Restituto Ynot vs.

IAC (Intermediate Appellate Court)

FACTS: Petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O.
626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of the executive order
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the IAC but it also upheld the RTC ruling.

ISSUE: Is E.O. 626-A constitutional?

HELD: The respondent contends that it I a valid exercise of police power to justify E.O.
626-A prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The SC said that
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing. The SC do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province that in another.
The SC found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he filed a
complaint for recovery and given a superseded bond. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Borjal vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal
and Soliver for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against
Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he
was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for
damages which was affirmed by the court of appeals. A petition for review was filed before the
SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the
published articles.

ISSUE: WON there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioner for libel.
HELD: The requisites to maintain a libel suit have not been complied with in the case at
bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslao who revealed he was the
organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

Manila Electric Company vs. Province of Laguna

FACTS: MERALCO was granted a franchise by several municipal councils and the National
Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in Laguna. Upon
enactment of the Local Government Code, the provincial government issued ordinance imposing
franchise tax. MERALCO paid under protest and later claims for refund because of duplicity with
Sec. 1 of PD No. 551. This was denied by the governor relying on more recent law (LGC).
MERALCO filed with RTC a complaint for refund, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the imposition of franchise tax is violative of the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution and of PD No. 551.

HELD: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause for the same must yield to
the inherent power of the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and constitutional.
The Local Government Code of 1991 explicitly authorizes provincial governments,
not withstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, to impose a tax on
business enjoying a franchise.

LIBAN vs GORDON

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a supreme court decision
which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify
him from being a Senator, and that the character creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC
is a private corporation and the congress is preluded by the Constitution to create such. The court
then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent
takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute
creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality
was only touched upon the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be
touched upon if it is not lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the court to have ruled on the constitutionality of
the PNRC statute.

RULING: Petition has merit. It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the court
should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis
mota of the case.
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue
of standing. As such, the court should not have declared certain provisions of such as
unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private
corporations that the constitution wants to prevent congress from creating.

CSC vs. SALAS

FACTS: On October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman
as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on December
3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence
Division of PAGCOR. The summary of intelligence information claimed that respondent was
allegedly engaged in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two
customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions by
respondent. The two polygraph tests taken by the latter also yielded corroborative and unfavorable
results.
On December 17, 1992, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent was
not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision of the MSPB
On September 14, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with
the finding that herein respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be
dismissed on the ground of lost of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the
proximity rule enunciated in the case of Guio, et.al. vs CSC, et.al.

ISSUE: Whether Section 16 of the PD No. 1869 has been superseded and repealed by
Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 constitution.

HELD: The CA opined that the provisions of Section 16 of PD No. 1869 may no longer be
applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by
Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point,
we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that Sec. 16 of PD
1869 in so far as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and
Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and EO No. 292.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Sec. 16 which
provides that all employees of the Casino and related services shall be classified as confidential
appointees. While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Sec. 2,
Rule XX of the IRR of the CSA of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical as identified therein has subsequently been codified and
incorporated in Sec. 12(a), Book V of EO No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This latter
enactment only sense to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Sec. 16 of PD NO.
1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
Thus, the aforecited case was decided on the uncontested assumption that the
private respondent therein was a confidential employee, for the simple reason that the propriety of
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was never controverted nor raised as an issue therein.
That decree was mentioned merely in connection with its provision that PAGCOR
employees hold confidential positions. Evidently, therefore, it cannot be considered as controlling
in the case at bar. Even the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid in cases where its validity
was not challenged does not preclude the court from later passing upon its constitutionality in an
appropriate cause where that person is squarely and properly raised. Such circumstances merely
reinforce the presumption of constitutionality of the law.

ANGELES vs. GAITE

FACTS: Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take
care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her
as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter
would seek petitioners financial support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization
expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the Grand niece, Michael Vistan,
failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no
more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different
provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The
police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for the counts of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI
of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of violations of Sec. 1
(e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of
Michael Vistan and Maria Mercedes.
The investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the
case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss
the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USec. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner
then filed a petition for review with Sec. Perez and was also denied.
 She tried appealing to the office of the President but was dismissed by such on the
ground of Memo Circular No. 88 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua or death. Petitioner want to the CA which sustained the dismissal. Petitioner
contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of control
of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered
power.

ISSUE: WON Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the

power of the President?

RULING: No, it does not diminish the power of the President. The Presidents act of
delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well
within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The CA cannot be deemed to have
committed any error in upholding the office of the Presidents reliance on the Memorandum
Circulars as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.

PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec. 35 RA No. 7354 which draw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and
its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7354 on the grounds that: 1.) its
title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; 2.) it did not pass the
required readings in both houses of congress and printed copies of the bill in its form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and 3.) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING: No, SC held that Sec. 35 RA No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

Article VI, Sec. 26 (1), of the Constitution providing that Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The title of
the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislative
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirements. We are
convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of RA No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing
Check Law). They moved seasonably to squash the information on the ground that the acts charged
did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-

imprisonment due to debt.
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract.
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause.

RULING: The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must
bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument
which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money, it forms part of
the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the
laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the checks, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the checks, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be
no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification
of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the clasiisfication
is not unreasonable arbitrary.