbing
large numbers of ex-guerillas into the non-state civilian KPC was meant
to significantly reduce the risk of civil unrest for the nascent post-war
society in Kosovo. The proper understanding of this civilian function
of demobilisation and absorption is needed if one is to comprehend,
and draw on thorough conclusions, the set-up of todays civil society in
Kosovo. Although the KPC was politically seen as the demobilised suc-
cessor organisation to the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
therefore as an army in waiting it was officially established as a civil
protection actor tasked with humanitarian disaster relief and emergency
response. In order to weaken its army-in-waiting potential, the interna-
tional community (through the 2007 Ahtisaari proposal) pushed the
Kosovo government after its declaration of Kosovos independence to
demobilise the KPC despite its status as a non-state civilian actor, and to
resettle most of its members through a special socio-economic reintegra-
tion programme, implemented in cooperation with civil society-based
organisations and local entrepreneurs. What is a novelty and of special
interest about the demobilisation process of the KPC from a civil society
perspective is the process and the underlying reasons of building up
a civil protection actor in a post-conflict peace-building environment
(such as Kosovo after 1999) in order to demobilise an armed group, and
196
 Jens Narten 197

then force such a civilian actor to demobilise and resettle again in the
context of an army-in-waiting with a too strong KLA legacy. Scrutinising
this process has demonstrated the highly ambiguous perception of the
KPC as a civil protection actor throughout the entire peace-building proc-
ess since 1999 in post-war Kosovo. The chapter finds that the renewed
demobilisation of a disarmed civil protection actor, such as the KPC,
represents a remarkable outcome of a constant bargaining, renegotiation
and co-optation process between local and international stakeholders
involved in Kosovos overall peace-building process.

Civil society in Kosovo

Under the Miloevic regime in the 1990s, significant parts of the civil
society in Kosovo contributed to the parallel structures of the unilater-
ally declared (but internationally unrecognised) Republic of Kosova, led
by President Rugova. Following the abolishment of Kosovos autonomy
in 1989, most Kosovo Albanians were excluded from their working
places in the public sector, replaced by Kosovo Serbs. As the socio-politi-
cal repression by the Belgrade government increased by the mid-1990s,
more and more local NGOs supported the Kosovo Albanian struggle for
independence. After the war and the consecutive international humani-
tarian intervention in 1999, many former NGO members were recruited
to work in international humanitarian NGOs or organisations, or joined
the local administrative structures ( JIAS) in cooperation with the United
Nations interim administration (UNMIK). However, the massive influx
of humanitarian and development aid and financial support into post-
war Kosovo led to an extreme growth of local NGOs in numbers, many of
which never became fully operational but served the purpose of securing
family income in the artificially inflated NGO market in Kosovo after
the war.1 In parallel, the international donor community opted not to
build on the remnants of Kosovos pre-war civil society organisations
but supported the establishment of new local NGOs, from which they
demanded implementation of the Western state-building agenda in
exchange for their donor support. This policy had the effect that many
local NGOs started to operate with an agenda detached from the generic
interests of the local majority population, in order to secure external
funding and often based on internationally imposed (but rather lip
service-oriented) priorities to promote internal peace, multi-ethnicity
and interethnic reconciliation.2
In the following years, this policy clashed with Kosovo Albanian inter-
ests to foster political independence from Serbia right up until Kosovos
198 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

final independence in 2008 (this time with wide international recogni-

tion). Moreover, many NGOs funded by international organisations
aggravated the local brain drain effect with their recruitment policy as
the most talented and best educated local personnel were recruited by
internationally funded NGOs or organisations, which regularly paid a
much higher salary than the local public sector. The effect was a severe
lack of such personnel in the local labour market: physicians, engineers
or administration experts preferred working as drivers or translators
rather than work for the local administration. This left the latter power-
less and understaffed.3 Taken together and as a direct consequence of
this development, citizens in post-war Kosovo hardly became actively
involved in the countrys civil society in its original civic meaning.
However, a strong sense of political support of Kosovos struggle for
independence prevailed throughout the early 2000s, which formed the
dominant public opinion in Kosovo and led to a high level of sympa-
thy and popular self-identification with the successor organisations to
Kosovos former liberation army, such as the KPC.4 The perception of the
Kosovo Albanian majority population strongly reflected the deep-rooted
popular feeling that the members of the KPC were to be regarded as
legitimate resistance fighters who were recruited from within the former
Kosovo society under siege by the Miloevic regime. It is within this
wider understanding of what forms the essential underlying elements of
Kosovos post-war civil society that it is necessary to shed light on the
build-up, and stand-down, of the KPC as an important non-state actor
in Kosovo.5 This process was embedded in, and strongly supported by,
actors of the civil society.

The build-up of the KPC

After the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and the withdrawal of

Serb forces on the basis of the Military Technical Agreement between
NATO and Belgrade on 9 June 1999, UN resolution 1244 called for the
demilitarisation of the KLA.6 Ten days later, this provision was codified
in the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the
UK as of 20 June 1999, agreed upon by the KLA and the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR), as also non-NATO states provided troops. This
agreement became the key document for the initial disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration of KLA fighters into civil society.
Apart from reaffirming KFORs final authority over all security aspects
in Kosovo, the KLA also agreed to its complete disarmament, KFOR-
controlled weapon storage and the complete disbandment of its troops
 Jens Narten 199

within 90 days under the supervision of a joint KFORKLAUN

Implementation Commission.7 In return, the international actors
involved would give due consideration to: (a) recognition that the
UK is committed to propose individual current members to par-
ticipate in the administration and police forces of Kosovo, enjoying
special consideration in view of expertise they have developed; (b) the
formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard
in due course as part of a process designed to determine Kosovos
future status.8
While former KLA membership was introduced from 2000 as an
additional qualifying criterion in the recruitment process of Kosovos
40007000 strong Police Service (KPS) in accordance with this agree-
ment, the formation of a Kosovo Army designed on the model of the
US National Guard never materialised. Instead, the KPC was tasked with
disaster response, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, demining
and rebuilding of infrastructure, without any role in law enforcement
or the maintenance of law and order.9 KFOR and UNMIK had urged
the KLA to officially transform the core of its troops into a civilian
emergency service agency, the civilian KPC, designed on the model of
the French Securit Civile.10 Such essential co-optation of the June 1999
Undertaking was made possible by a series of implicit compromises
among the KLA, KFOR and UNMIK. For example, the bulk of the 3000
active and 2000 reserve troops of the newly established KPC were to be
recruited from KLA ranks (mainly KLA officers). Furthermore, the KPC
would retain the existing KLA military command structure and its dense
network of facilities and barracks throughout Kosovo. Finally, the KPC
would be allowed to keep 2000 weapons under joint KPC/KFOR storage,
350 of them for active guarding of its facilities.11 Through this compro-
mise, the former KLA and new KPC leadership could hope to effectively
maintain the core KLA structure in the form of a demilitarised civilian
KPC as an army-in-waiting to be upgraded into a regular army once
Kosovo gained independence. In this context, former KLA commander-
in-chief and the then KPC commander eku declared: We see the KPC
as a bridge towards the future, from the KLA as a wartime organisation
towards a regular, modern army of Kosovo.12 International stakeholders
had also accepted this vision: former UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General Kouchner stated that the artful arrangement [of the
KPC] allowed to take account of what was for the international com-
munity an impassable red line, at the same time offering to General
eku and half of his men a structure and means that would allow them
to prepare an armed force one day.13 Interestingly in this context,
200 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

the Albanian translation of Kosovo Protection Corps is Trupat Mbrojtse

T Kosovs, which in Albanian has two meanings Corps for the
Protection of Kosovo and Corps for the Defense of Kosovo.
With respect to demobilisation and consecutive capacity-building of
the KPC, UNMIK and KFOR tasked the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM) with a five-month registration and screening process of
KLA veterans and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, into the
private sector and into the new KPC, all of which contributed to the initial
stabilisation of post-war Kosovo. For the 25,723 KLA veterans registered by
IOM by November 1999, two programmes were of special importance.14
The first one was the IOM Information Counselling and Referral Service
(ICRS) running from 1999 to 2003; the second one was IOMs Kosovo
Protection Corps Training Programme (KPCTP) from 2000 to 2004.
The ICRS started as early as August 1999 and later included the KPC
Recruitment Battery Test, through which the initial 4552 KPC members
were selected by a joint KFORKLAUNMIK commission from an overall
group of some 18,000 applicants.15 The remaining 15,000+ registered
KLA members were eligible to benefit from a wide range of vocational
and on-the-job training and education programmes, micro enterprises
and agricultural support, in-kind equipment, self-employment start-up
stipends and grants, job referral and financial incentives for employers,
psychosocial assistance and rehabilitation projects, all of which were
financed by the IOM-managed Reintegration Fund. The aim was to
reintegrate veterans into the civilian sphere by linking former combat-
ants with private employers, in consultation with or with the direct par-
ticipation of receiving local communities, municipal authorities and a
number of international cooperating partners and donors. Overall 9785
KLA veterans (and 58,275 family dependents) benefited from this pro-
gramme; as did the 1515 urban and rural businessmen providing 9785
employment positions.16 The KPCTP programme, in turn, aimed at con-
verting military KLA structures into civilian ones. The programme was
also developed and conducted by IOM and aimed at enabling the KPC
to meet its mandate of civilian emergency response. It consisted of five
training phases from February 2000 to April 2004, and an additional
sixth phase added in May 2004.17 However, in October 2004, following
a massive reduction in the core US funding for the KPC Trust Fund, the
KPCTP programme had to close down due to a lack of secured funding
in the IOM-run KPC Trust Fund. However, despite major input of the
KPC to the content of the KPCTP, additional input or partial oversight
of the KPC by local provisional institutions for self-government (PISG)
was ruled out by the international stakeholders involved.18
 Jens Narten 201

In terms of effective peace-building output, the programmes rather

disciplining effect of the KLA registration for KPC recruitment resulted
in a significant consolidation of the (until then fragile) post-war situa-
tion in 19992000. Over 20,000 of the total 25,000 KLA veterans applied
for service in the KPC, whose strict policy was to reject any applicant
with a criminal record during the application process and thereafter.19
While the outcome of KLA-related disarmament and general weapon
collection programmes was rather disappointing, IOMs reintegration
programmes for ex-combatants largely succeeded in keeping the bulk
of KLA troops busy and focused on a career in the new KPC. Such a
medium-term truce function can thus be considered a key achieve-
ment of KLAs conversion into the KPC.

Renegotiating the KPC deal

Longer-term cooperation and coordination between the KPC and KFOR/

UNMIK who exercised oversight and control functions over the KPC
through KFORs KPC Inspectorate and UNMIKs Office of the KPC
Coordinator became problematic after early 2001 when suspicion arose
about direct involvement of former KLA and active KPC members in ille-
gal and criminal activities as well as after the March 2004 riots against
ethnic minorities.20 Stronger oversight ambitions by KFOR and UNMIK,
following the March 2004 riots and at the end of IOMs training pro-
gramme led to intensified KFOR/UNMIK efforts to assist the KPC to
develop its own training capacity.21 Following a deterioration in trust
and in order to place the KPC structures as an army-in-waiting under
tighter control, the Head of UNMIK and UN Special Representative
Steiner initiated a policy in 2002 known as standards before status,
which aimed at linking the commencement of status talks with meeting
local standards, inter alia with respect to the KPCs increased financial
transparency, minority incorporation and purely civilian focus.22
However, the events of the Kosovo-wide riots in March 2004 radically
changed the bargaining position of Kosovo Albanian stakeholders vis-
-vis KFOR and UNMIK and led to a renewed co-optation process with
respect to the demilitarised KLAKPC option. The first indicator of this
was the thematic reopening of Kosovos unresolved status question in
the two reports compiled in 2004 and 2005 by UN Special Envoy Eide
after the March riots.23 At that time, the international perception of the
KPC and the policy of their tight control by international stakeholders
had been in flux. In summer 2006, the Contact Group (CG) members (the
US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) agreed on 13 priority areas
202 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

for the local PISG government that watered down UNMIKs formerly
strict standards. None of these areas was directly related to the KPC.24
In 2007, UNMIKs comprehensive Assessment of Standard Goals to
April 2007 found most of the KPC-related standards fulfilled including
compliance with the law, efforts to recruit minorities and reconstruct
minority communities, transparent and independently audited fund-
ing, reduction of KPC installations, introduction of a disciplinary code
and so on.25
The political turn with respect to the KPC finally came about under
UNMIKs new SRSG Sren Jessen-Petersen, who arrived after the 2004
riots. In close cooperation with the Western member states of the CG
(the Quint) and the EU, Jessen-Petersen initiated and steered the UK-
managed compilation of the 2006 Kosovo Internal Security Sectors
Review (KISSR). This broad review culminated in a detailed outline
proposing a comprehensive security framework for Kosovo, includ-
ing the establishment of a (re)armed Kosovo Defence Force (KDF, later
Kosovo Security Force/KSF) to be supervised by international forces and
depending on the continued transfer of competencies and decisions on
status. As a justification for such a policy, it was argued in the KISSR
that, should the international community attempt to deny an inde-
pendent Kosovo its own defence force, action would be taken to create
such a force.26 According to the KISSR recommendations, the bulk of
active KPC members were to be demobilised covered by an IOM/
UNDP resettlement and pension programme and a small percentage
of KPC members would be transferred to a new defence force. During
the KISSR bargaining process, the Kosovo Albanian leadership seemed
to have insisted on using the KPC as the primary source of recruit-
ment for the KDF. Trained and funded by NATO/KFOR, the future KDF
would support KFOR operations in Kosovo (in order to allow a gradual
withdrawal of KFOR troops some time in the future), while oversight
authorities held by UNMIKs Office of the KPC Coordinator would be
transferred to a new Kosovo Ministry of Defence.27
In March 2007, this co-optation became manifest in the Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement by UN Special Envoy for
Kosovo, Ahtisaari,28 which followed 14 months of inconclusive status
talks between Belgrade and Pristina between 2006 and 2007. As neither
side could agree on an effective compromise with respect to Kosovos
future political status (autonomy versus independence), Ahtisaari pre-
sented his own proposal of an internationally supervised sovereignty
for Kosovo to be endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC). In this
proposal, and in line with the KISSR, he suggested the dissolution of the
 Jens Narten 203

KPC through a renewed demobilisation and reintegration process for

KPC retirees, and the establishment of a lightly armed KSF. This would
have 2500 active and 800 reserve members and no heavy weapons,
and would fall under civilian governmental control and international
control by KFOR and a new International Civilian Representative, the
ICR. These limits in manpower and equipment were meant to be subject
to a review process by KFOR and the ICR after a period of five years.
With this set-up, the KSF would take over crisis response, demining and
civil protection tasks from the KPC, but could also be tasked with other
security functions not appropriate for the police or other law enforce-
ment organisations (meaning military functions) upon authorisation
by KFOR and the ICR.29

Kosovos independence and stand-down of the KPC

As UNSCs endorsement of the Ahtisaari proposal was prevented by
Russian veto threats and after another unsuccessful trilateral facilitation
attempt to find a compromise between Belgrade and Pristina (EUUS
Russia Troika Process) the newly elected Kosovar assembly and govern-
ment under former KLA Commander-in-Chief and new Prime Minister
Hashim Thai decided to declare Kosovos independence from Serbia
as a sovereign state in February 2008.30 The declaration of independence
was announced as being in full accordance with the recommendations
of the Ahtisaari proposal, which was declared legally binding for Kosovo
and would be incorporated into Kosovos new constitution.31 As a result,
the Constitution entered into force in June 2008 and included provisions
for a Kosovo Security Force to be established under control by democrati-
cally elected civilian authorities and to protect the people and commu-
nities of the Kosovo Republic.32
Parallel to this process, the Kosovo Assembly issued two new laws
related to the KPC and the KSF. The Law on the Dissolution of the Kosovo
Protection Corps foresaw dissolving and demobilising the KPC, under
the control of KFOR (International Military Presence/IMP) and the
International Civilian Office (ICO), within one year after the constitu-
tion entered into force (transition period) and parallel to a demobilisa-
tion and resettlement programme for current eligible members of the
KPC. All KPC members would be able to apply for service in the new
Kosovo army or for the KPC pension, severance package and reset-
tlement programme.33 The new Law on Service in the Kosovo Security
Force, on the other hand, provided for the regulation of service in
and the initial start-up of the KSF by the new KSF Ministry. The
Kosovo Security Force would be a flexible force with no territorial
204 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

affiliation and may be deployed abroad. KFOR/IMP would have the

overall responsibility for the initial establishment, development and
training of the KSF, as well as for the development of a formal selection
procedure for KSF members together with the Kosovo government.34
With respect to former KPC members, their initial appointment and
rank within the new Security Force may take account of their former
ranks, appointment and experience within the KPC. Furthermore, all
former KPC members within the new KSF were guaranteed the amount
of their former KPC salary, while the general age criteria of maximum 30
years for KSF officers and 25 for other ranks might be waived for former
KPC members.35
By end of January 2009, the new Kosovo Security Force was officially
established and the recruitment process commenced with a joint com-
mission of KFOR/ICO and the Kosovar authorities. This triggered an
immediate protest by the Belgrade government.36 In coordination with
KFOR/ICO, the Kosovar Government and UNMIKs KPC Coordinator,
UNDP was tasked as implementing agency with the management of a
$20 million budget of NATOs KSF Trust Fund and with conducting the
KPC Resettlement Programme (KPCRP). Starting in January 2009, some
1400 former KPC members benefitted from this three-year assistance pro-
gramme (including a 12-month severance payment and a business start-
up or job-placement option), planned and implemented by UNDP in
close partnership with the local Employment Promotion Agency, APPK.37
The KPCRP represented a follow-up programme for the civilian resettle-
ment of former KPC members most of them ex-KLA fighters after ten
years of international peace-building in Kosovo. For the KSF, disaster relief
training similar to IOMs 20004 KPCTP was envisaged to be continued
under the KFORs new training programme for the KSF.38 However, as a
security force rearmed with light weapons, the focus of the KSF mandate
lies on a quasi-military defence function.

Conclusion

Taken together, Kosovos post-war society has experienced a process

of double demobilisation from the demilitarised KLA into the civilian
disaster relief organisation KPC, and back into the rearmed military
security force KSF. This process was effectively buffered by a first gen-
eration of civilian reintegration efforts from 1999 to 2003, and again
by a renewed one for civilian resettlement from 2009 to 2011. Out of
the 20,00025,000 registered former KLA members, some 4500 (mainly
officers) were demobilised into the KPC (while some 1700 were absorbed
 Jens Narten 205

by the KPS). Another 10,000 benefited from IOMs reintegration pro-

grammes during that time. Some ten years later, starting in January 2009,
roughly 1400 KPC officers were in the process of becoming rearmed
within Kosovos new Security Force; while another 1400 benefitted from
UNDPs resettlement programme. These renewed efforts covered the
bulk of the some 2900 active KPC members in 2008.39 In essence, the
army-in-waiting option as favoured by the former KLA/KPC leadership
and tolerated by the KFOR and UNMIK has led to a long-term civil-
ian resettlement of nearly the entire KLA membership as of June 1999,
and to a strictly controlled rearmament of only a small group of former
KLA officers. This outcome has effectively satisfied Kosovo Albanian
interests in keeping these officers on duty in the new KSF structures,
and has served the interests of international stakeholders in an encom-
passing and sustainable demilitarisation of the former KLA. Thus, both
sides have been able to compromise on this form of co-optation of
initial security provisions in post-war Kosovo since 1999. However, Serb
stakeholders widely opted to boycott participation in the KLAKPCKSF
transition process, despite their limited engagement in the 2006 KISSR
process and the Ahtisaari-led status talks. Serb recruitment for the
KPC was also minimal, and is likely to remain so for the new KSF,
although both organisations were designed as multi-ethnic bodies. In
that respect cross-ethnic incorporation of all potential stakeholders was
not achieved.
The case study shows how ambiguous the role of the KPC as a demo-
bilised civilian actor was (and still remains for the KSF). Its legacy as a
successor organisation of Kosovos former liberation army was perceived
as a potential threat, both by the international community as well as
by minority groups inside Kosovo. However, the sudden turnaround
in UNMIKs and KFORs policy on the KPC from a tightly controlled
and purely civilian Protection Corps towards advocacy for the Corps
transformation into a rearmed defence force of Kosovo is remarkable
insofar as it has led to constant adaptation and co-optation of local
interests in relation to initial security provisions in post-war Kosovo.
The renewed demobilisation of a disarmed civil protection actor, such
as the KPC, represents a remarkable outcome of a constant bargaining,
renegotiation and co-optation process between local and international
stakeholders involved in Kosovos overall peace-building process. Such a
form of peace-building co-optation had effectively led to the paradox of
demobilising and dissolving the KPC as a civil protection actor in post-
war Kosovo in order to preventing a KLAKPC continuum in the build-
up of Kosovos new and lightly (re)armed Security Force. From the bulk
206 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

of registered KLA members in 1999, only a minor percentage was finally

recruited into the KSF. By doing so, the initial fear of a rearmament of
an army-in-waiting from the civilian KPC did not effectively materialise.
Following the stand-down and resettlement of the KPC, the limited
rearmament of the small KSF no longer poses a fundamental threat to
the peaceful development of Kosovos civil society or to neighbouring
countries in the Western Balkans, if kept under continued international
and local democratic oversight in the near future.
Finally and with regard to the civil society in Kosovo, this case study
generates two other remarkable findings. First, by its strong popular
support, both the build-up and the stand-down of the KPC was heav-
ily supported by the civil society actors in Kosovo, such as supporting
NGOs and local entrepreneurs as future employers. Second, this process
also shows the relative maturity of todays civil society in Kosovo: it
was willing to honour and to support former resistance fighters of the
KLA, first by keeping them as an army-in-waiting, later by integrating
most of them into local businesses and the civilian work force. It was
this strong support by civil society that helped prepare the ground for
Kosovos long-term democratic and rather peaceful stabilisation as a
young nation. This mutual relationship between the KPC as a non-state
civilian actor and Kosovos civil society at large also provides a key
example specific to other post-war civil societies and their special rela-
tionship with former resistance fighters to be integrated into peaceful
civilian structures. All in all, such proper understanding offers valuable
analytical insight and comparative background not only in relation to
Kosovo but also for the analysis of other post-war civil societies in the
Balkans and beyond.

