Women's Role in Tebhaga Movement
Peter dusters
The Tebhaga movement erupted in 1946 in Bengal on the eve of the withdrawal of the British. Although
tide of Tebhaga receded as fast as it rose, the uprising stands out as one of the most important political
in twentieth century Bengal. Among the unique features of the movement is the large-scale participation
on par with men. The landless and poor peasant
front rank role in defending the gains of the movement
The article describes and analyses the role of women in the Tebhaga movement and seeks to throw light on
fundamental questions such as why, despite
progressive movements, male dominance
IN 1946, on the eve of the withdrawal by
British colonialism from the Indian sub-
continent, a major agrarian struggle erupted
in the then united province of Bengal. With
the memory of a devastating famine still
fresh in their minds and bellies, the masses
of Bengal's tenants shaked off all lethargy
and subservience. They refused to submit
any longer to the feudal relations which kept
them enslaved to the rural gentry, the
jotedars, and demanded an immediate
increase in the share of the harvest. When
they started putting the demand into practice
themselves, the struggle for Tebhaga, a two-
thirds share, was on.
This agrarian movement in which women
participated on par with men, landless
labourers alongside those primarily benefit-
ed, with sharecroppers, spread like an
irresistible tidal wave to the various corners
of Bengal. From Jalpaiguri in the far north
to Kakdwip and Nandigram in the south
harvest battles were started, and they
aroused both tremendous enthusiasm and
spontaneous militancy among the toilers,
whilst the landlords and their British backers
were scared out of their wits.
Though the tide of Tebhaga receded iust
as fast as it arose, the uprising nevertheless
stands out as the most important political
event in twentieth century Bengal. In no
other people's movement has the character
ofvarious political forces been laid bare with
such nakedness. The powerful impact of
Tebhaga is also clear from this that the ruling
classes which came to power in the wake of
the uprising in both the divided parts of
Bengal were forced to make legal concessions
to the peasantry.
It is then clear why today, after nearly
forty years have lapsed, it remains very rele-
vant to review Tebhaga's short history. By
being conscious of the enormous strength
which Bengal's rural poor have displayed in
the past, it is possible to strengthen one's
confidence in their revolutionary potential.
Tebhaga can be a genuine source of inspira-
tion in preparing for any new agrarian move-
ment in Bangladesh.
Secondly, a review of Tebhaga has got yet
another future relevance. A basic feature of
the uprising was that the leadership which
initially had guided the peasants to revolt,
lagged far behind the masses once the
campaign developed. It made very elemen-
tary errors due to which the movement was
bound to collapse. A political assessment is
women formed fighting troops called nari bahini and took a
and in countering the repression of the state.
women's demonstrated capacity to organise,
remains unbroken.
thus relevant for avoiding a repetition of
mistakes.
But there is a third reason why a review
of Tebhaga history is cruciala reason
linked to the latter but distinct. At its height
the uprising was led by rural poor women
who took the front-rank role in defending
the movement's gains and in countering the
repression of the state. The most unique
feature of Tebhaga is the spontaneous crea-
tion of women's fighting troops, called "nari
bahini'. An assessment of the women's role
in Tebhaga is not just relevant for con-
temporary Bengal or South Asia, but for
progressive movements all over the world.
Contrary to various fashionable theories, 1
do not believe that a feminist perspective
excludes either the building of a party of the
oppressed or the waging of armed struggle.
On the contrary, the evidence from Tebhaga
rather seems to point in opposite direction.
First, the 'curse' of the provincial com-
munist leadership in Bengal was not that
they built a party as such. The leadership
erred, but it erred in assessing the country's
socio-economic and political situation. And
it did so from the early 1940s up until the
year of Bengal's sorrowful Partition, 1947.
And when amongst the rural poor the urge
for liberation reached its zenith during
Tebhaga's second and third phase, the party's
opportunism and restraint revealed them-
selves as utter lack of leadership!
Nor does the evidence from Tebhaga point
at any contradiction between female resi-
stance on the one hand, and the waging of
armed combat on the other. Though the
revolt generally did not reach the level of
planned guerilla-fighting, nonetheless rural
poor women through their courageous
deedssnatching police-guns, forming semi-
militia, and staging defensive actions against
the forces of the statewere bent on put-
ting that form of struggle for the agenda.
The predilections of Bengal's poor peasant
women were far from non-violent.
However, and this needs emphasis, the
reality of Tebhaga should not be construed
as an endorsement of'party-building' and
'armed struggle' under any kind of cir-
cumstances. Bengal's objective situation in
1946-47 was unmistakably revolutionary: an
agrarian society which had disintegrated
under the terrible weight of famine and war,
and where the rule of the British and their
rural allies, the landlords, had become
untenable.
Economic and Political Weekly Vol XXI, No 43
Review of Women Studies, October 25, 1985
the
events
of women
struggle and lead
However, whereas the patriarchal bias is
a problem of universal portent which, 1
believe, progressive movements everywhere
should boldly facethe organisational and
strategic frameworks in which the leadership
of (rural poor or proletarian) women is to
be aimed at, most certainly are not universal
in scope.
Let us begin with some concrete examples
from the later phase of Tebhagawhen
the leadership of the Communist Party
abstainedillustrating the astounding
heroism of rural poor women who stormed
heaven to defend the movement and its
gains.
24 ParganasAlarm and Seige: A big
contingent of policemen had just arrested
some male peasant cadres and wanted to
leave by truck. Suddenly, women of the
village sounded the warning system. The air
vibrated with the noise and echoes of conch-
shells, horns, gongs and other instruments.
At this, hundreds of womenHindus,
Muslims and tribals alikecame out from
their huts. With their brooms and knifes they
ran towards the truck and tried to set the
arrested men free. An unequal fight ensued,
in which the policemen could ultimately
outstrip the women, after they had fired
their rifles. But at no moment did the
women who were all from poor families
loose courage. "When the firing took place
the women became more daring!" Mass
encirclements of police personnel, in
response to alarm signals given by women,
were a regular feature of Tebhaga in its
militant phase.1
Northern MymensinghA Martyr's
Death: Women amongst the tribal Hazongs
had been aroused and unified by a middle-
aged widow called Rashomoni. They had
formed their own resistance troops which
were very active in protecting villages against
raids by the Eastern Front Rifles. When news
reached the female fighters that government
soldiers had raped two village girls and had
forcefully dragged away a third one (who
was newly married), Rashomoni was see-
thing with rage. Together with her female
comrades and some male volunteers who
hesitatingly followed her, she went to chase
the soldiers, until they got stuck in the sand
near the Shomeshori river and were sur-
rounded. The soldiers then started firing,
but Rashomoni ignored their bullets and
jumped, aiming her dagger at the soldiers
who had manhandled the bride. One of
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Review of Women Studies October 1986
them was hit lethally, but shortly after
Rashomoni was herselfkilled. The Hazong
volunteers, however, continued the battle on
the Shomeshori river for three long hours,
until they h a d routed the soldiers. The
Hazong w o m e n of Mymensingh, like tribal
women elsewhere in Bengal, showed 'un-
paralleled courage' during the Tebhaga
uprising. 2
JessorePolice Repelled: The rural poor
women of No rail in Jessore were no less
courageous or militant. They repeatedly
repelled police raids on villages, armed w i t h
only broomsticks. The women's troops (nari
bahini) of Norail were set up side-by-side
w i t h the peasant committees. They were built
by an energetic woman called Shoroladi who
could not read or write but was a capable
organiser. These women's troops undauntedly
faced the police before the male members
of the village dared to do so. They first came
in action after jotedars had filed court cases
against rebellious sharecroppers and had
called upon the police. When the boat in
which the police travelled was approaching
the village, the nari bahini suddenly showed
up and pulled the boat o n t o the riverside.
