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PEOPLE vs.

OANIS
July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta

FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the
room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned
out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only when
the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis
and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the
offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

G.R. No. 97920 January 20, 1997


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENRIQUE RAMIREZ y ANTONIO, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Rape is a savage and bestial attack that violates a woman's person in the most grievous and odious way
imaginable. This abomination revolts this Court no end. Perpetrators of this outrage are a depraved and evil lot
who must be brought to the crucible of justice. In the present appeal, the offender repeatedly ravished and
violated his own helpless step-daughter of tender years. He deserves the severest penalty provided under our
laws at the time of its commission.
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XLIX, 2 in Criminal Case No. 89-71802-SCC, finding appellant guilty of rape.
The Complaint 3 against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about the second week of March, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by
poking a bladed weapon at her, ordering her to undress and at the same time threatening to kill her and her family
should she resist or report the matter, and thereafter have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant,
a girl 13 years of age, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Complaint was treated as the Information after the City Prosecutor affixed his imprimatur thereto. When
arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision 5 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused ENRIQUE RAMIREZ guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, for the crime of "Rape" defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on the said Accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties of the law, and hereby condemns him to pay to Maribel Soriano the amount of P30,000.00
as and by way of moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused was detained during the pendency of this case shall be credited to him
provided that he agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail
of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
Maribel Soriano, a 13 year old lass, naive and unschooled, is the eldest daughter of Angelita De Guzman and
Alfredo Soriano. Since July 1975, Angelita and Alfredo lived together as man and wife, without the benefit of
marriage, at Labores Street, Pandacan, Manila. Aside from Maribel, they had other children: Alfredo, Jr., 10
years old and Mila, the youngest (TSN, September 11, 1989, pp. 10 & 13; pp. 18-19).
As fate would have it, Maribel did not grow up under the constant care and guidance of her mother Angelita.
Since the tender age of 2 years, she has been staying with her paternal grandmother, Juanita Soriano, at Zamora
Extension, Pandacan, Manila. Ostensibly, Maribel's mother gave her up to her mother-in-law, Juanita Soriano,
because the latter kept bothering her and her husband, Alfredo (Ibid., pp. 7-8).
As the life story of Maribel unfolds, the four-year relationship of her father and mother was turning sour and
was growing worse and worse everyday. It was the usual case of a daughter-in-law and a mother-in-law fighting
for the attention of a husband and son. This animosity was heightened by the fact that prior to his death, Alfredo
was abandoned by Angelita sometime in 1979 to live with another man, herein appellant Enrique Ramirez. Her
reason was simple: Alfredo was a "Mama's Boy". She claimed that he did not want to separate from his mother
and usually gave his earnings to his mother, Juanita Soriano (Ibid., pp. 13-14).
The sudden death of Alfredo Soriano on April 22, 1982 however did not improve the relationship between his
wife, Angelita de Guzman and his mother, Juanita Soriano. As a matter of fact, the demise of Alfredo Soriano,
exacerbated the ongoing feud between his mother and his wife.
In any event, Angelita de Guzman cohabited with appellant Enrique Ramirez, a casual laborer and a member of
the notorious Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang (Ibid., pp. 6 & 12). At that time, appellant Ramirez was already
separated from his lawful wife, Cristine Somera, by whom he had a child (TSN, September 21, 1989, pp. 33-
35).
Since 1979, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman stayed and lived in a one-room shanty, a place one can
hardly call a house, in a squatter's area in Tondo, Manila. As described by Maribel Soriano, the one-storey room
has two windows: one facing the street across which was the house of Ate Laki, and the other window facing
the river (TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 6; see also TSN, August 2, 1994, pp. 27 & 43).
In December 1988, when Maribel turned 13 years of age, her mother Angelita fetched Maribel from the house
of her mother-in-law, Juanita Soriano, Maribel's paternal grand- mother. Angelita took Maribel to spend vacation
in her house in Tondo, Manila where Angelita resides with her live-in partner, Enrique Ramirez appelant herein.
After the Christmas season, Maribel went back to her paternal grandmother's house in Pandacan (TSN,
September 11, 1989, pp. 15-23).
xxx xxx xxx
By then, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman already had four (4) children namely: Enrique, Jr.
