PART I: COURTS AND ITS JURISDICTION 2.
2. WON the motion to quash is not subject to the omnibus rule and that the
PILIPINAS SHELL V. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL [FEB. 16, 2015]
FACTS:
Respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing LPG by illegally refilling the
steel cylinders
Investigation team
Brought along 4 empty cylinders and asked to be refilled
Respondent refilled it
o Respondent was not authorized to di distribute, sell or otherwise
deal with these Petron LPG products
NBI investigated
For the purpose of prosecuting in relation to Section 170 of RA No. 8293
(IPC) and Sec 2 of RA 623 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or
Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels, and Others Similar Containers
Saw cylinders stockpiled at respondents warehouse
Distribute in different places, like Edrich Enterprises
NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell filed with the RTC-Naga two separate
Applications for a Search Warrant
Violation of Sec 155.1 in relation to Sec 170 of RA 8293(IPC)
RTC-Naga GRANTED said Application for a Search Warrant
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
No probable cause
Lapse of 4 weeks from the date of the test-buy to date of search and seizure
Most cylinders seized were not owned by Respondent but by 3 rd persons
Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Masflame
RTC-Naga DENIED the Motion to Quash
Respondent filed an Appearance with MR
Raised for the FIRST TIME: Impropriety of filing the Application for
Search Warrant at the RTC Naga when the alleged crime as committed
in a place within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
o Application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling
reason to justify the filing in a court which DOES NOT have
territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime
RTC-Naga GRANTED the MR, thus quashing the search warrant
CA affirmed
ISSUE:
1. WON the venue in an application for SW is jurisdictional. This is because a
SW is not a criminal case NO
issue of lack of jurisdiction may not be waived and may even be raised for the
first time of appeal? NO
(Did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue of said defect I
resolving the respondents MR where the issue was raised for the very first time?)
HELD:
1. NO. The venue in an application for SW is NOT jurisdictional
Sec 2, Rule 126 of Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure:
Application for SW shall be filed:
o Any court within those whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed
o For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of commission is known, or any court within the
judicial region where the warrant was enforced
o However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action
is pending
Thus the application for SW should have stated compelling reasons why the
same was filed with the RTC-Naga instead of RTC-Iriga
o Mandatory requiring statement of compelling reasons
SW limitation of rights; Sec 2 Art III of 1987 Constitution
o Sec 2 Rule 126 strictly construed against the state
Petitioners application for SW is insufficient AT THIS
POINT
2. NO.
Omnibus Motion Rule Sec 8 Rule 15 in relation to Sec 1 Rule 9
All available objections be included in partys motion, otherwise, said
objections shall be deemed waived.
Exceptions:
o Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter xxx
Applies to motions to quash SW:
o Abuan v. People
The motion to quash the SW which the accused may
file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of
the motion to suppress xxx
The TC could ONLY take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the
motion to quash IF:
1
 oNot available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the PEOPLE V. TAROY [SEP 7, 2011]
SW
Defect in the application was available and existent at the FACTS:
time of the filing of the motion to quash Public prosecutor two counts of rape against Taroy RTC of La Trinidad,
o Jurisdiction over subject matter Benguet
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER DES eldest daughter of MILA in 1st marriage
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases JURISDICTIONAL MILA + Taroy 2nd marriage
o Offense should have been committed or any of its essential o Lived in Pucsusun Brgy., Itogon, Benguet
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction 1997: Taroy poked a knife at DES and forced her. She was 10 y/o
of the court 1998: Abused her again
o It cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense 2002: At 15, she told her aunt
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory o They went with MILA to complain to NBI
Malaloan v. CA: An application for a SW is a SPECIAL CRIMINAL Doctor: two narrow notches in her hymen blunt force
PROCESS rather than a criminal action
Defense: fabrication aunt disliked him
o Power to issue is inherent in ALL courts
RTC:
Compared to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is
reposed in specific courts GUILTY reclusion perpetua
o Requisites, procedures, issuance are COMPLETELY DIFFERENT Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction
o Residence Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City
A warrant of arrest or a SW merely constitutes a PROCESS. It is not a criminal o RTC denied
action to be entertained by a court to its original jurisdiction. Did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived
the jurisdictional requirement
The rule that venue is jurisdictional DOES NOT APPLY CA AFFIRMED
ISSUES:
The power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts 1. WON the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases of rape against Taroy YES
2. WON the prosecution has proven his guilt in the two cases beyond
Improper for RTC-Naga to have even taken into consideration an issue which reasonable doubt YES
respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter HELD:
1. YES
RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a SW Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases
It can neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra: We likewise cannot approve the TCs act of entertaining The right venue must exist as a matter of law
supplemental motions xxx which grounds are already deemed waived To attach instituted where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients took place
PETITION GRANTED. Denial of Motion to Quash REINSTATED Informations committed in offenders house at City Limit, Tuding, Municiplaity of
Itogon, Benguet
Conferred territorial jurisdiction on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet
Taroy took place in Baguio uncorroborated
o Pre-trial admitted that RTC of La Trinidad had jurisdiction

APPEAL DISMISSED, CA AFFIRMED

2
PESTILOS V. GENEROSO [NOV 10, 2014] Prior to 1940 Rules of Court not necessary for the arresting officer to first
have knowledge that a crime was actually committed
FACTS: o Reasonable suspicion of arresting officer = probable cause
3:15AM: Altercation between Petitioners and Atty. Generoso at Kasiyahan St., Brgy. 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court there should be actual commission of an
Holy Spirit, QC offense, thus removing the element of the arresting officers reasonable
suspicion of the commission of an offense.
Atty. Generoso called, and police arrived in less than an hour and saw Atty. Generoso o Restricted discretion of arresting officer
badly beaten 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
o just committed
Police INVITED the petitioners to the police station for investigation limited arresting officers time frame
o personal knowledge
Inquest proceeding: City prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
with a bladed weapon
o Probable cause
o Notable changes:
Information: Petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
Qualified by just immediacy
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation Probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer
based on his personal knowledge
No valid warrantless arrest
o Police had NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE that they were the Minimize arrest based on hearsay
perpetrators o Elements:
INVITED inquest proceeding was improper An offense has just been committed
The arresting officer has probable cause to believe based
RTC DENIED the motion
on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it
CA:
PROBABLE CAUSE
Petitioners: rule 65 petition for certiorari DISMISSED
INVITED command = valid warrantless arrest Within personal knowledge
Void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based Whether at the time of the arrest, probable cause existed
DISMISSED Based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
RTC explained the grounds for denial of the motion arrest and not on the information acquired later
Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as
ISSUES: personal knowledge
1. WON the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant YES, valid The arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a
2. WON the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to victim of the crime
the police precinct YES, arrested
3. WON the order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is void for Personal knowledge actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion
failure to state the facts and the law upon which it was based - No, VALID o A reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
HELD: believe that the person accused is guilty
1. YES. Valid warrantless arrest Facts Actual facts or raw evidence
Rule 113 Sec 5 of Rules of Court Arrest without warrant Existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
(a) in flagrante delicto discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
(b) hot pursuit arrest xxx
The arresting officer operates on the basis of a more limited facts, evidence or
Evolution of Sec 5(b) Rule 115
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time
frame
3
CIRCUMSTANCES attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions
May pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation
or observation of the arresting officer at the scene of the crime
Even though the police has not seen someone actually feeling, he could still make
a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause
Determination of probable cause should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime
Just committed immediacy
Time gap widens contaminated and subject to external factors
Raw and uncontaminated facts or circumstances
Case at bar: Valid warrantless arrest as the police officers has personal knowledge of
the facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause
Arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the
crime
Petitioners admission although self-defense
Medico-legal certificate
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE does not require the actual presence at the scene
while the crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge OR CIRCUMSTANCES, that the person to
be arrested has recently committed the crime
2. YES. Invited = authoritative command
A formal declaration of arrest is not required.
It is enough that there is intention on the part of the parties to arrest the other and the
intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that mission is necessary.
Invited intention to arrest; not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense
2. NO. The order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is VALID
RTC, in resolving the motion, is NOT required to state all the facts found in the record
of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters is best reserved for full-blown trial of the case,
not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
It is the DECISION facts and law applied
In resolving a motion reasons only
PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED
UY V. JUDGE HAVELLANA [SEP 5, 2012]
FACTS:
Administrative case from a verified complaint for gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, and gross incompetence xxx filed by Public attorneys against Judge
Erwin Javellana of MTC LaCastellana, Negros Occidental
1. Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure
People v. Cornelio: For Malicious Mischief he issued warrant of arrest after the
filing of said case despite Sec 16:
People v. Celeste, et al: Trespassing to dwelling he did not grant motion to dismiss
for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sec 18 and 19(a) of Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, insisting it was a prohibited act
People v. Celeste, et al: refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the
same was patently without basis or merit hearsay evidence
People v. Lopez: For Malicious Mischief he did not apply the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure; instead conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure despite
confirming of no personal knowledge of witnesses which is a ground for dismissal
2. xxx
3. Judge Javellana violated Sec 6(b) Rule 112 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions
to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing
the accused under immediate custody
He issued warrants of arrest even when the accused has already voluntarily
surrendered or when the warrantless arrest has been effected
RESPONDENTS COMMENT: - sought dismissal
1. He was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
People v. Cornelio: he issued warrant of arrest judicial discretion and the necessity
holding of the accused in detention is evident when it was revealed that the was
accused was wanted for Attempted Suicide in another case
People v. Celeste, et al: referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictianal
requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on the said ground was a prohibited pleading
People v. Celeste, et al: refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the
same was patently without basis or merit hearsay evidence = accord due process to
complainant
People v. Lopez: For Malicious Mischief Motion to dismiss prohibited pleading
and could not dismiss since prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence
3. He claimed to have conducted preliminary examination with searching questions and
would sign the official form after such. In some cases, he was not aware that accused
had already voluntarily surrendered or was taken in custody because public officers did
not timely inform the court
4
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA) report:
Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law when he did not apply the Revised Rules The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
on Summary Procedure in cases appropriate investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule
Gross misconduct
Commencement of a criminal case within the scope of the Rule:
HELD: Sec 11:
AGREE WITH OCA. LIABLE Filing by complaint or by information
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure shall govern: o Metro Manila & Chartered Cities only by information
B. Criminal Cases Except: offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio
(5) xxx imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding P1,000 Accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and witnesses
xxx Provided, damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall o Copies accused + 2 for courts files
govern where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000 o Within 5 days otherwise dismissal
Sec 12:
Cornelio and Lopez: Both for malicious mischief
By complainant: outright dismissal if patently without basis or merit and order the
Art 328: Special cases of malicious mischief - Prision correcional in its minimum and
release of accused
medium periods, if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000
Art 329: Other mischiefs - Arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period, if the By information: order requiring the accused to submit counter-affidavit
value of the damage exceeds P1,000 pesos o 10 days
o Prosecution may file a reply after 10 days within receipt of counter-
Without showing that the accused in both cases were charged with the special
affidavit
cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Art 328, then Art 329
Sec 13:
should be applied.
No cause dismissal
Amount of damage:
o Cornelio: P6,000 With cause arraignment and trial
o Lopez: P3,000 If accused is in custody for the crime charged immediately arraigned
Penalty - imprisonment for 2 months and 1 day to 6 months o If he enters a plea of guilty sentenced
o THUS, governed by Revised Rule on Summary Procedure

