THE THIRD WAY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2015.

The third way (tertia via)1 a posteriori quia effect to cause demonstration of the existence
of God starts with the experience of generation and corruption of the visible beings of this world
and concludes with the affirmation of the existence of God as the Per Se Absolutely Necessary
Being: The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature
things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated and to be
corrupted, and consequently it is possible for them to be and not to be. But it is impossible for
them always to exist, for that which can not-be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything can
not-be, then at one time nothing was in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would
be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to exist only through something
already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist, and thus even now nothing would be in existence
which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something
the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by

1
Studies on the Third Way: L. CHAMBAT, La Tertia via dans Saint Thomas et Aristote, Revue Thomiste, 32
(1927), pp. 334-338 ; H. HOLSTEIN, L origine aristotlicienne de la tertia via de saint Thomas, RPhL, 48
(1950), pp. 354-370 ; D. O DONOGHUE, An Analysis of the Tertia Via of St. Thomas, The Irish Theological
Quarterly, 20 (1952), pp. 129-151 ; T. K. CONNOLLY, The Basis of the Third Proof for the Existence of God,
The Thomist, 17 (1954), pp. 281-349 ; U. DEGLINNOCENTI, La validit della terza via, Doctor
Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 41-70 ; A. PATTIN, La structure de la tertia via dans la Somme thologique de saint
Thomas dAquin, Revue de lUniversit dOttawa, 27 (1957), pp. 26-35 ; M. GONZALEZ, El problema de las
fuentes de la Tercera Via de Santo Toms de Aquino, Madrid, 1961 ; G. JALBERT, Ncessit et contingence chez
saint Thomas dAquin et chez ses prdcesseurs, Ottawa, 1961 ; T. MIYAKAWA, The Value and the Meaning of
the Tertia Via of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas, 6 (1963), pp. 239-295 ; T. PATER, The Question of the Validity
of the Tertia Via, in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 2, Washington, D.C., 1963, pp. 137-
177 ; J. BOBIK, The First Part of the Third Way, Philosophical Studies (Maynooth), 17 (1968), pp. 142-160 ; M.
DURANT, St. Thomas Third Way, Religious Studies, 4 (1968-1969), pp. 229-243 ; J. OWENS, Cause of
Necessity in Aquinas Tertia Via, Mediaeval Studies, 33 (1971), pp. 21-45 ; R. B. EDWARDS, The Validity of
Aquinas Third Way, The New Scholasticism, 45 (1971), pp. 117-126 ; C. G. PRADO, The Third Way Revisited,
The New Scholasticism, 45 (1971), pp. 495-501 ; R. B. EDWARDS, Another Visit to the Third Way, The New
Scholasticism, 47 (1973), pp. 100-104 ; M. V. LEROY, La troisime voie de saint Thomas et ses sources, in
Recherches dislamologie. Recueil darticles offerts Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs colleges et
amis, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1977, pp. 171-200 ; J. M. QUINN, The Third Way to God: A New Approach, The
Thomist, 42 (1978), pp. 50-68 ; J. M. QUINN, A Few Reflections on The Third Way: Encore, The Thomist, 42
(1978), pp. 75-91 ; J. F. X. KNASAS, Necessity in the Tertia Via, The New Scholasticism, 52 (1978), pp. 373-
394 ; J. OWENS, Quandoque and Aliquando in Aquinas Tertia Via, The New Scholasticism, 54 (1980),
pp. 447-475 ; L. DEWAN, The Distinctiveness of St. Thomas Third Way, Dialogue, 19 (1980), pp. 201-218 ; J. H.
WALGRAVE, Tertia via, in Quinque sunt viae, edited by L. Elders, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1980,
pp. 65-74 ; T. KONDOLEON, The Third Way: Encore, The Thomist, 44 (1980), pp. 325-356 ; J. F. X. KNASAS,
Making Sense of the Tertia Via, The New Scholasticism, 54 (1980), pp. 476-511 ; C. J. KELLY, The Third Way
and the Possible Eternity of the World, The New Scholasticism, 56 (1982), pp. 273-291 ; L. DEWAN, Something
Rather than Nothing and St. Thomas Third Way, Science et Esprit, 39-1 (1987), pp. 71-80 ; G. BLANDINO, The
Existence of God. The Proof From Contingent Beings to the Absolute Being, Aquinas, 38 (1995), pp. 529-552 ;
T. A. F. KELLY, Ex possibili et necessario: A Re-examination of Aquinas Third Way, The Thomist, 61 (1997),
pp. 63-84 ; M. PANGALLO, Partecipazione, contingenza e interiorit umana nella terza via di S. Tommaso,
Congresso Tomista Internazionale, Lumanesimo cristiano nel III millennio: Prospettiva si Tommaso dAquino,
Roma 22-25, Settembre 2003, 15 pp ; M. A. AUGROS, Aquinass Tertia Via, Angelicum, 83 (2006), pp. 767-792.