The police, completely overwhelmed, had to
humbly ask the women for mercy, before
being allowed to depart. The women's troops
of N o r a i l w i t h a reported membership of
at least 250were perhaps "the strongest of
the women's organisations in the whole of
Bengal". 3
These examples, drawn from widely
different areas of Bengal, provide us some
idea about the extraordinary women's
resistance during the Tebhaga movement. We
are now entering the t h i r d phase of the up-
rising, the phase in which police andmilitary
repression seriously increased. At the same
time, the people mainly had to rely on their
own courage and dexterity to weather the
forces of the state, as guidance by the centre
of the Communist Party had virtually dis-
appeared. It is the doubly oppressed women
foremost from Hindu and tribal com-
munities w h o spontaneously took over the
leadership of the resistance through their
semi-militia forces, the nari bahini.
U N B R I D L E D REPRESSION BY T H E
C O L O N I A L STATE
The third phase of the Tebhaga uprising
can be said to have started when the state
launched full-scale mopping-up operations.
The third period is usually dated from the
second half of February 1947. But before we
proceed w i t h the story, let's be on guard
against being too mechanical about the
process of the uprising and the government's
reaction. In fact, the state's repressive
apparatus was not very strict about 'phases'.
A r m e d personnel vigorously undertook
mopping up operations before it became a
declared policy.
Thus, local (thana) police forces were
often requested and bribed by embattered
jotedars to make arrests, and they had often
WS-98
responded to such paid calls. They had also
committed o u t r i g h t atrocities, such as the
killing t h r o u g h gunfire of two landless
peasants in Chirirbandar, early January. Nor
were repressive measures a purely localised
affair. As early as December the government
of Suhrawardy had posted armed police
in rebellious districts like Mymensingh,
Dinajpur and Jessore.4
An all-out mopping-up operation had
earlier been launched in at least one area
that of n o r t h e r n Mymensingh. Parallel to
the commencing of the Tebhaga campaign
in late 1946, the Hazongs and other tribal
minorities here had resumed their struggle
against the hated tonka system 5 of tenancy.
Now, on January 28 Eastern Front Rifles
had already been dispatched to the region
and military aircraft had reconnoitred next
day. In northern Mymensingh raids on
villages were carried out daily throughout
the first part of Februaryand w i t h vastly
destructive consequences. 6
Nevertheless, province-wise the govern-
ment took to m o p p i n g up operations only
in the third week of February. It was exactly
after the Bargadars' (sharecroppers) Bill had
been shelved that the British-appointed
government issued instructions to district
bureaucrats to crush the Tebhaga revolt. It
was precisely when it had been assured of
future power that the M u s l i m League
ministry fully made up its m i n d : the whole
weight of the state's armed might then came
down on the agrarian movement.
From this moment on, repression took a
rather u n i f o r m pattern of barbarity. First,
military camps were set up in rural areas.
Then, villages were raided and searched
resulting in the looting or demolition of
scores of houses, including ofpersons who
were under arrest. Under the protection of
police guns and bullets, jotedars who had
fled the countryside returned and recaptured
paddy stocks. Massive numbers of peasants
were rounded up during these raids; in
Dinajpur alone 1,200 were detained, of
whom 400 were Muslim peasants. 7
Numerous also were those shot dead,
either in confrontations or in cold blooded
murders. In one well k n o w n clash near
Khanpur in Dinajpur, 12 villagers including
the Rajbongsi female leader Jashoda Maa
were killed, after a police truck had been
trapped in a trench dug by tribal peasants.
Eight others later succumbed to their
injuries. 8 In the Matially locality of
Jalpaiguri, nine persons fell v i c t i m to a
brutal, pre-planned police firing: a post-
mortem is reported to have shown that all
dead peasants "had been shot at while
fleeing". 9 But the worst bloodbath perhaps
was the one in Shondeshkhali, in the
Sunderbans area down in the South. W h e n
villagers had crowded around a cutchery
demanding the release of detained peasant
comrades, they faced a rain of bullets: 200
dead bodies were counted after this k i l l i n g
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
In these mopping-up operations w h i c h
lasted for several months, women were not
spared. In fact, they often had to face the
brunt of the repression, especially in villages
where male peasants had fled. Swadhinota
reports in A p r i l , for example, spoke of
peasant women being dragged from their
homes, stripped naked and struck w i t h
canes. Several headlines drew attention to the
"bestial terror" perpetrated by the police,
and to the " v i o l a t i o n of women's honour"
Countless women were raped in this cam-
paign of cruel and chauvinist revenge.11
When groups of M A R S representatives went
to investigate tortures against women in
Dinajpur, they were barred f r o m entering
villages and detained by the police. 12
T A C T I C S TO C O U N T E R T H E U N B R I D L E D
REPRESSION
How did the movement react to and
counter this offensive by the state? The
leadership of the Communist party was
strangely absent. A d m i t t e d l y the party
"made less than necessary preparations
against the repression". 13 A l t h o u g h the
class-connections of the M u s l i m League
ministry in the countryside quite clearly were
closest w i t h the jotedars, the party-
leadership apparently did not apprehend
major repression by the state. The whoe pro-
vincial committee was "at aloss" about what
to do.
Their default is the more unbelievable if
it be recalled how the party and the Kisan
Sabha had had their taste of repression
during the big rehearsal, the Hat Tola Cam-
paign of 1939-1940. The movement against
illegal exactions had petered out under the
weight of a severe police-repression, slightly
foreshadowing Tebhaga, when jotedars had
filed hundreds of 'looting' cases and the
police, colluding w i t h them, had made
numerous arrests. 14 If even a movement
based on legal demands received such a
response, a campaign to put down the
Tebhaga revolt was w h o l l y predictable.
In the event, the masses and local cadres
were left to themselves to face the onslaught.
In some areas, for example in Dinajpur, they
retreated to the forests and jungles to elude
police terror. More often, attempts were
made to repell the police intruders through
massive encirclements. The tactic as already
depicted earlier meant that people would in
their thousands besiege cutcheries or other
'hot spots', at the mere sound of the
Tebhaga-alarm, a system operated by
women.
A different road to counter police repres-
sion was ultimately chosen in the north of
Mymensingh. Here the local party leader.
M o n i Singh retreated w i t h hundreds of
peasant cadres to the interior of the Garo
Hills, they were thus saved f r o m mass-arrest
and worsethey pre-empted "annihila-
tion". 1 5 In small expeditions from their
hide-outs in the hills, the Hazong cadres
subsequently employed the guerilla-tatic of
ECONOMIC AND P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
surprise: they successfully raided/ambushed
many a police patrol.