Cornelio: Issuance of Warrant of arrest is in violation of Sec 16 of the Rule 112
The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required
He never claimed that accused failed to appear to any hearing
Being tried for attempted homicide in another case distinct and separate
thus UNACCEPTABLE
o Proceeding for such should not be extended or made applicable to
the other
Lopez: He conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was NOT required or
justified
Penalty is just 6 months
He gave no reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants
to the speedy disposition of cases; Effectivity: November 15, 1991
Sec 1 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Preliminary Investigation required only if penalty prescribed is at least 4 years, 2
months and one day without regard to fine
Celeste: blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused and in insisting
that it is a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to
the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by Sec 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure
He should have allowed and granted the Motion to dismiss (albeit without prejudice)
filed by the accused
Sec 18:
Cases requiring referral to Lupon non-compliance = dismissed without
prejudice and may be revived only after compliance
Sec 19:
5
 Prohibited pleadings (a) motion to dismiss or quash except on the ground
of:
o Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
o Failure to comply with the preceding section
A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa
shall be dismissed without prejudiced. A motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings
prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles: Patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.
Cannot be made to apply only where the failure is deliberate or malicious
Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of malicious intent as a defense
Failure detrimental to the expedient and efficient administration of justice
OCA AFFIRMED, GUILTY.
MALABED V. ATTY. DE LA PENA [FEB 9, 2016]
FACTS:
Administrative complaint for dishonesty and grave misconduct
Dishonestly for deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood that misled the court
1. Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed refers to a different
complaint filed by complainants brother
Effect: No certificate to File action required on behalf of his client
2. Did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by the
OCT but forwarded a copy to the CA
Could not properly defend herself
Title presented by respondent was fabricated
3. Conflict of interest
Represented the occupants of the lot owned by complainants
family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Catholic
Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized
4. Connive with RTC
Judge was his former client in an admin case
5. Grave misconduct defied accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT
UE College of Law
Government institution received salaries
Violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal
which is his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government office
RESPONDENTS COMMENT: - denied claims
The Certification to File Action was the certification of the Lupon Chairman
Free patent title was attached to the folio of records and he furnished a copy
to complainants counsel
Notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against
the occupants
Matters regarding connivance should be addressed to the Judge himself
No longer connected with the NIT College of Law moot
o Designation was temporary no salary, only honorarium
o Furnished OBC and MCLE Office a copy of his designation no
objections
o Furnished the complainant to his admin case no objection to his
petition for judicial clemency
INP report and recommendation:
Respondent is GUILTY suspension for one year
1. For using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by
complainants brother against respondents client
2. Not furnishing complainants counsel with a copy of the free patent
3. For accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT in
violation of the accessory penalty
ISSUES:
WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct? - YES
HELD:
YES. GUILTY
1. Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences non-conciliation
between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in
court
The Certificate of Endorsement which the respondent claimed he used was
issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of he complaint on 19 Oct 2000.
o Did not exist when the complaint was filed
o NO TRUTH that the subject matter of Civil Case B-1118 was
brought before the Lupon Tagamapayapa and that a certificate
to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint he
misrepresented
GUILTY OF gross misconduct
6
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS Invoking Executive Judge has authority to SUPERVISE all detainees in the
municipal jail under Sec 25 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE MADRONIO, MTC Procedure, the private complainants sent copies of motion to transfer and
MANAOAG PANGASINAN [JAN 26, 2000] supplemental pleading to respondent Espanol.

FACTS: Mupas required private complainants to comment or opposition to petition for bail.
Indorsement by Sec. of Justice concerning a hold-departure order
Issued by Acting Judge Madrionio of MTC Manoag, Pangansinan Same day, Espanol issued TWO orders:
Criminal Case No. 5275 (People v. Castrence) Directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from the Municipal jail to
o Forcible abduction with rape and homicide the Provincial jail
Directed Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and
ISSUES: prevent the departure from the Philippines of the accused Eva Malihan
Sec. of Justice: The order is contrary to Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997 of this while the cases are pending
Court - YES
RESPONDENTS COMMENT: - complaint is groundless
HELD: Acted on the motions as Executive Judge in order not to frustrate the
administration of justice
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold departure orders to the RTC Transfer Order she has authority to supervise all persons in custody
in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction Hold departure Order authorized under SC Circular No. 39-97 which does
not require that the subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a
hold-departure order; accused is trying to abscond
MUPAS V. ESPANOL [JULY 14, 2004]
COMPLAINANTS REPLY:
FACTS: Hold departure order case was dismissed by the RTC of Imus Cavite
Letter-complaint filed with the OCA by Judge Mupas of MTC of Dasmarines, Cavite
Adds that Espanol is involved in practice of granting bail on cases within the
charging Judge Espanol of RTC of Dasmarines, Cavite, in her capacity as Executive
exclusive jurisdiction of MTC
Judge, with gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA) Memorandum:
Private complainants filed three separate criminal complaints for syndicated estafa
Respondents order to transfer NOT JUSTIFIED under Sec 25 of Rule 114
against Eva Malihan, et al before the MTC.
As Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in
Mupas conudected a PI
custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule
She issued warrant of arrest against the accused and recommended no bail for does NOT give her the authority to arrogate upon herself a power vested
their provisional liberty upon a presiding judge of the court where the case is pending
Respondent should have called the attention of complainant
Private complainants filed a motion to transfer accused Malihan from the municipal
jail to the provincial jail Respondent encroaches upon the power of complainant when
respondent took cognizance of the motions NOT pending in her cour
Mupas required Chief of Police to comment on the motion to transfer within
5 days
Respondents Hold departure order CANNOT BE SUSTAINED as it is contrary to
the mandates of SC Circular 39-97
Maliahn filed an urgent petition for bail
At the time of issuance, no case has yet been filed in the RTC
Private complainants filed a supplemental pleading to support their previous motion
for transfer While Sec 1 states that issuance of Hold departure orders are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC, the same should be read that the subject criminal case
has been filed and pending with the RTC.

7
 JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Case at bar, no final determination yet of a prima facie case that would warrant
the filing of an information in court. The determination made by an MTC INDING V. SANDIGANBAYAN [JULY 14, 2004]
would still be reviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor
FACTS:
ISSUES: Information was filed with SB charging Inding, a member of the Sangguniang
WON Respondents at of issuing said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases are Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of Sec 3(e) of RA No. 3019
pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of Faked buy-bust operations
authority? - YES Enable him to claim or collect from the coffers P30,500 as reimbursement
Cause undue injury to the government
HELD:
YES. Court agrees with OCA. PETITIONER: filed Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the case for lack of
Executive Judge only has administrative supervision over lower courts jurisdiction or referral of the case to RTC or MTC for appropriate proceedings
Management only A.O. No. 270 Rules an Regulations of LGC of 1991
Cannot unilaterally override the MTCs actions in cases pending with it under o SG 25
the guise of administrative supervision RA No. 7975, which amended PD No. 1606
Only when her courts jurisdiction is appropriately invoked in an appeal or o SB exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes
certiorari and other special civil actions can respondent judge, in her judicial committed by officials of LGUs only if such officials occupy
capacity, override the lower courts judgment positions with SG27 or higher
SG based on RA 6758 or Compensation and Position
The earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy administration of justice must at all Classification Act of 1989
times be exercised with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of their
jurisdiction or authority OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR comment
SB has jurisdiction, not RTC
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold departure order to criminal cases Sec 4 a(1)(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975
within the jurisdiction of second level courts (RTC). Criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts (MTC) do not fall within the ambit of the circular. The SANDIGANBAYAN resolution: DENIED
criminal cases must be pending in the sala of the RTC concerned. Information alleged he has a SG27
At the time of issuance of the hold-departure order Sec 2 of RA 7975 as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod SG27
Only at PI stage in the MTC for determination of reasonable ground
Complainant Judges findings had not yet been elevated to and reviewed by PETITIONER: Supplemental Motion
the provincial prosecutor. RA No. 8294 + Organo v. SB
SB as a trial court was made to depend not only on the penalty imposed by law on
Respondent Judges issuance of the hold departure order was PREMATURE the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but also on the rank and SG of accused
government officials and employees
OCA AFFIRMED, GUILTY.
MR Denied
Instant Petition for Certiorari
RA 8249 SB jurisdiction penalty imposed + rank and SG
Organo v. SB: SB original jurisdiction SG27 and above
Sangguniang Panglungsod member SG25
RTC, not SB that has jurisdiction
RESPONDENT through OSP: Sec 4 a(1)(b)
Sangguniang Panglungsod among others included regardless of SG