(Botchoy), 8 years old; Erwin, 6 years old, Erlinda (Inday), 4 years old and Nino, about 2 to 3 years old. Appellant
was then working as a casual laborer for his brother, Rudy Ramirez, in the latter's construction work along Pavia
Street, Tondo, Manila, only about 3 alleys away from the house of appellant Ramirez at Fajardo Street, Tondo
(Ibid., p. 43-B). Because of the proximity of the house from his place of work, appellant was allowed by his
brother to eat his lunch at home and to have some days-off. On the other hand, Angelita de Guzman who finished
Grade 6 only, earned a living by selling pails, pans and basins, travelling as far as Marikina and Montalban, from
8 o'clock in the morning up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 6
The offended party was violated several times by appellant during that holiday season as follows:
One day, shortly before Christmas, in 1988, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the Accused arrived home.
Angelita de Guzman was not in their house at the time. Maribel Soriano and the Accused, and the latter's four
(4) children were inside the house at the time. The Accused ordered his children to leave the house and, once the
children were out of the house, the Accused closed the door and the windows of the house, took out his "29
balisong" and poked the same to Maribel Soriano. The Accused, thereupon, ordered Maribel Soriano to undress.
Afraid for her life, Maribel Soriano did as ordered. The Accused also ordered Maribel Soriano to lie down on
the floor, she did. The Accused, thereupon, went on top of Maribel Soriano, kissed her on her cheeks and lips
and mashed her breasts to boot. The Accused warned Maribel Soriano not to tell the police authorities and her
mother about the incident otherwise he will kill all of them. The Accused, thereafter, inserted his private organ
into her privated (sic) parts and had sexual intercourse with Maribel Soriano. After the Accused was through, he
then dressed up. The Accused warned Maribel Soriano anew not to reveal the incident to the police authorities
and her mother. Since then, almost every day the Accused had sexual intercourse with Maribel Soriano (Exhibits
'E' and 'E-l"). After New Year, Juanita Soriano, took back Maribel Soriano to her house where Maribel Soriano
stayed until March 15, 1989, when Angelita de Guzman took Maribel Soriano anew because she wanted Maribel
Soriano to study. Maribel Soriano did not divulge to her grandmother what the Accused did to her. 7
Subsequently, the appellant again took advantage of and raped the offended party as follows:
In the second week of March 1989, at about 3:45 p.m., Maribel was in appellant's house in Tondo, together with
Alfredo, Jr., her 10 year old brother and her stepbrothers, stepsister and her Stepfather, appellant Ramirez. At
that time, her mother Angelita de Guzman, was out selling her wares (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 3 and 5; see
also TSN, August 8, 1989, p. 27).
Appellant then ordered the children to look for Botchoy, his eldest son, saying in the vernacular: "Labas kayo,
hanapin si Botchoy." (TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 10) Upon hearing appellant telling the other children to look for
Botchoy, Maribel volunteered to help look for the latter. However, appellant told her to stay put, so it was only
Maribel's younger stepsister Inday and her stepbrother Erwin who searched for Botchoy, who was reportedly
watching TV in the house of another relative somewhere within the vicinity (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 29-32).
Maribel, who was wearing a white T-shirt and a maong shorts, was then seated on the floor near the window
while appellant in brown-colored shorts was lying on the floor (TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 9). As soon as the children
left the shanty, appellant Ramirez closed the door and locked it. He also closed the window facing outside house
(TSN, August 2, 1989, p. 39 & pp. 42-43). A few minutes later, Maribel saw appellant already naked. With a
fan knife ("veinte nueve" balisong) in his right hand poked at the right chest of Maribel, appellant ordered her to
undress. Appellant Ramirez then started kissing Maribel and afterwards got on top of her and ravished her on
the floor of the shanty (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 2-8). It was at this point when Maribel saw her brother
pretending to be asleep (Ibid., p. 29;see also TSN, July 12, 1989, p. 7 and TSN, September 21, 1989, p. 61).
He warned Maribel not to complain to the police because he would kill her and her family. After consummating
his lustful desires on Maribel and reiterating his threat, appellant stepped out of the shanty. Likewise Maribel
went out of the house to fetch water and afterwards cooked rice for dinner (TSN, August 2, 1989, pp. 8-10).