But in general, no attempt was made to
preserve forces and build up military
strength. People equipped with natural
weapons such.as sticks and spears would
encircle cutcheries where police personnel
were encamped. They might snatch the fire
arms with all daringness, but these weapons
would then be broken or thrown away. W i t h -
out political theory or political guidance
Tebhaga could not possibly reach the level
of a people's war.
This being so, what stands out above all
else is the extraordinary heroism and
creativity displayed by the masses in this
difficult third phase. Praise should go in
particular to rural poor women who tried
to defend villages and homes and who
frequently succeeded in warding o f f police
raids. It is they, the rural poor women, who
set a unique example as the principal
fighting force of Tebhaga. It is they who
spontaneously set up their own organisa-
tions, the nari bahini, to weather the storm
of this state's suppression campaign. A n d
without them the outcome of the police
operations might have been much worse.
W A R N I N G SYSTEM O P E R A T E D B Y W O M E N
Before elaborating on the emergence of
the nari bahini, we briefly describe Tebhaga's
alarm system and its history. It is widely
recognised that the sounding of alarm was
a specific contribution of women. They
would blow conchshells, beat gongs and use
other instruments which ordinarily are
employed for Hindu religious purposes.
When a shrieking noise was thus spread,
villagers in the wide surroundings would be
informed of an approaching danger and
instantaneously flock in hundreds or even
thousands towards the place from where the
warning signals had been given. In this way,
mass mobilisation was extremely rapidly
achieved.
Now, the use of conchshells and gongs for
secular purposes had a long history in
Bengal. One local leader from Debigang,
conscious about women's role and about
history, explains that "traditionally these and
other sound-giving instruments were used to
blow the alarm against attacks on villages
by dacoits (robbers)!' A n d according to the
same leader "during the Swadeshi movement
at the beginning of this century, the conch-
shells had already been turned to a political
useas signals for warning against police
attacks!' Clearly, the method was far from
a novel invention. 1 6
In fact, the same tactic was employed even
much further back in Bengal's tumultuous
history. The 'modern' nationalist resistance
against British domination over India was
preceded by scores of peasant rebellions and
to several of those the alarm systems can be
traced. During the grand Indigo revolt, for
example, kettle-drums (dundubhf) were
placed on the edge of each village. Whenever
British planters with their armed guards were
about to attack, "peasants of adjoining
villages were informed about the danger
through the sound of the kettle-drum" and
"in no time the people of four to five villages
would engulf themselves in fierce battle?'. The
tactic, according to the author Suprakash
Ray, was so effective that the Indigo peasants
set an "example for people's rebellions in all
times". 17
What seems specific for Tebhaga, however,
is the creative application of this tactic
and the fact that it was almost everywhere
a women's job. Thus, in the Sunderbans area
of the 24 Parganas, religious instruments
were used in areas inhabited by Hindus,
while in Muslim-dominated villages it was
suggested that school bells be used. 18 A n d
in the Debiganj locality of Jalpaiguri where
large number of Hindus lived, yet another
solution was found. Here, women stood on
guard against police raids, but reportedly
lacked conchshells due to the extraordinary
poverty prevailing. "They therefore gave a
warning by yelling, the sound being carried
ahead from village to village by those women
who first heard the shouting". 19 In short,
the women of Tebhaga used a powerful tactic
with a very long pre-history.
The key to understanding the nari bahini
is that they were created in the phase in
which people's resistance was most spon-
taneous. Tebhaga's third phase was at once
the phase in which repression by the state
was fiercestand in which the leading roles
of the Communist Party and the Kisan
Sabha were weakest. Thus, the creation of
women's fighting forces, of nari bahini, was
not of their doing.
The leadership of the Cummunist Party
had encouraged the participation of rural
poor women, when the campaign for
Tebhaga was launched in the northern
districts of Bengal. Women were recruited
in large numbers to the volunteers squads
which harvested the paddy and stacked it on
the sharecroppers' threshing floors. The
founding of these volunteer squads was a
matter of conscious party policyin a sense
they were created 'from above'. 20
The nari bahini, however, did not come
about thus, but through a process from
below. This can be inferred, to start with,
from a statement by Rani Dasgupta who was
a party cadre in Dinajpur. According to her,
the concrete occasion was the moment that
the police intervened. When the police
arrived in a campaign-village with warrants
of arrest to prevent further harvesting of
paddy, female volunteers resisted and then
formed their own bahini: "One incident took
place where female volunteers drove away
the police. A f t e r this, nari bahinis were
formed everywhere to guard the villages". 21
The nari bahini in Dinajpur thus arose out
of the concrete needs of the agrarian strug-
gle. The process seems to have been similar
in the Norail subdivision of Jessore where
the women's troops became enormously
Review of Women Studies October 1986
strong. Here local party cadres had indepen-
dently (!) given the campaign the shape of
a food-movement. They took this 'liberty'
since they believed Tebhaga would not be
successful in Norail, given the fact that
sharecropping here prevailed less. 22
Therefore, they decided to attack govern-
ment trucks loaded with rice and distributed
the booty among the people.
The party cadres were vindicated in their
independent choice, for the movement in
Norail rapidly reached a climax point: the
people got close to capturing local political
power. In Magura, the subdivisional admini-
strative office was occupied and some five
hundred women held a procession through
the streets of the town demanding food and
blankets. "The women went to the court,
intruded the place and caught hold of the
judge, grabbing his tie. The police warned
the judge no to touch the women!' 2 3
In N orail too, nari bahini were established
in many villages to keep guard against likely
police attacks, heralding the intervention of
the colonial state. However, these were
formed by rural poor women themselves and
not at the instance of local party leaders or
the provincial party top. As one local leader
open-heartedly admits, "In Norail women
spontaneously set up their nari bahini. We
ourselves did not build a women's organisa-
tion". And that the village defence organised
by these female volunteers led by Shoroladi
was very effective has also been confirmed:
"Many times the police had to retreat, failing
to break through their array". 24
Then, there is a third area from where
some evidence is available about the pro-
cess of formation of the nari bahini, the
Sunderbans forests in the district of the
24 Parganas. In the documentary novel
"Enchained Earth", a moving description
is given of a mass-meeting held at one point
during the Tebhaga campaign. Two thousand
men and women had gathered, holding
spears and sticks. They were listening atten-
tively to proposals for strengthening the
organisational set-up of the local Peasant
Committee.
Suddenly, one woman arose and announ-
ced that women wished to form their own
armed force (ostro bahini). The male leaders
looked surprised, not knowing how to react.
Then, the spokeswoman was supported
forcefully by a female comrade, pleading
"The sad fate of women in peasant homes
nobody w i l l understand, except women
themselves! If men take up arms, why not
we? How else shall we defend ourselves,
when they are outdoors?" 25 Right there, on
the spot, a separate women's militia was
established and arrangements for training
made.
B I M A L A M A j i ' s SAGA
Bimala Maji from Midnapur district is a
striking example of those women who rose
to give local leadership in the Tebhaga cam-
paign. She was married off at the age of 13
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Review of Women Studies October 1986
or 14 and then found herself imprisoned
among in-laws who specialised in plunder
(dacoitry) and who denied her any rights.
