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FRANCISCO vs. NLRC G.R.

111501 Case Digest Skillpower and (5) Skillpower is a highly-capitalized business


[GR. No.170087 Aug. 31, 2006] G.R. No. 111501, March 5, 1996 venture.
Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp., Jennifer Bernardo and Atty. Victorino Luis,
Facts: petitioners Issue: (1) Whether Gerado is an employee of Fuji or of Skillpower.
Angelina Francisco has held several positions in Kasei Corporation, vs NLRC
to wit: (1) Accountant and Ponente: Mendoza Ruling: Contentions are without merit. Gerado is en employee of
Corporate Secretary; (2) Liaison Officer to the City of Makati; (3) Fuji.
Corporate Secretary; and (4)Acting Manager. Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC (1) Gerado was recruited by Skillpower to be assigned at Fuji. With
She performed the work of Acting Manager for five years but later finding Fuji guilty of illegally dismissing privated respondent Pedro a contract between Gerado and Fuji as basis.
she was replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Then, Kasei Gerado and ordering him reinstated. NLRC reversed the decision of (2) The job of Gerado may not generate income directly to Fuji but
Corporation reduced her salary and was not paid her mid-year Labor Arbiter finding Gerado to be an employee of another firm it is necessary in their products and promotion of the company's
bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. She (Skillpower). public image.
made repeated follow-ups with the company cashier but she was (3) The letters of the legal and industrial relations officer of Fuji and
advised that the company was not earning well. Ultimately, she did May 1977, Fuji entered into an agreement under Skillpower to the union president played the dismissal of the employee, the
not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal operate copier machines of Fuji in its sales offices where Gerado order of dismissal was issued as a mere obedience to the decision
before the labor arbiter. was assigned as key operator. of petitioner.
(4) The service being rendered by privated respondent was not a
Issue: February 1983, Gerado went on leave and his place was taken by a specific or special skill that Skillpower was in the business of
Was Francisco an employee of Kasei Corporation? substitute. He returned March and discovered that there was a providing. Skillpower is classified under Article 106 of the Labor
apoilage of over 600 copies. He tried to talk to the service Code; where there is "labor only" where the person supplying
Held: techinician of Fuji to stop the meter of the machine but was workers to an employer does not have suubstantial capital or
In certain cases where the control test is not sufficient to give a refused. Fuji then knew about the incident and reported to investment in the forms of tools, equipment, etc. and workers
complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing to Skillpower. Skillpower wrote a letter to Gerado asking for recruited and placed are performing activities directly related to
the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have explaination and suspended him from work. Gerado then filed for the principal employer. Skillpower merely supplied workers to Fuji.
been held by the worker. There are instances when, aside from the illegal dismissal. (5) There is an agreement between Fuji and Skillpower that
employers power to control the employee with respect to the Skillpower has no control over the workers they supplied with Fuji.
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, Labor Arbiter found that Gerado applied for work to Skillpower and
economic realities of the employment relations help provide a was made to sign a contract. Although he receives his salaries from
comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the individual, Fuji, Skillpower exercises control and supervision over his wrk.
whether as employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or Labor arbiter then held the decision that Gerado was an employee
some other capacity. of Skillpower.

The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test NLRC found Gerado to be an employee of Fuji and was illegally
involving: dismissed. NLRC found that Skillpower acted on behalf of Fuji in
(1) the putative employerspower to control the employee with supervising his work, and that FUji paid his salaries and Skillpower
respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be was just a paymaster-agent.
accomplished; and
(2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship. Here, Fuji petitions that Skillpower is an independent contractor
This two-tiered test would provide us with a framework of analysis, and Gerado is its employee: (1) Gerado was recruited by
which would take into consideration the totality of circumstances Skillpower, (2) work done by Gerado was not necessary to the
surrounding the true nature of the relationship conduct of business of Fuji, (3) Gerado's salaries and benefits were
paid directly by Skillpower, (4) Gerado worked under the control of
G.R. No. 83402 Case Digest 29 April 2005 / Labor Standards that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money
G.R. No. 83402, October 6, 1997 Employee-employer Relationship in a Publication Bond judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employers
Algon Engineering Const. Corp. and Alex Gonzales, petitioners Requirement When Employer Appeals in a Labor Case appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an
vs NLRC and Jose Espinosa, respondents Orozco v CA appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their
Ponente: Hermosisima employees just and lawful claims.
FACTS:
Facts: Orozco was hired as a writer by the Philippine Daily Inquirer in But in this case, this principle is relaxed by the Supreme Court
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of NLRC 1990. She was the columnist of Feminist Reflections under the considering the fact that the Labor Arbiter, in ruling that the
dismissing their appeal and denying their motion for Lifestyle section of the publication. She writes on a weekly basis Orozco is entitled to backwages, did not provide any computation.
reconsideration and affriming the Labor arbiter's findings that and on a per article basis (P250-300/article). The case is then remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the
Espinosa is an employee of Algon. computation. This necessarily pended the resolution of the other
In 1991, Magsanoc as the editor-in-chief sought to improve the issue of whether or not there exists an employer-employee
Algon as standard operating procedure of their construction Lifestyle section of the paper. She said there were too many relationship between PDI and Orozco.
business entered into a lease of contract with Espinosa for the Lifestyle writers and that it was time to reduce the number of
storage and parking of their heavy equipment in exchange for a writers. Orozcos column was eventually dropped.
storage or parking fee.