8
ISSUE:
WON the SB has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019? -
YES
HELD:
RA 7975 (May 16, 1995) and not RA 8249 (Feb 23, 1997) which applies to the case
Reckoning period: time of the commission of the offense
GR: jurisdiction to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action
Exception: violations of RA 3019, reckoning period is at the time of the
commission of the offense
Crime charged committed from Jan 3, 1997-Aug 9, 1997 = RA 7975 applies
Sec 2 or RA 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of SB as defined in Sec 4a(1)(b) of PD
1606:
Section 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
(A) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corruption Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurer, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officersof higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-ownedor
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
(B) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this
section in relation to their office.
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
With respect to the first category, the officials of the executive branch with SG27 or
higher, RA 7975 further specifically included other officials
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to
the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as
occupying xxx SG 27 and higher
If it was the intention of the Congress to confine the SB jurisdiction only to
officials in the executive branch with SG27 or higher, it could have just ended
paragraph (1)
Specific inclusion without reference to their SG
Lawmakers considered them big fish and their position important regardless
of their SG
Case: The petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and he is charged with a
violation of RA 3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod are specifically included
among those within the original jurisdiction of SB
PETITION DISMISSED. SB AFFIRMED.
9
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN [AUG 25, 2009]
FACTS:
Victoria Amante member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Toledo, Cebu
Jan 14, 1994 cash advance of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to
defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environment Protection,
which she headed.
After 2 years, no liquidation was made
Auditor issued a demand letter asking to settle within 72 hours
COA submitted an investigation report to Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas (OMB-Visayas)
OMB-Visayas recommended the filing of an Information for Malversation of
Public Funds
OSP memorandum: found probable cause
AMANTE: Filed a Motion to defer arraignment and motion for reinvestigation
Incomplete proceeding Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded
o At the time of investigation the liquidation papers were still in the
process of evaluation
o SB had no jurisdiction because Amante was then a local
official who was occupying a position of SG26
OSP: Opposition incomplete proceedings- matters of defense trial
SB has jurisdiction since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, falling under those enumerated under Sec 4 or RA 8249.
SB: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
Being that the violation is not among those under Sec 4(a), the general
qualification of having GS27 must apply
Motion for Reinvestigation moot and academic
ISSUE:
WON the SB has jurisdiction over a case involving a Sangguniang Panglungsod member
where the crime charged is one committed in relation to office, but not for violation of
RA 3019, RA 1379 or any of the felonies mentioned in CHII, Sec 2, Title IV of the
RPC? - YES
PETITIONER: Inding did not constrict application of enumeration in 4(a)(1) to those
mentioned, as it equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office
OSP: Esteban v. SB: in relation to office if the offense is intimately connected with
the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in performance of his official
functions
HELD:
YES, SB has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
under SG26 who was charged with violation of the Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
Applicable law: Sec 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Sec 2 of RA 7975 and RA 8249
Dec 19, 1995: commission of the offense
May 21, 2004: filing of the Information
GR applies: jurisdiction to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action
The present case falls under Sec 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved.
SB has jurisdiction over:
GR: violation of RA 3019, RA 1379 or any of the felonies mentioned in CHII, Sec 2,
Title IV of the RPC
Exception: In relation to their office [even if violation not among enumerated in GR.
As long as the offense charged in the Information is intimately connected with the
office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper and irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had
he not held the aforementioned office, the accused is held to have been indicted for
an offense committed in relation to his office
Lacson v. Executive Sec.: Murder; in relation to office
Alarilla v. SB: grave threats; in relation to office
In relation to office intimately connected with the accuseds respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions.
GR: S G27 or above
E: G26 may still be included if among enumerated in the same law Sec 4 (a)(1)(a-g).
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the
alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the SB
PETITION GRANTED. REMANDED TO SB.
10

SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN [JAN 22, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Serana was a senior student at UP-Cebu government scholar
(student of a state university)
She was appointed by Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a 1 year term
from Jan 1,2000-Dec 1, 2000
With her siblings and relatives, she registered with SEC the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI)
Renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex project of OSRFI
President gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation
Failed to materialize
Succeeding student regent filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the OMB
OMB: found probable cause to indict petitioner and brother for estafa
Hanna Serena, a high-ranking public officer, being then Student Regent of the UP
Diliman, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, did then and then willfully defraud the government by
falsely and fraudulently representing to former Pres. Estrada that the renovation xxx
for the amount of P15M xxx misappropriated for their personal use and benefit xxx
Petitioner moved to quash the information SB does not have any jurisdiction over
the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
No jurisdiction over the crime of estafa Title X, Chapter VI, Book II of
the RPC
It was President Estrada, not the government that was damaged
No jurisdiction over her person as a student regent, she is not a
public officer; she is a simple student and did not receive any salary as
a student regent
No power or authority to receive monies or funds vested on the BOR as a
whole
o Not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or
duties to receive funds or that it was committed in connection with
her official functions
OMB: opposed Sec 4(b) catch all phrase in relation to her office
Source of money is a matter of defense full blown trial
Shes a public officer member of BOR, compensation not an essential part
SB: DENIED motion to quash for lack of merit
SB has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation
to his office
Sec 4(a)(1)(g): Presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs, state universities,
or educational institutions or foundations
The SB has original jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g) irrespective of their SG, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions
Charter of the UP reveals that the BOR, which she belongs to, exclusively exercises
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university
Corp law: the corp can act only through its Board of directors, or board of
trustees in case of non-stock corps governing body of the corp
BOR performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a
non-stock corp
Thus, she belongs to the category of the public officials upon whom SB is
vested with original jurisdiction with original exclusive jurisdiction regardless
not SG27 or over
Petitioners MR denied
ISSUE:
WON SB has jurisdiction over the offense charged in the Information - YES
Petitioners arguments:
The SB has no jurisdiction over estafa
Petitioner is not a public officer with SG27 and she paid her tuition fees
The offense charged were not committed in relation to her office
Funds came from Pres. Estrada, not from government
HELD:
YES, SB has jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the SB is set by PD 1606, as amended, not by RA No. 3019,
as amended
Sec 4a(1)(g)
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals xxx with the public officers or
employees xxx they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in th
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them
SB has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa
11
Sec 4(B) of PD No. 1606: in relation to their office
Perlas, Jr. v. People: SB has jurisdiction over estafa of a director of the National parks
Development Committee
Bondoc v. SB: SB has jurisdiction over estafa
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer
Constitution does not define who are public officers. It is defined by statues and
jurisprudence
Aparri v. CA: a public officer is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
Right to public office exists at all only and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating or conferring it
It is not only the SG that determines the jurisdiction of the SB. The SB also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated by PD No. 1606
Sec 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the SB with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. The BOR performs functions similar to
those of a BOT of a non-stock corp. By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD 1606
Compensation is not essential
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the
Information
Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the Information.
Not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in
an answer, a motion to dismiss, or motion to quash
The information alleged, that petitioner being a student regent of UP, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, xxx
No grave abuse xxx on the part of SB when it did not quash the information based on
this ground
Source of funds is a matter of defense raised during trial on the merits
PETITION DISMISSED. SB has jurisdiction.
GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN [JUNE 22, 2005]
FACTS:
Petitioner Garcia was the Deputy Chief Staff for Comptrollership, J6 of the AFP
On Sep 27, 2004, Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Field
Investigation Office of the OMB, after due investigation, filed a complaint against
petitioner with public respondent OMB, for violation of:
Sec 8, in relation to Sec 11 of RA 6713
Art 183 of RPC
Sec 52(A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law
A case against Petitioners wife and sons were impleaded as they acted as conspirators
xxx ill-gotten wealth
REPUBLIC through the OMB filed before the SB, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex
Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner, his
wife and 3 sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec 2 of
RA 1379.
SB GRANTED
PETITIONER: Motion to Dismiss
Lack of jurisdiction of the SB over forfeiture proceedings under RA
1379
o SB is without jurisdiction over the civil action for forfeiture
xxx as it resides in the RTC
Theorizing that the SB, under PD 1606 or the law creating, was intended principally as
a criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions, Pres. Aquinos
issuances after the EDSA Revolution: (1) creation of PCGG for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth amassed by Marcos xxx (2) EO 14 amending PD 1606 and RA 1379 by
transferring to the SB jurisdiction over civil actions filed against Pres. Marcos
SB has been granted jurisdiction only over the separate civil actions
filed against Pres. Marcos
It does not provide that the SB has been vested jurisdiction over
separate civil actions other than those filed against Pres. Marcos, xxx
Hence SB has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action against him
Failure to comply with jurisdictional requirements under Sec 2 of RA 1379
Inquiry similar to PI
A certification to the OSG that there is reasonable ground
An action filed by the OSG on behalf of the Republic
Only information for perjury were filed and no information for violation of RA 1379
RESPONDENT: Comment
12
Republic v. SB: jurisdiction over RA 3019 and RA 1379 rests with the SB
Sec 4a(1)(d): Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher ranks;
Petitioner falls under the category of public positions covered by the aforestated law,
the petition for forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the SB
PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019, irrespective of
whether these are civil or criminal in nature
Not accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture as a civil case since it has been held
that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal and penal and that it is only the
proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature
OMB: Comment
Republic v. SB: grants of jurisdiction over RA 1379 did not change even under the
amendments of RA 7975 and RA 8294
The Office of the OMB has the authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture
proceedings against petitioner
Constitution: the constitutional power of the OMB is plenary and unqualified
o Covers unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officers as defined
under RA 1379
Sec 15(11) of RA 6770: expressly empowers the OMB to investigate and
prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth
Participation of the OSG no longer required since the OMB is endowed with the
authority to investigate and prosecute the case
Must be dismissed for forum shopping
Motion to Dismiss under SB
Instant petition with SC
PETITIONER: Reply
Use of violation of RA 3019 and 1379 in PD 1606 implies jurisdiction over cases
which are criminal or penal in nature because the concept of certain laws necessarily
carries with it the concept of imposition of penalties for such violation
Only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction SB
lack of jurisdiction over civil cases for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth
ISSUE:
1. WON SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379? - YES
2. WON the OMB has the authority to investigate, initiate, and prosecute such
petitions for forfeiture? - YES
3. WON the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping?
ISSUE:
#1: YES. SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379.
Originally, it was the OSG who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
Upon creation of the SB pursuant to PD 1486, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
such violations was vested in the SB.
PD 1606 was issued repealing 1486 removing jurisdiction over civil actions brought
in connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court
BP 129 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SB over the offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the
imposable penalty resulted in increase of cases punishable by a penalty not higher
than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious
P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is
lodged with the Sandiganbayan.
It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
since both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
were NOT YET ENACTED AT THE TIME.
First recognized civil nature for action of forfeiture
o Actions in rem civil in nature
o Do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State
o Procedure civil in nature
Cabal v. Kapunan Jr. forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
penalty
Divestiture of property without compensation
The doctrine laid down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of
the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of
respondents, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination
RA 1379 does not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which would
necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture
Respondent in a forfeiture proceeding is a public officer committed during his
incumbency and in relation to his office in line with the purpose behind the
creation of the SB as an anti-graft court to address the urgent problem of dishonesty
in public service
13
#2:
Before, it was the OSG who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
PD 1486 vested to SB jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings
Sec 12 of PD 1486 gave the Chief SP the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture
proceedings implied repeal
June 11, 1987, the same day that PD 1486 was enacted, PD 1487 creating the Office of
the OMB (formerly Tanodbayan) was passed originally no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the SB
Dec 10 1978:
primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
(II) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved therein.
It is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No.
1379.
However, the Ombudsman's exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and
initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986