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another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their
existence caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore,
we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as
God.2

The tertia via demonstrations starting point regards the corporeal beings in this visible
world that are generated and corrupted in substantial changes. We experience the fact that horses,
and dogs, for example, are born and then die or corrupt. The squirrel that we saw gathering nuts
in the yard a week ago is now found to be dead. The oak tree that we knew as a child is now not
here. It has died. Now, the starting point of the third way regards the generated and corrupted
beings that we see around us having undergone substantial changes, and not contingency, even
though these generated and corrupted corporeal beings are indeed contingent3 beings. Toshiyuki
Miyakawa observes that the empirical fact on which the proof is based is the substantial
changes of bodies. When we perceive a substance come out into existence by generation, or
perish by corruption, we judge that it is possible, for generation is the transition from non-
existence to existence and corruption is the transition from existence to non-existence as a
determined substance, and therefore the substance is possible.4 Why isnt contingency the
starting point of the third way? Sofia Vanni Rovighi explains that contingency is not an
immediate data of fact in sensible reality but rather an interpretation of a fact, an inferred
conclusion and not a starting point: la contingenza non un fatto, un dato immediato, un punto
di partenza, ma linterpretazione di un fatto, un punto di arrivo; la contingenza inferita dal
fatto del nascere e del morire, del generarsi e del corrompersi. Se qualcosa muore, passa
dallessere al non essere, e quindi vuol dire che per sua natura pu non essere (se di fatto non ,
pu non essere: ab esse ad posse datur illatio).5

We should also note that the starting point of the tertia via does not begin with a
philosophical consideration of the composition of prime matter and substantial form of corporeal
bodies; rather, it begins with the observation of corporeal beings that are generated and corrupted
in substantial changes. Miyakawa observes: Corruption and generation presuppose hylomorphic
compositionbut we must not forget that here the question is about an a posteriori proof of the
existence of God. St. Thomas starts the proof with a simple and ordinary experience in the
sensible world. Therefore it is impossible that when he writes: Videmus in mundo quaedam
quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia(Summa Contra
Gentiles, I, 15), or Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non
esse(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.), he should indicate the existence of beings, which are
conceived as composed of prime matter and substantial form. The hylomorphic composition is a
conclusion of philosophical reasoning. Substantial changes or the transition of a being from
existence to non-existence (or the contrary transition) as a determined substance, on the contrary,
is an evident and common fact in the realm of our sensible experience, from which, in fact, the

2
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.
3
Cf. T. B. WRIGHT, Necessary and Contingent Being in St. Thomas, The New Scholasticism, 25 (1951), pp.
439-466.
4
T. MIYAKAWA, The Value and the Meaning of the Tertia Via of St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum, 6 (1963),
p. 259.
5
S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 2 (Metafisica), La Scuola, Brescia, 1964, pp. 107-108.

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journey in research of God must start. These notions, therefore, which are used in the tertia via,
must be taken, at least at the beginning of the argument, in their empirical meaning, so that
corruptio, corrumpi, generatio and generari should mean a change by which from one substance
there originates a new substance or new substances, or from many substances we get a new
substance together with a vanishing of the old ones, and possibile, possibile non esse and
possibile esse et non esse should mean a being which passes from non-existence to existence as a
determined substance or which passes from existence to non-existence, and accordingly is not
necessary in existence.6

In the second constitutive element of our tertia via a posteriori quia demonstration of the
existence of God, we have the application of efficient causality to our starting point: What does
not exist begins to exist only thanks to something that already exists7 ; Everything that begins to
be has an efficient cause ; Every contingent being requires an efficient cause8 or All that is
contingent has an efficient cause9; Contingent beings are efficiently caused by a necessary
being10 Maurice Holloway writes: That corruptible beings need a cause of their being is easily
seen. Corruptible beings are beings that are composed in their very essence. But a composed
essence is one containing two distinct components or principles of being, matter and form. But
components that are of themselves distinct do not come together in composition unless some
extrinsic cause unites them, unless some agent educes the form from the potency of matter, by
which eduction the composite begins to exist

If all beings were corruptible, there would be no beings in existence. Therefore, it is

impossible for all beings to be corruptible. This is easy to see from the nature of a corruptible
being. Even while such a being is existing it is possible for it not to be. Therefore, such a nature
is of itself equally indifferent to esse or to non-esse. Thus if it is to exist and to remain in
existence, it must receive this esse or existence from some cause. But we cannot go into infinity
in corruptible beings that hold their existence from another cause, for reasons already studied in
the second way. Hence we must place some being that is necessary11