Notes
1. J. Narten (2009) Assessing Kosovos Postwar Democratisation: Between
External Imposition and Local Self-Government, Taiwan Journal of Democracy,
5(1), pp. 12930.
2. A. Devic (2006) Transnationalisation of Civil Society in Kosovo: Inter-
national and Local Limits of Peace and Multiculturalism, Ethnopolitics, 5(3),
pp. 25762.
3. J. Narten (2009) Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership: The Case of
Postwar Kosovo, in R. Paris and T. Sisk (eds) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding:
Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London/New York:
Routledge), pp. 25760.
4. Kosovo Albanian satisfaction and public support used to rank around 98 per
cent after the war. See UNDP Early Warning Report Kosovo No. 20/21, Special
Edition, JanuaryJune 2008, p. 15.
 Jens Narten 207

5. Such understanding of KPS reflects the academic debate on civil society, con-
cerning specifically its organisational and normative pluralism as outlined
by Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic in this volume.
6. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (1999) Resolution 1244, Doc. No.
S/RES/1244, adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4011th meeting on
10 June 1999, para. 15.
7. Kosovo Liberation Army/KLA (1999) Undertaking of Demilitarisation and
Transformation by the UK, Signed on 20 June 1999, available at www.nato.
int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm (accessed on 15 January 2009), paras 3, 7,
20 and 23.
8. Ibid., para. 25.
9. UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (1999) On the Establishment of the Kosovo
Protection Corps, Doc. No. UNMIK/REG/1999/8, 20 September 1999, section 1.
10. Ibid., Art. 1.1; also see UNMIK (2001) A Constitutional Framework for Kosovo,
Doc. No. UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 May 2001; and A. Heinemann-Grder
and W. Paes (2001) Wag the Dog: The Mobilisation and Demobilisation of the
Kosovo Liberation Army, BICC brief 20, (Bonn: Bonn International Center for
Conversion/Friedrich Naumann Stiftung), p. 22.
11. KFOR Statement of Principles (1999) The Kosovo Protection Corps: Commander
of Kosovo Forces Statement of Principles, 20 September 1999, available at
www.iom.ipko.org (accessed on 10 December 2005); and South Eastern
and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SEESAC) (2006) SALW Survey of Kosovo, August. However, several
reports indicated that the KLA/KPC continued to dispose off clandestine
weapon stocks; see ibid., p. 20. Also see T. Ripley (2000) The UKs Arsenal,
Janes Intelligence Review, November, p. 22; S. Vaknin (2000) KLA: The Army
of Liberation, Central Europe Review, 7 June, text also available at www.
geocities.com/Athens/Forum/6297/pp56.html (accessed on 15 January 2009);
A. Khakee and N. Florquin (2003) Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment
of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo, UNDP special report, June,
p. 14; D. Pozhidaev and R. Andzhelich (2005) Beating Swords into Plowshares:
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Kosovo (Pristina: Center for Political and
Social Research), p. 57; and E. Petersen (2005) The Kosovo Protection Corps:
In Search of a Future: Field Notes (Groningen: Centre for European Security
Studies), p. 3.
12. Z. Kusovac (1999) Interview with General Agim eku, Janes Defence
Weekly, 20 October; as quoted in Heinemann-Grder and Paes (2001), op.
cit. p. 22.
13. General eku quoted in Pozhidaev and Andzhelich (2005), op. cit., p. 73;
also see B. Kouchner (2004) Les guerriers de la paix: Du Kosovo Iraq (Paris:
Bernard Grasset).
14. For the figures, see International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2000)
Socio-Economic and Demographic Profiles of Former KLA Combatants Registered
by IOM (Pristina: IOM); also see Petersen (2005), op. cit., p. 4.
15. Parallel to this, another group of 1668 former combatants joined the new
KPS, in which roughly 50 per cent of the initially mandated 4000-member
strong police force was set aside for KLA veterans; see Heinemann-Grder
and Paes (2001), op. cit., p. 27; IOM (2002), op. cit., p. 6.
16. See Pozhidaev and Andzhelich (2005), op. cit., pp. 34 and 62.
208 The Paradox of Demobilising a Civil Protection Actor

17. See International Organisation for Migration (2004) IOM Kosovo Protection
Corps Training Program (Pristina: IOM); also see Petersen (2005), op. cit., p. 4.
18. See IOM (2004), op. cit.; also A. DiLellio (2005) A Civil Alternative: An
Evaluation of the IOM KPC Program, Annotated Conflict Cases of the
Organisation Beyond Intractability, available at www.beyondintractability.
org/casestudy/dilellio-civil (accessed on 15 January 2009).
19. Ibid.
20. See Pozhidaev and Andzhelich (2005), op. cit., pp. 31 and 49. A group
of some 2500 ex-KLA fighters, who fell under suspicion of having joined
extremist groups inside and outside Kosovo, had been left unaccounted
for by the IOM programmes; see Heinemann-Grder and Paes (2001),
op. cit., p. 39.
21. See Petersen (2005), op. cit., p. 5.
22. See UNMIK and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) (2004)
Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, Pristina, 31 March, available at www.
unmikonline.org (accessed on 7 November 2005).
23. K. Eide (2004) Report on the Situation in Kosovo, Summary and Recommendations,
Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annex I Enclosure, Doc. No. S/2004/932,
30 November; K. Eide (2005) A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in
Kosovo, Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council, Annex, Doc. No. S/2005/635,
7 October.
24. See UN Secretary-General (UNSG) (2006) Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Doc. No. S/2006/707,
1 September, Annex I. Only the Technical Assessment of Progress in
Implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, as attached to the quarterly
report of the UNSG, mentioned the KPC and their task of reconstructing the
March 2004 damaged village of Svinjare in conjunction with CG priority
areas. See UNSG (2006), op. cit., Art. 46, in this note.
25. See UNMIK (2007) Assessment of Standard Goals, Pristina, May, Articles 1029.
26. UNDP and PISG (2006) Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review 2006 (Pristina:
ISSR), available at www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_
ver2.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2009), p. XVIII.
27. See UNDP/PISG (2006), op. cit., pp. 140 and 141.
28. See UNSG (2007) Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council. Addendum: Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Doc. No. S/2007/168/Add.1.
29. See UNSG (2007), op. cit., Annex XIII, Articles 5 and 6.
30. See J. Narten (2008) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership:
Dynamics of External-Local Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations
Administration, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2(3), pp. 3815.
31. See Kosovo Assembly (2008a) Kosovo Declaration of Independence, Signed by the
President of the Assembly of Kosova, Jakup Krasniqi, Pristina, 17 February, Art.
14 and 12.
32. See Kosovo Assembly (2008b) Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, as Entered
into Force on 15 June 2008, Pristina, Art. 126.
33. See Kosovo Assembly (2008c) On Dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps,
Law No. 03/L-083, 13 June, Art. 1 and 310.
 Jens Narten 209

34. See Kosovo Assembly (2008d) On Service in the Kosovo Security Force, Law
No. 03/L-0823, 13 June, Art. 1, 2 and 5.12.
35. See Kosovo Assembly (2008d) op. cit., Art. 5.35.4, 8.1 and 16.4.
36. See Agence France-Presse (2009) New Kosovo Security Force Angers Serbia,
available at www.reliefweb.int/ (accessed on 15 January 2009).
37. See Kosovo Protection Corps (2009) The KPC Resettlement Programme, out-
line available at www.tmk-ks.org/ (accessed on 15 January 2009); J. Narten
(2010) The Kosovo Protection Corps Resettlement Programme, in Institute
for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg et al., MultiPart Final
Thematic and Case-Study Report of Work Package 4a: Multi-Stakeholder Security
Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, available at http://www.multi-
part.eu/ (accessed on 25 December 2010).
38. See US State Department (2008) NATO Will Help Train New Kosovo Security
Force, available at www.america.gov/ (accessed on 16 June 2008).
39. See IOM (2000) op. cit.; IOM (2002) IOM Programme on Reintegration of Former
Combatants through the Information Counseling & Referral Service (ICRS) and
Reintegration Fund (RF). A Background Paper (Pristina: IOM); UNDP (2008) KPC
Resettlement Programme Manager, UNDP vacancy notice closed at 21 December
2008, available at www.kosovo.undp.org/ (accessed on 15 January 2009).
12
Serbian Civil Society as an
Exclusionary Space: NGOs, the
Public and Coming to Terms
with the Past
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik

One of the most pressing concerns of Serbias transition to democracy

is the question of responsibility for wars and war crimes committed
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1990. The EU has made
Serbias integration prospects conditional on its full cooperation with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Serbia has been notoriously reluctant in cooperating with the Tribunal,1
and by extension it is generally understood to be failing to come to terms
with its past. While at the state level this can be observed through the
reluctant ICTY cooperation and lack of engagement with transitional
justice on part of various post-Miloevic governments, at the societal
level the issue is much more contentious.
There is a lack of empirical data on the engagement of the Serbian
society with questions of the past, and hence the observations in this
case are either assumptions or are based on a series of surveys carried out
by the Serbian non-governmental organisation (NGO), Belgrade Centre
for Human Rights, who have traced Serbias attitude to the ICTY and
war crimes annually since 2001. The most worrying findings that are
quoted are as follows:

In 2009, 50 per cent of Serbias population declared itself to be very

little or not at all familiar with the work of the ICTY (declining
from 72 per cent in 2005).
In addition, 78 per cent of Serbian citizens of Serb origin declared
having a mostly negative or very negative view of the ICTY, in com-
parison to 10 per cent of citizens of Bosniak ethnicity and 4 per cent
of Albanian ethnicity.

210
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 211

Furthermore, of those surveyed, 68 per cent of Serbs oppose the arrest

and transfer of war crimes suspect Radovan Karadic (only 18 per
cent support it), with very similar figures for the arrest and transfer
of ICTY fugitive Ratko Mladic.
Also, only 55 per cent of Serbian citizens polled in 2009 claim to
have heard that Sarajevo was under siege (declining from 70 per cent
in 2001); but that only 38 per cent believe this has happened (declin-
ing from 53 per cent in 2001).
Finally, out of the 77 per cent of citizens who heard that large num-
bers of Bosnian Muslims were killed in Srebrenica, only 46 per cent
believe this actually took place.2

It is these figures which observers find alarming and that, despite the
work of the ICTY and local civil society initiatives to discuss and open
the past, Serbian society is still largely in denial of atrocities commit-
ted by the Serb forces in 1990s wars. When asked in a recent interview
how is Serbia working on the process of facing the past, Sonja Biserko,
a prominent activist and head of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
NGO, stated that

It has not even been possible to start the process, despite the fact that
many groups and individuals have worked on it through confer-
ences, panels, printing publications As a state and a society, Serbia
has not been engaged in the process at all.3

The apparent reluctance of Serbia to engage in the process of facing

the past in this way is often attributed to a poor understanding and
low demand for transitional justice in the country.4 Transitional justice
refers to processes which may be initiated by democratising states fol-
lowing periods of violence and human rights abuses for the purposes
of either bringing perpetrators to justice or alleviating the suffering
of victims.5 As scholars have argued, the originally narrow, primarily
legal, response to violent and repressive regimes has been broadened
to include much more holistic views of transitional justice,6 to include
societal dynamics and justice initiatives from below and to empha-
sise the importance of civil society and grass-roots initiatives in the
process.7
All approaches, however, are underscored by the belief that the legacy
of these massive crimes cannot simply be buried, and must somehow
be addressed8 preferably in public discursive spaces9 such as trials,
212 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

tribunals, special laws, and truth and reconciliation commissions. This

discursive, confessional approach to post-conflict peace and justice10
can in part be attributed to the growth of what Vanessa Pupavac terms
international therapeutic governance11 in which post-conflict experi-
ences are psychologised following Anglo-American understandings of
emotional dysfunction. Thus, trials and truth commissions are expected
to heal traumatised, post-conflict nations and offer them closure.12 This
approach colours much of the current approach to transitional justice,
and is the guiding principle behind the idea of coming to terms with
the past. Despite an emerging critique of transitional justice in Africa
and Latin America as too narrow to accommodate various local practices,
such as silence and secrecy following violent events,13 in the Serbian
context it is usually the response of the public that is problematised,
rather than the framework itself.
Coming to terms with the past (variously also referred to as facing
the past or dealing with the past) has become a fashionable phrase in
recent years, gaining popularity in literature on the Western Balkans
following, in particular, Serbias poor record of cooperating with the
ICTY. It is especially visible in NGO-led initiatives, and a number of
prominent Serbian organisations, such as the Humanitarian Law Centre
(HLC) and Women in Black, declare confronting the past as one of
their key activities. For instance, the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights (henceforth, Helsinki Committee) states that [f]acing the past/
truth [is] the organisations landmark program.14 Their key activities
for the programme are book publications, public discussions and advo-
cacy for accountability for the war crimes committed in the name of
the nation with the aim of achieving a moral minimum for Serbias
normalisation.15 Similarly, a prominent youth NGO, Youth Initiative
for Human Rights (YIHR), meanwhile, hold Facing the Past seminars
for young people.16
Despite its importance, coming to terms with the past is conceptu-
ally opaque, and suffers both from conceptual stretching and narrowing.
The current usage of coming to terms with the past carries elements of
processing, remembrance, commemoration, uncovering, knowing and
acknowledging. It is overstretched since it can include any number or
combination of these, but at the same time it is very narrow due to its nor-
mativity and predetermined outcomes: societies must come to terms with
the past, and they must do so by confronting the truth.17 Furthermore,
there is a general agreement that it must take place at state and society
level. The general framework here is one of uncovering past wrongs,
exposing them and expecting that they will lead to reconciliation18 an
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 213

approach that has been adopted by a number of NGOs in Serbia, despite

warnings that the relationship between knowledge and acknowledge-
ment is not linear.19 The HLC, for instance, is committed to combating
war crimes denial among a public reluctant to face the truth about the
past and advocates the past.20 This approach has also been adopted by,
for instance, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights.21
Since reconciliation is further defined as reconciliation of former
enemies at least in the sense that, while they may continue to disagree
and even be adversaries, they live together non-violently as fellow citi-
zens,22 the role of civil society both in the transitional justice process
and peace-building is seen as important,23 partly because of civil socie-
tys ability to foster inclusiveness and open debate.24 Therefore, they are
seen to be important both as pressure groups and in their own right.25
Some practical roles for civil society in transitional justice include pri-
oritising goals of the transition process, assisting victims and assisting
with obtaining the truth about the past.26
At its broadest, civil society is a middle ground between the indi-
vidual and the state, a space that can limit state excesses, and allow an
individuals capacities to be expressed and developed unimpeded.27
Further definitions understand civil society to be the realm of volun-
tary private association, from neighbourhood committees to interest
groups to philanthropic enterprises of all sorts.28 In their assessment
of the civil society argument, Foley and Edwards identify two strands
of thought: Civil Society I of Robert D. Putnam, Adam Smith, Adam
Ferguson and Francis Hucheson, which puts special emphasis on the
ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in
particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a
democratic polity.29 The second is Civil Society II of Adam Michnik
and Jacek Kuron. This lays special emphasis on civil society as a sphere
of action, that is independent of the state and that is capable of ener-
gising resistance to a tyrannical regime.30
It appears, therefore, that in concepts of civil society, the emphasis is
usually on association (or organisation) and activity (or activism). Some
NGOs have also adopted this approach. YIHR, for instance, writes that
the aim of its Facing the Past Seminars is for young people to become
active citizens who understand why it is important for the country
and the society to face the heritage of the past and, if they wish, to
be included in the existing initiatives which deal with transitional
justice.31 The flipside of this argument is that it implies that those
members of the civil society who are not visibly associated or visibly
engaged in advocacy (such as active) do not hold much potential for
214 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

societal and political change. Excluding the non-organised, non-visible

members from civil society implies two things: first, that their contri-
butions are somehow not valid or worthwhile for social and political
change and, second, that processes such as coming to terms with the
past cannot take place there without the help of the organised. That is
not to deny the power and need for association. For instance, the Serbian
NGOs that lobbied the Serbian government in 2005 for the creation
of the Srebrenica Declaration (eventually adopted in 2010) would
have most likely not achieved this if they did not harness their col-
lective transformative power. However, this kind of activity is not the
only outlet for civil society to engage with transitional justice, nor the only
mechanism of confronting the past, since facing past atrocities is not a
one-dimensional exercise.
Rather, confronting the past takes place in private spheres where it
exists at the level of introspection, narrative and reflection. In Serbia,
organised civil society initiatives have little reach in such cases, despite
NGO efforts at targeting precisely this section of the public. In Eastern
Europe in general, membership in organisations and civil society asso-
ciations is very low32 and there are general difficulties with establishing
such activity, as the citizens have often been unresponsive to these.33
Thus NGOs and other organised groups working on projects related to
the past, form only a small and exceptionally unrepresentative sample
of the society.
The problem in the Serbian case is that the current approach to civil
society both in the literature and by NGOs themselves, has prioritised
NGOs as the most important agents of change on questions of the
past.34 In turn, the NGOs have also adopted this frame of reference and
have a tendency to treat the remainder of the non-organised citizenry
as passive consumers of narratives about the past. Furthermore, the cel-
ebratory approach35 to civil society and the narrow focus on organised
activity, the process of confrontation with the past (in all its conceptual
broadness) exists only as a minority project, imposed almost from
above by an elite group of activists and intellectuals. Therefore, as the
following sections will illustrate, in questions of the past and transi-
tional justice, Serbias civil society space is very exclusionary.