PD 1606 repealed PD 1486
PD1607 was also enacted amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate
admin complaints and created Office of the Chief SP
CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR exclusive authority to conduct PI of
all cases cognizable by SB, file information and direct and control the
prosecution of said cases
Removed from the Chief SP the authority to file actions for forfeiture
ON OR BEFORE - the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the
Sandiganbayan such forfeiture action -belongs to OSG
Respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its authority in
conducting the investigation of petitioner's illegally acquired assets and in filing
the petition for forfeiture against him.
PETITION DISMISSED. SB has jurisdiction.

The repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the
OSG to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of
the CFI over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the PI(that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Special Prosecutor)

PD 1630 Tanodbayan given the exclusive authority to conduct PI of all cases

cognizable by SB

P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861 - granted the Tanodbayan the same authority.

Constitution - ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Constitution.

The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No. 6770.

(I) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this

14

JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN INORDINATE DELAY
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN [DEC 11, 2013]
FACTS:
Hernando Perez, - Sec. of DOJ (high ranking public officer)
While in the performance of his official function
Conspired with accused Escaler, Perez, Arceo
Demand $2M from Mark Jimenez and succeeded
In consideration of his desistance from pressuring Mark to execute affidavits
implicating target persons involved in the Plunder case of Pres. Estrada and in
connection with Marks pending app for admission into Witness Protection Program
Dec 12, 2002 Cong. Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech in the HOR
denouncing the acts of bribery allegedly committed by then called 2M Dollar Man
Office of the Pres. Directed PAGC to conduct an inquiry
-asked people involved to provide information and documents
Nov. 25, 2002 OMB Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents releveant
Nov. 26 OMB requested Cong. Jimenez to submit sworn statement on his expose
which he complied with and submitted his complaint-affidavit to the OMB
Complaint-affidavit was referred to for PI and admin adjudication
Criminal case against respondent Perez, Escaler, Arceo
Admin case only Perez as respondent
Nov. 14, 2005 Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding
investigation and filed complaints against Perez, Escaler, Arceo, John Does for
violation of RA 3019 and 1379
Nov 6, 2006 Special Panel of the OMB issued a joint resolution finding probable
cause and recommending informations be filed against respondents:
All for Extortion (Robbery) par 5 in of Art 294 in rel to Art 293 of RPC
All for Sec 3(b) of RA 3019
Perez falsification of public documents art 171 par. 4 of RPC
Peez sec 7 of RA 3019 in rel to Sec 8 of RA 6713
April 18, 2008 Perez: petition for certiorari with an app for a writ of preliminary
injunction in the SC
April 18, 2008 OMB filed in the SB 4 informations against respondent**
May 8 Perez: motion to quash information
June 4: 1st Div SB Denied motion to quash
Respondents: MR
Nov 18: 1st Div SB granted MR
3(b) of RA 3019 only limited to contracts or transaction involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene under the
law
o requesting or demanding of any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit covered by 3(b) of RA 3019 must be in connection with this
Soriano v. SB: Contract/transaction involves some consideration as in credit
transactions
o Consideration is absent in the investigation conducted
Alleged desistance from pressuring Mark cannot be considered as
contracts or transactions no monetary consideration
Transaction involving execution for admission to WPP only in negotiation
phase because of refusal of Mark to execute affidavits against certain
individuals
State: MR; Criminal case re-raffled to 3rd Div of SB denied MR
Issue: meaning of transaction
3(b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery under RPC different and distinct
although arises from same transaction
June 22, 2009 OSP assailed SB quashing information, denying State MR
SC: Hernandez was not liable of robbery due to the delay in filing of the charge
resulted in violation of their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy disposition = it
took him 6 years to file a case
Aug 24 Current petition
ISSUES:
WON SB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate delay of the
OMB in brining the criminal action against respondents as to violate their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases?
HELD:
15
SB dismissed on the sole ground that OMB had incurred inordinate delay in resolving
the complaint Cong. Jimenez brought mainly to uphold their constitutional right to
the speedy disposition of cases
State delay not inordinate nor attributed to the OMB
Blamed respondents
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman: inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint, being
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy
disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION:
Extends to all parties in all cases
Mere mathematical reckoning of time is not sufficient
Violated:
o proceedings are attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive
delays
o unjustified postponements
o without case or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001 acts
November 25, 2002: The criminal complaint came to be initiated only on when
Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents
relevant to the expos of Cong. Villarama.
November 6, 2006: Special Panel created to investigate Cong. Jimenezs criminal
complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be
filed against the respondents.
January 5, 2007: Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution
January 25, 2008L The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the
respondents MR
April 15, 2008: Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on.
April 15, 2008: filed the informations charging the respondents with four different
crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on, thereby leading to
the commencement of Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0266.
In sum, the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.
INORDINATE AND OPPRESSIVE
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan: the Court ruled that a delay of almost three years in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the constitutional rights of
the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his case, taking into
account the following:
(a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the accused had a falling out with
former President Marcos, indicating that political motivations had played a vital role
in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process;
b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure
prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and
(c) the simple factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a
greater reason for us to hold so in the respondents case.
Incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that the delay
was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.
State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court primarily
because of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, like not having
a document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez; and that it could not obtain
the document, and to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to
await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR
Agreement), and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT) - the
States dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a sufficient
justification for the delay.
The fact-finding investigation January 15, 2003 - November 14, 2005, = two years and
10 months.
November 14, 2005: The FIO submitted its report which was after the Department of
Justice had received on September 8, 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy
Government Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to
the request for assistance dated June 23, 2005, and the reply of the Office of Justice of
Switzerland dated February 10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005
from Liza Favre, the Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang,
16
Acting Assistant Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents pertaining to the bank
accounts relevant to the investigation.
For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the HKSAR Agreement and the
Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would proceed with the
preliminary investigation was oppressive, capricious and vexatious, because the
respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.
We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would
thereby deliberately gain an advantage over the respondents during the preliminary
investigation. At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary
investigation of a criminal case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by
the Senate that would provide to the prosecutorial arm of the State, already powerful
and overwhelming in terms of its resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the
time of the investigation. To allow the delay under those terms would definitely
violate fair play and nullify due process of law:
fair play: because the field of contest between the accuser and the accused
should at all times be level; a
due process of law: because no less that our Constitution guarantees the
speedy disposition of the case.
The State: the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the PI
because the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period
spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to
the PI NO it does not matter
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by
the State is accepted.
For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts
and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to
the complaint or dismiss it are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution.
PETITION DISMISSED due to INORDINATE DELAY
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN JURISDICTION
DOJ V. LIWAG [FEB 11, 2005]
FACTS:
Mary Ong
Alleged she was a former undercover agent of PAOCTF and PNP Narcotics
Group
Filed a complaint-affidavit on Jan 8, 2001 before the OMB against PNP
General Panfilo Lacson, PNP Col. Aquino, other high ranking officials and
private persons
o Respondents: counter-affidavits, prayed for dismissal
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco letter to Sec. Perez recommended investigation of:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang,
James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming
May 7, 2001: a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino
and the other persons named in the witnesses sworn statements
Lacson and Aquino: gave a letter - [motion] to Dismiss the complaint
There are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of
facts against the same respondents.
Uy v. Sandiganbayan: the OMB has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as private respondents.
DOJ: denied motion to dismiss
not allowed under crimpro
crimes not related to their office investigated and prosecuted by
City/Provincial prosecutor
OSG received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before
the RTC DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a PI on the complaints
OJ was violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the SB
Judge Liwag Order (assailed here): prohibiting the DOJ from conducting the PI
17
 Prohibition until categorized as not in relation to their office
ISSUE:
WON the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts,
and circumstances?
HELD:
NO. DOJ must stop because the OMB has the jurisdiction to investigate the
case
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall
have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system;
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under
the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional
State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter
provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
all cases involving violations of penal laws.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case
or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution: specifically vests in the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-
feasance of public officers or employees.
Special features of OMB granted by Constitution:
Independence - Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of
partisan politics.
principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved
layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures.
o Granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors.
o It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against a
public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
complaint lodged before it.
o It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants
based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention
through sources other than a complaint.
o The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct,
informal, speedy and inexpensive.
o The exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate
public officials is given preference over other bodies
Section 15 (1) Republic Act No. 6770:
gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases.
This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative
bodies.
o All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the
delegate cannot claim equal power.
While the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
involving violations of the RPC, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish
the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is
an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence
granted to the Ombudsman.
18
Doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction: equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter
Settled rule: the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
o Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both
bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which
will first complete the investigation.
o In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the
complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the
DOJ.
Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted on by said
Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled
substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
Consequences:
would not promote an orderly administration of justice
promote multiplicity of proceedings.
cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear
and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents
unnecessary expenditure of public funds
PETITION DISMISSED. OMB has jurisdiction
OMBUDSMAN V. GALICIA [OC 10, 2008]
FACTS:
Ramon Galicia
former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School (MBASHS) in
Caloocan City
graduated from the FEU with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass
the board examinations.
represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in education in school
year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR)