When Maribel got out of the shanty, she was approached by a female neighbor, Ate Laki. Ate Laki whispered
to Maribel that through a hole on the wall of the shanty, she (Ate Laki) saw the appellant on top of Maribel. This
notwithstanding, Maribel just kept her mouth shut (TSN, August 9, 1989, pp. 7-9).
The following morning, Maribel approached her mother, Angelita, to report the dastardly act of appellant
Ramirez. She was with Alfredo, Jr, who told their mother, thus. "Nanay, akala mo sina Ate nakita ko
nagpapatungan." Instead of getting mad at her common-law-husband, Angelita surprisingly slapped Maribel and
defended appellant (TSN, September 21, 1989, pp. 50 & 61).
Angered by their mother's reaction, Maribel and her younger brother Alfredo Soriano, Jr. decided to go to the
police station, with the help of a man and a woman, both unidentified. However, they got lost along the way.
Subsequently thereafter, Maribel finally found her way to the police station, this time with her paternal
grandmother, Juanita Soriano (TSN, August 9, 1989 pp. 9-10). In the Police Station, she narrated her sexual
ordeal with her stepfather, appellant Ramirez, to police investigator Pat. Rodolfo Estrebel. After a lengthy
investigation, she was asked to sign her sworn statement (Exh. "E") assisted by her grandmother, Juanita Soriano.
Afterwards, she was also asked to sign the Complaint with Criminal Case No. 89-71802 for Rape (Exh. "F")
against Enrique Ramirez y Antonio.
On March 15, 1989 Maribel was examined at the NBI by Dr. Valentin Bernales, Medico-Legal Officer. Dr.
Bernales thereafter summarized his findings in his Report Living Case No. MG-89-185 (Exh. "A"). 8
On March 21, 1989, police from the Western Police Department went to the house of the appellant to invite the
latter for questioning. They were met instead by Angelita de Guzman, who fetched her common-law husband,
appellant Ramirez, from the construction site where he was working. As soon as appellant arrived, the policemen
then asked him to go with them to the police station for investigation. At the police station, he was properly
identified by Maribel Soriano as the person who sexually abused her. On the Basis of a "Booking; Sheet and
Arrest Report" (Exh. "B") which, together with an endorsement letter (Exh. "D") of Capt. Cresencio Cabasal,
was forwarded to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings.
The findings of Dr. Valentin Bernales as stated in his report 9 are as follows:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 138.0 cms. Weight: 36.8 kgs.
Normally developed, fairly developed, conscious, coherent, cooperative ambulatory subject.
Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light brown, 2.5 cm. in diameter. Nipples, light brown, slightly
protruding, 0.3 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injury noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hairs, fully grown, scanty. Labia Majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibule,
pinkish. Hymen, originally annular, tall, thick, with an old-healed complete laceration at 2:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of a watch, edges of which are rounded, non-coaptable, base, retracted. Hymenal
orifice, admits a tube, 2.8 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, moderately tight. Rugosities, moderately prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Old-healed hymenal laceration present.
Version of the Defense
In the main, the defense is one of denial and alibi. The defense's version is as follows:
Evidence for the defense shows that during the month of March 1989, accused-appellant was employed as a
construction worker at Pavia, Tondo. During the said month he left home before 8:00 o'clock A.M. daily and
returned home at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, Angelita de Guzman, Maribel's mother, was
always at home as it was her schedule when accused-appellant was working. She went out to sell her wares only
when appellant stayed home. Under this set-up, it was quite impossible for the alleged rape upon Maribel to have
ever taken place.
Enrique Ramirez denied having anything to do with the raping of Maribel, whom he treated as his very own
daughter. There was ill motive on the part of Juanita Soriano and Maribel Soriano in filing the rape charge.
Juanita nurtured a long standing grudge against Angelita de Guzman and the accused-appellant as Angelita left
(Alfredo) Soriano, (Sr.) and preferred to live-in with Enrique Ramirez. Maribel likewise harbored ill-feelings
towards appellant and filed the rape case in retaliation for appellant's having hit her on the head when she failed
to return home when she was sent on an errand. Maribel's defloration should rather be attributed to the well
known fact that she is a flirt as per the admission of her close relatives and she usually spent her idle time outside
the house and at a beer garden in the neighborhood. 10
The Error Assigned
Appellant posits the sole error that allegedly:
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the absence of
evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11
As the Court sees it, the crux of this case is the credibility of Maribel Soriano's testimony and the weight and
sufficiency of the prosecution's total evidence.