Interpreting the passage from the tertia via, namely, if everything can not-be, then at one
time nothing was in existence, Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in
rebus, Se tutte le cose possono non esistere, in un dato momento nulla ci fu nella realt,
Miguel Prez de Laborda writes that this would refer to a new kind of application of the
impossibility of an infinite regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes:
Alcuni12 pensano che il suo argomento si fondi sullidea che in un tempo infinito tutte le
possibilit si realizzerebbero, poich, se c un tempo sufficiente a disposizione (e leternit
sicuramente lo ), nessuna autentica possibilit resterebbe incompiuta; e, pertanto, arriverebbe un
momento in cui coinciderebbe che nessuna delle cose contingenti esisterebbe. In realt, questa
non pu essere la tesi sostenuta sa Tommaso, perch egli non riflette sulla questione da una

6
T. MIYAKAWA, op. cit., pp. 250-251.
7
Cf. J. MARITAIN, Approaches to God, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 48.
8
Cf. T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 180.
9
Cf. L. CLAVELL and M. PREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 308-309:
10
Cf. . L. GONZLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, p. 90 ; . L. GONZLEZ, Teologa
natural, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, p. 97.
11
M. HOLLOWAY, An Introduction to Natural Theology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1959, p. 109.
12
Ad esempio, COPLESTON, Aquinas, p. 120.

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prospettiva semplicemente logica (in un tempo infinito tutte le possibilit logiche si potrebbero
sviluppare), ma reale. E da questo punto di vista reale bisogna dire che le realt contingenti non
possono realizzare ciascuna delle loro possibilit, proprio perch arriva sempre un momento in
cui cessano di esistere.13 Inoltre, tale tesi non sembra compatibile con ci che spesso san
Tommaso sostiene: la possibilit di un processo allinfinito di cause subordinate
accidentalmente, come catena infinita di generazioni umane. vero che tutti gli uomini
attualmente esistenti un giorno non vivranno pi; ma, prima di morire, molti avranno generato
altri uomini, che, a loro volta, potranno generarne altri. Perch si dovrebbe sostenere che, poich
ognuno degli uomini mortale, ci sar un momento in cui non ci saranno pi uomini?

Secondo me, san Tommaso afferma che se tutte le cose possono non esistere, in un
dato momento nulla ci fu nella realt perch convinto che le realt contingenti non possono
fondare la loro eistenza le une sulle altre: sarebbe una sorta di nuova applicazione
dellimpossibilit di un processo allinfinito. Quindi, le cose contingenti hanno bisogno di un
fondamento necessario.14

Regarding necessary beings Holloway writes: The nature of incorruptible being. This
brings us to the consideration of the nature of beings that are incorruptible, that cannot cease to
be by way of the corruption of their natures. That being is incorruptible which does not have
within its essence the power to corrupt, whose essence has no potency for non-being.15 This
would be true, for example, of any essence not composed of matter, as in the case of immaterial
substances, like the angels. Form, or formal act, says of itself, only a possibility for being, a
capacity for existence; it does not say, of itself, a possibility for non-being. Hence where we find
in existence simple forms, we have a necessary being, possessing no possibility for non-being,
and thus naturally incorruptible, immortal, sempiternal. Another case in point would be the
rational soul. Once in existence, the rational soul is naturally immortal; when man corrupts the
soul remains in existence, since the act of being (esse) comes to the soul and is shared in by the
body through the soulBut in the case of non-spiritual forms, esse comes to the composite.
Thus when such a composite corrupts, the form corrupts with it. Whereas a spiritual form, like
the rational soul, can corrupt neither of itself nor by reason of the corruption of the composite.
Not of itself, because it has in itself no potency for non-esse; nor by reason of the composite,
since esse is given immediately to it and not to the composite.

Whence comes the necessity of incorruptible beings? Beings which necessarily exist
may, or may not, have received this necessity from another. By supposition, beings that
necessarily exist may hold this necessary existence from one of three sources: either from their
essence, their act of being (esse), or from some other being. Notice that with this consideration
we have left the plane of essence and are carrying on our analysis on the plane of existence. We
are concerned now with the contingency of being, why these necessary beings are rather than are
not.
13
Cfr. LLANO, Aquinas and the Principle of Plenitude, p. 148.
14
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, La ricerca di Dio, EDUSC, Rome, 2011, pp. 121-122.
15
Strictly speaking, it is false to talk of a potency for non-being, in the sense of a passive principle within the
essence. For potency is always ordered to act, and there is no act of non-being. Primary matter is a potency for
form. Hence, when it is said that a composed essence has a potency for non-being, what is meant is that, since
primary matter is a potency for all forms, a corruptible being can lose the form it actually has, thus corrupting, or
ceasing to exist.

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 If esse comes from the form or essence, then the being exists of its very essence. Its
essence is esse. The being is pure act in the order of existence, subsistent esse, God. But if not,
then the essence is actuated by something other than itself, by an act of being (esse) that has
come from without, and not from the essence itself.