Focus on NGOs as key actors in coming to terms

with the past

An exclusionary civil society space in Serbia has been created largely

as a result of the liberal-pluralistic focus36 on active civil society and
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 215

the normative-liberal mould of transitional justice. Similarly, Mercer37

points out that in much civil society literature NGOs are seen as good
things; microcosms of the (liberal) democratic process.
Following the normative slant of transitional justice, external observ-
ers and scholars also prioritise these NGO discourses on the past. In the
majority of works that consider this question, the remainder of the
society, such as the non-activist majority, is largely absent and its role
in transitional justice processes is neglected. For instance, in raising
the question of who in a society is best suited to open up public debate
on war crimes and responsibility, Gordy suggests that in Serbia the
most important initiatives in the responsibility debate have come from
independent groups of intellectuals, such as the Another Serbia
campaign, an initiative led by the Belgrade Circle of Independent
Intellectuals and NGOs such as Fund for Humanitarian Law, Centre for
Cultural Decontamination, the B92 radio station and the special issues
of intellectual Rec journal.38
The result has been a two-tiered civil society and a top-down approach
in which the engaged, vocal minority (NGOs, intellectuals) are leading
the debate with an attempt to inform and convert the majority (who are
not organised into active groups), so that they may begin the process of
coming to terms with the past/reconciliation. Importantly, this split has
informed our understanding of what coming to terms with the past is
and entails. In Serbia it has largely come to mean NGO-led initiatives of
uncovering and facing the truth,39 to the point where anything outside
of that discourse is deemed as a failure of understanding and dealing
with the past. Although NGOs in Serbia are not homogeneous and uni-
fied on the question of how to approach the past,40 the underlying logic
of the process generally follows the narrow view of transitional justice
where truth needs to be exposed and discussed publicly in order for rec-
onciliation to take place.41 Following Foucault, this discourse regulates
and excludes42 voices and approaches to the past that do not conform
to the civil society-led project. This may include, for instance, silence
about the past a technique employed frequently by ordinary people
who choose not to, or are unable to, engage in public debates about the
past. Thus, the civil society led project is reductive since it seeks a repli-
cation of NGO discourses on the past (knowledge, reconciliation). While
the importance of the NGO endeavour is not open to dispute here, the
over-determined focus on this part of the debate has led to more con-
ceptual narrowing, in which coming to terms with the past is treated
as an end product, or a set of objectives, rather than a (very protracted)
process which cannot be measured.
216 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

Furthermore, the focus on such NGO-led initiatives has, at times,

misrepresented the non-NGO civil society and over simplified their
attitudes towards the past. For instance, HLC writes on its website that
it is combating war crimes denial among a public reluctant to face the truth
about the past, and advocates the need to face the legacy of grave and
systematic human rights abuses in the times of armed conflict.43
But, how does the HLC assess that the public is reluctant to face
the truth, when the dialogue between the NGOs and the public is
weak? HLC states that it organises public discussions on matters of
transitional justice44 but discussions are not necessarily dialogue
because the ordinary public fails to engage with and be engaged by
such events. For instance, two such public discussions, one including
a focus on a HLC initiative for a regional truth commission (RECOM),
were held at the Days of Sarajevo Festival in Belgrade, May 2011.45 For
both panels, the audience consisted mainly of other NGO activists
from Serbia and the region, some academics, and a handful of students.
Although such events are aimed at the ordinary public (from outside of
the activist sector), the question and answer session afterwards made it
very clear that virtually no individuals from this sector of society were
in attendance. On a similar note, RECOM has carried out hundreds of
consultations regionally to gauge public needs and expectations for a
Truth Commission. This laudable exercise has probably been the only
attempt at such dialogue of its kind in the former Yugoslavia. However,
in Serbia, it seems to have predominantly engaged with bodies such as
the Associations of Families of the Dead and Missing from Knin, Croatia
and Kosovo groups much more likely to be organised and visible.46
Since RECOM is a victim-centred initiative, this inclusion certainly
makes sense. However, there is also an exclusion of all other segments
of the society the general public that is largely silent and not engaged
in initiatives.47 This segment is inadvertently excluded from the debate
of the past since their silence is seen as adversarial to the process of
coming to terms with the past.48 Thus, they are the targeted as recipi-
ents of knowledge produced by that debate; the truth that needs to be
confronted and consumed before reconciliation can take place. The
civil society-led debate attempts to create and give voices for them to
adopt, rather than taking into account what may be hidden beneath
the silence.49
The NGOs involvement with the public is therefore selective, since,
at times, large parts of the general public are seen as passive consumers,
rather than creators of discourses about the past.50 This is also seen in
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 217

the ways in which minority groups of civil society actors speak on behalf
of the public. For instance, key works on Serbias relationship with guilt,
reconciliation, transitional justice or war crimes denial51 are based on
research with macro-level politics, intellectuals, literary works or activ-
ists; or are actually created by NGOs or intellectuals themselves.52 This
appears to be a relatively common trend in transitional justice across
different geographic and societal contexts.53 In Serbia, the activists dis-
cuss and present the rest of the society as lagging behind in understand-
ing the past. For instance, a report on how the space for denial of war
crimes can be shrunk in Serbia, the analysis is based on the opinions
of NGO activists, journalists or broadcasters, Serbians who support the
ICTY,54 to explain the publics attitudes to war crimes.55 The selection
bias thus predetermines the findings, noticing a very entrenched denial
of many Serbian citizens.56
The narrow framing of coming to terms with the past, which allows
only for a replication or rejection of NGO narratives, or divides the
public quantitatively into those who accept or do not accept facts about
the past, has led to two overlooked problems. First, these frames are
inadequate for mapping out the complexity of the process of coming
to terms with the past among the ordinary public, which is not as
binary as it is presented by attitude-measuring surveys. Secondly, the
inability of those interpretative frameworks to access that complexity
has led observers to detect and focus on the first and immediately visible
manifestation: denial or silence. However, denial is just one element of
discourse generated by the public frequently, it is also accompanied
by implicit acknowledgement, commiserations with the victims, various
kinds of resentments, self-victimisation and, above all, confusion. These
narratives which express beliefs and memories (essentially, they are
externalisations of the coming to terms with the past process) are frag-
mented, contradictory, indecisive and often unable to express a coher-
ent opinion dynamics not unusual for naturally occurring speech.57
Moreover, what appears as silence is the site of much hidden knowledge
about the past, such as explicit knowledge about atrocities committed.
This kind of knowledge is not often publicly shared and hence it appears
as non-existent to the current approach.
Focus on categorical acceptance or rejection of war crimes essentially
reduces the publics relationship with the past to accepting the truth. But,
as anthropologists will point out, individual belief systems do not func-
tion in this way, particularly when the past is extremely contested and
painful. Individuals will need to talk about the past, deny it, interpret it,
218 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

reshape it and reconstruct it until they have made sense of it, or until it
fits something they understand and can cope with.58
NGO efforts, however well meaning, have not taken this into account
and have excluded the general publics approach to the past (which
may include silence, for instance) from the debate. This happens
because the debate is quite prescriptive, offering a singular approach
to the past in which there is only one acceptable point of view that is
allowed to join the conversation. The public, in turn, feels this exclu-
sion because it realises that some of its opinions are unwelcome, and
disengages from the NGO-led debate further. NGOs should not dismiss
these narratives, but should attempt to understand their origin and
complexity in order to tap into possible spaces for conversation and
engagement.
Above all, NGO-led initiatives clash with individuals responses to the
past as they do not concede that the processes of exploring, understand-
ing and accepting the past are fragmented, contradictory, inconsistent
and messy. In narratives about the past, there are glimpses of acknowl-
edgement, grappling with facts, expressions of remorse but they are
all difficult to pin down, as they do not follow the idealised patterns of
knowledge reconciliation and public testimony. The remainder of this
chapter will present some examples of such narratives to demonstrate
some of these features.

Narratives about the past

How, then, does the ordinary public understand the past, and what
can they contribute to the truth and reconciliation debates? If, as the
surveys tell us, 54 per cent of those polled who have heard about the
Srebrenica massacre do not believe that it took place, how can we
engage in a dialogue with those who do not wish to accept what has
for years been a well-established fact? The following part of this chapter
will present some of those narratives behind the survey statistics.
The intuitive reaction, when confronted with denial narratives, is to
convert much like the current NGO campaigns to present facts and
expect that the denier will change their mind. However, it is far more
productive to look at the content of denial narratives and pull out what
they are telling us.59 The following presentation of those narratives,
points us to some very interesting dynamics that would be useful to
take into consideration when we attempt to gauge coming to terms
with the past. The general public, far from being passive, are in fact
deeply engaged with reconstructing, understanding and working with
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 219

the past. In so doing, they are generally suspicious and resentful of what
they see as the dominance of NGOs and other international agencies
(such as the ICTY) at monopolising the debates about the past and,
moreover, find NGO campaigns confrontational and patronising.
To illustrate these findings, I draw on a larger ethnographic study of
Serbias ordinary citizens parts of the civil society not involved in
politics or NGO work, nor direct participants in war and their under-
standing of the recent past. Their roles and involvement in the decision-
making of the 1990s may have stretched to voting some did not even
participate in this way or protesting. But, for the majority of these
individuals, wars took place across the border and often without their
consent.60 The study took place from October 2005 until January 2007
in Belgrade, with respondents of a very wide age range (from 18 to 82),
and from an urban, lower-middle-class and middle-class backgrounds.
The study included over a hundred informal or non-recorded conversa-
tions, as well as 33 recorded, semi-structured interviews, in addition to
ethnographic observations. The aim is not a statistically representative
study from which it is possible to draw generalisations, but rather the
description of cultures where the search for universal laws is down-
played in favour of detailed accounts of the concrete experience of life
within a particular culture and of the beliefs and social rules that are
used as resources within it.61
The ethnographic study of this audience sought to explore the range
of narratives concerning the key issues in coming to terms with the
past debates (such as knowledge and understanding of war crimes),
and consider some of the narrative and interpretative strategies, used to
talk about war crimes. It also prioritises the importance of the contexts
in which the narratives are created, taking into account that for most
of the ordinary public, the request to face the past comes in at the tail
end of a very difficult two decades, during which they had not only
observed the break up of their country, economic sanctions, a decade
of warfare and NATO air strikes, but also personal loss of friends, jobs
and well-being. We must not underestimate the power of such events to
destabilise and disorientate and to lead to the reconfiguring [of] ones
world.62
Overall, the study unearthed some extremely complicated attitudes
towards the past. As Nenad Dimitrijevic points out, reflections about
the past in Serbia are characterised by moral, cultural and political
confusion,63 and this is present in these responses.
First of all, the past (i.e. the wars of the 1990s and war crimes) is vir-
tually non-existent in different kinds of public spheres and discussions
220 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

dominated by group dynamics for instance, family gatherings. Secondly,

the past is very contested and often approached as it if is not yet
over;64 which is in contrast to the ways in which NGOs present a sin-
gular view of the past and delineate firmly between then and now.
Furthermore, in one-to-one conversations respondents are very open to
the idea of talking about the ways in which they understood Serbias
role in the wars and war crimes of the 1990s. This suggests that discus-
sions of war and atrocities is very much an activity reserved for private
spaces and introspection immediately putting it at odds with various
NGO campaigns which attempt to expose the past and bring the issue
into the public sphere.
Based on discussions and interviews, it is clear that most respond-
ents knew about atrocities from the early 1990s, acquiring knowledge
either then or recently, contrary to the assumptions of many NGO
campaigns. The campaigns assume that there was simply no access to
information because the Miloevic propaganda was very careful to filter
out any wrongdoings of the Serbian side, and that alternative media
was sought out only by those who wanted to know.65 However, in my
study, respondents were very critical of both the Miloevic propaganda
and alternative media sources, yet managed to find out about (or sus-
pect) atrocities informally from rumours, for instance, or stories told
by refugees and former soldiers. For instance, when I asked Gordana
(all names in this chapter have been changed), a former journalist
who left Politika a mainstream daily newspaper, which during the
1990s was the voice of the Miloevic regime and a propaganda tool
in the 1990s (and one of the few respondents from whom news of
Srebrenica emerged later), if she heard about the massacre in 1995 or
later, she said:

To be honest, I didnt know about Srebrenica then. I didnt know that

was happening. Back then, when that was happening, our media
didnt although we had cable, Sky News and BBC since 1990 but
we didnt follow it. So, I accepted everything critically. I didnt take
news for granted. To me it was perfectly clear that it was impossi-
ble that only one nation was like that because all, Muslims, Serbs,
Croats, all took part in atrocities. That was clear to me. But who took
part in what measure? We are the largest people, numerically speak-
ing. So we may have committed the most evil it is possible. I do
believe these latest figures that the government of Republika Srpska
issued, that there were seven to eight thousand Muslims killed. Of
course, I am for the condemnation of all crimes.
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 221

Later in the same interview:

But to me it was clear, that it was all our fault, that what hap-
pened in Kosovo was, after all, horrific. That the police, or army, or
the paramilitary, that they were killing and raping women Was
that genocide? I dont go into that question. My level of information
comes from the media only.

The ways in which knowledge about war crimes was acquired varied
widely some of the younger respondents actively sought out alterna-
tive media sources such as B92 broadcasting network, while some others
actively rejected them. Some respondents obtained their information
about the war from refugees or former combatants. Interestingly, how-
ever, I did not come across anyone in the study who claimed to obtain
information about war crimes from NGOs and their campaigns. NGO
campaigns were also resisted, firstly, because there is a general suspicion
of all kinds of international and activist organisations. As one of my
middle-aged respondents said, I think they are all here with a specific
task, but one which is not in our interest. I would thank them and ask
them to please leave. And, secondly, because their campaigns are either
seen as condescending or confrontational and thus exclusionary.
Above all, virtually all ethnographic data I collected demonstrated
that narratives about the past tend to be inconsistent and confused,
with respondents unable to make up their mind about an event. The
following set of narratives demonstrates just how difficult it is to
squeeze such a response into a binary answer, such as may be found in
a survey in both of these, I asked the respondents whether they knew
about the Srebrenica massacre. Mladen, a middle-aged manager in a
state-owned company presented a very contradictory view: presenting
the Srebrenica massacre as something he knew, then did not, and some-
thing that is at once a tragedy and an invented scenario:

No, all of that [Srebrenica massacre] only came out after the Dayton
Agreement we listened to the news then, but unfortunately,
Srebrenica was missed, with so many victims. But, all those revelations
were probably tailored after the Dayton Agreement, when most of the
blame was proportioned to the Serbs. Up until Dayton it was all some-
how in order and then, that sentence was passed on the Serbs, and
then Srebrenicas66 and whatever camps were being discovered. Even
today I think thats just a big made-up scenario. Its impossible that
Serbs are so wrong, that they were simply declared as war aggressors.
222 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

Another respondent, Nevena demonstrated a similar level of confu-

sion, contradiction and re-examination in her answer:

About Srebrenica, only later the real truth came out. But, an ordinary
person would say, Its war, it happens, murders happen on one and
the other side. I dont know why it was necessary. To me, I mean me
personally, I wouldnt hurt a fly, so that to me was completely sick,
that kind of reasoning to commit those murders on purpose
Its war, killings are on one side and on the other, but for it to be so
organised, that to me is just beyond sanity. But, apparently, thats
now the truth; thats how its presented to the public. I always accept
things like that with some reserve; there is always something hiding
behind that I mean, its important, but how true is it? Theres
something thats not logical in that story. That army, and who was
in charge.

Contradictions in narratives often demonstrate the memory-making

process, an ongoing and actively constructed set of views on the past,
each view engaged by, and reflected back on, the other.67 Such inter-
nal contradictions and polyvocality are found in naturally occurring
speech68 but here demonstrate an ongoing revision of the past and a
constant struggle to find meaning and articulate beliefs.
In these private narratives of the past, it is usually not questioned
whether the event (in this case the Srebrenica massacre) took place but
why my ethnographic data shows a very high insistence and refer-
ence to moral codes (such as I wouldnt do that). In addition, when
these responses are placed in context of what the respondents think of
the 1990s and the wars in general, the key features that emerge are shock
and confusion the word most frequently used to describe the wars
is horror. In a lot of cases, respondents were quite literally unable to
speak certain words such as killing, death and murder. For instance,
van Dijk69 suggests that language users who pursue denial strategies are
well aware that the statement they are attempting to deny are outside
of social norms70 and hence denial seems to be employed mainly as a
mediation strategy.71 Paying more attention to such difficulties within
narrative, not just denial, would suggest that the respondents do not
simply deny victims or events ever happened, but that they experience a
profound need to mediate something through narrative.
But what is being mediated? The mediated elements here that exist
outside of van Dijks social norms are the knowledge of and the belief
in war crimes, massacres and atrocities committed by the Serbs. In other
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 223

words, respondents produce confused, multivocal narratives with ele-

ments of denial because they know. Various critics have pointed out that
knowledge of such extreme acts of violence has the potential to destabi-
lise world views, or to make and unmake worlds,72 as well as to shock
so profoundly that individuals must mediate, or find ways to minimise,
sanitise and neutralise this knowledge in order to incorporate it into
their belief systems.73 In other words, violence is hardly ever under-
stood unproblematically,74 and this is precisely the complexity that is
lost in the current approaches to coming to terms with the past.
The dynamic is similar with the question of victimhood, which con-
trary to assumptions, is not always invoked passively but critically, and
often as a question. The focus on ones own victimisation while ignoring
the plight of others is often a key reason given by observers for the soci-
etys failure to come to terms with the past. In Orentlichers report, broad-
caster Antonela Riha states that we dont have victims in Serbia, only
refugees. Serbians dont know what its like to be victims.75 However,
the respondents in my study felt the opposite and emphasised their own
victimisation as well as that of other Serb victims:

They are saying, Serbs killed this and that. But whos killing the Serbs?
Refugees everywhere. From Knin, Serbs are running away. From
Bosnia, Serbs running away and whos bombed? Serbs are It
turns out we are a nation thats really that were killing, slaughter-
ing, all that, but in fact havent Serbs been killed also, how many
murdered and slaughtered, and how many children?
Katarina (housewife)

The next response comes from Rada, a middle-aged, state company

employee, following a news item about the Belgrade trial of five former
members of an elite Serbian police unit known as the Scorpions.
A video depicting the five in the act of killing unarmed men and boys
in Trnovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was broadcast in the Miloevic trial
as evidence, having been unearthed by human rights lawyer Nataa
Kandic (director of HLC). The video was subsequently broadcast on all
major Serbian television networks in the summer of 2005 though B92
dedicated the most coverage to it.

That B92, how long will they keep showing these Women from
Srebrenica?76 And that video [Scorpions tape]. Its on all the time; they
just keep repeating it over and over. Enough! What about our victims?
What about all those Serbs killed in Bratunac? We are non-stop being
224 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

bombarded with corpses You always feel that you are someone who
has to pay the price for war. Sixteen years weve lived in that agony.

In all of these narratives, NGOs and civil society initiatives such as

B92 were either ignored completely or presented in a very negative
light for reasons that tie in very strongly with the perception of victim-
hood. Essentially, NGO-led discourse on the past asks the individuals to
accept the victims of others. The individuals though often already do
accept these. However, for this segment of the public, the NGOs have
not answered one important question: Where are the Serb victims? To
many of my respondents, this is genuinely puzzling.
The perceived exclusion of Serb victims from NGO discourse77 and the
perceived anti-Serb bias of the ICTY tapped into the feelings of resent-
ment and general perception that international actors and the West are
rewriting the history of the war. This also tied in to the foreign merce-
naries label with which NGOs were often labelled in the 1990s Miloevic
Serbia;78 and certainly, NGO initiatives were treated with some suspicion
by my respondents who could not understand their motivation.
This is one of the critical points on which the dialogue between NGOs
and private individuals diverges. The NGOs are very keen to point out
the facts that need to be accepted, but many individuals already do
accept these, but the ways in which they do so is not always apparent or
visible since the current frames of coming to terms with the past are
so narrow. At the same time, these individuals also have certain needs
in the process of exploring and confronting the past in addition to
accepting war crimes and victims of others, they also wish to engage in
discussions which will allow them to explore what they feel is their own
marginalisation and victimisation.
It is more than just a question of addressing Serb victims of the war as
represented in the RECOM consultations: this section of the Serbian pub-
lic clearly has a need to discuss their own experience, and one which falls
outside of the discursive frames of current transitional justice projects.
Given their perceived marginalisation from the debate, the public has
started to come up with its own interpretations and reassessments of the
1990s. The NGO-led initiatives at confronting the past display a limited
understanding of the complexities of this.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that contrary to normative expectations of

transitional justice literature, the involvement of NGO initiatives in the
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 225

process of coming to terms with the past in Serbia has not led to the
opening of a dialogue between civil society and the public. This is in
part due to confusion over what coming to terms with the past entails,
leading to narrow interpretations of the process. In Serbia, NGOs have
taken the lead on both addressing questions of the past at state level
and combating denial among the public. At the same time, they have
excluded opinions and narratives about the past which do not repli-
cate their own discourse of truth-facing and acceptance. This has also
resulted in the exclusion of the ordinary public from debates they are
written about and targeted by NGO campaigns, but because they are
deemed to be in denial of the past, their narratives are excluded from
debate. This in turn has led to feelings of resentment and alienation on
part of some sections of the public, who view the NGOs involvement
with questions of the past as suspicious and their approach to the public
as judgemental.
As this chapter has argued, the public and civil society diverge on
questions of the past, primarily as result of the NGOs neglect for the
publics need to have its own experiences of the 1990s discussed. Instead,
by treating the publics narratives of victimhood and denial as failures
of coming to terms with the past the NGO-led initiatives have under-
estimated the complexity of what the public must go through before
they reach the stage at which they can replicate NGOs discourse on the
question.