The appellant based his assigned error on the following arguments: 1. ". . . (t)he prosecution's failure to present
(Alfredo) Soriano, Jr. and Ate Laki as witnesses during the trial, when both allegedly were eyewitnesses to the
supposed sexual assault committed upon Maribel Soriano by herein appellant, gives raise to the presumption
that the testimonies of these two persons were evidently suppressed as these would be damaging to the
complainant's case. . . ." 12 2 the "(e)xistence of ill-motive on the part of complainant's paternal grandmother,
Juanita Soriano was amply shown by defense evidence which remains unrebutted. Juanita merely utilized her
grandchild Maribel, who likewise resented the appellant, in order to exact vengeance from the appellant and
Angelita de Guzman." 13 and 3. ". . . (i)n the instant case, as the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, he must therefore be
acquitted." 14
The Court's Ruling
Credibility of Witness
In deciding this appeal, the Court notes certain guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit:
(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge;
(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 15
The general rule in assessing credibility of witnesses is well-settled: "the trial court's evaluation as to the
credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to
so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and
the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses
were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial
judge plainly overloooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected." 16
After a thorough scrutiny of this case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the court a quo giving full credence
to the testimony of Maribel Soriano and convicting accused-appellant Enrique Ramirez of rape. We reiterate
that, "when an alleged victim of rape says that she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis
thereof." 17
In this case, Maribel Soriano was unequivocal and unswerving in charging the accused-appellant with rape. Her
account of the rape was straightforward, detailed, consistent on all material points and convincing both in her
sworn statement and testimony.The relevant portion of her sworn statement 18 is as follows:
T: Bakit ka naman naririto sa aming opisina at nagbibigay ng salaysay:
S: Irereklamo ko po iyong step father ko dahil ni-rape po niya ako.
T: Kailan ka ni-rape ng step father mo kung natatandaan mo, anong oras at saang lugar?
S: Marami na pong beses niya akong ni-rape, pero ang natatandaan ko, and huli niyang ginawa sa akin ay nuong
nakaraan pong linggo, Huwebes po, ito lang pong Marso 1989, duon niya ako ni-rape sa bahay namin sa Tundo
sa squatters area, sa Dalerena St., Fajardo, Tondo, Manila, kadalasan kung gahasain po ako ng step father ko ay
tanghali at gabi kung wala po ang nanay ko sa amin at nanonood po ng T.V. sa kapitbahay.
T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin kung papaano ka nire-rape ng iyong step father?
S: Ano po iyon, nuong isang taon po nuon, hindi ko na matandaan and petsa pero magpapasko po nuon ng una
niya akong nirape, dumating po ang step father ko bandang alauna ng tanghali, tapos pinalabas po niya yung
mga bata sa loob ng bahay namin, at isinarado niya iyong pintuan at bintana ng bahay namin, tapos po ay inilabas
niya iyong beinte nueve niya (balisong) at tinutukan niya ako, at sabi niya ay huwag daw po akong
magsusumbong sa nanay ko at sa pulis, kundi ay papatayin niya kaming lahat. Tapos po ay pinaghubad niya po
ako ng damit ko at panty at naghubad din po siya at pinahiga niya ako sa sahig at pinatungan niya ako....
(graphical description of act of rape omitted) at pinagbihis na niya ako no damit at pinagbantaan niya akong muli
na papatayin daw niya kaming lahat pag nagsumbong ako sa Nanay ko at sa mga Pulis. At simula nuon ay halos
araw-araw ay nire-rape niya ako, at ang huli nga po ay nuong nakaraang linggo po nitong Marso 1989, at dahil
hindi ko na po matiis and ginagawa niya sa akin ay tumakas po ako sa amin at nagsumbong na po ako sa Pulis,
tapos po ay pumunta po ako sa Lola ko at ipinagtapat ko ang ginagawa sa akin ng step-father ko.
T: Iligid mo nga ang iyong mga paningin sa loob ng opisinang ito, naririto ba ang taong iyong sinasabing nang-
rape sa iyo ng maraming beses?
S: Nandito po siya, ayan po ang step-father ko. (Declarant pointing to the person of ENRIQUE RAMIREZ y
ANTONIO, 34 years old, laborer. . . .)