Orozco filed for a case for Illegal Dismissal against PDI and
Espinosa claims that he was hired by Algon to be a watchman with Magsanoc. Orozco won in the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that
the duty of guarding the heavy equipment in other house spaces there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI and
his area from 6pm to 6am. This was affirmed by Labor arbiter, Orozco hence Orozco is entitled to receive backwages,
finding that Algon pays Espinosa P20 on a daily basis as watchman. reinstatement, and 13th month pay.

Algon then appealed to the NLRC, arguing that Algon did not hire PDI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The
Espinosa, the relationship is merely that of leased storage or NLRC denied the appeal because of the failure of PDI to post a
parking space. But NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter on the same surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. The
basis. Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC.

Ruling: Petition with no merit. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship between PDI and Orozco. Whether or not PDIs appeal
(1) Cash vouchers issued by Algon as payment to Espinosa illustrate will prosper.
that Espinosa was paid not only for the storage and parking in his
premisess but also with the other storage of Algon. (2) Algon's HELD: Under Article 223 of the Labor Code:
memorandum issued to Espinosa citing him for the loss of 4 ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
batteries is sufficient to prove the existence of en employer- Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
employee relationship as well. The two evidence fulfilling the by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
elements of employer-employee relationship: (1) selection and such decisions, awards, or orders.
engagement of the employee; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of
dismissal; and (4) employer's own power to control employee's In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
conduct. the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to
perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers
GR NO. 165881 APRIL 19, 2006 OSCAR VILLAMARIA, JR. Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma any third-party independent contractor. It also wielded the power
(Petitioner) Vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JERRY V. BUSTAMANTE, of dismissal over petitioners; in fact, its exercise of this power was
(respondents) Facts: the progenitor of the Second Case. Clearly, the workers are not
This case consists of 2 consolidated cases. independent contractors.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of the jeepneys which the The first case is an appeal from the decision of Laguesma, as It does not matter that the workers also work for other companies
private respondent is the one who is driving in a boundary basis. Undersecretary of Labor, in the Petition for Certification Election because this is just their way of coping with their daily expenses.
Villamaria and Bustamante entered into a contract were the filed by petitioner-union.
petitioner agreed to sell the jeepney entitled Kasunduan ng No particular form of proof is required to prove the existence of an
Bilihan ng Sasakayan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary-Hulog were The Caurdenataan Piece Workers Union is composed of the employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant
Bustamante would remit to Villamaria P550.00 a day for a period of employees of Corfarm Grains, Inc. They work as cargadores in evidence may show the relationship. If only documentary evidence
four years. Both parties agreed in such terms and stipulations of the said company and were paid on a piece rate basis. would be required to demonstrate that relationship, no scheming
the contract.When the private respondent failed to pay the employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice.
boundary-hulog, Villarama took back the jeepney driven by The said union was organized when some of their benefits were
Bustamante and barred the latter from driving the vehicle. Due to not given to them. Thus, they filed their petition for certification
the action of petitioner, Bustamante files a complaint before the election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition but this decision
court. was reversed, on appeal, by Laguesma saying that there was no Doctrine:
employer-employee relationship existing. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relation, this
ISSUE: Court has consistently applied the four-fold test which has the
Whether employer-employee relations exists. The second case involves a complaint for illegal dismissal against following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of
Corfarm. This arose because those workers who joined the said wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control -- the
HELD: union were replaced with non-members. last being the most important element.
The juridical relationship of employer-employee between
petitioner and respondent was not negated by the foregoing As to this case, the labor arbiter first ruled in favor of the workers
stipulation in the Kasunduan, considering that petitioner retained but subsequently, the NLRC reversed such ruling.
control of respondents conduct as driver of the vehicle. Even if the
petitioner was allowed to let some other person drive the unit, it Issue:
was not shown that he did so; that the existence of an employment Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship
relation is not dependent on how the worker is paid but on the between the cargadores and Corfarm.
presence or absence of control over the means and method of the
work; that the amount earned in excess of the boundary hulog is Held:
equivalent to wages; and that the fact that the power of dismissal YES. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relation,
was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did not mean Villamaria this Court has consistently applied the four-fold test.
never exercised such power, or could not exercise such power.
Hence, the employer- employee relationship exists. It is undeniable that petitioners members worked as cargadores
for private respondent. They loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of
palay from the warehouses to the cargo trucks and from the cargo
trucks to the buyers. This work is directly related, necessary and
vital to the operations of Corfarm. Moreover, Corfarm did not
even allege, much less prove, that petitioners members have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, [and] work premises, among others. Furthermore,
said respondent did not contradict petitioners allegation that it
paid wages directly to these workers without the intervention of
Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor G.R. No. 119205, April 15, 1998
G.R. No. L-32245 May 25, 1979 Ruling: Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. petitioner,
vs NLRC and Sime Darby Salaried Employees Assoc., respondents
DY KEH BENG, petitioner, The Hearing Examiner prepared a report which was subsequently Ponente: Bellosillo
vs. adopted in toto by the Court of Industrial Relations. An employee-
INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, employer relationship was found to have existed between Dy Keh Issue: Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its
ET AL., respondents. Beng and complainants Tudla and Solano, although Solano was employees and discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of
admitted to have worked on piece basis. According to the Hearing unfair labor practice?