Notes
1. For example, see J. Subotic (2009) Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in
the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); E. D. Gordy (2005) Postwar
Guilt and Responsibility in Serbia: The Effort to Confront it and the Effort
to Avoid it, in S. Ramet and V. Pavlakovic (eds) Serbia since 1989: Politics and
Society under Milosevic and After (Washington, DC: University of Washington
Press); V. Peskin (2009) International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual
Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
2. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2009) Public Perception in Serbia of the
ICTY and the National Courts Dealing with War Crimes, available at http://eng
lish.bgcentar.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=406%
3Aattitudes-towards-the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-the-former-
yugoslavia-icty-&catid=103&Itemid=136 (accessed 10 March 2011).
3. Sonja Biserko in Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (n.d., a) Head of
Serbias Helsinki Committee Says Serbia Still Relativises its Crimes and
Has Failed to tell Young People the Truth of what Happened in the Nineties,
available at www.helsinki.org.rs (accessed 2 April 2011).
4. Subotic (2009), op. cit., p. 367.
226 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

5. For an overview, see P. Hayner (2011) Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice

and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge);
W. Lambourne (2008) Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass
Violence, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(1), pp. 2848;
R. G. Teitel (2003) Theoretical and International Framework: Transitional
Justice in New Era, Fordham International Law Journal, 26(4), pp. 893906.
6. R. Nagy (2008) Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,
Third World Quarterly, 29(2), pp. 27589.
7. These include, for example, R. Mani (2002) Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice
in the Shadow of War (Malden, MA: Polity); K. McEvoy and L. McGregor (eds)
(2008) Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for
Change (Oxford: Hart Publishing); Lambourne (2008), op. cit.
8. Hayner (2011), op. cit., p. 8.
9. H. G. West (2003) Voices Twice Silenced: Betrayal and Mourning at
Colonialisms End in Mozambique, Anthropological Theory, 3(3), pp. 34365,
see p. 350.
10. West (2003), op. cit., p. 356.
11. V. Pupavac (2004) International Therapeutic Peace and Justice in Bosnia,
Social & Legal Studies, 13(3), pp. 377401, see p. 377.
12. Pupavac (2004), op. cit., p. 377.
13. See, for example, E. Baines (2010) Spirits and Social Reconstruction after
Mass Violence: Rethinking Transitional Justice, African Affairs, 109(436),
pp. 40930.
14. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (n.d. b) About us, available at www.
helsinki.org.rs (accessed on 1 March 2011).
15. Helsinki Committee (n.d. b), op. cit.
16. Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR) (n.d.) Programmes, available at
rs.yihr.org/ (accessed on 1 February 2011).
17. Normative aspects of transitional justice are discussed by L. Vinjamuri and
J. Snyder (2004) Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International
War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, Annual Review of Political
Science, 7(1), pp. 34562.
18. J. L. Gibson (2006) Can Truth Reconcile Divided Nations? in J. D. Meernik
and T. David Mason (eds) Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War
Societies: Sustaining the Peace (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 17695.
19. S. Cohen (2001) States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering
(Cambridge: Polity Press).
20. Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) (n.d.) Public Information and Outreach, avail-
able at www.hlc-rdc.org (accessed on 1 March 2011).
21. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (2005) New in the Testimonies Edition:
Srebrenica: From Denial to Confession, available at www.helsinki.org.rs
(accessed on 2 March 2011).
22. D. A. Crocker (1998) Transitional Justice and International Civil Society:
Toward a Normative Framework, Constellations, 5(4), p. 496.
23. R. Belloni (2001) Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Journal of Peace Research, 38(2), pp. 16380; K. Rupesinghe (ed.) (1995) Conflict
Transformation (New York: St Martins Press); C. Orujela (2003) Building
Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society, Journal of Peace Research, 40(2),
pp. 195212.
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 227

24. R. D. Putnam (1992) Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
25. Orujela (2003) op. cit., p. 197.
26. Crocker (1998) op. cit., pp. 5035.
27. Belloni (2001) op. cit., p. 168.
28. M. W. Foley and B. Edwards (1996) The Paradox of Civil Society, Journal of
Democracy, 7(3), p. 38.
29. Ibid., p. 38.
30. Ibid., p. 39.
31. YIHR (n.d.), op. cit., added emphasis.
32. P. Kopecky and C. Mudde (2003) Rethinking Civil Society, Democratization,
10(3), pp. 114.
33. J. Mertus (1999) Liberal State vs. the National Soul: Mapping Civil
Society Transplants, Social and Legal Studies, 8(1), pp. 12146; Belloni
(2001), op. cit.
34. E. Gordy (2005) op. cit., p. 177. See also Mladen Ostojic in this volume.
35. D. Kostovicova (2002) Civil Society and Post-Communist Democratisation:
Facing a Double Challenge in Post-Miloevic Serbia, Journal of Civil Society,
2(1), p. 22.
36. Belloni (2001), op. cit.
37. C. Mercer (2002) NGOs, Civil Society and Democratisation: A Critical
Review of Literature, Progress in Development Studies, 2(1), p. 9.
38. Gordy (2005) op. cit., pp. 1767, added emphasis.
39. M. Yerkes (2004) Facing the Violent Past: Discussions with Serbias Youth,
Nationalities Papers, 32(4), pp. 92138, see p. 924.
40. J. Dragovic-Soso (forthcoming) Collective Responsibility, International
Justice and Public Reckoning with the Recent Past: Reflections on a Debate
in Serbia in T. W. Waters (ed.) The Miloevic Trial An Autopsy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
41. Z. Miller (2008) Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the Economic in
Transitional Justice, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2(3), pp. 26691,
see p. 280.
42. See, for example, A. McHoul and W. Grace (1999) A Foucault Primer: Discourse,
Power and the Subject (Dunedin: University of Otago Press) pp. 3056.
43. HLC (n.d.) op. cit., added emphasis.
44. Ibid.
45. The RECOM coalition comprises over 1500 civil society organisations and
155 individuals from across the former Yugoslavia (see http://www.zarekom.
org/Koalicija-za-Rekom.sr.html, accessed on 10 April 2012). The rationale
behind the establishment of such a commission is to establish the facts
related to all victims of the wars waged on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia in the period 19912001. See RECOM (n.d.) Coalition for RECOM,
available at www.zarekom.org (accessed on 10 April 2011).
46. RECOM (n.d.), op. cit.
47. A similar issue is recorded in Argentina by A. Gandsman (2012) Testimonies
of Trauma, Human Rights, and the Reproduction of Conventional
Knowledge, paper presented at the Beyond Testimony and Trauma: Oral
History in the Aftermath of Mass Violence conference, University of Montral,
24 March.
228 Serbian Civil Society as an Exclusionary Space

48. See, for example, O. Fridman (2011) It was like Fighting a War with Our
Own People: Anti-War Activism in Serbia during the 1990s, Nationalities
Papers, 39(4), pp. 50722.
49. Cf. M. C. Ferme (2001) The Underneath of Things: Violence, History and the
Everyday in Sierra Leone (Berkley, CA: University of California Press).
50. See A. Ldtke (1993) Coming to Terms with the Past: Illusions of
Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany, Journal of
Modern History, 65(3), pp. 54272.
51. Subotic (2009), op. cit.; D. Orentlicher (2008) Shrinking the Space for Denial:
The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (New York: Open Society Institute); S. P. Ramet
(2007) The Denial Syndrome and its Consequences: Serbian Political Culture
Since 2000, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(1), pp. 4158.
52. S. Logar and S. Bogosavljevic (2001) Vidjenje istine u Srbiji, Rec, 62(8),
pp. 734.
53. G. Millar (2010) Assessing Local Experiences of Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone:
Getting to Why through a Qualitative Case Study Analysis, International
Journal of Transitional Justice, 4(3), pp. 47796, see p. 490; Miller (2008),
op. cit., p. 290.
54. Orentlicher (2008), op. cit., p. 56.
55. These in turn are based on the results of the surveys by Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights. See Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2009), op. cit.
56. Orentlicher (2008), op. cit., p. 90.
57. A. L. Smith (2004) Heteroglossia, Common Sense, and Social Memory,
American Ethnologist, 1(2), p. 263.
58. See E. V. Daniel (1996) Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of
Violence (Ewing, NJ: Princeton University Press).
59. See L. Malkki (1995) Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology
Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
60. The question of consent and support for the 1990s wars is very contentious.
Certainly the debate about bystanders is an extremely complicated one,
which merits considerations of silence/consent dynamics, which are beyond
the scope of this chapter. However, in this chapter I draw the conclusion
regarding consent based only on the respondents in the ethnographic study,
who explicitly stated their anti-war stance or participation in anti-war move-
ments, or even more explicitly stated that the wars took place without their
consent.
61. M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson (2004) Ethnography: Principles in Practice
(London: Routledge).
62. K. Verdery (1999) Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post-Socialist
Change (New York: Columbia University Press).
63. N. Dimitrijevic (2008) Serbia after the Criminal Past: What Went Wrong and
What Should be Done, The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2(1), p. 3.
64. G. Dawson (2007) Making Peace with the Past? Memory, Trauma and the Irish
Troubles (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 10.
65. Gordy (1999) op. cit., p. 97.
66. In the interview, Mladen used the plural Srebrenicas. The original Serbian
version was Srebrenice i kojekavi logori.
67. Smith (2004), op. cit., p. 263.
68. Ibid., p. 263.
 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 229

69. T. van Dijk (1992) Discourse and the Denial of Racism, Discourse and Society,
3(1), pp. 87118.
70. Ibid., p. 89.
71. Ibid., p. 97.
72. E. Scarry (1985) The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World
(New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press).
73. Daniel (1996), op. cit.
74. C. Sorabji (1995) A Very Modern War: Terror and Territory in Bosnia
Herzegovina, in R. Hinde and H. Watson (eds) War: A Cruel Necessity? The
Bases of Institutionalised Violence (London: I. B. Tauris), p. 82.
75. Orentlicher (2008), op. cit., p. 91.
76. A reference to a group called Mothers of Srebrenica, who arrived in Belgrade
to attend the trial of members of the Scorpions unit.
77. This is despite the fact that NGOs do not explicitly ethnicise their victims.
But, based on campaigns such as the exposition of truth about Srebrenica, the
ethnicity is implied. Some NGOs such as HLC also have campaigns that raise
the question of victims from Serbia, too. Currently, their website features a
database of victims who are citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, but
it does appear that this is not something that the public picks up on.
78. Kostovicova (2004), op. cit., p. 34.
13
Facing the Past while Disregarding
the Present? Human Rights
NGOs and Truth-Telling in
Post-Miloevic Serbia
Mladen Ostojic

Over the last two decades, transitional justice has become an integral
part of democratisation policies deployed by the international commu-
nity. Indeed, the search for accountability for past human rights abuses
has become almost a necessity for transition countries seeking to recover
their international legitimacy.1 As a matter of fact, the international
community has increasingly resorted to international judicial interven-
tion in order to enforce international standards of accountability in post-
authoritarian and post-conflict states. These policies have essentially
sought to punish perpetrators of mass atrocities and establish the truth
about their crimes on the basis that societies cannot achieve sustainable
peace or democracy without pursuing justice and coming to terms with
their past.2
In the case of Serbia, as for other states that once constituted the
former Yugoslavia, international judicial intervention is embodied in the
UN-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). Since the downfall of Miloevic in October 2000, cooperation
with the ICTY constituted a precondition for Serbias access to interna-
tional financial assistance and progress towards Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. As a result, most of the war crimes suspects indicted by the Tribunal
have been extradited and prosecuted in The Hague over the past decade.
Nevertheless, there is a widespread consensus among observers that
the ICTY has failed to generate reckoning with the past and normative
change in the targeted states. This state of affairs is largely imputed to
the policy of conditionality, which detached the extradition of indictees
from any notion of justice and truth.3 Indeed, the domestic political
elites have largely eschewed moral considerations associated with the

230
 Mladen Ostojic 231

pursuit of justice by justifying ICTY cooperation on purely utilitarian

grounds.
In view of the political elites reluctance to address the war crimes leg-
acy, the task of advancing the transitional justice agenda in Serbia has
been relegated to domestic human rights organisations. Essentially com-
posed of Belgrade-based intellectuals, most of these NGOs derived from
the anti-war movement and the opposition to the Miloevic regime in
the 1990s. Besides actively taking part in the removal of Miloevic, these
organisations have played an important role in collecting and dissemi-
nating evidence of atrocities committed during the wars of Yugoslav
succession. They have thus substantially contributed towards efforts to
prosecute war crimes suspects at the ICTY and before domestic courts
following the change of regime. In addition, these organisations have
sought to advance the process of facing the past in Serbian society by
exposing and denouncing the atrocities committed by the Serbian side
during the wars.
This chapter considers the strategies deployed by the human rights
organisations in order to promote truth-telling in Serbia over the past
decade.4 It essentially argues that the domestic NGOs have premised
truth-telling upon the acknowledgement of state responsibility for war
crimes, which has impeded rather than enabled reckoning with the
past in Serbia. Indeed, this strategy proved counterproductive because it
alienated the reformist political elites while exacerbating nationalist dis-
courses of victimisation and denial. The chapter begins with an analysis
of the failure of the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
in order to explain why there was no state-sponsored truth-telling initi-
ative following the overthrow of Miloevic. It then turns to the strategy
deployed by human rights NGOs in order to promote the acknowledge-
ment of Srebrenica, and its repercussions on truth-telling in Serbia.

The failure of the Yugoslav Commission for Truth

and Reconciliation

The idea of creating a Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation

originated from civil society even before Miloevic was ousted from
power. This initiative was promoted by the representatives of the Open
Society Institute (OSI) who considered that the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) could serve as a model for the Serbian
transition to democracy.5 Therefore, the representatives of the OSI in
Serbia invited the former chairman of the South African TRC Alex Boraine
232 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

to advise the Serbian civil society groups and opposition leaders on the
creation of such institution in Yugoslavia.
Following the overthrow of Miloevic, this initiative was taken up by
Goran Svilanovic, the leader of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, which was
renowned for its liberal orientation and proximity to the human rights
movement. Svilanovic, who was appointed Foreign Minister within the
Yugoslav government, suggested creating a truth commission in order
to prepare the public opinion for war crimes trials.6 This initiative was
given further impetus by the requests for cooperation with the ICTY
made by the international community to the new government. As they
advocated the need for trying Miloevic in Belgrade instead of The
Hague, the Yugoslav authorities were asked to show proof of their will-
ingness to address the war crimes legacy.7 The creation of a truth com-
mission was thus seen as a way to demonstrate the governments resolve
to deal with this sensitive issue.8 While this initiative was given support
by some international organisations such as the Council of Europe, it
was made clear that a truth commission could not replace The Hague
tribunal.9 In view of this, the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran indic sug-
gested that such a commission should work in conjunction with the
ICTY in order to attenuate the flaws of the Tribunal.10
This initiative eventually materialised with the creation of the Yugoslav
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation by President Vojislav Kotunica
in late March 2001.11 This decision was based on the conviction that the
disclosure of evidence on the national conflicts would contribute to truth
and reconciliation within the country and among the nations of the
region. The president appointed 19 members of the commission whose
mission was to organise research into disclosing evidence of the societal,
national and political conflicts that led to the war and to explore the
causal chain of these events.12 The commission was requested to inform
the public about its work and findings, as well as to establish cooperation
with similar commissions and institutions in the neighbouring countries
and abroad.
The credibility of the commission was challenged from the start as
two prominent intellectuals who were reputed for their opposition
to Miloevic and their engagement in the defence of human rights
refused to take part in it. The historian Latinka Perovic relinquished her
appointment criticising the unclear objectives and the state-sponsored
nature of the commission which, according to her view, undermined
its claims to impartiality.13 At the same time, the human rights law-
yer and activist Vojin Dimitrijevic resigned as he considered that
the Commissions mission of establishing the causes of the wars was
 Mladen Ostojic 233

unfeasible and ill-intentioned.14 Instead, he suggested that the Yugoslav

Commission for Truth and Reconciliation should focus exclusively
on human rights violations perpetrated in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.15 Dimitrijevic considered that since a commission com-
posed of Serbian citizens would not seem impartial in its attempt to
establish the truth about events that took place throughout the former
(Socialist) Yugoslavia its mandate should be limited to Serbia.
The resignations of Perovic and Dimitrijevic dealt a serious blow to
the legitimacy of the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
at its inception. The newly created institution was further challenged by
the representatives of the human rights NGOs which were critical both
of the way the Commission was created and the mandate it was given.
These dissensions were at the centre of the conference In Search of
Truth and Responsibility Towards a Democratic Future which brought
together representatives of the media, NGO activists, academics as well
as the countrys most important political leaders.16 The human rights
activists distanced themselves from the Commission which they criti-
cised for being established without any public debate or prior consulta-
tions within civil society.17 They argued that the Yugoslav Commission
for Truth and Reconciliation did not have the moral authority and the
capacity to investigate events that took place outside of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In their view, such an endeavour could only
be carried out by a regional body comprising all the parties that took
part in the conflict. Complaints were also raised regarding the composi-
tion of the Commission, as some members were closely related to the
former regime. In view of this, the most radical critiques denounced the
Commissions focus on exploring the roots of the conflict as an attempt
to exonerate the Serbian side for the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia.18
Besides facing the hostility of human rights organisations, it soon
became clear that the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
did not have the support of the political elite. At the aforementioned
conference, Foreign Minister Svilanovic deplored the fact that the
Commissions mandate was reduced to (re)writing the history of
Yugoslavias disintegration. In his own words, this Commission consti-
tuted an attempt at creating a new version of the Serbian facet of the
war.19 The position of Prime Minister indic was even more striking as he
had clearly turned his back on the idea of instigating a state-sponsored ini-
tiative for addressing the past. Indeed, indic considered that such initia-
tive risked destabilising the new political order and imperilling the reform
of state institutions.20 Although he acknowledged the need to expose
the sources of violence and transform the predominant political values
234 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

in Serbian society, indic prioritised the stability and legitimacy of state

institutions. The Serbian Prime Minister, who was seen as the leader of the
liberal wing of the DOS coalition, thus considered that reckoning with the
past needed to await a certain level of democratic consolidation.21
Without the support of the political establishment and civil society, the
Yugoslav truth commission was doomed to fail. Besides being assigned
a vague and unmanageable task, the Commission did not have the prac-
tical means to carry out its work. Indeed, the Commission was given
very little power: it did not have the authority to summon the wrong-
doers and the victims to appear at the hearings.22 At the same time, the
offenders had no interests in cooperating with the Commission since its
relationship with the judiciary was undefined and it did not have the
power to grant amnesties. Furthermore, the budget of the Commission
was very limited and its access to foreign funding was undercut by the
lack of support within civil society.23 As a result, the Commission did
not move from its starting point of defining its objectives and strategy
during the two years of its existence. The Yugoslav Commission for
Truth and Reconciliation was eventually extinguished in 2003 through
the transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
All things considered, one question that remains unanswered is why
President Kotunica created this institution in the first place. Bearing
in mind the ambiguous goals and the limited power given to the
Commission, it is hard to believe that it was meant to confront the
Serbian public opinion with the atrocities committed during the war.
In fact, Kotunica was noticeably opposed to the idea of coming to
terms with the past. As a moderate nationalist, he did not conceal his
disapproval of the ICTY and his disregard towards demands for moral
catharsis in Serbian society. The Yugoslav President believed that it was
unnecessary to confront the Serbian public with the atrocities commit-
ted by the Serbian side since the former adversaries did not undertake
similar steps. He rejected the notion of moral catharsis by pointing to
the NATO bombing:

The so-called moral catharsis is often invoked in the discussions

around The Hague. I do not know what that moral catharsis means.
There were so many crimes in wars and in history and nobody has
ever thought of talking about catharsis. There is no moral catharsis
without catharsis among the leading NATO officials who are respon-
sible for the bombing of this country in 1999. That would be a moral
catharsis. Otherwise, we would have in this country a hypocritical
 Mladen Ostojic 235

and immoral catharsis which we currently experience as a result of

the demands of people who are legally and politically responsible
such as Wesley Clark, Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke.24

Bearing in mind that the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and

Reconciliation was created a few days before the deadline for the
American certification of cooperation with the ICTY, it seems reason-
able to believe that the primary motive behind the creation of the
Commission was to appease the foreign pressure for cooperation with
the Tribunal (e.g. this certification was a condition for the provision of
US financial support to Yugoslavia). As mentioned earlier, the possibility
of creating a Commission was being considered by the Yugoslav authori-
ties as a way to demonstrate the willingness to address the war crimes
legacy to the international community. In this light, it seems that the
hasty creation of the Yugoslav truth commission was meant to make
up for the lack of cooperation with The Hague tribunal at a moment
when the authorities in Belgrade had not even proceeded with the
arrest of Slobodan Miloevic.
Besides assuaging the international community, it has been suggested
that the Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was cre-
ated in order to reconcile the opposed political factions within Serbian
society.25 According to this view, the Commission was meant to bridge
the gap between the conflicting interpretations of the wars of Yugoslav
succession among the supporters of the former regime and the different
opposition parties. Hence, the Commissions focus on the causes of the
wars was meant to produce a historical narrative that would transcend
political antagonisms and allow for the transformation of political rela-
tionships. While expounding the rationale behind the establishment
of the Yugoslav truth commission, the Yugoslav President argued that
this Commission was necessary in order to confront us and reconcile
us with ourselves. In a similar vein, the former coordinator of the
Commission Radmila Nakarada suggested that the commission was
meant to contribute to the internal normalisation and the establish-
ment of a coherent collective identity.26 From this perspective, the
Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation could be perceived
as an attempt to legitimise the transitional compromises brokered with
the former regime as this had previously been done in South Africa and
Latin America.
The failure of the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission
demonstrated that the Serbian transitional authorities did not have the
willingness to come out in public with the truth about war crimes. While
236 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

Kotunica appeared to be ideologically opposed to the idea of coming

to terms with the past, indic stood against truth-telling for pragmatic
reasons. In view of the compromises made with the former regime, the
Serbian Prime Minister had good reasons to believe that any attempt to
address the past would be obstructed by rogue elements within the state
institutions. In May 2001, the uncovering of mass graves of Kosovo
Albanians that had been scattered across different parts of Serbia by the
former regime provoked an open clash between the heads of the police
and the army over the responsibility for these crimes.27 The lack of a
domestic initiative to address the past can thus be attributed both to the
ideological preferences of the elite and the modalities of the transition
which upheld institutional resistance towards disclosing the atrocities
committed by the Serbian side during the wars.