"Repression in the home was enormous", she
recalls. " I f any person would see me from
the outside and my in-laws would mark this,
I would be beaten up badly. So I used to
ponder day after night, if this man (my
husband) dies, I will survive'." Her oppres-
sive husband in fact did die, after which
Bimala got bogged down for years in a fight
with her in-laws about the inheritance.
Bimala's political life started in the after-
math of the famine, when she accompanied
women-organiser Manikuntala Sen on atour
of the villages in her area.26 She was en-
trusted with the task of building local
women's committees through relief (milk
centres) and through rehabilitation. "For
destitute women we set up a system of dheki
(rice husking pedal operated by foot) labour.
From the godowns of big owners these
women obtained paddy which they proces-
sed and sold, after which they repaid the
landlords. Because the Mahila Samiti
(Women's Committee) gave them guarantees,
the landlords were willing to provide such
paddy to the destitutes. Our dheki-pro-
gramme had a double result; it enabled
destitute women to feed their own families,
and at the same time these destitutes became
committee members paying a handful of
rice!' The women's committee also enforced
a prohibition on wife-beating.
Subsequently, Bimala along with several
male cadres was sent by the Communist
Party to Nandigramanother area in her
home-district of Midnapur. Her task here
was to arouse women for the Tebhaga cam-
paign, but this initially appeared to be
extremely toughalmost impossible. To
indicate how deeply submissive women were
Bimala relates this incident in front of her
during one of the mobilisation meetings
held. "At the end of the meeting women
offered 'pronam' they touched my feet to
show their respect!' To which, Bimala says,
she retorted: "I am not that type of person,
I prefer another kind of respect-giving,
namely that you talk to me!'
In spite of all the weight of tradition
women got speedily mobilised, in a village
called Kedemari, stretched along the river,
they staged their first procession with
streamers, shouting "Hindu-Muslim Bhai-
Bhai (Brother)", "We want Tebhaga on the
basis of a receipt and without receipt we will
not give up our rice". Moreover, it is groups
of women who in Nandigram gathered the
harvest, armed with Red Flags, brooms and
spice powders, and stacked it on a j o i n t
threshing floor in lOto 15 villages. But even
before Tebhaga was launched, repression was
intensified. The jotedars sent their
doorkeepers (darwans) to intimidate the
peasants, and the police within no time,
erected village camps.
The following instance illustrates the bold
way in which the people faced the landlords'
WS-100
schemes and counter-plots. At one cutchery,
a whole group of guardsmen had assembled
to beat up women with bottles of glass. Then
5,000 people, including 2,000 women equip-
ped with broomsticks, encircled the cutchery.
We chanted the slogan " I f you want to
survivecome out, leave the village and
never return!". When the guardsmen, 30 in
all, in fact did come out, we smeared their
feces with black paint. Each of them had
to pass the row of 2,000 women and was
beaten up with brooms. After this, all
the paddy in the village came under the
peasants' control'"
Meanwhile, Bimala had to go under-
ground, as the police had started intensive
village-searches to seek out and arrest the
movement's leadership. She repeatedly
managed to escape, because of the clever
tactics which she and other women devised.
On one occasion the following diversion was
planned. "One woman was to simulate that
she was. pregnant, with three or four women
sitting around her. In the meantime I got
ready to flee, together with two old women.
Each of us carried a big bamboo bowl in
which the bottom parts of paddy-stalks are
collected from the field. When police
personnel entered the quarter, other women
kept them engaged, scolding "You can't
touch women!". In between, we managed to
sneak out. At night the police maintained
its village siege and forced every women to
show her forehead, since I had a mark on
my forehead by which I could easily be
identified!'
As village-searches continued and more
and more cadres got caught, the role of co-
ordination came to rest entirely on the
shoulders of Bimala. "Once all district
leaders of the Kisan Sabha and Communist
Party had been arrested, all responsibility to
give leadership fell on me" Under Bimala's
lead, for example, the decision was taken to
destroy the jotedars' threshing floors with
hoes, and to sell the landlords' paddy-shares
to small steamers passing by on the river.
Bimala Maji succeeded in helping the
movement advance and in evading the
police-net, until she finally was encircled in
a village where the geography disfavoured
any escape-attempt. Police then entered the
house in which she was hiding and dragged
her from under a mosquito-net. "The
guardsman who first spotted me com-
mented, From inside the snake's basket the
snake is still wagging its tail'. Then, when
they started hitting us, I opened my veil and
said they should stop their beating: 'Don't
tie the women with ropes, for we will go to
jail without this'."
Bimala ended her saga with a small act
of defiance. "After our arrests the police and
the guardsmen belonging to the jotedars'
paramilitia went to eat goat at the landlord's
house. I did not permit them to feed the
landlord's milk to my child. At the police
station a crowd of policemen who ail had
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
vainly tried to catch me came to watch me
curiously!' Once i n j a i l , Bimala was keptin
a cage for one month. No less than 140
court-cases were instituted against her. She
was to suffer detention for 21/2 years, before
being released, long after the Partition of the
sub-continent. 27
The above examples from Dinajpur,
Jessore and 24 Parganas together suffice to
draw a preleminary conclusion on the crea-
tion of the nari bahini. Clearly, they did not
spring from the brains of the provincial
party leaders who shrinked back from mili-
tant resistance. Nor was the idea of these
semi-militia generally conceived by local
party leaders who were sandwitched between
their party's political stand and the concrete
demands ofthe movement. No, on the whole
"the nari bahini were formed through the
spontaneous resistance of women", 28 They
were the independent organs of women's
power throughout Bengal's insurgent
villages.
K I S A N S A B H A A N D ITS P A T R I A R C H A L BIAS
The above can be corroborated through
negative evidence: the fact that the establish-
ment of nari bahini was not called for in
instructions emanating from the Kisan
Sabha's leadership. To clarify this, we review
two booklets drafted by Krishno Binod Ray,
the Chairman of the peasant association.
The first one, "The Peasants Buttle", was
published at an early stage of the Tebhaga
campaign. One of its strong points is that
it correctly foresaw the revolutionary thrust
of the campaign initiated: in the eyes of the
peasant participants Tebhaga was not just
a struggle for partial' demands. "So along-
side the partial struggles the echo can be
heard that the system of absentee land-
lordism should be destroyed. Every partial
struggle is the first step towards the ultimate
landbattle. The battle against feudal ex-
ploitation is a liberation battle" 29
Further, "The Peasant's Battle" roughly
describes elements of Bengal's class struc-
ture, such as the concentration of land-
ownership and the extent of sharecropping
in different areas, but it completely ignores
women's labour and feudo-patriarchal
oppression, such as the horrendous sexual
abuse of village women by the Landlords.
The same basic weakness can be pinpointed
for the 7 demands listed for the agrarian
movement. Included are issues like the
reduction of interests on crop loans and the
abolition of illegal exactions. But Ray's list
is completely silent on the specific interests
of rural poor women.
