[G.R. No. 149554.

July 1, 2003]
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES
HUGUETE-EMBUDO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Orders dated June 27, 2001[1] and July 26, 2001[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in
Civil Case No. CEB-24925.
On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites
Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys
Fees, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent
Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu,
for a consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed of sale,[3] after which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case,
arguing that the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,
pursuant to Section 33(3)[5] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.[6]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [7] alleging that the subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended. [8]
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which was denied on July 26, 2001.
Hence, this petition for review based on the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 33 (3) OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 129 IN UTTER DISREGARD OF SECTION 19 (1) OF THE SAME LAW AS WELL AS SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
ENUNCIATED IN RUSSEL VS. VESTIL, 304 SCRA 738 (MARCH 17, 1999) WHICH, WITH DUE RESPECT, WAS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AND THEREBY
INVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT.[10]
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of deed of sale and partition, and is thus incapable
of pecuniary estimation.Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and since the assessed value of the property
as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The pertinent portions of the complaint alleged:
4. Sometime in the year 1995, Teofredo A. Embudo, the son-in-law of plaintiffs offered them portion of Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay,
Cebu, which defendants bought on installment basis from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo. Desirous to live near their daughter and grandchildren, they
accepted defendants offer. Immediately, plaintiffs paid defendants the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) as full consideration and
payment of the purchase of 50-square meter lot at a price of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) per square meter;
5. Happily, plaintiffs built their house on the portion they bought from defendants which is adjacent to defendants house. Plaintiffs were issued Tax
Declaration No. 53170 for the house, copy is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex A;
6. Notwithstanding repeated demands for the execution of the Deed of Sale, defendants with insidious machination led plaintiffs to believe that the
necessary document of conveyance could not as yet be executed for the reason that they have not yet paid in full their obligation to Ma. Lourdes
Villaber-Padillo, the original owner of the lot in question, when in truth and in fact, as plaintiffs came to know later, that the aforesaid defendants were
already in possession of a Deed of Sale over the entire lot in litigation in which it appeared that they are the sole buyers of the lot, thusly consolidating
their ownership of the entire lot to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. A copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex
B.
7. As a way to further their fraudulent design, defendants secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99694 solely in their names on the
basis of the Deed of Sale aforementioned (Annex A hereof), without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. A copy of the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title is
hereto attached as an integral part hereof and marked as Annex C.
8. Since considerable time had already elapsed that defendants had given plaintiffs a run-around, plaintiffs then demanded for the partition of the lot,
segregating a portion in which their residential house stands, and despite such demand defendants, without qualm of conscience refused and still refuse
to partition the lot;
xxx xxx xxx;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Honorable Court is most respectfully prayed to render judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants,
ordering
1. Defendants to partition, divide and segregate a portion on which the house of plaintiffs is situated, with an area of Fifty (50) Square Meters;
2. That the Deed of Sale dated December 28, 1995 entered into by and between defendants and the previous owner of the lot in question be
annulled and cancelled;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to annul/cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 in the name of the defendants and in
lieu thereof directing him to issue Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs for the 50-square meter lot and another Transfer Certificate
of Title in favor of defendants for the remaining 100-square meter lot;
4. The Municipal Assessor of Talisay, Cebu to cancel Tax Declaration No. 46493 in the name of the defendants and directing him to issue Tax
Declaration in the name of the defendants for the 50-square meter lot and another Tax Declaration in the name of the plaintiffs for the
remaining 100-square meter lot;
xxx xxx xxx.[11]
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill,[13] we ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The reliance of the petitioners on the case of Russell v. Vestil[14] is misplaced. In the said case, petitioners sought the annulment of the document
entitled, Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition, whereby respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late
Spouses Casimero and Cesaria Tautho to the exclusion of petitioners.Petitioners brought the action in order for them to be recognized as heirs in the

1
partition of the property of the deceased. It was held that the action to annul the said deed was incapable of pecuniary estimation and the consequent
annulment of title and partition of the property was merely incidental to the main action. Indeed, it was also ruled in said case:
While actions under Section. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the
MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located
elsewhere. x x x.[15]
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which
they purchased from respondents.
Petitioners cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be
declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they
purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-
Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned
and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition
is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Order dated June 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 7, dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-24925, and its Order dated July 26, 2001 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