The contested NGO campaign for facing the past

In the absence of political will to address the war crimes legacy, the task
of disclosing the truth about the atrocities committed by the Serbian
side during the wars of Yugoslav secession was relegated to civil society.
The need for a domestic truth-telling initiative became apparent in
view of the ICTYs failure to generate reckoning with war crimes within
Serbian society. Indeed, the trial of Miloevic demonstrated that the
Tribunal was incapable of achieving this task. In view of its importance
and its truth-telling potential, this trial was broadcasted live on domes-
tic television and widely watched by the Serbian public. But instead of
discrediting Miloevic, this process actually regenerated public support
for the former Serbian strongman.28
While the negative public reception of Miloevics trial was largely
imputed to the ICTYs lack of outreach and mismanagement of pub-
lic relations,29 the domestic human rights organisations blamed the
Serbian elites for deliberately discrediting the process.30 These accusa-
tions led to a heated polemic over who bore responsibility for the war
(crimes) and how Serbian society should address the past among mem-
bers of the liberal intelligentsia. This polemic, which took place on the
pages of the weekly magazine Vreme between August and November
2002, generated a rift within civil society that was formerly united in
its opposition to the Miloevic regime.31 Besides deliberating over how
the trial of Miloevic was reported by the media and discussing the
legitimacy of the NATO bombing campaign, the different sides engaged
in debate voicing competing views regarding what confronting the past
entailed.32 On the one hand, a group of human rights activists and
 Mladen Ostojic 237

public intellectuals considered that Serbs were collectively responsible

for war crimes perpetrated by Serbian forces and that coming to terms
with the past essentially means confronting those crimes committed
in the name of the Serbian nation. On the other hand, another group
mainly composed of journalists and public intellectuals argued that the
responsibility for war crimes is primarily individual and that reckoning
with the past should encompass the crimes committed by all the sides
involved in the wars. According to this view, insisting on the Serb guilt
would be counterproductive because it would play into the hand of
nationalists by reinforcing discourses of self-victimisation.33
These divisions within civil society significantly weakened the domes-
tic impetus for addressing the war crimes legacy. In view of their diver-
gence over the aims and means of reckoning with war crimes, the
non-state actors were incapable of articulating a comprehensive initia-
tive for coming to terms with the past. At the same time, the domestic
political climate was increasingly unfavourable to such demands. Indeed,
the parliamentary elections of December 2003 produced a massive shift
to the right in Serbian politics. The right-wing Serbian Radical Party (SRS),
whose leader Vojislav eelj was on trial at the ICTY, resurrected as the
most important political force by obtaining a third of parliamentary
seats. Kotunicas Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) came second, which
allowed him to create a minority government in coalition with several
smaller parties thanks to the support of Miloevics Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS).
This remodelling of the political landscape brought radical change to
Serbias policy of cooperation with the ICTY in 2004. Instead of extra-
diting war crimes suspects, the new government sought to promote
voluntary surrender by providing financial and legal assistance to
war crimes suspects and raising their profile in the eyes of the Serbian
public. The media campaign deployed by the authorities depicted ICTY
cooperation as an unfair obligation imposed on Serbia, while portray-
ing the indictees as martyrs sacrificing themselves (once again) for their
homeland. While this policy boosted the transfer of war crimes suspects
to The Hague, it also undermined the ICTYs truth-telling agenda by
decriminalising the indictees and detaching their extradition from any
notion of justice and truth. Indeed, the transfer of indictees to The
Hague was carried out without any discussion of war crimes, as the
authorities and the media refrained from even mentioning the charges
which were imputed to these individuals. Unsurprisingly, public opin-
ion polls show a stark decline in public knowledge of war crimes during
the period 20015.34
238 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

In view of these political developments, the human rights community

mobilised to promote the truth about war crimes committed by the
Serbian side during the wars of Yugoslav secession. Several NGOs insti-
gated programmes for facing the past specifically designed to spread
knowledge of war crimes and war crimes trials among the Serbian public.35
These programmes primarily consisted in organising conferences and
media campaigns informing the public about the work and findings of
the ICTY.36 Besides disseminating evidence of war crimes, the human
rights NGOs adopted an openly confrontational attitude towards the
authorities in response to the governments policy of voluntary sur-
render. In December 2004, the Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) caused a
storm by accusing government representatives and senior police officials
of orchestrating a cover up of war crimes perpetrated by Serbian forces in
Kosovo.37 The HLC requested from the government to form a commis-
sion of inquiry in order to elucidate the incineration of Albanian victims
allegedly carried out by the Serbian forces in order to conceal the atroci-
ties perpetrated during the Kosovo war. But these demands were simply
ignored by the government, which remained silent on this issue.
In February 2005, a coalition of five NGOs announced that they would
coordinate their activities and elaborate a new strategy for promoting
the truth about war crimes.38 These organisations endorsed positive
propaganda in order to pressure the political elites and public opinion
into facing the atrocities committed by the Serbian side during the wars.
The NGO coalition particularly focused its activities on countering the
denial of Srebrenica in the months preceding the tenth anniversary of
the massacre. The issue of Srebrenica was until then largely absent from
political debates in Serbia. While the mainstream politicians tended to
avoid this issue, the massacre of Srebrenica was continuously denied
and downplayed by nationalist circles represented by the SRS and SPS.
In those circumstances, the NGO campaign directly clashed with the
militancy of right-wing organisations that celebrated the liberation of
Srebrenica and glorified general Mladic.39 In response to this appalling
denial of the massacre, eight NGOs appealed to the Serbian parliament
to adopt a resolution acknowledging and condemning the Srebrenica
genocide.40 The draft resolution put forward by the NGOs requested
from the Serbian state to distance itself from the Srebrenica genocide by
acknowledging that this crime had been committed in the name of the
Serbian nation.41 While this proposal was endorsed by two independ-
ent MPs, the possibility of adopting such a resolution was immediately
rejected by the leading DSS on the basis that Serbia could not take
responsibility for Srebrenica.42
 Mladen Ostojic 239

The NGO campaign was given further impetus by the broadcasting

of a tape showing the execution of six young Bosnian Muslims from
Srebrenica by a Serb paramilitary unit called the Scorpions. The tape,
which had originally been obtained by the HLC and shown at the trial
of Miloevic in The Hague, came as a stark wake-up call for politicians
and public opinion in Serbia.43 The authorities immediately proceeded
with the arrest of the members of the Scorpions unit and the political
elites unequivocally condemned these atrocities.44 For the first time,
the government recognised the need for facing the past and expressed
its full support to war crimes prosecutions. The Serbian president and
leader of the Democratic Party (DS) Boris Tadic went even further in
stating that this crime had been committed in the name of the Serbian
nation and announcing that he would attend the commemoration of
Srebrenica.45
The broadcasting of the Scorpions tape raised the initiative for
the adoption of a parliamentary declaration on the political agenda.
However, the different political parties had divergent views on what this
resolution should consist of. Over the following weeks, the main politi-
cal actors engaged in a heated debate over the content of the declaration
to be adopted by the parliament. On the one hand, the DSS, SRS and
SPS stood for the adoption of a declaration condemning all war crimes
committed during the wars of Yugoslav secession.46 These parties argued
that the responsibility for war crimes is individual and that the Serbian
state had nothing to do with the atrocities committed in neighbouring
countries. In addition, they rejected the distinctive nature and scope of
the Srebrenica massacre and insisted on the condemnation of all crimes,
including those committed against Serbs. On the other hand, another
group of parties centred around the DS insisted that the parliamentary
declaration should specifically condemn the Srebrenica massacre. While
they acknowledged that all sides in the war had committed atrocities,
these parties argued that the killing of thousands of men in Srebrenica
had become a symbol of war crimes in the entire world.47 Therefore,
they put forward a declaration condemning all war crimes, with a spe-
cial emphasis on Srebrenica.
After two weeks of negotiations among political parties, the initiative
to adopt a parliamentary resolution was abandoned as a result of the
irreconcilable positions of these two political blocs.48 These developments
triggered a fierce reaction of the human rights community, whose rep-
resentatives insisted that the Serbian state take responsibility for the
Srebrenica massacre. Indeed, the Director of the HLC Nataa Kandic
claimed that the Scorpions tape was a clear proof of Serbias involvement
240 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

in the Srebrenica genocide.49 The President of the Serbian Helsinki

Committee for Human Rights Sonja Biserko went even further by stat-
ing that Serbia committed genocide all over Bosnia and attempted to do
the same in Kosovo.50 As the political parties exposed their competing
views on this issue, the NGOs entered into direct confrontation with
the political elites. They denounced the attempts to reach a political
compromise with the SPS and SRS, whom they accused of being directly
responsible of war crimes.51 For the NGOs, the parliaments failure to
take a stance towards Srebrenica suggested that the political elites and
state authorities approved of the atrocities perpetrated by the former
regime. Accordingly, the silencing of Srebrenica in Serbia constituted
a form of rehabilitation of the former regime and implied collective
responsibility for the crimes committed by it. The human rights activists
also deplored the publics indifference in response to which the NGOs
intensified their campaign in the run-up to the tenth anniversary of the
massacre. Among other things, the NGO campaign involved displaying
billboards reminding the inhabitants of Belgrade about Srebrenica. This
sparked considerable public controversy.52
Instead of promoting reckoning with the past, the confrontational
strategy deployed by human rights groups reinforced political resistance
to the acknowledgement of Srebrenica. The maximalist demands of the
NGOs alienated the most reformist politicians and exacerbated the dis-
courses of denial and self-victimisation nurtured by nationalist parties.
The political resistance to the acknowledgement of Srebrenica derived
to a great extent from the fear of the impact that this could have on the
genocide lawsuits brought against Serbia before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). Bosnia and Croatia had instigated two separate lawsuits
against Yugoslavia before the ICJ in the 1990s.53 The Bosnian Genocide case
was particularly problematic for the Serbian authorities since the ICTY
had established that the Srebrenica massacre amounted to genocide in
its verdict to the trial of Radoslav Krstic in August 2001.54 This decision
implied that Serbia could have been found responsible for genocide had
it been established that the authorities in Belgrade had had command
over Bosnian Serb troops at the time of the Srebrenica massacre.
In this context, no political party was ready to acknowledge Srebrenica
being genocide, even less to accept responsibility for it. Even the DS
which insisted on specifically condemning the Srebrenica massacre
rejected the NGOs demand that Srebrenica be defined as genocide and
the Serbian state held responsible for it.55 As a result, the NGO initiative
failed to generate political support. At the same time, the nationalist par-
ties accused the NGOs of orchestrating an anti-Serbian campaign aimed
 Mladen Ostojic 241

at undermining the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Serbian state.56

Accordingly, the allegations that Serbia was involved in Srebrenica and
bore responsibility for genocide were meant to prepare the ground
for the suspension of the Republika Srpska and the independence of
Kosovo.57 By opposing the adoption of a declaration on Srebrenica and
insisting that all war crimes be condemned, the nationalist parties por-
trayed themselves as defenders of the Serbian state whose integrity was
challenged by the accusations of the NGOs.
Paradoxically, the opening of the Srebrenica issue led to renewed
nationalist mobilisation in Serbia. Besides discrediting the demands of
the human rights groups, the nationalist circles centred around the SRS
launched a counter-campaign denouncing war crimes committed against
Serbs. Following the methods used by the NGOs, they organised public
conferences and broadcasted footages of war crimes committed against
Serbs in order to disprove the collective responsibility of the Serbian
nation. In addition, the nationalists challenged the singularity of the
Srebrenica massacre by denying the intent to commit genocide, con-
testing the scale of the atrocity and relativising the massacre by point-
ing to the war crimes committed by Bosnian Muslim troops in the
surroundings of Srebrenica. As a result, the Serbian political class and
public opinion were deeply polarised with regards to this issue. While
the Serbian President Boris Tadic attended the tenth commemoration of
the Srebrenica massacre on 11 July 2005, the SRS leaders attended the
commemoration in the neighbouring town of Bratunac on the day after.58
By drawing a parallel between these two events, the Serbian nationalists
effectively sealed any debate about the singularity of Srebrenica and the
responsibility for this massacre. They thus watered down the effect of
the Scorpions tape, which eventually failed to generate genuine public
deliberation about war crimes committed by the Serbian side.
The issue of Srebrenica was brought back on the Serbian political
agenda by the ruling of the ICJ in February 2007. The ICJ cleared Serbia
from direct responsibility and involvement in the Srebrenica genocide,
but it ruled that Serbia had breached the genocide convention by fail-
ing to prevent the genocide and to bring perpetrators to justice before
the ICTY.59 This decision provoked ample discontent among the human
rights community in Serbia. Indeed, several NGO representatives had
previously called the international community to support the genocide
lawsuit against Serbia, arguing that this was a precondition for Serbia
to face its past.60 Having premised truth-telling upon the establishment
of state responsibility, the human rights NGOs saw the ICJ ruling as a
blow to transitional justice and to the acknowledgement of war crimes
242 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

in Serbia.61 Nevertheless, the Courts decision emboldened President

Tadic to launch the initiative for the adoption of a parliamentary resolu-
tion condemning Srebrenica which he saw as a symbolic compensation
to the victims.62 But once again, the adoption of such resolution was
thwarted by political divisions, as the political parties held on to the
positions adopted earlier.
The Serbian parliament eventually adopted a parliamentary resolution
acknowledging and condemning the Srebrenica genocide in March 2010.
This came about mainly as a result of a reconfiguration of the Serbian
political scene. Following the parliamentary elections of May 2008, the
DS formed a pro-European government with a rejuvenated SPS and was
now able to push for the adoption of a resolution condemning Srebrenica
in parliament. However, this resolution was dismissed by human rights
NGOs and liberal elites for not explicitly defining Srebrenica as geno-
cide.63 Also, the Serbian parliament subsequently adopted a second
resolution condemning all crimes committed against Serbs, which led
commentators to argue that the acknowledgement of Srebrenica came
about as a result of political bargaining rather than being a genuine
truth-telling initiative.64
Under these circumstances, the acknowledgement of Srebrenica has
thus far done little to promote reckoning with war crimes in Serbia.
Public opinion polls showed that only 20.6 per cent of the population
supported a resolution on Srebrenica, while 46.2 per cent were in favour
of a resolution condemning all war crimes.65 This lack of support for
the resolution shows that the official acknowledgement of Srebrenica
was not the result of societal reckoning with war crimes, but rather a
top-down initiative assumed by the political elites. The parliamentary
resolution was drafted by political parties behind closed doors, which
inhibited any public debate about war crimes. Human rights activists
have warned that the resolution will have no effect whatsoever on reck-
oning with war crimes unless its message is disseminated in society.66
Amid these observations, it is obviously too early to judge whether, or
how, the adoption of the Srebrenica resolution will affect reckoning with
war crimes in Serbia in the long run. Human rights activists generally
agree that significant progress towards the acknowledgement of Serbian
war crimes has been made in the past five years.67 Whereas the issue of
Srebrenica used to be taboo and Serbian war crimes openly denied until
fairly recently, this is no longer the case even among nationalist circles.
Although the nature of the crime remains contested and relativised, the
fact that a horrendous massacre was committed by Serbian forces has
now become widely accepted. Public opinion polls show that, in 2010,
 Mladen Ostojic 243

55.2 per cent of the population believed that a crime was committed
in Srebrenica, against only 37 per cent in 2004.68 While this constitutes
only a partial success, it is nonetheless fairly impressive in view of
the short period under consideration. As the German example shows,
societal reckoning with war crimes is a long-term process which spans
decades.69 In view of this, a definitive verdict on the significance of the
Srebrenica resolution will have to await future researchers.

Conclusion

During the past decade, human rights NGOs have played a key role in
advancing the transitional justice agenda in Serbia. In view of the politi-
cal resistance to address the war crimes legacy, these organisations con-
stituted the principal vector for promoting the truth about the atrocities
committed by the Serbian side during the wars of Yugoslav secession.
The Serbian NGOs have undeniably contributed to bringing up the war
crimes issue into the domestic political agenda, as illustrated by the sen-
sitisation campaign on the eve of the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica.
Nevertheless, the strategies deployed by these organisations have largely
failed to generate any genuine reckoning, let alone self-reflection about
the past in Serbian society.
Indeed, the human rights NGOs have premised their truth-telling
campaign upon the assumption that reckoning with war crimes requires
the establishment of state responsibility for these atrocities. As a result,
they explicitly requested the Serbian authorities to acknowledge and
take responsibility for the Srebrenica genocide. But in view of the Bosnian
Genocide case before the ICJ, no political party was eager to endorse these
demands. Had Serbia been the first state ever held responsible of geno-
cide, it would have suffered a massive loss of international legitimacy
besides potentially having to pay substantial monetary compensations
to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, even the reformist political
elites considered the NGOs demands unreasonable. Instead of bringing
about the acknowledgement of Srebrenica, the NGO campaign backfired
by reinforcing the discourses of self-victimisation and denial deployed
by the nationalist parties.
Several lessons can be drawn from the analysis presented in this
chapter. First of all, human rights organisations working in the field
of transitional justice need to take into account political realities in
order to define feasible objectives and adopt suitable strategies. If not,
their activities may prove ineffective or counterproductive, as the previ-
ous case shows. Second, the acknowledgement of state responsibility
244 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

for past atrocities should be seen as an outcome, not a starting point,

of a long-term process of coming to terms with the past. Otherwise,
demands to face the past may lead to the overt politicisation of this
issue or to acknowledgement without reckoning. Public opinion polls
show that, while there is widespread knowledge and partial acknowl-
edgement of war crimes in Serbia, there is no awareness that the former
regime was criminal. This leads to a third point: exposing facts about
war crimes is not enough for coming to terms with nationalist authori-
tarianism. Attempts to face the past in the Western Balkans need to
be refocused towards highlighting the criminal aspects of the former
regimes and exploring the mechanisms that made people support or
tolerate their rule.

Notes
1. C. Turner (2008) Delivering Lasting Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in
Times of Transition: The Role of International Law, The International Journal
of Transitional Justice, 2(2), pp. 12651.
2. For a critical overview of the peace-promoting claims of truth-telling and
justice, see D. Mendeloff (2004) Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling and Postconflict
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm? International Studies Review, 6(3),
pp. 35861.
3. J. Subotic (2009) Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press); P. C. McMahon and D. P. Forsythe (2008) The
ICTYs Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism Meets Network Politics,
Human Rights Quarterly, 30(2), pp. 41235; M. Spoerri and A. Freyberg-Inan
(2008) From Prosecution to Persecution: Perceptions of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Serbian Domestic
Politics, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(4), pp. 35084.
4. This research has been supported by the Arts and Humanities Research
Council (AHRC).
5. D. Ilic (2005) Jugoslovenska komisija za istinu i pomirenje 2001? (The
Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation) Rec, 73(19), pp. 602.
6. Otvorena sva vrata (All Doors Opened), Vreme, 16 October 2000.
7. Rizicno kolebanje (Risky Hesitation), Vreme, 25 January 2001.
8. Saradjivacemo sa Hagom (We will Cooperate with The Hague), NIN,
1 February 2001.
9. Otvorena sva vrata, op. cit.
10. Nove tehnologije umesto ljivovice (New Technologies Instead of ljivovica),
NIN, 21 December 2000.
11. Decision on the Establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), No. 15/2001
and 59/2002, available at http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/
commissions/Serbia&Motenegro-Charter.pdf (accessed on 20 August 2010).
12. Ibid.
13. Ostavke (Resignations), Vreme, 19 April 2001.
 Mladen Ostojic 245

14. Ibid.
15. V. Dimitrijevic (2001) Izgledi za utvrdjivanje istine i postizanje pomirenja u
Srbiji (Prospects for Establishing the Truth and Achieving Reconciliation in
Serbia), Rec, 62(8), pp. 6974.
16. Conference organised by B92, Belgrade, 1820 May 2001. The proceedings of
the conference are available at www.b92.net/trr/2001/diskusija/diskutanti_
hronoloski.php (accessed on 19 August 2010).
17. Bol, sporovi i sarkazam (Grief, Disputes and Sarcasm), Vreme, 24 April 2001.
18. Ilic (2005), op. cit., p. 65.
19. Svilanovic referred to an edited collection of essays written by the Serbian
liberal intelligentsia. See N. Popov (ed.) (1996) Srpska Strana Rata (The
Serbian Facet of the War) (Belgrade: Republika).
20. Zoran indic, speech given at the conference In Search of Truth and
Responsibility Towards a Democratic Future, Belgrade, 19 May 2001, avail-
able at www.b92.net/trr/2001/diskusija/diskutanti_hronoloski.php (accessed
on 25 November 2010).
21. Ibid.
22. Jelena Pejic, speech given at the conference In Search of Truth and
Responsibility Towards a Democratic Future in Belgrade, 19 May 2001,
available at www.b92.net/trr/2001/diskusija/diskutanti_hronoloski.php
(accessed on 25 November 2010).
23. A. Kranjc and E. Marinkov (2005) Komisija za Istinu i Pomirenje, 18, avail-
able at www.most.org.rs (accessed on 25 November 2010).
24. Mucna saradnja (Painful Cooperation), Vreme, 5 July 2001
25. Prva spoticanja (First Frictions), NIN, 26 April 2001.
26. Radmila Nakarada (2008) Raspad Jugoslavije: Problemi tumacenja, suocavanja
i tranzicije (The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Problems of Interpretation,
Reckoning and Transition) (Beograd: Slubeni Glasnik), p. 169.
27. Tovar strave (The Load of Horror), Vreme, 10 May 2001.
28. This is demonstrated by the public opinion polls conducted during the first
weeks of the trial. See Strategic Marketing & Media Research Institute (2002)
Gledanost direktnih prenosa sudjenja Slobodanu Miloevicu u Hagu (TV Ratings
of the Live Broadcasting of the Trial of Slobodan Miloevic in The Hague)
(Belgrade, SMMRI).
29. See V. Dimitrijevic (2005) Kako ubediti javnost (How to Convince the
Public), Pravda u Tranziciji, 5, available at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/
html_trz/%28CASOPIS%29/SRP/SRP01/38.pdf (accessed on 24 November
2010).
30. These criticisms were voiced by Sonja Biserko, the Director of the Serbian
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, in an interview for the Croatian
weekly magazine Feral Tribune. See Opta amnestoza (General Amnestose),
Feral Tribune, 17 July 2002.
31. This debate was later published in book form by the Serbian Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights. See Tacka razlaza (Parting of Ways) (Belgrade:
Helsinke sveske no. 16, 2003).
32. For a comprehensive analysis of the debate, see J. Dragovic-Soso (2012)
Collective Responsibility, International Justice and Public Reckoning with
the Recent Past: Reflections on a Debate in Serbia, in T. Waters (ed.) The
Miloevic Trial An Autopsy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 126.
246 Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present?