The second booklet, "Tactics of Peasant
Combat", dated January 1947 (t), is even
more revealing. It advocates the expansion
of Tebhaga's volunteer force and lengthily
discusses the volunteers' tasks: watching out
for police spies and warning the village
through signals about any dangers, cutting
paddy and protecting this work through
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
separate batches, etc. It is even advised that
" all people should be counted as volunteers
women, men, children, youngsters and the
old". 3 0 Yet nowhere does the author suggest
that the operation of the alarm system be
women's specific task, or that nari bahini be
set up. Thus, the evidence f r o m these
documents supports the conclusion that the
leadership of rural poor women emerged
spontaneously indeed.
NARI B A H I N I AND THE RURAL
PROLETARIAT
There was, as explained, a connection
between the increasingly spontaneous
character of the uprising and the more and
more prominent role played by women, lb
grasp the nature of Tebhaga we should see
another link: between the spontaneity of the
struggle on the one handand the fact that
amongst village women, proletarian and
semi-proletarian women came to the fore.
The nari bahini were not only organs of
women's leadership, but also of class-
leadership.
The Tebhaga uprising, like many other
peasant rebellions in history, thus marked
a spontaneous 'class transition'. Earlier, the
Women's Self-defence League, M A R S , had
done precious relief work to serve the most
deprived women in towns and villages, the
destitute famine-victims. M A R S had also
contributed to growing awareness among
rural poor women about their rights, to the
growth of political consciousness. But this
organisation had not, generally, built class
leadership: cadres of M A R S mostly hailed
from middle class or better-off peasant
families.
These female cadres often were t o j o i n t h e
agrarian campaign, yet t h r o u g h the nari
bahini a different section of women in the
countryside rose to a position of leadership.
Members of the semi-militia forces mostly
were doubly oppressed women, from schedu-
led caste H i n d u a n d t r i b a l communities. In
many areas of Bengal they cultivated the
fields, either alongside sharecropping
husbands or as agricultural labourers (rural
proletarians). A large number of tribal
members, of the nari bahini in particular
were agricultural labourers. 31
Now, to put things into sharp relief: the
transition in class leadership during Tebhaga
occurred in spite of the Communist Party,
for the party failed to advance the class
interests of the rural proletariat, though it
claimed to be 'proletarian'. For example, the
booklet "The Peasant's Battle" by Krishno
Binod Ray ignored wage issues as badly as
the particular problems of rural poor
women. W h i c h now, after forty years, has
become a point of self-criticism: " It was the
leadership's error that we did not accede any
advantage for landless labourers". 32
In spite of this, the rural proletariatmen
and womenmassively joined the campaign,
since they expected revolutionary changes:
" I n s t i n c t i v e l y the landless (labourers)
understood that the stacking of rice on the
tenants' threshing floors would favour them.
M a n y among them had lost their lands
during the famine. They hoped that the
struggle would be carried ahead, and that
they w o u l d ultimately receive land. Every-
where Tebhaga was waged you will find that
the landless were the boldest" 3 3
This then is the essence of the class tran-
sition during Tebhaga: the rural proletariat
j o i n e d the fight against the jotedars spon-
taneously. The Communist Party leadership
neither championed their cause, nor did it
by a long way equal them in dedication to
the tenants' Tebhaga demand. As the up-
rising proceeded, the party leadership stood
vacillating in the rear. Meanwhile, the rural
proletariatespecially womenorganised a
heroic defence. The nari bahini meant:
spontaneous class leadership.
SHAMEFUL OPPORTUNISM FSWOMEN'S
MARTYRDOM
In the months of March, April and May
1947, the uprising gradually crumbled under
the weight of the mopping-up operations by
the state. In some pockets, however, the
tenaciousness of the people was such that
the tide of rebellion did not subside until
much later. M e n t i o n has already been made
of northern Mymensingh where armed raids
continued being staged from the Garo-hills.
But there were other pockets of tenacious-
ness, such as the Kakdwip area in the
southern district 24 Parganas.
K a k d w i p is an exceptional area in that
here the explosion of people's anger took
shape w i t h comparatively little subjective
preparation. Unlike the n o r t h of Bengal,
K a k d w i p had seen no rehearsal, and con-
trary also to many other Tebhaga strong-
holds, village organising was started here
only in 1943, by distributing relief in the
wake of a cyclone. "We investigated about
land relations", one former male leader
recalls, "and wondered how the land system
could be changed. We began recruiting
cadres, but before Tebhaga there were no
more than 200-300 members (of the Kisan
Sabha) in the whole of K a k d w i p areal" 3 4
Yet, once struggle was started, the deter-
m i n a t i o n of the people was extraordinary.
This is best exemplified by what happened
during the movement's down-swing, for
K a k d w i p is a rare area where the peasants
stubbornly refused to return the paddy they
had captured. "They w o u l d rather let it rot
in the field than return the paddy to the
jotedars!" 3 5 This determination could not
even be swayed by opportunist top leaders
of the Kisan Sabha who came over to
K a k d w i p to make the villagers resign in
defeat and surrender their paddy. At a huge
public rally these leaders, Krishnao Binod
Ray(!) and Ambani Lahiri, simply failed to
convince the people who had gathered, "They
subsequently returned to Calcutta and
changed their resolution: those who have the
Review of Women Studies October 1986
strength can retain their paddy! They had
understood the temper of the peasants in the
Sunderbans area: here peasant don't
surrender!' 36
Lastly, let us not forget that the solidarity
and determination of the women is parti-
cularly noteworthy. They continued standing
in the forefront of the movement, even when
its collapse had become inevitable, Thus,
many members of the nari bahini were
martyred in K a k d w i p and other pockets as
late as 1948 and 1949. In the Chandanpiri
village of 24 Parganas, seven peasant women
and female labourers were murdered, when
they tried to save the stacked paddy-shares
and protested against police searches; one
of them was the renowned female leader
Oholla. 3 7 A n d in the districts of H o w r a h
and Hooghlytoo, women's troops continued
defending rebellious villages by blowing
conchshells and encircling police patrols. In
two recorded cases seven and nine women
were martyred, including t w o young girls
and a pregnant woman. 3 8 Even when left to
their own by a failing party, women's
courage never failed.
WHY WOMEN LED
Having analysed the process of the up-
rising in its different phases, it is not difficult
to sum up why rural women ultimately took
the lead. Only a few things need to be added
from living history. In the first place rural
poor womenthose belonging to families
of sharecroppers and agricultural labourers
were those most oppressed in Bengal's
agrarian society. T h e y suffered most
miserably under the feudo-patriarchal rule
of absentee landlords and jotedars. Their
double oppression explains why these
women showed unparalleled militancy.
"Women were doubly oppressed, they were
also socially oppressed by the males.
Therefore, they showed double strength in
fighting." 39
Their position as outcasts in particular,
explains why so many H i n d u widows
became local leaders and dauntless fighters.
For example, Bimala Maji, who as a young
widow-girl was recruited to do women's
organising and later emerged as overall
leader of the Tebhaga campaign in the
Nandigram area of Midnapur, Or the daring
Bhandari who led women in Ranisankai) in
resisting a police attack and in keeping a
police inspector detained, 40
Secondly, as noted before, many members
of the nari bahini used to do fieldwork.