2
 [G.R. No. 119347. March 17, 1999]
EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS,
GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN
PERALES, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA,
DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January 12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his Order dated February
13, 1995 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION,"
with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN 2275. The complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners
are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was
previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs,
herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By
virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs
of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were
not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. [1]
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
case as the total assessed value of the subject land isP5,000.00 which under section 33 (3)[3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691,[4] falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela. [5]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[6] saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended. [7]
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.[8] A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed
by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land
but an action to annul a document or declare it null and void,[9] hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration. [10]
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation,
thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the
complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are reproduced hereunder:
xxx
3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long time ago;
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land containing 56,977.40 square meters, more or less, located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification issued by the Office of the Land Management copy of which are hereto attached as
Annexes "A" and "A-1" and are made part hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;
5. That the land passed to the children of the spouses.(who are all deceased except for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta,
Felicisimo, Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and defendants upon their death they being their descendants and
legal heirs;
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by and among the legal heirs of said previous owners;
7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of
partition, affecting the land executed by and among the defendants whereby defendants divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
plaintiffs who are entitled thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part hereof is xerox copy of said document;
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a complete nullity because the defendants are not the only heirs of Casimero Tautho;
plaintiffs are also legal heirs and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there has been no oral partition of the property;
9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to the great damage
and prejudice of plaintiffs;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven (7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had seven children;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at the barangay level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to file Action;
12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant action and contract the services of the
undersigned counsel with whom they bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to declare null and void the document (Annex "B") of declaration of heirs and
confirmation and to order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall respectively go to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho
and considering six (6) of them died already the same shall go to their children or descendants, and to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises. [11]
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said
court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12] we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a

3
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).[13]
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of
judgment;[14] also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,[15] annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid [16] and for
rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.[17]
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If
the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).[18]
However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves
as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who
also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein.[19]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order
denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)

Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,
affecting the land executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners
who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that the
document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been
made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the
heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value
of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.

Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

4
 [G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002]
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, petitioner, vs. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090 which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari as
well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint [2] for reconveyance of two (2)
parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of deceased
Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the
same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Bernabe and
Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-owners
thereof.
When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject property was P3,770.00,
petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the property was lower
than P20,000.00.
The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was
beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction. [3] Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration was denied,[4] hence, she filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the motions to dismiss
and at the same time maintaining her position that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the assessed value of the property was
below P20,000.00.
The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration
thereon was similarly denied by the appellate court, hence this petition.
Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par. (3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691 which provides -
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of "title, possession and
interests" of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and relief prayed for in the complaint coupled with
the assessed value of the disputed property place the action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19, par. (1), of the same law which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation: x x x
Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of action which include the annulment of sale and other
instruments of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC.
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129
as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1),
applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving sum of money or title to,
possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real property
involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property the assessed
value of which falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed
for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC.
As can be readily gleaned from the records, the complaint was for "Reconveyance and/or Recovery of Common Properties Illegally Disposed, with
Annulment of Sales and other Instruments of False Conveyance, with Damages, and Restraining Order." Private respondents alleged therein that they
were co-owners of the property along with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso; and that in or about 1998, with fraud and machination, Antonio together
with the spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria made it appear in a public document entitled Pagpapatunay ng Kusang Loob na Pagbabahagi that they were
the co-owners of the subject property and had divided the same equally between themselves to the exclusion of private respondents. Subsequently, they
sold the subdivided lots to the other defendants namely Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Private respondents also sought payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorney's fees plus appearance fees
amounting to more or less P286,500.00.They likewise applied for a TRO pending the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants
from further alienating the common properties. They also prayed of the trial court to order the cancellation, annulment and/or rescission of the four (4)
deeds of absolute sale made in favor of the buyers, and to order Lolita B. Copioso and the estate of Antonio Copioso to return the price that the buyer-
defendants had paid to them for the land sold.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any interest in the real
property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso
would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of
annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes merely
an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.

5
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62090 as well as its 30 July 2001
Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Copioso vs Copioso, 391 SCRA 325; GR No. 149243, October 28, 2002
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)

Facts: Respondents filed with the RTC an action for specific performance of reconveyance of two parcels of land having an assessed value of
P3,770.00.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents,
and that through fraud and machination the deceased had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Doria who subsequently sold the
same to third parties. Thus, they are praying for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-owners thereof.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground that it was the MTC and not the RTC that had jurisdiction considering that the assessed value
of the property was lower than P20,000.00 (Section 33 [3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691). Petitioners argue that the
complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of title, possession and interests of each of the
stakeholders over the subject parcels of land.
Respondents claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of action which include the annulment of sale and other
instruments of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC ( Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as
amended).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its
jurisdiction.