33. Ibid.
34. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2005) Javno mnenje Srbije: Stavovi prema
hakom sudu (Public Opinion: Attitudes towards the Hague Tribunal), avail-
able at www.bgcentar.org.rs (accessed on 20 July 2009).
35. These programmes were implemented by human rights NGOs such as the
Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC), the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
(HCHR), and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM).
36. For example, the HLC organised a column titled The Hague Among Us
in the newspaper Danas between April 2004 and June 2005. The HLC also
organised a series of conferences at which the findings of the ICTY were
presented in partnership with the Tribunals outreach programme.
37. Secret Police in Kosovo Cover Up, B92, 30 December 2004.
38. These organisations were the HLC, the Civic Initiatives, the YUCOM, the
Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the HCHR. See Jocic i Bulatovic
koce istinu o Mackatici (Jocic and Bulatovic Obstruct the Truth About
Mackatica), Danas, 4 February 2002.
39. On the confrontation between liberal and illiberal civil society surrounding
the commemoration of Srebrenica, see D. Kostovicova (2006) Civil Society
and Post-Communist Democratisation: Facing a Double Challenge in Post-
Miloevic Serbia, Journal of Civil Society, 2(1), pp. 2137.
40. The five NGOs aforementioned were joined by the Belgrade Circle, the
Centre for Cultural Decontamination and the Women in Black.
41. Odreci se zlocina (Rejecting the Crime), Vecernje Novosti, 28 May 2005.
42. Dilema da li priznati zlocin (The Dilemma about whether to Acknowledge
the Crime), Danas, 28 May 2005.
43. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Scorpions tape, see
I. Zverzhanovski (2007) Watching War Crimes: The Srebrenica Video and
Serbian Attitudes to the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, Southeast European and
Black Sea Studies, 7(3), pp. 41730.
44. Policija munjevito uhapsila korpione (Police Quick to Arrest the
Scorpions), Glas Javnosti, 3 June 2005.
45. Poklonicu se rtvama Srebrenice (I will Bow to the Srebrenica Victims),
Vecernje Novosti, 3 June 2005.
46. Vecina za osudu svih zlocina (Majority in Favour of Condemning All
Crimes), Politika, 14 June 2005.
47. Osuda na recima (Promises of Condemnation), Vecernje Novosti, 15 June
2005.
48. Skuptina Srbije nece doneti deklaraciju o osudi zlocina (Serbian Parliament
will not Vote for Resolution Condemning Crimes), Danas, 15 June 2005.
49. Prikazan video zapis o ubijanju muslimana iz Srebrenice (Footage Shown
of Srebrenica Muslims Being Killed), Danas, 2 June 2005.
50. Biserko: Srbija izvrila genocid u BiH (Biserko: Serbia Committed Genocide
in BiH), Politika, 25 June 2005.
51. Nataa Kandic even went as far as to accuse the deputy leader of the SRS,
Tomislav Nikolic, of having committed war crimes during the war in Croatia.
Nikolic instigated legal proceedings against Kandic who was later found guilty
of defamation. See Kamen u svakoj cipeli (A Stone in Each Shoe), Vreme, 19
February 2009. This ruling was subsequently annulled by the District Court in
Belgrade. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 Serbia, available at
www.hrw.org/world-report-2010/srbija-0 (accessed on 18 May 2012).
 Mladen Ostojic 247

52. Zlocin kao reklama (Crime as Advertisement), Vecernje Novosti, 2 Jul. 2005
53. For a discussion of the political context of the Bosnian Genocide case, see
V. Dimitrijevic and M. Milanovic (2008) The Strange Story of the Bosnian
Genocide Case, Leiden Journal of International Law, 21(1), pp. 6594.
54. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case Information Sheet, Case No. IT-98-33, available
at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/cis/en/cis_krstic.pdf (accessed on
2 November 2010).
55. Vecina za osudu svih zlocina (Majority in Favour of Condemning All
Crimes), Politika, 14 June 2005.
56. Zaustaviti kampanju NVO protiv Srba (Stop the Anti-Serb NGO Campaign),
Glas Javnosti, 25 June 2005.
57. Priprema za ukidanje Republike Srpske (Preparation for the Suspension of
the Republika Srpska), Nacional, 6 June 2005.
58. On 12 July each year, the Serbian community commemorates the victims
of the war crimes perpetrated in Bratunac by the Bosnian Muslim forces
stationed in Srebrenica.
59. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Judgement of 26 February 2007, International Court of Justice.
60. Podrati tubu BiH protiv SCG (Support the BiH Lawsuit Against S&M),
Politika, 28 January 2006.
61. Prve reakcije na presudu medjunarodnog suda pravde u Hagu (First
Reactions to the Ruling of the International Court of Justice in The Hague),
Danas, 27 February 2007.
62. Tadic: Skuptina mora da donese deklaraciju o Srebrenici (Tadic: Parliament
Must Adopt Resolution on Srebrenica), Politika, 27 February 2007.
63. Instead of giving a legal qualification to the crime committed in Srebrenica,
the resolution simply referred to the ruling of the ICJ.
64. For a detailed analysis of the adoption of the Srebrenica resolution, see
J. Dragovic-Soso (2012) Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the
Serbian Parliament, the European Union, and the Politics of Compromise,
East European Politics, 28(3), pp. 123.
65. Za rezoluciju 20.6 odsto gradjana (20.6 per cent of Citizens in Favour of the
Resolution), B92, 3 February 2010.
66. Srebrenicu u nastavni program (Srebrenica in the School Curriculum),
Danas, 1 April 2010.
67. Personal interviews with Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco, Director of the Yugoslav
Committee for Human Rights, and Vesna Pesic, former leader of the Civic
Alliance of Serbia and MP for the LDP, on 20 July and 5 August 2009, respec-
tively.
68. Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research, Public
Opinion in Serbia: Attitudes towards the ICTY, August 2004, available at
http://www.bgcentar.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=358:stavovi-prema-ratnim-zloinima-hakom-tribunalu-i-domaem-pravo
suu-za-ratne-zloine-&catid=125 (accessed on 7 March 2010).
69. A. Ludtke (1993) Coming to Terms with the Past: Illusions of Remembering,
Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany, The Journal of Modern History,
65(3), pp. 54272.
14
A Practitioners Perspective
Florence Hartmann

The limited impact of civil society in producing social changes and

transformation in the war-torn and divided societies in the Western
Balkans can hardly be considered separately from the limited impact in
this respect of the EU and other external factors, on one side, and of the
domestic governments and political elites, on the other. These are the
three main actors with the capacity to influence the war-to-peace transi-
tion in a region where post-conflict regeneration challenges coincided
with the parallel transformation of the economic and political system
of several neighbouring countries.
Expectations that civil society actors can and will bring about changes
that international state-building strategies have not themselves man-
aged to accomplish are necessarily bound to fail. Civil society can never
compensate for all of the deficits of democratisation, state-building and
post-conflict reconstruction. False expectations that civil society actors
could repair or compensate for the failures of the state itself or of
international interventions, prevent a fair assessment of the capabilities
and scope of the NGOs in the Western Balkans. All the more so when
relevant civil stakeholders were excluded from the initial phases of this
complex transition, as for example from the peace process (Bosnia/
Dayton) or from the liberalisation phase undertaken in all countries of
the region in the immediate aftermath of the war. Civil society was at
best seen as a partner ahead of the first post-war elections. But in any
event, the internationally driven strategy of liberalisation first was far
from an inclusive approach in respect of civil society.
Regrettably, the European Union and other international actors came
to a civil society building strategy only after weaknesses or failure
in the primarily state-run transition process had appeared. By neglecting
the local civil society as a pivotal partner in all phases of the transition,
248
 Florence Hartmann 249

they contributed to the confinement of the existing NGOs, which had

gained legitimacy in opposing the war and the illiberal regimes, to a
reduced and marginal role in the post-war period, rather than encour-
aging its early transformation into a successful, positive and legitimate
interface facilitating, from the very beginning, interactions between
the state and the society as a central issue of good governance and
reconstruction. This transformation was all the more necessary given
that civil society was itself facing transition. NGOs had to shift their
wartime activities to peacetime programmes. Their early inclusion would
certainly have facilitated more inclusive projects on their part, and there-
fore encouraged the emergence in the Western Balkans of a more diversi-
fied and powerful civil society engaged not only in transitional justice
or human rights activities but also focused on empowering citizens
to use the democratic tools to provoke societal and political changes.
Instead, after more than a decade of transition, state institutions, politi-
cal parties and traditional civil society actors like labour unions, profes-
sional organisations, religious organisations and war veterans unions
remained mostly fragmented and organised along ethno-political lines
in the whole region.
Peace-building requires working concomitantly from the bottom-up,
the top-down and the middle-out. Therefore a transformation from a
civil society dominated by anti-war intellectuals to a more inclusive civil
society would have strengthened its capacity to (1) provide a basis for
a social consensus upon which political, economic and societal reforms
can be based and (2) influence an overall transition mostly outside driven
and characterised by a liberalisation before democratisation strategy
that has produced social frustrations among citizens left with no palpable
democratic compensations.
State-building, peace-building and building civil society are indubi-
tably intermeshed and parallel processes that cannot be undertaken
separately or sequentially. The same applies when it comes to assess-
ing their influence on war-to-peace transition. In many instances, civil
society in the Western Balkans was expected to function as substitute
for usually state-run activities and to redress the failure of both the
states and the international actors over a process in which it was mostly
excluded, being perceived as a valuable partner only after it appears that
the transition was partially unsuccessful. As a result, the civil society was
confined, and indeed confined itself, mostly to specific substitution
tasks and hence created isolated pockets of activities.
In the absence of political will to address the war crimes legacy,
many of the most crucial tasks of any war-to-peace transformation of
250 A Practitioners Perspective

a society were relegated to civil society. It includes assistance to the

judiciary, civil education, initiatives for cross-cultural understanding
and relationship-building between former enemies, documentation of
war crimes, fact-finding and support to identify missing people, deal-
ing with trauma and psychosocial support for war victims, refugees and
returnees, initiatives for dealing constructively with the past (fact-finding,
story-telling, reconciliation initiatives), and so on. In other words, civil
society actors took upon themselves an important, and probably the most
difficult, part of the peace-building efforts.
For these efforts to produce discernable and lasting societal changes,
interactions between civil society, the state and external actors (the EU
foremost as well as the wider international community) were essential.
Although, starting in the early 2000s, Western governments have indi-
vidually provided financial support to local NGOs engaged in cross-
border peace education, in establishing norms of tolerance, putting
pressure on institutions to deal with prejudices and enemy images, as
well as raising awareness of responsibility for the past in order to coun-
teract collective amnesia and apathy, it is only much later that the EU
understood that transitional justice needed to become an integral part
of the democratisation policies deployed by the international commu-
nity. At first, the EU considered that reckoning with the past needed
to await a certain level of democratic consolidation. It figured that the
people in the region would iron out their differences once integrated
into the EU. It was therefore keen to avoid, at least in the short term,
pushing for conflicting issues to be addressed for fear that it could
derail the already difficult transition. When, at the beginning of the
2010s, the EU eventually developed a strategy to support civil society
in addressing wartime legacies, stereotypes and misconceptions towards
the former enemies, they had remained mainly unchallenged by the
domestic governments for more than a decade. The very recent increase
of funds that NGOs can apply for their projects aimed at pursuing
regional reconciliation witnesses how recent this change of approach is.
However, by failing to coordinate its efforts and activities, the EU might
not reach its objectives in this respect. For example, the impact of civil
society (large as well as small local groups or even self-funded neigh-
bourhood initiatives) engaged in cross-cultural understanding and
relationship-building between divided communities is likely to be very
limited as long as international actors (OSCE, EU and so on) back the
two schools under one roof practice that has disseminated all over
mix areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as well as in Kosovo and in some
parts of Croatia, such as Vukovar). Such a model of segregation, which
 Florence Hartmann 251

clearly affects new generations and thus the reconciliation process in

the long term, and which is in obvious contradiction with European
and international standards, has been tolerated under the claim that
it helps avoid tensions. The EUs late inclusive strategy towards local
civil society, and the lack of coherence in its efforts, reveals a pattern
of misunderstanding in the EU post-conflict management based on the
assumption that stabilisation and the addressing of conflicting soci-
etal issues are opposed and need be undertaken sequentially. Both are
instead intermeshed and therefore the success of any peace-building
strategies depends on a parallel implementation of all these activities.
Most international efforts in respect of transitional justice were pri-
marily focused on enforcing international standards of accountability
in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states. These policies have essen-
tially sought to punish perpetrators of mass atrocities and establish the
truth about their crimes. But in the Western Balkans, they failed for
more than a decade to include the mechanisms that would facilitate
the transmission of knowledge to the concerned society, for instance,
by including in the EU enlargement package for the Western Balkans
the requirement that local states establish, in collaboration with the
local civil society, peace education and other dedicated education pro-
grammes within the normal school system as well as appropriate training
for teachers. This failure has not only resulted in international mecha-
nisms (like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
hereafter ICTY) having had little impact on the dealing with the past in
the Western Balkan societies, but also domestic war crimes trials (enabled
under international pressure). Neither the ICTY outreach programme,
initiated at the end of 1999, nor the multiple initiatives launched con-
comitantly by Western Balkan NGOs to disseminate and publicise the
facts established through the international, and later the domestic war
crimes trials, could reach the concerned societies through appropriate
educational reform without the participation of local governments.
Nowadays, educational materials across the region remain mostly ethno-
centric, biased and foster stereotypes and prejudices instead of accept-
ance and understanding.
Domestic war crimes trials, however, illustrate in an exemplary man-
ner how efficient a sound interaction between international actors,
local governments and the local civil society can be. Both international
actors and the local civil society pressured, although with different
motives, the local governments into creating an instrument that would
continue the work of the ICTY. Following the establishment of special
war crimes courts with mainly international financial support (Serbia,
252 A Practitioners Perspective

Bosnia-Herzegovina), both actors, international and local, continued to

interact in order to make the trials possible despite the lack of domestic
political will to prosecute members of ones own military and police
units. The ICTY transferred some of its pending cases or evidence to
domestic prosecutors and local civil society, such as the Humanitarian
Law Centre (HLC) in Serbia; undertook efforts to identify victims and
witnesses in war crimes cases; encouraged people to testify despite the
reluctance of witnesses and survivors to cross the border in order to
seek justice from institutions they often see as unreformed and hostile;
cooperated with the police authorities in order to secure protection for
key witnesses; served as a victims legal counsel in order to represent
victims in the proceedings; and facilitated the families of victims and
survivors from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo to come to Serbia in order
to monitor the trials.
Yet, international actors have missed many opportunities to inter-
act in such a way. For instance, the EU insistence on full compliance
with the ICTY as one of the political conditions set for advancing the
Western Balkans on the path to EU integration was said to be intended
to support the efforts to redefine national goals away from the national-
ist enmities of the past, and thus to support the efforts undertaken by
part of the civil society in the region. It did produce results in terms
of delivery of key war crimes indictees to The Hague. However, it did
not lead to a shift in the public perceptions of their war heroes as the
truth about their wartime behaviour emerged. Consistent EU pressure
on the governments in the region to fulfil an already binding obligation
pursuant to several UN Security Council Resolutions appears in the end
to be rather predicated on the need to test their disposition to comply
with international obligations and establish the rule of law than on the
need to bring about the delegitimisation of extreme nationalist ideol-
ogy. The conditionality used appeared to offer a model of interaction
between the EU and local civil society that would be able to create a
political consensus in the region in order for the governments to face
down local opposition to the ICTY. However, the EU left in the middle
of the process.
As another example, the People to People (P2P) initiatives launched
by the EU in 2008 with the aim of facilitating a direct dialogue with all
elements of local civil society was mainly limited to EU outreach efforts.
By organising opportunities to further explain the European integration
process to civil society representatives, EU institutions hope to broaden
the number of those who remain committed to Europe and are also
communicating Europe in their home countries, rather than redefining
 Florence Hartmann 253

EU strategies in order to encourage deeper and swifter changes in the

Western Balkan societies by taking into account the shortcomings or
other deficiencies pointed out by civil society during these consultations.
Although those who participated in the P2P programmes benefited by
familiarising themselves with EU policies, institutions, decision-making
processes and legislation, these programmes appeared to be unsuccessful
as suggested by the surveys on Europe in the region. Since 2008, levels
of popular support for European integration have constantly fallen.
Although this increasing euroscepticism in the region is not imputable
to the P2P programmes, such consultations are far from a real par-
ticipatory approach. More generally, international actors have almost
entirely disregarded the need for citizen participation in political and
social processes, even though they might have helped break some dead-
locks in the transition process. Since 2006, Bosnia-Herzegovina has
faced a constitutional crisis that the EU has failed to ease despite repeated
attempted negotiations with the divided political parties. The EU, how-
ever, did not find it appropriate to engage in an open dialogue on this
matter with civil society and try a bottom-up approach to pressure
the parliament into a consensus even though the crisis is very much
related to the terms of multi-ethnic coexistence and the nature of post-
war democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And when two representatives
of the civil society, representing minority groups, in 2009, obtained
from the European Court of Human Rights a ruling confirming that the
ineligibility of minorities, other than the three constitutional peoples,
to run for the Parliament or the Presidency was discriminatory, the EU
laid the whole blame on Bosnia-Herzegovina even though the move of
the plaintiffs was equally critical of their political leadership at home
and of the international actors who wrote the Constitution as part of
the Peace Accords from 1995, and then oversaw the electoral law. This
illustrates well the weaknesses of international approaches and mecha-
nisms to foster the emancipatory potential of civil society in countries
undergoing transitions from violence to peace. It also shows how the
very foundations of the post-war Bosnian state are a clear obstacle to
wider opportunities for participation and social inclusion beyond the
narrow boundaries of ethnic politics.
The ongoing transition in the region has so far mostly produced
hybrid quasi-democratic regimes where former Communists, national-
ists and warlords continue to maintain influential positions in politics
and in the economy. While many of those who were involved in or
supported the criminal policies that had led to mass violence are still in
position of power, most of the political leaders have been reluctant to
254 A Practitioners Perspective

address the shadow of the past and some of them have even failed to
clearly acknowledge the importance for transitioning states to shift to
new political practices that clearly delegitimise violence, intolerance
and ethnic hostility as a normal way of conducting policy. Should civil
society be held accountable for this situation, or is this situation the
main reason for the limited impact of civil society in producing trans-
formation? Why similarly democratic tools established through the
joint pressure of the international community and the local civil soci-
ety to fight intolerance and discrimination are insufficient to produce
visible changes? Where is the hitch?
The lack of democratisation provides in any event a weak founda-
tion both for peoples participation in political and social changes and
for the consolidation of the conflict transformation. Yet, the main
obstacle remains the unwillingness on part of the political elite to shift
to new political practices by abandoning ethnic politics mainly used
as a tool to maintain the submission of their own community and
compensate for the effect of democratic pluralism on their own politi-
cal power. Ethnocentrism in such a context became the most efficient
tool to neutralise the effect of the ongoing democratic transition, but a
dangerous one as it is conducive to the occurrence of conflict and not
conducive to its constructive resolution. Political elites across the region
have openly, or insidiously, undermined civil society efforts to create
space for interethnic cooperation and alternative thinking on social
development that is no longer led by nationalist ideologies or religious
fundamentalism, ensuring at least that the discourse beyond ethnic
lines promoted by the civil society do not develop outside small urban
elitist pockets. Similarly, they have made no serious or genuine effort to
promote mutual understanding, overlapping mutually inclusive identi-
ties (to be, for example, a Serb, a Bosnian and a European at the same
time), and a better understanding of the dynamics and policies that lead
to the war. All this makes reconciliation all but impossible to achieve
in the near future.
By failing to undertake educational approaches aimed at combating
all forms of discrimination and violence and to deal with the denial and
veil of silence over ones nations own crimes during the 1990s wars, the
local governments have not helped post-war generations create a safe
distance from the past atrocities. Young generations have instead often
been faced with ideologies based on ideas of us versus them that have
reinforced the prejudiced image of the other ethnic groups as enemies.
For the general public to be involved in the process of facing the past
it is essential that young generations through their knowledge and the
 Florence Hartmann 255