Whether in Kakdwip, in Debiganj or else-
whererural poor women themselves were
employed as tenants and labourers and thus
directly felt economic exploitation by the
landlord class. Its involvement in field
cultivation or in harvesting and transporting
paddy from the field 41 which apparently ex-
plains why poor women in Tebhaga demon-
strated a spirit of staunch independence.
But all those women who lived secluded
WS-101
Review of Women Studies October 1986
lives (in purdah) too understood clearly that
their interests lay with the movement. They
were responsible for the cooking in the
homes, they had seen and felt the terrible
consequences of the famine holocaust. Of
course, they wanted to be rescued from the
threat of another catastrophe. Though
unlike their sisters from tribal and Hindu
communities, Muslim women did not
emerge as leaders of the movementyet
against the background of their own history,
the mass participation of Muslim women in
Tebhaga and in the nari bahini was decidedly
a breakthrough. 42
For rural poor women in general, the
Tebhaga struggle had a deep emotional
significance. "When during the Tebhaga
movement paddy was stacked at their own
threshing floor, women bowed with folded
hands in front of the paddy. Thisthe
emotional upsurge regarding riceis not
understood by the urban man. Many women
never saw unthreshed rice before in their
lives! They thought that this (the stacking
of rice) was a revolution!"
There is yet another factor that needs to
be listed, though it has been mentioned
before: that women had been partially
awakened through earlier struggles, such as
the Hat Tola campaigns of the Kisan Sabha
and the food mobilisations of MARS. These
had weakened, if not broken, the hold of
feudo-patriarchal ideology; they had spread
the message that, if united, women could
challenge landlordism and male oppression.
And the challenge undoubtedly was upto
women themselves. "The sad fate of women
in peasant homes nobody will understand,
except women themselves."
But the distinguishing factor, explaining
why women led, is that the Communist
Party with its patriarchal prejudices no
longer dominated the movement once it had
entered its most militant phase. Rural poor
women had been politicised thanks to the
party, but paradoxically they could only rise
to a position of leadership in spite of it.
Thus, the key-point for our understanding
is that the nari bahini were created and rural
poor women gave leadership because of the
spontaneous character that the struggle had
obtained.
FEATURES OF THE N A R I BAHINI
How then do we summarise the basic
features of this unique creation, the nari
bahini? Though the names of these troops
varied from region to regionJhata (Broom)
Bahini, Protirodh (Resistance) Bahini, Nari
Rakkhi (Defence) Bahini, Gayen (Pestler)
Bahini, etcthey shared common features.
First, the nari bahini had its own, clearcut
social base. It differed crucially from that
of the Kisan Sabha and of MARS. While
those were mass organisations uniting people
from all peasant classes in the villagesthe
nari bahini were the specific organs of
doubly oppressed rural poor women. Many
members hailed from scheduled caste Hindu
WS-102
and tribal communities, but Muslim women
also joined the movement.
Speaking in terms of organisational
formwe may call the nari bahini 'semi-
militia'. Just like militia in a full-fledged
people's war, they were locally based and
undertook primarily the tasks of defending
villages and agricultural fields. 44 Unlike
regular militia, however, the nari bahini was
largely untrained. They were not taught the
tactics of guerilla warfare, and they were not
consolidated as the mass-base for a (future)
people's army.
The nari bahini was armed only with local
instruments. These might be household
instruments, such as jhata (broomsticks),
boti (wooden panel with a knife attached,
to cut vegetables); or gayen (pestlers), which
are used for processing paddy at home; they
might also be traditional equipment to ward
off ordinary thiefs, such as the rid (stick)
and churi (small knife); or instruments for
hunting such as the widely used bollom
(spear). Merely holding these for their
defence, women stood up against police and
military forces armed with fire-powder.
This brings us, finally, to the feature that
was the binding theme of the movement
the outstanding courage of the 'semi-militia1.
Wherever they arose, the nari bahini excelled
in shielding villages against the brutal police
raids. They frequently arrested, repelled and
humiliated police patrols carrying fire-arms,
largely relying on courage and ingenuity.
Thus, exceptional bravery too is charac-
teristic for all those nari bahini which
temporarily functioned in Tebhaga's third
phase.
PARTYS FAILURE
We have now reached the point where we
need to draw from historical conclusions,
conclusions regarding the heroic achieve-
ments of the village participants on the one
handand the dismal failure of the leader-
ship on the otherthe distinction is that
sharp!
To take the leadership first: it really lost
a tremendous historical opportunity. Tbday
this is recognised by quite a few persons who
themselves played a prominent role in the
events of those days. From their critical com-
ments it emerges that if the (provincial)
leadership of the Communist Party would
have followed a revolutionary instead of an
opportunist policy, the fate of Bengalmight
have been other than the horrible communal
bloodshed and Partition of 1947.
At a national, all-India level, the situation
after the end of the Second World War was
squarely revolutionary. In this very post-war
period the anti-imperialist struggles of the
Indian people against British colonialism
reached their very apex. Wave upon wave of
strikes and demonstrations were held by the
industrial proletariat, students and soldiers.
Moreover, the masses stopped looking to the
parties representing the bourgeoisie and
landlords for leadership and guidance. This
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
was the time for a breakthrough! 45
But the Communist Party at this crucial
moment failed to take determined initiative,
it refused to provide the leadership which the
people expected it to. And it failed to turn
the revolutionary situation to revolutionary
advantage, for it could have held the gun:
" I f the party would have continued the
people's movement after the Second World
War there would not have been Partition!
Part of the army offered co-operation to the
party in the fight with the British, but the
party did not accept this". 46
A very concrete instance where the party
conspicuously failed to act and lead is in
connection with the naval mutiny. One
former local leader of Tebhaga severely
criticises the party for having allowed
stalwarts of the Congress (Patel/Gandhi)
and the Muslim League (Jinnah) to arbitrate
the surrender of the mutiny. "We could have
formed the Indian Liberation Army in those
days, but the party refused to take the leader-
ship. It thought that the leadership should
remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie!' 47
This lagging behind the massesbeing
backward when the people are ready to rush
aheadis what is called right opportunism.
It applies to the stand of the Communist
Party's national leadershipfrom the early
1940s up and until 1947 but applies equally
to the Bengal provincial leadership in regard
to Tebhaga. It too lagged behind, refused to
start armed struggle when the peasantry of
Bengal was ready for it. It refused to build
a military force, when rural poor women
spontaneously set up their semi-militia, and
this attitude had, as mentioned before, far-
reaching negative consequences.
For not only was an exceptional oppor-
tunity lost to achieve the liberation of the
oppressed, the damage was loaded with even
larger consequences. "Tebhaga contributed
tremendously to the sense of Bengali nation-
hood, to peace in rural areas. In the crucial
period of Tebhaga, Bengal lost its last chance
to remain united. If peasants would have
been provided with arms, partition could
have been prevented."48
CONCLUSION
Given the failure of the leadership, the
Tebhaga uprising was bound to collapse. Left
to themselves and forced to rely totally on
their own strength and insights, the people
could carry on for some time. But lack ot
co-ordination and political guidance in-
evitably spelt the deathknell and disintegra-
tion of the revolutionary agrarian
movement.