from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC).
passed the Teachers' Professional Board Examination (TPBE) given on
November 22, 1987.
Yamsuan, principal of MBASHS - TOR submitted by Galicia was not an original copy,
but only stamped with "verified correct from the original" signed by Administrative
Officer Rogelio Mallari
Division Memorandum: Yamsuan required Galicia and other teachers with similar
records, to secure authenticated copies of the TOR that they submitted.
All of the teachers who were given the said instruction complied, with the
exception of Galicia.
Yamsuan proceeded to confirm with school:
Reply from Marilyn Torres-De Jesus, College Registrar of CCPC:
no record of the said TOR,
no records that Galicia, indeed, took up eighteen (18) units of education in SY
1985-1986
Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification,
dishonesty, and grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
OMBUDSMAN: GUILTY
Guilty of Dishonesty
Galicia presented the original of the questioned documents during the preliminary
conference,8the Ombudsman nevertheless found that the absence of a certification
from the College Registrar destroyed the TOR's credibility
The Official TOR submitted by the respondent is spurious, owing to the fact that he
does not have any record of having attended and/or obtained the eighteen (18) units of
teaching education subjects
19
If the respondents did took (18) units of teaching education subjects, then the same
can be easily established by the records of the college itself - the Caloocan City
Polytechnic College has been consistent in its stand that the respondent has no record
of having obtained the teaching education units in question.
MR
Galicia MR - raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time.
Not the Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the
School Superintendent, which has jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers, as mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4670, or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
Challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act which enumerates the instances
when the Ombudsman may not conduct an administrative
investigation
1. Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;
2. The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman;
3. The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
4. Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or
5. The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.
o According to Galicia, all of the above conditions were present in the
case filed against him. An adequate remedy existed in the Office of
the Secretary of Education; the matter was outside the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman; the complaint was made in bad faith; and
complainant Yamsuan had no sufficient personal interest in the
matter.
The Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint was filed only
in 2002, thirteen (13) years from the time he allegedly committed the
dishonest act in 1989.
o Violated Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770, which mandated that all
complaints must be filed within one year from the occurrence
of the act charged
CA: OMB no jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over public school teachers belonged to the School Superintendent as
mandated by R.A. No. 4670.
The arguments of Galicia and, consequently, overturned the findings of fact during the
investigation proceedings
The school's lack of certification did not establish that the TOR was
fabricated or spurious. It was possible that the records were only missing. The
"verified correct from the original" notations in the photocopied TOR and
COG prove that the documents were, indeed, authentic.
ISSUE:
Authority granted to the Ombudsman over administrative cases against public school
teachers
HELD:
The Ombudsman must yield to the Division School Superintendent in the
investigation of administrative charges against public school teachers.
The duty and privilege of the Ombudsman to act as protector of the people
against the illegal and unjust acts of those who are in the public service,
emanate from no less than the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12 of Article XI states:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations
on its own or upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate
disciplinary actions against erring public officials and employees.
In Deloso v. Domingo: the Court declared that the clause "illegal act or omission of any
public official" encompasses any crime committed by a public official or employee.
no requirement that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
the performance of official duty.
o To insulate the Ombudsman from the corrupt influences of
interested persons who are able to sway decisions in their favor
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. xxx
POWER OF INVESTIGATION GRATED TO OMB IS NOT EXCLUSIVE
BUT IS SHARED WITH OTHER SIMILARLY AUTHORIZED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
20
In the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary
authority.
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
reveals an apparent overlapping of jurisdiction over administrative cases against
public school teachers.
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers grants jurisdiction over erring
public school teachers to an Investigating Committee headed by the Division School
Superintendent.
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative xxx
Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte: by virtue of the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, original jurisdiction belongs to the school
superintendent.
The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate standard and procedural
requirement for administrative cases involving public school teachers, must be given
consideration
Hence, the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent
We hold here that the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction was proper (Ermin
v. de leon)
Galicia was given the right to due process in the investigation of the charges
against him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his
defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a decision
adverse to him was rendered did he question the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too
late for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation conducted and
the decision rendered against him.
Galicia was given an opportunity by petitioner to comment on the
certification issued by De Jesus that CCPC has no record of the TOR
and COG presented by Galicia. Indeed, Galicia was able to present his
side when he filed his comment to said certification on January 17,
2003.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint. Absent substantial evidence to prove the falsity of the
TOR presented by Galicia duly signed by the College Registrar at that time, We are
constrained to uphold his innocence of the charges of falsification.
PETITION DENIED. OMB exercise was proper
ANGELES V. GUTIERREZ [MAR 12, 2012]
FACTS:
Judge Angeles Presiding Judge of [Caloocan] RTC
Velasco senior state prosecutor at DOJ
Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the
Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the SB for the following acts allegedly
committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal
case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
trial prosecutor in a criminal case involving the smuggling of jewelry - failed
to present a material witness
considering the materiality of the gemmologists testimony, which respondent
must have known of, since he was the handling trial prosecutor of the case,
his failure to offer the said testimony in court shows that he tried to suppress
the evidence in favor of the accused in the said cas
corrupt practice the acts of public officers that give unwarranted benefits
2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases
against petitioner;
The second act complained of refers to respondent Velascos filing of two
Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases filed against petitioner Judge
Angeles.
o Petitioner was previously charged with inflicting physical and
psychological abuse on Maria Mercedes Vistan, her 13-year-old
grandniece.
o Respondent was the one who conducted the PI of the Complaint for
child abuse and later indicted petitioner for 21 counts thereof.
o However, the DOJ later on reversed respondent Velascos
recommendation upon a Petition for Review filed by respondent.
o Motive vengeance for filing admin complaints against respondent
since respondent Velasco was not the trial prosecutor in the said case, his
unauthorized act of filing two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases
constituted a violation
3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the
child abuse Complaint was conducted.
According to petitioner Judge Angeles, respondent Velasco made it appear
that he had conducted a clarificatory hearing on the Complaint for child abuse
on 22 June 1999 as shown in the Minutes of the said hearing
21
 Petitioner alleges that Leonila Vistan, the witness who supposedly attended
the hearing, was seriously sick and could not have appeared at the alleged
clarificatory hearing.
Moreover, respondent had, in fact, resolved the cases two days earlier, on 20
June 1999, as shown by the date on the Resolution indicting petitioner. Thus,
the latter alleges, the Minutes of the hearing on 22 June 1999 must have been
falsified by respondent by making it appear that Leonila Vistan had
participated in an inexistent proceeding.
OMBUDSMAN: DISMISSED
No cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication with
regard to the charges.
MR denied
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.
[Whether the Ombudsman) committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of its discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute criminal complaints]
HELD
Power of the Court over Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers:
GR: the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative
and prosecutorial powers
E: good and compelling reasons
Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
GR: Non-interference with the Plenary Power of the Ombudsman
E: good and compelling reasons
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto: plenary powers of the Ombudsman:
If the OMB, using professional judgment, finds a case dismissible, the Court shall
respect that finding, unless the exercise of such discretionary power was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto : rationale for the
plenary powers of the Ombudsman
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.
Its plenary powers were constitutionally designed to insulate it from outside
pressure and improper influence.
OMB: "the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of
public service."
Discretionary nature of the PI:
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure),specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
OMB has FULL DISCRETION:
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receipt of a complaint.
Should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may
recommend its outright dismissal.
Within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation
should be conducted
No grave abuse of discretion in the OMB Evaluation of evidence:
This Court acknowledges exceptional cases calling for a review of the Ombudsmans
action when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of
discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse
must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion = petitioner, and she has failed to
discharge this burden.
22
 She merely states why she does not agree with the findings of the
Ombudsman, instead of demonstrating and proving grave abuse of discretion.
Suppression of evidence
We cannot subscribe to the other reason for the Ombudsmans dismissal of the charge
pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act.
The provision allows the Ombudsman to decide not to conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of, if it
believes that the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject
matter of the grievance.
In relation to Section 19, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act applies only to
administrative cases.
It should not have been used by the Ombudsman as a ground to dismiss the
first charge, since the Complaint filed by petitioner before the Ombudsman was
criminal in nature.
Sec 19: Administrative Cases
Sec 20: Exceptions - option not to investigate an administrative complaint
even when its subject is an act or omission listed in Section 19
That both Sections 19 and 20 of the Ombudsman Act apply only to
administrative complaints is made even clearer in the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure.
This lapse notwithstanding, we do not find any arbitrariness or whim in the manner
that the Ombudsman disposed of the charge. If there was any abuse of discretion at all,
it was not grave.
Private Practice
OMB found that Velasco was not engaged in private practice
Falsification of Public Documents
Not substantiated
Clarificatory hearing was conducted
In sum, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from its long-standing policy
of non-interference in the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and
prosecutorial powers which, as we have emphasized, are plenary.
Although the Court diverges from some of the conclusions reached by the
Ombudsman, we find that its dismissal of the charges against respondent Velasco was
arrived at after a rational deliberation. Such deliberation was shown by its reasoned
disposition of the case in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated discretionary
powers. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries of its plenary powers and
acted within the permissible limits. We do not find any arbitrariness or abuse that was
so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its discretion as would warrant this
Courts reversal.
PETITION DISMISSED. AFFIRM JOINT ORDERS OF OMB
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG [Feb 11, 2005]
FACTS:
Complaint filed against Binay Jr. and before the OMB
Plunder and RA 3019 5 phases of procurement and construction o the Makati City
Hall Parking Building
OMB special panel of investigators fact finding
1st special panel filed a complaint = 6 admin case for grave misconduct, serious
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service + 6 cases for violation of
sec 3 or RA 3019, Malversation, Falsification of public documents
2nd special panel issued subject preventive suspension 6mos without pay
Before Binay Jr. could file counter-affidavits
During pendency of case all req are present
Binay Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA nullification of preventive
suspension order TRO and WPI to enjoin implementation
Phase 1 and 2 befsore he was elected as Mayor in 2010
Phase 3 1st term
Re-election condoned his administrative liability = moot
Failed to show evidence of guilt is strong
Clear and unmistakable right to hold office winning election
Condonation doctrine
March 15, 2015 | 8:24AM: Sec. Roxas implementation of order after failing to
personally serve to Binay points of entry to Makati City Hall were closed
CA:
Noon CA resolution: Granted Binays TRO
Apply condomation doctrine
March 17 | OMB: TRO did not sate what act was being restrained;
Order already served and implemented no longer any act to restrain
Binay filed for petition for contempt
Deliberately refusing to obey the CA
23