Facts: Examiner, the evidence for the complainant Union tended to show
that Solano and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from Facts:
A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955, respectively, and that except in the Sime Darby is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires,
proprietor of a basket factory, for discriminatory acts within the event of illness, their work with the establishment was continuous tubes and other rubber products. Private respondent is an
meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic Act although their services were compensated on piece basis. Evidence association of the monthly salaried employees of the Sime Darby
No. 875, by dismissing on September 28 and 29, 1960, respectively, likewise showed that at times the establishment had eight (8) factory workers in Marikina. Prior to the controversy, all employees
Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for their union activities. workers and never less than five (5); including the complainants, of Sime Darby worked from 7:45am to 3:45pm with a 30-minute
and that complainants used to receive P5.00 a day. Sometimes paid "on call" lunch break.
After preliminary investigation was conducted, a case was filed in less.
the Court of Industrial Relations for in behalf of the International On August 14, 1992, the company issued a memorandum to all
Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines and two of its members, The award of backwages granted by the Court of Industrial factory employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in
Solano and Tudla In his answer, Dy Keh Beng contended that he did Relations is herein modified to an award of backwages for three Marikina Tire plant except those in the warehouse and Quality
not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the years without qualification and deduction at the respective rates of Assurance Dept., of a change in work schedules. (M-F, 7:45am-
latter came to the establishment only when there was work which compensation the employees concerned were receiving at the time 4:45pm and Sat 7:45am-11:45am) with cofee break of 10 minutes
he did on pakiaw basis, each piece of work being done under a of dismissal. The execution of this award is entrusted to the between 9:30am-10:30am and 2:30pm-3:30pm and lunch break
separate contract. Moreover, Dy Keh Beng countered with a National Labor Relations Commission. Costs against petitioner. between 12nn-1pm(M-F).
special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of the
labor union, Bienvenido Onayan. Because of this memorandum, the association filed a complaint in
behalf of its members a complaint with labor Arbiter for unfair
According to Dy Keh Beng, however, Solano was not his employee labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability. However, the
for the following reasons: labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
elimination of the 30 minute paid lunch break constituted a valid
(1) Solano never stayed long enought at Dy's establishment; exercise of management prerogative and that the new work
(2) Solano had to leave as soon as he was through with the schedule did not have the effect of dimishing the benefits for the
(3) order given him by Dy; work did not exceed 8 hours.
(4) When there were no orders needing his services there was
nothing for him to do; Labor arbiter added that it would be unjust if they continue to be
(5) When orders came to the shop that his regular workers could paid during their lunch break even if they are no longer on call or
not fill it was then that Dy went to his address in Caloocan and required to work during the break.
fetched him for these orders; and
(6) Solano's work with Dy's establishment was not continuous. The association appealed to the NLRC but NLRC has affirmed the
labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the appeal. However, in the
Issue: motion for reconsideration, NLRC having two new commissioners
has reversed the earlier decision. Stating that,the public
Whether there existed an employee-employer relation between respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the
petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondents Solano and Tudla. employees of the benefits of a time-honored company practice of
providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in Full Text SO ORDERED.
an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 EDUARDO B. PRANGAN, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
of the Labor Code, as amended. RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MASAGANA SECURITY Apparently not satisfied with the above-mentioned monetary
SERVICES CORPORATION, and/or VICTOR C. PADILLA, award, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations
Ruling: respondents. Commission (NLRC) contending that the Labor Arbiter erred in
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a DECISION concluding that he only worked for four hours and not twelve
manifestation and motion recommending that the petitioner be ROMERO, J.: hours a day. Evidently, the shorter work hours resulted in a lower
granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992 memorandum which monetary award by the Labor Arbiter. However, the NLRC
contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the Private respondent, a corporation engaged in providing security dismissed his appeal for failure to file the same within ten-day
union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the services to its client, hired petitioner on November 4, 1980 as one reglementary period.[4]
part of petitioner. of its security guards. Thereafter, he was assigned to the Cat
We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work House Bar and Restaurant with a monthly salary of P2,000.00 until Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, in
schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In its closure on August 31, 1993. the interest of justice, was favorably granted by the NLRC
the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the resulting in the reinstatement of his appeal. Nonetheless,
adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint[1] against private petitioners victory was short-lived as the NLRC eventually
improved production. respondent for underpayment of wages, non-payment of salary dismissed his appeal for lack of merit,[5] the dispositive portion of
from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, the decision reads:
The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving rest day, night shift differential, uniform allowance, service
discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year 1990 to WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and
change of work schedule, which management deems necessary to 1993. decision is affirmed in toto.
increase production, constitutes unfair labor practice. As shown by
the records, the change effected by management with regard to Private respondent, in its position paper,[2] rejected petitioners SO ORDERED.
working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in claim alleging it merely acted as an agent of the latter in securing
the same line of work whether or not they are members of private his employment at the Cat House Bar and Restaurant. Thus, the Petitioner is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on
respondent union. Hence, it cannot be said that the new scheme liability for the claims of the petitioner should be charged to Cat the part of respondent NLRC (a) declaring that he rendered only
adopted by management prejudices the right of private House Bar and its owner, being his direct employer. four hours and not twelve hours of work, and (b) affirming the
respondent to self-organization. monetary award.