Issue: WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.

Held: Yes. Although the assessed value of the two parcels of land involved is P3,770.00, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the action filed by
the respondents is for specific performance of reconveyance, annulment of contracts and claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the action affects the title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It
is within the jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

6
 [G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their
behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and
the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not
sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered,
and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be
extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely personal but institutional, and
the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations[1] who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who once
held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now interrupted
by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two
Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. There is an understandable temptation
to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the desirable solution. But easy,
reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.
Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and procedural laws,
for all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly
mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the legally
infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of
Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens[2] who
each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos
regime.[3] The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious
violations of international law.[4] These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly
consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed
or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000)
members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of
which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture,
summary execution and disappearance victims.[5] Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary
damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final
Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine
Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision
rendered on 17 December 1996.[6]
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. [7] They argued that since the
Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment,
the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section
50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.[8]
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No.
7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of
Rule 141.[9]
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada[10] of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary
estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the
proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge. [11] They prayed for the annulment of the questioned
orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment,
and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred
Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as
required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty, a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required
exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case.[12] It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered,
ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a
7
case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another
country.[13] The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.
The Courts disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign
judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special circumstances
of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged allegation of human rights abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded
that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
The provision states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with
leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total
sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00
but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00
less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but
less than P 250,000.00 - P 1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but
less than P 300,00.00 - P 1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but
not more than P 400,000.00 - P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not
more than P400,000.00 - P 2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of
P 400,000.00 - P 10.00
...
(Emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-
in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present
petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a money claim against an estate not based on judgment.
Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or
on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the
mortgagees claim.[14] In special proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the
property.[15] The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads
in full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the value
of the subject matter
cannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions except
judicial foreclosure which
shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00
3. All other actions not
involving property --- P 600.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis
in computing the fees.
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. [16] Neither the complaint nor the award of
damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic
table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in determining
the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[17] This principle
was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot[18] and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v.
Walter E. Olsen & Co.[19] The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in
Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California
Act of March 11, 1872.[20] Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged
down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. [21]However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our

8
local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, [22] collusion, fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party aggrieved
by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. [25]
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment [26], even if such judgment has conclusive
effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for
the court to properly determine its efficacy.[27] Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity.[28]
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no
question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right,[29] and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a conclusive
judgment upon title or the presumptive evidence of a right. [30] Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.[31]
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising
from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the
right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from
the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action
derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious
act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation
is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign
judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal
notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.[32] Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous
litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness.[33] If every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.[34]
Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a foreign
judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny.
For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed Order, the respondent
judge pounced upon this point without equivocation:
The Rules use the term where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The subject matter of the present case is the judgment rendered by
the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court finds that the value of the
foreign judgment can be estimated; indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish between the enforcement of a
judgment and the amount of said judgment, and separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff suing on
promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million,
but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such enforcement cannot be estimated.[35]
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos
Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,[36] from which the rule
in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:
xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions
for support, or for annulment of judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.[37]
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances
and money deposits,[38] validity of a mortgage,[39] the right to support,[40] validity of documents,[41] rescission of contracts,[42] specific performance,[43] and
validity or annulment of judgments.[44] It is urged that an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same class.
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for the enforcement
of the foreign judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment
will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the point
that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance wherein a first level
court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level
courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies
in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must
be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

9
 (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.[45]
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property
or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of
action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary
estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision
indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office
is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141.
What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we
find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property.
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to
the same amount required for other actions not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of
discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is
grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, [46] as well as the principles
of comity, utility and convenience of nations[47] as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot[48] relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived from the landmark treatise of Justice Story in
his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834.[49] Yet the notion of comity has since been criticized as one of dim contours[50] or suffering from a
number of fallacies.[51] Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern
doctrine of obligation.[52]
There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which
eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and rvision au fond.[53] The most ambitious of these attempts
is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference
of International Law.[54] While it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect, [55] it is recognized as representing current scholarly thought
on the topic.[56] Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the Convention.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty
rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:
. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth
of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity
or similarity of the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further a community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules
on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role in both fields.[57]
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations
and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state, and proceedings there are not tainted
with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.[58]
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier
discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long
standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of
international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States, and on its face, the term valid brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties.[59] Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation
with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,[60] as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute a clear mistake of law or fact.[61] And
finally, it has been recognized that public policy as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international
practice which may lead to a denial of recognition.[62]
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction.[63] This defense
allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does
in cases wherein the judgment is against a person.[64] The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to
a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing
court, applied the wrong law to the case.[65] The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it
can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure
for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part
of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. [66] The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[67]
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the
Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law. [68] As earlier demonstrated,
there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying
degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a
disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether
statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and
procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, [69] but they all prescind from the