CA required OMB to comment on the contempt case
OMB: present petition
Assailing Mar 15 CA resolution
CA does not have jurisdiction to grant Binays TRO
Ombudsman Act of 1989: no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
OMB investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter
thereof is outside the latters jurisdiction
Directive to comment = illegal and improper
o OMB impeachable officer -> cannot be subjected to contempt
proceedings
Binay: Sec 1 Art VIII of Constitution grants CA judicial power to review acts of any
branch of government GALADEJ he accused happened when OMB issued
preventive suspension order
OMB should have been apprised of the condonation doctrine
OMB: reliance on condonation doctrine a matter of defense
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari?
2. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or a WPI enjoing
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the OMB?
3. WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and WPI enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay based on the
condonation doctrine?
4. WON the CAs directive for the OMB to comment on Binay Jr.s petition for
contempt is improper and illegal?
HELD:
Partly meritorious.
#1: Par 2 Sec 14 of RA 6770: No appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against the decision or findings of the OMB with the exception of the SC on pure
question of law
GR: bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the OMB prohibiting:
Appeal against decision or finding of the OMB
Any application of remedy (subject to the exception) against the same
E: Rule 45 appeal taken to SC on pure question of law
Inappropriate
Rule 45 can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, not against
findings of quasi-judicial agencies
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence it cannot alter the scope of
a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory findings issued by the OMB.
By confining the remedy to a Rule 45, the provisions takes away the remedy of certiorari,
grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally
vested in courts.
Par 2 Sec 14 of RA 6770 increased the Courts appellate jurisdiction without
showing that it gave consent to the same [without its advice and concurrence]
thus making it unconstitutional and void
Questions on the jurisdiction of the court below or of appellate court may be raised at
any time or on the courts own motion
In this case, the court raised the issue on its own motion
Issue 1 held: The CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main case over the
petition for certiorari
#2: The first par. Of Sec 14 RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending
provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by the OMB
There is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of the
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another
Sec 1, Art VIII of the Constitution judicial power is allocated to the SC and all such
lower courts
Jurisdiction pertain more accurately to jurisdiction over the subject matter
CA subject matter jurisdiction CAs original but also concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and SC
TRO/WPI
temporary measures during pendency of action;
ancillary and mere incidents
inherent in all courts necessary for ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction
When Congress passed the first par. Of Sec 14 RA 6770 and took away from the
courts their power to issue a TRO/WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the OMB, it encroached upon this Courts constitutional rule-making authority
These issuances are matters of procedure, which belong exclusively within the
province of the SC
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion
24
jurisdiction of the various courts under Sec 2, Art VIII as well as to create statutory
courts under Sec 1, Art VIII, it does not result in an abnegation of the Courts own
power to promulgate rules od pleading, practice, and procedure under Sec 5(5)
Art VIII.
When Congress creates a court and delimit its jurisdiction, the procedure for
which jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates
Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created
by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, without the Courts
consent to the proscription violation of the separation of powers
#4: Indirect comtempt against OMB
OMB: As an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt, because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty results in her
effective removal from office
The CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr.s contempt petition
premature for the Court to rule on the issue
ANTONIO V. DESIERTO [Dec 18, 2008]
FACTS:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by Pres. Diosdado Macapagal
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and
health resort site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of
General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of
land of the public domain situated in the said municipality and more
particularly described as follows
o a parcel of land of Gen Santos, Cotabaton
o 52, 678 sqm
Charter of the City of General Santos "The National Government hereby cedes to
the City of General Santos the ownership and possession to all lands of the public
domain within the city.
Amendment: "The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city shall be
in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred
forty-one, as amended: Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from such
disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."
Property subject of Pres. Proc. 168: subdivided into 3 lots
Lot Y-1
Lot X
Lot Y-2
Marcos: Proc. 2273 amended Proc. 168
Exclude from operation of Proc. 168 Lot Y-1 and Lot Y-2
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No.
168 and is therefore reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with
the District Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in
1983.
In 1984, two cases were filed by the local government of General Santos City against
the said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the
Heirs of Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and
Damages. RTC; Judge Andre
25
1991: the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed Resolution No. 87,
Series of 1991: "Resolution Approving the Compromise Agreement to be entered into
by and between the City Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor
and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park"
Judge Andre Order: Compromise Agreement Approved and Adopted
1997: acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous Subject from the
Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory
Order" submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer and
Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued another
Order (assailed order):
The movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the City of
General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
agreement.
Lot X was subdivided into 16 Lots
Excluded Lot X MR 1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment
August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the
Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) applicants
recommending for the private sale of the subject lots to the above-named applicants-
respondents, without public auction
Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the
registered owners sold their lots to the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) in the amount of (P2,997,000.00)
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j),
Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and for malversation of public
funds or property through falsification of public documents.
OMB: DISMISSED
Mayor Nunez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the Compromise Agreement
on behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of
Mayor Nunez and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod.
The validity of the Compromise Agreement had been settled when the OSG and the
RTC found it to be in order.
The Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of the case
Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed
their official functions
MR denied
The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed
against the indicted and the cases were already pending before the SB and the regular
courts, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
Petitioner: Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of
substantial evidence which clearly establish the existence of a common design among
the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot X of
the Magsaysay Park.
HELD: DISMISS FOR LACK OF MERIT
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive
or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received
through counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she
failed to establish that her MR was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to refute
the assertion of the respondents based on the Certification that petitioner was
personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999.
There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the
interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at
all for the late filing of the MR.
We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the MR, when, at the time of
the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.
GR: The Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
26
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that No showing of evident BF and or gross negligence in the acts of respondents GF is
indicate otherwise. presumed (case itself)

PETITION DISMISSED. OMB NO GRAVE ABUSE

E: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 finding of the OMB is tainted with GALADEJ
Collantes v. Marcelo: exception:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
ENEMENCIO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN [Jan 13, 2004]
FACTS:
Petitioner Enemecio is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and
Technology, College of Fisheries Technology ("CSCST-CFT"), Carmen, Cebu.

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
Private respondent Bernante is an Assistant Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.
Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of
public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante before
the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT.
Dr. Severino R. Romano, CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas

6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document.
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
PETITIONER:
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; Bernante caused spray-painting of obscene and uprintable words against her
on the walls of the campus
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; Shouted defamatory words while on the campus
He made it appear in his application that he was on forced leave serving 20
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to day prison term (slight physical injury)
quash on that ground has been denied. o Not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his "falsified
leave applications.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, RESPONDENT (Bernante):
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so Did not deny he was in prison
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
Received salary approved leave applications
a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.
Admin compliant retaliation for the case he filed against Enemecios friends
The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the OMB is wanting in this case GR Denied being behind the spray-painting
applies
OMB:
while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is DISMISSED ADMIN COMPLAINT
not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely No regulation restricting the purpose or use of an employees earned leave credits.
abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court Duly approved - does not how he utilizes his leave for it is not a
petitioner failed to do requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on leave be spelled out
in such application
Spray painting insufficient evidence
27
Shouting defamatory words act of respondent was not in relation to his official duties
DISMISSED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
No probable cause to indict for falsification of public documents
OMG DENIED MR for dismissal of Criminal complaint
Leave forms are public documents
No falsification form does not require stating reasons for going on leave
Omission does not affect validity of its approval
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA dismissed for being
filed out of time; must be petition under Rule 43, not Rule 65
MR: (Main issue)
CA should not have relied on Fabian
Fabian declared void only Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770") and
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 ("AO No. 07") insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court.
The other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07, including
the "final and unappealable character" of orders, resolutions or decisions exonerating a
respondent from any criminal liability, still stand.
She filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA because she considered
Bernantes absolution from the administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201
as already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate remedy of appeal,
Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari before the
appellate court under Rule 65.
CA denied MR
The proper remedy is a petition for review
Fabian does not apply to Enemecios petition assailing the dismissal of
the criminal complaint against Bernante.
The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770,
which authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases.
Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in administrative
disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
The power to review decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained
by the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the CA is the proper remedy to
question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the OMB?
HELD:
No. Petition is dismissed.
Enemecio claimed that what was involved in the petition before the appellate court was
the administrative, not the criminal case
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of
Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution and Order
dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante
Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the CA as
the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters
in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the
Ombudsman, remain valid.
Where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal
cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court under Rule 65.
Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the CA, instead of the SC, she availed of
a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright
Substance of the case - no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans determination
of whether there exists a prima facie case against Bernante
PCGG v. Desierto: The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The
Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or
substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise.
If, in the Ombudsmans view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, he may
proceed with the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a
complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation.
28
Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it would
not be right to subject the private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged
anguish.
PETITION DISMISSED
BAVIERA V. ZOLETA [Oct 12, 2006]
FACTS:
Baviera filed several complaints against officers or directors of the Standard Chartered
Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, including Sridhar Raman, an Indian national who was
the Chief Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents
Baviera
Former employee of the said bank
Investor
Victimized by the officers or directors of conspired in defrauding him as
well as the investing public by soliciting funds in unregistered and
unauthorized foreign stocks and securities
Requested Sec. of DOJ for the issuance of a HDO
o Sep 26, 2003: GRANTED by Sec. Datumanong
Sec. Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria
Undersecretary Navarro-Gutierrez was designated as Acting Sec. of DOJ
Sep 28: At NAIA, Ramad was apprehended in NAIA HDO
Sep 29: Raman was able to leave 8:15AM flight attend conference in Singapore
Acting Sec. Navarro-Gutierrez verbally allowed the departure
Raman wrote to Sec. Datumanong for the lifting of HDO
Acting Sec. Navarro-Gutierrez ORDER allowing Raman to leave
o Chief SP no objection to the travel of Raman to Singapore
Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman charging
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended
The actuations of respondent Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular and
questionable
No written order
Gave him unwarranted, undue preference, benefit and advantage
Verbal special permission granted to Raman by respondent Gutierrez was
illegal as there is no specific law or DOJ rule allowing the grant of special
permission or exception to an HDO
Gutierrez denied allegations; merely upheld his rights to travel as guaranteed under
the Constitution
Requested OMB to dismiss the complaint against her
Baviera: The main issue against her is NOT an individual's constitutional right to travel
nor the wide discretionary powers of the DOJ to grant special permits to travel to
individuals subject of HDO BUT her abuse of such discretionary powers.
Oct 5,2003: SCB and Raman, filed a MR of HDO
Oct 17: Sec. Datumanong lifted the HDO
June 22, 2004: Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Zoleta signed a resolution
recommending that the criminal case against Gutierrez for violation of RA 3019 be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
No actual or real damage was suffered by any party, including the government
as Mr. Raman immediately returned to the Philippines, the truth of which was
not rebutted by the herein complainant in his Reply-Affidavit
o Did not suffer undue injury as an element of the law
Even the court (or the Sandiganbayan in the case of IMELDA MARCOS) that
requested or issued a Hold Departure Order on a person already charged in court
allows under certain conditions the accused to travel for a specific purpose and for a
certain period. There is no reason why Mr. RAMAN, who is just a subject of a
preliminary investigation by a prosecutor, should not be granted the same benefit as he
continues to enjoy not only the constitutional presumption of innocence but the
constitutional right to travel or liberty of abode
Acting Secretary of Justice, is authorized or empowered not only to allow the travel
abroad of Mr. RAMAN under specific conditions but also to order the lifting of such
Hold Departure Order
Mr. RAMAN still enjoys the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel or liberty of
abode even if a preliminary investigation involving him is still pending at the office of
the concerned DOJ Prosecutor
Resolution was approved by Deputy OMB
Baviera MR Zoleta recommended denial Deputy OMB denied
CA:
Baviera filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the CA
CA dismissed proper remedy: Rule 65 with the SC (Enemecio v. OMB)
29
Baviera MR:
Petition for Certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 was in accordance with the ruling
in Fabian v. Desierto.
Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency of the government, and under BP
Blg. 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The filing of his Petition for Certiorari with the CA conformed to the established
judicial policy of hierarchy of courts as explained by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.
CA DENIED MR
Fabian is not applicable applies only in appeals from resolutions of the OMB in
administrative disciplinary cases
Aug 18, 2005: Baviera filed with the SC the insant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner in the CA was the proper remedy
to assail the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman;
Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman: In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the
Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is
likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with
the Court of Appeals following our ruling in
Merits: petitioner failed to establish that the respondent officials committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere
with the exercise of the Ombudsman's discretion, who, based on his own findings and
deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.
PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT; CA AFFIRMED

(2) WON respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint of petitioner against
respondent Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez for lack of probable cause.

ISSUES:

(1999)Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario: the remedy of the aggrieved party from a resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause in
criminal cases was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the S Court.

(February 22, 2006) Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman: The remedy to challenge the
Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was to
file a Petition for Certiorari in this Court under Rule 65.

Estrada v. Desierto: Court rejected the contention of petitioner therein that Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order/Resolution of the OMB in criminal
cases should be filed in the CA, conformably with the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas): the remedy of aggrieved parties from
resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases
or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an
original action for certiorari with [Supreme] Court and not with the Court of
Appeals.

30
 Jan 20: R filed an urgent MR

Reset of arraignment to March 9, 2005

March 9: R failed to appear before the RTC

POWER OF THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE MR denied
Denied motion to quash
DINO ET AL V. OLIVAREZ [Dec 4, 2009] Admitted amended informations
Ordered arrest of respondent and confiscation of the cash bond
FACTS:
Petitioners - Complaint for vote buying against Olivarez
Mar 11: R filed an urgent MR and/or to lift the order of arrest
Asst. City Prosecutor Pablo-Medina: there is probable cause
Order: Denied
o 2 Informations were filed charging Olivarez with violation of Sec
o Bench warrant to be issued for the arrest to secure presence in
261 par a,b, and k of Art XII of the Omnibus Election Code
arraignment
Oct 18, 2004 set date of arraignment
Oct 7: respondent filed before the law dept. of COMELEC appeal with motion to
April 5: COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion
revoke continuing authority
Alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC's powers to investigate and
pendency of appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC would
prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of
prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC no probable cause
its authority to the city prosecutor
until COMELEC resolved the appeal
Resolution No. 7457
Oct 11: COMELEC directed city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records o revoke the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution final Paranaque to investigate and prosecute election offense cases xxx
resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc o To direct the Law Department to handle the prosecution of these
cases and file the appropriate Motion and Manifestation before the
Oct 11: respondent filed a motion to quash the two final informations on the ground RTC to hold in abeyance further proceedings until the Commission
that more than one offense was charged has acted on the appeal of respondents
Reset of arraignment to Dec 13
April 8: R filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the CA assailing the orders of
the RTC
Oct 28: Asst. Pros. Pablo-Medina Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to
admit amended informations
CA granted appeal
Violation of only par a
the COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
election offenses and to prosecute the same.
Reset of hearing to Feb 1 2005
the COMELEC may delegate such authority to the Chief State Prosecutor,
Dec 14: Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
No resolution was issued to explain the changes The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding power, too, to revoke such
authority to delegate.
City prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the Informations, since
COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the case Thus, the categorical order of the COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of
and suspend the hearing of cases before the RTC until resolution of appeal the case before the RTC effectively deprived the city prosecutor of the
before the COMELEC en banc authority to amend the two informations.
Judge Madrona erred in admitting the amended informations, since they were
Jan 12: Judge Madrona issued an order DENYING respondents Motion to quash and made in excess of the delegated authority of the public prosecutor, and his
admitted amended informations
31
 orders to arrest the respondent and to confiscate the latter's cash bond were
devoid of legal basis.
HELD:
In finding that the public prosecutor of Paranaque, in filing the Amended
Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by COMELEC, we said that the
public prosecutor's delegated authority to prosecute the case was not yet
revoked when said amended informations were filed on 28 October 2004, since the
authority was revoked only on 4 April 2005 when COMELEC Resolution No.
7457 was issued.
The letter from the COMELEC which directed the public prosecutor to
transmit the entire records did not revoke said delegated authority
Filing of the amended informations was not made in defiance of the
instructions but was rather an act necessitated by the development of the case
o Intended not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution
of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the
Amended Informations.
o By filing the amended informations, the public prosecutor avoided
the undesirable situation that would have forced the COMELEC to
re-file the cases, waste government resources and delay the
administration of justice.
Judge Madrona did not abuse discretion when he issued the orders for the arrest of
Respondent due his failure to be present for his arraignment
Having acquired jurisdiction over the cases and the persons of the accused,
the disposition thereof, regardless of what the fiscal may have felt was the
proper course of action, was within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretion of the court
The arraignment of respondent cannot be suspended indefinitely, for the reviewing
authority has at most 60 days within which to decide the appeal
5 months was more than the sixty days allowed by the rules for the
suspension of the arraignment and was ample time to obtain from
COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause
MR HELD:
WON the City Prosecutor defied the order or direcsdtive of the COMELEC when it filed the
amended informations?
MOTION GRANTED
The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section 20, empowers the COMELEC to
investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election cases.
Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure details the continuing
delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority
the COMELEC may revoke or withdraw anytime in the proper exercise of its
judgment.
Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the COMELEC the power
to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor
and/or provincial/city prosecutors.
The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective
assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to
conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the
election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or
withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its
judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution
of the case can be done by the COMELEC.
Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city
prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or
in derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases
that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute.
Being mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the
COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
It was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the deputation of the City
Prosecutor of Paranaque. However, when the COMELEC Law Department directed
the City Prosecutor of Paranaque to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law
Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the fastest means
available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc, it had the effect
of SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the City Prosecutor to prosecute the
case.
The order issued by the COMELEC Law Department was with the authority of the
COMELEC En Banc. In other words, it was as if the COMELEC En Banc was the
one that ordered the public prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally resolves the
appeal.
It was but proper for the City Prosecutor of Paranaque to have held in abeyance any
action until after the resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En Banc.
32
This suspension of delegated authority was made permanent and this delegated
authority was revoked upon issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE

COMELEC Law Department has the authority to direct, nay, order the public The trial court's knowledge that the filing of the amended informations was done by
prosecutor to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final the public prosecutor in excess of his delegated authority no longer gives him the
resolution of said appeal, for it is speaking on behalf of the COMELEC discretion as to whether or not accept the amended informations.

Public prosecutor knew that the COMELEC Law Department could make such an The only option the trial court had was not to admit the amended informations as a
order, but the public prosecutor opted to disregard the same and still filed the sign of deference and respect to the COMELEC, which already had taken cognizance
Amended Informations contrary to the order to hold the proceedings in abeyance until of respondent's appeal.
a final resolution of said appeal was made by the COMELEC En Banc.
Abuse of authority by the public prosecutor Necessarily, all actions and rulings of the trial court arising from these amended
o In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the informations must likewise be invalid and of no effect.
proceedings in abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City
Prosecutor clearly exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority. MR by Respondent is GRANTED. Assailed decision of SC RECONSIDERED
o As a deputy of the COMELEC, the public prosecutor acted on its AND SET ASIDE
own and wantonly defied the COMELEC's directives/orders.
o For that reason, we rule that any action made by the City
Prosecutor of Paranaque in relation to the two criminal
cases subsequent to the issuance of the COMELEC order
dated 11 October 2004, like the filing of the amended
informations and the amended informations themselves, is
declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.