In resolving the dispute in a decision dated May 31, 1995,[3] the
Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion Labor Arbiter brushed aside the private respondents contention The public respondent, through the Solicitor General, and the
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work that it was merely an agent of the petitioner and concluded: private respondent filed their respective comments on the petition
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, refuting the allegation of the petitioner. Specifically, they asserted
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents MASAGANA that the decision was supported by ample evidence showing that
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of SECURITY SERVICE CORPORATION and/or VICTOR C. PADILLA are petitioner indeed worked for only four hours and not twelve hours
workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Further, hereby ORDERED to pay within ten (10) days from receipt hereof a day.
management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the herein complainant EDUARDO B. PRANGAN, the total sum of Nine
service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Two Pesos & Sixteen Centavos A review of the alleged error raised by the instant petition leads us
So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the (P9,932.16) premium pay for holiday and rest days, night shift to conclude that the same is factual in nature which, as a rule, we
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, uniform do not pass upon. As a general rule, it is not for us to correct the
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under allowance, and unpaid salary. NLRCs evaluation of the evidence, as our task is confined to issues
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[6] Obviously, however,
exercise. Complainants other claims as well as respondents counter claim the same will not apply where the evidence require a reversal or
are hereby DISMISSSED either for the reason of prescription and/or modification.[7]
Petition granted. lack of merit.
As proof of petitioners actual hours of work, private respondent Private respondent hardly bothered to controvert petitioners tilted in favor of the employee. Since it is a time-honored rule that
submitted the daily time records allegedly signed by the petitioner assertion, much less bolster its own contention. As petitioners in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts
himself showing that he only worked four hours daily. employer, private respondent has unlimited access to all relevant reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
documents and records on the hours of work of the petitioner. agreements and writings should be resolved in the formers
In contrast, petitioner argues that these daily time records were Yet, even as it insists that petitioner only worked for four hours and favor.[17]
falsified for the simple reason that he was not required to submit not twelve, no employment contract, payroll, notice of assignment
one. He further stressed that, assuming such documents exist, its or posting, cash voucher or any other convincing evidence which WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
authenticity and due execution are questionable and of doubtful may attest to the actual hours of work of the petitioner were even hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the NLRC dated July
source. presented. Instead, what the private respondent offered as 31, 1996 is hereby VACATED. Whatever money claims due to the
evidence were only petitioners daily time record, which the latter petitioner shall be computed on the basis of a twelve-hour daily
We find merit in the petition. categorically denied ever accomplishing, much less signing. work schedule. For this purpose, the case is hereby REMANDED to
the Labor Arbiter for immediate recomputation of said claims in
To be sure, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, In said alleged daily time record, it showed that petitioner started accordance with the foregoing findings. No costs.
particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are work at 10:00 p.m. and would invariably leave his post at exactly
accorded with respect even finality if supported by substantial 2:00 a.m. Obviously, such unvarying recording of a daily time SO ORDERED.
evidence.[8] In this regard, we have defined substantial evidence record is improbable and contrary to human experience. It is
as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[9] Absent such exactly the same time, day in day out. The very uniformity and
quantum of evidence, the Court is not precluded from making its regularity of the entries are badges of untruthfulness and as such
own independent evaluation of facts.[10] indices of dubiety.[14]

In the instant case, there is no dispute that matters concerning an Another consideration which militates against private respondents
employees actual hours of work are within the ambit of claim is the fact that in the personnel data sheet of the
management prerogative. However, when an employer alleges petitioner,[15] duly signed by the formers operation manager, it
that his employee works less than the normal hours of shows on its face that the latters hours of work are from 7:00 p.m.
employment as provided for in the law,[11] he bears the burden of to 7:00 a.m. or twelve hours a day. Hence, private respondent is
proving his allegation with clear and satisfactory evidence. estopped from assailing the contents of its own documents.

In the instant petition, the NLRC, in declaring that petitioner only Further, the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and
worked for four hours, relied solely on the supposed daily time Restaurant[16] showed that petitioner worked from 7:00 p.m. to
records of the petitioner submitted by the private respondent.[12] 7:00 a.m. daily, documents which were never repudiated by the
We, however, are of the opinion that these documents cannot be private respondent.
considered substantial evidence as to conclude that petitioner only
worked for four hours. It is worth mentioning that petitioner, in his All told, private respondent has not adequately proved that
Sur-Rejoinder to Respondents Rejoinder,[13] unequivocably stated petitioners actual hours of work is only four hours. Its unexplained
that: silence contravening the personnel data sheet and the attendance
sheets of Cat House Bar and Restaurant presented by the
Complainant (petitioner herein) never made nor submitted any petitioner showing he worked for twelve hours, has assumed the
daily time record with respondent company considering the fact character of an admission. No reason was proffered for this silence
that he was assigned to a single post and that the daily time despite private respondent, being the employer, could have easily
records he allegedly submitted with respondent company are all done so.
falsified and his signature appearing therein forged.
As is well-settled, if doubts exist between the evidence presented
by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998 NSC appealed to NLRC, but NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter holding Thus, it is clear the minimum requirements of due process have
National Semiconductor Distribution, Ltd., petitioner, that the conclusions were sufficiently supported by the evidence. been fulfilled by petitioner.
vs NLRC and Edgar Philip Santos, respondents
Ponente: Bellosillo NSC now imputes grave abuse of discretion to NLRC in affirming Petition Dismissed.
the labor arbiter. Contending that the night shift differentials were
Issue: (1) Who has the burden of providing a claim for night shift never raised as an issue nor pusued by Santos; also denied that
differential pay, the worker who claims not to have been paid night Santos was not given due process because he was afforded ample
shift differentials, or the employer in custody of pertinent opportunity to be heard.
documents which would prove the fact of payment of the same?
(2) Were the requirements of due process substantially complied Issues: (1) Was Santos illegally dismissed? (2) Santos entitled for
with in dismissing the worker? the money claims?