process of questioning faced their parents and the wartime heritage and
make sense of what had happened, at their own pace, within the family
as well as within society at large. Education is therefore central. Yet
none of the governments in the region have taken on this duty. Instead
new generations are provided history textbooks offering truncated or
even false presentation of the events from the 1990s, with exclusive
perspectives and the glorification of their own nations past. While his-
tory textbooks are considered a mirror of society, they have merely not
changed since the end of the war, more than a decade ago, despite the
attempts by civil society to obtain support from local governments to
help the society gradually accept a more realistic view of the war and
thus move from denial to acknowledgement. In the absence of state
participation, civil society efforts are bound to fail: witness, for instance,
the stark decline in public knowledge of war crimes during the period
20015 in Serbia, which was revealed by public opinion polls.
Moreover, the competing views on attribution of responsibility
collective guilt versus isolated individual responsibility (see chapter by
Mladen Ostojic) that has polarised civil society, foremost in Serbia,
constitutes another obstacle in the process of coming to terms with the
past in Western Balkan societies. But this polarisation does not solely
result from strategy choices within the society in question (full truth
versus denial). Individualisation of criminal responsibility through legal
proceedings in The Hague or before local judiciaries has helped prevent
collective guilt, but at the same time created a problematic distortion.
The condemnation of the crimes associated with individual perpetrators
has created a public perception that the regimes behind these crimes,
and their exclusionary nationalist ideology, were exonerated. There
has been a clear avoidance of condemnation of the regimes, and their
underpinning ideology. Nor have they been stigmatised as criminal.
This drift is polarising and detrimental; all the more so since these ide-
ologies were not defeated with the end of the wars, and their survival
is conducive to the recurrence of regional tensions and to conflict.
Attempts to deal with the war legacies therefore need to be refocused
towards highlighting the criminal aspect of the former regimes and
exploring the mechanisms that made people support or tolerate their
rule. Such an approach would contribute to overcoming the current
competing views on the attribution of responsibility and give a new
impetus to civil society efforts to deal constructively with the past. It
is all the more important that the perpetrator generations descendants
are obviously not prepared to confront honestly the violence of the
1990s since the conflict is still often perceived as having successfully
256 A Practitioners Perspective

enabled the ethnic dismantling of the former Yugoslav space into eth-
nically homogeneous entities or states. It has therefore been integrated
into their nations history not as their own negative possession but
rather as a positive one, still glorified as a facilitator for the establish-
ment of their own nation state.
There is a direct connection between continuing instability in the
region and the failures to address legacies of the past. The recent
regional non-governmental truth-seeking initiative, known as RECOM,
initiated in 2006 by a group of dedicated human rights NGOs and
victim associations from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo appears
therefore pivotal to move forward. It seeks to establish an official
Regional Commission to be endorsed by the governments of the post-
Yugoslav states while at the same time remaining independent from
them. Although a good example of possible interaction between civil
society and the corridors of power, the Commission has not yet been
endorsed by any government, or by any parliament, in the region.
Without official support, it is unlikely that the Commission will have
a broad social and political impact. Its findings would be largely irrel-
evant if there is no political will on any side to take the results seriously
and streamline them into the political process.
Finally, the limited impact of civil society in the Western Balkans over
the course of transition can also be attributed to the reluctance of domes-
tic political leaders, parliaments and governments to cooperate with
civil society and to see the benefit of such cooperation. Senior political
leaders often envisage such relation only as one either of submission or
of opposition. As a result, they often openly exert control over small
organisations, social groups, victims and veterans, or even co-opt NGOs
for the purposes of separatist politics, or cooperate with select parts of
civil society that strengthen their own power, ignoring more liberal
or critical forces. Local politicians see civil society as a counterbalance
to the power of the nation state, as outside-driven forces. Despite the
ongoing transition, ethno-political leaders still oppose the emergence of
a strong and powerful civil society which could counterbalance ethno-
politics and continue often to use the same rhetoric as during the war
labelling the leading civil society groups as traitors.
The lack of democratisation, and of democratic behaviour among the
regional political elite, is neither conducive to inclusive conflict resolu-
tion nor to the strengthening of the civil society. But this still unsuc-
cessful transition in the Western Balkans makes it all the more necessary
for civil society to fulfil its role of both watchdog and partner of the
governments, of both counter-power and facilitator.
Conclusion
James Ker-Lindsay

This work has sought to highlight the varied, and often contradictory,
roles played by civil society in the transformation of the Western Balkans.
In the first part, the focus was on state-building and the work started
with two chapters that sought to explore the role of the EU as a catalyst
for the development of civil society in the region. As John OBrennan
highlighted, while the European Union has actively sought to engage
with civil society actors in the process of enlargement, this has been
hampered by its rather limited focus on technocratic procedures. This
has meant that much of the good that the EU could have done to build
civil society in the region has been lost, as attention has been focused
far too much on the elites. Picking up on this theme, but challenging
much of the conventional thinking of the subject, Adam Fagan looked
at donor assistance to NGOs and other civil society actors in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia. He showed that, in actual fact, some NGOs have
benefited enormously from EU support, but only when the support has
been focused on building sustainability. However, as will be discussed
later, this has come at a price. The third chapter, by Iavor Rangelov,
shifted attention to the development of the rule of law in the region.
As he showed, civil society has played a somewhat ambivalent part in
this process. To end the section, Giulio Venneri returned to the theme of
the role of the European Union, and argued that in fact the EU had been
far more aware of the need to learn lessons than many believed and that
civil society is accorded a much more prominent role in considerations
than many external observers realise.
The second section shifted attention to the role of civil society in
democratisation. Here the emphasis was more explicitly focused on the
development and evolution of indigenous, broadly conceived, organisa-
tions and the ways in which these bodies can often be seen in seemingly
257
258 Conclusion

contradictory ways. For example, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers exam-

ined VETVENDOSJE! (Self-Determination) and its charismatic leader,
Albin Kurti, and questioned the motives of the widespread international
hostility towards the movement. Delving deeper into its philosophy,
she acknowledged the ways in which it could be seen in a negative light,
but seemed to suggest that it is not as troubling as it is often portrayed
as being. For their part, Francesco Strazzari and Ervjola Selenica con-
tinued by arguing that even rather liberal-leaning NGOs cannot easily
escape much of the nationalist rhetoric that exists in Kosovo. Moving
to Croatia, Anita Brkanic looked at the role of diasporic organisations in
processes of democratisation, and showed that while they have tended
to see themselves as having played an important role in the transforma-
tion of the country it can also be argued that they have hindered demo-
cratic development. In his study of civil society in Macedonia, Nenad
Markovic showed how the development of civil society has taken a
worrying direction as it has failed to challenge, and has in some cases
even supported, illiberal attitudes in society at large, creating what he
calls an uncivil society in the country. To conclude this section, Joanna
Hanson argues that many of the factors are not indigenous to the
Balkans. Similar traits could be seen during the transition of the states
of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, there are important lessons
learnt available to policymakers as they seek to challenge some of the
more unsavoury aspects of civil society in the region.
The third, and final, section sought to understand the role of civil
society in post-conflict reconstruction. In her study of the downsizing
of the police force in Bosnia, Gemma Collantes-Celador explored the
way in which two key organisations sought to challenge the opaque
nature of this process, thereby challenging both the international com-
munity and local political forces, but helping to build more open and
accountable institutions. Meanwhile, Jens Narten examined the trans-
formation of the creation, development and eventual dissolution of the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). This was important as it provided an
interesting analysis of the way in which a popular guerrilla movement,
in this case the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), was gradually disbanded
in a controlled fashion, and with very little societal resistance. Moving
on, the next two contributions look at the role of civil society in efforts
to come to terms with the past. Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik challenges
the argument that civil society has not done enough to bring to fore
the wrongdoings committed by Serbs in the conflicts of the 1990s.
However, as she also shows, the particular understanding of transitional
justice and the zeal with which these groups often approach their mission
 James Ker-Lindsay 259

means that their message is often rejected by society at large. Mladen

Ostojic continues with the same subject, but from a slightly different
angle, arguing that the problem these organisations face is that they are
too often used by international actors to press their agenda. He discusses
the implications of their efforts in this light. To conclude, Florence
Hartmann concurs that civil society has certainly had its shortcomings
when it comes to playing a role in persuading the people of the region
to confront their past. However, their failures must also be matched by
the action, and inaction, of various other local, regional and interna-
tional actors. There is plenty of blame to spread around.
There is no doubt that the emergence of a vibrant civil society is a
cornerstone of any process of transition and democratisation of authori-
tarian regimes. Breaking the hold of top-level politics, empowering
people and communities to provide services that cannot be delivered by
central and local authorities, and challenging deeply engrained preju-
dices held by society at large are the fundamental steps required to bring
about transformation in societies that are seeking to move beyond an
authoritarian past. As has been shown in this book, significant progress
has been made in terms of fostering civil society across the countries
of the Western Balkans. A plethora of groups, organisations and move-
ments have emerged that have radically altered the social landscape of
the region. In some cases, the growth of civil society has been astonish-
ing in its speed and scope. Kosovo is perhaps the best example. Bosnia-
Herzegovina also represents an obvious case where civil society has
emerged to play an important role in the post-conflict transformation
of the country. At the same time, one can point to many examples of
this beneficial role that civil society has played. One clear example
highlighted in this work concerns the campaign waged by a number
of organisations and groups in Slovenia on behalf of the erased. One
can also highlight how civil society has been at the forefront of efforts
to reconstruct society, and build indigenous political institutions and
practices even in the face of occasional external impediments. For
instance, the efforts by police groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina to chal-
lenge the opaque and essentially undemocratic decision-making proc-
esses of the international overseers in the country is a good example of
how indigenous civil society can promote democratic values even
to those who are on a mission to teach the locals about such matters.
Overall, the growth of civil society in the Western Balkans over the
course of the past 20 years has not only been phenomenal, it has
undoubtedly played a very beneficial role in easing and encouraging the
regions political and social transition.
260 Conclusion

However, as the contributions in this book have also shown, there

are also some less savoury aspects to civil society that have emerged
over the past two decades. The development of illiberal civil society
or uncivil society, where notions of civility are in short supply, if not
lacking altogether, has, in some cases, been very pronounced and rep-
resents a worrying trend. One of the most prominent examples of this
has been the perpetuation of nationalist groups in the Western Balkans.
Each country harbours organisations that continue to expound essen-
tially intolerant views, sometimes violently. In some cases, these groups
remain on the very fringes of society. In other cases, they show a high
degree of popular support. One of the most obvious examples of this is
VETVENDOSJE! which is based on a doctrine that marries crude popu-
larism with overt nationalism. While enjoying a substantial degree of
local legitimacy, it presents a challenge for Kosovos international over-
seers and to the goal of establishing a functional multi-ethnic polity.
Despite having fought for the right of Kosovo Albanians to break free
of all outside domination, they are all too willing to ensure that those
same rights of self-determination are now denied to others. Elsewhere
across the region we can find many other examples of nationalist groups
that espouse intolerance. The activities of a number of organisations in
Croatia to try to prevent perpetrators of war crimes during the Homeland
War from being brought before the courts, a campaign that received con-
siderable public support, as well as support from the diaspora, is another
example of how civil society groups have in fact played a part in perpetu-
ating nationalist attitudes.
As has also been shown, such extremism represents one aspect of the
problem of civil society in the Western Balkans. In other cases, while not
exacerbating tensions between various sections of society, civil society
shows a distinct unwillingness to challenge the underlying prejudices of
the community from which it has emerged and within which it exists.
In some cases, civil society organisations (CSOs) have promoted efforts
to combat one form of discrimination, all the while tacitly allowing
the perpetuation of another form of prejudice. This is quite clearly
an indication of the degree to which some of the underlying norms of
European liberal-democratic thinking have yet to become fully embed-
ded in society. Once clear example of this problem relates to approaches
towards homosexuality, which remains a taboo in much of the Western
Balkans. A live-and-let-live approach to difference is still relatively rare
in the region as a whole. Rather, attempts by groups to organise gay
pride marches have often met with severe opposition. It is particularly
worrying that in many cases where the forces of tolerance meet the
 James Ker-Lindsay 261

forces of intolerance, violence emerges. Moreover, in handling such

incidents, the state fails to defend fully the rights of those who seek to
promote equality and acceptance. Far too often its action (or inaction)
is justified in terms of EU accession. Accepting a gay pride march should
not be justified in terms of meeting the requirements for EU member-
ship. It should be promoted as a sign of an open and tolerant society
that embraces European values.
The problems facing the development of civil society in the region
do not just relate to those elements that promulgate violence and dis-
crimination, or fail to challenge extremism. In many cases there is also
a fundamental disconnect between many civil society groups and the
very society that they seek to serve. Indeed, in the worst cases, organi-
sations that may have been formed with the best of intentions have
in fact become vehicles for the perpetuation of the very problems that
they have sought to address. One area where this problem of discon-
nect appears to be particularly pronounced is with regard to efforts to
try to encourage societies in the region to come to terms with the past
and accept the reality of the atrocities that were committed during the
bitter and bloody conflicts of the 1990s. One obvious example of this
has been the Humanitarian Law Centre in Belgrade. As an NGO that
has singularly made a critical impact to recognise all victims of violence
throughout the Western Balkans, launching an innovative regional
truth seeking initiative, the Coalition for RECOM, it is still regarded
negatively by many segments of Serbian civil society, not unlike other
CSOs dealing with issues of transitional justice both in Serbia and in
other Western Balkan states. They are often perceived as doing nothing
less than airing the nations dirty linen in public. At the same time,
there is a great deal of resentment about the way in which these groups
provide ammunition for others to shift their own responsibility for their
own crimes an illustration of an interconnected regional nature of the
processes of coming to terms with the past. Furthermore, they are often
seen as pursuing international agendas while being disconnected from
the very grass roots they seek to represent.
These might be only perceptions but the end result of these views is
that these groups fail to win over even moderate and liberal elements
of society who often regard them with opprobrium and, in doing so,
regard their message with hostility. Sadly, this is taken by these groups
to be further evidence of denial that must be challenged. This in turn
feeds a cycle of alienation between society and these organisations.
This is particularly troubling inasmuch as the essential message of these
groups is one that needs to be heard, understood and internalised.
262 Conclusion

Another aspect of civil society that needs to be considered is the split

between rights-based groups and organisation and service providers.
This has led to the development of a civil society hierarchy or pecking
order. Far too often it is the rights-based groups that sit at the top of the
pyramid, thereby attracting the lions share of international attention
and funding. It is also the representatives of these groups who are usually
present at major international conferences. And yet, in so many cases, it
is the unsung service providers, who often tackle less glamorous issues,
that provide the essential support and services that the state is often
unwilling or unable to provide. To be sure, the rights-based groups have
an important, if not vital, role to play in tackling the most ingrained
prejudices that perpetuate inequality and discrimination within society.
However, it is hardly surprising that they often come to be seen, fairly
or unfairly, as vehicles for the narcissism of their founders. Meanwhile,
there are many, many other often very small and extremely localised
groups that are quietly working to ensure that victims of prejudice,
those living in poverty and some of the most marginalised members of
society are given a degree of practical support and assistance. In assess-
ing the role of civil society, there is an obvious need to ensure that these
service providers receive the necessary attention, funding and support
required to ensure that they can continue to carry out work that often
has a profound effect on the day-to-day life of people in the region.
Indeed, one can argue that more needs to be done to ensure that these
two strands of civil society connect and work with each other. Perhaps
there should be more efforts made to condition financial aid to rights-
based organisations by ensuring that they are also actively engaged with
service-based organisations.
This brings us to yet another important factor shaping civil society
development that needs to be addressed: the role of international actors.
In many cases CSOs would not be able to emerge, let alone survive,
without the financial support and technical know-how of international
organisations, governments and other civil society groups. As has been
seen, the European Union has played an enormous contributory role in
the process of civil society development in South East Europe generally,
and the Western Balkans in particular. Its efforts to tackle a range of
issues, especially those that might otherwise receive little local attention,
are absolutely crucial to tackling some of the most pressing problems
facing citizens in the region. And yet it can also be shown that many of
the most serious problems facing CSOs in the region are also products
of the way in which external parties have involved themselves with the
development of civil society in the region. While external actors are
 James Ker-Lindsay 263

vital to the development of civil society, it must also be recognised that

these external bodies have also been the cause, and serve to perpetuate,
some of the very worst aspects and practices that have arisen across civil
society in the Western Balkans. This issue came out very clearly in the
discussions during the conference that formed the basis of this book.
Time and time again, criticisms were voiced about the way in which
regional CSOs operated and the role played by external groups in form-
ing and enhancing these worst practices. Again, far too often groups
that started out well became less and less functional and useful as they
ceased to focus on their core message and instead became enmeshed in
the international circuit. At the same time, sustainability became an end
in itself. Organisations started to focus more on the mechanism for their
endless perpetuation for their own sake rather than a focus on reach-
ing specific goals. The problem of cliques and exclusivity emerged as a
direct consequence of the way the international support to civil society
was organised. Far too often a core of international darlings would
emerge showered with international support, while many other less
plugged-in bodies struggle for survival. An overall picture has emerged
of a top-layer of civil society that has largely lost sight of its very pur-
pose and in doing so has become alienated from the very society from
which it emerged, and which it is now failing to serve.
The extent of this problem was highlighted at the conference from
which this book emerged. A detail from the conference is illustrative.
The final session of the day was a discussion between policymakers
and regional analysts. One of the speakers, from an international NGO
network, having failed to attend the rest of the event and listen to any
of the preceding talks or discussions, waltzed into the session to give his
presentation. In it, he proudly explained how his organisation was pro-
viding opportunities for NGO leaders across Europe to interact with one
another, how it was training them to have a long-term future, and how
it had a policy of self-selection, whereby new entrants to the network
were chosen following recommendations from those already within it.
It was an absolutely wonderful, and rather amusing, end to the proceed-
ings inasmuch as it perfectly reinforced the message concerning the
often negative consequences of international engagement with local
civil society that many of the other speakers and participants at the
event had so articulately conveyed. Promoting and encouraging civil
society is not about developing and perpetuating small, elite cliques
that tread an international circuit of self-congratulatory events. Apart
from the fact that these groups may often be more concerned with their
own goals and ambitions than those of the society around them, one
264 Conclusion