But it would be wrong to one-sidedly por-
tray Tebhaga as a 'failure'. In fact, the
peasantry in consequence of the uprising
scored concrete economic and social gains.
Thus, the jotedars from then on dared
neither claim illegal cesses nor rape village
women at their will. A n d , as happens so
often after peasant rebellions are crushed,
the State (of West Bengal) in the wake of
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
Tebhaga, felt obliged to legally concede
precisely the demand for two-thirds of the
harvest crop. 49
Politically also, people's results should not
be underestimated. Sharecroppers and
agricultural labourers, men and women,
unitedly waged class struggle against their
sworn oppressors, the absentee landlords
and the jotedars. Those failed to subvert the
movement through the vicious weapon of
communalism, for "Hindus and Muslims
protected each others' houses and joined
hand-in-hand in the struggle against the
police". 50 A l l through the uprising com-
munal harmony prevailed in areas where
Tebhaga-battles raged.
But the biggest achievement was scored
by the rural poor women of Bengal. It is
undeniable that among them "dauntless and
clever leadership was created", that many
female leaders locally emerged.51 Poor
village women not only joined, as we have
seen, in harvesting paddy and in encircling
the cutcheries of jotedars. They not only
were most militant in facing police repres-
sion. Rural poor women also gave precious
leadership to the uprising in its roughest
phase.
However, the experience was a limited one.
Women did not lead an agrarian struggle
over a very prolonged period. The Tebhaga
uprising, however large the participation in
numbers, was very short-lived, and so was
the leadership of the doubly oppressed rural
women.
Women did not appear on the stage as
'conscious history' in this sense that they
were theoretically and practically prepared
for this role. It was primarily through her
militancy and concrete struggle experience
that women realised the need for female
volunteers, for nari bahini. On the whole this
creation happened spontaneously, as we have
seen.
The basic question, then, for the agenda
of struggle is this: How can we use the past
example, of the heroic Tebhaga women to
realise women's leadership in the future?
How do we turn the spontaneous history of
the rural poor women of Bengal into a
conscious political reality?
The answer is not an easy one. Patriarchal
ideas are entrenched in the tradition and
theories of liberation movements themselves.
Because people in general do not change
their ideas easily, and because it goes against
male interests to be frank, the 'overhauling'
of revolutionary ideology undoubtedly will
not happen without a very tough struggle.
Notes
[The article is based on the author's forth-
coming book "Rural Poor Women and
Revolutionary Leadership".]
1 This example is based on the tales told by
inhabitants of Rajbari village in the -24
Parganas (interviews taken in February
1984); the quotation is from a Muslim
woman who herself participated in this
fight.
2 The battle on the Shorneshori river is
recounted by Promoth Gupta in his book
"Je Shongramer Shesh Ner ("The Struggle
Which Never Ends", Calcutta, 1971,
pp 99-100); by Moni Singh in his auto-
biography "Jibon Shongram" ("Life
Struggle", Dhaka, 1983, p 85); and by
Suprakash Ray in his book "Mukti Juddhe
Bharatiyo Krishok" ("India's Peasantry in
the Liberation War", Calcutta, 1962,
pp 198).
3 The Nari Bahini of Norail are most exten-
sively described by Badruddin Umar in his
"Chirosthayi Bondoboste Bangladesher
Krishok" ("The Peasants of Bangladesh in
Permanent Settlement", Calcutta, 1980,
pp 86-87, The quotation is from this book);
see also Moni Singh in the autobiography
mentioned under note 2, p 96.
4 According to the author Sunil Sen in
"Agrarian Relations in India (1793-1947)"
(New Delhi, 1979, p 200); yet, according to
Nikhil Chakraborti in 'Bengal Kisans Wage
Their Biggest Struggle' (People's Age,
December 29, 1946) the Bengal government
on December 17 issued a press note urging
the landlords "in their own interests to
accommodate the bargadars (share-
croppers)"; but Chakraborti also noted
increasing police terror in various localities.
5 The different phases of resistance against
this tenancy (a prolonged fight lasting from
1937 till 1950) are also recounted by Moni
Singh in the autobiography mentioned
under note 2.
6 A day-to-day description of the operations
by the Eastern Front Rifles is contained in
Promoth Gupta's book "Muktijuddhe
Adivasf ("The Tribal People in the War of
Liberation", Calcutta, 1982, pp 119); see also
the report of the Non-official Enquiry
Committee, published as an Appendix to
Gupta's book mentioned under note 2.
7 These figures are mentioned in a report
published in the Communist Party's daily
paper Swadhinota, April 6, 1947, "Muslim
Peasant and Muslim League" according to
the same article, in Dinajpur 5 lakh peasants
had j oined the movement, including one
lakh Muslims; the same report details the
countertactics of the Muslim League against
the Tebhaga campaign; for other reports on
the repression see, eg, Swadhinota, April
16, 1947, in which police terror for six
districts is described.
8 The Khanpur events are described, amongst
others, by Sunil Sen in 'Agrarian Struggle
in Bengal, 1946-47", (People's Publishing
House, New Delhi, p 63); and extensively
by Kali Sarkar in his contribution to the
book "Utter Bonger Adhiyar Bidroh O
Tebhaga Andolen" ("The Sharecroppers'
Rebellion and Tebhaga Movement of North
Bengal", Maldah, 1984, p 97). According to
Chabi Ray in "Banglar Nari Andolen
Shongrami Bhwnikar Der Sho Bochor"
(The Women's Movement of BengalOne
Hundred Fifty Years of Struggle-Policy",
Calcutta, pp 162) a second woman was
killed in the same incident, Pagli Kolkamar
Review of Women Studies October 1986
(Saotali).
9 According to the report printed in
Swadhinota, April 12, 1947; the firing is
also mentioned by Ranajit Dasgupta in
' Peasants, Workers and Freedom Struggle:
Jalpaiguri, 1945-47' (Economic and
Political Weekly, July 27, 1985, p PE 48),
10 According to Swadhinota report of
April 17, 1947.
11 See eg, Swadhinota, April 8, 1947, 'Hor-
rendous Stories of Bestial Maltreatment and
Violation of Modesty" and Swadhinota,
April 6, 1947 'In Dinajpur Women's
Honour Has No Value for the Police*.
12 According to reports in Swadhinota of
April 1, 1947 (first delegation)other
delegations, for example of students, were
also expelled from Dinajpur according to
this report; and in Swadhinota, April 5,
1947 (second delegation).
13 This admission was made by Abdullah
Rasul (author of "Krishok Sabhar Itihash"
History of the Peasant Association,
Calcutta, 1976) in a personal interview
(August 1983).
14 See for example the contribution by Bibhuti
Ghua to the book mentioned under note 8,
p 19.
15 Quoted from a personal interview with
Souren Bose who later was to become a pro-
minent member of the Naxalite party
around the late Charu Mazumdar; Bose's
recognition of Moni Singh's contribution
is noteworthy, as their political standpoint
and evaluation of Tebhaga widely differs
(interview July, 1983).