Facts: Ruling:
NSC a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Phil. The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate his claim for night
manufactures and assembles electronic parts for export in mactan, shift differentials is not prejudicial to his cause. After all, the
lapu-lapu city. Santos was employed by NSC as a technicioan in its burden of proving payment rests on petitioner NSC. Santos'
special products group assigned to the graveyard shift from 10pm- allegation of non-payment of this benefit, to which he is by law
6am. entitled, is a negative allegation which need not be supported by
evidence unless it is an essential part of his cause of action. It must
On January 8, 1993 Santos did not report for work on his shift. He be noted that his main cause of action is his illegal dismissal, and
resumed his duties as night shift on January 9. However, at the end the claim for night shift differential is but an incident of the protest
of his shift, he made 2 entries in his DTR to make it appear that he against such dismissal. Thus, the burden of proving that payment
worked on both the 8th and 9th. of such benefit has been made rests upon the party who will suffer
if no evidence at all is presented by either party. By choosing not to
His supervisor Limisiaco, received the report that there was no fully and completely disclose information to prove that it had paid
technician in the graveyard shift on January 8. Limsiaco then all the night shift differentials due to private respondent, petitioner
checked the DTRs and found out that Santos did not report on 8th failed to discharge the burden of proof.
and have found in the DTR the otherwise.
On the issue of due process, we agree with petitioner that Santos
Informal investigation were conducted by management and have was accorded full opportunity to be heard before he was
required Santos to explain in writing why no disciplinary action dismissed.
should be taken against him for dishonesty, falsifying DTR and The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
violation of company rules. Santos explain that he was sick on the as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
8th and his DTR was a mere oversight or carelessness on his part. one's side. In the instant case, petitioner furnished private
respondent notice as to the particular acts which constituted the
Not satisfied with the explanation, NSC dismissed Santos for the ground for his dismissal. By requiring him to submit a written
violations made. Santos then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal explanation within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the
and non-payment of wages and other money claims. company gave him the opportunity to be heard in his defense.
Private respondent availed of this chance by submitting a written
Labor arbiter found that Santos was dismissed on legal grounds explanation. Furthermore, investigations on the incident were
although he was not afforded due process, ordering NSC to actually conducted.
indemnify him and the unpaid night shift differentials.
Finally, private respondent was notified on 14 January 1993 of the
management's decision to terminate his services.
Full text dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution,
G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment. 5 although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that
there should not be included the time when execution is stayed,
CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner, In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
vs. execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond the five-year injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise.
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the
Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.), respondents. reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.
signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging
Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner. settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The xxx xxx xxx
petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of
The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent. discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead. There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever
slept on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere
Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitation
has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do
CRUZ, J.: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A so, for causes beyond their central.
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and
this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is
are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-
the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in connection with dallied.
her work, where the rules are not as fickle. A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 6715, viz. The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days
The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction from receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on
Development Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her
herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was
accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise
surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement
complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing
arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order agreement. 7
wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to or award. ...
date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims
affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2 The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and she was actually reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should
cites the exception snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978,
On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a Court held: date of her dismissal, until the date of her reinstatement. She
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The conveniently omits to mention several significant developments
motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast
dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner of execution has been previously withheld in the interest of the doubt on her candor and bona fides.
the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has no
the judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent
Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar, and waiving her right to reinstatement in the compromise
sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11, 1989, however, the Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866) agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen
NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from
October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she
by that business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of officers from money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, is singing a different tune.
P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP. separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other
benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with the In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and
For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re- above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had accepted
employment with the CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the claims or right of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are
position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 future or contingent against said corporation and its officers, not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by
plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly. 9 relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79. the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new
management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now
On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into
and asked that the rights granted her by the decision dated August of November 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis signing the second quitclaim.
29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was supplied.) 12
invalid. 10 Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If
The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private the memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not
respondent (now Philippine National Construction Corporation) November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part: later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11 others who have helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional P9,544.00 among others ... making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release reading as what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
follows: As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
now occupying the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.
The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the
THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all her
No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of yearly company increases and other statutory benefits, the private rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement
the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to she received? It must be remembered that on that date the
PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the P3,588.00 monthly. decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this
unpaid balance of the back wages due me under the judgment Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The
award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. Then the lull. Then the bombshell. petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on
PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount
full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to
Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily waived the subject of this petition. the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand
reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu after the lapse of eight years.
thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my present position as It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has
XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office. blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held
she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed in countless cases that this should be limited to three years from
Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not
finality of the Decision dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own fault she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without
and that PNCC is not liable thereto. settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that
waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even
without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been
counted against her) that she was actually employed during most Songco v NLRC together. Insofar as whether the allowances should be included in
of that period. G.R. 50999 the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of
their separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case
Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the computation of backwages and
to question the failure of the private respondent to file a Facts: Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic salary
supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General Office No. 4) a clearance to terminate the services of petitioners of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living
correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to alleged allowances. In the issue of whether commission should be included
appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order financial losses. However, the petitioners argued that the company in the computation of their separation pay, it is proper to define
enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar. is not suffering any losses and the real reason for their termination first commission. Blacks Law Dictionary defined commission as the
was their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case, recompensed, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman,
As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their the petitioner manifested that they no longer contesting their executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the
clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the dismissal, however, they argued that they should be granted a same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his
ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the separation pay. Each of the petitioners was receiving a monthly transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the
valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government salary of P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale they made. work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration
Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc. and the petitioners, in for services rendered demonstrate clearly that the commission are
hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the Article XIV, Section 1(a), Any employee, who is separated from part of petitioners wage and salary. Some salesmen do not receive
client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or
own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable not due to the fault of said employee shall receive from the commissions alone, are part of petitioners wage and salary. Some
law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel. company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on
months salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in commission and allowances or commissions alone, although an
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of employer-employee relationship exist. In Soriano v. NLRC, it is
petitioner. It is so ordered. retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner
service credits, a fraction of at least six months being considered (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly
one year, including probationary employment. Other basis for includible in such base figure since such commissions must be
petitioners contention are Article 284 of the Labor Code with earned by actual market transactions attributable to petitioner.