10
premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle,
to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely
from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court,[70] and
could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the
land, including generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments.[71]
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws,
and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the
pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum. [72] The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity of
the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the
enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate
may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia where real
property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined
by the standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement
of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance,
given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of
classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not
involving property. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that [F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of
Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our
preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality
of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds [73] or unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the
determination of the case.[74]
One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of
a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render
verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may
legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid
down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision
on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-
1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Mijares, et al vs Ranada et. Al GR No. 139325, April 12, 2005

Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final
Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary
damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php
410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate
of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating
that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum
of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which
Petitioners had not paid.

Issue:
Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

Ruling:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. The Regional Trial Court
of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
However, the Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners
state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang
Pambansa 129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action
or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16
of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time,
it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation
of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.

11
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents..
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be
heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the
case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs.
Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2While the present case is an action for
torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership
and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom
in the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the
pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach
such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a
contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's
fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million
as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was
considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of
P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is
obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the
complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint
in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in
the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages
should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original
complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly
that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in
the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that
was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by
the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought
in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of
omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner
through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was
only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended
complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

12
Manchester Development vs Court of Appeals
149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees Claimed Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of
pleadings

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter
to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction
thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their
action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said
amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in
consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations
and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes
an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that
from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

13
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law
Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not
been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for
the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel
Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including
E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary
and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-
assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be
re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was
then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess
the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment
of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court
instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said
certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00
as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim
amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the
docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the
basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-
41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid
the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned
and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil
case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in
Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the
case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the
docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
14
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office
of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This
Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the
filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced
no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right
to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the
proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this
Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However,
we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a
separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and
void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly
rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount
of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff
alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00
was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the
exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended
complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must
be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient.
In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the
action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld
the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which
was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the
issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of
the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the
tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as
its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee
computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-
plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12,
1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this
Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and
void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together
with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium
and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986,
private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in
damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the
decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the
pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92.
Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the
amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it
is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

15
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester,
due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance
by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the
additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, and costs
of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount
to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of
damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended
complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the
complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was
reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the
decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the
pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92.
Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the
amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid?

Ruling:
Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect.
The Court dismissed petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees.

Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid
the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the
intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees

16
 [G.R. No. 141947. July 5, 2001]
ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M. PASTRANA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS.,
INC., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to annul the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54853 dated 28 September 1999 which summarily
dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari for failing to execute properly the required verification and certification against forum shopping and
to specify the material dates from which the timeliness of the petition may be determined.
Private respondent Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PEPSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of
beverages. At the time of their termination, petitioners Ismael V. Santos and Alfredo G. Arce were employed by PEPSI as Complimentary Distribution
Specialists (CDS) with a monthly salary of P7,500.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, while Hilario M. Pastrana was employed as Route Manager with a
monthly salary of P7,500.00.
In a letter dated 26 December 1994,[2] PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations it would
restructure and streamline certain physical and sales distribution systems to improve its warehousing efficiency. Certain positions, including that of
petitioners, were declared redundant and abolished. Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.
On 15 January 1995 petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their separation pays and executed the corresponding releases and
quitclaims. However, before the end of the year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new positions called Account Development Managers (ADM) with
substantially the same duties and responsibilities as the CDS. Aggrieved, on 15 April 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that the creation of the new positions belied PEPSIs claim of redundancy. They further alleged that the
qualifications for both the CDS and ADM positions were similar and that the employees hired for the latter positions were even less qualified than they
were.[3] Likewise taking note of possible procedural errors, they claimed that while they were notified of their termination, PEPSI had not shown that the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also notified as mandated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code which states -
Art. 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof x x x x (italics supplied).
PEPSI, on the other hand, maintained that termination due to redundancy was a management prerogative the wisdom and soundness of which were
beyond the discretionary review of the courts. Thus, it had the right to manage its affairs and decide which position was no longer needed for its
operations. It further maintained that the redundancy program was made in good faith and was not implemented to purposely force certain employees out
of their employment. It also claimed that a close perusal of the job descriptions of both the CDS and ADM positions would show that the two (2) were very
different in terms of the nature of their functions, areas of concerns, responsibilities and qualifications. [4]
On 18 June 1997, Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Furthermore, he ruled that the one (1)-month written
notice prior to termination required by Art. 283 was complied with.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. However, in its Decision[5] dated 5 March 1999
it found that the Establishment Termination Reportwas submitted to the DOLE only on 5 April 1995 or two (2) months after the termination had already
taken place[6] and thus effectively reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the required one (1)-month notice prior to termination was complied
with. Nonetheless, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, citing International Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC,[7] which held -
x x x x if an employee consented to his retrenchment or voluntarily applied for retrenchment with the employer due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, closure or cessation of operation or to prevent financial losses to the business of the employer, the required previous notice to the
DOLE is not necessary as the employee thereby acknowledged the existence of a valid cause for termination of his employment x x x x (italics supplied).
On 10 September 1999, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. [8] The Court of Appeals in the
assailed Resolution dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with a number of requirements mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1,
Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent appellate court found that the verification and certification against forum shopping were
executed merely by petitioners counsel and not by petitioners. The petition also failed to specify the dates of receipt of the NLRC Decision as well as the
filing of the motion for reconsideration.[9] Under the aforecited Rules, failure of petitioners to comply with any of the requirements was sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioners now present the sole issue of whether there was failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules in filing their petition for certiorari.
We find no manifest error on the part of the Court of Appeals; hence, we affirm.
It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being
presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and belief.[10] However, the same does not apply as regards the requirement of a certification
against forum shopping. Section 3, Rule 46, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly requires -
x x x x The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom x x x x
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is in
the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.[11]
Petitioners argue that while it may be true that they are in the best position to know whether they have commenced an action or not, this information
may be divulged to their attorney and there is nothing anomalous or bizarre about this disclosure. [12] They further maintain that they executed a Special
Power of Attorney specifically to authorize their counsel to execute the certification on their behalf.
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia[13] that a certification against forum shopping may be signed by an authorized lawyer who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA Savings Bank must be distinguished from the case at bar
because in the former, the complainant was a corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the general rule that
the certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g., signing and
delivery of documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically authorized individuals. In the instant case, petitioners are
all natural persons and there is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the certification. [14] It is noteworthy that PEPSI
in its Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves who executed the verification and certification requirements in all their previous pleadings. Counsel
for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is executed to promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative to the
handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position since it is clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute
petitioners in signing the certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be made the basis
for a circumvention of the Rules.
Neither are we convinced that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. Petitioners argue that there are very
important issues such as their livelihood and the well being and future of their families. [15] Every petition filed with a judicial tribunal is sure to affect, even
tangentially, either the well being and future of petitioner himself or that of his family. Unfortunately, this does not warrant disregarding the Rules.