must also accept that, in a region where conspiracy theories continue

to wield a high degree of purchase, these groups come to be seen, at
worst, as agents for external interests. Even at best, to reiterate the point
made in the introduction, they are often seen as being in the pockets of
international donors. Outside donors need to be aware that by focusing
on such groups, which sit divorced and alienated from the very societies
that they are meant to be helping, they are not only failing to help the
communities that they wish to assist but are also perpetuating much of
the hostility that has arisen within societies towards these groups and
the agendas that they are pursuing.
In conclusion, the picture that emerges of civil society and of its
contribution to multiple facets of the ongoing transformation in the
Western Balkans is rather mixed. To be sure, it has had an absolutely
central role in the process of political, social and economic transition in
the region. But there are also a range of negative aspects to civil society.
These apply, as highlighted in the introduction to this book, both to the
normative definition of civil society as well as to its presumed impact.
On the one hand, civil society in the region in populated by groups
purveying distinctly illiberal ideas. On the other, even progressive non-
state actors have not been able to deliver a decisively positive outcome.
While, in some cases, civil society has been at the forefront of efforts to
alleviate poverty, challenge discrimination, protect the environment and
fight injustice, at other times social groups have led efforts to resist the
encroachment of liberal-democratic values. At other times, the actions
and activities of organisations that espouse such values have served
as an unwitting impediment to the wider societal acceptance of these
norms. This serves to emphasise the degree to which efforts to intro-
duce external help and best practices must to some degree be shaped
by, and rooted in, the society. Of course, this does not mean that such
efforts should be abandoned due to seemingly insurmountable resist-
ance. Rather, by working from the ground up, and encouraging groups
that can deliver results as well as messages to local communities, would
seem to be particularly worthwhile and beneficial. Looking ahead, there
are further challenges to be faced in the region, across a whole range of
issues in which the agency of civil society remains paramount. However,
as this work has attempted to show, these challenges will be more easily
tackled if the lessons are learned from the experiences to date.
Index
A Bonn Powers, 189
Academy for Educational
Development (AED), 138
Accession Treaty, 87
active citizens, 213
actors, civil society, 3, 68
Affair, Rywin, 173
Ahtisaariane (Ahtisaarian), 98
Albania, 170
Albanian society
democratisation through
defiance, 95110. See also
Self-determination Movement
(Lvizje VETVENDOSJE!),
Kosovo
Albert Einstein Institution, 104
America
and Croatia civil society
institutions, political role in.
See Diaspora dilemma
anti-corruption, 125
apartheid, Kosovo and, 120
Aristotle, 4
Article 81 of the Aliens Act, 74, 75
Association of Decertified Policemen,
177, 178. See also policemen, in
Bosnia-Herzegovia
Associations, NGOs and, 132
B (MTA), 1212
The Balkan Civil Society Development
Network, 39
Balkan Insight, 36
Ban Ki-Moons six-point plan, 126
B92 broadcasting network, 221,
2234
Bekaj, A., 121
Belgrade, nationalism in, 120, 121
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights,
21011
besa, 103, 104
Bieber, Florian, 180
Biserko, Sonja, 240
Boraine, Alex, 2312
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14, 38
EU assistance to, NGOs/CSOs and,
478. See also institutionalisation
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14, 38, 17790
civil society in, 17982
Constitutional Court, 189
decertified policemen, 18590
EU assistance to, NGOs/CSOs
and, 478, 5364. See also
institutionalisation
NGOs in, 17982
overview, 1779
police certification process, 1825
population, 179
Bosnian Genocide case, 240
Burmali mosque, 164
C
CAA. See Croatian American
Association (CAA)
Canton, Tuzla, 181
capacity-building, 42
Caparini, Marina, 1778
CARDS. See Community Assistance
for Reconstruction, Development
and Stabilisation (CARDS)
Catholic Association Mother Teresa
CEE. See Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE)
eku, 199
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 29,
33, 36, 51
Central Europe, 171
certification process, of police, 1825
Chelikowski, J., 118
Church, 173
Cicero, 4
citizenship
and human rights in Slovenia, 736
Civic Alliance of Serbia, 232
265
266 Index
civic resistance, 118
civility, civil society vs., 811
civil society
actors, 3, 68
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17982
building and promotion
programmes, 12
celebratory approach, 214
challenge of multiple transitions,
11, 1315
civility vs., 811
concept of, 3, 9
in Croatia, 1369
defined, 3
European Commission and,
356. See also European
Commission, enlargement
policy and civil society in
Western Balkans
European integration and, 302
globalisation, 1
history, 35
in Kosovo, 1978
legal institutions and, 7181
meanings, 68, 1314
in multiple transitions, 11, 12
overview, 12
post-conflict transition, 13
promotion in Western Balkans,
8592
roles, 68
statesociety distinction, tracing,
36
transition from Communism, 1
Civil Society Facility (CSF), 389
civil society organisations (CSO),
301, 39, 47, 85, 91
in Croatia, diaspora and, 1369.
See also Diaspora dilemma
diaspora, 1404
EU and civil society promotion in
Western Balkans, 88, 91
civil society organisations (CSO),
in post-independence Kosovo,
11732
after state independence, 1259
after war, towards independence,
1225
defined, 11819
IGOs. See international
governmental organisations
(IGO)
INGOs. See international NGOs
(INGO)
NGOs. See non-governmental
organizations (NGO)
from parallel force to base for
liberal democracy, 11922
cognitive dissonance, 36
Commission Delegations, 878
Communism, 1
Community Assistance for
Reconstruction, Development
and Stabilisation (CARDS), 47, 53
Council for the Defence of Human
Rights and Freedoms (KMDLNJ),
119, 121
Council of Europe (CoE), 72, 190, 232
coupling, 52
credibility gap, 180
Croatia
and America civil society
institutions, political role in.
See Diaspora dilemma
breakdown of rule of law, 77
civil society in, 1369
CSO, diaspora and, 1369
current human rights record,
diaspora on, 1469
diasporas political role in 1990s,
13940
EUs enlargement policy, 38
overview, 1356
war crimes trials in, 7681
Croatian American Association (CAA),
147
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ),
142, 144, 145, 146
Croatian Diaspora, 1356. See also
Croatia
Croatian National Bank, 143
Croatian World Congress (CWC), 139,
143, 148
Croatian Worldwide Association
(CWA), 1478
CSF. See Civil Society Facility (CSF)
CSO. See Civil society organisations
(CSO)

CTVMost, 57
CWA. See Croatian Worldwide
Association (CWA)
D Employment Promotion Agency in
Dayton Agreement in 1995, 29, 38
Dayton Peace Accords, 170, 183
decision-making, 30, 31, 36, 42, 49,
50, 51
Demai, Adem, 106
democracy
key principles of, diaspora and,
1449
democratic deficit, 35, 44
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
1201
Democratic Party (DS), 239
democratisation
peace-building and, 14
through defiance, Albanian society,
95110
democratisation, in homeland
CroatianAmerican civil society
institutions, political role.
See Diaspora dilemma
Denica, 165
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 5
Diaspora dilemma, Croatia, 13551
CSOs in, 1369
current human rights record and,
1469
diaspora CSO, 1404
key principles of democracy and,
1449
political role in 1990s, 13940
voting rights and fair elections, 1446
Dimitrijevic, Nenad, 219
Dimitrijevic, Vojin, 2323
Directorate General for Enlargement,
89, 90
DUGA, 63
E European Union (EU), 71, 173
EAR. See European Agency for
Reconstruction (EAR)
Early Warning Report, 160
EIDHR. See European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR)
Index 267
Ekotim, 64
Electricity Production and
Distribution Company (ESM), 162
emotional dysfunction, 212
Kosovo (APPK), 204
Enlargement Package documents, 85
enlargement policy
European Unions, and civil society
in Western Balkans, 2944
Enlargement Strategy in 2007, 38
2010 Enlargement Strategy Paper, 37
ESI. See European Stability Initiative
(ESI)
ESM. See Electricity Production and
Distribution Company (ESM)
ethno-territorial rights, 118
EU. See European Union (EU)
EU Delegations, 878, 89
EULEX, 127
European Agency for Reconstruction
(EAR), 53
European Commission, enlargement
policy and civil society in
Western Balkans, 2944
customary enlargement practice,
33
eastern enlargement, 34
goals of Commission, 356
PHARE democracy programme,
345
roles, 325
sources, 33
European Convention of Human
Rights, 189
European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), 72
European Instrument for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR), 38,
47, 53
European Parliament, 33, 34
European Stability Initiative (ESI), 183
acquis, 87
assistance to Bosnia, Herzegovina
and Serbia, 478, 5364. See also
institutionalisation
enlargement policy and civil society
in Western Balkans, 2944
268 Index
European Union (EU) continued
integration and civil society, 302
NGOs, 31
performative and representative
functions, 31
political influence, 32
promotion in Western Balkans,
8592
EU Stabilisation and Association
Process, 170
external institutionalisation, 556
F Gusia, Linda, 123
facing the past, 212
Faculty of Architecture in Skopje,
1656
Fagan, Adam, 179
fair elections, diaspora and, 1446
Ferguson, Adam, 4, 213
Ferraj, Hysamedin, 128
FeR (the new spirit), 1289
flag day, 103
Fondacija lokalne demokratije, 58,
634
FOSIM. See Foundation Open Society
Institute Macedonia (FOSIM)
Foundation Open Society Institute
Macedonia (FOSIM), 156
foundations, NGOs and, 132n12
Free Ante Gotovina, 148
Freedom House, 1245, 163
From Dictatorship to Democracy:
A Conceptual Framework for
Liberation, 104
G in Slovenia, 736
Gazeta Wyborcza, 173
GDR. See German Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Genocide, Srebrenica, 23843. See also
Srebrenica
George Soros, 36
German Democratic Republic (GDR),
173
Glava, Branimir, 1489
Gotovina, Ante, 1478
governance
concept of, 48
government vs., 489
hierarchies, 4950
new modes of, 4950
power, 4950
relations between actors, 49
statenon-state nexus in post-
socialist states, 503
governance beyond the state
analysis, 50
government
governance vs., 489
Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 6
Gregorian, Raffi, 189
H
HDZ. See Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ)
Hegel, 4, 5, 6
Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights, 164, 213
Herzegovina. See Bosnia-Herzegovina
hierarchies
governance, 4950
HLC. See Humanitarian Law Centre
(HLC)
Hobbes, Thomas, 4
Hockenos, Paul, 142
Homeland War, 77, 78
Hoxha, Elvis, 128
Hucheson, Francis, 213
Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC), 79,
238
human rights
record of Croatia, diaspora on,
1469
human rights abuses, 230
Human Rights Ombudsman, 74, 76
human rights violations, 121
Huntington, Samuel, 43, 141
Hysa, Armanda, 98
I
ICJ. See International Court of Justice
(ICJ)
ICO. See International Civilian Office
(ICO)
ICRS. See Information Counselling
and Referral Service (ICRS)

ICTY. See International Criminal
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)
IDPs. See internally displaced persons
(IDPs)
IFIs. See international financial
institutions (IFI)
Information Counselling and Referral
Service (ICRS), 200
In Search of Truth and
Responsibility Towards a
Democratic Future, 233
institutionalisation
centralisation and, 55
defined, 55
engagement in governance networks
(hypotheses 2 and 3), 614
external, 556
internal, 55
professionalisation and
sustainability of recipient NGOs
(hypotheses 1 and 4), 569
professionalism and, 55
focus on policy, 5961
Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA), 38, 86
interethnic conflict in Macedonia, 161
interethnic relations in Macedonia,
1601
Interim Administrative Council, 124
internal institutionalisation, 55
internally displaced persons (IDPs), 54
International Civilian Office (ICO),
203
international community, 126, 1701,
230
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 240
International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 72,
147, 148, 21011, 2301
international financial institutions
(IFI), 48
international governmental
organisations (IGO)
in Kosovo, 123
international NGOs (INGO)
in Kosovo, 123
International Organisation for
Migration (IOM), 200
Index 269
International Police Task Force (IPTF),
177, 1825
intifada, Kosovo and, 120
IOM. See International Organisation
for Migration (IOM)
IPA. See Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA)
IPTF. See International Police Task
Force (IPTF)
J
Janus-faced approach, 41
JIAS. See Joint Interim Administrative
Structure ( JIAS), 197
K
KAN. See Kosovo Action Network
(KAN)
Kandic, Nataa, 223, 23940
Keane, John, 161
KLA. See Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)
Klan TV, 128
KMDLNJ. See Council for the Defence
of Human Rights and Freedoms
(KMDLNJ)
Koha Ditore, 129
Kohler Koch, Beate, 301
Koinona politik, 4
Kosovo, 14, 38
civil society in, 1978
KPC. See Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC)
Lvizje VETVENDOSJE! (Self-
determination Movement),
96110. See also Self-
determination Movement
(Lvizje VETVENDOSJE!),
Kosovo
Kosovo, post-independence
nationalism and civil society
organisations in. See civil
society organisations (CSO);
Nationalism
Kosovo Action Network (KAN),
104
Kosovo Albanians, 1978
Kosovo Army, 199
Kosovo Force (KFOR), 198
270 Index
Kosovo Internal Security Sectors
Review (KISSR), 2023
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 96,
196
Kosovo Police Service (KPS), 199
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 1967
formation, 198201
renegotiating deal, 2013
stand-down of, 2034
Kosovo Protection Corps Training
Programme (KPCTP), 200
Kosovo Security Force (KSF), 203
KPC. See Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC)
KPC Resettlement Programme
(KPCRP), 204
KPCRP. See KPC Resettlement
Programme (KPCRP)
KPCTP. See Kosovo Protection Corps
Training Programme (KPCTP)
KPS. See Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
Krstic, Radoslav, 240
Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, 76
Kuron, Jacek, 213
Kurti, Albin, 97, 106, 126
L 2.0 modus interagendi, 88, 8992
language users, 222
LDK. See Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK)
League of Prizren, 103, 121
Lvizje VETVENDOSJE! (Self-
determination Movement).
See Self-determination Movement
(Lvizje VETVENDOSJE!),
Kosovo
Llamazares, M., 1201
Locke, John, 4
Love is Love, 163
M National Federation of Croatian
Macedonia, 15567
interethnic conflict in, 161
interethnic relations in, 1601
language, 165
March of Tolerance, 1634
NGOs, 1623
overview, 1556
political orientations, 1589
post-Communist syndrome, 1568
religious agency, 1645
sexual orientation, 164
uncivil society, 1613
violence, 1657
vulnerable and marginalised social
groups in, 159
young population in, 15960
Macedonian Association for Free
Sexual Orientation (MASSO), 164
Macedonian conflict (2001), 173
Macedonian Orthodox Church, 166
Makolli, Ibrahim, 121
March of Tolerance, 1634
marginalised social groups in
Macedonia. See vulnerable social
groups in Macedonia
Marx, Karl, 5
Massacre, Srebrenica. See Srebrenica
MASSO. See Macedonian Association
for Free Sexual Orientation
(MASSO)
memory-making process, 222
Mesic, Stipe, 78
Michnik, Adam, 213
Mill, John Stuart, 144
MTA. See Catholic Association Mother
Teresa (MTA)
multiple transitions, in civil society,
11, 12
challenge of, 11, 1315
Municipality of Centar, 164
N
Nakarada, Radmila, 235
narratives, in facing the past, 21824
contradiction, 2212
National Endowment for Democracy,
145
Americans (NFCA), 139, 146
National Foundation for Civil Society
Development (NFCSD), 138
nationalism, in post-independence
Kosovo, 11732. See also civil
society organisations (CSO)
from parallel force to base for
liberal democracy, 11922

NATO Membership Action Plans, 170
Network of Albanian Organisations,
127
The New York Times, 98
NFCA. See National Federation of
Croatian Americans (NFCA)
NFCSD. See National Foundation
for Civil Society Development
(NFCSD)
NGO. See non-governmental
organisations (NGO)
NGO-isation, 41
non-governmental organisations
(NGO), 21014
in Bosnia, 17982
EU, 31
EU and civil society promotion in
Western Balkans, 88, 91
EU assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia, 478
as key actors, 21418
in Macedonia, 1623
non-governmental organisations
(NGO), in Kosovo, 1235
associations and, 132n12
CSO and, 11819
foundations and, 132n12
O post-conflict transition, 13
OBrennan, John, 90
oda, 105, 106
Office of the High Representative
(OHR) Bonn Powers, 182, 183,
185, 187, 188, 189
Ohrid Agreement, 170
Open Society, 36
Open Society Institute (OSI), 231
ORA, 1289, 133n35
ordinary citizens, 219
Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), 72, 124, 145
OSCE. See Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
P Self-determination Movement
Paine, Thomas, 162
peace-building
democratisation and, 14
Index 271
peace dividend, 15
People-Centred Analysis, 160
People to People (P2P)
Programme, 90
objectives, 90
Perovic, Latinka, 232
PHARE democracy programme, 34
objectives, 345
Plotad Sloboda (Freedom Square),
166
pluralism, 10, 31
Podujevo case, 79, 80
Poland, 172
police abuse, 121
policemen, in Bosnia and Herzegovia
certification process, 1825
decertified policemen, 18590
Police Restructuring process (20048),
1812
political opportunity structure
(POS), 30
Political Order in Changing
Societies, 43
Politika, 220
Ponte, Carla Del, 148
POS. See political opportunity
structure (POS)
post-conflict reconstruction, 1704
post-socialist states
statenon-state nexus in, 503
power
governance, 4950
P2P. See People to People (P2P)
Programme
professionalism, institutionalisation
and, 55
focus on policy, 5961
sustainability of recipient NGOs,
569
Progress Reports, EU, 889
project culture, 95
Protestant Church, 173
Prva arhibrigada, 166
publications
(Lvizje VETVENDOSJE!), 97,
1001
public discursive spaces, 21112
272 Index
public opinion polls, 2423
Pula, Besnik, 118, 119, 1223
Pupavac, Vanessa, 180, 212
Putnam, Robert D., 5, 213
R Serbia, 118, 11920, 126, 127, 230
Rabushka, A., 144
Rada, 223
Rehn, Olli, 33
Republika e Kosovs, 120
Republika Srpska Association of
Decertified Policemen, 177
Revolutionary Movement for
Albanian Unity (RMAU), 104
Reynolds Levy, L., 1201
RMAU. See Revolutionary Movement
for Albanian Unity (RMAU)
Rrjeti i Organizatave Shqiptare
(RrOSh), 127, 128
RrOSh. See Rrjeti i Organizatave
Shqiptare (RrOSh)
Rugova, Ibrahim, 120, 121
rule of law
citizenship and human rights in
Slovenia, 736
formal vs. substantive concepts, 72
overview, 713
war crimes trials in Croatia and
Serbia, 7681
in Western Balkans, civil society
and, 723
Rupel, Dmitrij, 73
S Sorensen, Jens Stilhoff, 117
Sampson, Steven, 95, 179
Sanader, Ivo, 146
SAP. See Stabilisation and Association
Process (SAP)
Scorpions, 239
Self-determination Movement (Lvizje
VETVENDOSJE!), Kosovo, 96110
agenda, 99
cultural and historical significance,
1056
graffiti and, 99, 1012
inspirations and trajectories of
defiance, 1046
international attitudes towards, 1068
nationalism, 98
publications, 97, 1001
student demonstrations, 105
symbolic actions and performances,
99, 1014
world view, 979, 1001
EU assistance to, NGOs/CSOs
and, 478, 5364. See also
institutionalisation
war crimes trials in, 7681
Serbian Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights, 240
eelj, Vojislav, 237
sexual minorities, 163
SFRY. See Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY)
shadow of hierarchy, 51, 52
Sharp, Gene, 104
Shepsle, K., 144
Simmons, Cynthia, 181
Skendaj, Elton, 124
Slovenia
citizenship and human rights in,
736
Smith, Adam, 4, 213
social autism, 15
Social Democratic Union of
Macedonia, 162
Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), 73
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), 237
societas civilis, 4
oljak, Niko, 143
South Africa, 173
SPS. See Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)
Srebrenica, 2202, 23843
ICJ and, 2412
nationalist mobilisation, 241
official acknowledgement, 242
parliamentary resolution, 242
Srebrenica Declaration, 214
Stabilisation and Association Process
(SAP), 15, 29, 38, 41, 712
Stability Pact, 170
state-building, 14
Statement of Good Intent, 73
statenon-state nexus, in post-socialist
states, 503

statesociety distinction, tracing, 36
Strategy for Cooperation of the
Government and the Civil Sector, 157
Study on Transparency, Accountability
and the Democratic Capacity of
the Civil Sector in the Republic of
Macedonia, 157
Sullivan, Stacy, 142
Sulstarova, Enis, 128
Surroi, Veton, 1289
Svilanovic, Goran, 232
T Verheugen, Gnter, 33
TACSO. See Technical Assistance to
Civil Society (TACSO)
Tadic, Boris, 239
Technical Assistance to Civil Society
(TACSO), 91
Thai, Hashim, 104
Thessaloniki Summit, 85
tight coupling, 50
Top Channel, 128
transitional justice, 230
TRC. See Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC)
tribune, 105
Trupat Mbrojtse T Kosovs. See
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC)
South African, 2312
Yugoslav, 2336
tubime, 105
Tudman, Franjo, 140, 142, 145
Turkey
EUs enlargement policy, 38
U promotion in, 8592
Uncivil society, in Macedonia, 1613
United Croatian front, 139
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), 138
United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), 118, 1234, 197
United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), 1801
UNMIBH. See UN Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
Index 273
UNMIBH/IPTF, 1825
UNMIK. See United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK)
UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 177,
1825
UNSCR 1244, 170
UN Security Council, 189
USAID NGO Sustainability Index, 181
V
VETVENDOSJE! movement, 1267,
128, 171
vibrant civic society, 33
violence, in Macedonia, 1657
Visoka, Gzim, 98
VMRO-DPMNE, 162
voting rights, diaspora and, 1446
Vreme, 236
vulnerable social groups in
Macedonia, 159
W
war crimes trials
in Croatia and Serbia, 7681
Werbner, P., 141
Western Balkans, 2, 11, 13
EU assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia, 478, 5364
European Unions enlargement
policy and civil society in, 2944
post-Communist and post-conflict
transitions in, 13
rule of law. See rule of law
Western Balkans, EU and civil society
financial support for NGOs and
CSOs, 91
2.0 modus interagendi, 88, 8992
P2P Programme, 90
Progress Reports and, 889
Whitehead, L., 141
Women in Black, 212
Y
YIHR. See Youth Initiative for Human
Rights (YIHR)
274 Index
young population in Macedonia,
15960
Youth Aspiration Survey, 159
Youth Initiative for Human Rights
(YIHR), 212
Yugoslav Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation, 2336
credibility, 2323
human rights NGOs, 233
internal normalisation, 235
moral catharsis, 2345
Yugoslavia, 71, 117, 120
Z
Zagreb, 142
Zunzer, W., 141