regards to reduction of personnel and Sections 9(b) and 10 of Rule Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case
1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor were earned by actual market transactions attributable to
Arbiter rendered his decision directing the company to pay the petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the
complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month salary computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the
(exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of average commissions earned during their last year of employment.
service that they have worked with the company. The petitioners
appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres
filed a Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of
petition contending that he had received, to his full and complete
satisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances


should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the
purpose of computation of their separation pay.

Held: The petition is granted. Petitioners contention that in


arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due to
them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary,
earned sales commissions and allowances should be added
Full Text discussions and exchange of views, the parties on October 29, 1952 The agreement was submitted to the Court for approval and on
G.R. No. L-7349 July 19, 1955 reached an agreement effective from August 4, 1952 to December December 26, 1952, was approved by the Court in an order giving
31, 1954 (Rec. pp. 18-23). The Agreement in part provides: it effect as an award or decision in the case (Rec., p. 24).
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs. I Later, Case No. G.R. No. L-5276 was decided by this Court
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, (promulgated March 3, 1953), affirming the decision of the Court
respondents. That the petitioner, Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company, of Industrial Relations fixing the minimum cash wage of the
Incorporated, agrees to abide by whatever decision that the laborers and employees of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. at P3.20
Pablo C. Sanidad for petitioner. Supreme Court may render with respect to Case No. 523-V (G.R. cash, without rice ration, or P2.65, with rice ration. On June 13,
Roxas and Sarmiento for respondents. 5276) and Case No. 523-1 (10) (G.R. 5594). 1953, the labor union presented to the Court a petition for the
enforcement of the terms of the agreement of October 29, 1952,
REYES, J. B. L., J.: xxx xxx xxx as allegedly modified by the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-
5276 and the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law, which has
On September 4, 1950, the petitioner labor union, the Atok-Big III since taken effect, praying for the payment of the minimum cash
Wedge Mutual Benefit Association, submitted to the Atok-Big wage of P3.45 a day with rice ration, or P4.00 without rice ration,
Wedge Mining Co., Inc. (respondent herein) several demands, xxx xxx xxx and the payment of differential pay from August 4, 1952, when the
among which was an increase of P0.50 in daily wage. The matter award became effective. The mining company opposed the
was referred by the mining company to the Court of Industrial That the petitioner, Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company, petition claiming that the Agreement of October 29, 1952 was
Relations for arbitration and settlement (Case No. 523-V). In the Incorporated, and the respondent, Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit entered into by the parties with the end in view that the company's
course of conciliatory measures taken by the Court, some of the Association, agree that the following facilities heretofore given or cost of production be not increased in any way, so that it was
demands were granted, and others (including the demand for actually being given by the petitioner to its workers and laborers, intended to supersede whatever decision the Supreme Court
increased wages) rejected, and so, hearings proceeded and and which constitute as part of their wages, be valued as follows: would render in G.R. No. L-5276 and the provisions of the
evidence submitted on the latter. On July 14, 1951, the Court Minimum Wage Law with respect to the minimum cash wage
rendered a decision (Record, pp. 25-32) fixing the minimum wage Rice ration payable to the laborers and employees. Sustaining the opposition,
at P2.65 a day with the rice ration, or P3.20 without rice ration; the Court of Industrial Relations, in an order issued on September
denying the deduction from such minimum wage, of the value of P.55 per day 22, 1953 (Rec. pp. 44-49), denied the petition, upon the ground
housing facilities furnished by the company to the laborers, as well that when the Agreement of the parties of October 29, 1952 was
as the efficiency bonus given to them by the company; and ordered Housing facility entered into by them, they already knew the decision of said Court
that the award be made effective retroactively from the date of (although subject to appeal to the Supreme Court) fixing the
the demand, September 4, 1950, as agreed by the parties. From 40 per day minimum cash wage at P3.20 without rice ration, or P2.65 with rice
this decision, the mining company appealed to this Court (G.R. No. ration, as well as the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law
L-5276). All other facilities such as recreation facilities, medical treatment to requiring the payment of P4 minimum daily wage in the provinces
dependents of laborers, school facilities, rice ration during off-days, effective August 4, 1952; so that the parties had intended to be
Subsequently, an urgent petition was presented in Court on water, light, fuel, etc., equivalent to at least regulated by their Agreement of October 29, 1952. On the same
October 15, 1952 by the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company for day, the Court issued another order (Rec. pp. 50-55), denying the
authority to stop operations and lay off employees and laborers, 85 per day claim of the labor union for payment of an additional 50 per cent
for the reason that due to the heavy losses, increased taxes, high based on the basic wage of P4 for work on Sundays and holidays,
cost of materials, negligible quantity of ore deposits, and the It is understood that the said amount of facilities valued at the holding that the payments being made by the company were
enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law, the continued operation abovementioned prices, may be charged in full or partially by the within the requirements of the law. Its motion for the
of the company would lead to its immediate bankruptcy and Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc., against laborer or reconsideration of both orders having been denied, the labor union
collapse (Rec. pp. 100-109). To avert the closure of the company employee, as it may see fit pursuant to the exigencies of its filed this petition for review by certiorari.