The salient portion of her testimony is as follows:
FISCAL FORMOSO: Where were you on the second week of March, 1989?
WITNESS: I was in the house, sir. 19
FISCAL FORMOSO: While there on that time and date, was there any unusual incident that took place?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: And what was that?
WITNESS: Ni raped po ako.
FISCAL FORMOSO: Who raped you?
WITNESS: That person there, sir.
INTERPRETER: The witness pointed to a person, when asked of his name he stated Enrique Ramirez.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FORMOSO: How was the accused able to do this rape against you?
WITNESS: He kissed me and then he laid on top of me, sir. 20
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FORMOSO: Before the accused laid on top of your (sic), did he ever utter any word?
WITNESS: Yes, sir,
FISCAL FORMOSO: What were those?
WITNESS: He told me not to complain to the police because if I will do so, he will kill me and all of us, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: When he uttered those words, was he holding anything?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: What was that?
WITNESS: He was holding a viente nueve, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: How big is that knife?
WITNESS: About four inches in length, sir. 21
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FORMOSO: And what did you do after you were asked to remove your clothing and while the knife
was being poked in your neck?
WITNESS: He lay on top of me, sir. "Pinatungan niya ako."
FISCAL FORMOSO: You stated that you were asked by the accused to remove your clothes. What did you do?
Were you able to remove your clothes?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: What else did you remove after removing your clothes?
WITNESS: My panty, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: After removing your panty, what did you do after that?
WITNESS: He lay on top of me, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: What exactly in the place did he lie on top of you? Was it on the bed, on the floor or what?
WITNESS: It was on the floor, sir.
FISCAL FORMOSO: When the accused lay on top of you, what did he do after that?
WITNESS: "pinasok niya ang ari", sir. He inserted his organ and after that he made a movement, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness is demonstrating by moving her buttocks forward, backward.
FISCAL FORMOSO: You stated that the accused here inserted his sex organ. Where did he insert that?
WITNESS: He inserted that sex organ in my private part, sir. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FORMOSO: And what did you (feel) while the accused here inserted his sex organ in your sex organ
at the same time swinging his body forward and backward?
WITNESS: I felt pain, sir. "Masakit po".
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FORMOSO: Did you notice anything in your sex organ or on your thighs?
WITNESS: A white substance, sir, I just do not know what was that. 22
We deem it highly unlikely that Maribel ". . . . with all her childhood naivet and innocence would make up
stories against appellant. . . ." 23 And "considering that the victim was of tender years and not exposed to the
ways of the world, it is most improbable that she would impute a crime as serious as rape to any man if it were
not true." 24 It is a truism that "no woman especially one who is of tender age would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." 25
Furthermore, even appellant's own testimony shows that Maribel was just an innocent child who could not have
been capable of weaving such an intricate web of deceit as the one the appellant would have this Court believe
she did:
WITNESS: My wife and I, Your Honor, we have been talking about Maribel and my wife told me also to extend
patience to this Maribel because this Maribel has a thinking of the child "isip bata". . . . 26
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
In fine, this Court finds that Maribel's testimony is replete with spontaneity and directness so overwhelming as
to be impervious to a mere denial by the accused. "It is a well settled rule that an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. . . ." 27
Accused-appellant argues that the non-presentation of Alfredo Soriano, Jr. and Ate Laki signifies a willful
suppression of their testimonies as the same would have been adverse if presented in court. We are not persuaded.