Did the trial court judge commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he admitted the amended informations despite full knowledge that the COMELEC had ordered
the City Prosecutor of to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of the appeal before it?

YES.
Amended informations are VOID and of NO EFFECT - the amended informations
filed before the trial court are nothing but mere scraps of paper that have no value, for
the same were filed sans lawful authority

The trial court judge knew that the COMELEC had directed the City Prosecutor to
transmit the entire records of the case to the COMELEC
He knew that the City Prosecutor no longer had any authority to amend the
original informations.
Despite this, the trial court judge still admitted the amended informations.
In doing so, the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of excess of jurisdiction.

GR: once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to
its dismissal, or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of
the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it

33

VIUDEZ II V. CA [June 6, 2009]
FACTS:
Honorato Galvez were fatally shot on June 9, 2000 in Bulacan
June 26: complaint for alleged murder was filed by 303 rd PNP CID with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor against Respondents
July 14: a complaint for murder against petitioner Enrique Viudez II was filed by
Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor Honorato Galvez, for the killing of the latter and his
driver
March 31, 2001: Resolution by the Investigation State Prosecutor finding probable
cause
Sep 19: 2 informations for murder were filed with RTC Malolos, which then issued
warrants of arrest on the same day
Sep 21: petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the
Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of
the DOJ arguing that all the accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely
Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to Section 9 of
Department Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said
Petition for Review
Sep 28: Order RTC denied petitioners motion
The implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was concerned,
said warrant had already been issued for his apprehension
There was no way for it to recall the same in the absence of any compelling
reason, and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it;
hence, petitioner had no personality to file any pleading in court relative to
the case until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the court.
MR - denied
CA:
Oct 11: Petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a WPI
The CA granted a TRO, commanding respondent RTC Judge Gabo to enjoin the
implementation of the said warrants of arrest
Respondent Judge Gabo and OSG Comment:
With motion to lift TRO and opposition to the application for the issuance of a WPI:
Determination of whether to issue a warrant of arrest after the filing of an
information was a function that was exclusively vested in respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way obligated to defer the
implementation of the service of the warrant of arrest simply because a
Petition for Review was filed by petitioner before the Secretary of Justice to
question the filing of the information against the same petitioner
The issue proposed by petitioner was the mere suspension of the implementation of
the warrant of arrest to await the resolution of the Department of Justice; hence,
respondent Judge was under no obligation to suspend the proceedings, because
the issuance of the warrant of arrest was his exclusive function.
CA: DISMISS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Lack of merit and found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the
respondent Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged Orders.
Since the premise of petitioner's conclusion was erroneous - for said circular and the
cases cited did not make it obligatory for respondent Judge to grant petitioner's motion
- petitioner's cause was lost.
When a Petition for Review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor - -
finding probable cause to indict a respondent - - is filed with the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, the court which earlier issued warrants of arrest, should
suspend their enforcement
ORDER of Respondent Judge: issue an alias warrant of arrest for the apprehension of
petitioner by virtue of the expiration of the effectivity of the TRO issued by the CA
Petitioner filed with the CA a MR denied
INSTANT PETITION:
Petitioner: Decision of the CA was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that Department Circular No. 70 of the Department
of Justice promulgated on July 3, 2000 was plainly a directive of the Secretary of Justice
to the accused and the trial prosecutor to ask the Court to suspend the proceedings
thereon during the pendency of the appeal
Unless a TRO was issued enjoining the implementation of the warrant of arrest dated
September 19, 2001 and the alias warrant of arrest issued by virtue of the Order of
34
January 9, 2002, he stood to suffer great and irreparable injury, as he would be deprived
of his liberty without due process of law
SC issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner and to direct respondent Judge to cease
and desist from implementing the warrant of arrest dated September 19, 2001 against
petitioner and the alias warrant of arrest issued
OSG:
The determination of whether to issue a warrant of arrest after the filing of an
information was a function that was exclusively vested in respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way obliged to defer the
implementation of the service of the warrant simply because a Petition for
Review was filed by petitioner before the Secretary of Justice to question the
filing of the information against him.
Respondent Judge did not need to wait for the completion of the preliminary
investigation before issuing a warrant of arrest
Petitioner did not challenge the finding of probable cause of respondent Judge in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against him.
Petitioner simply wanted a deferment of its implementation by virtue of
Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70;
The issuance of the TRO was tantamount to an abatement of the criminal
proceedings
PETITIONER: lifting of the TRO would cause grave and irreparable injury to his
rights because no bail had been recommended for his provisional liberty
Sep 19: Petitioner: filed a Manifestation informing this Court that the Secretary of
Justice had already sustained his Petition for Review
The Secretary of Justice had already issued a resolution on the Petition for
Review that he filed with the said office, and that the State Prosecutor had
already filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information against him
and his co-accused; hence, the instant petition may already be moot and
academic because of the said developments
ISSUE:
WON a pending resolution of a Petition for Review filed with the Secretary of Justice
concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court,
including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioner: DOJ Department Circular No. 70, specifically paragraph 2 of Section 9
thereof, which provides that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that,
pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
Includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants of arrest issued by
the court.
HELD:
NO.
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Determines probable cause for the Ascertains whether the offender should
issuance of a warrant of arrest be held for trial or be released
JUDGE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR
Baltazar v. People: the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
PROBABLE CAUSE is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested.
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of
probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant
of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a Petition for Review by
the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is
executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would
be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to
suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular,
and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof.
No contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest
Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the implementation of the
warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the
Petition for Review
Sec 9 of DOJ Department Circular:
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The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the
appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
Directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor
Nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the
proceedings in abeyance
In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised his judicial discretion
when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of
arrest.
CA was correct when it found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the
trial judge's discretion in issuing the challenged orders.
Whether the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending resolution by the
Secretary of Justice of a Petition for Review on the finding of probable cause YES
Nowhere in the said decisions did it state that the implementation or
enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended, as
herein petitioner prays for
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information
has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further
proceedings until the appeal is resolved.
Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso
facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete
control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The
decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the
Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion.
PETITION DENIED
ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL IN CRIMINAL
CASES
PEOPLE V. DUCA [Oct 9, 2009]
FACTS:
Arturo Duca with his mother, Cecilia Duca were charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Documents defined and penalized by Art 172 in relation to Art
171 par 2 of RPC
Cause the preparation of the Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow
type residential house
Dec 10, 2001: By making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn
statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth is its not
because he was abroad at that time having arrived only on Dec 12, 2001
It was Arturo Duca who affixed his own signature to the prejudice of private
complainant Pedro Calayanan
1999: Calayanan filed an action for ejectment and damages against the Ducas
Decided in favor of Calayanan
Oct 19, 2001: Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution
and Damages with prayer for WPI and TRO
The house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her
son Aldrin Duca
Sworn statement with his signature affixed on top of his name
The signature was that of Arturo Duca, who made it appear it was Aldrin Ducas
signature
Cecilia said she had no participation since she was in Manila during the execution
Arturo testified that the signature was his - duly authorized by Aldrin to procure the
said tax declaration
April 3, 2003: MCTC found Arturo GUILTY
36
RTC: Affirmed
CA: Petition for Review reversed RTC decision
Prosecutionf ailed to establish that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin
in procuring the tax declaration
The defense was able to establish that Arturo was duly authorized by his
brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house
Arturo could not have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real Porperty
actually acting on his brothers behalf
ISSUE:
CA gravely abused its discretion and had acted without jurisdiction when it resolved
private respondent Arturo Ducas appeal without giving the people of the Philippines
through the OSG the opportunity to be heard thereon? - YES
PETITIONER: The prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the
respondent's appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
of the pendency of the same and without requiring the OSG to file his comment.
Once the case is elevated to the CA or [Supreme] Court, it is only the OSG who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People.
The decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being
violative of due process.
RESPONDENT: The prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of
evidence under the control and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Since the control and supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial
Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the
prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the
respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor's failure to
inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.
HELD:
YES.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA
and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the OSG.
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina: Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the
Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan
trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial
courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of
Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People
of the Philippines not the fiscal.
In criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have
been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People.
The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment on Duca's petition.
Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a
copy of the said Resolution.
The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment
deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case.
Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al: When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it
must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge.
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.
A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity to be heard.
Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec 1: xxx furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition xxx
Sec 3: xxx be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof xxx
37
The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve
copies of his Petition for Review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the
Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on the
OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.
The Solicitor General is the SOLE representative of the People of the Philippines in
appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent's failure to have a copy
of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition
PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE. CASE REMANDED TO CA
REPUBLIC V. IYOY [Sep 21, 2005]
FACTS:
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March
1997
Crasus married Fely on 16 Dec 1961 at Cebu
5 children
Fely was hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant
Fely left the Philippiness for the US
Cresus received a letter that he let her sign the enclosed divorced papers
1985: Fely got married to an American
1987: Fely and her American family went back to the Philippines
Fely had been openly using her American surname in the Philippines nd in
the US Micklus
Fely's acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.
FELY:
She was already an American citizien since 1988 and was not married to
Stephen Micklus
Crasus drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household
While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to
her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child.
She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00
which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert.
On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
Fely's counsel filed a Notice, and, later on, a Motion, to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.
Despite the Orders and Commissions issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, considering Fely to have waived her
right to present her evidence
RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio ground: psychological incapacity
CA:
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the CA
CA affirmed based on Art 26
Petitioner Republic filed Instant Motion
ISSUE:
Respondent Crasus questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the OSG, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not
the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
HELD:
Instant Petition is meritorious
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the
RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
38
 obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.
At the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen
o She married her American husband in 1985
o She alleged she had been an American citizen in since 1988
o Art 15 of NCC: She was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity
She could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Art 48 of the FC: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the OSG does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,
effective on 15 March 2003
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and
take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts
PETITION GRANTED. Marriage remains valid and subsisting

EO No. 292, (Administrative Code of 1987): appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government
.
His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence;

The Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it

GR: only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals.

39