DESIGN FOR SAFETY

HAZARD & OPERABILITY

STUDIES -HAZOPs

RISK ANALYSIS METHODS

HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY
STUDY)
PETERS & TIMMERHAUS, P. 29 AND
PERRY’S, 26-10
EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT
LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITY
RESULTS IN A REPORT
WITH
LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESS
DEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDS
CLARIFICATION OF OPERATING
PROCEDURES

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 SAFETY IN PLANTS
MORE THAN JUST A PHRASE
THE COMBINATION OF CHEMICALS
AND PROCESSES CAN RESULT IN
HAZARDS
THE SIMPLEST HAZARDS ARE THE
SAME AS IN ANY OTHER
INDUSTRIAL OR OFFICE SITUATION
– TRIPPING OR FALLING
– ELECTRIC SHOCK,
– CHOKING
– JUST GETTING
TO WORK

CAUSES OF DEATHS
TOP 10 CAUSES OF DEATHS AGES 25–44 years 2004
RANK DESCRIPTION NUMBER RATE/100,000
TOTAL All causes 124,376 147.8
1 Accidents (unintentional injuries) 28,273 33.6
Motor vehicle accidents 13,370 15.9
All other accidents . 14,903 17.7
2 Malignant neoplasms 18,263 21.7
3 Diseases of heart 15,744 18.7
4 Intentional self-harm (suicide) 11,403 13.6
5 Assault (homicide) 7,192 8.5
6 Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease 6,312 7.5
7 Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis 3,035 3.6
8 Cerebrovascular diseases) 2,893 3.4
9 Diabetes mellitus 2,568 3.1
10 Influenza and pneumonia 1,204 1.4
All other causes 27,489 32.7
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 54, No. 19, June 28, 2006

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 BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTS
AGES 25 – 34, 2004 DATA
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus.html

BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTS

AGES 35 – 44, 2004 DATA
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus.html

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 LOCATION OF INJURIES
http://www.nsc.org/library/report_in
jury_usa.htm
THE SAME REPORT INDICATES THE
LOCATIONS OF MOST DEATHS AND
INJURIES

RELATIVE RATES FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshc_d99.htm#first.link
188.3 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR
THE COUNTRY
111.4 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
124 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR
THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
85 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE
DRUG INDUSTRIES

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OBJECTIVE FOR ENGINEERS
ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE
HAZARDS AND
DESIGN THEM OUT OF THE SYSTEM
DESIGN THE SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE
THE FREQUENCY AND THE
INTENSITY
REDUCE THE RISK AS LOW AS
PRACTICAL WHILE STILL KEEPING
AN ECONOMICALLY SOLVENT
OPERATION

RISK AVERSION
http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds_dying.jpg

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IDENTIFY INHERENT PROBLEMS
METHODS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED
WITH OBJECTIVES:
DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS
HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
SAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF
CONTROL
DETERMINE HISTORY OF
INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES
CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING,
ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROLS
EVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
ANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR
PROCESSES AS PART OF:
SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW
AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/sar
a.htm)
OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.sh
ow_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARD
S

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 HAZOPS FLOW CHART

ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM

WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS
EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE
DESIGN ENGINEERS
OPERATORS
MATERIALS SPECIALISTS
EH&S SPECIALISTS
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

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 COLLECT DATA
PFD’S, P&ID’S, ONE-LINES, LOGIC
DIAGRAMS, & OTHER DESIGN
DRAWINGS
EQUIPMENT DRAWINGS,
CALCULATIONS AND
SPECIFICATIONS
MAINTENANCE INFORMATION
MSDS

DEFINE PROCESS NODES

WALK THROUGH THE PROCESS
AND BREAK IT INTO AREAS FOR
ANALYSIS
LOCATE THESE ON
P&IDs
http://www.tisec.com/images/relia
bility/refinery.jpg

http://www.mne.psu.edu/me415/spring06/AP
1/PID.jpg

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 ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH
NODE
PURPOSE OR INTENT
PROCESS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE:
HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION,
SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION,
INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC.
PROCESS VARIABLES INCLUDE:
PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL,
COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION,
CORROSION, EROSION, ETC.
HUMAN INTERACTION:
HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED
INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS
AT EACH NODE.

POSSIBLE PROCESS DEVIATIONS

PREDICT RESULTS IF NON-STANDARD
CONDITIONS ARISE, WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION OF SOURCE

NO OR NOT OTHER THAN

MORE FLUCTUATION
LESS EARLY
AS WELL AS LATE
REVERSE

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 DEFINE RISK
SEVERITY AND PROBABILITY
DETERMINE CAUSE
– EQUIPMENT FAILURE
– OPERATOR ERROR
– ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES
– EXTERNAL IMPACTS

http://www.qualityame
rica.com/QAProducts/i
mages/fishbone.jpg

ESTIMATE SEVERITY

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PREDICT EVENT FREQUENCY

COMPLETE REVISION
RECOMMENDATIONS
EXAMINE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS
DEFINE REVISIONS AND
ESTABLISH CHECK LIST TO
IMPLEMENT
– ACTIONS THAT CAN REMOVE THE
CAUSE –
– INHERENT FAIL-SAFE DESIGN
ACTIONS TO MITIGATE OR ELIMINATE
CONSEQUENCES

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