Their additional testimonies are not needed because "(t)ruth is established not by the number of witnesses but
by the quality of their testimonies" 28 and "the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape if credible is
sufficient to sustain a conviction." 29 It is axiomatic that "witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered." 30 For "after all, there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration except when the law so expressly requires." 31 The pronouncement of this Court in People
vs. Martinez through Mr. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa aptly elucidates on this point:
Over the years, certain principles have been laid down in decisions involving the analysis and assessment of
evidence in cases of rape; and, having been so often invoked and applied, have become so familiar and prosaic
as to seem platitudinous. Such propositions as that rape is not normally perpetrated in the presence of third
persons; hence, in prosecutions therefor, the only evidence against the accused is usually the testimony of the
offended woman herself, her sole testimony being sufficient for conviction if it rings true and is otherwise
credible. . . . 32
No False Accusation of Rape
The allegation of appellant Ramirez that the complaint against him was false and made only because complainant
Maribel Soriano was instigated and used by her paternal grandmother Juanita Soriano as an instrument of
revenge against Ramirez is bereft of merit. The Court observes that Maribel was raised and cared for by her
grandmother Juanita Soriano from infancy to her early teens and was therefore a "grandma's girl." Naturally, It
is only to be expected that Juanita would have for her grandchild Maribel all the love and protectiveness of a
true parent. Hence, it would be very unlikely for Juanita to subject Maribel to the indignities of executing her
sworn statement at the police station before a male police officer, examination of her private parts by a male
doctor at the National Bureau of Investigation, and the embarrassment of having to answer very personal and
embarrassing questions at a public trial, all just to spite Ramirez. Thus, this allegation of the appellant is
disregarded by the Court. We have held that "[i]t is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma. No mother would stoop so low
as to subject her daughter to the physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage
her own hurt feelings." 33
Based on the foregoing discussion, our conscience rests easy upon the moral certainty that accused-appellant
Enrique Ramirez is indeed guilty of rape.
Moral and Exemplary Damages
The trial court correctly awarded moral and exemplary damages to the victim. An award of moral damages for
rape is mandated by Art. 2219 in relation to Art. 2217 both of the Civil Code. We appreciate the presence of
alternative or aggravating circumstance of relationship in this case, as "the relationship of stepfather or
stepmother and stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to that of ascendant and
descendant." 34 Thus, the award of exemplary damages is likewise proper. 35 Moreover, the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, apart from moral and exemplary damages, should have been awarded by the trial
court. 36
One last point. The evidence points to several counts of rape committed by the accused against his stepdaughter.
However, we could not impose multiple penalties because the Complaint charged only one count. In the future,
prosecutors and the police are enjoined to file as many complaints/information as the evidence in their hands
may warrant so that as many separate penalties could be imposed by courts.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Enrique Ramirez
y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own stepdaughter Maribel
Soriano and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that he shall indemnify the victim in the amount of eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) broken
down as follows: fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity; plus thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of
the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who
jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or
catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening
the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened
on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room
was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called
out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow
had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the
light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening
of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one
of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms
prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door
and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk
with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano
stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated,
Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs
and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing
his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he
was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died
from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of
his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would
kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have
been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor
his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he
was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or
his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except
in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing
a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law,
sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People,
32 N.Y., 509; Ishamvs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration
is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that
the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the
actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the
actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of
the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient
of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions
are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is
so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may
very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less
in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to
be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article,
say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code
of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence
of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article
of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act,
an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio
169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of
May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church,
there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes
every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission
of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive
judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article
568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject
to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than
those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the
degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the
direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of
malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that
while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently
understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies
an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose;
in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
"maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal
justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it
be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with
an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely
present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies
between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but
crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not
make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from
civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of
an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement,
when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of
reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not
offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person
is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark
upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad
intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth
is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the
law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract
justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class
of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always
held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol.
12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the
evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in
fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the
maxim here isIgnorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense,
a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg.vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to
say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the
effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the
intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will
justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without
fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the
right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes
self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the
law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where
a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are
in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly
be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of
the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same
time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed
"voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him,
and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will
not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used
and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418,
Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in
the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design
of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there
had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before
he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away
the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party
killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this
principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here
set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to
the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick
with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor,
and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house.
It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned
his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The
accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited
during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and
in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment,
with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the
following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck,
and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because
of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same
stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took
from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration
which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the
means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of
supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon
arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
"Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke,
and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense
under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity
of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I,
p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered
"the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and observing in
an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at
one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt
from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months ofprision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that
the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I
Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of
his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

People Vs. Beronilla G.R. No. L-4445


Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the
judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected
mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who
was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which
authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or
abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed under custody
and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla
reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying I can only compliment you for your impartial but
independent way of handling the whole case.
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the murder of
Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to
persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the
grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to lawful
order of superior

Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could not
question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was
done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received
the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality of
Borjals conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to
Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial,
defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence
review sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are any reasonable doubt as
to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

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