and the consequent lay-off of hundreds of laborers and employees, operation.
the Court, instead of hearing the petition on the merits, convened The first issue submitted to us arises from an apparent
the parties for voluntary conciliation and mediation. After lengthy contradiction in the Agreement of October 29, 1952. By paragraph
III thereof, the parties by common consent evaluated the facilities compromise was reached whereby it was agreed that the company provinces), the laborers should be paid a minimum wage of P4 a
furnished by the Company to its laborers (rice rations, housing, would pay the minimum wage fixed by the law, but the facilities day. From this amount, the respondent mining company is given
recreation, medical treatment, water, light, fuel, etc.) at P1.80 per then being received by the laborers would be evaluated and the right to charge each laborer "in full or partially", the facilities
day, and authorized the company to have such value "charge in full charged as part of the wage, but without in any way reducing the enumerated in par. III of the Agreement; i.e., rice ration at P0.55
or partially against any laborer or employee as it may see fit"; P2.00 cash portion of their wages which they were receiving prior per day, housing facility at P0.40 per day, and other facilities
while in paragraph I, the Company agreed to abide by the decision to the agreement (hearing of Oct. 28, 1952, CIR, t.s.n. 47). In other "constitute part of his wages". It appears that the company had
of this Court (pending at the time the agreement was had) in G.R. words, while it was the objective of the parties to comply with the actually been paying its laborers the minimum wage of P2.20 since
No. L-5594; and as rendered, the decision was to the effect that requirements of the Minimum Wage Law, it was also deemed August 4, 1952; hence they are not entitled to any differential pay
the Company could deduct from the minimum wage only the value important that the mining company should not have to increase from this date.
of the rice ration. the cash wages it was then paying its laborers, so that its cost of
production would not also be increased, in order to prevent its Petitioner argues that to allow the deductions stipulated in the
It is contended by the petitioner union that the two provisions closure and the lay-off of employees and laborers. And as found by Agreement of October 29, 1952 from the minimum daily wage of
should be harmonized by holding paragraph III (deduction of all the Court below in the order appealed from (which finding is P4 would be a waiver of the minimum wage fixed by the law and
facilities) to be merely provisional, effective only while this Court conclusive upon us), "it is this eventuality that the parties did not hence null and void, since Republic Act No. 602, section 20,
had not rendered its decision in G.R. No. L-5594; and that the like to happen, when they have executed the said agreement" provides that "no agreement or contract, oral or written, to accept
terms of said paragraph should be deemed superseded by the (Rec. p. 49). Accordingly, after said agreement was entered into, a lower wage or less than any other under this Act, shall be valid".
decision from the time the latter became final, some four or five the Company started paying its laborers a basic cash or "take- An agreement to deduct certain facilities received by the laborers
months after the agreement was entered into; in consequence, (it home" wage of P2.20 (Rec. p. 9), representing the difference from their employer is not a waiver of the minimum wage fixed by
is claimed), the laborers became entitled by virtue of said decision between P4 (minimum wage) and P1.80 (value of all facilities). the law. Wage, as defined by section 2 of Republic Act No. 602,
to the prevailing P4.00 minimum wage with no other deduction "includes the fair and reasonable value as determined by the
than that of the rice ration, or a net cash wage of P3.45. With this background, the provision to abide by our decision in G.R. Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily
No. L-5276 can only be interpreted thus: That the company agreed furnished by the employer to the employee." Thus, the law permits
This contention, in our opinion, is untenable. The intention of the to pay whatever award this Court would make in said case from the the deduction of such facilities from the laborer's minimum wage
parties could not have been to make the arrangement in paragraph date fixed by the decision (which was that of the original demand, of P4, as long as their value is "fair and reasonable". It is not here
III a merely provisional arrangement pending the decision of the September 4, 1950) up to August 3, 1952 (the day previous to the claimed that the valuations fixed in the Agreement of October 29,
Supreme Court for "this agreement" was expressly made effectivity of the Compromise Agreement) and from August 4, 1954 1952 are not fair and reasonable. On the contrary, the agreement
retroactive and effective as of August 4, 1952, and to be in force up to December 31, 1954, they are to be bound by their agreement of expressly states that such valuations:
to and including December 31, 1954" (Par. IV). When concluded on October 29, 1952.
October 29, 1952, neither party could anticipate the date when the "have been arrived at after careful study and deliberation by both
decision of the Supreme Court would be rendered; nor is any This means that during the first period (September 4, 1950 to representatives of both parties, with the assistance of their
reason shown why the parties should desire to limit the effects of August 3, 1952), only rice rations given to the laborers are to be respective counsels, and in the presence of the Honorable
the decision to the period 1952-1954 if it was to supersede the regarded as forming part of their wage and deductible therefrom. Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations" (Rec. p. 2).
agreement of October 29, 1952. The minimum wage was then fixed (by the Court of Industrial
Relations, and affirmed by this Court) at P3.20 without rice ration, Neither is it claimed that the parties, with the aid of the Court of
To ascertain the true import of paragraph I of said Agreement or P2.65 with rice ration. Since the respondent company had been Industrial Relations in a dispute pending before it, may not fix by
providing that the respondent company agreed to abide by paying its laborers the basic cash or "take-home" wage of P2 prior agreement the valuation of such facilities, without referring the
whatever decision the Supreme Court would render in G.R. No. L- to said decision and up to August 3, 1952, the laborers are entitled matter to the Department of Labor.