17
 Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are
three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order
or Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Petitioners failed to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing of
their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners counter by stating that in the body of the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals, it was explicitly
stated that the NLRC Resolution dated 11 May 1999 was received by petitioners through counsel on 30 July 1999. They even reiterate this contention in
their Reply.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a
petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed.[16] Therefore, that the
petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was
not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material
dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are
not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [17]
But even if these procedural lapses are dispensed with, the instant petition, on the merits, must still fail. Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC for holding that the CDS and ADM positions were dissimilar, and for concluding that the redundancy program of PEPSI was
undertaken in good faith and that the case of International Hardware v. NLRC[18] was applicable.
This Court is not a trier of facts. The question of whether the duties and responsibilities of the CDS and ADM positions are similar is a question
properly belonging to both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In fact, the NLRC merely affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on this point and further
elaborated on the differences between the two (2). Thus it ruled -
x x x x We cannot subscribe to the complainants assertions that the positions have similar job descriptions. First, CDS report to a CD Manager, whereas
the ADMs do not report to the CD Manager, leading us to believe that the organizational set-up of the sales department has been changed.
Second, CDS are field personnel who drive assigned vehicles and deliver stocks to dealers who, under the job description are those who sell and deliver
the same stocks to smaller retail outlets in their assigned areas. The ADMs are not required to drive trucks and they do not physically deliver stocks to
wholesale dealers. Instead, they help dealers market the stocks through retail. This conclusion is borne out by the fact (that) ADMs are tasked to ensure
that the stocks are displayed in the best possible locations in the dealers store, that they have more shelf space and that dealers participate in
promotional activities in order to sell more products.
It is clear to us that while CDS are required to physically deliver, sell and collect payments for softdrinks, they do so not primarily to retail outlets but to
wholesale dealers who have retail customers of their own. They are not required to assist the dealers they deliver to in selling the softdrinks more
effectively whereas ADMs sell softdrinks to big retail outlets (groceries and malls who have shelves and display cases and who require coolers and other
paraphernalia). They do not only sell but they have to effectively market the products or put them in the best and most advantageous light so that the
dealers who sell the softdrinks retails can sell more softdrinks. The main thrust of the ADMs job is to ensure that the softdrinks products ordered from
them are marketed in a certain manner (Pepsi-Way standards) in keeping with the promotional thrust of the company.
Factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be
disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, [19] defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[20] In this case, there is no doubt that the findings of the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence. The job
descriptions submitted by PEPSI are replete with information and is an adequate basis to compare and contrast the two (2) positions.
Therefore, the two (2) positions being different, it follows that the redundancy program instituted by PEPSI was undertaken in good faith. Petitioners
have not established that the title Account Development Manager was created in order to maliciously terminate their employment. Nor have they shown
that PEPSI had any ill motive against them. It is therefore apparent that the restructuring and streamlining of PEPSIs distribution and sales systems were
an honest effort to make the company more efficient.
Redundancy exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the
enterprise.[21] A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business,
dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of a service previously undertaken by the business.[22]
Based on the fact that PEPSIs Metro Manila Sales Operations were not meeting its sales targets,[23] and on the fact that new positions were
subsequently created, it is evident that PEPSI wanted to restructure its organization in order to include more complex positions that would either absorb
or render completely unnecessary the positions it had previously declared redundant. The soundness of this business judgment of PEPSI has been
assailed by petitioners, arguing that it is more logical to implement new procedures in physical distribution, sales quotas, and other policies aimed at
improving the performance of the division rather than to reduce the number of employees and create new positions. [24]
This argument cannot be accepted. While it is true that management may not, under the guise of invoking its prerogative, ease out employees and
defeat their constitutional right to security of tenure, the same must be respected if clearly undertaken in good faith and if no arbitrary or malicious action
is shown.
Similarly, in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC[25] petitioner company effected some changes in its organization by abolishing the position of Sales
Manager and simply adding the duties previously discharged by it to the duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales Manager used to report. In that
case, we held that the characterization of private respondents services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an
exercise of business judgment on the part of petitioner company. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to
discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter or of the NLRC so long as no violation of law or arbitrary and malicious action is indicated.
In the case at bar, no such violation or arbitrary action was established by petitioners. The subject matter being well beyond the discretionary review
allowed by law, it behooves this Court to steer clear of the realm properly belonging to the business experts.
We agree with the NLRC in its application of International Hardware v. NLRC that the mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination given to
the worker and the DOLE is rendered unnecessary by the consent of the worker himself. Petitioners assail the voluntariness of their consent by stating
that had they known of PEPSIs bad faith they would not have agreed to their termination, nor would they have signed the corresponding releases and
quitclaims.[26] Having established private respondents good faith in undertaking the assailed redundancy program, there is no need to rule on this
contention.
Finally, in a last ditch effort to plead their case, petitioners would want us to believe that their termination was illegal since PEPSI did not employ fair
and reasonable criteria in implementing its redundancy program. This issue was not raised before the Labor Arbiter nor with the NLRC. As it would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow a party to raise a question which has not been passed upon by both administrative tribunals,[27] it
is now too late to entertain it.
WHEREFORE, in the absence of any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated 28
September 1999 which summarily dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule
65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

18
 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. No. 177456
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