Now we must direct our attention to this act of being (esse) by which a necessary being
exists. Whence comes this act of being (esse)? Did it cause itself? But nothing can cause itself,
for that would mean it existed before it existed, which is impossible. Is this act of being (esse) its
own reason for being? But then it would be an act of subsistent esse, not the actuation of an
essence, but pure act, unreceived esse. And this, again, would be God. But if this esse is
received, that is, if it comes neither from the essence nor itself, then it must be received from
some other being. And since the necessary being is here and now existing, if follows that here
and now it is receiving that esse from another. Hence that other must be here and now causing
the existence, holding the necessary being in necessary existence.

Now we cannot go into infinity in necessary beings that receive their necessity from
another. For if we did, there would be no first necessary Being. Thus we would be faced with the
contradiction of beings that have received necessary existence from another, and yet no other
(that is, a first) from which they have received it. For there is question here of essentially ordered
effects of beings that are here and now receiving, as from their efficient cause, their necessary
existence. Hence, we must posit a first and absolutely necessary Being who holds its necessity
from no one. It is the very nature of such a Being to exist. Such a Being contains no contingency
whatsoever, neither in the order of essence nor existence, for its essence is esse. Necessary
beings which receive their necessity from another are necessary in the order of essence. For they
are incorruptible and will never lose their being since they have no potency for non-being. Yet
in the order of beingthey have received their act of being (esse as actus essendi) from
another.16

There are beings (like trees, dogs, cats, lions) that are not necessary, contingent beings
subject to generation and corruption that are both intrinsically and extrinsically possible not to
be; intrinsically, because they have within their essence a potency not to be, whose source is
prime matter; and extrinsically, because they depend upon an extrinsic agent both for their
coming into being, their generation, and for their duration in being. These are corruptible
beings.17 As regards necessary beings, Holloway explains that there are 1. those that are
intrinsically necessary but not extrinsically necessary, and 2. there is a Being that is both
intrinsically and extrinsically necessary. 1. There are those that are intrinsically necessary but are
not extrinsically necessary: intrinsically necessary, since they possess within their essence no
potency from non-being but they depend upon an extrinsic agent both for the reception of their
act of being (esse) and its conservation. And these are subsistent forms, like angelic essences and
the human soul18

2A being that is both intrinsically and extrinsically necessary; one that not only
possesses in itself no potency for non-being, but whose esse itself is unreceived, and hence is not

16
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 107.
17
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 110.
18
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

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subsistent form but subsistent Being. Such a Being is infinite and necessary in the order of
existence. God is such a Being.19

Regarding the passage from the tertia via, namely, But every necessary thing either has
its necessity caused by another, or not, Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae
necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet, Renard explains that by the expression necessary being
having a cause for its necessity, St. Thomas designates a being whose essence, because fully
actuated by a distinct act of being (esse), has no capacity, no potency, to cease to exist. Such is a
spiritual formthese beings are necessary, that is, incorruptible. Nevertheless, since the act of
being (esse) is really distinct from their essence, they are not absolutely necessary beings in the
order of existence, but their necessity depends upon the active potency of an extrinsic agent.

By an absolutely (per se) necessary being, St. Thomas understands a being which has no
cause for its necessity, because the esse is the essence; it simply is. Such a being is God.20 Si
arriva pertanto allesistenza di un primo Ente necessario per se stesso, che non pu avere
ricevuto la propria necessit, ma assolutamente necessario. Lessere necessario per se stesso
quello che non ha ricevuto lessere da o attraverso un altro, ma che si identifica con il suo stesso
essere, lessere stesso sussistente: Dio.21 Se llega por tanto a la existencia de un primer Ente
necessario por s mismo, que no puede tener la necesidad recibida, sino que es absolutamente
necesario. El ser necesario por s mismo es aquel que no tiene el ser recibido de o por otro, sino
que es su mismo ser, el ser mismo subsistente: Dios.22 La terza via mette in chiara luce la
fragilit ontologica degli esseri dellesperienza, ma anche lintimit, nel loro centro, dellazione
causale di Dio. Poich latto di essere ci che vi di pi profondo nel reale, ci per cui un
essere tutto quello che ; ora, qui che Dio penetra come sola Causa propria e principale (I, 8,
1). Poich negli esseri creati lessere leffetto pi universale che si ricollega alla Causa
universale, come cosa sua propria: Esse est proprius effectus Primi agentis (Summa Contra
Gentiles, III, 66). LEssere di Dio, immenso, ovunque allopera per produrre e conservare
lessere contingente; la minima realt segno della sua presenza.23

19
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 111.
20
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1951, pp. 38-39.
21
. L. GONZLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, p. 108.
22
. L. GONZLEZ, Teologa natural, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, p. 112.
23
M. GRISON, Teologia naturale, Paideia, Brescia, 1967, p. 74.