5276, it is important to remember that, as shown by the records, to a differential pay of P0.65 per working day from September 4,
the agreement was prompted by an urgent petition filed by the 1950 (the date of the effectivity of the award in G.R. L-5276) up to Petitioner also argues that to allow the deductions of the facilities
respondent mining company to close operations and lay-off August 3, 1952. appearing in the Agreement referred to, would be contrary to the
laborers because of heavy losses and the full enforcement of the mandate of section 19 of the law, that "nothing in this Act . . .
Minimum Wage Law in the provinces, requiring it to pay its From August 4, 1952, the date when the Agreement of the parties justify an employer . . . in reducing supplements furnished on the
laborers the minimum wage of P4; to avoid such eventuality, of October 29, 1952 became effective (which was also the date date of enactment.
through the mediation of the Court of Industrial Relations, a when the Minimum Wage Law became fully enforceable in the
The meaning of the term "supplements" has been fixed by the Mabeza v NLRC
Code of Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Wage SEC. 4. Commonwealth Act No. 444 (otherwise known as the Eight
Administration Office to implement the Minimum Wage Law (Ch. Hour Labor Law) provides: FACTS:
1, [c]), as: Norma Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio
No person, firm, or corporations, business establishment or place City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the Department of Labor
extra renumeration or benefits received by wage earners from or center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work and Employment (DOLE) at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE
their employees and include but are not restricted to pay for during Sundays and holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management.
vacation and holidays not worked; paid sick leave or maternity at least twenty-five per centum of his regular renumeration: Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his
leave; overtime rate in excess of what is required by law; sick, employees to execute an affidavit which would purport that they
pension, retirement, and death benefits; profit-sharing; family The minimum legal additional compensation for work on Sundays have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza
allowances; Christmas, war risk and cost-of-living bonuses; or other and legal holidays is, therefore, 25 per cent of the laborer's regular signed the affidavit but she refused to certify it with the
bonuses other than those paid as a reward for extra output or time renumeration. Under the Minimum Wage Law, this minimum prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not
spent on the job. additional compensation is P1 a day (25 per cent of P4, the allowed to take her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not
minimum daily wage). granted yet shes not being allowed to work. In May 1991, she then
"Supplements", therefore, constitute extra renumeration or special sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said
privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and While the respondent company computes the additional that Mabeza abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed
above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other compensation given to its laborers for work on Sundays and a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he alleged that she had
hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborer's and his holidays on the "cash portion" of their wages of P2.20, it is giving stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng
family's existence and subsistence, so that by express provision of them 50 per cent thereof, or P1.10 a day. Considering that the went on to amend his reply in the labor case to make it appear that
the law (sec. 2 [g]) they form part of the wage and when furnished minimum additional compensation fixed by the law is P1 (25 per the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of
by the employer are deductible therefrom since if they are not so cent of P4), the compensation being paid by the respondent confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by Mabeza.
furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the company to its laborers is even higher than such minimum legal The labor arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled
same. It is thus clear that the facilities mentioned in the agreement additional compensation. We, therefore, see no error in the in favor of Peter Ng.
of October 29, 1952 do not come within the term "supplements" as holding of the Court a quo that the respondent company has not
used in Art. 19 of the Minimum Wage Law. violated the law with respect to the payment of additional ISSUE:
compensation for work rendered by its laborers on Sundays and Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether
For the above reasons, we find the appeal from the Order of the legal holidays. or not loss of confidence as ground for dismissal applies in the case
Court a quo of September 22, 1953 denying the motion of the at bar.
petitioner labor union for the payment of the minimum wage of Finding no reason to sustain the present petition for review, the
P3.45 per day plus rice ration, or P4 without rice ration, to be same is, therefore, dismissed, with costs against the petitioner HELD:
unmeritorious and untenable. Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit Association. No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the
Labor Arbiter which was unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC.
The second question involved herein relates to the additional Abandonment
compensation that should be paid by the respondent company to Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to
its laborers for work rendered on Sundays and holidays. It is inquire about the status of her work or her employment status.
admitted that the respondent company is paying an additional She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for
compensation of 50 per cent based on the basic "cash portion" of leave is a clear indication that she has no intention to abandon her
the laborer's wage of P2.20 per day; i.e., P1.10 additional work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his purported
compensation for each Sunday or holiday's work. Petitioner union reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he
insists, however, that this 50 per cent additional compensation amended his reply to indicate that it is actually loss of confidence
should be computed on the minimum wage of P400 and not on the that led to Mabezas dismissal.
"cash portion" of the laborer's wage of P2.20, under the provisions Loss of Confidence
of the Agreement of October 29, 1952 and the Minimum Wage It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an
Law. employee. But this is ideally only applied to workers whose
positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), RULING:
those who are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides
ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work. These
hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the
to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by
hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of Superintendent of International School-Manila; and which employers treat their employees.
these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,
supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further, the Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by
suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000 the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
after she initiated her labor complaint against him hardly warrants an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Mabezas dismissal. FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers
PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the
for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State
temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, as the local-hires.
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local- comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local- consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best
hires. suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995,
petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local- and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity
hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
caused a deadlock between the parties. bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The
basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to
compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
favored the School. Hence this petition.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have
ISSUE: indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
local- hires. history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires
enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-
hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and
home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of
the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining
unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of
their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is


hereby GRANTED IN PART.