DOMINGO R. DANDO, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), assailing
(1) the Decision[1] dated 20 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82881, which granted the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court filed by herein respondent Domingo R. Dando (Dando); and (2) the Resolution dated 4 April 2007 of the appellate court in the same
case denying the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, annulled the Orders dated 13 January 2004 and 3
March 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial conference; and reinstated the
earlier Order dated 10 October 2003 of the RTC dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281 for failure of BPI to file its pre-trial brief.
The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages [2] filed on 13 March 2003 by BPI against Dando before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-281. The Complaint alleged that on or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of P750,000.00
from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement.[3] The parties agreed that Dando would pay FEBTC
the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at the end of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the periods reckoned from the time of availment
of the loan. Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and penalties thereon. Despite repeated demands,
Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.[4] In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving entity,[5] thus, absorbing
the rights and obligations of the latter.[6]
After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim,[7] BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. Acting on the said Motion, the RTC,
through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order[8] on 11 June 2003 setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial
conference on 18 August 2003. Judge Pimentel subsequently issued, on 16 June 2003, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference,[9] which directed the parties to
submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief[10] to the RTC on 11
August 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial Brief[11] with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on 18 August 2003, the very
day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.
When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003 for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 03-281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, through an Order issued on the same day, required Dando to
file a written motion within five days from the receipt of the said Order and BPI to file its comment and/or opposition thereto. The RTC order reads:

On calling this case for the pre-trial conference, counsel for both parties appeared and even [respondent] Domingo R.
Dando appeared. The attention of the Court was called by the counsel for the [respondent Dando] that the counsel for the [petitioner
BPI] only filed her Pre-Trial Brief today at 9:00 oclock in the morning instead of at least three days before the pre-trial conference, as
required by the Rules. This prompted the counsel for the [respondent Dando] to ask for the dismissal of the case for violation of Rule
18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Counsel for the [respondent Dando] even claims that he has not received a copy of the pre-trial brief, but then according to
the counsel for the [petitioner BPI], a copy thereof was sent by registered mail to counsel for the [respondent Dando] since (sic) August
18, 2003, and considering the nature of the motion of the counsel for the [respondent Dando], it is best that the [respondent Dandos]
counsel reduce the same in writing within five days from today, furnishing personally a copy thereof the counsel for the [petitioner BPI]
who is hereby given five days from receipt thereof within which to file her comment and/or opposition thereto, thereafter, the incident
shall be considered submitted for Resolution.

Meanwhile, no pre-trial conference shall be held until the motion is resolved. [12]

On 25 August 2003, Dando filed with the RTC his written Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for violation of the mandatory rule on filing of pre-trial
briefs.[13] BPI filed an Opposition[14] to Dandos Motion, arguing that its filing with the RTC of the Pre-Trial Brief on 18 August 2003 should be considered as
compliance with the rules of procedure given that the Pre-Trial Conference did not proceed as scheduled on said date.

In an Order dated 10 October 2003, the RTC granted Dandos Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for the following reasons:

In resolving this motion, this Court should be guided by the mandatory character of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court
which: strictly mandates the parties to the case to file with the Court and serve on the adverse party and SHALL ensure their receipt
thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon the parties the
mandatory duty to seasonably file and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs. The aforesaid rule does not merely
sanction the non-filing thereof of the parties respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon the parties the mandatory duty to
seasonably file and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs. Pre-trial briefs are meant to serve as a device to clarify
and narrow down the basic issues between the parties so that at pre-trial, the proper parties may be able to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and the facts before civil trials and this prevent said trials from being carried in the dark. [15]

Consequently, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the [herein respondent Dandos] motion to dismiss to be impressed with merit the same
is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.[16]

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC, praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Expectedly, Dando
filed his Comment/Opposition thereto.[18]

19
On 13 January 2004, the RTC, now presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan (Judge Untalan), issued an Order resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of
BPI as follows:

The Court finds merit in plaintiffs motion.

Considering that although reglementary periods under the Rules of Court are to be strictly observed to prevent needless delays,
jurisprudence nevertheless allows the relaxation of procedural rules. Since technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants [Sy vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000; Adamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990);
Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA, 225 SCRA 249, 258 (1993)], in the interest of substantial justice, and without giving premium to
technicalities, the motion for reconsideration is hereby granted.[19]

At the end of its 13 January 2004 Order, the RTC disposed:

Wherefore, the Order dated October 10, 2003 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.

Let this case be set for pre-trial anew on February 13, 2004 at 8:30 in the morning. Notify both parties and their respective counsel of
this setting.[20]

It was then Dandos turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration,[21] which the RTC addressed in its Order dated 3 March 2004, thus:

Finding no new issue raised in defendants motion, as to warrant a reconsideration of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2004, the
instant motion is hereby denied.