16 Quoted from a personal interview with Biray
Niyogi, former local leader from Debiganj
(November 1984); Niyogi stressed that the
operation of the warning system during
Tebhaga was a "concrete contribution of
women".
17 All quotations in this paragraph are from
the book by Suprakash Ray, "Bharoter
Krishok Bidroh O Ganatantrik Shangramf
("Peasant Rebellions and Democratic Strug-
gles of India", DNBA Brothers. Calcutta,
1970, p 320.
18 According to Hemanto Ghoshal who was
a leader of the Tebhaga struggle in the
Sunderbans area (interview, February 1984).
19 According to Niray Niyogi in the interview
mentioned under note 16.
20 According to Mesbah Kamal and Ahmed
Kamal in 'Dinajpurer Tebhaga Andolon
(1946-48)' (Tebhaga Movement of Dinajpur)
Bichitra, p 111, the issue regarding women's
role in countering the police repression
against paddy cutting was discussed during
the training-camp held in advance of the
Tebhaga campaign by the three Northern
Kisan Sabha Committees.
21 See Rani Dasgupta's article, 'Tebhaga
shongrame krishok mahilader obodan'
(The Contribution of Peasant Women to
the Tebhaga Struggle' in the memorial col-
lection "Tebhaga ShongramRojotJoyonti
Sharok Grontht ' CPI Publication, 1973).
22 The description of Norail's food movement
is from Anil Sinha, who at the time was a
local party leader (interview, July 1983).
23 Ibid.
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Review of Women Studies October 1986 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

24 Quoted from the autobiography by Moni local leader from Norail in Jessore. Also see Sooner or later it will adopt violence on a
Singh, mentioned under note 2, pp 95-96; note 22. major scale, unless there is a fundamental
see also note 3. 40 Example is mentioned by Sunil Sen in the change of policies by the British Cabinet,
25 See the documentary novel "Shrinkolito book quoted under note 8, p 51. to take cognizance of the proverbial writing
Mrittika" ("Enchained Earth1', Calcutta, 41 To show some of the variety in women's on the wail" (p 52).
1982, pp 205-207); significantly, the woman involvement in agricultural/field-activities: 46 Quoted from a personal interview with
who pleaded mentioned the beating, by in Kakdwip their tasks are said to have Promoth Gupta, author of the books men-
husbands and the raping by landlords as included both the transplanting of seeds, tioned under notes 2 and 6 (interview,
reasons for forming a women's armed force. weeding and the cutting of paddy; here even August 1983).
26 The tour is described by Manikuntola in her Muslim participate A in land cultivation 47 Opinion expressed by Anil Sinha in the per-
autobiography, "Se Diner Kotha" (Haldar, see note 34; in Nandigram women's sonal interview mentioned under note 22;
("Memoirs of Those Days", Calcutta, 1982, specific tasks were to carry the load from according to Sudhi Pradhan, historian and
pp 90-91). the field and to the threshing). formerly prominent organiser on the Com-
27 This Saga is based on the personal inter- 42 Some attention to the role of Muslim munist Party's cultural front, Ho Chi Minh
view held with Bimala Maj i (November 11, women in the Tebhaga struggle has been during a visit to Calcutta at the time,
1984); some aspects of women's role in the paid by Chabi Ray in her booklet men- privately questioned the line of the Indian
Tebhaga campaign of Nandigram also men- tioned under note 8. She stresses their parti- party and thereby refer to the Burmese
tioned in "Nandigram Thana Tebhaga cipation thus: "In Muslim homes revolu- example: "They (the Burmese party leader-
Andoloner Shonkhipto Itihash" ("Concise tionary girls were born. But those were ship) have armed the people; we haveyou
History of the Tebhaga Movement in not the homes of urban middle class are just talking" (personal communication,
Nandigram Locality", edited by Kanai Das), (families)but the homes of hundreds of November 1984).
28 Quoted from the interview with the luckless Muslim sharecroppers" (pp 145).
Swadhinota reporter Golan Quddus who 43 Swadhinotareporter Golam Quddus in 48 According to Sudhi Pradhan (personal com-
during the Tebhaga uprising travelled widely the personal interview mentioned under munication referred to under note 47 in
in Bengal (Interview, February 1984). note 28. early 1946 (before the naval mutiny) at his
29 Quoted from Krishno Binod Ray's booklet 44 A beautiful description of women's militia own initiative procured some arms, as he
"Chashir Lorai" ("The Peasant's Battle" in the Chinese revolution is given in the was in favour of waging armed struggle.
undated, but drafted and published when book "Island Militia Women" (Foreign 49 Economic gains are stressed by Krishno
the campaign was clearly well underway). Languages Press, Peking, 1975, in German: Binod Ray in the evaluation he wrote for
The point is important, because some "Die Frauen-MMz der Eintracht-insel" the memorial collection mentioned under
writers on Tebhaga maintain that the up- Rotfront Verlag, Kiel 1977). note 21; for the results of the tonka-
rising was for 'partial' demands (for 45 It is noteworthy that the famous author on struggles see the books by Moni Singh
example Sunil Sen). China, Edgar Snow, in a book published in (mentioned under note 2 and by Promoth
30 See Krishno Binod Ray's booklet 1945, "Glory and Bondage" (Victor Gupta mentioned under note 6).
"Krishoker Loraier Kaida" ("Tactics of Golancz Ltd, London) foresaw these 50 Quoted from the contribution by Com-
Peasant Combat", intended for members of possibilities: "A new leadership based on munist Party leader Bhowani Sen to the
the peasant committees only, and dated militant organisations of working class memorial collection mentioned under
January 1947). power, combined with support from the note 21.
31 According to Sunil Sen in the book men- Indian industrial bourgeoisie, and tied in 51 Quoted from Moni Singh's autobiography
tioned under note 8, p 84. closely with trends in China and with other mentioned under note 2; the creation of
32 Critical admission against by Abdullah Asiatic revolutionary movements, and not women's leadership is, amongst others, also
Rasul in the personal interview mentioned afraid to penetrate and use the Indian stressed by Chabi Ray (booklet mentioned
under note 13. Army (!), may well emerge after the war. under note 8.
33 Quoted from the interview with Golam
Quddus mentioned under note 28; it is
significant that Krishno Binod Ray in the
booklet mentioned under note 30 referred
to efforts made by the landlords to divide
sharecropping peasants and agricultural
labourers "saying the latter are not benefited
by the Tebhaga struggle".
34 Stated by Kongshali Haldar in a personal
interview (November 1985); Haldar also
contributed an article on the Kakdwip
struggle in the memorial collection men-
tioned under note 21.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 On Ohoila a song was later composed;
Haldar (interview note 34 also recalled the
extraordinary determination of women, the
fact that they "did not betray secrets in spite
of incredible tortures".
38 These incidents are described in the article
by Prabha Chatterjee, "Tebhaga Andoloner
Dingulite" f i n the Days of the Tebhaga
Movement', Eksathe* September/October
1984, pp 91); the names of these three
martyrs killed on September 9, 1948 in the
village of Haial (Howrah) were Monorarha,
Shadhubala and Joshodamoyi.
39 Quoted from the interview with Anil Sinha,

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