The Pre-trial set on March 19, 2004 at 8:30 in the morning shall proceed accordingly.[22]

Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
82881.[23] Dando averred that RTC Judge Untalan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its Order
dated 13 January 2004. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 20 November 2006 where it held that:

In this case, the BPI stated in its motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action that the delay in the filing of the pre-trial
brief was solely due to the heavy load of paper work of its counsel, not to mention the daily hearings the latter had to attend. We find
this excuse too flimsy to justify the reversal of an earlier order dismissing the action. The BPI did not come forward with the most
convincing reason for the relaxation of the rules, or has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by
the rules. We therefore find the public respondent to have gravely abused his discretion in considering and granting the BPIs motion
for reconsideration. The BPI failed to even try to come up with a good reason for its failure to file its pre-trial brief on time in order to
relax the application of the procedural rules. Heavy work load and court hearings cannot even be considered an excuse. The trial
court cannot just set aside the rules of procedure and simply rely on the liberal interpretation of the rules. Clearly, public respondent
ignored the mandatory wordings of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18. Under Section 6, the plaintiffs failure to file the pre-trial brief at least
three days before the pre-trial shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Under Section 5 of the same Rule, failure
by plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action. There is grave abuse of discretion when a lower court
or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. [24]

The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 13, 2004 and March 3, 2004, of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 03-281 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The October
10, 2003 Order is hereby REINSTATED.[25]

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 4 April 2007,[26] denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition where BPI raises the following issues:

A. IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY
APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
B. IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECT WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER
(ANNEX H TO THE PETITION) DISMISSING THE CASE, DESPITE THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION OR
POWER TO RELAX COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.[27]

Relevant herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial:

Rule 18
PRE-TRIAL
SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their
receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among
others:
xxxx
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphases ours.)

It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as shall, must, or ought are employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which
the courts ought to enforce.[28]

20
 The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end
to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard. [29]
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility
in their application.[30] In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to
argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice
would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. [31]
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to
procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [33]
Herein, BPI instituted Civil Case No. 03-281 before the RTC to recover the amount it had lent to Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon,
clearly, a matter of property.The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of
procedure,[34] more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes
only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI.[35] To dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281 with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had
lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.
The counsel of BPI invokes heavy pressures of work to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to
Dando at least three days prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.[36] True, in Olave v. Mistas,[37] we did not find heavy pressures of work as sufficient
justification for the failure of therein respondents counsel to timely move for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in Olave,[38] the failure of BPI to file
its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was
the first and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the bank in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and
reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case No. 03-281 for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt
of Dandos Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissingCivil
Case No. 03-281.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh
out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of Civil
Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law. [39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 November 2006 and Resolution dated 4 April 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82881 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 13 January 2004 and 3 March 2004 in Civil Case No. 03-
281, insofar as they set aside the prior Order dated 10 October 2003 of the same trial court dismissing the Complaint of petitioner Bank of the Philippine
Islands for failure of the latter to timely file its Pre-Trial Brief, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149, is DIRECTED to
continue with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281 with utmost dispatch, until its termination. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

21
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 (Case Digest)
FACTS:
The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages by BPI against Dando before the RTC.Dando availed of a loan
in the amount of P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), BPI's predecessor in interest. Dando defaulted in the payment and
despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.
After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. The RTC issued a Notice of Pre-
Trial Conference, which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial.
Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on time while BPI filed its Pre-trial Breif with the RTC and furnished Dando with a copy thereof on the very
day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. Dando then moved for the dismmissal of the case on the ground of late filing of the Pre-trial Brief. RTC granted
Dandos Motion to Dismiss.
BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC which reconsidered and set aside it former order. Dando filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied.
Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. CA held that BPI's excuse is too flimsy to justify the reversal
of an earlier order dismissing the action. The BPI did not come forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation of the rules, or has not shown
any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules. The RTC decision was ANNULLED and SET ASIDE by the CA.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE.

RULING:
It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as shall, must, or ought are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded
as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts
ought to enforce.

x x x However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily
and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard. x x x This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all
parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In
that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural
rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

x x x The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since
Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his
outstanding liability to BPI. To dismiss the case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to Dando would be to
unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.

x x x BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the
Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set the
case for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dandos Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10
October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing the case.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their
claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of the case, as he is not stripped of any
affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

22